Pokaż uproszczony rekord

dc.contributor.authorRehman, Sharaf
dc.contributor.authorDzionek‑Kozłowska, Joanna
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-15T10:40:35Z
dc.date.available2019-01-15T10:40:35Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn1899-2226
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/26444
dc.description.abstractRecent studies by cognitive scientists demonstrate that people’s choices are more complex than the image provided by rational choice theory, and consistency of choice is not a characteristic to be expected in real-life situations. This exploratory paper attempts to isolate three variables in relation to decision making. Working with a sample (N=70) of university students in the U.S, and using the three variants of the Trolley Problem, the subjects’ responses are used to identify the similarities and differences based on the three dimensions. The participants were asked to respond to three hypothetical situations regarding a runaway trolley. Their decision in the first scenario could save a person’s life or let him be run over by the trolley. In the second scenario, their decision could either let one person die and save five lives or save one life and let five people be killed. These two scenarios require pulling a lever to switch the trolley from one track to another. The third scenario requires pushing an obese person in front of the runaway trolley to stop it from killing five persons. The paper presents the findings on the three variables: gender, age, and relational status.en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegoen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAnnales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym;3
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.en_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0en_GB
dc.subjectdecision makingen_GB
dc.subjectTrolley Problemen_GB
dc.subjectinconsistency of choicesen_GB
dc.titleThe Trolley Problem Revisited. An Exploratory Studyen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.page.number[23]-32
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Department of Communication
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Department of the History of Economic Thought and Economic History
dc.identifier.eissn2353-4896
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dc.contributor.authorEmailsharaf.rehman@utrgv.edu
dc.contributor.authorEmailjoanna.dzionek@uni.lodz.pl
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/1899-2226.21.3.02
dc.relation.volume21en_GB
dc.subject.jelD91
dc.subject.jelZ13


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