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GENERAL SESSION

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What is the object of semantics?

As a moment's thought will reveal, this question is ambiguous, for the word "object" may mean either aim, here a discipline, or the entities comprising the domain of the discipline. In this paper, I shall try to answer this question in both of these senses of the word "object". I shall begin by addressing the question in the first sense, since its answer bears on the answer I shall give to the question in the second sense.

A central aim in the study of language is to explain how a speaker's understanding of a complex expression in his or her language arises on the basis of his or her understanding of the expression's immediate subexpressions. The observation on which the aim is based was brought to the general attention of modern philosophers and linguists by Donald Davidson and by Noam Chomsky. And though the observation is often said to have been first made by Gottlob Frege, in fact it is found both in the work of Medieval European philosophers and in the work of ancient Indian grammarians and philosophers. However, it was only with the advent of the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski that this aim could be pursued in a rigorous way. The key idea is that one might do for the expressions of natural language what elementary parts of model theory do for strings of symbols in a notation, an idea first mooted by Alfred Tarski in his pioneering work on model theory (Tarski 1935, 164) and mentioned subsequently by other prominent logicians such as Paul Rosenbloom (1950, 153) and Alonzo Church (1956, 3) - all of whom thought the undertaking infeasible, since they thought that the grammatical expressions of natural language do not form a well-defined set. However, in the early 1970s a number of people undertook to carry out at least part of such a project. They included Richard Montague, a student of Tarski's, Renate Bartsch and Theo Vennemann (1972), David Lewis (1972) and Max Cresswell (1973). While I believe that the pursuit of this aim has proved most illuminating in semantics, its fruits have been spoiled in much work by two failures, the failure to look at data widely enough to extract reliable empirical generalizations, on the one hand, and the failure to formalize properly the generalizations extracted. These twin failures are especially egregious in work which falls partially or entirely under the rubrics of subcategorization, selection restriction,

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argument structure, event structure, X-bar theory and type-driven semantics. I shall show how better attention to the facts and better care with respect to formalization not only broadens the empirical scope of the grammar, but simplifies its formalization. Next, drawing a general lesson from the foregoing, I shall conjecture an answer to the second question: what are the entities in the domain of semantics? I shall try to shore up my conjectured answer with an illustration from the syntax and semantics of natural language numerals.

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What is language for? The complexity arguments

In their 2016 book *Why Only Us?*, Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky argue that language is primarily an instrument of thought, and only secondarily an instrument of communication. Language evolved as an instrument of thought, and we can learn that from facts about computational complexity: "There is, then, a conflict between computational efficiency and interpretive-communicative efficiency. Universally, languages resolve the conflict in favor of computational efficiency. These facts at once suggest that language evolved as an instrument of internal thought, with externalization a secondary process." (Berwick and Chomsky 2016, p 74).

The main idea is that certain syntactic movements, or internal merge operations, have a low computational complexity but increase the complexity of the interpretation task for the hearer.

Two questions immediately arise:

1. Is the inference from complexity considerations premises to conclusions about purpose, in the sense of evolutionary selection criteria, justified?

2. Do facts about the computational complexity of language processing support the idea that articulation is privileged over interpretation?

I shall briefly discuss the first question and spend more time on the second. I shall examine the reasoning that supports the articulation privilege, and I shall present facts that speak in the opposite direction, supporting interpretation.

Those facts concern the complexity of interpretation, in the sense of computing the meaning of a disambiguated expression. We can computationally model the interpretation process as a Term Rewriting system which reflects the clauses in a formal semantics, for instance a truth definition. In such a system, rewrite rules, which are substitution rules, step by step take us from a representation of the object language

meaning to a direct representation of the content in the meta-language. The complexity measure is the number of rule applications in a derivation that leads to full interpretation, that is, to a right-hand side that no longer contains OL terms or computation-symbols. We get a complexity assessment by relating the length of the derivation to the size of the input/size of the output.

Examination of such systems shows that compositionality is a necessary condition both of minimal interpretational complexity, and of tractable interpretational complexity. If we allow recursive but non-compositional semantics, we also allow non-tractable complexity. We thus have an a priori reason to believe that natural language semantics is (general) compositional, and this is borne out by actual theories (as far as I know).

Thus, interpretation after disambiguation is, in a sense, easy, and this also helps with disambiguation. Semantics then seems designed to make communication less complex for the hearer. In fact, finding an appropriate expression of a thought is in one respect more complex, because of the linguistic articulation choices between (near-)equivalent alternatives that need to be made.

The question of the evolutionary purpose of language is therefore more complex. Facts do not unambiguously point in the direction privileging thinking. Some of them actually point in the opposite direction.

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Literary interpretation: explanation, chance and usefulness

Intentional interpretation has been severely questioned in scholarly circles during the last fifty years or more. It is in general taken to be a possible, but misguided or irrelevant, course of interpretative practice. I claim that the search for authorial intentions is a valuable part of literary scholarship, but that the author's intention can't be a criterion of interpretative validity. There are two main reasons for this: the author may have failed to realize his intentions; and a work of art may be created by chance, and consequently without any authorial intention. Leaving these objections aside, we may ask why intentional readings are and have been so popular among non-professional readers, and also, in particular before New Criticism, among scholars. I suggest the answer is: because they explain, in the scientific sense of the word, why the work is as it is, and why the reader reads as he/she does. This puts the notion of explanation in focus and gives support to the idea that interpreters of different kinds try to understand the literary work in an explanative perspective. If this is true of all kinds of interpretations, also interpretations produced by scholars who explicitly repudiate such an idea, the explanative character must be found in the interpretation itself, not in the claims formulated by the interpreter. I suggest three such features: 1) almost all interpreters try to avoid blatant anachronisms, and 2) they prefer strong interpretations that cover much of the material, that is the interpreted work, and, finally, 3) they prefer simple interpretations. The two latter properties, strength and simplicity, are central in scientific theorizing and scientific explanation. I will illustrate how they show themselves in some extremely sketchy alternative *Hamlet* interpretations. This idea, if true, constitutes an answer to the first objection of intentionalism – the failed intention – but not to second – artworks produced by chance. Still worse, as demonstrated by some Dadaist examples, this second objection disqualifies all explanative claims. Should we ignore the lessons from these modernistic and post-modernistic works and programmes because they represent such a small part of the totality of artworks? I think not – I will give an example of the explicit intentions made by a more representative literary writer which point to a compromise. Interpretations in general contain both explanative perspectives and a more pragmatic aspect: the interpretation that is fit to use is chosen.

Key words: literary interpretation, intentional interpretation, explanative interpretation, chance and interpretation

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Can one refer to and quantify over intentional objects of hallucination?

A.D. Smith (2002) has claimed that we can refer to nonexistent objects of our hallucinations, which are intentional objects that are ordinary objects, just as the existent objects of our genuine perceptions, even though, unlike the latter, they do not belong to the overall ontological domain of entities. Both Tim Crane (2001, 2013) and Mark Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012) have generalized this claim to all nonexistent objects of our thoughts. According to them, we can truly quantify over such objects, even though they fail to be entities but are merely grammatical items or at most schematic objects, i.e., objects that have no metaphysical nature insofar as they are thought-of; thus, such a true quantification is not a mark of ontological commitment. In this talk, I will however try to show that we cannot have our cake and eat it too: if we refer to and truly quantify over nonexistent intentional ordinary objects of hallucination and of thoughts in general, this is because they are fully-fledged entities just as intentional objects of perception and of other factive mental states. Indeed, the only reading of an existential quantification of the kind "There are intentional objects that do not exist" that saves its genuine truth is the reading that commits one to nonexistent entities. To be sure, Crane finally attempts to justify the claim that both singular and existential sentences about nonexistent intentional ordinary objects can be true and yet noncommittal, by grounding them in truthmakers involving only genuine existing entities. Yet such an attempt does not work. For it fails to provide sufficient truthmakers. Moreover, Sainsbury's (2017) recent attempt at defending the merely grammatical character of the objects that such sentences involve does not work either. He tries to show that these sentences are just particular cases of intentional sentential constructions that have complements that seem not to refer to objects of any sort. Yet in order for the latter sentences to be genuinely true, they must either involve intentional objects that are genuine entities or be paraphrased into sentences that involve such entities. As a result, sentences that seem to involve intentional objects that turn out to be non-entities can merely be phenomenally true, that is, true within the scope of our phenomenology. In this respect, they work like sentences that are interpreted within a fictional context: such sentences do not commit us to the items they make-believedly involve insofar as they are merely fictionally true, that is, true within the unreal world of that fictional context. This result may please Smith, since

his original claim that we can refer to nonexistent objects of our hallucination is for him a phenomenological, not an ontologically loaded, claim that he appeals to in order to account for the force of the so-called Phenomenal Principle: if it sensibly appears to someone to be something that possesses a certain sensible property, then there is something of which that someone is aware that possesses that property.

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Analogy, similarity, and the *Periodic Table of Arguments*

Arguments based on the concept of analogy (or adjacent concepts such as comparison, equality, metaphor, and similarity) have long been deemed fallacious because they cannot be conceived in terms of deductive reasoning processes. In recent decades, scholars in the field of argumentation theory have included them in their accounts of 'argument schemes', a notion that also allows for arguments based on defeasible reasoning. Unfortunately, the various accounts are premised on different ideas about the constituents of arguments and employ different rationales for classifying the types of arguments. As a result, there is little agreement as to the linguistic characteristics of arguments based on analogy and the way in which they relate to other types of arguments.

The aim of this paper is to indicate the systematic place of arguments based on the concept of analogy within the theoretical framework of the *Periodic Table of Arguments*, a new standard for describing and classifying arguments that integrates traditional dialectical accounts of arguments and fallacies and rhetorical accounts of the means of persuasion (*logos*, *ethos*, *pathos*) into a comprehensive framework.

First, the theoretical framework of the table will be expounded. Then, several concrete examples of arguments based on analogy, comparison, equality, metaphor, and similarity will be analyzed in terms of the framework. Finally, it will be indicated where they can be placed in the *Periodic Table of Arguments*, which subtypes can be distinguished, and how they relate to other types of arguments that are listed within this new standard of argument description and classification.

Key words: argument classification, analogy, comparison, equality, metaphor, *Periodic Table of Arguments*, similarity

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Accommodation in linguistic interaction

Accommodation is a mechanism whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted or repaired in order to maintain the presumption that the utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move. In other words, if the appropriateness of a speech act made in uttering a certain sentence requires that the context has a certain property, and if this requirement is not satisfied just before the time of this utterance, then *normally* – i.e., if certain conditions are met and no one objects – the context is changed so as to have the required property. The idea of accommodation plays a central role in philosophical accounts of such conversational phenomena as informative presuppositions (Lewis 1979; Stalnaker 1998, 2002; von Fintel 2008), conversational implicatures (Thomason 1990), anaphora resolution (van der Sandt 1992), explicit performatives (Lewis 1979), conversational exercitives (McGowan 2004), negotiated illocutionary forces (Sbisà 2009, 2014), and "back-door" authority-establishing acts (Langton 2015; Witek 2013, 2015). One can doubt, however, whether all these phenomena can be accounted for along the same lines. It is true that they all can be adequately described as involving a kind of context-redressive process driven by the need to meet certain expectations of appropriateness. When it comes to details, however, it turns out that different forms of accommodation should be accounted for by reference to different mechanisms, presumptions, and principles.

My aim in this talk is to develop a comprehensive framework within which one can account for the variety of forms that accommodation takes in linguistic interaction. Considering different instances of accommodation, I focus on the following four questions. First, how to represent the context that is affected by the accommodating mechanism under scrutiny? In particular, should we think of it as the *common ground* understood as a system of propositional attitudes mutually shared by the interacting agents or, rather, as the *conversational score* construed as a rule-governed structure whose elements track the evolving state of the conversation and register public commitments of its participants? Second, what is the nature of the considered mechanism? Should we describe it as a *cooperative interaction* involving the speaker's expression and the hearer's recognition and adoption of the speaker's goals or, rather, as

an *objective mechanism* that functions against the background of shared linguistic rules and, at least in some cases, affects the conversational score *independently of* what the speaker and the hearer believe? Third, what kind of appropriateness drives the accommodating mechanism under scrutiny? Should we describe it in terms of *general expectations of cooperativeness* or, rather, by reference to *specific requirements* defined by linguistic rules and norms? Fourth, does the redressive process that lies at the heart of the accommodating mechanism under scrutiny consist in adjusting, repairing or dramatically rebuilding the context? Our answers to these questions will vary from case to case, depending on the type of accommodating mechanisms involved in particular cases. My conclusion is that the alternative perspectives suggested by the above questions are not conflicting but complementary: we need them all to account for the varieties of accommodating mechanisms encountered in linguistic interaction.

SPECIAL SESSION
The Philosophy of Argumentation

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Proximization in public policy: from anti-terrorism to health discourse

Proximization is a concept that marks the discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and/or states of affairs as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee. By projecting the remote entities as gradually encroaching upon the speaker-addressee territory, the speaker seeks legitimization of actions and policies proposed to neutralize the growing impact of the negative, 'alien', 'antagonistic', entities. There are three strategies of proximization, which include the construal of spatial impact (spatial proximization), ideological impact (axiological proximization), as well as imminence of the impact sanctioning prompt response from the 'self' parties (temporal proximization).

The explanatory power of proximization and Proximization Theory (Cap 2013) has been thoroughly explored within the territory of state political discourse, especially the discourse of the war-on-terror. The present paper postulates extending the application of the proximization model to account for other domains of public communication involving, similar to the cradle domain, dichotomous representations of the home 'self' and the remote 'other'. The empirical aim of the paper is to demonstrate that fear-inducing proximization strategies are present in health discourse and particularly in the discourse of disease prevention and health promotion. Construing disease as an 'aggressive enemy' which 'invades' the 'self' entity (the body of the patient), the speaker (medical practitioners, healthcare institutions) generates a strong fear appeal which helps legitimization of a preferred course of treatment. It is shown that threat construction in health discourse relies mostly on spatial and temporal proximization, which depict the threat as apparently remote yet quite concrete and tangible and, above all, rapidly developing to eventually deliver a 'strike'. The discussion is illustrated with data from cancer prevention campaigns, detailing specific lexico-grammatical constructs (deictic markers of momentousness, imminence, impact speed) responsible for the spatio-temporal construals.

Key words: proximization, health discourse, public policy, legitimization, cancer prevention

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Norms in deliberation

The aim of this contribution is to address a topic in the domain of the philosophy of argumentation. It concerns the status of the normative principles that, according to the discourse theory of practical argumentation, underlie deliberative dialogues. In particular, within the framework of procedural theories of justice it has been contended that a deliberative discourse presupposes conditions of equality, symmetry, and inclusiveness for all participants. These tenets have raised a number of objections. For some scholars, the strong idealizations that these principles introduce are neither necessary for the ends of deliberation nor empirically viable in many institutional and social contexts. A more radical objection concerns moral deliberation and the principle of universalization, as additional to the usual rules of argumentation – provided that there are any.

To that objection, the defendants of the discourse theory might reply that the contested principles should be seen as *regulative*. This would entail not only that they heuristically guide the participants' performance, but also that these principles are available as normative criteria of evaluation concerning the quality of the attained result. Yet the theoretical view underlying the discursive account can also be stated in stronger terms, contending that those principles are *constitutive* of deliberation, in an emphatic sense. This means that taking part in a deliberation dialogue, in which the participants seek agreement on a practical decision, unavoidably presupposes that these principles are in force.

My aim is to consider this contention, taking into account Toulmin's general schema of argument and an Austinian approach to the speech acts intervening in deliberation. In my view, there are different sorts of norms that may play a role in deliberation. And I think that there are good reasons to support the view that some of them are constitutive of deliberation dialogues.

Key words: practical argumentation, deliberation, principles of discourse, speech actions, rules of argumentation

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"You might as well argue…"

At some point in virtually every book on critical reasoning or logic primer that includes discussion of fallacies, we encounter some formulation of the following thought: in order to discredit a given argument *A*, it is sufficient to find some argument *B* that shares certain structural characteristics (a "form") with *A*, but that has true premise(s) and false conclusion. The distribution of truth-values in *B* is sufficient to show that *B* is not a strong argument; and the moral to be drawn is that, if *B* is not strong, then neither is *A*. We may call this procedure "refutation by analogy".

It is not always stressed just how risky a procedure refutation by analogy is. I look at two of the most general risks.

One regards the indeterminacy of the idea of "logical form". Within a given formalism, we can say which constants determine the structural characteristics of a given argument, and thus vindicate validity within the formalism. But every argument can (also) be represented as being of the form "Something (therefore) Something"; and we know that at least one argument of this form has true premise and false conclusion (e.g. *C*: "Paris is in France (therefore) Moscow is in Spain"). Hence it would seem that every argument – including the present one – can be refuted by analogy with *C*.

