

Małgorzata Karkocha

Flagrante bello

The Russo-Turkish War in the Warsaw Press
(1787–1792)



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(1787–1792)

*Translated by
Magdalena Hebda*



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On the front cover: The victory at Foksan over 30,000 Turks by the k. k. Prince of Coburg's troop corps in union with the Russian Imperial Division on 31 July 1789. Copper engraving by Anton Balzer, 1789

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD	— Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw)
AORMP	— Akta Osobisto-Rodzinne i Majątkowo-Prawne (Personal, Family, and Property Records)
APP	— Archiwum Publiczne Potockich (Public Archive of the Potocki Family)
ARE	— Archiwum Roskie (Roskie Archive)
GNiO	— ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ (The National and Foreign Gazette)
GW	— ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ (The Warsaw Gazette)
KW	— ‘Korespondent Warszawski’ (The Warsaw Correspondent)
PNH	— ‘Przegląd Nauk Historycznych’ (Historical Science Review)
PHP	— ‘Pamiętnik-Historyczno-Polityczny’ (Historical and Political Memoir) (since 1788 published under the title ‘Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczno-Ekonomiczny’ – Historical, Political and Economic Memoir)
PSB	— <i>Polski słownik biograficzny</i> (Polish Biographical Dictionary)
RBS	— <i>Russkii biograficheskii slovar’</i> (Russian Biographical Dictionary)

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INTRODUCTION

1. REVIEW OF SOURCES

It was during my doctoral research, a decade ago, on the situation in France at the outset of the French Revolution (1789–1794)¹ that I first came to appreciate the immense wealth of knowledge offered by the Warsaw press published during the reign of Stanislas Augustus – a source both invaluable to researchers and rich in insights across a wide range of subjects. Years later, I was once again confronted with that source – this time in my search for information on the so-called Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792). This armed conflict between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, to which Austria became a party in February 1788 as an ally of Catherine II², has yet to be the subject of a monographic study in Polish or, to the best of my knowledge, in any of the major international languages. Yet that war saw events that have secured their place in history: suffice it to mention the siege and capture of the Turkish fortresses of Ochakov (1788) and Izmail (1790), or the spectacular victories of the Austro-Russian forces at Focsani (1789) and Rymnik (1789), as well as the Russian triumph at Matchin (1791). The present study represents the first attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the subject based on press reports³.

¹ M. Karkocha, *Obraz Francji w dobie rewolucji na łamach prasy warszawskiej z lat 1789–1794*, Łódź 2011.

² Notably, my analysis does not extend to the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, which Russian and Western European historiography sometimes considers part of the Russo-Turkish War. The two conflicts – the Russo-Turkish War and the Russo-Swedish War – are discussed separately in the Warsaw press. The publisher of ‘Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny’ even introduced a separate section titled *The Northern War between Moscow and Sweden*, in which readers were regularly informed about military engagements in the Baltic region.

³ Selected campaigns and specific issues have been discussed in separate studies by the author. See M. Karkocha, *Wojna rosyjsko-turecka (kampania 1789 roku)*

The primary objective of this study was to present the Russo-Austro-Turkish War as depicted by the reports in the Warsaw newspapers. My intention was to illustrate what readers towards the end of Stanislas Augustus' reign – whether average or more discerning – could learn about that conflict from the periodicals printed in the Polish capital. An equally significant line of inquiry concerned whether the representation of the Eastern Question crafted by newspaper publishers accurately reflected reality.

In the absence of monographic studies, I relied on a relatively extensive body of supplementary literature, primarily in foreign languages, to verify the information derived from the Warsaw newspapers. This included memoirs and accounts from the period (e.g., by Grigory A. Potemkin, Roger de Damas, and Ivan I. Herman), monographs and articles on military history discussing the armies and fleets of Russia, Turkey, and Prussia, as well as general histories and works on individual states. Most extensively, however, I consulted biographies of rulers, commanders, and military figures,

w świetle doniesień “Pamiętnika Historyczno-Polityczno-Ekonomicznego”, PNH 2017, vol. XVI, no. 2, pp. 43–70 (= *The Russo-Turkish War [the Campaign of 1789] in the Light of Reports from “Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczno-Ekonomiczny”*, PNH 2017, vol. XVI, no. 3, pp. 41–69); eadem, *Wojna rosyjsko-turecka na łamach “Pamiętnika Historyczno-Politycznego” (1787–1788)*, [in:] *Sic erat in votis. Europa i świat w czasach nowożytnych. Studia i szkice ofiarowane Profesorowi Zbigniewowi Anusikowi w sześćdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, eadem, P. Robak, eds, Łódź 2017, pp. 311–342; eadem, “*Gazeta Warszawska*” o wielkiej wojnie wschodniej (kampania 1789 roku), PNH 2018, vol. XVII, no. 2, pp. 155–177 (= “*Gazeta Warszawska*” on the Russo-Turkish War [the 1789 Campaign], PNH 2018, vol. XVII, no. 3, pp. 157–180); eadem, *Początek wojny rosyjsko-tureckiej w świetle doniesień “Gazety Warszawskiej” księdza Łuskiny (1787–1788)*, [in:] *Ab Occidente referunt... “Zachód” doby nowożytnej w badaniach historyków polskich*, M. Markiewicz, K. Kuras, eds, compiled by R. Niedziela, Kraków 2018, pp. 87–109; eadem, *Ostatnia faza wojny rosyjsko-tureckiej (1790–1792) na łamach “Pamiętnika Historyczno-Polityczno-Ekonomicznego”*, [in:] *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczypospolita. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Stroynowskiemu*, M. Durbas, ed., Częstochowa 2019, pp. 767–782; eadem, *Działania na morzach w czasie wielkiej wojny wschodniej (1787–1792) w świetle relacji “Gazety Warszawskiej” i “Pamiętnika Historyczno-Politycznego”*, [in:] *Oblicza wojny*, vol. I (*Armia kontra natura*), W. Jarno, J. Kita, eds, Łódź 2020, pp. 91–105; eadem, *Oblężenie i szturm Oczakowa (17 XII 1788) w relacjach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Twierdze osiemnastowiecznej Europy. Studia z dziejów nowożytnej sztuki wojskowej*, vol. III, M. Trąbski, ed., Częstochowa 2020, pp. 129–143; eadem, *Kongres pokojowy w Szyszowie (1790–1791) na łamach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Władza i polityka w czasach nowożytnych. Dyplomacja i sprawy wewnętrzne*, Z. Anusik, M. Karkocha, eds, Łódź 2020, pp. 199–211; eadem, “*Póki włosy w mojej brodzie nie zajmą się ogniem, póty nie poddam się*”. *Oblężenie i zajęcie Belgradu (1789) w relacjach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Twierdze osiemnastowiecznej Europy. Studia z dziejów nowożytnej sztuki wojskowej*, vol. IV, M. Trąbski, ed., Częstochowa 2022, pp. 249–266.

including Potemkin⁴, Alexander V. Suvorov⁵, Mikhail I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, and Fedor F. Ushakov⁶. Particularly noteworthy are the studies by Matthew Z. Mayer on the Austro-Turkish War (1788–1791)⁷ and by Stanford J. Shaw on Turkey under the rule of Selim III (1789–1807)⁸. Equally deserving of mention is the seminal two-volume monograph on the second Russo-Turkish War during Catherine II's reign by the Russian military historian Andrei N. Petrov. Despite its publication nearly 150 years ago, that work has retained its relevance⁹.

Among the works of Polish scholars, the authoritative study by Walerian Kalinka on the Great Sejm, outlining the course of the first two Austrian campaigns and Russian operations from 1787 to 1790, as well as the broader international context of the period, proved particularly valuable¹⁰. Also notable is the popular science publication on the Russo-Turkish wars from the seventeenth to the twentieth century by Wojciech Morawski and Sylwia Szawłowska, however, its inclusion herein is merely out of obligation, as the work offers little new to my study¹¹.

⁴ Noteworthy are especially the publications by Simon S. Montefiore (*Potiomkin, książę książąt*, Warszawa 2000; *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarski romans*, Warszawa 2013) and Olga Eliseeva (*Grigorii Potemkin*, 1st edn, Moscow 2005; I consulted the 3rd edition of 2016).

⁵ The most notable is the excellent and, to date, the best biography of that commander by Aleksandr Petrushevskii, published in three volumes (*Generalissimus kniaz Suvorov*, vols I–III, St Petersburg 1884), as well as the work by Viacheslav Lopatin (*Suvorov*, Moscow 2012).

⁶ A detailed list of printed sources and studies is provided at the end of the dissertation in the appended bibliography.

⁷ M.Z. Mayer, *Joseph II and the Campaign Against the Ottoman Turks*, [unpublished MA thesis defended at McGill University, Canada], Montreal 1997; idem, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I – Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789*, “International History Review” 2004, vol. XXVI, no. 2, pp. 257–299; idem, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II – Leopold II, the Prussian Threat, and the Peace of Sistova, 1790–1791*, “International History Review” 2004, vol. XXV, no. 3, pp. 473–514.

⁸ See, for example, S.J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971; idem, *The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, “Oriens” 1965/1966, vol. XVIII/XIX, pp. 168–184; idem, *The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III*, “Journal of Modern History” 1965, vol. XXXVII, no. 3, pp. 291–306.

⁹ A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vols I–II, St Petersburg 1880.

¹⁰ W. Kalinka, *Sejm Czteroletni*, vols I–II, Warszawa 1991.

¹¹ W. Morawski, S. Szawłowska, *Wojny rosyjsko-tureckie od XVII do XX wieku*, Warszawa 2006.

The historical figures mentioned in the press and relevant to my research were, in most cases, referenced without their first names. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder*¹² proved invaluable for identifying envoys and diplomats, while various encyclopaedic publications, lexicons, and dictionaries were particularly useful for commanders and military personnel, most notably the multivolume work by Constantin von Wurzbach¹³, as well as the studies of Jeronim Hirtenfeld¹⁴, Alexander Mikaberidze¹⁵, and Sergei Volkov¹⁶. Given that the names of most of those individuals are unfamiliar even to historians, I deemed it appropriate to include additional bibliographical information about them in the footnotes. In this regard, the principle held true that the older the referenced publication, the more detailed the biographical information it provides.

I consulted Turkish literature only to a limited extent, primarily due to its scarce availability. Regarding the works of Turkish historians that have not been published in any of the major international languages, my access was almost exclusively through online resources.

2. THE WARSAW PRESS

The Warsaw press, a term that warrants brief clarification, was my primary source of information on the Russo-Turkish War. It refers to Polish-language newspapers printed in the capital of Poland between 1787 and 1792. During that period, two titles were published continuously: ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ – the leading news daily edited and published by a former Jesuit, Rev. Stefan Łuskina (1725–1793)¹⁷; and ‘Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny’ (renamed

¹² *Repertorium der diplomatischen vertreter aller Länder*, vol. III (1764–1815), O.F. Winter, ed., Graz–Köln 1965.

¹³ C. von Wurzbach, *Biographisches Lexicon des kaiserthums Oesterreich, enthaltend die lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen kronländern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben*, vols I–LX, Wien 1856–1891.

¹⁴ J. Hirtenfeld, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden und seine Mitglieder: Nach authentischen quellen bearbeitet*, vols I–II, Wien 1857.

¹⁵ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815*, New York 2005.

¹⁶ S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. I (A–K), Moscow 2010; vol. II (L–Â), Moscow 2010.

¹⁷ J. Szczepaniec, *Łuskina Stefan*, [in:] *PSB*, vol. XVIII, Wrocław 1973, pp. 577–579; J. Łojek, *Don Kichot XVIII-wiecznej prasy polskiej (Stefan Łuskina)*, “Kwartalnik Historii Prasy Polskiej” 1991, vol. XXX, nos 3–4, pp. 17–25.

‘Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczno-Ekonomiczny’ in 1788) – a monthly socio-economic publication, offering a wealth of information on the latest domestic and international events, edited by Rev. Piotr Świtkowski (1744–1793)¹⁸. On 1 January 1791, in violation of Łuskiński’s *cum iure exclusivo* privilege, which guaranteed the exclusive right to publish newspapers in the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland in all languages except French¹⁹, ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ (1791–1792) began publication. That periodical, aligned with the reformist faction, promoted patriotic and independence-oriented ideas and was published by three young political activists: Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, Józef Weyssenhoff, and Tadeusz Mostowski, with Stanisław Szymański²⁰ as editor. Warsaw saw the emergence of another patriotic newspaper. ‘Korespondent Warszawski donoszący wiadomości krajowe i zagraniczne’ was first issued exactly on the first anniversary of the adoption of the May 3rd Constitution, with a former Jesuit, Rev. Karol Malinowski acting as its editor-in-chief. These four periodicals became my primary sources of information on the Russo-Turkish War, although the last of them proved less significant due to its late inception, and as each has already been the subject of monographs and numerous studies²¹, this

¹⁸ For information on P. Świtkowski and his literary and publishing activity, see E. Aleksandrowska, *Świtkowski Piotr*, [in:] *Dawni pisarze polscy od początków piśmiennictwa do Młodej Polski. Przewodnik biograficzny i bibliograficzny*, vol. IV (S–T), coordinated by R. Loth, Warszawa 2003, pp. 232–233; I. Łossowska, *Piotr Świtkowski (1744–1793)*, [in:] *Pisarze polskiego Oświecenia*, T. Kostkiewiczowa, Z. Goliński, eds, vol. II, Warszawa 1994, pp. 305–319; I. Homola-Dzikowska, *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny Piotra Świtkowskiego 1782–1792*, Kraków 1960, pp. 10–24; and especially M. Getka-Kenig, *Świtkowski Piotr*, [in:] *PSB*, vol. LII, Warszawa–Kraków 2017–2019, pp. 45–49.

¹⁹ J. Szczepaniec, *Monopol prasowy Stefana Łuskińskiego w Koronie w latach 1773–1793*, “Ze Skarbcza Kultury” 1961, no. 13, pp. 5–99.

²⁰ For information on the editors of the newspaper and their journalistic pursuits, see J. Skowronek, *Mostowski Tadeusz Antoni*, [in:] *PSB*, vol. XXII, Wrocław 1977, pp. 73–78; S. Kieniewicz, M. Witkowski, *Niemcewicz (Ursyn Niemcewicz) Julian*, [in:] *ibidem*, pp. 771–780; A. Goriaczko, “Gazeta Narodowa i Obca”, Wrocław 1953, pp. 23–39; J. Dihm, *Niemcewicz jako polityk i publicysta w czasie Sejmu Czteroletniego*, Kraków 1928.

²¹ Among the more significant works, see I. Homola-Dzikowska, *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny...*; eadem, *Piotr Świtkowski i jego “Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny”*, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Seria Nauk Społecznych. Historia” 1958, no. 3, pp. 119–161; J. Łojek, “Gazeta Warszawska” księdza Łuskińskiego 1774–1793, Warszawa 1959; idem, *Dziennikarze i prasa w Warszawie w XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 1960, pp. 55–65, 94 ff; I. Łossowska-Zaporowska, “Korespondent Warszawski” w latach 1792–1796. (Zarys monograficzny), Warszawa

obviates the need for a detailed discussion. Nevertheless, several issues warrant closer examination in the context of my further analysis.

