Fictionalism, Understanding and the Purity Assumption in the General Theory of Norms
Streszczenie
This chapter examines whether fictionalism can sustain the purity of legal science in Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms. It considers the separation between is and ought, the fundamentality of ought, and the separation between law and morality. It argues that a fictionalist framework brings greater coherence to Kelsen’s late theory and reveals a stronger hermeneutic strand than has generally been recognised. On this reading, fictions help us understand how lawyers think without requiring a scientific explanation of their thought processes. The chapter concludes by identifying a question that remains open: how can the separation between is and ought be maintained when Kelsen’s account of norms links them to empirically understood acts of will?
URI
https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/dynamic-approach-to-hans-kelsens-general-theory-of-norms-9781509942763/http://hdl.handle.net/11089/59660
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