Even when we have determined the sameness of form, say *F*, as between *A* and *B*, the other risk is that refutation by analogy refutes itself, because it presupposes that, if some argument of form *F* is invalid, then every argument of form *F* is invalid. But this presupposition seems to be of the same form as *D*: "Some Italian is excitable (therefore) Every Italian is excitable", which has a true premise and a false conclusion.

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Ironical utterance as a pseudo-fallacy:
resolving the case using argumentation theory

In this contribution I focus on intentional deviations from the ordinary use of language where there is a secret message that has to be discovered, from a perspective where abductive reasoning plays a necessary role. The speaker usually utters some "mysterious" words based on the abductive capability of the interlocutor. To arrive at a correct interpretation, the context of the participants and the context of the dialogue are essential, i.e., argumentation theory has to be invoked.

To connect abduction and interpretation, I emphasize that abductive reasoning is a type of everyday reasoning; however, some methodology is advisable to achieve a remarkable abductive capability. Including persuasion/reasoned dialogue models as part of the abductive method, we could both improve our level of *logica docens,* and analyze and criticize each new hypothesis arrived at by abduction.

In response to the dialectical perspective of abductive reasoning and to our abductive capability, detecting a pragma-dialectical fallacy in the course of a dialogue can help us to discover certain intentions of our interlocutor, at least from the point of view of the interpretation. This is the case in the *ironical utterance,* which would be a legitimate strategic manoeuvre, in this case shifting or evading the burden of proof, in a critical discussion or a persuasion dialogue and which is pronounced based on our assessment of the abductive capability of the interlocutor. To solve this question, an abduction has to be proposed from the contextual elements, i.e., from the knowledge at that point in the argumentative exchange.

Key words: abduction, critical discussion, irony, pragma-dialectical fallacy, persuasion dialogue

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Values as premises in legal arguments?
The concepts of dignity and (dis)respect in judicial decisions on same-sex marriage

On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled gay couples nationwide had a right to marry. The decision passed narrowly, with a 5-4 vote. As a result, the United States became the 18th nation to grant the right to same-sex couples. Same-sex marriage and its legal status has proved to be one of the most divisive issues leaving not just society but also judges bitterly split over their final decisions.

In this contribution I focus on the axiological component of legal argumentation and discuss the ways in which values enter legal argumentation in the justification of two judicial decisions concerning same-sex marriage in two landmark cases: *United States, Petitioner v. Edith Schlein Windsor* and *Obergefell et al. v. Hodges.* In my presentation, I argue that certain concepts such as *dignity, equality* and *liberty* permeate judicial argumentation not only textually, i.e., their instances of use are very frequent in quantitative terms, but they also underpin major arguments in the justification of judicial decisions. Drawing upon the extended pragma-dialectic approach (van Eemeren 2010; Feteris 2015) I attempt to reconstruct those argumentative patterns used in the opinion of the court (majority opinion) and in dissenting opinions that revolve around the concepts of dignity and (dis)respect. In doing so I examine a range of patterns of legal justification, such as *referring to the intention of the legislator*, *the historical context of the legislation*, *invoking related precedents*, *consequentialist argumentation* and *argument from absurdity*.

I then demonstrate how they differ in their use of evaluative language (Hunston 2011) depending on the type of legal interactant (majority vs. dissent). By considering both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions, the findings reveal significant differences related to the issue of argumentative polyphony (Bletsas 2015), which has received relatively little attention in judicial argumentation.

Key words: evaluative language, legal argumentation, justification, values

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On arguments from ignorance

The purpose of this paper is threefold. Firstly, I attempt to disambiguate the several meanings to which the terms 'argument from ignorance' and 'argumentum ad ignorantiam' are put. I make it clear that modern uses of these names to signify a fallacy where a proposition is assumed to be true because the opposing proposition has not been or cannot be proven to be true is far from the argument outlined by Locke, which is concerned primarily with a shifting of the burden of proof. Secondly, I show how attempts to embellish the basic understanding of this form of reasoning have been both unnecessary and, indeed, unhelpful. Here I consider and reject Walton's (1992, 1999) attempt to include the operation of a cautionary principle in cases of a lack of evidence as examples of the same form of argument, and question Kreider's (2016) assertion that arguments from ignorance are best analysed as cases of abductive reasoning. Lastly, I offer what I believe to be a full and effective account of the argument from ignorance as both a fallacy of logic and a perfectly decent form of practical reasoning. I claim that in cases where there is indeed no evidence available of p and it is reasonable to believe that evidence of p would be available if it were in fact the case, then it is reasonable to assume that p is not the case, even though that lack of evidence cannot be taken as a basis for stating definitively that p is not true.

Key words: Locke, Walton, fallacy, ad ignorantiam, ignorance, abduction

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Ad misericordiam revisited

The paper discusses the nature and functioning of *argumentum ad misericordiam*, a well-known but less theorised type of argument. A recent monograph by D. Walton (1997) offers an elaborate conceptual framework for identifying and assessing such arguments. It does so on the basis of an overview of definitions of *misericordia* (which Walton finally translates as 'pity'), as well as the careful analysis of several cases. Appeals to pity, Walton concludes, are not necessarily fallacious. There is, on this account, a difference between *ad misericordiam* arguments and fallacies.

In this paper I first argue for a narrower concept of *ad misericordiam*, limiting it to cases in which someone asks for the non-application of a certain rule, clearly relevant for their case, with reference to some (unfavourable) circumstance, which is, however, irrelevant for the application of the rule. Second, building on Hansen's (2000) 'dual-role analysis', I challenge his own assessment of *ad misericordiam*. Here, my claim is that it is only from the perspective of one role, i.e., the one connected to the application of a rule, that such arguments qualify as *ad misericordiam*, and that in that context they are necessarily fallacious.

Key words: *ad misericordiam*, appeal to pity, fallacy, normativity, fairness

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An argument structure for causal explanations by analogy.
The case of Galileo's explanation of the tides

The aim of the talk is to present an argument scheme for causal explanations by a special analogy, exemplified by Galileo's (false) explanation of the tides.

In his 'Dialogo...' Galileo presents a central piece of his argument against the Ptolemaic system: reasons for a rotating movement of the Earth as the main cause of the tides. He does so by an analogy to the movement of water shipped to Venice to provide the city with freshwater.

Theories developing a formal structure of analogies can be used to reconstruct Galileo's analogy as an argument with premise-and-conclusion structure. Their respective problems can be assessed this way and just because Galileo's explanation today is considered to be false it can be used as a test case for the efficacy of the theories of analogy in helping to find critical weaknesses in argumentative reasoning.

I will reconstruct Galileo's argument guided by an account of analogical reasoning centring around the structural isomorphism of two parts of reality that allows the conclusion about the second part of reality to be inferred. After demonstrating advantages and disadvantages of this style of argument in the case of Galileo and in general, I will proceed by laying out a reconstruction that sticks closer to the text: Galileo uses a technical analogy to explain the tides. The way an instrument can be manipulated to produce certain effects is used to infer a cause of an event that is out of technical control. His strategies to avoid counterarguments against his theory of the tides show the hidden premises he assumes to be necessary for drawing the conclusion. I will present this interventionist argument by analogy and discuss it's relation to the classical theory of analogy introduced previously.

Key words: analogy; argumentation theory, explanation of the tides, causal explanation, interventionism

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Positive versus negative WHY constructions and the emotion dynamics in argumentation

The structure of an argument typically includes a claim followed by data and materials to support it, while its goal is to persuade the interlocutor. The function of *why* sentences both of a positive type (*Why are we using it?*) as well as when followed by negation (*Why didn't you do something about it?*) seems very special in this respect. Bakhtin (1979) posits the practical absence of 'absolutely neutral utterances' and *why* constructions in particular play a primary role in such contexts with a special function observed in the case of negative *why* constructions. On the one hand, negation and negativity are cognitively more salient devices in discourse than corresponding positive forms (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996) and on the other, negative emotions are also less controllable and potentially more revealing with regard to the mental state and stance expression than positive emotions (Wilson and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2014). This is particularly visible in the case of *why* constructions in building an argument. This type of structure involves truth conditions to a lesser extent, relating rather to the *purpose* of the speaker when making a discourse move, and is hardly sensitive to rebuttal, undercutting or undermining when juxtaposed to prototypical rational arguments (see Winterstein 2017).

The paper focuses on *why* constructions in English and their comparable corpus counterparts in Polish spoken data juxtaposed to the materials drawn from Computer-Mediated Communication (political and social posts). The constructions – both in their positive and negative forms - possess potential emotional valence combined with an evaluative assessment which are likely to exert an impact on the structure and dynamicity of argumentation patterns in discourses. A comparison between spoken data and CMC materials in the two languages is likely to reveal differences in the patterns and frequencies of use (Martin and White 2005, Biber 2006, Hunston 2011, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2015).

Key words: argument, Computer-Mediated Communication, corpora, emotion, evaluation, spoken language

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Dualisms and dilemmas of argumentation theory

One common, if not dominant, way of understanding argumentation is to treat it as (a part of, a form of) a reasoned dialogue, where claims are tested through arguments, critical questions and counter-arguments. This is the case with much of the informal logical tradition (Freeman, 2005; Johnson, 2000; Walton & Krabbe, 1995), the pragma-dialectical (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) and formal-dialectical (Barth & Krabbe, 1982) theories, as well as philosophically-informed rhetorical approaches (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Tindale, 2015).

In this paper, I argue that most definitions of argumentative dialogue commit a category mistake. *Dialogue* is typically defined as a communicative exchange "between two (or more) people", where some of those people, the pro-side, defend a given position, while others, the con-side, doubt or attack it (Johnson, 2000, p. 161). The mistake lies in the fact that the duality (pro vs. con) is basically a *normative* category of bi-valued logic, where the dialogical pro-side stands in for the logical truth-value while the con-side stands in for the falsehood of the claim to be verified. By contrast, the multiplicity (exchange between "more than two people") is a *descriptive* category of communication studies, including linguistic studies of conversation and dialogue, as well as rhetoric. Because of this mistake, argumentation theory risks failing empirically, when a model of the two and only two sides is imposed on complex multi-party exchanges, or failing normatively, when a complex argumentative exchange challenges the normative simplicity of dualistic models.

To address this challenge theoretically, the paper develops a concept of *argumentative poly-logues*, a form of a reasoned debate where more than two positions on a given issue are taken. I use philosophical insights from speech act theory, the Gricean approach to conversation, and the work on collective intentionality, to ground the claim that what I call *methodological dualism* is not fully justified and that argumentation theory should instead avail itself of the concept of a polylogue.

Key words: Argumentation, collective intentionality, conversation, dialectics, dialogue, polylogue

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Arguing on uncertainty

Hume's gap divided two main types of propositions: *is-propositions* and *ought-propositions*. According to this we cannot argue for an ought-proposition by some is-propositions. The same is true vice versa by the so-called moralistic fallacy (or reverse naturalistic fallacy). Thus we cannot argue even for an is-proposition with some ought-propositions. *The uncertainty* can be defined as a state in which we are unable to say that *X* is the case (or should be the case) pointing out only factual propositions (or norms) and in strictly rational debate we should abstain from any conclusion made that way. But there are practical reasons in real life (e.g. cases of negligence) when this abstinence is not acceptable. In these cases, we do not want to depart from ratio, thus we have to find a means to bypass the gap.

In the cases where the problem of crossing from ought-propositions to is-propositions is considered, the possibility lies in adding the procedural rule which makes clear which party needs to reject the state of what should be the case by presenting contradicting facts. This can be done by placing a burden of proof. Thus, in some examples the party without this burden can argue for an is-proposition by ought-propositions. E.g., in a court of law this is done by presumption of innocence. In a simplified way, the defender can use the argument that he has done *Y* because he should have done it. On the other hand, the prosecutor has to point out contradicting evidence. Much more complicated is the situation where there is a presumption of guilt.

Key words: Hume's gap, moralistic fallacy, is-ought problem, factual uncertainty, normative uncertainty, burden of proof, theory of argumentation

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Explicating the role of values of valuations in the construction of political arguments

While *argumentation* is formally defined as a "(…) rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic (…) by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint" (Frans et al. 2004), it is rarely the case that a real-life argument is structured in accordance with these stipulations, nor is the critic always strictly reasonable in their interpretation of and response to the argument that is being put forth. These facts call for the theory of logical fallacies (Williamson 2006), which are a potent device for dismantling ill-constructed arguments, and which bring to the fore what in times of ever-escalating political correctness (Adams 2016) has become one of the most commonly utilised demagogical tools that aim at bolstering the validity of one's standpoint and undermining that of the opponent(s) - valuative judgements. Valuative judgements used in argumentation consist in establishing associative links between a) the espoused standpoint and positively-valenced concepts (Aguado et al. 2005) (for instance, by declaring one's ideology as 'progressive') and b) the opposing standpoint and negatively-valenced concepts (for instance, by declaring the ideology of the other as 'regressive'); these types of judgements have been extensively used by both left- and right-wing media prior to the 2016 US presidential election to sway the public's vote in favour of the supported candidate and away from the opposition. By combining axiological discourse analysis (Krzeszowski 1997) with the affective priming theory (Aguado et al. 2005) and the logical fallacy framework, it has been possible to analyse these ongoing debates and illuminate how values and valuations embedded in affect-laden words are employed by the media subconsciously operating on the knowledge that "valence is (…) is automatically activated when the stimulus is presented" (Aguado et al. 2005), which means that strong affective response to a given argument may be generated despite its ill-conceived structure by virtue of its sheer emotive force, thus priming the audience to be unreasonably oppositional or receptive towards it regardless of its validity.

Key words: axiology, politics, media, argument, valuation, valence

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The fallacy of emotionless logic

Within the general focus of highlighting the role of emotions *vis-à-vis* logic in argumentation, the paper aims to assess how arguments can be influenced by emotions. The approach is consistent with "current theories of practical reasoning [that] do not reject emotions and feelings as irrational or as otherwise illegitimate as reasons for actions" (Blair, 2005). The importance of emotions in this regard is demonstrated by Mikels et al. (2011), who underscore the role of the affect heuristic (see also Slovic et al., 2004) in their results showing that complex decision making can be enhanced relatively more by affective encoding than deliberative encoding. When one considers the possible role played by emotions in unconscious processes (e.g., Megill, 2003), this is consistent with observations that unconscious thinking can process complex arguments more thoroughly than conscious thinking (Handley and Runnion, 2011). The possible fundamental role of the unconscious in this respect is further highlighted by results showing that activity can be detected in the cortex of participants at least 10 seconds before reaching conscious awareness (Soon et al., 2013), which underscores the "conscious bias" described by Perlovsky and Ilin (2012: 794). One possible way that such unconscious content reaches conscious awareness is through dreams, which can represent, through metaphor, a further emotional basis to argumentation. Extending the work of Wilson (2012), it is argued that the broadening of conceptual scope, which is influenced by the interplay between emotion and the intensity of motivational orientation (e.g., Gable, Poole and Harmon-Jones, 2015), is a feature of what Hartmann (2013: 187-188) terms "focused waking thought" at one end of the scale of mental functioning, and can be contrasted with "artistic reverie, daydreaming, and dreaming" at the other end of this scale that are characterised by hyperassociativity between emotion memory fragments (Malinowski and Horton, 2015) and *thymophor* (Hartman, 2013), which is the transformation of emotion into imagery, and is at the heart of creativity as it, in addition to dreams, appears in the construction of metaphor.

Key words: argumentation, conceptual scope, emotions, logic, metaphor, unconscious

SPECIAL SESSION
Wallace Stevens: Figurative Language and Philosophy of Language

Convenors: Kacper Bartczak & Jakub Mácha

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"Out of nothing": Patterns of negativity in Wallace Stevens' Poetry

Negation lies at the core of human communication and has been an important area of humanist study. Modern epistemic insecurity has inspired numerous writers and philosophers to engage with the concept of negation and negativity in language and thought. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, Agamben, Kafka and Celan, to name only a few, have probed the structures, semantics, aesthetics, politics as well as ethics of negativity. With the aid of selected philosophical and linguistic considerations, I will attempt to explore the types, patterns, functions and significance of negation in the work of Wallace Stevens. His oeuvre is deeply informed by philosophical and metalinguistic interrogations embracing also the questions of non-being. I intend to argue that the modernist poet uses a plethora of negative constructs (e.g. sentential negation, double negation, negative polarity, lexical negation) to both erode and induce the synthetic thrust of his metaphor, enhancing the existential import of his writing. In particular, my investigation references Agamben's inquiry into the ungroundednes and negativity of being as expressed in language, as well as selected linguistic studies of negation (e.g. Giora et al.) which claim that negative structures tend to provoke a metaphorical interpretation largely absent from the processing of affirmative constructions. I will focus on defining a particular mode of poetic communication which emerges as a result of the breakdown of the presentation effected by negative structures. As will be shown, Stevens employs both direct and indirect negation; consequently, his verses hesitate on the threshold of meaning, even as they absorb and increase the potential for the meaning thus blocked, suspended or withdrawn.