METHODS OF SOURCING NEWSPAPER CONTENT

Reports on the latest events unfolding around the world – often including Poland – published in the press were primarily derived from foreign newspapers. Due to insufficient funding, publishers could not afford to station correspondents abroad – whether on a permanent or even a temporary basis – who would provide them with regular reports and accounts. Instead, they relied on subscriptions to foreign newspapers from France, England, Italy, and other European countries, with particular emphasis on the so-called international gazettes. Those publications were printed in French (less frequently in German) in Holland and the western German states and were intended for circulation throughout almost all of Europe. The most renowned and influential among them included: ‘Nouvelles Extraordinaires de Divers Endroits’, known to readers as ‘Gazette de Leyde’; ‘Staats- und Gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen Unparteyischen Correspondenten’, commonly referred to as ‘Hamburgische Correspondent’; ‘Curier du Bas-Rhin’, printed in Cleves by the Jesuits; and ‘Gazette de France’, the official newspaper of Versailles²². The editors of each newspaper subscribed to multiple foreign periodicals, the number determined by available financial resources, and selected the most notable news items, either translating them verbatim or adapting them as required. At times, their publishers revealed the sources of their information by citing the title of the periodical from which the content had been reprinted. The list of newspapers cited by Rev. Łuskina (only some of which appear in their original form, making identification more difficult) comprises over twenty titles, although it is doubtful that he subscribed to all of them. In all probability, some – if not most – were cited second-hand. These included: English newspapers such as ‘The Chronicle’²³, ‘The Morning

1969; W. Giełżyński, *Prasa warszawska 1661–1914*, Warszawa 1962, pp. 45–50, 60–64; J. Bartoszewicz, *Gazeta księdza Łuskiny*, [in:] idem, *Znakomici mężowie polscy w XVIII wieku*, vol. I, Warszawa 1855, pp. 261–330.

²² J. Łojek, *Prasa dawnej Rzeczypospolitej*, [in:] idem, J. Myśliński, W. Władyka, *Dzieje prasy polskiej*, 1st ed., Warszawa 1988, pp. 16–17; J. Łojek, *Dziennikarze...*, p. 13; idem, *Polityczna rola prasy polskiej 1661–1831*, “Kwartalnik Historii Prasy Polskiej” 1980, no. 2, p. 9; D. Hombek, *Dzieje prasy polskiej. Wiek XVIII (do 1795 r.)*, Kielce 2016, p. 57.

²³ GW, 17 April 1791, no. 34, p. [4].

Herald²⁴, ‘The Morning Post’²⁵, ‘The London Gazette’²⁶, and ‘The Times’²⁷; French titles such as the ‘Journal de Bruxelles’ (most likely)²⁸, ‘Gazette de Strasbourg’²⁹, ‘Gazette de France’³⁰, ‘Journal de Paris’³¹, and ‘L’Ami du Roi, des Français, de l’ordre et sur-tout de la vérité’³²; Spanish ‘Diario de Madrid’³³; Dutch newspapers such as ‘Gazette d’Amsterdam’³⁴, ‘Gazette van Gand’³⁵, ‘Gazette de la Haye’³⁶, ‘Gazette de Leyde’³⁷, and ‘Rotterdamsche

²⁴ GW, 3 September 1791, no. 71, p. [1].

²⁵ GW, 26 July 1788, no. 60, supplement, p. [3].

²⁶ GW, 31 October 1787, no. 87, supplement, p. [3]; 23 April 1788, no. 33, p. [4]; 10 May, no. 38, supplement, p. [2]; 16 July, no. 57, supplement, p. [2]; 17 September, no. 75, supplement, p. [2]; 5 November, no. 89, supplement, p. [2]; 11 September 1790, no. 73, p. [2]; 1 December, no. 96, supplement, p. [3]; 8 December, no. 98, p. [2]; 1 January 1791, no. 1, p. [4]; 22 January, no. 7, supplement, p. [3]; 29 January, no. 9, supplement, p. [1]; 19 February, no. 15, supplement, p. [2]; 2 March, no. 18, supplement, p. [2]; 20 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [3]; 2 May, no. 35, supplement, p. [1]; 31 August, no. 70, supplement, p. [1]; 7 September, no. 72, p. [4].

²⁷ GW, 13 June 1789, no. 47, p. [3]; 20 July 1791, no. 58, p. [2].

²⁸ GW, 2 December 1789, no. 96, p. [3]; 2 January 1790, no. 1, p. [3] and supplement, p. [1]; 30 June, no. 52, supplement, p. [3]; 24 July, no. 59, supplement, p. [3]; 8 June 1791, no. 46, p. [3]; 6 June 1792, no. 45, p. [2].

²⁹ GW, 21 December 1791, no. 102, p. [4]; 28 December, no. 103, p. [3].

³⁰ GW, 12 September 1787, no. 73, p. [1]; 22 September, no. 76, p. [2]; 5 April 1788, no. 28, supplement, p. [3]; 7 June, no. 46, supplement, p. [1]; 11 April 1789, no. 29, p. [3]; 5 August, no. 62, p. [4]; 19 August, no. 66, supplement, p. [3]; 17 October, no. 83, p. [3]; 4 November, no. 88, p. [3]; 23 December, no. 102, supplement, p. [3]; 27 January 1790, no. 8, supplement, p. [3]; 5 May, no. 36, p. [2]; 12 May, no. 38, p. [2]; 22 May, no. 41, supplement, p. [2]; 4 September, no. 71, p. [2]; 24 November, no. 94, p. [3]; 12 January 1791, no. 4, p. [4]; 9 July, no. 55, supplement, p. [2]; 4 February 1792, no. 10, supplement, p. [3]; 13 June, no. 47, p. [4].

³¹ GW, 2 March 1791, no. 18, supplement, p. [3]; 5 March, no. 19, p. [2].

³² GW, 9 April 1791, no. 29, p. [2]; 4 June, no. 45, supplement, p. [2].

³³ GW, 24 October 1789, no. 85, p. [2]; 28 September 1791, no. 78, supplement, p. [3]; 7 April 1791, no. 28, p. [4].

³⁴ GW, 3 November 1787, no. 88, p. [2]. The newspaper was founded in Amsterdam in 1691 by Jean Tronchin Dubreuil. Cf. *La “Gazette d’Amsterdam”: Miroir de l’Europe au XVIII^e siècle*, P. Rétat, ed., Oxford 2001.

³⁵ GW, 9 December 1789, no. 98, supplement, p. [3]. The newspaper was published in Ghent between 1723 and 1809.

³⁶ GW, 13 December 1788, no. 100, supplement, p. [3]; 8 April 1789, no. 28, supplement, p. [1]; 6 January 1790, no. 2, p. [4]; 5 February 1791, no. 11, p. [1]; 9 July, no. 55, supplement, p. [3]; 23 July, no. 59, p. [3].

³⁷ GW, 22 September 1787, no. 76, supplement, p. [2]; 13 September 1788, no. 74, supplement, p. [2]; 29 April 1789, no. 34, p. [2]; 3 February 1790, no. 10, supplement, p. [1]; 7 August, no. 63, supplement, p. [2]; 27 July 1791, no. 60, supplement, p. [2].

Courant³⁸; Russian ‘Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti’ (most likely)³⁹; Italian titles such as ‘Gazette Universall’⁴⁰ and ‘Diario di Roma’⁴¹; and German and Austrian publications including ‘Brünner Zeitung’⁴², ‘Curier du Bas-Rhin’⁴³, ‘Berlinische Zeitung’⁴⁴, ‘Hamburgische Correspondent’⁴⁵, ‘Gazette de Cologne’⁴⁶, ‘Historisches

For more on that newspaper, see J.D. Popkin, *News and Politics in the Age of Revolution: Jean Luzac’s “Gazette de Leyde”*, Ithaca 1989; P. Ugniewski, *Między absolutyzmem a jacobinizmem. “Gazeta Lejdejska” o Francji i Polsce 1788–1794*, Warszawa 1998.

³⁸ GW, 18 November 1789, no. 92, supplement, p. [3]; 7 April 1790, no. 28, p. [1].

³⁹ GW, 12 December 1787, no. 99, p. [2]; 7 June 1788, no. 46, supplement, p. [1]; 26 July, no. 60, p. [2]; 30 July, no. 61, supplement, p. [1]; 2 August, no. 62, supplement, p. [2]; 30 August, no. 70, p. [2]; 13 September, no. 74, p. [2]; 3 January 1789, no. 1, supplement, p. [2]; 26 February 1791, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]; 28 September, no. 78, supplement, p. [2]. For further information on this newspaper, see A.M. Chebotarev, *Znachenie gazety “Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti” v informatsionno-prosvetitelnoi deiatelnosti XVIII veka v Rossii*, “Vestnik Iuzhno-Uralskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta” 2006, no. 17(72), pp. 123–126.

⁴⁰ GW, 20 June 1789, no. 49, p. [4]; 11 January 1792, no. 3, supplement, p. [2].

⁴¹ GW, 15 September 1787, no. 74, p. [4].

⁴² GW, 2 July 1788, no. 53, supplement, p. [2]; 13 September, no. 74, p. [2]; 25 June 1791, no. 51, p. [3]. A newspaper published in Brno from 1755 to 1918. Cf. *Bibliographie deutschsprachiger Periodika aus dem östlichen Europa*, vol. I (*Zeitung und Zeitschriften*), compiled and edited by A. Weber, [n.p.] 2013, p. 174.

⁴³ GW, 21 January 1789, no. 6, supplement, p. [2]; 2 May, no. 35, p. [2]; 6 November 1790, no. 89, p. [3]; 17 August 1791, no. 66, supplement, p. [3]; 20 August, no. 67, supplement, p. [3]; 10 December, no. 99, supplement, p. [1]; 14 December, no. 100, p. [1]. For further information on that newspaper, see M. Beermann, *Zeitung zwischen Profit und Politik. Der Courier du Bas-Rhin (1767–1810)*, Leipzig 1996.

⁴⁴ GW, 12 November 1788, no. 91, p. [3]; 18 August 1790, no. 66, p. [2]. Most likely, it refers to the daily newspaper ‘Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen’, published between 1751 and 1791 by bookseller Christian Friedrich Voss (later known as ‘Vossische Zeitung’). Cf. A. Buchholtz, *Die Vossische Zeitung. Geschichtliche Rückblicke auf drei Jahrhunderte*, Berlin 1904; A. Schumann, *Berliner Presse und Französische Revolution. Das Spektrum der Meinungen unter preußischer Zensur 1789–1806*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Technische Universität Berlin, Fakultät I – Geisteswissenschaften], Berlin 2001, <https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/713> (accessed 10 November 2020).

⁴⁵ GW, 21 January 1789, no. 6, supplement, p. [2]; 29 April, no. 34, p. [4].

⁴⁶ GW, 12 September 1789, no. 73, p. [4]; 2 December, no. 96, p. [2]; 21 April 1790, no. 32, p. [4]; 16 June, no. 48, supplement, p. [3]; 10 November, no. 90, supplement, p. [3]; 23 July 1791, no. 59, p. [3]; 10 September, no. 73, supplement, p. [1]; 14 December, no. 100, supplement, p. [2]; 15 February 1792, no. 13, p. [1]. A French-language newspaper published in Cologne from 1734 to 1810, initiated by Jean Ignace Roderique.

Portefeuille⁴⁷, 'Leipziger Zeitung'⁴⁸, 'Prager Zeitung'⁴⁹, 'Preßburger Zeitung'⁵⁰, and 'Wiener Zeitung'⁵¹, as well as lesser-known titles such as 'Ungarische Staats-

⁴⁷ GW, 23 April 1788, no. 33, p. [1]. For further information on that popular German periodical, published in Hamburg between 1782 and 1788, see D. Sidorowicz, *Artykuły z niemieckiego miesięcznika "Historisches Portefeuille" (1782–1788) w przekładach polskich na łamach czasopism Piotra Świtkowskiego*, "Czasopismo Zakładu Narodowego Imienia Ossolińskich" 2001, no. 12, pp. 22–26.

⁴⁸ GW, 9 May 1792, no. 37, p. [4]. A newspaper published in Leipzig from 1734 to 1921.

⁴⁹ GW, 8 July 1789, no. 54, supplement, p. [1]. It was a periodical published between 1744 and 1890 in Prague. See *Bibliographie deutschsprachiger Periodika...*, p. 332.

⁵⁰ GW, 5 April 1788, no. 28, p. [4]; 25 October, no. 85, supplement, p. [2].

⁵¹ GW, 15 September 1787, no. 74, supplement, p. [3]; 30 April 1788, no. 35, p. [1]; 3 May, no. 36, p. [1]; 10 May, no. 38, p. [1] and supplement, p. [1]; 14 May, no. 39, p. [2] and supplement, p. [3]; 17 May, no. 40, pp. [1–2]; 21 May, no. 41, p. [2]; 24 May, no. 42, p. [1] and supplement, p. [1]; 28 May, no. 43, p. [1]; 31 May, no. 44, p. [1] and supplement, p. [2]; 4 June, no. 45, p. [1]; 7 June, no. 46, p. [1]; 11 June, no. 47, p. [1]; 14 June, no. 48, p. [1]; 18 June, no. 49, p. [1]; 21 June, no. 50, p. [1]; 25 June, no. 51, p. [1] and supplement, p. [1]; 28 June, no. 52, p. [1]; 5 July, no. 54, p. [1]; 9 July, no. 55, p. [1]; 12 July, no. 56, p. [2] and supplement, p. [1]; 16 July, no. 57, p. [1]; 19 July, no. 58, pp. [1–2]; 23 July, no. 59, p. [1]; 26 July, no. 60, supplement, p. [1]; 30 July, no. 61, p. [1]; 2 August, no. 62, p. [1]; 6 August, no. 63, p. [1]; 9 August, no. 64, p. [1]; 13 August, no. 65, p. [1]; 16 August, no. 66, p. [1]; 20 August, no. 67, p. [2] and supplement, pp. [1, 3]; 23 August, no. 68, p. [1] and supplement, p. [1]; 27 August, no. 69, p. [2] and supplement, p. [1]; 30 August, no. 70, p. [2] and supplement, p. [1]; 3 September, no. 71, pp. [1, 3–4] and supplement, p. [1]; 6 September, no. 72, p. [2] and supplement, p. [1]; 10 September, no. 73, pp. [1, 4] and supplement, p. [1]; 13 September, no. 74, supplement, pp. [1, 3]; 17 September, no. 75, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 20 September, no. 76, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 24 September, no. 77, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 27 September, no. 78, p. [4] and supplement, pp. [2–3]; 1 October, no. 79, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 4 October, no. 80, p. [1] and supplement, p. [2]; 8 October, no. 81, p. [2] and supplement, p. [2]; 11 October, no. 82, pp. [2, 4] and supplement, p. [2]; 15 October, no. 83, p. [3]; 18 October, no. 84, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 22 October, no. 85, p. [3]; 25 October, no. 86, p. [2] and supplement, p. [3]; 29 October, no. 87, supplement, p. [2]; 1 November, no. 88, p. [2]; 5 November, no. 89, p. [2] and supplement, p. [3]; 8 November, no. 90, p. [4]; 12 November, no. 91, supplement, p. [3]; 15 November, no. 92, supplement, p. [3]; 19 November, no. 93, supplement, p. [2]; 22 November, no. 94, p. [4]; 26 November, no. 95, p. [4] and supplement, p. [1]; 29 November, no. 96, supplement, p. [2]; 3 December, no. 97, supplement, p. [3]; 6 December, no. 98, supplement, p. [2]; 17 December, no. 101, p. [4]; 24 December, no. 103, p. [3]; 27 December, no. 104, supplement, p. [1]; 31 December, no. 105, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 7 January 1789, no. 2, p. [2] and supplement, p. [2]; 10 January, no. 3, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 14 January, no. 4, supplement, p. [2]; 17 January, no. 5, p. [3]; 31 January, no. 9, supplement, p. [1]; 7 February, no. 11, supplement, p. [1]; 21 February, no. 15, supplement, p. [2]; 21 March, no. 23, supplement, p. [3]; 4 April, no. 27, p. [3];

und Gelehrte Nachrichten'⁵², and 'Erlanger Real-Zeitung'⁵³. The priest-editor also drew from publications issued in Hanau⁵⁴, Hermannstadt⁵⁵, Frankfurt⁵⁶, and Stockholm⁵⁷. According to the newspaper's monographer, Jerzy Łojek, Łuskina regularly relied on only a few periodicals ('Hamburgische Correspondent', 'Gazette de Leyde', 'Gazette de France', and 'Curier du Bas-Rhin'), and to keep apprised of events in Southern Europe, he subscribed to one Italian periodical, most likely 'Gazette Universalle'⁵⁸ published in Genoa. My research indicates that the latter was referred to in 'Gazeta Warszawska' only twice, and even if some instances were overlooked, they would still be isolated cases, suggesting that it was only occasionally used as a source. Łuskina, however, frequently referred to 'Wiener Zeitung' and likely subscribed to it – if not for the entire duration of his 'Gazeta', then at least during the period relevant to my research, certainly between 1788 and 1789⁵⁹.

