http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13311 Tue, 07 Apr 2026 23:14:36 GMT 2026-04-07T23:14:36Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13460 Polski ośrodek rządowy o przeszłości i przyszłości międzynarodowej organizacji bezpieczeństwa (1939-1945) Ponczek, Eugeniusz This article deals with the attitude of the Polish Government in exile during the Second World War and his representation in Poland towards the idea of creation an international security organisation which would be able to maintain a democratic and peaceful order in the post-war world. That idea was compared to the „Versatile order” after the First World War and the activity of the League of Nations. The necessity to win the war against both German and Soviet aggressors was firmly stressed but „to win the peace” seemed even more important. The Polish experts took up wide spread work on preparation the future treaty with Germany. Their attitude towards the political order between the wars and activity of the League of Nations was rather critical. According to their opinion that organisation had not been able to give the guarantee of security for the European countries, because of insufficient efficacy of its activity and limited capability to oppose against pro-war tendencies. Basing on those experiences they proposed to create new and better international security organisation after the war which would be convenient to the hopes of Polish society demanding restitution of an independent, sovereign, „whole” from the territorial point of view (included all the pre-war Polish east provinces and demanded aggrandisement on the west) and democratic Poland. Such a state should become an important factor of the stability and peace in Central and East Europe. Polish government in exile strongly opposed the very idea of the spheres of influences in Europe as being contrary to the declaration of the Atlantic Charter. The members of the future international security organisation could not accept such a project. At the end of the Second World War Polish authorities protested against the decision not to invite Polish delegation to the Conference in San Francisco, where the United Nations were to be created. It was considered from the moral point of view. In the same time when the Conference in San Francisco approached to its end, sixteen of the leaders of Polish underground state were on trail in Moscow while on Stalin’s influence „The Temporary Government of National Unity” dominated by the Polish communist wad proclaimed as the only legal one in Poland. All those events were notified with bitterness by the Polish government in exile and patriotic opinion in the country suffering under Soviet rule. Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane przez Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej Fri, 01 Jan 1999 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13460 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13459 Idea międzynarodowej współpracy kulturalnej we wczesnej publicystyce Klausa Manna (1924-1930) Jedynakiewicz, Katarzyna Der Artikel präsentiert einen wichtigen Aspekt des frühen publizistischen Schaffens von Klaus Mann - seine Tätigkeit für die Idee der internationalen kulturellen Zusammenar ei nach Beedigung des ersten Weltkrieges. Diese Konzeption nahm einen wesentlichen Platz in Kontakten der europäischen lntelektuellen ein, besonders der, die zur jungen Generation Schöpfer gehörten. Die Forderungen Klaus Mann betrafen vor allem die Nötigkeit der franzosisc eu sc Annäherung und damit auch die Überwindung langjähriger Phobien und Vorurteile zwischen beiden Nationen. Ein eigenartiger Beitrag des Schrriftstellers war sein Vorschlag der Eröffnung auf Leistungen und das Werk amerikanischer Kultur, insbesondere nach seiner Reise in die USA in Jahren 1927-1928. Wegen der Gefahr des Faschismus, die in Deutschland am Ende der zwanziger Jahren anwuchs, erklärte sich Klaus Mann für die Pan-Europa Vision von Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, obwohl er skeptisch ihre Grundlage-Idee „einer neuen europäischen Elite” ansah. Nach dem Erfolg der NSDAP in Raichstagswahlen am 14. September 1930 trat der Schriftsteller auf den Weg eines aktiven Kampfes mit dem Nationalen Sozialismus, was seine Wiederspiegelung im Schaffen nach 1930 fand. Der dargestellte Artikel wurde an der Analyse der Publizistik von Klaus Mann (Rezensionen, Artikel, Berichte, Feuilletons und Vorlesungen) aus der Jahren 1924-1930 angelehnt. Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane przez Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej Fri, 01 Jan 1999 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13459 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13456 Czechosłowacka polityka bezpieczeństwa w latach 1918-1919 Nowinowski, Sławomir M. The studies over the conception of security of Czechoslovakia was initiated during the First World War by Tomas Masaryk. They were recapitulated in the book The New Europe which was published in autumn 1918. According to the author, the close co-operation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland, leading to the federation open for the rest of the states of that region should be the base of the political and economic stabilisation o f Central Europe. However that project was a kind of constructive solution of the problem, it abstracted from the political, economic and ethnic reality which minimised the chances of its realisation. In that period the activity of Eduard Beneś was concentrated on the attempts to get the strategic allied among the powers of Entent, who would be able to give Czechoslovakia the real guaranty of security. That role was taken up eventually by France, who declared her readiness for supporting the Czechoslovak territorial claims. The French military mission that had been sent to Prague took the control over the army of ĆSR. During the period of preparation to the Paris Peace Conference the government of Czechoslovakia did not show the great interest in the conception of the League of Nations. It attempted to reach the security of the state by assuring the strategic frontiers for it. It is worth stressing that in general it ignored the national point of problem in spite of the fact that whole territory along the demanded frontiers with Austria, Germany and Hungary was inhabited by the people of those three nations whose attitude towards the Czechoslovak statehood was negative. On the Paris Peace Conference the Czechoslovak diplomacy did not manage to obtain the powers approbation of her conception of security. Eventually they accepted „the historical frontiers”, nevertheless that was considered as a great success of the I Republic. Signing the peace treaties with Austria and Germany (among the other these treaties limited the possibility of Anschluss and the number of military forces of these both states and forbade them the possessing of some category of arms) Czechoslovakia obtained the new guaranty of security. As the primeval member of the League of Nations it also obtained the guaranty assured by the Pact. Still a state of the international relations in Central-East Europe was far from that one that was wanted from the Prague’s point of view. The military circles of ĆSR recognising the danger of the isolation of the state, appealed to the government for intensification of the military cooperation with France and for find the allies in the neighbourhood. Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane przez Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej Fri, 01 Jan 1999 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13456 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13455 Kwestie francuskiej pomocy wojskowej dla republik zakaukaskich w latach 1919-1921 Olszewski, Paweł The article presents the French plans of deliveries of arms for independent Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The very beginning of them are connected with the appeals of the representatives of those states to the French government for acceptance of the purchase of arms in France. During the period of the defeats of Denikin’s army, at the beginning of 1920 and after the soviétisation of Azerbaijan in the end of April of that year, French and the other allies were considering the possibility of sending to Armenia and Georgia the arms that was former intended for the Denikin’s „volunteers” and the armament delivered to them by defeated Bulgaria. Eventually in autumn 1920 Georgia and Armenia were supplied with some arms, that were not from the French stock and only partially satisfied the needs of their troops. France once more considered the question of deliveries of armament for Georgia after the soviétisation of Armenia at the beginning of December 1920. But also those plans were not realised. On March 1921 the question ceased to exist because of the conquest of Georgia by Bolsheviks. On of the main causes of the failure of these projects was their second importance for the policy and military activity of France, which was concentrated on a military aid for Poland and Czechoslovakia. Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane przez Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej Fri, 01 Jan 1999 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13455 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z