dc.contributor.author | Firszt, Dawid | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-23T09:08:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-05-23T09:08:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0208-6107 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4587 | |
dc.description.abstract | In my article I present David Armstrong's stance on properties, relations, particulars and states of
affairs. I introduce this categories to show, at the most general level, his metaphysical system
called factualism. My article consists of four parts, in each one I characterize following categories:
1. Properties 2. Relation 3. Particulars 4. States of affairs. I also discuss Armstrong's arguments
considering the nature of those categories and their role in his philosophy. Also, I try to emphasis
differences between Armstrong's factualism and other contemporary metaphysical positions
(Bundle theory and Trop theory). | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Philosophica;24/2011 | |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.title | Faktualizm Davida Armstronga | pl_PL |
dc.title.alternative | Factualism of David Armstrong | pl_PL |
dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | 105-120 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Instytut Filozofii Teoretycznej, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski | pl_PL |