A similar practice was followed in other periodicals. Foreign news was reprinted in the conventional manner from foreign newspapers and journals, mostly German, English, and French, with 'Hamburgische Correspondent' being the most frequently utilized source. The editor

13 May, no. 38, supplement, p. [3]; 3 June, no. 44, pp. [3–4]; 10 June, no. 46, p. [4]; 20 June, no. 49, p. [3]; 27 June, no. 51, p. [2]; 1 July, no. 52, supplement, p. [2]; 19 August, no. 66, p. [2]; 3 October, no. 79, supplement, p. [3]; 10 October, no. 81, supplement, p. [2]; 17 October, no. 83, supplement, p. [2]; 24 October, no. 85, p. [4]; 18 November, no. 92, p. [2]; 28 November, no. 95, p. [2]; 12 December, no. 99, p. [3]; 13 February 1790, no. 13, supplement, p. [3]; 6 March, no. 19, supplement, p. [3]; 24 March, no. 24, p. [4]; 5 June, no. 45, p. [4] and supplement, p. [2]; 14 July, no. 56, p. [2]; 21 July, no. 58, p. [1]; 31 July, no. 61, p. [4]; 28 August, no. 69, p. [3]; 1 September, no. 70, supplement, p. [3]; 29 September, no. 78, p. [4]; 10 November, no. 90, p. [1]; 24 November, no. 94, p. [1]; 23 February 1791, no. 16, p. [3]; 16 July, no. 57, p. [1]; 27 August, no. 69, supplement, p. [2]; 7 September, no. 72, supplement, p. [2]; 21 January 1792, no. 6, p. [1]; 24 March, no. 24, supplement, p. [2].

⁵² GW, 13 September 1788, no. 74, p. [3]; 4 October, no. 80, p. [4]; 5 November, no. 89, p. [3]; 12 November, no. 91, p. [4]; 13 October 1790, no. 82, supplement, p. [2].

⁵³ GW, 18 April 1792, no. 31, p. [4].

⁵⁴ GW, 17 September 1791, no. 75, supplement, p. [2].

⁵⁵ GW, 9 April 1788, no. 29, supplement, p. [3]; 23 April, no. 33, p. [1]; 4 October, no. 80, supplement, p. [1]; 1 November, no. 88, p. [2]; 29 November, no. 96, supplement, p. [3].

⁵⁶ GW, 31 October 1789, no. 87, p. [2]; 24 March 1792, no. 24, p. [3].

⁵⁷ GW, 27 June 1789, no. 51, supplement, p. [2]; 7 November, no. 89, p. [2]; 23 June 1790, no. 50, p. [1]; 3 July, no. 53, supplement, p. [3]; 28 July, no. 60, p. [3].

⁵⁸ J. Łojek, "Gazeta Warszawska"..., p. 33; idem, *Dziennikarze...*, pp. 57–58.

⁵⁹ See fn. 51 for references to the source.

of 'Pamiętnik', Rev. Świtkowski, also relied extensively on 'Mercure de France', 'Journal de Paris', and 'Altonaische Gelehrte Zeitung'⁶⁰.

Apart from the foreign press, another source of political news – i.e., current information from around the world – came from correspondents' reports. Only a few newspapers could afford to employ full-time reporters on a regular stipend. More often, they depended on the goodwill of acquaintances embarking on long journeys, private letters, commercial correspondence, or reports from diplomatic agents. This was the most valuable type of information, and the more serious the publication, the more readily such a source was used⁶¹. Such reports often bore the heading "From a letter", followed by the name of the city from which the information originated (e.g., "From a letter from Vienna") or given titles such as "From private letters", "Particular letters", "Authentic account", etc. At times, editors published communications submitted on the readers' own initiative⁶², a practice openly encouraged by the Warsaw-based periodicals. 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' also obtained up-to-date foreign news through private contacts with members of Warsaw's diplomatic corps, including the offices of the Prussian ambassador Girolamo Lucchesini and the British envoy Daniel Hailes⁶³.

The significant influence exerted by Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski on 'Gazeta Warszawska', which was under his control, deserves particular attention. Especially in the early stages of the Four-Year Sejm, the king sought to steer public opinion towards a moderate and restrained position in relation to Russia. It can therefore be assumed that at least some of the pro-Russian texts published in Rev. Stefan Łuskina's periodical were prompted by the Polish monarch. It should also be noted that Warsaw lay on the route of Russian couriers carrying news from the theatre of the Russo-Turkish War to St Petersburg. The Russian

⁶⁰ I. Łossowska-Zaporowska, "Korespondent Warszawski"..., p. 32; A. Goriaczko, "Gazeta Narodowa i Obca"..., p. 41; I. Homola-Dzikowska, *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny*..., pp. 29–32; D. Hombek, *Dzieje prasy*... p. 63.

⁶¹ J. Łojek, *Dziennikarze*..., p. 12; idem, "Gazeta Warszawska"..., p. 32.

⁶² An example includes "A letter from a traveller from Moldavia, 1 November" (GW, 8 December 1787, no. 98, supplement, p. [2]); "An excerpt from a letter dated 19 February, sent from Paris to Warsaw, written by a Frenchman who had lived in Poland for many years" (GW, 12 March 1791, no. 21, supplement, p. [3]); or a report on the participation of Poles in the defence of the Turkish fortress of Izmail, captured by the Russians in December 1790 (GNiO, 26 February 1791, no. 17, p. 68).

⁶³ A. Goriaczko, "Gazeta Narodowa i Obca"..., p. 41; J. Łojek, *Dziennikarze*..., pp. 140–141; *Historia prasy polskiej*, J. Łojek, ed., vol. I (*Prasa polska w latach 1661–1864*), Warszawa 1976, p. 21; D. Hombek, *Dzieje prasy*..., p. 62.

embassy provided Stanislas Augustus with the most important reports from Grigory Potemkin's headquarters in Jassy, and the king passed them on, primarily to the publisher of 'Gazette de Leyde'⁶⁴. As a result, there were instances where news already familiar at the royal court in Warsaw reached the Warsaw press via newspapers published in Western Europe. Naturally, the situation changed at the turn of 1789 and 1790, when closer cooperation was established between the king – who endorsed the idea of an alliance with Prussia at that time – and the “true” patriots striving to reform the political system of Poland. The gradual deterioration of relations between Stanislas Augustus and the Russian court and embassy undoubtedly led to the closure of that channel of information for the royal court in Warsaw. Indeed, while in 1789–1790 'Gazette de Leyde' quite often featured reports from Potemkin's headquarters in Jassy (published as correspondence from Warsaw), such reports became noticeably less frequent thereafter⁶⁵.

EDITORIAL COMMENTARY

It is commonly believed that the news-oriented press of the Enlightenment was entirely devoid of editorial commentary and other forms of authorial expression. Reports derived from foreign periodicals were translated *in extenso* into Polish and then published in domestic newspapers. Pure facts, free of judgment – this was the prevailing understanding of journalistic integrity at the time. This was also what readers expected of publishers. Newspapers were expensive, and both subscribers and occasional buyers purchased them not for the opinions of individual editors, but to keep abreast of the latest news from home and abroad⁶⁶. In practice, however, the situation was somewhat different, and many publishers – especially towards the end of the eighteenth century – made little effort to uphold that ideal. Commentary in the press was provided in various forms, whether explicit or implicit. The former involved personal opinions stated directly in the main text or – more commonly – in minor footnotes at the bottom of the page. It also made use of descriptive phrases and evaluative terms that unequivocally expressed the editor's view on the events described. The latter entailed the careful selection of content and subjects covered in notes and articles; a highly detailed description of events; repeated emphasis on certain issues to lend them greater weight and significance; omitting facts

⁶⁴ P. Ugniewski, *Między absolutyzmem a jakobinizmem...*, pp. 50, 149.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

⁶⁶ J. Łojek, *Dziennikarze...*, pp. 11–12; *Historia prasy polskiej...*, p. 20.

that were politically or ideologically inconvenient to editors; or reducing them to brief notes and publishing them with significant delay. Even the size and type of font used carried meaning, although this criterion was not always reliable. Not every extensive account set in Roman type and standard font size implied an intention by the publisher to draw the reader's attention to it. Sometimes the reasons were far more practical, such as having to fill space in an issue when the postal service failed to deliver the subscribed newspapers on time, which was a common occurrence⁶⁷.

To clarify this point, it should be acknowledged that overt commentary did feature in the Warsaw press, though not as frequently as one might expect. Among the publishers of fact-based newspapers, Rev. Łuskina was the most frequent contributor of such commentary, but he enjoyed a press monopoly and had the support of King Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski and later the Targowica authorities. In 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' and 'Korespondent', opinions were often conveyed through fictional or authentic private letters⁶⁸. A somewhat different approach was taken in 'Pamiętnik', where review articles were published. The other aspect (covert commentary) is difficult to identify, partly due to the absence of eighteenth-century foreign periodicals in Poland and partly due to the unavailability of in-depth studies in this area.

With regard to reprinted materials, one notable aspect is that the foreign political news published in the Warsaw newspapers was, in essence, a literal translation of foreign publications. It may be of interest to compare several press reports selected at random, which, I believe, were based on the same source of information. All excerpts originate from 'Gazeta Warszawska' and 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca', as these examples best illustrate the similarities. Let me begin with an extensive report from Constantinople, dated 9 May 1791, which was published two months later (on 2 July). The excerpt is presented with the original structure of the text preserved. Obvious differences in the text are underlined. Łuskina noted as follows:

On 2 instant [of July – M.K.], the kapudan pasha departed with considerable ceremony from the local port, leading the fleet destined for the Black Sea and with favourable winds prevailing, the fleet's departure was orderly and in good form. The commander of the Algerian

⁶⁷ As noted, for example, by Łuskina: GW, 10 October 1787, no. 81, p. [4].

⁶⁸ A. Goriaczko, "Gazeta Narodowa i Obca"..., p. 11; I. Łossowska-Zaporowska, "Korespondent Warszawski"..., p. 26.

squadron, acting as vice admiral, now occupies the flagship designated for this purpose. The grand sultan places great trust in the skill of that naval commander, who, should he bring a successful military campaign to completion, would without fail be elevated to the rank of kapudan pasha, or grand admiral. At present, the kapudan pasha is stationed with his fleet in the Channel between the said capital and Bujukdere [Büyükdere – M.K.], taking on further provisions. The kaimakam himself has inspected all fortifications along the Channel leading towards the Black Sea. The sultan remains much engaged and shall not proceed to his summer residence until the close of the present month.

On 27 ultimo, two English vessels once more made their arrival there, laden with gunpowder and sundry other stores, the whole of which has been procured by the government⁶⁹.

Below is the equivalent of the report as published by a rival newspaper:

The Turks persist in indulging in the belief that the English fleet may shortly be seen in the Black Sea; yet those better versed in political affairs express doubts on the matter. – This morning, the kapudan pasha made a public departure hence with his fleet bound for the Black Sea; and as the winds were favourable, the fleet set out in the finest order. The commander of the English squadron serves aboard that fleet in the capacity of vice admiral. The sultan places the greatest trust in the excellence of that man, and should he succeed in but a single campaign, he is expected to be appointed kapudan pasha, or grand admiral. The kapudan pasha himself remains in the Channel, supplying his fleet with the necessary provisions. The kaimakam has personally inspected all the fortresses along the Channel leading to the Black Sea; the sultan himself is also greatly occupied and will likely not proceed to his summer residence until the close of the month. – Two muftis recently sentenced to exile have received permission to return. – On 27 ultimo, two English ships did yet again make their arrival, bearing gunpowder and sundry other military provisions⁷⁰.

Another example may be found in the same issues, titled “From St Petersburg on 3 June”. The former newspaper reported that:

⁶⁹ GW, 2 July 1791, no. 53, supplement, p. [2].

⁷⁰ GNiO, 2 July 1791, no. 53, p. 212.

The day before yesterday, the English envoy from London, Mr. Fawkner, arrived there and was presented to Her Imperial Majesty at Tsarskoye Selo, where she remains in good health⁷¹.

An excerpt from ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ reads as follows:

The day before yesterday, the Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Fawkenner, arrived there from England and had the honour to be presented to Her Imperial Majesty at Tsarskoye Selo, where he found the empress in excellent health⁷².

Finally, a somewhat longer excerpt from 1792 concerning the events of interest. Łuskina noted as follows:

Letters from Jassy report that the Porte intends to send the reis effendi himself, who was present at the peace congress, as an envoy extraordinary to St. Petersburg. The Russian empress, in turn, has appointed General Tamara, who commanded the Russian fleet in the Archipelago, as her minister at Constantinople, and Mr de Severin [Ivan Ivanovich Severin – M.K.], formerly the Russian consul general in Wallachia and Moldavia, as her chargé d'affaires therein.

The Porte’s chief interpreter at the congress, Mr Morusi [Alexander Moruzi – M.K.], even before his elevation to princely rank, was presented by the empress with a golden snuffbox with her portrait set in diamonds. Later, upon assuming the title of prince, further gifted was he with a costly fur coat of black foxes.

For the clearing of the port at Ochakov and its adaptation to receive large men-of-war, the empress has set aside 250,000 roubles. From all quarters of the Turkish dominions, wealthy Greeks are said to be seeking to settle, some in Ochakov, others in the ports of the Crimea. Twice weekly, a transport vessel is to be dispatched from Ochakov to Constantinople and back⁷³.

The equivalent of that article in ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’, entitled “From over the Wallachian border on 18 February” reads as follows:

⁷¹ GW, 2 July 1791, no. 53, supplement, p. [3].

⁷² GNiO, 2 July 1791, no. 53, p. 213.

⁷³ GW, 14 March 1792, no. 21, pp. [1–2].

It is reported that the reis effendi, who was present at the congress, is to be sent by the Porte as an envoy extraordinary to St Petersburg, while the Muscovite empress has appointed General Tamara, who commanded the flotilla in the Archipelago, as her minister to the Porte, and Mr Severin, formerly the Muscovite consul general in Moldavia and Wallachia, is to serve as the empress's chargé d'affaires therein. The Porte's chief interpreter at the congress, Prince Moruzi, was presented by the empress with a golden snuffbox and a black fox fur coat. The port of Ochakov is to be cleared and made ready next summer for the reception of large men-of-war, for which the empress has set aside 250,000 roubles. From all quarters of the Turkish dominions, wealthy Greeks are said to be gathering, some in Ochakov, others in the ports of the Crimea. For the convenience of trade, a packet boat is to depart from Ochakov to Constantinople and back twice per week. Two wealthy relatives of Maurojeni [Nicholas Mavrogheni – M.K.] have received permission to betake themselves to Trieste. Baron Herbert has been instructed to assist them in removing their entire property from Turkish lands⁷⁴.