Key words: Wallace Stevens, modernist poetry, metaphor, negativity in language and thought

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Varieties of "nothingness" – Stevens's poem as figurative field

Stevens's life-long engagement with poetry writing can be treated as an aesthetic, philosophical, and spiritual inquiry into the nature of the meaning-productive, world-disclosing powers of language. Adhering to the ongoing capacity of the poem to contaminate the dead literalness of the given with the movement of conceptual/poetic re-description, Stevens finds himself repeatedly returning to the concept of "the nothing." In his employment of this term, Stevens can be listed alongside other inquirers into the world-disclosing powers of language: Martin Heidegger, J. Hillis Miller, Harold Bloom, and, arriving at this concept from a different tradition, Donald Davidson.

In Stevens's poetics, the philosophical concept of "the nothing" gets absorbed into the figurative field of the poem as a whole and, as an aesthetic feature, becomes a source of its entire figurativeness. In order to demonstrate that, I will first present how two Heideggerian readings of the poet, by J. Hillis Miller and Stephen Critchley, clash with the reading offered by Harold Bloom, a critic who opposed Heidegger's treatment of the relation between poetics and mortality. Through this juxtaposition, I will hope to show how Stevens's poetics of "the nothing" takes us incessantly away from any notion of "the things as they are," that is from any notion of the given, the literal, the dead.

Finally, I will also show how Bloom's romantic insistence on Stevens's poem eschewing the literal can be elucidated and regulated by considering his figurativeness in the context of the extended Rortian-Davidsonian model of metaphor. It is this model, I argue, that allows us to better understand how "the nothing" becomes an active principle working within the figurative field of the poem, rather than a philosophically discovered reality of things lying beyond the poem. In other words, by the paradoxical bringing together of Bloom's inspirational readings of Stevens with the sober-minded pragmatist Davidsonian-Rortian model of metaphor, I intend to show Stevens's poetry as radically anti-representational: at the center of this *poesis* is the life of the poem – not the life of things.

Key words: Stevens, figurative language, Rortian-Davidsonian model of metaphor, Harold Bloom

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Metaphor as that which makes us see

Stevens discusses the relationship between reality and imagination as involving a tension: on the one hand, he insists that feeding only on the unreal would make imagination (poetry) short-lived, without vitality. On the other hand, he suggests that imagination cannot simply give itself over to reality. Those poets who consider the essence of poetry to be providing insights into reality appeal, ultimately, to their recipients' "good sense" and "civilization". Those poets, for whom *imagination* is central, try to explore what lies beyond this domain and to locate the *future* poetry here. This distinction has to do with another one: the sense of our world as something independent of us, and the poet's sense of his world, informed (as is any individual's genuine sense of his/her world) by his personality and the shape of worldview.

Metaphor is central to Stevens' notion of poetry. I'd like to suggest a possible reading of what metaphor does (one which, if not directly continuous with Stevens' account, certainly doesn't contradict it) that goes across these distinctions. Since everyone's sense of the world is informed by their preconceptions, the sense of the world as independent may not refer to a commonplace, but to the *reality* we are blind to. As Iris Murdoch argues, art (poetry, too) awakens us to see the reality we tend to overlook, engaged with our fantasies. Metaphors then have the power to make us see what more commonplace, perfunctory linguistic tools cannot show us. Essential is their capacity of conveying and highlighting overlooked resemblances, making us aware of them (as in Stevens' example of Matthew's "flock of sheep"), feel their full bearing. Seeing these important connections – coming in terms of *resemblance*, not identity or imitation – requires, in agreement with Stevens, an exercise not only of imagination, but of focused and realistic imagination.

Key words: metaphor, reality, imagination, seeing, resemblance

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The kinship of poetry and philosophy.
Reflections about a discussion of W. Stevens and P. Weiss

In my contribution I would like to comment on an interchange of ideas about the relationship between poetry and philosophy that was entertained by W. Stevens and the philosopher P. Weiss. Stevens had asked Weiss to draw up a list of ideas that are essentially poetic in nature. As Weiss himself might have realized for the first time in full clearness, all the fundamental notions of philosophy turned out to be essentially poetic in nature. Stevens concluded from this: "[t]hat all philosophy is poetic in conception and doctrine is no more true than that all poetry is philosophic in conception and doctrine".

From his beginning as a philosophical writer, Weiss was aware of the existence of a pulsative force that was cosmic in reach and patterned the rhythm of existence. In later works he called this force the "dunamis" and joined it to its very opposite, namely the "rational", thus gaining the crucial notion of a "dynamic-rational". For him, the dynamic-rational is the ultimate condition for a process of transformation that produces definite beings out of a background of indefinite Being. In an essay under the title *The Dunamis*, he gave what might be described as a cosmic drama of the coming-into-existence of all that there is.

Stevens, in his turn, tried to explore the conditions that a poem had to fulfill that might be described as the "supreme fiction". In a sense, the problems Stevens encountered were the problems of Weiss also, i.e., to balance actuality and possibility, imagination and reason, and to demonstrate the supremacy of mind in the most concrete fashion. In the end, he discovered an ultimate dualism, too: the war between mind and sky or between thought and day and night. The supremacy of the mind is irresolvably intertwined with the rhythm of existence. Stevens's insight can be refined by a synoptic commentary of three of his late poems, namely, *The World as Meditation*, *Final Soliloquy of the Internal Paramour*, and *Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself*.

Key words: poetry, philosophy, the dynamic-rational, the war between mind and sky

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Resemblance and identity in Wallace Stevens' conception of metaphor

Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians conceived of metaphor as a figure of speech in which one thing is given a name or an attribute of another thing on the basis of some resemblance that exists between the two things. Wallace Stevens (1951) conceived of metaphor not as the production of pre-existing resemblances observed in nature but the "creation of resemblance by the imagination". Resemblance, and not identity, according to Stevens, is the fundamental relation between the two terms of a metaphor. This is akin to contemporary accounts of metaphor in terms of the phenomenological or experiential seeing of one thing *as* another thing (Yoos 1971; Davidson 1978; Camp 2006; Semino 2008; Ritchie 2013). Seeing one thing *as* another thing on the basis of resemblance or similarity implies that the one thing *is not* the other. I shall offer a challenge to these accounts that construe the "is" of metaphor in terms of resemblance. Consider this metaphor: "the soul is the *only* bird that sustains its cage" (Victor Hugo). A resemblance relation assumes that there is one unique bird that sustains its cage, and whatever that bird is, it resembles (but not the same as) the soul. But the metaphor asserts that the soul *is* that bird and not that it resembles or is similar to it. There is an assertion of an identity or *sameness* between the two elements of the metaphors. Crucially, an utterance of this metaphor commits one to the 'existence' of a single element: the soul is the same entity as the bird that sustains its cage. But when we construe the relation as that of resemblance, we have a change in our ontology: we are now committed to the existence of two different entities. In meeting this challenge, I shall discuss Northrop Frye's (1957) view on Wallace Steven's conception of *poetic identification* where in saying that one thing *is* another thing, the one thing is both identified *as* itself and identified *with* the other thing.

Key words: Wallace Stevens, metaphor, resemblance, identity

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The central poem as a transcendental ideal.
Wallace Stevens on metaphor and resemblance

Poetic language has, for Wallace Stevens, a higher expressive power than plain language. What can be, then, expressed by the most articulate poem, to which Stevens refers as the "central poem" (the "essential poem at the centre of things", a *supreme fiction*)? First, I shall investigate Stevens' concepts of resemblance and metaphor in order to portray the supremacy of poetic language. He distinguishes several kinds of resemblances involving real or imagined things and thereby elaborates an intricate concept of resemblance leading to the use of metaphors. In order to strengthen the theoretical background, Stevens' understanding of metaphor will be compared with contemporary accounts of metaphor in analytical philosophy, most notably the seminal, but also controversial account by Donald Davidson. In the second part, Stevens' poetic practice with metaphors will be illustrated by means of some examples from his poetic work: *Study of Two Pears* and, primarily, *The Motive for Metaphor*. The third and final section will be devoted to the construction of a bridge between the philosophical theory of relations and Stevens' aesthetics and lyrical production. In order to be understood, every poem has to be rooted in the reality external to it. The central poem, however, cannot be related to something external; it comprises of internal relations only. Although metaphor is able to turn external relations into internal ones, this cannot be achieved completely. The conclusion is that the central poem is not attainable and can best be thought of as the transcendental condition of all poetical practice, as a transcendental ideal.

Key words: Wallace Stevens, central poem, resemblance, metaphor, supreme fiction, Donald Davidson

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Poetry as creation: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Wallace Stevens

Poetic language is often posited as somehow distinct from ordinary language, but the nature and extent of this distinction is subject to many discussions. Is poetic language of a different nature or is it rather a different use, a different language-game in Wittgenstein's words? In *The Necessary Angel*, Wallace Stevens tackles this question and one of the main characteristics he attributes to poetic language is imagination: 'It is the interdependence of the imagination and reality as equals'. This focus on imagination and its relation to reality proves to be very germane in conceptualising poetic language and can be interestingly developed by bringing it in relation to Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The role Stevens gives to imagination is close to Nietzsche's idea of creation: the poet, etymologically, is the one who makes, who creates. But what does she create? In Nietzsche's philosophy, the task of the poet—but also that of the philosopher—is to create new perspectives, new ways of relating to the world: there is no distinction between creation and reality for reality is itself a creation. This idea of imagination can also be related to Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing-as': in order to see things as they are—or as they could be—one needs to imagine them as such. Wittgenstein takes as an example children who play with a chest imagining it is a house: in that case, the chest really appears to be a house for the children. My aim is to bring Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Wallace Stevens into a dialogue in order to open paths for a conceptualisation of both the task and the language of poetry.

Key words: poetic language, imagination, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Wallace Stevens

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"They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne": Stevens and the recalcitrant particularity of language

Stevens's poetry invites philosophical appreciations thanks to its abstract nature and profound interest in questions concerning the nature of reality and man's being. The fact that he maintained his relationship with George Santayana, whose work exerted an impact on some of Stevens's perception of the interdependence of language and reality, adds more credence to philosophical investigations into the poet's work. And yet one feels that, despite the affinity between his poetry and the continental philosophical tradition, particularly hermeneutics, his poetry tends to create its own conditions of existence and the modes of exploration of those conditions. While the poems are inevitably tangential with the thingly world, they also seek to negotiate a path leading deeper into the modus vivendi of what Stevens called "supreme fiction." Therefore implementing analytical operations derived from the work of the likes of Santayana or Heidegger, or Gadamer may offer a way to approach the foundations of Stevens's "fluent mundo" but one is likely to be led astray should one persist in identifying conceptual similarities. What Stevens's poems seem to present is an idiosyncratic experience of language, a more sceptical version of Shelley's "separate fantasy" that challenges and eventually undermines every generalised description of its status or function. The presentation will therefore attempt to pursue some of the experiences of language that Stevens's poems instantiate, in the process exploring his arguably derisive swerve that "They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne."

Key words: Wallace Stevens, George Santayana, supreme fiction

GENERAL SESSION

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Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the principle of charity

In this paper I return to the topics of indeterminacy and underdetermination of meaning to propose that the discussion should be purged of evidently flawed illustrations if room is to be made for actually interesting and convincing examples

Quine's *Indeterminacy of Translation* and Davidson's *Indeterminacy of Interpretation* depend upon, and arise from, two prior theses, *Underdetermination of Translation* and *Underdetermination of Interpretation*. The last two are epistemic theses, they affirm the translator/interpreter's inability in principle to justify an option between several systems of translation or interpretation that fit all the available evidence equally well. The first two theses are metaphysical, they affirm that there is actually no fact of the matter determining which system of translation/interpretation is the correct one. Typically, the claims of underdetermination are met with less rigour and resistance than the subsequent metaphysical step. Once underdetermination is conceded, two options emerge: either accept semantic indeterminacy, or blame underdetermination on some epistemic insufficiency on the translator/interpreter's part.

In this paper I consider the third, less explored, option, the rejection of underdetermination. However, I'll only explore Davidson's case. Quine's more austere setting renders underdetermination almost certain, but that comes with a cost. Quine's translator appears too remote from actual speakers to be of relevance in the study of meaning and communication. Davidson develops a more realistic approach to the problem that commits his interpreter to a much broader use of a stronger Principle of Charity. This drastically limits the possibilities of underdetermination. I'll show how the typical examples of underdetermination on offer in the literature are easily dispelled with Davidson's stronger version of the Principle.

Finally, I'll sketch a new type of example of underdetermination that can, perhaps, stand a better chance in Davidson's more realistic and demanding environment, also raising the prospects of genuine indeterminacy.

Key words: meaning indeterminacy, meaning underdetermination, the principle of charity, rationality, Davidson

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Modality without modals

It is widely assumed that our knowledge of systematic and non-contextual aspects of meaning consists in our knowledge of linguistically-encoded meaning. Although it appears to be truistic, the aim of my talk is to show that this assumption reflects a profound neglect of the substantive contributions of (extra-linguistic) cognition to our understanding of language and that, as a consequence, it distorts our conception of what natural language meaning is; what the connection between language and thought is like; and the form that illuminating explanations may take in this domain.

My talk will focus primarily on modal discourse. This assumption manifests in this domain as the supposition that modal interpretations must be explained in terms of modal meanings. I argue that this supposition generates intractable problems in connection with the imperfective system, which is assumed to be a major natural language modal system. While some interpretations associated with this system do not obviously appear modal (e.g., Mary lives in Paris), even those that are cannot obviously be linked to modals. As I discuss, we confront a variety of unification problems and modal puzzles in connection with this system which can be traced back to the assumption that these modal interpretations are anchored to modals.

I recommend that we think of these interpretations, instead, as interface phenomena, arising at the interface between language and thought and, accordingly, I offer an interface explanation for their emergence. Expressions that are associated with these modal completion requirements are unified insofar as they have ends (i.e., are telic) but are not at an end. The projection of possible continuations up to their ends reflects a *modal* understanding of expressions of that type (of something's having an end but not being at its end) – the work of modal cognition not modal language.

Key words: modality, covert modality, language-cognition interface, imperfective system, semantic explanation

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(Seemingly) proper names of legal institutions

There are certain social institutions that are created and regulated entirely by a legal system. Such institutions are individuated by a name: Sąd Rejonowy dla Krakowa-Śródmieścia; Naczelnik Urzędu Skarbowego, Marszałek Sejmu, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (also: Supreme Court, United Nations, Attorney General of the United States of America) etc. All the qualities such institutions possess can be *(prima facie)* interpreted from law. A certain duality is associated with those (seemingly) proper names: Attorney General of the United States of America can be used to refer to Loretta Lynch (an incumbent Attorney General); however, this name can also be used to refer not to a person but to an institution *per se* (as in: "The office of Attorney General of the United States of America was established in 1789"). In my presentation, I want to focus on the latter use of such names and discuss their input to propositions expressed: whether they are singular, directly referential terms or, instead, they should rather be perceived as descriptive ones.

Within general legal philosophy one can find some ideas suggesting that law can be perceived in a way comparable to literary fiction (e.g. Gawthorne 2013; Marmor 2014 etc.). In other words, these ideas suggest that "the world of law" is significantly similar to "the world of literary fiction". If fictionalism in law can de defended as legitimate, an initial analogy can be drawn between names of these institutions and names of fictional characters. I want to discuss certain advantages as well as disadvantages of such an approach to names of legal institutions.

Key words: proper names, social artefacts, legal institutions, fictionalism, language of law

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Linguistic relativity: why do we need philosophy for a better discussion?

The history of so-called 'linguistic relativity' is an odd and multifaceted one. Brought to the attention of scholars notably in the 18th and 19th centuries by German Romantic philosophers and later made world-famous during the 20th century, mainly thanks to amateur linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf, finally in the last 50 years or so, this issue has been mostly dealt with by cognitive psychologists, who seemingly ruled out some of the philosophical questions intrinsic to the language-thought problem. Certainly, there were solid reasons for such a move, nonetheless it is argued that linguistic relativity has deep philosophical presuppositions and entailments. In fact, it deals with many problems already being faced by several philosophical branches and traditions, such as (but not restricted to) pragmatics, theory of meaning, philosophy of mind, concepts formation and categorization, social reality creation through words, and so on.

It is argued then that (i) linguistic relativity demands (and deserves too) some sort of 'holistic' approach and that (ii) empiric psychological research should be informed by theories and suggestion from philosophy, for this could result in depicting a misleading picture of language, cognition and the other notions involved. Hopefully, philosophers will soon feel entitled again to take the linguistic relativity debate as something they can contribute to and, on the other hand, psychologists will accept contributions coming from philosophy, having reassessed its usefulness for a better understanding of how language works and how linguistic diversity correlates to cognitive performances and many other aspects of speakers' lives.

