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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica 1987/32</title>
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<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 13:06:13 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Klauzule generalne jako odesłanie pozasystemowe</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11637</link>
<description>Klauzule generalne jako odesłanie pozasystemowe
Wójcik, Krystyna
General clauses can be characterized as a particular case of extra -systemic references because them eaning of such terms (wich are a particular group of evaluations) is stated from the point of view  of special kind of extra -system rules of reference (e.g. rules of morality) - when we accept conception of a legal system as „nanarrow system" containing only the norms as result of a law -making by the state agencies.&#13;
Qualification of the peculiar character of such phenomenon depends on characterization of rules (and evaluations) to which it refers. These rules of reference can be qua liiied as fuzzy, not strictly detamined (as e.g. a referen ce of a general clause of „principles of social coexistence” lo moral system, w h ich in practice means putting into action the social-political ideals of the legislator himself). The evaluations formulated on the basis of general clauses can be characterized as concrete-individual ones, and cannot be generalized .
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1987 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Podstawy sporu o obumieranie państwa w myśli marksowskiej</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11636</link>
<description>Podstawy sporu o obumieranie państwa w myśli marksowskiej
Wojnicki, Zbigniew
The paper is devoted to ananalysis of the conception of the withering away of state and law in the do ctrine of Marxist classics.
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1987 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>Związki filozofii i teorii prawa. Zagadnienia metodologiczne</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11635</link>
<description>Związki filozofii i teorii prawa. Zagadnienia metodologiczne
Leszczyński, Jerzy
The paper is a developmen  of J. Wroblewski's analyses. The author presents&#13;
the basic problems, arguing with the critical remarks of J. Woleński. Hedefends the&#13;
thesis of the need to distinguish two spheres when examining the relationship between philosophy and theory of law: the relationship of reference and relationship of&#13;
ascription. He points that the aim of the analysisis not giving a method of logical&#13;
criterion of identification of philosophical and theoretical theses, but examination of relationship between the theses. An answer is sought to the question what kind of&#13;
relationship can appear, and whether the dependence of theory on the accepted&#13;
philosophical assumptions can be graded. According to the author's opinion, the degree of dependence can be assessed due to the systemic or a systemic character of&#13;
philosoph  and theory, and the type of logic or quasi-logic rules of ascription of&#13;
philosophical thesis to theory , in the case of theories expressing a philosophical attitude,&#13;
the ro les of ascription may be the technique of „new rhetoric" of Ch. Perelman,&#13;
allowing to keep ait least a loose connection with philosophy. To reconstruct&#13;
the philosophical assumptions of a philosophical theories the rules of logic are necessary. To define the series of philosophical theses and the rules of ascription, the&#13;
author makes use of the idea of presupposition , defined for the sake of legal discourse by J Wróblewski.
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1987 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<title>An outline of a general theory of legal interpretation and constitutional interpretation</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11633</link>
<description>An outline of a general theory of legal interpretation and constitutional interpretation
Wróblewski, Jerzy
Istnieje szereg pojęć interpretacji prawa. Autor ujmuje interpretację jako ustalenie&#13;
znaczenia budzących wątpliwość testów prawnych. Jest to ujęcie przydatne dla&#13;
badań wykładni podejmowanej w procesie stosowania prawa (wykładnia operatywna)&#13;
i dotyczy wykładni dokonywanej przez naukę prawa (wykładnia doktrynalna), choć&#13;
w obu rodzajach wykładni odmienne są źródła wątpliwości oraz charakter podejmowanej decyzji interpretacyjnej.&#13;
Autor przedstawia typologię wykładni, ze względu na: (a) źródła wykładni,&#13;
(b) moc wiążącą ustaleń interpretacyjnych , (c) rodzaj interpretowanego tekstu, (d) kwalifikację wykładni.
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<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1987 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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