The informative value of the compared examples remains nearly identical, with any differences arising chiefly from translation or the omission of minor passages. A linguist examining the original Polish version would observe that Łuskina's multi-clause sentences follow Latin syntax, with predicates often placed at the end. While this may affect readability in Polish, it does not alter the substance of the printed information. This characteristic, however, is not reflected in the English translation, as such sentence structures are foreign to natural English syntax.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR IN THE WARSAW PRESS

Throughout the Russo-Turkish War, the publishers of the Warsaw newspapers followed the course of the conflict with keen interest. They reported on the most significant land and naval battles, as well as minor skirmishes. Their accounts included information on troop movements, the condition of the enemy armies, and preparations for forthcoming campaigns. They printed lists of the military forces of the belligerent armies, the state of the fleets, war reports, and statistical, geographical, and biographical information. The newspapers also covered the efforts undertaken by the European courts to restore peace, provided accounts

⁷⁴ GNiO, 3 March 1792, no. 18, p. 105.

of the diplomatic congresses in Reichenbach and Sistova, and detailed the peace negotiations in Jassy. They published the texts of agreements and international treaties, the manifestos of imperial courts, the rescripts issued by monarchs, and excerpts from their correspondence. This diverse and overall extensive body of material was sufficient to keep Polish readers informed of developments in the Turkish theatre of war. As was typical for the press of that period, reports on the Russo-Turkish War published in the Warsaw newspapers were delayed by two to three weeks⁷⁵.

THE EDITORIAL APPROACH TO THE EASTERN QUESTION

This issue is fundamental to my study, as the political inclinations of the publishers had a significant impact on their selection and presentation of material. To provide context, it is useful to first examine the views of the editors of newspapers that were in circulation throughout that period. The former Jesuit, Rev. Stefan Łuskina, displayed clear pro-Russian leanings and did not alter his views even during the Four-Year Sejm. At every opportunity, he lavished praise on Catherine II⁷⁶, fervently supported the expansionist policies of the St Petersburg court towards Turkey and Sweden between 1787 and 1792, and advocated for keeping Poland in a position of close dependence on Russia. The reports on the Russo-Turkish War published in ‘*Gazeta Warszawska*’ were curated by Rev. Łuskina to highlight the superiority of the empress’s forces over the Turkish army and navy. He commended the bravery of Russian soldiers and exaggerated their victories while predicting the imminent defeat of the Sublime Porte in its struggle with the allied courts⁷⁷. Łuskina’s admiration for Catherine II

⁷⁵ Cf. J. Łojek, *Prasa...*, p. 16; idem, *Dziennikarze...*, p. 12; idem, “*Gazeta Warszawska*”..., p. 34.

⁷⁶ Suffice it to mention the laudatory expressions he used to describe her, such as “great”, “invincible”, and “magnificent”, among others. The source of such admiration for the empress lay in her refusal to recognize the dissolution of the Society of Jesus and her decision to preserve the Jesuit province within her empire. Moreover, while at the initial stage of the Four-Year Sejm some articles in Łuskina’s newspaper may have been inspired by Stanislas Augustus, who sought to temper the prevailing anti-Russian sentiment among the public, it seems unlikely that the king had any influence over the pro-Russian rhetoric of the editor’s writings in ‘*Gazeta Warszawska*’ between 1791 and 1792.

⁷⁷ GW, 2 February 1788, no. 10, p. [3]: “for there is little hope that the war shall turn in favour of the Porte, as all matters concerning its army, artillery, etc., are in great disarray; whereas on the Austrian and Russian side, such dispositions have been made as to leave scarce any doubt regarding the successful conclusion of their military expeditions. Considering also the internal discord within the Divan itself, whereby even the wisest and most experienced among the high-ranking officials are

extended to her ally, Emperor Joseph II. He described the Turks unfavourably and with a certain disdain, comparing their army to a “wild, lawless mass”. With relish, he recounted the “excesses” allegedly committed by the Turks in the Banat and other regions of the Habsburg Monarchy⁷⁸, reported on the high number of deserters from the Ottoman army⁷⁹, diseases⁸⁰, supply shortages⁸¹, and other hardships⁸².

often stripped of their posts and banished to distant lands; all things thus weighed, the fall of the Turkish Empire seems almost inevitable, should war against both Russia and Austria indeed come to pass”.

⁷⁸ For example, GW, 12 January 1788, no. 4, p. [3]: “The Turks, having recently arrived in Jassy from Constantinople with a force of 50,000 men, laid waste to all the merchant shops in the city, carried off young maidens by force, put the aged and children to the sword, and at last set the town ablaze, whereby more than forty houses were consumed by fire”; GW, 20 September 1788, no. 76, p. [2]: “The Turks act with barbarous cruelty; every village they seize in the Banat they lay to waste with fire, slaughtering the inhabitants”; GW, 24 September 1788, no. 77, p. [3]: “The Turks relent not in their cruelties in the Banat. They cut open the belly of the colonel of the Wallachian-Illyrian Regiment and mercilessly slaughtered a great number of our infirm in a field hospital, together with twelve medics, taking their heads with them”.

⁷⁹ A few accounts from the early stages of the war: GW, 15 December 1787, no. 100, supplement, p. [2]: “Of late, up to 3,000 Turks have deserted from various places in Moldavia”; GW, 19 December 1787, no. 101, p. [2]: “The defeat suffered by the Turks at Kinburn [12 October – M.K.] so greatly alarmed the garrison at Ochakov that several hundred fled and returned home”; GW, 22 December 1787, no. 102, p. [2]: “There is word that the Ottoman forces about Izmail number up to 40,000 men; howbeit, these forces, like all others, dwindle daily due to desertions, particularly among the Asian soldiery, who suffered greatly from the autumn rains and now endure yet greater hardship as the winter draws near”; GW, 5 January 1788, no. 2, p. [1]: “Lamentations from pashas and commanders of the Turkish forces reach here almost daily, bewailing that their soldiers are returning home in bands”.

⁸⁰ GW, 6 February 1788, no. 11, p. [2]: “By accounts received from the Turkish army, the exceedingly damp and unwholesome air this winter has given rise to many an illness within their ranks. Though ailments befall both the Austrian and Russian troops alike, the lazarettos of the Russians and Austrians are far better appointed than those of the Turks”. See also GW, 1 November 1788, no. 88, p. [4].

⁸¹ See, among others, GW, 3 October 1787, no. 79, supplement, p. [2]; 7 November 1787, no. 89, supplement, p. [1].

⁸² For example, GW, 13 February 1788, no. 13, p. [2]: “The Turkish army is in a state of utter disarray, and military discipline among the Turks seems even more contemptible now than it was during the previous war with Russia”. Notably, the priest-editor’s pro-Russian leanings greatly vexed readers and exposed him to accusations of bias and unreliable reporting on the war. Rev. Łuskiński even decided to respond to one such accusation, concerning his account of the Swedish-Russian naval battle of 26 July 1789 (GW, 22 August 1789, no. 67, supplement, pp. [1–2]). He was also compelled to address further allegations of unreliable coverage

Łuskina, on occasion, portrayed the Turks in a positive light, however, this was likely a reflection of the nature of the sources he relied on rather than an expression of his own beliefs. One such example is found in an article from Vienna, dated 19 July 1788:

Particular letters from the General Headquarters of our [Habsburg – M.K.] army report that from daily and rather prolonged experience there, it transpires that our bayonets cannot withstand the lances of the Turks, which they employ with singular dexterity and perform no small exploits therewith, accordingly, it was counselled that part of our soldiery be armed with like lances, albeit several inches longer, and set in the first line of infantry against the enemy. Howbeit, it is likewise observed that merely possessing a long lance suffices not; one must also have the reach to wield it with due effect, wherein the Turks, from their earliest youth – even amidst household diversions and recreations – have been wont to train almost from childhood [...] and thus accomplish many feats of knightly prowess with these very lances, to the wonderment of even the strongest and best-armoured adversary. Wherefore, such lances, if placed in the hands of our soldiers unaccustomed to their proper use, might cast yet greater confusion upon our army⁸³.

Another passage reads as follows:

The Bosnian Turks are our most valiant adversaries. That they hold but little fear of death was made plain at Dobrozello [in April 1788 – M.K.], where six Turks, having been taken prisoner there, did afterward cut their own throats. This was not perceived until five lay already lifeless, and the sixth still grasped a knife in his hand; though the knife was wrested from him, it was done too late, for he had already half-severed his throat⁸⁴.

The editor of 'Pamiętnik', Rev. Piotr Świtkowski, was, in turn, an advocate of pro-Turkish policies, which was more reasonable in the context of Polish patriotism during the Great Sejm. He endeavoured to win the readers' sympathies for Turkey, which was waging war against

of parliamentary proceedings (e.g., GW, 17 June 1789, no. 48, p. [2]; 22 August, no. 67, supplement, p. [2]).

⁸³ GW, 30 July 1788, no. 61, supplement, pp. [2–3].

⁸⁴ GW, 8 July 1789, no. 54, supplement, p. [2].

Russia, praised the courage and martial prowess of Ottoman soldiers⁸⁵, and sought to demonstrate that the Sublime Porte was not as afflicted by internal crisis as was commonly believed (the “sick man of Europe”). In an article published in March 1788, Świtkowski remarked:

It is certain, on the one hand, that the Turkish military power cannot compare to the armies of the European Christian powers, being composed in part of freshly conscripted men, wild and undisciplined; yet, on the other hand, it is no less undeniable that the Turks are not so contemptible as they are commonly portrayed. In general, nothing certain can yet be spoken of the Turkish army, for it has not been assembled as a whole. The great bands of armed men that for several months now have shown themselves in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia [Serbia – M.K.] are composed for the most part of Tatars alone, fierce, unruly barbarians, it is true. Yet their great multitude and their manner of making war, akin to that of the ancient Parthians, who, dispersed into countless companies, unceasingly harassed the Romans, granted them no respite, laid waste to all lands before them, and never engaged in regular battle, make them a terror and require the utmost vigilance in guarding the borders⁸⁶.

Comparing the military forces of the Porte and those of the imperial states, in July of that year he noted that:

Until the onset of the present war, opinions concerning the Turkish army were misguided and well-nigh false. The public prints depicted the Turkish forces as an innumerable throng of feeble, ungoverned, and unarmed men, who neither practised discipline, nor trained in the military art, nor possessed any knowledge thereof. It was foretold that just as they swiftly assembled, so would they scatter yet more hastily upon the first misfortune, whether by defeat, hunger, hardship, or the rigours of war, forsaking the banners of Mahomet. Those opinions were founded upon the state of affairs in times past. Yet this is now changed. [...] The Turks, to cite an Englishman who spent many years in Constantinople and but lately returned thence, are not, in the present war, in so poor a condition as many mistakenly suppose. Their sentries

⁸⁵ See, for example, PHP, May 1788, pp. 440–441; June 1788, pp. 525–526; July 1788, pp. 603–605.

⁸⁶ PHP, March 1788, pp. 235–236.

hold their posts with greater exactitude, their pickets are placed with prudence and military caution, and their patrols move as regularly as in any other European army. It is no longer so easy to lay ambushes for them as in the last war. Their artillery, which formerly consisted of pieces vast and unwieldy, is now made lighter and more serviceable, modelled after the French and English fashion⁸⁷.

And further, characterizing the Ottoman cavalry and infantry, he explained:

Upon the open plain, their fierce impetuosity, unearthly boldness, and their cavalry, both exceedingly numerous and valiant, afford them great advantages. The Turkish horsemen dart about with inexpressible swiftness, allowing the enemy no repose, ceaselessly falling upon his outposts and harassing him without surcease. The Turkish infantry is also now better drilled than before⁸⁸.

Many more such examples could be given (some will emerge later in this book in the context of military operations). Yet these have been chosen as the most representative ones, offering a striking illustration of the political propaganda espoused by Świtkowski.

The progressive ‘*Gazeta Narodowa i Obca*’, on the other hand, operated as the press organ of the reformist camp. It was edited in a patriotic spirit, expressing hostility towards the policies of the Petersburg court, which it regarded as an obstacle to Poland’s full sovereignty⁸⁹. Likewise, ‘*Korespondent Warszawski*’ remained steadfastly patriotic, at least at the early stage of its publication (i.e., until preventive censorship was imposed by the Targowica authorities in July 1792)⁹⁰.

Bringing this somewhat lengthy discussion of the Warsaw newspapers to a close, I should note that in my studies on the last Russo-Turkish War of the eighteenth century, I did not consider the so-called manuscript gazettes – handwritten copies of information intended for a select group of recipients. Like Jerzy Łojek, a tireless researcher of the history of Polish press and an undisputed authority in the field, I maintain that such

⁸⁷ PHP, July 1788, pp. 592–594.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 595.

⁸⁹ A. Goriaczko, “*Gazeta Narodowa i Obca*”..., p. 13 ff.

⁹⁰ The ideological transformations of that newspaper are discussed by I. Łossowska-Zaporowska in “*Korespondent Warszawski*”..., pp. 66–212.

a form of writing should not be regarded as part of the press, if only due to its distinct functions and its lack of public – and therefore broader – circulation⁹¹.

One more general observation is in order. The reports and articles on the Russo-Turkish War published in the Warsaw periodicals are remarkably detailed. On the one hand, they offer the satisfaction of uncovering numerous new and previously unknown facts. On the other hand, they pose a considerable challenge due to the necessity of verifying information derived from the press solely through accounts of the time and a limited body of relevant scholarship. Consequently, many of the issues addressed in this study require more extensive research and in-depth archival exploration.

3. NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The book presented to the Readers follows a chronological and thematic structure. It comprises an introduction, five substantive chapters, and a conclusion. Each chapter provides an account of how the Warsaw press reported on successive military campaigns. This arrangement was primarily informed by the source material itself, given that the war of interest to me was presented in the Warsaw press campaign by campaign (this was still a time when military operations were suspended during the winter season). The length of individual sections was determined, naturally, by the availability and volume of source material. The study is supplemented with an appended bibliography, an appendix containing excerpts from newspapers (texts of international treaties), indexes (of personal and geographical names), and relevant illustrative material.

⁹¹ Jerzy Łojek first expressed his view on that matter, which he would later strongly emphasize in his subsequent works, in one of his reviews (J. Łojek [rev.], Armela Bułówna, *Katalog gazet pisanych z XVIII wieku w zbiorach Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich*. Wstęp napisali Armela Bułówna i Józef Szczepaniec, Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1969, ss. 478, ilustr. 32, “Rocznik Historii Czasopiśmiennictwa Polskiego” 1970, vol. IX, no. 4, p. 596). W.M. Kolasa discusses the changing views on manuscript newsletters, which earlier historiography often associated with the press as direct predecessors of printed newspapers, in *Kierunki badań nad prasą polską XVIII stulecia*, “Zeszyty Prasoznawcze” 2012, vol. LV, no. 1–2(209–210), pp. 97–98. An analysis of the contents of handwritten newsletters stored at the National Museum in Kielce, including reports on the Russo-Turkish War, is provided by M. Janik, *Gazetki pisane w roku 1789 ze zbiorów Muzeum Narodowego w Kielcach*, “Rocznik Muzeum Narodowego w Kielcach” 1993, vol. XVII, pp. 45–74.

The quotations from the press are presented in accordance with the editorial guidelines of Kazimierz Lepszy⁹², which recommend the modernization of spelling and orthography. In this translation, however, both geographical and personal names have been rendered in their standard English forms for the sake of clarity and the convenience of an English-speaking reader.

Following the practice of the Warsaw newspaper editors, all dates are given according to the Gregorian calendar (New Style) in use in the West. In the eighteenth century, that calendar was 11 days ahead of the Julian calendar (Old Style) used in Russia. In certain instances, both dates are provided.

The original spelling of names is retained in their native languages, except for monarchs and figures of established historical prominence (e.g., Potemkin). Place names appear in their anglicised forms, with the original spelling provided upon first mention. Transliterations from Cyrillic follow established conventions in English-language historical scholarship, with widely recognised forms retained where their usage in Anglophone historiography clearly prevails. The same system has been applied consistently in bibliographic references.