Key words: linguistic relativity, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, language and thought, extended mind, social interaction, speech acts

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Against objections to corpus analysis as a tool for philosophy

Experimental philosophers are most prone to employ experimental methods from psychology and cognitive science. Only recently, has interest emerged in using experimental and empirical methods from linguistics in a like spirit—additionally, and not necessarily for the same methodical aims. One method from linguistics that lends itself to this purpose is corpus analysis. There are different ways of employing corpus analysis (and some less technical alternatives) in philosophy. All of them have in common that they give access to large quantities of what may be termed linguistic surface data. This immediately provokes the question, why optimising access to such data is of use to philosophers. Some of the worries about corpus analysis can be traced back to objections against corpus analysis usually attributed to Chomsky. Their main thrust is that the linguistic surface data collected in corpora only show actual language uses, while access to the proper object of linguistic research is only gained with the help of introspective judgements about the *correctness* of language use. The paper recounts these objections and argues for the use of data on actual language use in philosophy.

Key words: experimental philosophy, corpus analysis, Chomsky

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Actions, products, and truth-bearers:
a critique of Moltmann's neo-Twardowskian account

Friederike Moltmann has recently defended an account of primary truth-bearers as the "spatio-temporally coincident products" of certain kinds of cognitive and linguistic acts, such as acts of judging and claiming. Her account is based on Kazimierz Twardowski's action/product distinction, and more specifically, on his notion of "non-enduring product." Moltmann's proposal is meant to provide a third option between the dominant conception of primary truth-bears as mind-independent entities, and the recently rediscovered conception of primary truth-bearers as cognitive and linguistic acts. This paper has two goals. i) First, it challenges Moltmann's main argument against the act-theoretic approach. Moltmann argues, after Twardowski, that this approach commits a category mistake: an act is not the sort of thing to which truth and falsity can be intelligibly applied. Her argument, like Twardowski's, is based on the different logical behaviour of expressions such as "John's *claim* that *p*" and "John's *claiming* that *p*." I show, however, that this sort of linguistic evidence can be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with the idea that when we speak about, say, "John's claim that *p*," we are speaking about one of his *actions*. ii) The second goal of this paper is to argue that Moltmann does not present a coherent alternative to the act-theoretical approach. The problem lies in the obscurity of the Twardowskian notion of a "non-enduring product." While the action/product distinction is unobjectionable in connection with "enduring products" (*building a house* vs. *the house*), it becomes far from obvious in connection with "non-enduring products," which are supposed to be spatio-temporally coincident with the actions that produce them. I suggest that this distinction is at best a wrong-headed account for the difference between an action in progress and a completed action—which, for all its completeness, does not stop being an action.

Key words: truth-bearers, act/product distinction, Moltmann, Twardowski

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Intentional identity and coordination

According to Geach (1967), the sentence, "Hob believes a witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob believes that she killed Cob's sow," can be true even if there are no witches, even if neither Hob nor Nob has any particular witch in mind, and even if Hob and Nob do not know each other at all.

Standard semantic analyses, however, cannot provide the desired truth-conditions. Altering the scope of the existential quantifier results in either the *de re* or *de dicto* reading– the former leads to a dubious ontological commitment, the latter misrepresents Hob's and Nob's respective mental states. A dismissive attitude toward intentional identity cannot be sustained either, as scientific progress often relies on entertaining and investigating entities that may or may not exist.

I argue that the phenomenon is much more widespread and significant than previously perceived. Instances are pervasive, including not only long-standing philosophical conundrums such as Quine's (1956) discussion on Ralph, Ortcutt and Kripke's (1979) puzzles about beliefs, but also everyday attitudinal reports that exemplify folk psychology. Seen in this light, the problem of intentional identity is really a problem of coordination in thought and language.

I specify a template for generalizing intentional identity and identify three sets of intricacies: (a) what type of noun phrases and whether they are empty; (b) whether the agents have in mind something specific; (c) the nature of attitudes and their inter-relatedness. I make recourse to Newen's (2011) object file, a multi-faceted entity representation that is not entirely language-like, and propose a new way to characterize the truth-conditions of limited but representative examples. My proposal leads to interesting ramifications: first, linguistic content and mental content need not match in exact detail; second, linguistic communication requires the coordination of content, which need not be strict equivalence

Key words: intentional identity, coordination, files, de re/de dicto, puzzles about belief

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Propositional contents and propositional representations

In recent debates regarding the ontology of concepts (Margolis, Laurence 2007) it has been argued that every theoretically fruitful talk about concepts conceived as *abstract entities* might be replaced with a talk about concepts qua *mental representations*. This controversial anti-Fregean and neopsychologistic attitude towards *concepts* has a natural counterpart in the theory of *propositions*: one may argue, on similar grounds, that all fruitful talk about propositions qua *abstract entities* (*propositional contents* henceforth) might be replaced with a talk about propositions qua *mental representations* (*propositional representations* henceforth). In my paper I discuss the scope and limits of such neopsychologism. In particular, I propose and defend a version of the heterogeneity hypothesis about propositions. It states that objects we call "propositions" have distinct theoretical roles to play and there is no reason to claim that there exists a single kind of entity that corresponds to all these diverse roles.

In order to state the hypothesis in a more precise manner, I describe the general desiderata and theoretical tasks propositions are expected to fulfil (cf. Weber 2012). I argue that *propositional representations* fit specifically the role of contents of propositional intentional states while *propositional contents* fit the role of semantic values of sentences in contexts. I illustrate the distinction with the theory of indexical belief reports committed to the class of *representations of limited accessibility* but not to *propositions of limited accessibility* (cf. Perry 1979). In the final section of the paper I briefly discuss the aftermath of the heterogeneity hypothesis for debates regarding the nature and the structure of propositions.

Key words*: propositions, contents, mental representations, propositional multi-tasking, heterogeneity hypothesis

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Presuppositions, again

Presupposition is surely one of the most debated notions in the linguistic and philosophical literature. Historically, there are two main theoretical approaches on presuppositions. According to the first one, the semantic view, presuppositions are semantic implications, that is, truth-conditional relations between propositions and statements. In this sense, presuppositions are considered as properties of sentences and a presupposed proposition is a necessary condition for the truth of the presupposing statement: if a sentence B presupposes a sentence A, then B entails A, and if A is false, then B is neither true nor false (cf. Strawson 1950, 1952, van Fraassen 1968, Keenan 1971). On the second approach, the pragmatic view, presuppositions are not properties of sentences but rather properties of speakers or of linguistic performances given a certain context of utterance (cf. Stalnaker 1972, 1973, 1974, 1999, 2002). On this view, a presupposed proposition is a condition for the felicitous utterance of the presupposing statement in a given context.

Traditionally, it is commonly assumed that semantic presuppositions differ from classical entailments, as presuppositions, unlike classical entailments, project under negation: if we compare a context of entailment to a context of presupposition, we should see that entailments, but not presuppositions, disappear under negation. This presentation aims at proposing a revision of the notion of semantic presupposition. I argue that semantic presuppositions are classical entailments. Moreover, I claim that all semantic presuppositions are also pragmatic presuppositions, while not all pragmatic presuppositions are also semantic presuppositions. I contend that factive verbs offer a paradigmatic example, as the factivity related to *know* is semantic, whereas the factivity related to *regret* is merely pragmatic. This claim stands in contrast with Karttunen's (1971) well-known analysis of factive verbs and his distinction between *true factives* (that is, emotive factives) and *semifactives* (that is, cognitive factives).

Key words: presupposition, classical entailment, constancy under negation, factivity, *know, regret*

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Does *Finnegans Wake* mean something?
Understanding, meaning, and the target of inquiry

Wittgenstein remarked that a main cause of philosophical problems was only considering one kind of examples. Oftentimes, linguistics begins with what it takes to be "standard cases" and considers abnormality tangentially, as something that a mature linguistics research program will be able to handle. This paper seeks to problematize the assumption that cases linguistics considers as abnormal are best handled in this way. In effect, it argues that limiting the scope of linguistic inquiry to non-problematic cases restricts and distorts language meaning and understanding in important ways. Thus, I argue that more energy should be devoted to what are taken as abnormal cases. Section one discusses a highly abnormal case, Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* (hereby FW). I consider several arguments from thinkers - ranging from literary critics to philosophers - about whether the work is best thought of as a novel at all. In section two, I argue that the work should be read as a novel. Pursuant to this, in section three, I argue that FW is, in fact, meaningful, that this meaning can be understood, and that claims about the novel can be true or false in the same way claims about more conventional novels are. Section four attempts to deploy two semantic theories into FW - specifically those based on speaker-meaning and those based on truth/assertability conditions. I argue that both are incapable of explaining how FW manages to have a meaning. Thus, there is at least one case of meaning that cannot be assimilated into those theories. Finally, section five argues for the merits of a more broad-minded approach to semantic theorizing. Specifically, I argue that these abnormal cases can offer both a testing ground for our theories (as anomalies have in the natural sciences) and as a lab in which we can develop new views.

Key words: semantic theories, abnormal cases, *Finnegans Wake*, meaning, understanding, truth/assertability conditions, speaker-meaning

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A linguist's comment on the methods of experimental philosophy
(the Knobe effect)

The experimental branch of analytical philosophy refers mostly to online questionnaires, designed to check how native-speakers understand certain notions of philosophical interest (in Knobe's effect – how they understand the notion of intentionality). In the paper I question such experimental methods, from the point of view of a semanticist dealing with the problem of expressing intentionality and agency in a natural language (Polish).

Foremost, what is of interest to philosophers (including experimental ones) in the notion of "intentionality" is still intentionality *in a broad philosophical sense*, otherwise they would not attempt to draw general conclusions irrespective of a particular language. Yet, examining the usage of notions in a natural language, one can draw conclusions only within the context of a natural language. Native-speakers of Polish have at their disposal words such as *celowo, specjalnie* or *umyślnie* – each with its own characteristics, which can significantly influence the responders' decisions. English questionnaires first of all refer, of course, to the word *intentionally* (whereas *intencjonalny* in Polish can be used only as a professional term), but this too has its own semantic features, just like *purposefully* or *deliberately*, and it is not quite clear why exactly this English word should be crucial for the "intentionality question" in general.

I also discuss other linguistic factors that can influence the results of questionnaires, either connected with a key notion (e.g. whether it is a noun or a related adverb, the latter possibly ambiguous), or with a general wording of the story submitted to questioning (e.g. whether certain contents are expressed in the form of subordinate clauses or nominalizations, the latter also possibly ambiguous). As far as I know, factors of this kind are not taken into account in research – neither respondents nor researchers seem to be aware of them. Although they may appear secondary, they could nevertheless prove critical for the final results.

Key words: intentionality, experimental philosophy, the Knobe effect, semantics

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Metonymy and deferred reference

The past several decades have seen discussion of the phenomenon often known as 'deferred reference' among philosophers and linguists. This is the phenomenon in which an expression in an utterance is used to denote something not conventionally denoted by that expression. Metonymy is a rhetorical device that involves similar features. But there has been little discussion regarding whether metonymy and deferred reference are the same phenomenon, whether one is a subset of the other, or neither of these is true. I argue that there are two ways in which one might argue that they are neither the same phenomenon, nor is one phenomenon a subset of the other: 1) some uses of metonymy may fail to pick out a unique, alternative non-conventional meaning, or 2) even if metonymy does correspond with a change in the meaning of an expression, the mechanism by which it does so may differ from the mechanism by which deferred reference occurs. Geoffrey Nunberg seems to have adopted something like the second option. I will argue that this is a misguided conclusion. Even so, metonymy is not identical with, a subset of, or a superset of deferred reference because (1) holds: it is not the case that metonymy always involves the identification of a unique non-conventional denotation of the metonymic expression. To show this, I consider several examples of metonymic uses of language. Many of them correspond neatly with the most common accounts of deferred reference. Some cases of metonymy, however, lack central properties of deferred reference.

Key words: reference, deferred reference, metonymy, semantics, pragmatics

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Moderate holism and linguistic phenomena

Traditionally, meaning holism is a theory that is related to the meaning attributed to words and their relationships to other words in a language. This theory can be more specifically defined as a defense of the mutual interdependence of all items of linguistic knowledge, so that, for example, to understand the meaning of a given expression, it is necessary to understand a large sector of the language in question or, even the complete language. The aim of this paper is to present a moderate version of meaning holism that was proposed by Henry Jackman in his work "Moderate holism and the instability thesis" (1999), which argues that meaning holism does not imply the thesis of instability - if there is the change of belief about an object, there is a change of meaning - and, in this way, it is possible to attribute meanings to objects admitting changes of opinions and then beliefs. It will be shown how this version of holism gives an account of the main criticisms made of meaning holism in the last decades and also how this theory can justify linguistic phenomena (like vagueness and polysemy) that are often treated as problems of language. Finally, it will also be argued that these linguistic phenomena are intrinsic to languages and that the moderate version of meaning holism can justify the occurrence of these phenomena.

Key words: meaning holism, philosophy of language, linguistics, semantics

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The scale of moral adjectives

'It is morally better to keep a promise than to save a life.' Sentences like those show that moral adjectives such as 'good' or 'bad' are gradable, that is, they place their objects on a scale. But can we say more about their semantics, and the types of scales they use? In this paper we propose some experiments to test how and whether moral adjectives fit well-known semantics for gradable adjectives.

We first test whether moral adjectives are relative or absolute adjectives. To do this, we look at the entailment patterns of moral adjectives both in the positive and comparative form, as well as their compatibility with modifiers such as 'almost' and 'slightly'. The preliminary results point towards the fact that moral adjectives don't fall neatly under either category. In addition to this, moral adjectives are multidimensional, i.e., they combine more than one scale; thus, we also consider the question of how their different scales combine with each other and whether the different scales have different properties.

In the second part we tackle the question of the scale of moral adjectives in a more theoretical fashion, i.e., by investigating their possible scales with mathematically precise tools. Classical measurement theory admits of ordinal (for example, quality control surveys), interval (for example, temperature), and ratio scales (for example, height or weight). Each can be combined with an operation of aggregation, or sum, which can behave differently: for instance, the height of a combination of two objects is additive, while their temperature is not. We discuss the consequences of each choice of scale for ethical theory. For instance, if the scale of moral adjectives (say, 'morally good') is an interval, intermediate scale, certain logical inferences are not allowed, and furthermore, moral aggregation cannot be additive: thus certain normative theories (i.e., some forms of consequentialism) are ruled out.

Key words: evaluative terms, scalar semantics, metaethics

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Why should a causal theory of reference borrowing
be a descriptive-causal theory?

In a reference theory a distinction is usually made between a theory of reference fixing and a theory of reference borrowing or transmission. According to a purely causal theory of reference borrowing, like Kripke's, the reference of a term – proper name and natural kind term – as used by borrowers is exclusively determined by its membership of a causal chain regardless of the descriptions or properties they could associate with the term, since these do not play any role in the reference determination of the term as used by borrowers. Although Devitt and Sterelny plead for a descriptive-causal theory of reference fixing for proper names and natural kind terms they advocate a purely causal theory of their reference borrowing.

The question arises as to whether a borrower's linguistic competence with a word is compatible with large ignorance or error about its referent, and in case he is required to know "very little" about the referent, what is the descriptive element that the competent borrower has to associate with the term. My proposal will be that the descriptive element required will be at least a categorial term that indicates the sort or type of entity referred to. Thus, I claim that a causal theorist should maintain a descriptive-causal theory of reference borrowing, which involves a causal chain in addition to some associated descriptive element, at least some categorial term.

Key words: reference borrowing, proper name, natural kind term, categorial term, causal theory

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On the difference between ambiguity, vagueness, and indeterminacy

"Ambiguity differs from vagueness" (Quine 1960: 129) or indeterminacy; they are similar phenomena but surely different. Surprisingly, some authors defend something like an ambiguity-vagueness continuum. According to this view it would be only a question of degree whether a term is vague or ambiguous (Tuggy 1993, Winter-Froemmel/Zirker 2010). I don't think that this account is correct but it's due to the lack of an adequate ambiguity criterion. Therefore, my aim is to argue for an *ambiguity criterion of rational assertability*. It's easy to find paradigmatic examples of ambiguity (1), vagueness (2), and indeterminacy (3) and we can distinguish them intuitively without difficulties:

(1) the *black knight* [a figure in the Arthurian legend/piece in the game of chess]
(2) Telly Savalas is *bald* [no hair/about 100 hairs on the head/…].
(3) Today is *someone's* [Peter's/Paul's/Mary's] birthday.

Do we need an ambiguity criterion if we can tell the difference between ambiguity and vagueness intuitively? We need a criterion because our intuition fails in less paradigmatic cases; there are two problems:

(a) *The problem of classification:* There are plenty of non-paradigmatic examples (Zwicky/Sadock 1975; Simpson 1970; Blackburn 1983; Atlas 1991), where it is not clear intuitively whether they are ambiguous, vague, or indeterminate.
(b) *The problem of the criterion:* so far, there is no criterion to distinguish between paradigmatic examples of ambiguity, vagueness, and indeterminacy.

The *ambiguity criterion of rational assertability* fits with our intuitive concept of ambiguity. A term or a sentence is ambiguous (in contrast to vague or indeterminate) iff (i) there are several interpretations/meanings of a term or sentence. And (ii) iff it is impossible for a rational speaker to assert a sentence meaningfully or to use a term appropriately without deciding on one of these several interpretations/meanings. If both conditions are met, it is a case of ambiguity.

