| dc.contributor.author | Ebner, Maria | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-15T12:30:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-15T12:30:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/31167 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to present various answers to the skeptical
argument and propose an alternative solution. Suggested solution
refers to the results of empirical research which lead to abandonment
of entailment thesis concerning knowledge. My answer is contextualist
inasmuch as it recognizes the existence of different concepts of
knowledge. The applicability of these concepts depends on the
situation; in a skeptical context the concept of knowledge is not
accompanied by appropriate belief, and in ordinary contexts knowledge
requires a belief of specific content. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.abstract | Celem niniejszej pracy jest przedstawienie różnych prób wyjaśnienia,
dlaczego argumenty sceptyczne mają dużą siłę przekonywania, a przy
tym ich konkluzja wydaje się niemożliwa do przyjęcia. Zaproponuję
przy tym własną diagnozę takiego stanu rzeczy, która odwołuje się do
wyników badań w ramach filozofii eksperymentalnej wskazujących na
istnienie takiego rodzaju wiedzy, która nie pociąga za sobą
odpowiedniego przekonania. | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;44 | |
| dc.subject | argument sceptyczny | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | kontekstualizm | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | teza o pociąganiu | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | zasada domknięcia | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | relewantne alternatywy | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | skeptical argument | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | contextualism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | entailment thesis | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | closure principle | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | relevant alternatives | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Wybrane odpowiedzi na argument sceptyczny | pl_PL |
| dc.title.alternative | Various answers to the skeptical argument | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.rights.holder | © Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS 2019 | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 105-116 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Warszawski | pl_PL |
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| dc.relation.volume | 1 | pl_PL |
| dc.discipline | filozofia | pl_PL |
