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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica 2014/73</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4675" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4675</id>
<updated>2026-04-04T04:19:59Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-04T04:19:59Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Prawda w procesie karnym</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4755" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Izydorczyk, Jacek</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4755</id>
<updated>2021-10-07T09:11:36Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Prawda w procesie karnym
Izydorczyk, Jacek
The article Truth in criminal trial points out great importance of facts in every criminal procedure. The author presents a new look at some legal regulations in Poland. For example he strongly &#13;
criticizes laws (and practice!) which forbid disclosure of a criminal’s personal data. It is just unfair &#13;
towards decent citizens because they might be future victims of such criminals. By the way: veritatem sequi est tueri iustitiam.
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Dążenie do poznania prawdy w procesie cywilnym</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4754" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Jankowski, Janusz</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4754</id>
<updated>2021-06-29T07:01:00Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Dążenie do poznania prawdy w procesie cywilnym
Jankowski, Janusz
In the literature and jurisprudence there are distinguished two opposite principles ruling over &#13;
revealing the truth: a material truth principle (objective) and a formal truth principle (procedural). &#13;
In the proceedings based on the material truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual &#13;
state should reflect the reality. The judge aims to clarify all circumstances essential to solve a case &#13;
in order to reveal a really existing legal relation bounding both parties to litigation. On the other &#13;
hand, in proceedings based on the formal truth principle, judicial decisions in the matter of the actual &#13;
state should only reflect the factual material and evidence gathered by the parties. In the study there &#13;
is presented an evolution of norms and doctrinal opinions in the matter of the endeavor to establish &#13;
the truth in civil proceedings connected with amendments to the Civil Procedure Code in 1996, &#13;
2000, 2005 and 2012.
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Prawda arystotelesowska w procesie administracyjnym i sądowoadministracyjnym</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4753" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Gontarski, Waldemar</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4753</id>
<updated>2018-02-01T11:18:54Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Prawda arystotelesowska w procesie administracyjnym i sądowoadministracyjnym
Gontarski, Waldemar
The contemporary truth reconstructed in a trial reflects differences between the Aristotelian &#13;
truth in terms of its essence and criterion (material truth – veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus&#13;
– ad Aristotle, The Metaphysics IV.7.[1011b 26-27])- and its practical realisation (objective truth &#13;
– in medio stat veritas – ad Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7.[1108a 19–20]). In a non-adversarial processes – such as the Polish criminal trial - as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one - the Polish &#13;
administrative procedure (an administrative court has only a controlling function, not a reformative &#13;
one and does not ascertain facts on its own) or separate proceedings in the Polish civil procedure &#13;
– the court is expressis verbis obliged to reconstruct the objective truth (i.e. the truth which can &#13;
be ascertained by a man meeting the diligentia boni patris familias standard) and not the material &#13;
truth. Nonetheless, if the judicial truth understood in this way (the truth ascertained by the court; if &#13;
the court does not demonstrate an evidential initiative, then it will not ascertain the truth, but it will &#13;
merely assess the reliability of the evidence submitted as in the Anglo-American criminal trial) will &#13;
differ from the material truth, it can act as a statutory premise to resume the proceedings. That is, &#13;
generally speaking, the main difference between the inquisitorial and the adversarial models.
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Doctrina multiplex, veritas una</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4752" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Łukowski, Piotr</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4752</id>
<updated>2018-02-01T11:18:51Z</updated>
<published>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Doctrina multiplex, veritas una
Łukowski, Piotr
Coherent thoughts about the truth seem to be more difficult than about any other abstract&#13;
concepts. According to some fundamental presuppositions, the truth should be one and in a sense&#13;
unchangeable. On the other hand, even a simple observation suggests something opposite – the truth&#13;
seems to be variable and relative and that is why given in some different, alternative forms. The paper&#13;
deals with all the above mentioned problems and other relative ones concerning the truth.&#13;
The entire discussion coincides with an ancient dictum being the title of the article
</summary>
<dc:date>2014-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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