Moralność jako źródło (banalnego) zła. Hannah Arendt czyta Kanta
Abstract
The experience of totalitarianism made Arendt notice how problematic
the common understanding of morality is. If we identify it with the
obedience to the rules governing human relationships it can happen
that when those rules become questionable we are no longer able to
distinguish right from wrong. But totalitarian leaders not only rejected
the existing rules; they replaced them with the ones that prescribed evil
things. Arendt thinks that the real moral problem is with those
"ordinary" people who adapted to the new situation. Both the ease of
their conversion and the example of those who were able to resist it, led
her to conclude that “morality of rules” might be detrimental to the
activities that can make us refrain from doing evil.
Analyzing these activities, which are thinking and judging, Arendt often
refers to Kant’s philosophy. I want to demonstrate the fruitfulness of
this interpretation, and its importance to moral and political thought of
Arendt herself. The presentation of these topics is supposed to deepen
the reflection on the problem of "banal" evil.
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