Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?
Abstract
n the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different
approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem
and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception
approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither
theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option
which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern
particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that
dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological
account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve
this position.
Sponsor
Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83).Collections