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Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning

dc.contributor.authorThomason, Richmond H.
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-20T06:26:00Z
dc.date.available2021-08-20T06:26:00Z
dc.date.issued2021-06-30
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/38702
dc.description.abstractFor as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain amount of skepticism. Recent more sophisticated arguments question whether agents can acquire common attitudes and whether they are needed in social reasoning. I argue that this skepticism arises from assumptions about practical reasoning that, considered in themselves, are at worst implausible and at best controversial. A proper approach to the acquisition of attitudes and their deployment in decision making leaves room for common attitudes. Postulating them is no worse off than similar idealizations that are usefully made in logic and economics.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;2en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0
dc.subjectcommon knowledgeen
dc.subjectbeliefen
dc.subjectnonmonotonic logicen
dc.subjectpractical reasoningen
dc.titleCommon Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoningen
dc.typeOther
dc.page.number229-247
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Michigan, Philosophy Department, 2251 Angell Hall, 48109-1003 Ann Arbor, Michigan, USAen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
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dc.contributor.authorEmailrthomaso@umich.edu
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2021.04
dc.relation.volume50


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