I wish to extend my gratitude to those without whom this book would not have taken its present form. First and foremost, I am deeply thankful to my mentor, Professor Zbigniew Anusik, for his meticulous reading of the manuscript, invaluable substantive feedback, and bibliographic guidance, as well as for granting me access to the resources of his private library. My colleague from the Department of Early Modern History at the University of Lodz, Dr. Piotr Robak, deserves my heartfelt thanks for reviewing the sections related to Anglo-Russian relations. I extend my deepest gratitude to my beloved daughter, Olga, for her patience and understanding that, absorbed in writing, I could not give her the attention she deserved. I wholeheartedly intend to make amends in the future.

Special thanks are due to the reviewers of this publication, Professor Tadeusz Srogosz (Jan Długosz University in Czestochowa) and Professor Piotr Ugniewski (University of Warsaw), for their valuable comments and suggestions, which greatly assisted me in preparing the final version of the manuscript for print.

⁹² *Instrukcja wydawnicza dla źródeł historycznych od XVI do połowy XIX wieku*, K. Lepszy, ed., Wrocław 1953.

I am also grateful to Professor Dariusz Nawrot (University of Silesia in Katowice) for pointing out several significant bibliographic sources after the Polish edition of this book had been published. Those have since been incorporated and duly acknowledged in the English edition of this study.

CHAPTER I

1787: THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

1. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

The Muscovites [...] hastened upon the tidings of peace being broken, to defend their frontiers. They even proceeded into the lands of Poland.

PHP, DECEMBER 1787, p. 1093

In August 1787, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid I (1725–1789)¹ declared war on the Russian Empire. The outbreak of that conflict was unlikely to surprise keen observers of the political landscape of the time. Since the late 1770s, Russia had systematically extended its territorial holdings in the Black Sea region, repeatedly breaching the provisions of the peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774)²². Shortly after the conclusion of that treaty,

¹ F. Sarıcaoğlu, *Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774–1789)*, İstanbul 2001; K. Şakul, *Abdülhamid I*, [in:] G. Ágoston, B. Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, New York 2009, pp. 5–6.

² For more on the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, see E.I. Druzhinina, *Kuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda (ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie)*, Moscow 1955; R.H. Davison, ‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility’: *The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered*, “Slavic Review” 1976, vol. XXXV, no. 3, pp. 463–483; A. Sorel, *Kwestia wschodnia w XVIII wieku. Pierwszy podział Polski i traktat kainardzyski*, Warszawa 1981, pp. 232–235. For an analysis of the role played by the Russian resident in Istanbul, Alexei Mikhailovich Obreskov (1718–1787), in the conclusion of the treaty, see M.V. Amelicheva, *The Russian Residency in Constantinople, 1700–1774: Russian-Ottoman Diplomatic Encounters*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Georgetown University], Washington, D.C. 2016, pp. 664–693, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1041841/Amelicheva_georgetown_0076D_13417.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 20 November 2020). On the significance of this peace treaty, see Y. Kurtuluş, *The Legal Regime*

the court of Empress Catherine II of Russia (1729–1796) devised the so-called ‘Greek Plan’³. It envisioned the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire, encompassing Constantinople, mainland Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, and Bulgaria. Moldavia and Wallachia, united into the ‘Dacian Principality’, were to serve as a bridge between that new Eastern empire and Russia. The throne in Constantinople was intended for the younger grandson of the empress, Grand Duke Constantine. The Dacian Principality, in turn, was envisioned for Catherine II’s omnipotent favourite, Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin (1739–1791). Preparing for conquests in the Balkans, the empress loosened the long-standing alliance with Prussia and drew closer to Austria. In the summer of 1780, she met with the Holy Roman Emperor, Joseph II Habsburg (1741–1790), in Mogilev, in what is now Belarus. In May 1781, an informal Russo-Austrian alliance was forged. The monarchs exchanged imperial letters in which they guaranteed each other territorial acquisitions at the expense of Poland and the Ottoman Empire, while also promising an equitable division of any potential spoils⁴. Concurrently, the Russians persistently fomented unrest in the Crimea, which had been formally independent since 1774. The outbreak of new disturbances on the peninsula was used by the empress, in 1783, as a pretext for a second military intervention within so short a span of time. The pro-Russian Crimean Khan, Shahin (Şahin) Giray, abdicated, and his entire state, along with Taman and the Kuban, was annexed by Russia. The Ottoman Empire, unable to rely on assistance from France, which was increasingly engulfed in internal turmoil, refrained from going to war. Pressured by the diplomacy of Versailles, which urged concessions, Turkey recognized Russia’s annexation of the Crimea by signing the second convention at

of the Turkish Straits: Regulation of the Montreux Convention and Its Importance on the International Relations after the Conflict of Ukraine, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main], Frankfurt am Main 2019, pp. 40–43, <http://publikationen.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/50470> (accessed 20 November 2020). Text of the treaty in Russian: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, vol. XIX (1775–1780), St Petersburg 1830, no. 14164, pp. 957–967; in French: *Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman*, G. Noradounghian, ed., vol. I (1300–1789), Paris 1897, no. 36, pp. 319–334 and *Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535–1855*, London 1855, pp. 463–475.

³ See A.A. Lebedev, *Konstantinopolskie plany Rossii epokhi “Grecheskogo proekta”: teoriia i zhizn’*, “Gangut” 2012, no. 69, pp. 71–96.

⁴ M. Hochedlinger, *Krise und Wiederherstellung Österreichische Großmachtpolitik zwischen Türkenkrieg und “Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution” 1787–1791*, Berlin 2000, *Historische Forschungen*, vol. LXV, pp. 106–108.

Ainali-Kavak on 8 January 1784⁵. It was Grigory A. Potemkin who served as the chief executor of the operation culminating in the annexation of the Crimea and was rewarded by the empress with the title of Prince of Taurida in recognition thereof⁶.

The Russians undertook the colonization of the Black Sea steppes and the Crimea. Peasants from the interior of Russia, as well as German settlers, were relocated to the region. New cities were established, including Kherson (1778), Ekaterinoslav (1783), and Sevastopol (1784). The Crimea became the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In the early 1780s, Russo-Ottoman relations in the Caucasus also deteriorated. In 1783, the ruler of the united Georgian kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti, Heraclius II (1720–1798), concluded an agreement with Catherine II, accepting Russian protection (the so-called ‘Treaty of Georgievsk’)⁷. In Constantinople, concerns arose over the potential recurrence of the Crimean operation, which could result in the incorporation of Georgia into the Russian Empire. Such an outcome would bring the Ottoman borders into direct contact with Russia in the northeast. The situation in the Caucasus is considered one of the primary factors behind Turkey’s declaration of war. Moreover, disputes emerged over navigation in the straits and the extent of Russian consular authority in the Balkans. However, it appears that

⁵ *Polnoe sobranie...*, vol. XXI (1781–1783), St Petersburg 1830, no. 15901, pp. 1082–1083; *Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers...*, pp. 508–509. For an analysis of the Crimean crisis, see M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783–4*, “The Slavonic and East European Review” 1958, vol. XXXVII, no. 88, pp. 17–41; A.W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772–1783*, Cambridge 1970.

⁶ E. Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna. Wiek XVIII*, 6th edn, Warszawa 1998, pp. 458–460; Z. Wójcik, *Dzieje Rosji 1533–1801*, Warszawa 1971, pp. 318–320; A. Skałkowski, *Przełom w dziejach Europy Wschodniej (1788–1795)*, [in:] *Wielka historia powszechna*, vol. VI (*Od wielkiej rewolucji do wojny światowej*), part 1 (1789–1848), J. Dąbrowski, O. Halecki, M. Kukiel, S. Lam, eds, Warszawa 1936, pp. 177–183; J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane. Wiek XVIII*, part 1 (*Polityka zagraniczna Sejmu Wielkiego*), selected, edited, and introduced by M. Kornat, Kraków 2019, pp. 41–43; Z. Koçak, 1787–1792 *Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Değişen Dengeler ve Yaş Antlaşması*, “Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi” 2017, vol. XXXII, no. 2, pp. 461–462; I. de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, London 1981, pp. 383–388; A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Jako monarcha i jako człowiek. Uwarunkowania personalne decyzji politycznych Józefa II Habsburga*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 254–260.

⁷ *Polnoe sobranie...*, vol. XXI, no. 15835, pp. 1013–1017. For an analysis of the individual articles of that treaty, see S. Kuzucu, 1787–1792 *Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Firat University], Elazığ 2012, pp. 53–54, <https://openaccess.firat.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11508/14673/303671.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 20 November 2024).

the immediate cause of the decision made in Constantinople to commence war was the meeting between Catherine II and Emperor Joseph II, held in May 1787 in Kherson. During that congress, a preliminary plan for the *de facto* partition of the Ottoman Empire was devised⁸. Although the Turks were unaware of the details of the discussions held at Kherson, the imperial congress was regarded as a provocation by the Ottoman cabinet. The continuous concessions made to the infidels had finally exhausted the patience of the Turks. Stirred by a wave of religious fanaticism and the ideal of a holy war, the sultan declared war on Russia, and the Turkish armed forces commenced offensive operations on land and at sea⁹.

The editor of 'Gazeta Warszawska' was the first to inform readers that peace between the two states had been broken. On the front pages of issue 77, dated 26 September, he published news of the arrest of the Russian envoy in Constantinople, Iakov Ivanovich Bulgakov (1743–1809)¹⁰, and reported on the initial skirmishes at sea¹¹. In a supplement to that edition, Rev. Łuskina reprinted a substantial excerpt from the Sublime Porte's manifesto declaring war on Russia, which had been presented to the foreign ministers of the courts in Constantinople on 24 August¹². In the manifesto, Catherine II was reproached for violating the provisions of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca by annexing the Crimea, for denying the inhabitants of Ochakov the right to extract salt from the lakes between Kinburn and Kobylskoye, and for providing refuge to the rebellious Moldavian hospodar Alexander Mavrocordatos II (1754–1819). Moreover, Russia incited rebellion against Turkey among its subjects in Moldavia,

⁸ For a detailed analysis of Austrian plans for the partition of Turkey, see B. Bronza, *The Habsburg Monarchy and the Projects for Division of the Ottoman Balkans, 1771–1788*, [in:] *Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 1699–1829*, P. Mitev, I. Parvev, M. Baramova, V. Racheva, eds, Berlin 2010, pp. 51–62.

⁹ E. Rostworowski, *Historia powszechna...*, p. 460; Z. Wójcik, *Dzieje Rosji...*, pp. 320–321; A. Skalkowski, *Przełom w dziejach...*, pp. 184–185. For a detailed examination of Russo-Turkish relations between 1774 and 1787, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoroia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vol. I (1787–1789 gg.), St Petersburg 1880, pp. 3–55; and S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 3–64.

¹⁰ P. Maikov, *Bulgakov, Iakov Ivanovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. III (*Betankur–Baxter*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1908, pp. 468–473.

¹¹ GW, 26 September 1787, no. 77, pp. [1–2].

¹² The full text of Turkey's declaration of war was published by Łuskina only in May of the following year: GW, 21 May 1788, no. 41, pp. [3–4]; 24 May, no. 42, p. [4]; 28 May, no. 43, pp. [3–4].

Wallachia, and the islands of the Archipelago, while Ottoman merchants faced trade restrictions in Russia:

They were made to pay taxes two or even three times higher than those levied upon merchants of other foreign nations, and when some merchants of the Porte sought to collect monies owed to them in Russian lands, they were not safe even upon the highroads, so much so that, finding no justice for themselves, they were compelled to return to their own country. Likewise, when the ships of the Ottoman Porte, either in pursuit of the freedom of the seas or out of necessity for provisions, sought to enter Russian ports, they were repelled with cannon fire¹³.

When the Ottoman cabinet lodged a complaint regarding the extension of Russian protection over eastern Georgia, it received a response from Bulgakov stating that Prince Grigory A. Potemkin was leading a strong army towards the southern borders, where the empress herself would soon arrive. This, undoubtedly, demonstrated that the minister had effectively declared war on Turkey¹⁴.

The Empress of All the Russias responded with a manifesto dated 18 September 1787, which was published in the October issue of 'Gazeta Warszawska' and a month later in 'Pamiętnik'. Therein, she explained that the purpose of annexing the Crimea

was not the extension of Russia's frontiers, but rather the destruction of a nest of vice and depredation, in which the people inhabiting that peninsula had indulged, by placing them under a government that might teach them to respect the bonds uniting one nation with another, with the preservation, within the frontiers of both empires, of harmony and good neighbourly relations – this being the sincere intention of the Russian court¹⁵.

She denied that the Russians had obstructed the inhabitants of Ochakov in exercising the privileges guaranteed by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. She further accused Turkey of barring Russian consuls from certain territories within its borders and of inciting the Lezgins and Kuban Tatars against the Russian Empire and its vassal, Heraclius II, the king

¹³ GW, 26 September 1787, no. 77, supplement, p. [2].

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. [1–2].

¹⁵ GW, 17 October 1787, no. 83, p. [1].

of Georgia. Despite those hostile measures, the “peace-loving” Catherine remained willing to reach an agreement with the Sublime Porte, relying on the mediation of friendly courts, both imperial and French. However, the arrest of her ambassador in Constantinople was an offence that could not be left unaddressed. In short, Russia was forced into a war it neither initiated nor desired. The empress concluded the manifesto by expressing her faith in God’s assistance, the wisdom of her commanders, and the bravery of her soldiers¹⁶.

The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’, Piotr Świtkowski, seemingly awaiting the development of events, did not publish the first reports from the Turkish war until December 1787. In a comprehensive article spanning 20 pages, he outlined the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the armed conflict and provided an accurate assessment of the then international relations. Świtkowski reported that at the end of July 1787, Bulgakov was summoned to a meeting of the Ottoman cabinet, where he was presented with an ultimatum calling upon Russia to return the Crimea to Turkey. He was given only four days to respond. On July 30, he was summoned again for an audience with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (*reis efendi*), Süleyman Feyzî Efendi (?–1793/1794), which was also attended by the Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha (1730–1800)¹⁷. Since the Russian envoy “would not agree to one of the terms set before him and, regarding the others, wished first to consult his court and dispatch a courier to St Petersburg”¹⁸, the Ottoman authorities promised to await Catherine II’s decision. Having received Bulgakov’s letter, Catherine consulted her ministers during the night of 14–15 August and dispatched a courier to the Ottoman capital the following day. However, before her reply arrived, a decision to initiate hostilities had already been made in Constantinople. The efforts of the imperial internuncio, Baron Peter Philipp von Herbert-Rathkeal (1735–1802)¹⁹, were to no avail; on 2 August, he presented a note from Joseph II to the Ottoman

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. [1–3]; PHP, November 1787, pp. 1037–1055. Cf. A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo Starodubskogo polka*, St Petersburg [1908], p. 6; W.A. Serczyk, *Katarzyna II carowa Rosji*, Wrocław 1989, p. 256 (incorrectly dating the proclamation of the manifesto to 23 September). For a brief analysis of the Turkish declaration of war of 13/24 August and Catherine II’s manifesto of September 7/18, 1787, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 56–58.

¹⁷ K. Beydilli, *Yûsuf Paşa, Koca*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLIV, İstanbul 2013, pp. 23–25.

¹⁸ PHP, December 1787, p. 1077.

¹⁹ C. von Wurzbach, *Herbert Freiherr von Rathkeal, Peter Philipp*, [in:] *idem, Biographisches Lexicon des kaiserthums Oesterreich, enthaltend die lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen kronländern geboren*

court, in which the emperor assured that he was not indifferent to the conduct of the Sublime Porte and offered mediation in the conflict with Russia. Similarly ineffective was the intervention of the French envoy in Constantinople, Count Marie-Gabriel-Florent-Auguste de Choiseul-Gouffier (1752–1817). On 6 August, the sultan convened the Great Divan, during which the majority of officials supported an immediate declaration of war. Four days later, Bulgakov was once again summoned to a meeting of the Ottoman cabinet, where he was informed that Russia had violated the provisions of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca by annexing the Crimea. The Russian diplomat attempted to object, reminding his hosts that at the beginning of 1784, the Porte had officially reconciled itself to the annexation. His protests, however, proved futile. He was informed, in a “defiant tone”, of the commencement of war, then bound and imprisoned for over two years in the Fortress of the Seven Towers (Yedikule), where eight members of his retinue were also detained²⁰.

