Imputation as a supervenience in the General Theory of Norms
Streszczenie
In Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, imputation was understood as a relative a priori category. It linked a legal condition to its legal consequence in the realm of ought, in a way analogous to Kant’s category of causality. It thus played an epistemic role in the cognition of legal norms and in securing the objectivity of legal science. In his final book, General Theory of Norms, Kelsen abandoned the neo-Kantian framework of relative a priori categories, although he retained imputation as the normative link between condition and consequence. This raises the question of whether imputation can still contribute to objectivity once it has lost its epistemic role. The chapter identifies the elements that imputation connects and examines whether their relation can be understood as supervenience: there can be no difference in A without a difference in B. It argues that imputation, understood in this way, yields an implicit rule of formal equality linked to Kelsen’s conception of the norm as an objective meaning.
Instytucja finansująca badania
This research was financed by the National Science Centre (Poland) within the framework of research project 2021/41/B/HS5/01174.URI
https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/usd/objectivity-in-jurisprudence-legal-interpretation-and-practical-reasoning-9781803922621.htmlhttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/59658
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