Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Modals in the Framework of Dynamic Semantics
Streszczenie
In dynamic semantics meaning of a statement is not equated with its truth
conditions but with its context change potential. It has also been claimed
that dynamic framework can automatically account for certain paradoxes
that involve epistemic modals, such as the following one: it seems odd and
incoherent to claim: (1) “It is raining and it might not rain”, whereas
claiming (2) “It might not rain and it is raining” does not seem equally odd
(Yalcin, 2007). Nevertheless, it seems that it cannot capture the fact that
statement (2) seems odd as well, even though not as odd as the statement
(1) (Gauker, 2007). I will argue that certain probabilistic extensions to the
dynamic model can account for this subtlety of our linguistic intuitions and
represent if not an improved than at least an alternative framework for
capturing the way contexts are updated and beliefs revised with uncertain
information.
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