Key words: ambiguity, vagueness, indeterminacy, ambiguity criterion

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Empirical study on selfless assertions

My paper considers the topic of so-called "selfless assertion" (Lackey 2007). An assertion that p is selfless if and only if (i) a speaker does not believe that p, (ii) is aware of reasonable evidence in favour of p, and (iii) she asserts that p. Thus, if a subject does not believe in the asserted claim (and knowledge requires belief), we can assert something which we do not know. Because of this, selfless assertion is made as an argument against the knowledge account of assertion (e.g. Williamson 1996), i.e., that we should assert only what we know.

I have two goals in my paper. Firstly, I will be criticizing Turri's (2014, 2015, 2016) empirical study on selfless assertion. According to Turri's studies, people believe in the content of what Lackey takes to be examples of selfless assertion. My critique of his claims will be threefold. First, I argue that his experimental vignettes do not contain all the essential options to participants and thus results do not reflect properly their mental state attributions; second, Turri does not consider an obvious issue that participants in his experiments have to ascribe contradictory mental states to characters in the described cases; third, I raise a worry that what is the subject of the majority of Turri's experiments is not knowledge, but only assertability in specific conditions.

The second goal of my paper is positive. I will submit my own proposal of an experimental study concerning this topic and a theoretical framework for cases of selfless assertion. I will be arguing that Turri's account cannot properly explain selfless assertion because he analyses those speech acts as genuine assertions. Because of this, I introduce which changes in Turri's experiments should be made to properly examine cases of selfless assertion. At the end, I will argue that we should not count them as cases of genuine assertion, but as belonging to the class of assertives.

Key words: assertion, selfless assertion, experimental philosophy, knowledge, belief

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Singular thought, cognitivism, and conscious attention

The focus of this paper will be on singular thoughts. In the first section I will present Jeshion's cognitivism; a view that holds that one should characterize singular thoughts by their cognitive roles. The paper will present and discuss some of the key examples that she uses to prime her intuitions that initially support her view, arguing that contrary to Jeshion's claim there are conflicting intuitions on how to understand those examples. In the second section I will argue that, also contrary to Jeshion's claims, results from studies of object tracking in cognitive psychology do not support cognitivism. First, the studies in object tracking do not support the view that information is loaded into object files and, second, the studies do not support Jeshion's view that we can have singular thoughts of objects that do not exist. In the third section I will discuss Jeshion's easy transmission of singular thought and argue that it ignores a relevant distinction between general and specific understanding of names, where a general understanding allows one to use a name competently without knowing what it refers to while the specific understanding encompasses general understanding as well as knowledge of a name's reference. Finally, the last section will argue that conscious attention should replace Jeshion's significance condition as a necessary condition for one to have a singular thought. The paper will show that we need to take seriously the acquaintance requirement for singular thoughts, as even the easy transmission of singular thoughts with the use of names will be called into question.

Key words: reference, singular thought, cognitivism, fingers of instantiation, acquaintance requirement

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Fictional objects and semantics: towards a hybrid view

Realism about fictional objects assumes that a satisfactory semantic account of proper names and quantifier phrases that occur in fictional discourse requires that there are fictional objects. Anti-realism about fictional objects avoids this assumption by suggesting that fictional discourse is not to be taken at face value; it proposes paraphrases of fictional sentences in which there is no reference to, nor quantification over, fictional objects. It is our aim to steer a middle course between these two opposites. We propose an account that is neither realist nor anti-realist. According to our view, fictional objects are purely semantic entities that are needed for a satisfactory account of semantic phenomena, but do not have a special kind of being. Fictional objects are modelled as individual roles that can be explicated as functions from possible worlds to individuals. Each role is associated with a set of requisites, i.e., properties that have to be instantiated by an object in order to be a functional value. Since the set contains mutually incompatible properties (such as *being a detective* along with *being non-existent*), these functions are undefined for all worlds. Nevertheless, if a fictional name occurs in the *de dicto* mode, it designates something, namely the role itself; the name is empty only provided it occurs in the *de re* mode. The *de dicto* vs. *de re* distinction is suitable for explaining the attributions of truth-values to various kinds of sentences involving fictional names or expressions seemingly quantifying over fictional objects. At the same time, the roles are cut out for explaining certain non-semantic phenomena, such as the authorial creation, the authors' and consumers' attitudes to fictions, or the identity conditions for fictional characters.

Key words: fictional discourse, fictional object, individual role, semantics, the *de dicto* vs. *de re* distinction

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Usage as an object of inquiry: an epistemological break for linguistics?

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Strawson, John Austin and Paul Grice emphasized in the 1950s that observation of the usage of natural languages should be the privileged object of inquiry for philosophy of language, this idea was not really taken into account and put into practice by linguists until forty years later. This situation could be described as "paradoxical", since appealing to usage is in itself a *sine qua non* condition for the elaboration of any linguistic theory, yet it remains true that the real consideration of usage through linguistic approaches at the end of the eighties resulted in upsetting the well-established order between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Understood to be the cause behind the change in linguistic forms and no longer as the updating of a system, the observation of usage questioned the Chomskian postulate on the autonomy of grammar and this theoretical break brought a paradigm shift taking full advantage of the semantic and pragmatic properties of the utterances in usage to construct syntax.

The aim of this paper is to propose an analysis of the theoretical changes induced by usage-based approaches to language. To do this, we will draw up a map of these changes and this study will lead us to show that the reciprocal restructuring of the domains of syntax, semantics and pragmatics also resulted in the revision of pivotal concepts within these three disciplinary fields. We will then highlight the domains, such as learning or the language-memory link, that usage-based approaches can more easily explain. The two previous studies will then offer us the opportunity to clarify why, when usage becomes the privileged object of inquiry, language can then be conceived as a natural and social system in continual evolution.

Key words: usage, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, epistemology, usage-based approach

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Semantic paradoxes and the "New Wittgenstein"

We are going to present a new approach to the problem of semantic paradoxes from the "New Wittgenstein" perspective on understanding language and nonsense. We will take this perspective as our starting point in criticism of traditional attempts to resolve paradoxes – we call these attempts "regulative". These approaches are at best inadequate and at worst simply inconsistent. What motivates the emergence of restrictive theories constraining the realm of acceptable linguistic constructions is the initial acknowledgement of the very semantic structures leading to paradoxes. So, postulating such a solution one either falls into contradiction with oneself by accepting the intelligibility of formulas which one subsequently excludes as nonsensical, or, like Tarski, stipulates that one's theory has application exclusively within artificially created formal languages, for natural language is doomed to inconsistencies and inaccuracies.

We believe that the approach to understanding inspired by Rush Rhees, Stanley Cavell and John McDowell and elaborated by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Rupert Read and other authors associated with the "New Wittgenstein" movement is a good starting point for a much more fruitful strategy of attacking the problem of semantic paradoxes. The "New Wittgenstein" approach underlines the importance of the Fregean context principle – developed later by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* – for a proper understanding of the problem of nonsensicality. According to this perspective, nonsense may not be gradable; nonsensical propositions cannot express any "deep truths", mainly because they are not real propositions at all – they are constructions only apparently similar to propositions.

Key words: semantic paradoxes, context principle, nonsense, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond

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Concepts as soft detectors – a naturalized framework of the notion of "concept"

Many researchers believe that concepts play a significant role in at least some perceptions. The intuition is rather old and can easily be traced back to Descartes and his deliberations on what can be simply "seen" and what can only be perceived by the "eye of reason". Some researchers say that the difference between direct and indirect perceptions manifests itself whenever we perceive abstract or general properties. Others point at second order properties or causal properties. Furthermore there is always a question as to how widespread concept dependent perceptions are. Can we attribute them to animals or infants? Are there concept users who are not at the same time language users?

The talk presents a proposition of an answer to the aforementioned questions by proposing a naturalistic explication of the notion of "concept" suitable both for philosophy of language and for philosophy of mind.

I propose to identify the role concepts play in perception with a mechanism of "soft detection". The best way to understand soft detectors is to differentiate them from hard detectors (receptors). The latter react to their targets because of the way they are built or because of the way they are embedded in the cognitive system. Contrary to this, soft detectors are to be understood as dynamic categorization devices which enable the system to selectively react to undetectable properties via flexible exploitation of data from hard detectors.

I show that concepts understood in this way explain many of the traditional intuitions associated with the notion of "concept" without creating confusion typical for the competing accounts.

Key words: concepts, direct perception, indirect perception, basic cognition, receptors

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Explaining away Kripke's Wittgenstein

Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* presents the infamous paradox of rule-following that Kripke finds in his reading of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. The paradox purports to show that words and thoughts have no content - that there is no such thing as intentionality.

This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, i.e., explanations of subjects' actions and thoughts in terms of their propositional attitudes. Under either of the two plausible conceptions of rational explanation, the paradox fails. If rational explanation is just a causal form of explanation, then the *a priori* requirements that the paradox places upon intentional content do not actually apply. If, on the other hand, rational explanation is more than just a causal form of explanation, then the supposed flaw in content ascription that gives the paradox traction is actually a feature of successful rational explanations, ones that advert to agents' (real, extant) intentional contents. Whichever conception of rational explanation turns out to be right, the paradox poses no threat to intentionality.

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Plurals: the linguistic semantics approach vs the philosophical approach

The plural idiom has been investigated both by philosophers (e.g. Boolos, Florio, Linnebo, McKay, Nicolas, Oliver, Smiley and Yi) and by linguists (e.g. Gillon, Link, Landman, Moltmann, Sharvy, Schein and Schwarzschild).

Despite their common object of study, there has not been much of a dialectical exchange between the two traditions. My aim in this paper is to put them side by side and provide some starting points for a fruitful dialogue. Naturally, the aims and interests of the philosopher and those of the linguist do not generally coincide. Consequently, neither do their methodologies.

The main motivations for the philosopher to engage with this debate are the search for solutions to paradox (historically steming from Boolos's work) and different forms of metaphysical nominalism. The rationale behind the linguistic work is different: plurals are present in ordinary language and thus semantic facts involving plurals should be accounted for by our best semantic theory. Linguists, as opposed to philosophers, are not particularly concerned with paradoxes arising in niche fragments of language. Moreover, they are not interested in metaphysical issues such as whether abstract entities exist or what the nature of sets is.

In this paper, I will point to and discuss some of the themes common to both parties. In particular, I will first focus on the extensional uses of plurals and examine the mainstream semanticist view of those – a form of singularism which helps itself to mereological sums and groups. I will argue that paradox lurks in the analysis. Secondly, I will survey the intensional uses of plurals and I will argue that the fact that philosophical scholarship on plurals has ignored intensionality is a deficiency. I will finish by looking into the linguistic treatment of plural intensionality and its potential use in philosophy.

Key words: plurals, plural logic, mereology, groups, intensionality, extensionality, paradox of groups, nominalism

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Communicative turn-taking and linguistic understanding

The paper examines consequences of recent psycholinguistic research on turn-taking (e.g. Levinson and Torreira, 2015; Garrod and Pickering, 2015; Levinson, 2016) for philosophical theories of linguistic understanding. According to the turn-taking literature for the gaps between subsequent utterances in conversations to be as short as they are (ca. 0.2 s), speakers have to start formulating their utterances long before the previous speaker's turn ends. In consequence, speakers usually react to what is their prediction of the content of the utterance on the basis of only part of the content they have actually heard. I argue that available philosophical theories of understanding cannot accommodate these results since they focus almost exclusively on the occurrent state of understanding, characterized either as a knowledge-like (Dummett, 1993; Davies, 1989; Heck, 1995), perception-like (Hunter, 1998; Fricker, 2003; Pettit, 2010) or a content entertaining state (Longworth, 2016). However, in fast turn-taking, through the most part of the time of production of our responses, we can neither know nor entertain nor even perceive the full content of the antecedent utterance. There is simply nothing to be known or perceived at this point. At best, something to be anticipated. I propose an alternative account on which understanding is characterized as an event of cognitive processing taking place upon hearing an utterance in a language the hearer is disposed to understand. My approach may thus be characterized as an understanding event monism and understanding states pluralism, in which one type of cognitive event gives rise to different types of occurrent states. Such a solution allows us not only to accommodate the empirical results of turn-taking research, but also incorporate advantages of different accounts that up to this point were supposed to be mutually exclusive.

Key words: linguistic understanding, turn-taking, communication, language faculty, speech processing

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Relational nouns, inverse linking and long-distance indefinites: a unified dependent type account

In this talk, we develop a new account of the so-called relational nouns (e.g. *representative*, *solution*) from the perspective of a semantic system combining generalized quantifiers with dependent types (Grudzińska, Zawadowski, 2017a,b). Whereas in the Montagovian setting relational nouns are interpreted as two-place relations (expressions of type <e,<e, t>>), our framework allows us to interpret them as dependent types (Martin-Löf, 1984; Makkai, 1995). We then use our dependent type account of relational nouns to provide a uniform treatment of the two puzzling phenomena: inverse linking (May, 1977, 1985; Larson, 1985; Barker and Shan, 2014) and long-distance indefinites (Chierchia, 2001; Schwarz, 2001).

Key words: relational noun, inverse linking, long-distance indefinite, dependent type

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The legacy of philosophical pragmatism in explaining the bio-cultural origin of folk psychology

Our aim will be to show how pragmatic approaches to meaning and knowledge are deployed in contemporary discussion on the origin of folk psychologies (theories of mind). In other words, we want to demonstrate how the classic ideas of John Dewey and William James allow for a deeper understanding of bio-cultural origins of the mindreading ability. Citing Katherine Nelson's work, we will demonstrate the way pragmatic views are incorporated into theories given the label of "developmental systems," which aim to explain, among others, the phenomenon of mindreading (Nelson, 2005, 2007). Pragmatism is central there as experience is claimed to be the interface where biological and cultural factors come together in an integrated system and give birth to meanings that lie at the very base of folk theories about the mind. We are interested in the question of whether such a view, presenting folk theories of mind (folk psychologies) as composed of meanings scaffolded in a pragmatic interplay of biological and cultural factors, makes for a serious alternative to theories based on the computational model of the mind (Fodor, 1975, 1983) that view folk psychologies as conceptually rooted in cognitive mechanisms inherent to the human mind (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Carruthers, 2013, 2015). Conclusions will highlight the aspects in which the pragmatic framework outclasses the computational model, as well as those which still pose a problem to systemic analyses.

Key words: mindreading, theory of mind, folk psychology, developmental systems, pragmatism, integrated systems

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Expressive meanings and commitments *de lingua*

Expressives, i.e., words such as 'damn' or 'bastard', seem to convey a specific kind of content, different from, or on top of, 'regular' descriptive meaning. Following the seminal work of Chris Potts (2005) the meaning of expressives is often conceptualized in a 'two-dimensional' semantic framework, in which descriptive and expressive contents are separated as a result of special rules of semantic composition (cf. Gutzmann 2015). This approach is successful in accounting for some interesting semantic properties of expressives, e.g. their projective behavior, and has also been extended to other classes of expressions, such as racial slurs or honorifics. However, it does not offer any actual insight into the nature of expressive meaning (the two-dimensional formalism operates on dummy values, independently of what they may stand in for).

The present paper offers an alternative, *pragmatic*, account of expressives, based, among other things, on the observation that expressive meanings seem to directly involve *the speaker* (her states, emotions or attitudes) rather than just abstract (e.g. truth-conditional) contents. The account is developed in a commitment-based scorekeeping model of discourse (based on Lewis 1979 and Brandom 1994), in which hearers interpret speakers' utterances by attributing commitments to them. Besides assertoric commitments (and potentially other kinds), commitments *de lingua* (cf. Harris 2016) can be distinguished. These are commitments to the appropriateness or applicability of a given expression, which also can be attributed to speakers based on their utterances (separately from assertoric commitments). What characterizes expressives as a lexical class is that they always raise the issue of speaker's *de lingua* commitment. In short, expressive meanings are commitments to the appropriateness of strongly charged (often vulgar or taboo) vocabulary – which, in turn, can signal a speaker's heightened emotional state, negative attitude etc.

Key words: expressives, commitment, commitment de lingua, scorekeeping, multidimensional semantics

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What is this thing they call "home"?
Temporal standpoint-dependence and proper objects of reference

Some uses of the term "home" are understandable descriptivistically as straightforwardly specifying some place defined by a mutually agreed set of features (e.g. "I want to go home!", interpreted as meaning "I wish to return to my current non-temporary place of residence"). Others lend themselves more to being understood along the lines of causal-historical accounts of proper names and indexicals, as labels rigidly designating some place for particular users, in ways fixed by an initial baptism (e.g. "That's 'home' for me!", interpreted as meaning "That place there will always count as 'home' for me!").

Elements of both of the above may also show up in one and the same use, pointing to a hybrid account of reference (cf. Evans) in which descriptively specifying and rigidly designating elements each play a necessary but insufficient role in securing reference (e.g. "It was only when I had really got to know the other people living there that I was prepared to call that place 'home'").

