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Własność menedżerska w polskich spółkach publicznych

dc.contributor.authorBohdanowicz, Leszek
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-03T11:29:16Z
dc.date.available2022-10-03T11:29:16Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationBohdanowicz L., Własność menedżerska w polskich spółkach publicznych, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, https://doi.org/10.18778/7969-993-3pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn978-83-7969-993-3
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/43496
dc.descriptionWzrost zainteresowania wpływem własności menedżerskiej na funkcjonowanie spółek łączy się z dynamicznym rozwojem rynków kapitałowych i ekspansją kapitału prywatnego. W tych warunkach inwestorzy indywidualni poszukują korzystnych możliwości inwestowania wolnych środków. Równocześnie tworzona jest cała infrastruktura wokół rynków kapitałowych, która ułatwia inwestowanie. W rezultacie spółki mają większe możliwości pozyskania kapitału niezbędnego do ich rozwoju, jednak muszą dbać o satysfakcję inwestorów, która objawia się jak najwyższymi stopami zwrotu z zainwestowanego przez nich kapitału, ale przy akceptowalnym ryzyku. Ponadto w warunkach bogacenia się społeczeństw wzrosła też siła inwestorów instytucjonalnych, którzy zaczęli stawiać menedżerom coraz większe wymagania. Zmusza to menedżerów najwyższego szczebla do odpowiedzialnego sprawowania funkcji zarządczych, przejrzystego działania i wdrażania dobrych praktyk ładu korporacyjnego. Przedstawione w publikacji badania dotyczą najistotniejszych problemów wynikających z pojawienia się własności menedżerskiej w spółkach oraz z wpływu tego rodzaju własności korporacyjnej na różne aspekty funkcjonowania spółek i ich organów statutowych.pl_PL
dc.description.sponsorshipUdostępnienie publikacji Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego finansowane w ramach projektu „Doskonałość naukowa kluczem do doskonałości kształcenia”. Projekt realizowany jest ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Wiedza Edukacja Rozwój; nr umowy: POWER.03.05.00-00-Z092/17-00.pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZarządzanie;
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Międzynarodowe*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectstrategie spółekpl_PL
dc.subjectRada nadzorczapl_PL
dc.subjectwłasność menedżerskapl_PL
dc.subjectCorporate governancepl_PL
dc.subjectSpółkapl_PL
dc.subjectład korporacyjnypl_PL
dc.titleWłasność menedżerska w polskich spółkach publicznychpl_PL
dc.title.alternativeManagerial Ownership in Polish Listed Companiespl_PL
dc.typeBookpl_PL
dc.rights.holder© Copyright by Author, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016pl_PL
dc.page.number304pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Zarządzania, Katedra Finansów i Strategii Przedsiębiorstwa, 90-237 Łódź, ul. Jana Matejki 22/26pl_PL
dc.identifier.eisbn978-83-7969-994-0
dc.contributor.authorBiographicalnoteLeszek Bohdanowicz ukończył studia magisterskie ma Wydziale Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego w roku 2000. Od 1 października 2000 r. jest zatrudniony w Katedrze Finansów i Strategii Przedsiębiorstwa (dawniej Katedra Zarządzania Przedsiębiorstwem). Początkowo na stanowisku asystenta, a od 2007 r., po obronie rozprawy doktorskiej, na stanowisku adiunkta. Zainteresowania naukowe Leszka Bohdanowicza koncentrują się wokół ładu korporacyjnego, a w szczególności struktur własnościowych spółek publicznych oraz funkcjonowania ich rad nadzorczych i zarządów. Był kierownikiem bądź wykonawcą kilku projektów badawczych finansowanych ze środków centralnych, w tym kierownikiem projektu na temat „Wpływu struktur własnościowych na kapitał intelektualny polskich spółek” finansowanego ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki. Jest autorem bądź współautorem ponad 70 publikacji, w tym artykułów naukowych opublikowanych w polskich i zagranicznych czasopismach, takich jak: „Organizacja i Kierowanie”, „Przegląd Organizacji”, „Master of Business Administration”, „Journal of Positive Management”, „Management of Organizations: Systematic Research” czy „Przegląd Corporate Governance”. Jest również autorem lub współautorem ponad 30 referatów na międzynarodowe i ogólnopolskie konferencje naukowe, a także recenzentem artykułów w polskich i zagranicznych czasopismach naukowych. Leszek Bohdanowicz jest wykładowcą zarządzania strategicznego, ładu korporacyjnego oraz relacji inwestorskich na Uniwersytecie Łódzkim. Prowadził również wykłady na temat problemów „corporate governance” na zagranicznych uczelniach. Pod jego kierunkiem powstało ponad 60 prac magisterskich oraz licencjackich, a także prac dyplomowych w ramach studiów podyplomowych. Ponadto, Leszek Bohdanowicz pięciokrotnie otrzymywał indywidualne lub zespołowe nagrody Rektora Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Został również odznaczony Medalem Brązowym za Długoletnią Służbę przyznanym postanowieniem Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.pl_PL
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dc.identifier.doi10.18778/7969-993-3
dc.disciplinenauki o zarządzaniu i jakościpl_PL


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