Further on in the article, the priest-editor explained that in the Turkish capital, the news that peace with Russia had been broken was announced in the evening of 15 August and the following morning. Shortly thereafter, the imperial internuncio was advised of that development, and instructed to seek a clear and definitive statement from his court as to whether Austria would remain neutral in the unfolding conflict or enter the war in support of Russia. Turkey commenced hostilities by seizing enemy ships in its ports and ordering the expulsion of all subjects of the empress from the country. A squadron of several small and larger vessels was dispatched to the Black Sea, while near the Russian border, in the vicinity of Ochakov, Bender, and Khotin, several thousand troops were assembled²¹.

Regarding the reasons why Turkey declared war on Russia, the publisher of ‘Pamiętnik’ noted as follows:

wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben, vol. VIII (Hartmann–Heyser), Wien 1862, pp. 352–357.

²⁰ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1077–1079. See S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 72–75. The relevant historiography places Bulgakov’s imprisonment on 16 August, not 10 August. Cf., for instance, W.A. Serczyk, *Katarzyna II...*, pp. 256; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka. Prawda i mit*, Warszawa 2012, p. 486; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus kniaz Suvorov*, vol. I, St Petersburg 1884, pp. 299–300; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin*, 3rd edn, Moscow 2016, pp. 415–416. The same date (August 5/16) is indicated in the manifesto of the Russian Empress dated 18 September 1787, published by Łuskińska’s periodical (GW, 17 October 1787, no. 83, p. [3]).

²¹ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1080–1081.

It is commonly held that the Porte has acted most improperly in declaring war at this juncture, and that this step is as untimely and imprudent as it is unexpected. We, however, have ample reason to hold a different view. The state of affairs between Moscow and the Porte since the seizure of the Crimea was such that war could not but ensue between them. As Moscow, in the year 1783, did unexpectedly seize the Crimea, and, with its great power augmented by the formidable forces of Austria held in readiness, whilst the Porte was then in a state of disarray and lacking sufficient defence, it is no cause for wonder that war did not immediately ensue. Yet, as soon as the treaty whereby the Crimea was ceded to Moscow was signed (on 8 January 1784), the Turks commenced great preparations for war, which continued without pause to this very day and were intensified when Moscow shortly thereafter brought Georgia under its dominion – to such an extent that the Porte, already at that time, began to incite the Lezgins and other Tatars, who on multiple occasions fell upon the Muscovites and engaged them in open war. The Porte supported the raiders so openly that Moscow lodged complaints, but received no more than equivocal replies in return²².

In 1787, the empress visited the Crimea and met with Joseph II²³, which, according to Świtkowski, must have accelerated the outbreak

²² *Ibidem*, pp. 1081–1082.

²³ The empress's journey to the Crimea has been examined in numerous works, such as: N. Bessarabova, *Puteshestviia Ekateriny Velikoi po Rossii: ot Iaroslavlia do Kryma*, Moscow 2014; G. Esipov, *Puteshestvie imperatritsy Ekateriny II v yuzhnnuiu Rossiiu v 1787 godu*, "Kievskaiia Starina" 1890, vol. XXXI, pp. 175–194, 391–411; 1891, vol. XXXII, pp. 98–118, 215–231, 402–421; vol. XXXIII, pp. 68–81, 244–258; vol. XXXIV, pp. 22–52, 237–253, 407–426; vol. XXXV, pp. 232–245, 361–383; 1892, vol. XXXVI, pp. 295–306, 458–471; vol. XXXVII, pp. 225–230; T. Adamczyk, *Die Reise Katharinas II. nach Sudrussland im Jahre 1787*, "Jahrbucher fur Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven" 1930, Neue Folge, vol. VI, no. 1, pp. 25–53; D.M. Griffiths, *Discovers the Crimea*, "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas" 2008, Neue Folge, vol. LVI, no. 3, pp. 339–348; T. Ciesielski, *Antoniego Zabłockiego relacja o pobycie Katarzyny II i Józefa II w Chersoniu i na Krymie w roku 1787*, [in:] "Verba volant, scripta manent". *Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Zbigniewowi Anusikowi w sześćdziesiątą piątą rocznicę urodzin*, M. Karkocha, P. Robak, eds, Łódź 2022, pp. 175–223. The meeting between Catherine II and the Polish monarch Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski in Kaniv has been the subject of separate studies: Z. Zielińska, "Król wydał trzy miliony, czekał trzy miesiące, by widzieć Katarzynę przez trzy godziny". *Po co ta podróż?*, [in:] *Stanisław August i jego Rzeczpospolita. Dramat państwa, odrodzenie narodu. Materiały z wykładów*, A. Sołtys, Z. Zielińska, eds, Warszawa 2013, pp. 183–194; M. Karkocha, "Gazeta Warszawska" księdza Stefana Łuski o podróży Stanisława Augusta Poniatowskiego do Kaniowa w 1787 r., PNH 2011, vol. X, no. 2, pp. 109–132.

of war. The sultan, however, delayed declaring it for several months for a number of reasons. The envoys of France, Britain, and Austria at Constantinople stated that Catherine's journey through a territory that had been ceded to her voluntarily could not be forbidden, and attempted to persuade the Porte to acquiesce. It was also necessary to await the return of Bulgakov, who had travelled to Kherson to receive the empress's response to the Turkish grievances, and, finally, the conclusion of Ramadan²⁴.

Świtkowski believed that Abdülhamid I chose an opportune moment to declare war:

Whosoever believes that it is ill-timed and perilous for the Turks to commence war against such mighty powers, especially now that both imperial courts are so closely allied, fails to consider that this alliance endures continually, and thus the danger for the Turks remains the same, whether now or hereafter. Moscow, however, had it been granted further delay, might have grown ever stronger in the Crimea, expanded its fleet on the Black Sea, and increased its trade in the region, deriving ever greater benefits from this new possession²⁵.

According to the editor of 'Pamiętnik', Turkey's internal situation was stable, as was its international standing. The rebellious pasha of Albania, Mahmud, had been defeated and no longer posed a threat. The Muslims were inflamed with a desire to reclaim their lost possessions. The Tatars were a reliable and numerous ally, capable of conducting significant diversions in the Asiatic territories of Russia. The Porte had recently concluded an agreement with the sultan of Morocco and maintained an alliance with the court of Madrid. This fostered Turkish expectations that Spain would block the Russian fleet from entering the Mediterranean, as had been the case during the previous Russo-Turkish War. As a result, Turkey could concentrate greater naval forces in the Black Sea without concern for a potential attack from the Mediterranean. France, even if it refrained from openly supporting Turkey, would continue to aid her covertly and would not allow Russian trade in the Mediterranean to expand. England, which had for some time been striving to revitalise Levantine trade, would not accept armed neutrality. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire maintained amicable relations with Prussia, which could carry out a significant diversion. Turkey's financial and economic situation also

²⁴ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1083–1085.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 1085.

appeared favourable – the Grand Admiral (Kapudan Pasha), Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha (1713–1790)²⁶, had, under the guise of overdue taxes, collected nearly 10 million piastres in Egypt, and food supplies from that province were also expected²⁷.

On the final pages of his article on the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), Świtkowski discussed the efforts undertaken by European courts to restore peace, the mobilisation of the parties, and naval operations. He noted that Emperor Joseph II of Germany was particularly committed to seeking an end to the Russo-Turkish conflict. The ruler instructed his envoy to declare at the sultan's court that, as an ally of Catherine II, he was compelled to provide her with military assistance, but nonetheless offered his mediation. In response, the grand vizier reminded him that during the last Austrian war, the Porte had maintained neutrality and thereby earned the right to reciprocity in the current situation. As regards the proposed mediation, Turkey would be more content with it,

yet, beholding an imperial army of 160,000 men suddenly assembled upon its frontiers, along with all the preparations for war, one cannot reproach the Sublime Porte for distrusting such amicable declarations, nor for refusing to place confidence in these assurances of peace, so long as the emperor does not withdraw his forces with all possible haste – lest the Porte be compelled to declare war upon him²⁸.

That declaration prompted even greater military preparations in the Austrian territories. They were conducted with such urgency that, by the end of August 1787, the entire imperial army mobilised for the war with

²⁶ A.R. İşıpek, *Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa*, İstanbul 2009; Z.S. İlker, İ. Sancaktaroğlu, M. Polat, *Kaptan-ı Derya Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa*, Ankara 1989. See also L. Kirval, *The Era of "Ghazi Hasan Pasha of Algiers" (1713–1790) and Its Aftermath: The Last Visionary Ottoman Grand Admiral (Grand Vizier)*, [in:] *Seapower, Technology and Trade, Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, D. Couto, F. Günergün, M. Pia Pedani, eds, İstanbul 2014, pp. 173–181.

²⁷ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1085–1087; GW, 31 October 1787, no. 87, supplement, p. [2]. A markedly different assessment was offered by the Turkish historian Serhat Kuzucu, who argued that the Ottoman Empire was financially unprepared for war. After hostilities began, serious financial difficulties emerged, particularly concerning the payment of soldiers' wages, which led to widespread disobedience and mutinies within the army. In an effort to stabilise the situation, the Ottoman government sought loans from European states. See idem, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 85–86.

²⁸ PHP, December 1787, p. 1090.

the Porte had already assembled in the vicinity of Petrovaradin and Ilok, well supplied with artillery, ammunition, and provisions. A military cordon was established in Galicia, Bukovina, and Transylvania, stretching along the Moldavian and Wallachian borders²⁹.

The Russians, too, actively engaged in the preparations for war, amassing troops and equipment in the southern regions of the country, insofar as circumstances permitted. The editors of the Warsaw newspapers reported that Catherine II fielded two operational armies against Turkey: the Ekaterinoslav Army, numbering 70,000 men and commanded by Prince Grigory A. Potemkin, who combined the roles of field marshal and grand admiral; and the Ukrainian Army, consisting of 50,000 to 70,000 troops, under the command of Field Marshal Count Petr Alexandrovich Rumiantsev-Zadunaisky (1725–1796)³⁰, a veteran of the previous Russo-Turkish War. The task of the former was to lay siege to Ochakov, while the latter was to advance from the Polish border into Wallachia, protecting the right flank of the main army. By late October 1787, the forces commanded by Rumiantsev had entered Ukraine in two columns, led respectively by Major General Johann Martin von Elmpt (1725–1802)³¹ and Lieutenant General Prince Sergei Fedorovich Golitsyn (1749–1810)³². In connection with those movements, the Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Otto Magnus

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 1088–1091. Rev. Łuskiński also extensively reported on Austria's military preparations, including troop mobilization, the recruitment of new conscripts, and the enlistment of provisioning bakers and field surgeons. See GW, 29 September 1787, no. 78, p. [2]; 20 October, no. 84, p. [4] (where a specification of the troops intended for the defence of the Hungarian border is provided) and supplement, pp. [2–3]; 7 November, no. 89, p. [2]. The editor of 'Gazeta Warszawska', like Rev. Świtkowski, estimated the number of imperial troops deployed for the war against Turkey at approximately 160,000 soldiers. See GW, 20 October 1787, no. 84, p. [4]; 3 November, no. 88, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski i Fryderyk Drugi król pruski monarchowie w jednym czasie panujący, prawdziwie wielcy. Pamiętnik dwóch geniuszów wieku XVIII sławnych*, Wrocław 1819, p. 31.

³⁰ P. Maikov, *Rumiantsev, graf Petr Aleksandrovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. XVII (*Romanova-Riasovskii*), Russian Historical Society, Petrograd 1918, pp. 521–573; N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety XVIII i XIX stoletii* (= *Portraits russes des XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*), vol. IV, no. 3, St Petersburg 1908, p. 102; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar' generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. II (L–Â), Moscow 2010, p. 431.

³¹ I. Artamonova, *Elmpt, von, Iwan-Martin (Ivan Karnovich)*, [in:] RBS, vol. XXIV (*Shchapov-Iushnevskii*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1912, pp. 218–219.

³² The right flank of the Ukrainian Army was held by a corps under General Count Ivan Petrovich Saltykov; the centre by General Elmpt's corps; and the left flank by the corps commanded by General Mikhail Fedotovitch Kamensky. Cf. *Lev Nikolaevich*

von Stackelberg (1736–1800)³³, submitted a note to the Polish court on behalf of the empress, assuring that the presence of the Russian forces in Poland would not prove burdensome, as military discipline would be maintained, and the Russians would pay in cash for any goods purchased “at prices set in the markets”³⁴. Held in reserve were regiments stationed in the North Caucasus and the Kuban (approximately 30,000 troops) under the command of General Petr Abramovich Tekelli (Tökelli) (1720–1793)³⁵, tasked with repelling Turkish attacks on the Crimea and engaging with mountain tribes³⁶.

Engelhardt (10.II.1766 – 4.XI.1836), [in:] *Russkie memuary. Izbrannye stranitsy. XVIII vek*, E.M. Kostrova, ed., Moscow 1988, p. 251.

³³ A.G., *Shtakelberg, von, Otton-Magnus*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. XXIII (*Shebanov-Shchuts*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1911, pp. 394–395.

³⁴ GW, 24 October 1787, no. 85, p. [1].

³⁵ *Tekelli, Petr Abramovich*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. XX (*Suvorova-Tkachov*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1912, pp. 440–443; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 567.

³⁶ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1093–1094; March 1788, pp. 239, 245–246; GW, 29 September 1787, no. 78, p. [2]; 24 October, no. 85, p. [1]; 29 December, no. 104, pp. [1–2]; 11 June 1788, no. 47, p. [3]. Cf. *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama*, “Starina i novizna: Istoricheskii sbornik” 1914, vol. XVIII, p. 12; M. Bogdanovich, *Ruskaia armia v veke imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 25; F. Fejtő, *Józef II. Habsburg rewolucjonista*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 305–306; V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów 1700–1870. Oblężone imperium*, Oświęcim 2019, p. 154; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 300. Notably, the strength of the main Russian army is most often estimated in the relevant historiography at 80,000–82,000, the auxiliary forces at 30,000–50,000, and the Kuban regiments at 18,000 troops. Cf., for instance, W. Kalinka, *Sejm Czteroletni*, vol. I, Warszawa 1991, p. 28; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700–1814 gg.*), Moscow 1992, p. 149; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 318–319; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 488; M. Bogdanovich, *Ruskaia armia...*, p. 25; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I – Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789*, “International History Review” 2004, vol. XXVI, no. 2, p. 269; A.G. Elchaninov, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov*, [in:] *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot zarozhdeniia Rusi do voiny 1812 g.*), St Petersburg 2003, p. 364. According to A.N. Petrov (*Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 82), the Ekaterinoslav Army comprised 82,000 soldiers, several thousand Cossacks, 6 jaeger regiments, and 180 cannons; the Ukrainian Army numbered 30,100 men, while the forces in the Caucasus consisted of 12,000 regular troops. Slightly different figures are provided by David R. Stone (*A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, Connecticut–London 2006, p. 85), who estimated Potemkin's forces at 100,000 men; A.G. Martynov (*Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, pp. 6, 11), who estimated the main army at 70,000 and the Kuban Corps at 30,000; and L.G. Beskrovnii (*Ruskaia armia i flot v XVIII veke [Ocherki]*, Moscow 1958, p. 522). The latter source suggests that the Ekaterinoslav Army numbered between 75,000 and 80,000 soldiers, the Ukrainian Army between 35,000 and

2. OPERATIONS IN THE DNEIPER LIMAN REGION AND THE KUBAN

The Turkish army, stationed before Ochakov, resolved to take Kinburn, a stronghold lying opposite Ochakov, which guarded the approach to Kherson and the Crimea from that quarter.