Nevertheless, merely noting such instances does not shed light on the question of what distinctive sort of referential object such hybrid forms might imply. In particular, it does not allow us to determine whether the sort of thing that may count as a proper object of such references is itself constituted as a hybrid, or whether this feature only reflects structural distinctions operative at the level of language. In my paper I will make use of the notion of temporal standpoint-dependence to give an account of how this question might be answered for cases involving the term 'home' – one that may also be extended to cover a number of other cases.

Key words: reference, descriptivism, rigid designator, temporal standpoint-dependence, home, place

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Constitutive rules and language games

There is a long tradition in the analytic philosophy of language of considering language as somehow analogous to games. The view that language is a game could be understood in at least two ways. First, that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by rules. Second, that types of speech acts are constituted by rules. But some aspects of the idea of "constitutive rules" have not been investigated thoroughly. Searle (1969) characterizes constitutive rules by their form: "X in circumstances C counts as Y". Such an account is highly controversial because it makes it impossible to break such a rule (and it is obvious that many rules of practices can be violated). The second problem (Glüer and Pagin 1998) is the question of how to differentiate a situation when violation of the constitutive rule terminates the activity, from the case when it is just an "illegal" move within the practice.

In my presentation I intend to investigate closely the idea of constitutive rules, which is a background for philosophical theories that language is a game. I plan to avoid those problems the Searlian account faces by looking carefully at complicated practices established and governed by rules. The model example of such practices are games. I plan to determine what constitutive rules are exactly thanks to thorough investigation, how games are constituted by rules. Philosophers have hitherto mainly analyzed the game of chess, which seems to me not the best analogy for reflection on language. The game of chess is constituted by a relatively small number of rules and is quite unforgiving with the issue of violating its rules. I am convinced that if we look carefully at more complicated games (like basketball or football), that allow for breaking the rules without terminating the game, it is possible to avoid problems that traditional accounts of constitutive rules have faced and, therefore, make a more credible analogy between games and language.

Key words: constitutive rules, language games, Searle, rules of games, system of rules

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The vague, the evaluative, and the subjective – a classification of adjectives

In my talk, I propose a certain classification of evaluative adjectives. I hypothesize that the basic criterion to distinguish between evaluative and descriptive terms is the faultless disagreement test (which predicts that purely descriptive terms do not give rise to this kind of disagreements). Next, I discuss a few kinds of phenomena which seem to render this distinction dubious: context-sensitivity, vagueness and using descriptive terms to express evaluative judgments. Further, I investigate Ch. Kennedy's proposal (2016) according to which gradable adjectives can express two kinds of subjectivity (one being generated by vagueness and one stemming from evaluativity). I modify this account by postulating another sub-class of subjective adjectives which are not subjective due to vagueness but which are not evaluative either as they do not necessarily encode any valence. I call them "experiential" since they require that the speaker has some kind of interaction with the object she is describing with the use of these terms. I propose a linguistic test to identify these expressions. Finally, I check where my classification of adjectives places the predicate of personal taste "tasty". I suggest that "tasty" is both evaluative and experiential and, additionally, it carries a condition of its own use, that is the information that it can be used to positively assess the taste of something. This, I argue, makes it similar to thin evaluative terms as it carries no descriptive component at all.

Key words: faultless disagreement, subjectivity, evaluativity, predicates of personal taste, vagueness

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Meaning holism and analyticity again

In his severe criticism of Meaning Holism, Michael Devitt (1996) attempted to prove that (among other things) there are no good reasons to adopt that theory. He presented a series of sophisticated arguments against some arguments for Meaning Holism (MH). One group of such arguments concerns the notorious analytic-synthetic distinction (A/S), as it is commonly said that rejecting the distinction inevitably leads to accepting holism. Devitt focuses particularly on the inferential roles holism, according to which meaning of an expression is determined by all of its inferential roles, and he argues that:

    (I) accepting MH in fact does not eliminate A/S but rather supports it;

    (II) even if A/S is abandoned, MH entails some analogue of A/S;

    (III) Molecularism – which is Devitt's own anti-holistic approach – does not entail acceptance of (any analogue of) A/S.

In my paper I will argue against Devitt. To reject (I) I am going to make two following steps:

    (i) based on Peter Pagin's (2008) considerations, I will show that although some versions of holism may indeed be said to support A/S, the version of MH which I regard as the most reasonable does not;

    (ii) I will show that Devitt made quite a simple mistake as he apparently treated the rejection of analyticity as something that leads to holism.

Regarding (II) I will argue that even if MH is quite easy to reconcile with some analogue of A/S, it does not entail any distinction of that kind. With regard to (III) I will attempt to show that it is the definition of Molecularism alone which entails some counterpart of A/S.

Key words: meaning holism, semantic holism, inferential roles, analytic-synthetic, molecularism, atomism

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Deferred reference, meaning transfer and proper names

In typical cases of deferred use, an indexical refers to an object (a deferred referent) which is not present in the immediate context of the utterance by way of a different object (an index), which is present in the context and related in a contextually salient manner to the deferred referent (e.g. reference to an author by way of pointing to his book). Such uses were first analyzed by Nunberg (1978, 1993). At first Nunberg (1978) proposed deferred reference for the analysis of examples such as "the ham sandwich":

(*)   The ham sandwich left without paying. [uttered by a waiter in a restaurant]

But in (1993) and (1995) he argued that this analysis does not generalise and proposed instead a version with the help of meaning transfer. Meaning transfer is an operation on predicates in which "the name of a property that applies to something in one domain can … be used as the name of a property that applies to things in another domain" (Nunberg 1995, 111).

Fara (2015a,b) referred to Nunberg in her defence of predicativism against arguments relying on Costume Examples ("Two Obamas came to our Halloween Party", Jeshion 2012, 2015). She used the term "deferred interpretation". I argue that her defence rests on an equivocation and collapses - for different reasons - both if deferred interpretation is understood as deferred reference and when it is understood as meaning transfer. The conclusion will be that Fara's defence is unsubstantiated. Finally, I will sketch an alternative analysis of the mentioned examples which relies on a mechanism that deploys features of both deferred reference and meaning transfer. My analysis will also provide an explanation of the psycho-linguistic results of McElree et al. (2006) according to which not all forms of metonymic transfer are equally taxing for the language comprehension system.

Key words: deferred reference, meaning transfer, deferred interpretation, predicativism, proper names

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Truly practical 'ought' and its logical structure

According to John Broome, the central normative ought is agentive ought, i.e., telling the agent what she *ought to do* where this agentive ought is to be accounted for in terms of *owned ought*. In deontic logic owned oughts are often referred to as 'personal obligations'. Owned oughts are typically represented by agential 'ought' sentences of the general form '*S* ought to *phi*'. However, agential 'ought' sentences are tricky since some of them ascribe ownership and others do not, and we cannot tell which from their grammar. Compare the sentences: 'Peter ought to brush his teeth at least twice a day' and 'Kate ought to get a promotion'. These two sentences have the same surface logical form, but that is misleading as the former sentence is naturally interpreted as having agentive content which is not so in the case of the latter. In Broome's terminology we will say that ought in the first sentence is *owned*, whereas ought in the second sentence is *unowned*. I shall criticize Broome's account on two fronts. First, I show that ownership is not a plausible candidate for the hallmark of agentive ought since ownership is not necessarily a normative notion. Second, I show that Broome's logical interpretation of owned ought fails by its own standards. I argue that what matters is authorship and not ownership. I also propose a logical interpretation of authorship.

Key words: Broome, truly practical 'ought', owned ought, logical form, authorship

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Ernest Hemingway's short story "Mr. and Mrs. Elliot": the case of Romantic philosophy inverted

One of the fundamental elements of Romantic philosophy is "the subject of the divided and the reunited mind" (Abrams 1973: 292). The opposition of unity and fragmentation reflected the condition of fast social, political, and industrial change of the early 19th century (Abrams 1973: 293).

Romantic philosophy employed the Neoplatonic (Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysus, John Scotus Erigena) term "love" to refer to all cohesive forces that countered the processes of fragmentation (Abrams 1973: 293). The concept is present in the works of Blake, Shelley, Wordsworth, Schiller, Hegel, and others, which often blend it with the element of wandering or pilgrimage culminating in the hero's return to where he had started, that is, to unity (Abrams 1973: 294-295, 193).

Based on elements of narratology (Campbell 1949; Hogan 2003) and Cognitive Poetics (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Kövecses 2006), the paper argues that Hemingway's short story "Mr. and Mrs. Elliot" inverts the Romantic philosophical formula in that its narrative reflects the journey from disunity to partial unity and back to disunity. Eros as a form of love functions as a force that finally fails to unite the two young persons. The inverted Romantic plot serves as the source domain of the cognitive metaphor MENTAL IS PHYSICAL, which – together with a number of category- and place-related metonymies – represents the condition of the Americans that lived in Europe after World War I and often represented the "lost generation" attitude (Horton and Edwards 1967: 321-322).

Key words: disunity, Eros, journey, metaphor, metonymy, narrative, Romantic, unity

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Odd conditionals and the limits of pragmatic explanations

It is a common intuition that the antecedent of an indicative conditional should have something to do with its consequent, that they should be somehow connected. The lack of a relevant kind of a connection seems to be precisely the reason why missing-link conditionals, e.g.:

(1)   If kangaroos have no gills, then they cannot fly.

strike us as odd. On those theories of conditionals that validate the Principle of Centering, such as the material account (Grice 1989) or Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics (Stalnaker 1968), the truth of this conditional's antecedent ("kangaroos have no gills") and its consequent ("they cannot fly") is enough to infer the truth of (1), while on the Suppositional account which denies that conditionals are truth-apt at all (Edgington 1995), (1) is highly acceptable. Proponents of these theories claim that the oddity of missing-link conditionals is simply a matter of pragmatics, yet no one has offered a full-fledged pragmatic explanation of why they appear odd and what is the nature of the connection conditionals seem to suggest (Douven 2015).

In this talk, we argue against the view that the intuition that conditionals convey the presence of a connection between their antecedents and consequents is a pragmatic phenomenon. We present results of an experimental study of various factors that can affect people's evaluation of different kinds of conditionals. In particular, we investigated how the presence or absence of an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent and the type of content a conditional expresses can influence people's assertability judgments of both conditionals and conjunctions. Finally, we argue that our results cannot be reconciled with the available pragmatic explanations of the oddity of missing-link conditionals, and hence they pose a challenge to any semantics of conditionals that does not posit the need for a connection between antecedent and consequent.

Key words: indicative conditionals, assertability, pragmatics, semantics, Principle of Centering

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Utterance interpretation without utterance meaning

It's commonly assumed that an important task of a theory of meaning is to tell how the meaning of an utterance is determined. Intentionalism takes the speaker's (S) intention to settle utterance meaning. There may be constraints on intention formation, but intentionalists insist that epistemic considerations don't interfere with metaphysical meaning determination. Anti-intentionalism takes public features (conventional meaning and contextual cues) available to the hearer (H) to determine utterance meaning. Aspects of these two basic approaches may combine to form various intermediate positions. In order to argue for their position, theorists have recourse to intuitions concerning cases of divergence between S's intended and H's assigned meaning, as well as to general assumptions regarding the purpose of communication, accessibility, accountability and the structure of thought and belief.

I argue that S and H's interaction supports neither intentionalism nor anti-intentionalism, but rather suggests there's no such thing as utterance meaning. In cases of divergence, H often submits to S's clarification, but that doesn't imply intention settles utterance meaning. Rather S's original utterance is, as it were, erased and replaced by a novel utterance understood by H to S's satisfaction. The account of communicative success doesn't require more than convergence between S's intended and H's assigned meaning. Nor does accountability require settling utterance meaning. In cases where H wants to hold S responsible for her utterance, H need argue merely for the reasonableness of her interpretation and S's responsibility for its content. Thus, interpretive practice is dominated by the questions 'What is S's intention?' and 'What was S most reasonably taken to mean?', neither of which presupposes any notion of utterance meaning.

This account may be extended to intentionalism and anti-intentionalism in aesthetic interpretation. The opposition between authorial intention and aesthetic significance disappears once 'the meaning of the work' is abandoned.

Key words: utterance interpretation, utterance meaning, intentionalism, anti-intentionalism, subjective truth conditions

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Is TRUTH primitive?

Primitivism is the view that TRUTH is a primitive concept – that is, one which cannot be analysed without invoking the concept itself. For the primitivist, TRUTH is conceptually fundamental. The leading contemporary defender of primitivism is Jamin Asay. In this talk I explain why he thinks that TRUTH is a primitive concept; and I defend Wolfgang Künne's analysis of propositional truth in terms of sentential quantification from Asay's arguments.

Key words: truth, primitivism, quantification, logical connectives, analysis, Asay, Künne

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I-Semantics: Foundational Questions

The problem that will be addressed in this talk can be formulated as follows: what is the relationship between the notion of an internalized linguistic competence, as conceived by the generative program, and a semantic theory? In other words, what is the scope of a semantic theory consistent with the theoretical assumptions adopted by the generative program? I will compare two approaches: the denotational approach, according to which syntactic derivations are inputs to truth conditional interpretation, and the intensional approach, according to which the syntactic derivations constrain, but do not determine, truth conditions. I argue that the first approach leads us to a dilemma: if the semantic structure is isomorphic to the syntagmatic structure, we multiply the terms of explanation, without explanatory advantage. If there is no isomorphism, we have an even more serious problem, because we can not explain the explanatory success of certain syntactic principles (such as the asymmetry between external and internal argument, for example). Therefore, the denotational approach does not provide the proper idealization; it's not able to extend the positive heuristic of the generative program. I argue that the intensional approach, by contrast, increases the positive heuristic of the generative program, because it is able to explain important empirical generalizations discovered by the generative program (and not simply redescribe them). I argue that the formulation of an I-semantics requires, necessarily, a revision of traditional and tacitly accepted assumptions regarding the nature of natural language semantics. I argue that the I-Semantics explains the etiology of the computational principles underlying interface phenomena, not the implementation of these operations, how sentences can be used to make true or false assertions.

Key words: syntax-semantics interface, generativism, logical form, compositionality, philosophy of linguistics

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Varieties of contradiction

The concept of contradiction plays a fundamental role in both philosophy and logic. For example, we believe that contradictions form the ultimate black mark against the adequacy of a theory and use them in constructing formal proofs for theories. We should hope then to have a precise understanding of what contradictions are. Given this, it's surprising that little time has been spent considering and evaluating the available definitions of 'contradiction' in the literature, as has been done with other important logical concepts such as logical consequence, truth, and assertion.

This talk takes on this much needed project, arguing that multiple non-equivalent definitions of 'contradiction' occur within the literature, some of which are often treated as though they were equivalent. Four general categories of definitions of contradiction are introduced: *semantic*, which define contradictions in terms of semantic properties, *syntactic*, which define contradictions in terms of their form, *pragmatic*, which define contradictions in terms of types of speech-acts, and *ontological*, which define contradictions in terms of existence and the possession of properties. The different types of definitions within each category are then explored, with particular emphasis placed upon three common types of semantic definitions:

Truth-Conditional Account: Contradictions are (sets of) logically false propositions.

Explosion Account: Contradictions are (sets of) propositions that imply every proposition.

Structured Account: Contradictions are conjunctions of propositions and their respective negations.

It's argued that, contrary to what is often proposed, none of these three forms of definition of 'contradiction' are equivalent. This first result then triggers the second question of which of these definitions is the most philosophically plausible, given that they all pick out different sets of propositions. In order to partially answer this question, the talk proposes some considerations which demonstrate that the *truth-conditional* and *explosion* accounts aren't as reasonable as they originally seemed.

Key words: logical definitions, contradictions, law of non-contradiction, contradictories, truth-conditions, explosion

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The Kantian turn in the study of language

Both philosophy of language and linguistics have often taken an 'absolute' third person (3P) perspective on reference. For example, the denotation of a 1P pronoun is often analyzed as equivalent to a 3P nominal like 'the speaker'. Similar strategies are pursued for tense, modals and other so-called indexicals, like 'today' or 'now', which are standardly defined in absolute rather than relative terms.

We propose a Kantian turn to linguistics, presenting a system centered on the notion of a *transcendental subject* as a condition of possibility of human language. Kant argued that experience is necessarily that of a subject; that is, experience is always relative to a subject and thus provides the subject with a perspective upon the experienced. We argue that grammar is similarly perspectival, by systematically relating person/space, time and modality of what is said to the speech act's context which is 'fixed' by the 1P/origo. We argue that this system may not only be crucial to the way we communicate our thoughts to others, but also play an important role in our human specific cognition more generally. We delineate how the study of grammar may in this way shed light onto topics that have long been at the very heart of philosophy, such as intentionality, self-consciousness, and the formal ontology through which we perceive the world.

Our approach is embedded in a theory of the ontogenetic (and phylogenetic) development of the first person as summarized in (1):

(1) The emergence of the transcendental subject occurs as a triangulation schema based on Person that creates a deictic frame through which we can refer intentionally, opening up the way to both the system of extended deixis we call grammar, and the conscious self.

