| dc.contributor.author | Pokropski, Marek | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-22T09:33:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-02-22T09:33:10Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/24143 | |
| dc.description.abstract | n the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different
approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem
and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception
approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither
theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option
which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern
particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that
dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological
account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve
this position. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83). | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;38 | |
| dc.subject | other minds | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | concepts; theory-theory | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | direct perception | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | dispositions; phenomenology | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | theory-theory | |
| dc.subject | phenomenology | |
| dc.title | Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach? | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 58-73 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Warszawski | pl_PL |
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