| dc.contributor.author | Bielecka, Krystyna | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-22T10:09:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-02-22T10:09:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/24146 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The concept of narrow content is still under discussion in the debate
over mental representation. In the paper, one-factor dimensional
accounts of representation are analyzed, particularly the case of Fodor's
methodological solipsism. In methodological solipsism, semantic
properties of content are arguably eliminated in favor of syntactic ones.
If “narrow content” means content properties independent of external
factors to a system (as in Segal's view), the concept of content becomes
elusive. Moreover, important conceptual problems with one-factor
dimensional account are pointed out as a result of analysis arguments
presented by J. Searle, S. Harnad and T. Burge. Furthermore, these
problems are illustrated with psychological and ethological examples.
Although understanding content as partially independent from
contextual factors allows theorists to preserve content properties, it
seems that understanding content in total abstraction from external
factors of these properties is implausible. As a result, internalism is
rejected in favor of externalism. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83). | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;38 | |
| dc.subject | internalism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | externalism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | one-factor dimensional account of representation | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | mental representation | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Fodor | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | methodological solipsism | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 123-146 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Warszawski | pl_PL |
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