PHP, DECEMBER 1787, p. 1094

Before the land battles fully commenced, the first clashes occurred at sea. At the end of September 1787, 'Gazeta Warszawska' reported on a minor incident in the area of the Dnieper Liman. On 30 August, the Russian frigate *Aleksandr*, commanded by Captain Bolianinov, and an accompanying packet boat were attacked by a Turkish squadron consisting of 17 xebecs and cannon boats. Despite the enemy's overwhelming advantage, the two vessels held out steadfastly for three hours. The batteries of the Ochakov fortress joined the fray. By evening, the Russians managed to disengage from the enemy and sail towards Kherson, suffering a loss of only four men. As a reward for their participation in that engagement, all officers of the Russian frigate were promptly advanced to higher ranks, while the helmsman of the packet boat was conferred the rank of officer³⁷.

In the second half of September, the Turks attempted to capture the old Kinburn fort, situated opposite Ochakov at the tip of a narrow peninsula at the mouth of the Dnieper Liman, as reported in detail by the Warsaw press. Although of little strategic importance, the fortress hindered access

40,000, and the forces assembled in the Crimea and the Kuban between 25,000 and 30,000 men. A crucial consideration in determining the strength of Rumiantsev's forces is the observation made by General Lev Nikolaevich Engelhardt, a participant in the war, who recorded in his memoirs that the Ukrainian Army, if fully assembled, would number 50,000 but certainly did not exceed 30,000 troops. See *Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt...*, pp. 251, 254. By analogy, it can be assumed that the figure of 80,000–82,000, frequently cited in a number of studies, represents the nominal strength of the Ekaterinoslav Army; in fact, however, it numbered no more than 70,000 troops, as noted by the Warsaw press.

³⁷ GW, 26 September 1787, no. 77, p. [2]; 29 September, no. 78, pp. [1–2]. Cf. J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie 1775–1851*, Warszawa 2001, p. 139; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 397; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov*, Moscow 2012, p. 136; and in particular, R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853*, Princeton 1952, p. 319 (noting that the Turkish flotilla consisted of 11 small vessels); A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 302.

to the Dnieper waters and obstructed direct communication between Ochakov and the Crimea. On 24 September, an Ottoman fleet consisting of eight ships of the line approached the sandspit and commenced bombardment of the fortress, causing little damage. A few houses were destroyed, five people were killed, and ten wounded. Far greater losses were inflicted by the Kinburn batteries, which sank one enemy frigate, while another was destroyed in an explosion along with its entire cargo owing to an oversight on the part of the Turks. The following day, a small detachment of Janissaries (700 soldiers) began landing on the cape but was compelled to withdraw, sustaining considerable casualties, by a unit under Major General Ivan Grigorievich von Reck (German: Johann von Reck) (d. 1798)³⁸. On the Russian side, 30 soldiers were killed or wounded.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Liman Flotilla, Rear Admiral Nikolai Semenovich Mordvinov (1754–1845)³⁹, reinforced the defences of the fortress with two frigates and four galleys. On the morning of 26 September, one of the galleys, the *Desna*, carrying 120 grenadiers concealed behind its bulwarks, advanced towards the enemy. The Turks, taken by surprise, began to retreat under the cover of Ochakov's batteries. The *Desna* pursued them, engaging with the left column of the enemy squadron. The exchange of fire lasted for two hours, inflicting significant losses on the Turks (one vessel exploded, killing its crew of 600). The Russians, however, suffered no casualties⁴⁰.

A few days later, on 2 October, the Ochakov fleet launched another attack on Fort Kinburn. The bombardment began at around two in the afternoon and lasted until eight in the evening, yet it inflicted little damage. By the end of the day, the Turks withdrew from the engagement,

³⁸ *Pekh, von, Ivan Grigorievich (Reck)*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. XVI (*Reitern–Roltsberg*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1913, p. 45; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 389.

³⁹ Biographical note on that commander: V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia Rossiiskogo flota*, vol. III (XVIII vv.), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 541–542. For information on his military service, see S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, pp. 169–170.

⁴⁰ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1094–1095; GW, 13 October 1787, no. 82, p. [1]. See J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 140; P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich. Wiek żagla*, vol. I, Warszawa 1995, p. 408 (however, it contains inaccurate information, claiming that the exchange of fire between the galley *Desna* and the Turkish squadron took place on 11 September). R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 319–320; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin, książę książąt*, Warszawa 2000, p. 452; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarzski romans*, Warszawa 2013, p. 476; V. Ganichev, *Ushakov*, Moscow 1990, p. 163; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 305; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 526.

having sustained further losses. The captain of the galley *Desna*, Chevalier (i.e., Lombardo), who had sought refuge in Kherson after a daring assault on the Turkish squadron, once again opened fire on the enemy vessels without suffering any harm himself⁴¹.

By late October 1787, Łuskina reported on a multi-day storm in the Black Sea, which the previous month scattered the Sevastopol Fleet under the command of Count Marko Ivanovich Voinovich (1750–1807)⁴². Taking advantage of the fact that the Russian rear admiral needed time to gather the dispersed vessels and repair the damage, the forces of Gazi Hasan returned to Kinburn on 11 October and commenced a heavy bombardment of the fortress. The following day, a Janissary force of approximately 5,000 men, supported by naval artillery fire, landed on the Kinburn Spit. The Turks promptly began digging entrenchments, while their ships and naval vessels withdrew to the open sea to discourage thoughts of retreat. General Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov (1729–1800), commanding the coastal defences, struck twice at the enemy, but was repelled both times. Meanwhile, the Turkish squadron closed in on the shore and commenced a cannonade. Although the galley *Desna*, commanded by the Maltese corsair Colonel Lombardo, attacked the left flank of the enemy fleet and forced part of the lighter vessels to withdraw from the shore, while the coastal artillery destroyed two large xebecs, the Turks continued receiving reinforcements. The Russians were compelled to withdraw, having lost a significant number of grenadiers. By evening, Suvorov led his troops in a third, ferocious bayonet and sabre charge, driving the Janissaries from the fortress walls and utterly destroying the enemy landing force. Only 500 Janissaries managed to escape in small boats, retreating from the spit, while the rest were either killed or taken prisoner. On the Russian side, several officers and 136 soldiers died, while

⁴¹ GW, 24 October 1787, no. 85., p. [1].

⁴² GW, 20 October 1787, no. 83, p. [1]. A brief biographical note of Voinovich in V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia...*, pp. 487–488. Notably, a Russian squadron of three ships of the line and seven frigates, departed Sevastopol on September 11 and set course for Varna. Its mission was to attack the Turkish fleet stationed there and, if possible, inflict significant losses. However, on 20 September, near Cape Kaliakra, Voinovich's vessels encountered a severe storm, which resulted in the frigate *Krym* sinking, the ship of the line *Maria Magdalena* drifting into the Bosphorus and being seized by the Turks, and the rest of the ships suffering serious damage. Cf. A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 302–303; V. Ganichev, *Ushakov...*, pp. 160–162; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 452; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 477; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 153; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 420–421, 423; L.G. Beskrovniĭ, *Russkaia armĭia...*, p. 526.

several dozen others suffered severe wounds, including Generals Suvorov (wounded in the side and left arm) and von Reck⁴³.

Catherine II openly rejoiced at the victory. She ordered a solemn *Te Deum* to be sung in St Petersburg on October 28 and rewarded those who had distinguished themselves in battle. Some received military decorations, others were promoted to higher ranks, while still others were granted financial rewards⁴⁴. In the Turkish capital, however, it was maintained that both sides had suffered equal losses at Kinburn, though the culpable officers were nonetheless punished. In November 1787, eleven Turkish military commanders, whose “unmeasured dispositions” were blamed for

⁴³ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1095–1096; GW, 31 October 1787, no. 87, pp. [1–2]; 10 November, no. 91, p. [1]; 12 December, no. 99, pp. [2–3]. For a detailed discussion, see L.G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armia...*, pp. 528–529; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworow Rymnikski, Field-marshal-general in the Service of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias: with a Preliminary Sketch of His Private Life and Character*, vol. II, London 1799, pp. [13–24] (noting that Russian losses amounted to 200 dead and 300 wounded, while no more than 600 men from the 6,000-strong Turkish landing force survived); A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 307–312 (indicating that 5,300 Janissaries landed on the promontory, of whom barely 700 survived; Russian casualties were recorded at 138 dead and 302 wounded); J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 140; R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 320–321; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, pp. 30–31; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 488–489; W.A. Serczyk, *Katarzyna II...*, p. 257; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 455; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 480; *Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt...*, pp. 251–252; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 140–141; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 424–425 (where the strength of the Russian garrison is estimated at 4,000 men); A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 149 (reporting that Suvorov had 1,600 soldiers at his disposal, while the defenders' losses amounted to 435 men); A.G. Elchaninov, *Aleksandr Vasilievich...*, pp. 364–369 (recording Russian losses at approx. 1,000 dead and wounded); E. Kholova, *A.V. Suvorov: Liubimyi polkovodets naroda*, Moscow 2017, pp. 90–93. A.N. Petrov notes that of 5,300 Turks, only 300 survived, while Russian losses amounted to 136 men who were either killed or died as a result of their injuries. Additionally, 14 senior officers and 283 non-commissioned officers and soldiers were reported lightly wounded. See idem, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 101–102.

⁴⁴ GW, 12 December 1787, no. 99, pp. [1–2]; 20 February 1788, no. 15, p. [2]. Cf. J.T. Alexander, *Catherine the Great. Life and Legend*, New York 1989, p. 264; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, pp. 29–30. For that victory, Suvorov was awarded the highest military decoration at the time – the Order of St Andrew the Apostle the First-Called. The text of the rescript sent to him by the empress along with the decoration cited in GW, 15 March 1788, no. 22, pp. [3–4]. Potemkin strongly advocated for Suvorov to receive that distinction. Cf. A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 314–315; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 103; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 456; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 482; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 427–428.



1. Battle of Ochakov and Kinburn, 12 October 1787, engraving
by Francesco G. Casanova, 1788

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the failed assault on the fortress, were publicly beheaded, and their heads were displayed before the sultan's palace. Another senior officer was exiled and had his property confiscated, while the commander of Ochakov was dismissed from his post⁴⁵.

Subsequently, the Turks no longer undertook significant operations in the vicinity of Kinburn. They also abandoned the blockade of the liman, withdrawing their fleet to their own waters. This was of considerable significance for the defence of Ochakov – their main stronghold in the Crimean region. As early as October 1787, an oared flotilla under Mordvinov's command attacked a Turkish squadron in the Black Sea, capturing one vessel loaded with ammunition and setting another ablaze. The Russian commander then proceeded to bombard the fortifications of Ochakov, causing extensive damage. In an effort to reinforce the fortress, the Turks constructed a battery facing the sea and burned the suburb most exposed to enemy artillery fire. At the mouth of the Boh, they built a substantial earthwork, garrisoned it with troops, and positioned

⁴⁵ PHP, January 1788, p. 70; GW, 29 December 1787, no. 104, pp. [1–2].

artillery within. On 30 October, Mordvinov issued the order to attack the fortification from both land and sea. The entire assault was executed so effectively that, after a long and valiant defence, the Turkish troops were forced to surrender, suffering significant losses in manpower⁴⁶.

The Warsaw press also reported on the operations in the Caucasus, where a Russian corps under the command of General Tekelli was engaged. At the end of September 1787, a Turkish ally, Sheikh Mansur (1760–1794), leading a strong contingent of Tatars, crossed the River Kuban and attacked a numerically inferior enemy force, killing or capturing several hundred Russians. The Tatars even managed to reach the island of Taman on the Bosphorus, but Tekelli, reinforced by troops from the Crimea, struck back and drove them across the river. He then crossed the Kuban (on 12 October), defeated an eight-thousand-strong Tatar detachment, and chased the remnants high into the mountains. On 24 October, the Russian general once again forded the river and within three weeks subdued the enemy completely. Łuskina remarked:

The habitations and retreats of the Kuban Tatars are made utterly desolate, their entire substance and movables taken, and a considerable number of their people carried unto the Caucasian provinces; by which means the frontiers of the Russian Empire on the Kuban side are rendered fully secure⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ GW, 14 November 1787, no. 91, p. [2]; 21 November, no. 93, p. [1]; 29 December, no. 104, p. [2]. Cf. R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 320–321.

⁴⁷ GW, 12 December 1787, no. 99, p. [1]; 5 January 1788, no. 2, supplement, pp. [2–4]; 26 January, no. 8, pp. [3–4] (as cited above); 29 March, no. 26, pp. [4]; PHP, January 1788, pp. 69–70. On the resistance movement of the Caucasian highlanders against Russia during that period, see V. Potto, *Kavkazskaia voina*, vol. I (*Ot drevneishikh vremen do Ermolova*), Moscow 2006, https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1013400/14/Potto_-_Kavkazskaya_voyna._Tom_1._Ot_drevneyshih_vremen_do_Ermolova.html (accessed 30 August 2019); A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 109–112. Notably, in recognition of his service, General Tekelli was awarded the Order of St Vladimir, First Class, by Catherine II. GW, 20 February 1788, no. 15, p. [2].

3. ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION

The court of Versailles, it is certain, has never before exerted itself with such diligence as it does now, striving to quell this dreadful war and to restore the peace broken before the winter.

PHP, MARCH 1788, p. 240

The outbreak of a new armed conflict usually gives rise to hopes for its swift resolution through an amicable settlement of disputes. The same held true in this case. The Warsaw press, particularly ‘Pamiętnik’, regularly informed its readers of the negotiations undertaken by the courts of France, Britain, and Prussia in an effort to restore peace in Eastern Europe. The new war was especially unfavourable to the French monarchy, which feared for its commercial interests. In an article from December 1787, Świtkowski noted:

Nothing could be more inopportune for France than this Turkish war. It has but newly entered into a commercial treaty with Moscow; with the Porte it remains in long-standing amity, without which it cannot subsist, for Levantine trade is the most vital and most lucrative for France, and may rightly be deemed the principal source of its wealth; the northern trade with Moscow and this new alliance are likewise of great import. Thus does this court find itself between two foes, both of whom are its friends, each demanding that its friendship be preferred above the other. As if this were not burden enough, Austria, France’s friend and ally, takes its stand beside Moscow. To extricate itself from this grievous threefold difficulty, France sets all its levers in motion, employs every art of policy, and strives to quell by agreement a war already begun in blood⁴⁸.

Accordingly, the French ambassador in Constantinople, Count Marie-Gabriel-Florent-Auguste de Choiseul-Gouffier, communicated to the Ottoman ministry at the end of 1787 that Louis XVI was, for the time

⁴⁸ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1088–1089. On the role of Levantine trade in the French economy, see E. Eldem, *French Trade and Commercial Policy in the Levant in the Eighteenth-Century*, “Oriente Moderno. Nuova serie” 1999, vol. LXXIX, no. 1, pp. 27–47. For an analysis of French diplomatic efforts to restore peace between Russia and the Porte, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 113–114.

being, unable to provide assistance to the Sublime Porte, a statement that was met with “great indignation”⁴⁹.

The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ returned to the question of mediation in the January issue of his periodical. He asserted that France had the greatest interest in preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as Levantine trade was more lucrative for it than any other. France exerted itself to the utmost in diplomatic efforts to dissuade the emperor from providing reinforcements to the Empress of All the Russias. All such attempts, however, proved futile. The Spanish court had already announced that it had concluded a new treaty of alliance with the Porte, and on 30 August 1787, the Turkish envoy Ahmed Vâsif Efendi (c. 1730–1806)⁵⁰ arrived in Madrid on a special mission. Following an extended consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Moñino, Count of Floridablanca (1728–1808), a courier was dispatched to the Neapolitan court regarding the agreements it had concluded with St Petersburg – treaties which the Porte considered suspicious and detrimental to its interests.

