Związki filozofii i teorii prawa. Zagadnienia metodologiczne

Abstract

The paper is a developmen of J. Wroblewski's analyses. The author presents the basic problems, arguing with the critical remarks of J. Woleński. Hedefends the thesis of the need to distinguish two spheres when examining the relationship between philosophy and theory of law: the relationship of reference and relationship of ascription. He points that the aim of the analysisis not giving a method of logical criterion of identification of philosophical and theoretical theses, but examination of relationship between the theses. An answer is sought to the question what kind of relationship can appear, and whether the dependence of theory on the accepted philosophical assumptions can be graded. According to the author's opinion, the degree of dependence can be assessed due to the systemic or a systemic character of philosoph and theory, and the type of logic or quasi-logic rules of ascription of philosophical thesis to theory , in the case of theories expressing a philosophical attitude, the ro les of ascription may be the technique of „new rhetoric" of Ch. Perelman, allowing to keep ait least a loose connection with philosophy. To reconstruct the philosophical assumptions of a philosophical theories the rules of logic are necessary. To define the series of philosophical theses and the rules of ascription, the author makes use of the idea of presupposition , defined for the sake of legal discourse by J Wróblewski.