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dc.contributor.authorSzczygielski, Wojciech
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-06T09:38:28Z
dc.date.available2016-10-06T09:38:28Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn1644-857X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/19825
dc.description.abstractThe beginnings of the debates of the Great Seym (October 1788-January 1789) were dominated by strong criticism of the Permanent Council (government dependent on Russia). This criticism focused besides political aspects on the problems of the State's political system: the latter in the near future were to influence the constitution which was to be prepared by the Great Seym. The Permenent Council's centralising powers and its composition came under severe criticism. This criticism was due to both the gentry's traditional prejudices against strong government as well as modern reformist concepts of radical republican solutions (the supervisory character of the government like the Council or the Guardians, permanent Seym i.e. combining legislative and executive powers). The Permenent Council's right to interpret laws passed by the Seym and to suspend civil servants received the most strident criticism. The criticism of these aspects was so sharp and extensive that even the most ardent supporters of the Permanent Council did not dare to defend these prerogatives. Consequently, it was impossible for the future government, which was to be formed by the constitution, to receive these prerogatives. Other critical remarks concerned sovereign powers of the Permanent Council in relation to all the administration and its government prerogatives in the strict meaning of this word. The opponents of the Permanent Council promoted the concept of collegiate administration departments in the form of autonomous Commissions which were subordinated only to the Seym. The government such as the Council or the Guardians was supposed to be a supervising body not a decision-making one. In this way centralization of the government's powers was opposed (contrary to the king's concept). However, in practice during the Seym's further debates it turned out that it was possible to reach a compromise as far as these matters were concerned. After the abolition of the Permenent Council (19 January 1789) when the strong initial political emotions subsided and the Commonwealth regained full independence, the time was ripe for deeper political reflection and more rational reformist decisions. The compromise between the king and the gentry parliamentary formation consisted in centralization of the government's power on the one hand and a high degree of autonomy of collegiate administration departments (Commissions) on the other hand. This compromise was possible thanks to; the strengthening of the king's political role in 1790, the sense of reformist security of the gentry (due to the functioning of the permanent Seym), the fact that parliamentarians noticed the weakness of the permanent Seym as the executive power and the appreciation of centralizing powers of the Permanent Council by the gentry supporting the king before the Great Seym. Lastly, the composition of the Permanent Council, reflecting the structure of the Seym, was strongly criticized, The structure of the Permanent Council consisting of 3 segments: the king representatives of the senate and representatives of the gentry was considered to be wrong as it posed threat to the sovereignty of the Seym. It was suggested that ideally the government such as the Guardians should be made up of two segments: the king, and representatives of the senate (also ministers) excluding representatives of the gentry. And although there were many supporters of including representatives of the gentry in the government, this concept failed to be introduced to the constitution. It happened mainly because of the king, who promoted the idea of a government consisting only of ministers, Consequently, it may be said that the criticism of the composition of the Permanent Council at the beginning of the Great Seym made it easier to include a provision concerning the make-up of the government in the constitution just as the king wanted. According to the Third of May Constitution it was ministers that the Guardians of Law consisted of.pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPrzegląd Nauk Historycznych;2
dc.titleKrytyka parlamentarna Rady Nieustającej w początkach obrad Sejmu Wielkiego a problem konstytucyjnej reformy władz wykonawczych państwapl_PL
dc.title.alternativeParliamentary Criticism of the Permanent Council at the Beginning of the Debates of the Great Seym and the Problem of Constitutional Reform of the State’s Executive Powerspl_PL
dc.title.alternativeLa critique du Conseuil Permanent au debut de Grand Diète et le problem de la reforme constitutionelle de pouvoir exécutifpl_PL
dc.title.alternativeParlamentarische Kritik des Ständigen Rates am Anfang des Großen Sejms angesichts der Frage von der polnischen Verfassungsreform 1788–1792pl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.rights.holder© Copyright by Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2003pl_PL
dc.page.number[67]-110pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniwersytet Łódzki.pl_PL
dc.relation.volume2pl_PL


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