Przeglądaj Bulletin of the Section of Logic 50/2 (2021) według tytułu

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    • Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning 

      Thomason, Richmond H. (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)
      For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain amount of skepticism. Recent more sophisticated arguments question whether agents can acquire common attitudes and whether ...

    • Extended MR with Nesting of Predicate Expressions as a Basic Logic for Social Phenomena 

      Parol, Aleksander; Pietrowicz, Krzysztof; Szalacha-Jarmużek, Joanna (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)
      In this article, we present the positional logic that is suitable for the formalization of reasoning about social phenomena. It is the effect of extending the Minimal Realisation (MR) logic with new expressions. These ...

    • The Good, the Bad and the Right: Formal Reductions among Deontic Concepts 

      Glavaničová, Daniela; Pascucci, Matteo (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)
      The present article provides a taxonomic analysis of bimodal logics of normative ideality and normative awfulness, two notions whose meaning is here explained in terms of the moral values pursued by a given community. ...

    • Reasoning about Social Phenomena 

      Jarmużek, Tomasz; Ju, Fengkui; Kulicki, Piotr; Liao, Beishui (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)

    • Tableau Systems for Epistemic Positional Logics 

      Klonowski, Mateusz; Krawczyk, Krzysztof Aleksander; Pięta, Bożena (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)
      The goal of the article is twofold. The first one is to provide logics based on positional semantics which will be suitable for the analysis of epistemic modalities such as ‘agent ... knows/beliefs that ...’. The second ...

    • Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures 

      Faroldi, Federico L. G. (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021-06-30)
      After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of (dis)agreement based on (exact) truthmaker semantics.