http://hdl.handle.net/11089/31897 2026-04-05T13:57:31Z 2026-04-05T13:57:31Z Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberly http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33619 2021-02-17T02:02:44Z 2020-03-28T00:00:00Z

Reinach and Kantorowicz: Justice, Phenomenological Realism and the Free Law Movement Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberly Adolf Reinach met and befriended Hermann Kantorowicz in one of Lujo Brentano’s political economy seminars during the 1901/1902 academic year at the University of Munich. After Munich, Kantorowicz would go on to be a major contributor to the Free Law Movement (Freirechtsbewegung) in Germany and play an important role in the development of the sociology of law in the 20th century. Reinach encountered the work of Edmund Husserl while studying with Lipps and later became central to the phenomenological movement in Göttingen. But all the while he remained interested in and focused on issues related to justice. His last scholarly publication before leaving for battle in WWI, Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (The a priori Foundations of Civil Law, 1913) published in the very first edition of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) is a testament to this. Here we see Reinach taking his phenomenological education and applying it to entities of justice. I believe Kantorowicz inspired this lasting interest in matters of justice. This essay will focus on the influence of Kantorowicz on Reinach, and while doing so attempt to flesh out and contrast the ways in which these two men sought to overcome the problems of justice (Recht) of their time. Many of these problems still continue to be relevant today.

2020-03-28T00:00:00Z Sobota, Daniel Roland http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33620 2021-02-17T02:02:43Z 2020-03-28T00:00:00Z

The Law and Question. The Phenomenon of Question as a Possible Point of Departure for the Phenomenologico-Genetic Theory of Law Sobota, Daniel Roland In his original phenomenology of law Adolf Reinach distinguishes among experiences the so-called “social acts”. These include acts directed towards other persons that require that the latter acknowledge the communicated contents and assume certain attitudes. Among these acts Reinach mentions there are promises, orders, requests and questions. He argues the promise is the special act that creates the a priori grounds of law. It is to be noted that Reinach’s phenomenology of law is of static character (in the Husserlian sense of the word) and therefore it shares all its advantages and disadvantages. In my paper I would like to draw attention to another social act, which can also be attributed to certain law-making activities, especially from the perspective of the genetic phenomenology. It is questioning. At the same time when Reinach was working on his theory of law, his Munich friend, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947), also a student of Theodor Lipps and a friend of Edmund Husserl, who together with Reinach made an “invasion of the Munichs at Göttingen”, worked on the first phenomenology of the question. Although he did not refer his research to the phenomenon of law, we can ask whether, like Reinach’s deliberations about promises and obligation, it cannot be done. That this is possible to some extent, for example, is evinced by the Hannah Arendt and Klaus Held’s phenomenology of the political world. He points out that the public world as such arises from the primordial openness of man, understood as “zoon politikon”. This openness might be interpreted as the question which is not so much a single act as it is an attitude. The purpose of the paper is to outline how, while starting with the phenomenological reflection over various types of utterances, one can specify their certain forms and the acts constituting them as well as the attitudes which allow for a priori grounding the phenomenon of law from the perspective of static and genetic phenomenology.

2020-03-28T00:00:00Z Massa, Manuela http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33618 2021-02-17T02:02:42Z 2020-03-28T00:00:00Z

Property and “Nuda Potestas” as Constitutions of Reinach’s Philosophy of Law Massa, Manuela This contribution centers on the notions of property and nuda potestas in Reinach’s philosophy of law. I aim to demonstrate how both terms ground an important part of Reinach’s understanding of a priori condition for civil rights. Consequently, I assess the principle of property with a comparison to Luis de Molina, since he shows in his De Iustitia et Iure how dominium and rights justify some forms of property (lay and ecclesiastical) and political power (Molina 1659, disp2 n1; Kaufmann 2014, 129). Hence, the right of the person is discussed by following the potestas. In Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes, Reinach implicitly refers to the nuda potestas, which is a kind of power that can be applied only formally and not in fact to something else and for that reason, it can only be caught a priori, since acts are performed by another person within it. This is the reason why the rights of a person can be divided between more people, and it is at first just a kind of property, which can be exercised upon the individual. Consequently, I divide my contribution as follows. First, in considering the social act, I show how its characteristics of Anspruch and Verbindlichkeit result from the commitment that human beings make to one another. In doing this, I discuss the particular condition of slavery through which it is possible to find the property and the nuda potestas since there is no enjoyment of the good to which it refers. Second, I apply both concepts by showing a parallel with Luis de Molina. This comes about in consideration of the case of dominium, in which absolute rights can be ascribed to their relative claim. Third and finally, I offer a critique of Reinach, in which I show how absolute rights and relative claims cannot be assimilated.

2020-03-28T00:00:00Z Goździalski, Krzysztof http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33621 2021-02-17T02:02:41Z 2020-03-28T00:00:00Z

Phenomenological Concept of Law from the Perspective of Carlos Cossio Goździalski, Krzysztof The originality of Cossio’s works is expressed by a strong relationship between philosophy of law and his philosophical assumptions. The starting point for deliberating on law are widely recognized ontological and epistemological contentions. Cossio justifies his legal theses basing them on his philosophical views. Egology derives from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology which is related to some elements of William Dilthey’s philosophy of culture. Martin Heiddeger’s and Immanuel Kant’s philosophies are the basis too. The first part describes Cossio’s ontologies of subjects otherwise known as regional ontologies. Methods for examining the above subjects and gnoseological acts are presented here too. The second part presents the characteristics of law as a cultural subject. The article is not only a report. Its aim is also to show that Carlos Cossio’s legal philosophy is semantic in character.

2020-03-28T00:00:00Z