Key words: Kant, transcendental subject, deixis, Person, intentionality, self, grammar

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Can entailments be implicatures?

Recanati (1989: 316) convincingly argues that the semantic content of an utterance and the conversational implicature(s) that that utterance may carry need not be logically independent. In particular, he shows that it is not difficult to find uncontroversial cases of conversational implicatures that entail what is said. But can an entailment of what is said be the implicatum of an utterance of it? Bach (2005: 5) argues that it can. Such cases, although infrequent, are possible: "Suppose someone says to you, 'Nobody has ever long-jumped over 28 feet.' You reply, 'Whad'ya mean? Bob Beamon long-jumped over 29 feet way back in 1968.' Here you are clearly implicating that somebody has long-jumped over 28 feet. But this is entailed by the fact that Beamon long-jumped over 29 feet."

However, Bach's position is not the most popular one in the literature. Following Grice (1989), it is common to take one or more of the criteria for identifying implicatures to rule out entailments from this class. These criteria include: being intended to be conveyed to an audience, being cancellable, reinforceable, non-detachable, indeterminate, calculable etc. Neale (1992: 19), for instance, notes that explicit or contextual cancellability successfully distinguishes conversational implicatures from entailments. However, it is not uncontroversial that cancellability is a necessary condition for conversational implicatures, as the recent debate on this topic indicates (see Haugh 2013). On the other hand, Sadock (1978) and Sperber and Wilson (1986: 107-8), among others, suggest that only one feature, calculability, is clearly a necessary property of conversational implicatures. I argue that entailments, when they are both calculable and intended to be conveyed ("invited inferences", to use the terminology of Geis and Zwicky 1971) count as genuine pragmatic phenomena in the vicinity of implicatures. Depending on further assumptions, they might or might not be classified as conversational implicatures.

Key words: entailments, conversational implicatures, cancellability, calculability, invited inference

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Relativism vs. contextualism

An expression is indexical when it expresses different contents in different contexts. 'I', 'now', and 'here' are indexicals. When Sally utters the sentence 'I am here now' on Tuesday in London and Susan utters the same sentence on Thursday in Barcelona, different thoughts are expressed. A sentence is assessment relative when different utterances of that sentence express the same proposition, but that proposition has different truth values relative to different parameters associated with those utterances. For example, on the standard account, a contingent proposition is true at one world and false at another.

When we find one utterance of a sentence being correct while another utterance of the same sentence is incorrect, how do we decide whether a contextualist or relativist explanation is to be preferred? I argue that the issue can be settled by noticing that relativist accounts carry metaphysical commitments. At the basic level, an atomic proposition is true in virtue of individuals instantiating properties and standing in relations to one another. If the truth of those propositions shifts across a parameter, then it follows that an individual's instantiating a property also shifts across that parameter and so how reality is constituted is perspectival with respect to that parameter. While some may take this to show that relativist accounts are always false, as reality is constituted absolutely - reality is not perspectival - I argue that there are good reasons for thinking that reality is fundamentally perspectival with respect to times and possible worlds and so relativist accounts of temporal and modal variation are to be preferred. By contrast, because there are good reasons to think that reality is not perspectival with respect to space, persons, and standards of taste, precision, and justification, for example, the same considerations support contextualist accounts of phenomena associated with variations across those values.

Key words: contextualism, relativism, truth, modality, tense

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A moderate relativist account of sub-sentential speech acts and the argument from connectivity

The most commonly given examples of sub-sentential speech acts are expressions such as "Nice dress", "From Spain", "Where?" etc. uttered in such circumstances in which speakers uttering them are regarded as "making moves in a language game", e.g. stating, asking, promising etc. The argument from connectivity is one of the most important arguments for the claim that such utterances – contrary to appearances – are in fact ellipses, i.e. sentential speech acts. The argument uses examples from inflectional languages, such as Polish or German, in which allegedly sub-sentential speech acts (e.g. "Obiema rękami" (Both hands. DAT) said by a father to his little daughter drinking hot chocolate from a glass) appear in cases other than the nominative. Those who think that they are just fragments of longer unpronounced sentences have no problem in explaining where the case comes from, but for those who think that such utterances are truly sub-sentential the answer is more problematic. In my talk I'd like to argue that the argument is by no means conclusive and the defenders of sub-sentential speech acts need not be worried by connectivity effects. I'll suggest a moderate relativist account (see Recanati 2008) of sub-sentential speech acts on which connectivity can be explained. Recanati's relativism presupposes two principles: duality and distribution. In the case of sub-sentential speech acts we have to postulate a two-staged principle of distribution: it's not only the case that the determinants of truth-value distribute over content and circumstance, but also the content itself is distributed over the locutionary what is said and the situation of the utterance. The explanation of connectivity effects is that the speakers use cases other than the nominative in order to simplify the process of enrichment for the hearers. The cases make it easier to determine which completion of the articulated content is admissible.

Key words: connectivity effects, ellipsis, moderate relativism, situation-relativity, sub-sentential speech acts

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I am here now: the necessity of a bifocal logic

The way in which human beings are able to interact with what surrounds them through the tool of speech is the driving force and the core of an endless philosophical and linguistic debate. Inasmuch as, we are a context, we express a context, we assume a context and we build a context. What makes us able to do all this is our capacity of using words. However, what is important to us is to consider from a logical-philosophical perspective what role the context plays in determining the meaning of a sentence. What is studied here is how two distant, although related, positions - those of Lewis and Kaplan - build a theoretical necessity in treating the topic of indexing. We start our study debating the indexical octuple, and from Lewis we will move in the direction of the Kaplanian double-indexing, as formally introduced by Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach. After having discussed what we mean by logical truth and how this is recognized in a theory no longer based upon the generalization of indexes, we finally define the necessity of a *bifocal* logic, as we have labelled it here. That is, a logic which simultaneously takes into account both the context of use and the circumstances of evaluation.

Key words: context, indexing, extension, intension, semantics, demonstratives

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Relativism and opacity

The aim of this paper is to show that a relativist approach to the analysis of opaque attitude ascriptions (an approach according to which the truth-value of the proposition expressed by the ascription would be relative to a mode of presentation fixed by a free process which would be triggered by the terms used) is able to cope with some of the problems that both Russellian and Fregean alternatives face, such as the transparency of iterated attitude ascriptions, cross-attitudinal anaphora, and the challenge of accommodating modes of presentation within the logical form of the proposition expressed. Moreover, this analysis would cash out on the usual benefits of relativist semantics concerning disagreement.

Key words: relativism, opacity, attitude ascription, disagreement, anaphora

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Variability, rigidity and the nesting problem

To block controversial predictions of 2D semantics (*The Nesting Problem*) Chalmers and Rabern (2014) proposed adding an additional constraint called 'the liveness constraint' in definitions of epistemic modals. Without this constraint, all scenario-world pairs counterfactual to a scenario-world pair considered as actual in a 2D matrix for a contingent a priori proposition were problematic for 2D semantics. This is because although it is false that... in such pairs, it is a priori true that... . I argue that 2D semantics still have controversial predictions for counterfactual scenario-world pairs – adding the liveness constraint to the definition of epistemic conceivability operator causes contingent propositions to appear as inconceivable in such scenario-world pairs. At the end of my talk I will show that the need to keep two conflicting ideas together, namely variability and rigidity for proper names, opens 2D semantics to an objection similar to Kripke's one against descriptivism.

Key words: two-dimensional semantics, the nesting problem, proper names, epistemic operators, rigidity, contingent a priori, conceivability

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Can distal reference be naturalized?

In their recent book *Minds without Meanings* Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn present a project of naturalization of what they think is the basic semantic relation, namely reference. The bulk of their project is devoted to the naturalization of reference of items of language of thought to object in the perceptual field of the subject.

In my talk, however, I want to focus on the problem of naturalization of reference to objects outside the perceptual field (I should call this phenomenon "distal reference"). According to Fodor and Pylyshyn the relation of distal reference can be naturalized by reference to the causal theory of reference in the spirit of Kripke.

I will argue that such a conception doesn't succeed in naturalizing distal reference. In my opinion, even if we show that there is a natural, causal relation which ties a linguistic token (either of public language or of language of thought) to its putative distal referent, this is not enough to show that we have naturalized the relation of reference. In order to do so, I will propose certain desiderata which the theory which purports to naturalize reference should meet. Such a theory should show that the putative natural relations which are to serve as natural designates of "reference" form a uniform and scientifically useful kind. But this is not the case with Fodor and Pylyshyn's conception. So, the problem of naturalization of distal reference remains open.

Key words: reference, naturalism, natural kinds, referentialism, causal theories

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Case, grammatical meaning, and the syntax-semantics interface

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a tension between two perspectives on the grammatical category of case and their consequences for the conception of the relation between syntax and semantics. The challenges posed by the need to account for morphological case variation have inspired a large body of research within generative linguistics. This has resulted in a number of approaches and above all in what amounts to the typology of cases, with the significant distinction between structural (abstract) Case and morphological (lexical, inherent, dependent, semantic) case. The former has a purely formal character and depends on structural factors, whereas the latter involves semantic factors (thematic meaning) or idiosyncratic properties of a case-assigning lexical item.

More recently Hinzen (2014) proposes a radical reconceptualization of case in terms of grammatical meaning, understood as meaning that depends on grammatical organization and is unavailable lexically or non-linguistically. Crucially, he argues that forms of reference (object, event, proposition) arise grammatically rather than lexically and are based on relations captured by structural Case in Minimalist syntax. As a result, structural Case is no longer a meaningless aspect linguistic organization, because it is linked with 'formal-ontological distinctions' (in Hinzen's terms).

There is a tension then between the linguistically-oriented approach, where (at least some aspects of) case are purely formal (meaningless) and the philosophically-oriented approach, where receives treatment in terms of grammatically-established reference. These two stances have important consequences for the view of the relation between syntax and semantics (the so-called syntax-semantics interface), and thus on the overall architecture of language. The current position in the Minimalist framework is that the derivational syntactic engine and the semantic component are distinct systems. The referentiality-based 'rationalization' of Case proposed by Hinzen (2014) is in line with his earlier attempts (2006, 2009, 2012) to demonstrate that syntax is hardly distinguishable from the system responsible for abstract thought.

Key words: types of case, structural case, morphological case, grammatical meaning, syntax-semantics interface

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Value disagreement and dual aspect semantics

If two speakers disagree about an evaluative term like 'torture' in a sentence like 'Waterboarding is torture', do they only talk past each other? On the basis of work by Plunkett & Sundell (P&S) (2011, 2013, 2014), I lay out why existing contextualist and relativist proposals, which were originally developed for predicates of personal taste, fail to explain such value disagreement, but also criticize their own metalinguistic negotiation view. According to P&S, speakers negotiate the best use of a notion on the basis of '... sociological facts about its sociological role' (P&S 2013: p. 25), and the value disagreement can be substantial because there is something '... substantive at stake in how the relevant terms are used in the context [...] and the speakers recognize this fact.' (ibid.)

I argue that P&S are right in claiming that some of their own examples have a metalinguistic flavor, as they implicitly concern the question of what a given term *really* means. However, it can be shown that speakers do not negotiate the 'best use' of a term in value disputes and that despite their efforts P&S fail to argue convincingly that under the negotiation view the disagreement in question remains substantial. Instead, I propose a dual aspect theory of meaning that is based on a suggestion that Putnam (1975ab) made in the context of arguing for semantic externalism. Speakers agree about a truth-conditionally incomplete core meaning, a stereotype in Putnam's parlance, of a value term while disagreeing about the noumenal meaning or what it really means. I show that once it is elaborated, such a dual aspect theory of meaning can solve the puzzles raised by (supposedly) metalinguistic negotiation examples and that the same type of disagreement also occurs with other theoretical general terms like 'atom'.

Key words: value disagreement, contextualism, relativism, truth-conditional semantics, dual aspect theories

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Naïve Russellians and the Goldbach Puzzle

Following the work of Kaplan, Kripke, Perry and Donnellan Naive Russellians like Salmon, Soames and Braun hold that

(DR_N) The content of 'n is F' with respect to a context c is the singular proposition $\langle o, \phi \rangle$, where o is the referent of the name n with respect to c and ϕ is the property expressed by F with respect to c.

(G) A sentence of the form 'A believes that S' is true with respect to a context c iff the referent of A with respect to c believes the proposition expressed by S with respect to c.

I will call this 'the Naive Russellian theory'. It suggests itself that within the Naive Russellian theory also (DR_G) is true.

(DR_G) The content of 'A believes that S' with respect to a context c is the singular proposition $\langle \langle o, p \rangle, \text{BELIEVE} \rangle$, where o is the referent of A with respect to c and p is the proposition expressed by S with respect to c.

In this talk, I will argue that together with (DR_N) and (G) this leads to unacceptable consequences. For example, I will argue that there are cases where (1) is true and (2) is false.

(1)   Peter believes that Ralph believes Goldbach's Conjecture.

(2)   Peter believes that Ralph believes that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes.

Since it follows from (DR_N), (DR_G) and (G) that (1) is true if and only if (2) is true, we will have to reject (DR_N), (DR_G) or (G). This is the Goldbach puzzle. I will argue that within the Naive Russellian theory the solution of the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject (DR_G). It will follow that we have to abandon the Naïve Russellian theory. Concluding, I will discuss the possibility to reject (G) and to claim with Crimmins and Perry that 'believe' denotes a three-place relation holding between agents, propositions and modes of presentation.

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Making sense of embedded implicatures

There is a well-known kind of objection to Grice's account of conversational implicature (CI) — one which, while not threatening the very notion, identifies a problem with the way Grice and most subsequent mainstream work in philosophy of language has implemented it. The objection builds on cases of alleged conversational implicatures which seem to be generated from clauses which fall under the scope of some logical operator or propositional attitude verb. These cases challenge Grice's account of CI, which is generally committed to the idea that CIs are generated from complete utterances, rather than unasserted sub-clauses. Assuming Grice's view holds, this is thus taken to generate a *reductio* argument against the possibility of embedded implicatures, and, hence, to show that the data that allegedly exemplify them must be accounted for in some other way.

Mandy Simons has in recent work questioned this argument on the grounds that it conflates two distinct things, namely (i) the fact that a pragmatic effect (e.g. a CI) is embedded and (ii) the fact that the pragmatic inference that accounts for the effect takes place locally, rather than at the level of the whole utterance. Simons's point is that the inferences corresponding to embedded CIs can be global even if their effect is local. The overall conclusion is that problematic pragmatic effects associated with embedding can be accommodated within a Gricean framework, and indeed these effects can be seen as similar, although not identical, to ordinary, utterance-level, conversational implicatures. In the talk I will review some of the recent discussion on the subject while trying to make sense of embedded CIs.

Key words: contextualism, embedded implicatures, free enrichment, local pragmatics

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Grounded, embodied meaning in language use and translation.
An argument against dual coding approaches to semantic processing

A pivotal question concerning the interplay of language and mind is that of the locus and nature of language processing, i.e., whether we should expect language processing to be carried out by an amodal linguistic system, an embodied conceptual system or a combination of both. This, of course, entails the philosophical question what it is that human beings do when they use language, and how this type of mental activity is related to other (cognitive) domains.

The debate was prompted by a number of purely amodal symbolic systems proposed around the turn of the century (see e.g. Landauer & Dumais 1997, Kintsch et al. 2000), but recently the discussion appears to have shifted towards models that suggest a division of labor between amodal and modal processing (see. e.g. Barsalou et al. 2008, Louwerse 2011, Santos et al. 2011, cf.Taylor 2015). While embracing such a dual coding system appears promising, none of the proposals so far has presented a convincing answer to the symbol grounding problem (see Glenberg and Kaschak 2002). The commonly cited argument that "frequencies and correlations in perceived situations are mirrored in frequencies and correlations of words used to describe them" (Barsalou et al. 2008: 252) only purports to solve the issue.

Consequently, I argue for a fully-grounded model of human cognition and language processing. Based on Harnad's notion of symbolic theft (2002), Turner's concept of network scale cognition (2009) and the theory of predictive coding by Clark (2014), I suggest a distinction between horizontal and vertical cognitive processing, with vertical routes always grounded in perception and motor action. This is reflected in my own model of translation processing (Sickinger in preparation), which posits that interlingual translation can only be explained by recourse to an extralinguistic, conceptual level of mental simulation jointly accessed by both languages.

Key words: embodiment, symbol grounding, language processing, translation processing, dual coding, mental simulation

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Are scalar implicatures implicatures?

Paul Grice noticed that people usually convey more than just the amalgam of the meaning of the words they pronounce. This surplus of meaning is an implicature, for example:

(I) A: Are you hungry?
(II) B: I have just had breakfast

Through her utterance, B implicates that she is not hungry. Implicatures are cancellable by means of an explicit statement:

(III) I have just had breakfast, but a very modest one.

