dc.contributor.author | Chrzanowska, Klementyna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-10T10:56:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-10T10:56:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/25538 | |
dc.description.abstract | Through a close reading of a small section of Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modern Identity, this paper aims to highlight what is, in
the author’s view, a particularly significant aspect of Charles Taylor’s
conception of the constitution of selfhood. Namely, its entanglement in
speech. “We don’t have selves in the way we have hearts and livers”,
Taylor argues. We ‘have selves’ through the constant effort of
articulation, which we are only capable of because we learned it from
and with others in what Taylor calls the original situation of
conversation. If the human ability to speak is the underlying feature
behind self-interpretation, morality, and community – all important
components of identity in Taylor’s view – then the very way we ‘have
language’ will strongly impact the way we ‘have selves’. Language
theory must thus become an important element of considerations on
human identity and selfhood. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;39 | |
dc.subject | Charles Taylor | pl_PL |
dc.subject | identity | pl_PL |
dc.subject | selfhood | pl_PL |
dc.subject | speech | pl_PL |
dc.subject | language | pl_PL |
dc.subject | language theory | pl_PL |
dc.subject | human agency | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Cavell | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Wittgenstein | pl_PL |
dc.subject | tożsamość | pl_PL |
dc.subject | podmiot | pl_PL |
dc.subject | mowa | pl_PL |
dc.subject | język | pl_PL |
dc.subject | teoria języka | pl_PL |
dc.title | Who Am I? Taylor's Selfhood and the Transcendental Condition of Conversation | pl_PL |
dc.title.alternative | Who Am I? Taylor's Selfhood and the Transcendental Condition of Conversation | pl_PL |
dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | 1-18 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Jagielloński | pl_PL |
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dc.relation.volume | 4 | pl |