dc.contributor.author | Tarała, Sebastian Tomasz | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-21T12:35:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-02-21T12:35:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2025-02-18 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1427-9657 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/54715 | |
dc.description.abstract | Since the events of July 1997, when the Cambodian People’s Party staged a military coup and defeated the hitherto co-ruling FUNCINPEC party, relations with China have become an essential element for the new regime’s survival. Chinese support allowed the government to protect itself from human rights pressures, corruption and abuse of power, and gave it the political and economic space it needed at the time. Since then, Cambodia’s increasing and multidimensional dependence on the PRC has become apparent, raising questions about the actual nature of the relationship. This article aims to analyse bilateral relations between China and Cambodia through the lens of the theory of the patron–client arrangement in international relations. The author presents the course of cooperation between the two countries so far in the military and political fields by relating it to the theory of clientelism. He also points out the main motives behind the cooperation between the two states, arguing that the ‘security transfer’ characteristic of patron–clientelist relations takes place primarily with regard to the regime security (domestic policy) of the weaker partner rather than the strictly military dimension. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Od wydarzeń z lipca 1997 r., kiedy to Kambodżańska Partia Ludowa dokonała przewrotu wojskowego i pokonała dotychczas współrządzącą z nią partięFUNCINPEC, relacje z Chinami stały się dla nowego reżimu istotnym elementem dla jego przetrwania. Chińskie wsparcie pozwoliło na ochronę rządu przed naciskami w zakresie praw człowieka, korupcji i nadużywania władzy oraz dało potrzebną mu wówczas przestrzeń polityczną i gospodarczą. Od tamtego czasu widoczne jest coraz większe i wielowymiarowe uzależnienie Kambodży od ChRL, które rodzi pytania o faktyczny charakter tej relacji. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu analizę stosunków bilateralnych pomiędzy Chinami a Kambodżą przez pryzmat teorii układu patron–klient w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Autor przedstawia w nim dotychczasowy przebieg współpracy obu państw na polu militarnym i politycznym, odnosząc ją do teorii klientelizmu. Wskazuje w nim również na główne motywy przyświecające współpracy obu państw, argumentując, że charakterystyczny dla stosunków patronalno-klientelistycznych „transfer bezpieczeństwa” odbywa się przede wszystkim w odniesieniu do bezpieczeństwa reżimu (polityki wewnętrznej) słabszego partnera niż wymiaru stricte militarnego. | pl |
dc.language.iso | pl | |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Eastern Review;1 | pl |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | China-Cambodia relations | en |
dc.subject | Sino–Khmer relations | en |
dc.subject | patron–client relations | en |
dc.subject | international clientelism | en |
dc.subject | Relacje Chin i Kambodży | pl |
dc.subject | relacje sino-khmerskie | pl |
dc.subject | relacje patron-klient | pl |
dc.subject | klientelizm międzynarodowy | pl |
dc.title | Relacja Chin i Kambodży jako przykład klientelizmu międzynarodowego | pl |
dc.title.alternative | The relationship between China and Cambodia as an example of international clientelism | en |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.page.number | 30-44 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2451-2567 | |
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dc.contributor.authorEmail | sebastian.tarala@zoho.eu | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/1427-9657.12.02 | |
dc.relation.volume | 12 | |