| dc.contributor.author | Kaluziński, Bartosz | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-11T13:30:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-11T13:30:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20337 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to investigate if ideas developed by
philosophers representing the current called Virtue Epistemology are
able to resolve the Gettier problem. First of all, I am going to remind
what classical concept of knowledge as justified true belief consists in,
then I present co-called Gettier cases that are counterexamples to the
classical idea of knowledge. Then I investigate how the idea of
evaluating beliefs formulated by Ernest Sosa is able to deal with hard
cases made by Gettier, but also Chisholm and Goldman. I argue that
Sosa’s conception could be viewed as satisfactory analysis of
knowledge, if we slightly modify it to accommodate Goldman’s case. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Numer został przygotowany przy wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego. | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;30 | |
| dc.subject | Virtue Epistemology | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Gettier cases | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | knowledge | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | justified true belief | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Ernest Sosa | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Linda Zagzebski | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Czy „Epistemologia Cnót” pozwoli nam rozwiązać problem Gettiera? | pl_PL |
| dc.title.alternative | Can virtue epistemology solve the Gettier problem? | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.rights.holder | © Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS 2015 | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 158-174 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Chisholm, Roderick, 1966, Theory of Knowledge, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Gettier, Edmund, 1963, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, “Analysis”, 23, ss. 121–123. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Goldman, Alvin, 1967, A Causal Theory of Knowing, “Journal of Philosophy, 64, ss. 355–72. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Goldman, Alvin, 1976, Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 73, ss. 771–791. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Greco, John and Turri, John, Virtue Epistemology, “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”, Edward N. Zalta (red.). | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Kartezjusz, 2005, Medytacje o filozofii pierwszej, Kraków: Zielona Sowa. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Platon, 2005, Teajtet, [w:] idem, Dialogi, t. 2, przeł. Władysław Witwicki, Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Quine, Willard van Orman, 1986, Epistemologia znaturalizowana, [w:] idem, Granice wiedzy i inne eseje filozoficzne, przeł. B. Stanosz, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, ss. 106–125. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Russell, Bertrand, 1905, On Denoting, “Mind”, 14, ss. 479–493. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Russell, Bertrand, 1910–1911, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”, Vol. XI, ss. 108–128. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Sosa, Ernest, 2007, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford University Press. www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/epistemol ogy-virtue/. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Zagzebski, Linda, 1994, The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, “The Philosophical Quarterly”, 44, ss. 65–73. | pl_PL |