One possible analysis of quantifiers, such as 'some', states that they are implicatures. This relies on the observation that in standard logic 'some' includes 'all'. By contrast, in natural language, if you hear the sentence 'Some of the students passed the exam' you will infer that not all of them have. Otherwise the speaker would have said that 'all the students passed the exam'. The reason for which the analysis claims that the 'not all' part is pragmatic rather than semantic, is that it can be cancelled, for instance:

1. 'Some of the students have passed the exam, in fact all of them have.'

The proponents of this analysis claim that the sentence below is incorrect:

2. 'All of the students have passed the exam, in fact some of them have.'

However, the standard intuition is rather that in both 1 and 2 the speaker has corrected his initial statement because of receiving some additional information. Thus, the common intuition is that the 'not all' part of 'some' is a conventionalized part of meaning.

What could undermine this intuition is the theory of lies. The utterer of 2 is more likely to be accused of lying than the utterer of 1. For this reason, it might be sensible to claim that the 'not all' element is pragmatic, yet it is not an implicature but a default enrichment.

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The role of language in the theories of understanding others

Mental state attribution to others can be modelled in different ways. In philosophical literature it is sometimes explained as the process of building folk theories (Theory Theory (TT)) (Dziarnowska, 2012; Goldman, 2012; Newen, 2015), making simulations (Simulation Theory (ST)) (Dziarnowska, 2012; Goldman & Mason, 2007; Newen, 2015), establishing person models (Person Model Theory (PMT)) (Newen, 2015), experiencing the mental states directly (Interaction Theory (IT)) (Gallagher, 2001), or understanding them through narrative abilities (Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH)) (Hutto, 2008).

The authors of those theories indicate low-level (spontaneous/unconscious) and high-level (deliberative/conscious) elements within that process (Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Goldman, 2006; Newen, 2015). Low-level elements are more connected with direct perception and high-level elements with the attribution of propositional attitudes (Goldman, 2006). The latter appear to be inseparably connected with language abilities. However, there are disproportionately few language elements in such theories (with the exception of NPH). On the other hand, it appears that propositional states ascription engages language terms, and there is empirical evidence that various language capacities play an important role in the development of the ability of attributing mental states to others (e.g., Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007).

After a brief description of the theories mentioned above, I will focus on a comparison of ST and PMT, at the level on which they raise the role of language in the process of understanding others. I have chosen these two because in both of them it is mentioned that the process of understanding others contains two levels of mental attribution. I will indicate the role of language in those theories and the language aspects and competencies which they bear on. The results of such a comparison can provide important ideas about the need for the correction and completion (especially with language-related elements) of those theories.

Key words: understanding others, language, Simulation Theory, Person Model Theory

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Chomskyan biolinguistics and language as a natural kind

Trevor Pateman (1983) distinguished five approaches to language: Platonism (language as an abstract object), naturalism (language as a natural kind), nominalism (language as a name given to a set of objects), and two varieties of sociologism (language as a social fact), with different consequences for the ways language exists: as a natural kind and/or as a cultural kind. In this talk I will concentrate on Chomskyan mentalism (cf. Chomsky 1980, 2007, 2016), akin to naturalism, and claim that within the generative paradigm language is a natural kind; a claim already made by Humberstone (1971), with reference to early developments in Chomskyan linguistics.

In the biolinguistic framework (cf. Chomsky 2007, 2016), language is *I-language* (internal language), a state of the computational system of the mind/brain that generates structured expressions, each of which can be taken to be a set of instructions for the interface systems within which the faculty of language is embedded (Chomsky 2007: 1). I-language is a biological property of humans, an organ of the mind/brain. Chomsky reverses the Aristotelian perspective and stresses that "language is not sound with meaning but meaning with sound" (Chomsky 2016: 14).

The talk will end with a cautionary note, recalling Ferdinand de Saussure's caveat that '… in the matter of language, people have always been satisfied with ill-defined units' (de Saussure 1959: 111); additionally any such discussion should take into consideration appropriate ontological concerns (for some recent remarks, see Santana 2016).

Key words: language, natural kind, mentalism, biolinguistics, Chomsky

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On relations between "and" and "but"

Using "and" and "but" in sentences makes for differences in meaning, difference in how the respective sentences are understood. But philosophers have long thought that there is no *semantic* difference between "and" and "but", no difference on the level of, for instance, truth conditions. This view may perhaps be explained by saying that a sentence featuring an "and" will be true/false whenever the corresponding "but" sentence is true/false. In saying this, philosophers have had Frege (Frege 1879) and Grice (Grice 1989) on their side. Frege thinks of the difference between "and" and "but" as a kind of colouring (Färbung) of the content. Grice talks of *conventional* implicature, distinguished from conversational implicature, partly due to the contribution made by the conventional meaning of "but". Such theories are perhaps too simple. Bach (Bach 1999) discusses examples where this simple view doesn't seem appropriate. Toosarvandani (2014) shows some further subleties in various uses of the and/but contrast.

My talk discusses cases where there are systematic differences in truth conditions between "and" and "but". In certain cases, "and" and "but" interact differently with modal verbs, leading to differences in their truth conditions. Frege-Grice type explanations won't work. The phenomenon is systematic, and not confined to English. Some tentative hypotheses concerning the explanation of this phenomenon are discussed. Main explanations are that these phenomena are either of a semantic or pragmatic nature.

If the phenomenon is of a semantic nature, this would mean that the meaning contributed by the choice of "but" over "and" is of a more complicated nature than previously held. If the phenomenon is to be given a pragmatic explanation, it is not really like other kinds of pragmatic phenomena discussed in the literature.

Key words: conventional implicature, meaning, pragmatics, procedural meaning, semantics, what is said

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Semantic complexity influences quantifier distribution in corpora

Linguists and philosophers have been searching for various ways to estimate complexity and expressivity of natural language. These endeavors are usually driven by different (but often related) questions: What are the semantic bounds of natural languages or, in other words, what is the conceptual expressiveness of natural language (Szymanik, 2016)? What is the 'natural class of concepts' expressible in a given language and how to delimit it (Barwise and Cooper, 1981)? Are there differences between various languages with respect to semantic complexity (Everett, 2005)? Or from a more methodological perspective: how powerful must our linguistic theories be in order to minimally describe semantic phenomena (Ristad, 1993)? A similar question can be also asked from a cognitive angle: are some natural language concepts harder to process for humans than others (Feldman, 2000)?

In order to contribute to the above outlined debate we focus on one aspect of natural language: its ability to express quantities by using the wide repertoire of quantifier expressions. We propose to use an abstract measure of semantic complexity: the minimal computational device that can compute the meaning of a quantifier. Using regression analysis we show that semantic complexity is a statistically significant factor explaining 27.29% of frequency variation. We compare that with the influence of other factors (e.g., quantifier monotonicity or quantifier length). We take this result as an argument in favour of the claim that abstract semantic complexity measures may enrich the methodological toolbox of the language complexity debate.

Key words: semantics, complexity, generalized quantifiers, expressiveness, computations, corpora

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Verb form, event and viewpoint – English aspect(s) revisited

The concept of aspect has received wide attention from both philosophers and linguists. The earliest interest in this type of time semantics is attributed to the ancient Greeks, who are said to have recognized different language constructions which express either the completion or incompletion of an event (Binnick 1991: 135). Prototypically, aspect is perceived through the paradigm of the *Slavic-style aspect*, in which the semantic opposition between the *perfective* and *imperfective*, i.e. the completion or incompletion of an event, is overtly marked by the verb. Nevertheless, this approach cannot be fully applied to the study of aspect in the English language, where the verb itself does not always display reference to this dichotomy.

The proposed paper attempts to demonstrate how aspect may be perceived with reference to the English language. It should, however, be noted that the proposed paper is not intended to establish a new taxonomy of aspects, yet it seeks to address the problem of aspect in English with the application of certain existing theories. The author reviews three approaches. Firstly, the *grammatical aspect* is presented. In this approach the time-dependency is manifested in the morphology of verb forms (Comrie 1976/2001, Binnick 1991, Higginbotham 2009). Then, the author moves on to discuss the so-called *Vendlerian aspect*. These are semantic classes based on *time schemata* (Vendler 1957), which have been treated as the *semantic aspect* in Anglo-American aspectology. Finally, the author focuses on the traditional *viewpoint aspect*, for which a sentence- or discourse-level approach is advocated.

Such a diversification of possible approaches undoubtedly makes the study of English aspect a difficult task. Hence, this author proposes a complex approach to understanding aspect and treats it as a function which may be realized at a number of levels (cf. Leiss 1992, Kotin 2007).

Key words: grammatical aspect, semantic aspect, viewpoint aspect, time schemata, time semantics

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Mental files and acquaintanceless singular thoughts

The Mental Files framework (MF), on recent accounts (notably François Recanati's), is construed with the explicit aim of defending Singularism against Descriptivism. The purpose of my talk is to show that MF would rather bridge the gap and *unite* Singularism and Descriptivism, at least at semantic level.

I argue that descriptivists can account for having and expressing singular thoughts for Descriptivism does not consist in the thesis that all thoughts are general in the sense of *not* conforming to the singular schema, but takes a stance about what are the conditions in which the schema can hold at all, or what does it mean for someone having a thought about x that "there is an object x such that the thought is true with respect to an arbitrary possible world *w* if and only if, in *w*, ... *x* ...". Specifically it requires that the subject must *have some internal content* identifying that object (not necessarily descriptive or even verbal at all), not only *be in some external relation* with this object. Now, since MF meets this requirement, adopting this framework into Singularism in principle ends the debate on the semantic grounds and we can move on to raise an array of interesting questions about the use of MF in semantics. One of them is the question of acquaintanceless mental files. As Recanati would put it: 'The subject cannot entertain a singular thought about an object *a* without possessing, and exercising, a mental file whose referent is *a.* To possess and exercise a mental file whose referent is *a* the subject must stand in some acquaintance relation to *a* (Recanati 2012: 155)'.

In the talk I present a model of mental files in which singularity is not connected with acquaintance relations and thus singular acquaintanceless thoughts are admitted.

Key words: mental files, singularism, descriptivism, semantics

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Mental representation and indexicality

While indexicality is commonly seen as one of the more familiar properties of natural language, there is no consensus about whether it is also a property of mental representations. In other words, are there such things as mental indexicals? In this talk I will survey some arguments for and against the thesis of mental indexicality. My first objective is to show that Perry-style cases of essential indexicality are not good arguments in favor of mental indexicality, that is, the fact that first-personal utterances have a particular cognitive significance does not show that their mental counterparts have the property of indexicality *per se*. In the focus of my discussion will be François Recanati's indexical model of mental files, according to which singular mental representations should be type-individuated by the kind of contextual relations they bear to their referents, much in the same fashion as the more familiar linguistic indexicals. I will consider criticisms to that model offered by Papineau, Ninan and Onofri – all of whom argue that we should model singular concepts of (context-insensitive) proper names, instead of linguistic indexicals. I will try to dispel their worries by claiming that the indexical model of mental representation affords us advantages over its adversary, e.g. it allows us to adequately rationalize cases of fusion and fission of singular concepts.

Key words: mental representation, indexicality, cognitive dynamics, singular thought

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How to say when: a Reichenbachian approach to the answering machine paradox

In this presentation we tackle the "answering machine paradox" – the puzzle raised for the Kaplanian framework by uses of temporal indexicals that don't get their reference from the context of utterance. Our solution to the puzzle consists in adopting a Reichenbachian framework in which not one, but three times are relevant: the utterance time (UT), the event time (ET) and the reference time (RT). We show that the puzzle can be solved by the flexibility inherent in the Reichenbachian framework. It is typical of Reichenbachian approaches to treat temporal abverbials, indexicals included, as modifiers of ET and RT. Temporal adverbials can modify the temporal reference of ET or of RT, and specify values for them. The main difference between indexicals and other adverbials is that temporal indexicals apparently cannot modify the temporal reference of ET; rather, they seem to be always modifiers of the temporal reference of RT.

Besides the answering machine cases, examples of historical past (e.g., *Now they had left*, *Napoleon now faced his most crucial battle*) show that *now* does not give the value UT to RT. Rather, temporal indexicals indicate the time interval where RT takes place with respect to a temporal frame of reference that need not be located in UT. On this construal, the alleged shifts in the use of temporal indexicals in present tense utterances are not motivated by non-standard uses of them but by where we place the temporal frame of reference with respect to RT. That is, the reference of temporal indexicals in present tense utterances is a function of the temporal frame of reference that we use –just like we would say that the reference of *on the left* is a function of the spatial frame of reference that we use. Dislocating UT from RT and ET in a present tense utterance might sound odd, but the fact is that we can do it and that we actually do do it often enough. Usually, we use UT to fix the temporal frame of reference: time starts running from the moment we speak. But just as we may not use our own body as the centre of a spatial frame of reference, we may also not use UT as the centre of a temporal frame of reference. Moving the temporal frame of reference forward or backwards is analogous to using an allocentric spatial frame of reference.

Key words: temporal indexicals, answering machines, historical past, Kaplan, Reichenbach, reference time, frames of reference.

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Implicative verbs and accommodation

Implicative verbs have been traditionally regarded as presupposition triggers (PTs), but some experimental results (Włodarczyk 2017) show that, unlike in the case of other PTs, indirect messages associated with the use of implicative verbs can be reinforced without producing a sense of anomalous redundancy. This suggests that presupposition triggers do not form a homogenous class in regards to the rules that guide their usage in communication. In my talk I put forth a hypothesis according to which the results of the experiment can be explained in terms of differences in accommodation process associated with the use of implicative verbs and with the use of other PTs. I explore two possibilities: i) that the indirect messages linked to the use of implicative verbs should be treated as default meaning rather than presuppositions; ii) that there is a difference in the rules that guide the accommodation of presuppositions triggered by utterances containing various PT's. The latter explanation seems to require the rejection of the common ground theory of accommodation (Stalnaker 2002) that relies heavily on the concept of common belief and does not differentiate between accommodation of the presuppositions triggered by various PT's. Instead, we can utilize the non-Gricean model of accommodation as a rule-governed process (Lewis 1979; Witek 2015; Witek 2017). This approach will allow us to establish different rules for various presupposition triggers.

Key words: presupposition, accommodation, implicative verbs, defaults

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Varieties of biscuit conditionals

People commonly assume that there are two kinds of indicative conditionals. There are hypothetical conditionals such as

      (1)   If you want to hear the truth, you should ask somebody else.

And there are biscuit conditionals such as

      (2)   If you want to hear the truth, you look shitty.

They commonly also assume that there is no analogous distinction within subjunctive conditionals.

In a recent paper, Swanson argues that this is not true: embedded in the contexts of wants and wishes, at least certain subjunctive conditionals are read in a biscuit like fashion (Swanson 2013).

In this paper, I shall go beyond Swanson's claim. In section 1, I shall present indicative biscuit conditionals of four different kinds. In section 2, I shall argue that subjunctive versions of all of them can be read biscuit-y, even outside the contexts of wants and wishes. One such subjunctive case will be the following:

      Paul: How would I look if I were to wear this lipstick tomorrow for the party? Not sure I want the truth.

      Mary: Well ...

      (2*)   If you wanted to hear the truth, you would look shitty.

      Paul: How would I have looked if I had worn this lipstick yesterday for the party? Oh boy, I can tell from your face! I guess I'd rather not want to hear the truth!

      Mary: Well ...

      (2**)   If you had wanted the truth, you would have looked shitty.

In section 3, I shall defend my claim against two objections: first, sentences such as (2) and (2**) can get a hypothetical reading even in the contexts I provide, but one can also force a biscuit reading; second, one might consider the conditionals provided elided versions of hypothetical conditionals, but this does not show that they themselves are not biscuit conditionals.

Key words: biscuit conditionals, relevance conditionals, speech act conditionals, indicative conditionals, subjunctive conditionals

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The paradox of synthesis

Assume semantic holism to be the view on which the meaning of any given term depends on the meanings of all the other terms of a given language. If a holist is asked in what manner does his theory explain how the language works, she typically asks us to consider how a change in meaning of a given term (e.g. elephant) would bring about changes in a number of other terms (e.g. tusk, peanut, mammal) and claims that the whole of the language behaves along the same lines. In other words, she first points at [the local] and then argues that [the global] behaves similarly. Easier said than done:

(P1) If one assumes that the local sufficiently resembles the global, then the reference to the global is redundant.
(P2) If one does not assume that the local sufficiently resembles the global, then the reference to the global is unwarranted.
(P3) One either assumes or does not assume that the local sufficiently resembles the global.
(C) The transition from the local to the global is either redundant or unwarranted.

I argue that this objection also applies to physicalism and [ethical] consequentialism and address three immediate worries concerning it. Firstly, there is a temptation to argue against the first premise by saying that in such a case the global need not be redundant, for it may be that the two levels are sufficiently similar with respect to the structure, it just being a part of content that the local misses. The second puts the originality of the problem into question by claiming that it is merely a modified version of some other well-established philosophical argument. The final objection is that the paradox rests on a very uncharitable reading of the discussed theories.

Key words: analogy, holism, physicalism, consequentialism, dilemma, local, global

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