| dc.contributor.author | Lenart, Karol | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-15T11:49:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-01-15T11:49:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/31165 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A standard contemporary formulation essentialism defines essential
properties with a help of a concept of possible worlds. It is often argued
that in order to use possible worlds effectively, facts about transworld
identity of individuals need to be determined. In this paper I discuss
how essentialist might attempt the issue of transworld identity of
individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism
and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is,
haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a detailed analysis of
different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are
incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In
contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be
combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this
paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a
haecceitist. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Artykuł powstał dzięki hojnemu wsparciu Narodowego Centrum Nauki w ramach grantu
nr: 2017/25/N/HS1/01378. | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;44 | |
| dc.subject | istota | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | esencjalizm | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | światy możliwe | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | haecceityzm | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | antyhaecceityzm | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | indywidua | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | identyczność | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | essence | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | essentialism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | possible worlds | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | haecceiitsm | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | antihaecceitism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | individuals | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | identity | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Esencjalizm, antyhaecceityzm i haecceityzm | pl_PL |
| dc.title.alternative | Essentialism, Antihaecceitism, and Haecceitism | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.rights.holder | © Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS 2019 | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 132-151 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Jagielloński | pl_PL |
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| dc.relation.volume | 1 | pl_PL |
| dc.discipline | filozofia | pl_PL |