It seems – ‘Pamiętnik’ reported – that the greater part of the Italian states, if not openly, then covertly and indirectly, will take some part in the war now ensuing. Moscow is in close amity with Naples and Venice, the Prince of Tuscany has once more offered his ports to the Russian fleet and has commanded that they be fortified. Genoa has been called upon to open its port of [La] Spezia to the Muscovites, should the need arise⁵¹.

Świtkowski also discussed the extensive military preparations of Austria and Turkey. He anticipated that, although the latter assembled an army of 400,000 soldiers, it would struggle to defeat the combined Austro-Russian forces, particularly given the additional threats it faced – such as a potential attack from Persia, as well as uprisings among the beys of Egypt and Mahmud, the Pasha of Albania⁵².

Nevertheless, despite the efforts of French and British diplomacy, peace could not be restored in Eastern Europe. Turkey repeatedly reiterated its demand for the return of the Crimea and would not consent

⁴⁹ PHP, December 1787, p. 1089.

⁵⁰ M. İlgürel, *Vâsif Ahmed Efendi*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLII, İstanbul 2012, pp. 535–537. Account of that mission: E. Önalp, *La Cronica de Ahmet Vasif Efendi, Premier Embajador Turco en la Corte Española (1787–1788)*, “Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi” 1999, vol. X, pp. 175–191.

⁵¹ PHP, January 1788, pp. 72–73.

⁵² *Ibidem*, pp. 71–76.

to free navigation in the Black Sea⁵³. In order to avoid the threat of a two-front war, Turkey proposed to Austria a ten-year extension of peace and a settlement of border disputes in Austria's favour. Łuskiński reported that the sultan had agreed to cede Belgrade and part of Serbia to the emperor; however, the latter demanded the restoration of borders as they had stood before the Treaty of Passarowitz, along with several million in compensation for the costs of military preparations. Furthermore, the Viennese court instructed its envoy to convey to the Sublime Porte that, should it fail to reach an agreement with Russia, Austria would be compelled to fulfil its alliance obligations to that country⁵⁴.

In April 1788, Świtkowski published an article entitled "A Comparison of the European Circumstances Relating to the Previous and Present Turkish War". Therein, he predicted that, much as in the previous Turkish war (1768–1774), Britain would support the Russian Empire in its operations against Turkey, whereas France and Spain, wary of British might, would take no overt measures against it. Thus, Catherine II would win glory both in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The same could be expected on land, even if she were to receive no substantial military assistance from Joseph II⁵⁵.

With regard to the international situation, 'Pamiętnik' reported that France and Britain took neutral positions in the ongoing conflict. The latter, while not prohibiting Russian ships from entering its ports, where they could procure food and other necessities, did forbid its sailors from entering foreign service. In March 1788, both nations submitted a peace proposal to the Porte, but it was rejected. Venice also declared its neutrality. Spain, on the other hand, remained steadfast in its resolve to prevent the Russian fleet from entering the Mediterranean. To this end, it armed approximately twenty ships of the line and reinforced its coastal fortresses. The editor of the periodical observed that Turkey exercised exceptional caution in its dealings with the Habsburg monarchy, more so than with any other power with which it had previously gone to war. The manifesto issued upon Joseph II's entry into the war was remarkably measured in tone. Unlike the Russian envoy Bulgakov, who had been imprisoned in the Yedikule Fortress, the bearer of bad tidings, Baron Herbert, was permitted to leave

⁵³ GW, 19 January 1788, no. 4, p. [2]; 2 February, no. 10, p. [3]; PHP, March 1788, p. 241.

⁵⁴ GW, 5 December 1787, no. 97, p. [4]; 26 January 1788, no. 8, p. [1]; 13 February, no. 13, p. [1]; 20 February, no. 15, p. [2]. See also A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 114.

⁵⁵ PHP, April 1788, pp. 336–349.

Constantinople after formally presenting the imperial declaration of war to the grand vizier on 9 February 1788⁵⁶.

Notably, after Austria became involved in the Russo-Turkish conflict, Catherine II's demands increased significantly. She insisted that the Ottoman Empire renounce all claims to the Crimea, cede Ochakov, Bender, and the entirety of Bessarabia to Russia, and grant Russian men-of-war free passage through the Dardanelles. Furthermore, she demanded the execution of the grand vizier, whom she held responsible for instigating the war along with three million piastres in compensation for a breach of the law of nations through the arrest and imprisonment of Iakov Bulgakov⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 452–456. Cf. GW, 5 March 1788, no. 19, p. [3].

⁵⁷ GW, 12 March 1788, no. 21, p. [2].

CHAPTER II

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1788

1. AUSTRIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

[...] the imperial minister [in Constantinople] already ceased to make remonstrances and declared that the emperor, should the Porte fail to make peace with Moscow, would have to support the latter with all his might.

PHP, MARCH 1788, PP. 246–247

The winter of 1787/1788 saw both belligerents readying their land and naval forces for the upcoming campaign. Turkey's armament attracted the greatest attention from the publishers of the Warsaw newspapers. Reports in 'Gazeta Warszawska' and 'Pamiętnik' suggested that the Sublime Porte, despite having declared war on Russia, was as unprepared for the conflict as its adversary. The sultan dispatched a sizeable military contingent to the Russian border and assembled approximately 40,000 troops near Izmail on the Danube to aid Bender and Khotin, should the need arise. However, the main army, under the command of Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, was still in the process of formation¹ and was not expected to reach full readiness for battle by the spring of 1788. To accelerate mobilisation, an order was issued in late 1787

¹ For the text of the sultan's letter entrusting the grand vizier with supreme command over the Ottoman army, see GW, 10 November 1787, no. 90, supplement, p. [3].

requiring all sanjak-beys to provide cavalymen with arms and equipment at a ratio of 100 per 1,000 men. Similar regulations applied to the infantry. Additionally, the size of the artillery corps was increased from 600 to 2,700 men, and fortresses of strategic importance, including Khotin and Belgrade, were reinforced². Those measures also extended to the navy. The press reported that the Turks were forming a formidable fleet in Constantinople (consisting of 80 vessels of various types, armed with 10 to 74 cannons), destined for the Black Sea. Its construction was personally overseen by Kapudan Pasha Gazi Hasan, who visited the shipyards and arsenals daily, urging the labourers to increase their efforts. Another Turkish squadron was formed in the Adriatic Sea to defend the islands in that region³.

² Khotin was surrounded by a wide trench and reinforced with artillery, while in Belgrade, extensive fortifications were undertaken under the supervision of French engineers, with 600 cannons mounted on the ramparts and the garrison brought up to 15,000 men. PHP, December 1787, p. 1092; GW, 2 January 1788, no. 1, p. [4]; 5 March, no. 19, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 12 March, no. 21, pp. [2–3]; 15 March, no. 22, supplement, p. [1]; 22 March, no. 24, supplement, p. [1]; 2 April, no. 27, supplement, pp. [2–3]. Cf. S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Firat University], Elazığ 2012, pp. 99–100, <https://openaccess.firat.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11508/14673/303671.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 20 November 2024).

³ PHP, December 1787, pp. 1092–1093; March 1788, pp. 236–238, 243; GW, 29 September 1787, no. 78, supplement, p. [1]; 27 October, no. 86, p. [1]; 31 October, no. 87, p. [3]; 14 November, no. 91, p. [2] (where the strength of the Ottoman army is given as 207,460 infantry and 240,054 cavalry – totalling 447,457 troops, of whom 277,454 were intended to serve in the field); 22 December, no. 102, supplement, p. [3]; 2 January 1788, no. 1, p. [2]; 20 February, no. 15, p. [2]; 27 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [2]. According to Łuskina's reports, there were over 80,000 Christians in the Ottoman army, among them 100 French officers, 70 German officers, and 25 Poles, whom the Porte "paid generously". GW, 9 January 1788, no. 3, supplement, p. [3]. Notably, determining the exact number of Ottoman troops deployed against the Russo-Austrian coalition is extremely difficult, as German and Russian sources tend to overestimate the figures, while Turkish sources are generally imprecise. The Austrian military historian Oskar Criste estimated that in the first year of the war, the Ottoman army consisted of approximately 207,000 infantry (including 113,000 janissaries) and 240,000 cavalry (including 10,000 spahis), thereby confirming the reports published in the Warsaw press. Figures cited in E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków. Konfrontacja Imperium Osmańskiego z koalicją rosyjsko-austriacką w 1788*, series: Bitwy/Taktyka, Zabrze–Tarnowskie Góry 2021, p. 26. At the outbreak of the war, the Ottoman fleet's fighting strength comprised 23 frigates, 19 galleons, 5 bomb vessels, and several smaller ships (a total of 55 vessels). Cf. S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 92–93.

In the Ottoman capital, it was determined that restoring the wavering honour of the Crescent required not only strengthening the state's military power but also effecting changes at the ministerial level. As early as 22 December 1787, the sultan's council dismissed the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feyzî Süleyman Efendi. To compensate for his removal, he was appointed governor-general (*beylerbey*) of Rumelia and elevated to the rank of pasha of three tails (*üç tuğlu*)⁴. He was succeeded by Mehmed Râşid Efendi (c. 1753–1798), chief scribe – a man of “ignoble birth, but [...] great talents and rare foresight”⁵. In turn, the janissary agha, Mehmed, was granted a three-tailed *tuğ* (thus becoming a pasha of three tails). “All these men, whether recently promoted or raised somewhat earlier”, Świtkowski noted, “are protégés of the old kapudan pasha [Gazi Hasan – M.K.], who now, more than ever, holds the reins of government”⁶.

Equally extensive preparations for the campaign were underway in the Russian Empire. The empress announced two extraordinary army conscriptions, expected to yield 140,000 new troops⁷. She ordered the reinforcement of the fortress of Kinburn and the expansion of the Black Sea Fleet. By the second year of the war, the latter – bolstered by new vessels – comprised 3 ships of the line armed with 100 cannons, 12 64- and 74-gun ships of the line, 6 frigates, 2 bomb ships, and 8 xebecs⁸. In the spring of 1788, both armies were fully formed: the Ukrainian

⁴ Notably, in the Ottoman military hierarchy, pashas (paşas) were divided into three ranks, and the insignia of their dignity was a horse's tail, adorned with feathers and ribbons, mounted on a staff (*tuğ*), and carried before them as a mark of high distinction. A *mirliva* (roughly equivalent to a brigadier general) bore a single *tuğ* and was thus referred to as a pasha of one tail; a *ferik* (major general) carried two *tuğs* and was known as a pasha of two tails; while a *müşir* (field marshal) had three *tuğs*, and was accordingly styled a pasha of three tails, or *üç tuğlu*. Cf. Z. Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, vol. I, Warszawa 1900, p. 128 (entry: Basza); A.K. Czartoryski, *Słowniczek wyrazów przyjętych do mowy polskiej ze wschodnich języków. (Przez Adama Księcia Czartoryskiego)*, “Czasopism Naukowy Księgozbioru Publicznego imienia Ossolińskich” [Lwów] 1828, vol. I, no. 2, p. 96 (entry: Buńczuk).

⁵ PHP, March 1788, p. 242.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 242–243 (quoted on p. 243).

⁷ In the first of those conscriptions, two recruits were selected for every 500 men; in the second, one for every 100. Cf. GW, 28 November 1787, no. 95, p. [3]; PHP, April 1788, p. 347. “Tis true that recruits, drawn from the plough or the fishing net, cannot at once be good soldiers; many fall ill from hardship and perish. Yet a prudent commander can shield them at first and make them steadfast little by little” – Świtkowski noted (PHP, April 1788, pp. 347–348).

⁸ GW, 9 January 1788, no. 3, p. [2]; 30 January, no. 9, p. [2]; 27 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]. At the outset of the war, that fleet comprised five ships of the line,

Army, commanded by Field Marshal Rumiantsev, which held positions stretching from Bratslav to Kamianets-Podilskyi, and the Ekaterinoslav Army, under the command of Prince Potemkin, deployed along a line from Kremenchuk to the Crimea. According to Łuskina, the Russians were to open the campaign by capturing Bender in southern Moldavia, followed by an assault on the Black Sea port of Varna. Securing the latter would allow them to provision their forces by sea and rely on support from their own fleet. The primary objective of the Russian land and naval forces in the upcoming campaign was to seize the coastal fortresses from Ochakov to the mouth of the Danube, thereby integrating the Crimean Peninsula, New Russia, and Bessarabia. That strategy, named after its architect, was known as the Potemkin system⁹.

Austria, Russia's ally, was also strengthening its military forces – although for the time being, it remained officially uninvolved in the ongoing conflict¹⁰. “The Austrian preparations for this war are extraordinary”, Świtkowski noted¹¹. Łuskina echoed this sentiment, stating: “His Imperial Roman Majesty commands most fearsome preparations for war against the Turks”¹². Joseph II mobilised the largest army ever assembled against

nineteen frigates, a bomb vessel, and ten smaller warships. Cf. L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armii i flot v XVIII veke (Ocherki)*, Moscow 1958, p. 523.

⁹ GW, 21 June 1788, no. 50, pp. [2–3]; 16 July, no. 57, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, March 1788, pp. 245–246. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm Czteroletni*, vol. I, Warszawa 1991, p. 28; F. Fejtő, *Józef II. Habsburg rewolucjonista*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 305–306; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka. Prawda i mit*, Warszawa 2012, p. 488; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armii...*, p. 530. According to A.N. Petrov, on the eve of the 1788 campaign, the Russian forces numbered 80,000 men (excluding Cossacks) in the army commanded by Grigory Potemkin, 27,000 in Rumiantsev's army, and 18,500 soldiers in the Kuban. Cf. idem, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vol. I (1787–1789 gg.), St Petersburg 1880, p. 130.

¹⁰ Cf., for instance, GW, 8 December 1787, no. 98, p. [1]; 22 December, no. 102, supplement, p. [3]; 26 December, no. 103, p. [4]; 20 February 1788, no. 15, p. [3]. See also *Jozef Drugi cesarz rzymski i Fryderyk Drugi król pruski monarchowie w jednym czasie panujący, prawdziwie wielcy. Pamiętnik dwóch geniuszów wieku XVIII sławnych*, Wrocław 1819, pp. 30–31. Cf. P. Nuić, D. Matanović, *Josephine Reform of the Military Frontier and the Austro-Ottoman War (1788–1791) on the Example of the Petrovaradin Regiment*, “Osmanlı Mirası Araştırmaları Dergisi / Journal of Ottoman Legacy Studies” 2023, vol. X, no. 28, pp. 619–640, on the reform of the border infantry regiments, with particular reference to the Petrovaradin Regiment in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Austro-Turkish War.

¹¹ PHP, March 1788, pp. 255–256.

¹² GW, 20 October 1787, no. 84, supplement, p. [3]. Elsewhere, Łuskina noted that “in all the Austrian hereditary lands, military preparations and arming proceed with such haste, as though the war should last for years to come. Ammunition is

the Porte – some 255,000 men and 1,800 cannons¹³, well supplied with provisions and military equipment¹⁴.

Apart from the grenadiers – as reported by ‘Pamiętnik’ – twelve thousand of the most excellent marksmen were also enlisted and distributed among the regiments. These marksmen were not furnished with a common musket, but rather with air rifles, which, though requiring a longer time to load, permit several successive shots. Both cavalry and infantry were arrayed with iron crosses and braided ornaments on their heads. The bombs likewise are to be of an entirely novel kind, designed to hurl heated shot against fortresses. To withstand the dreadful onslaught of the Turkish horse, the troops were provided with wooden

carried unto the army without cease, though the store already with the troops might well suffice for five or six campaigns. Recruits are chosen still, and by the highest command, they shall, as is reported, take even wedded men that hold no estate”. GW, 12 July 1788, no. 56, supplement, pp. [1–2].

¹³ Of the total force, 218,200 were line troops; the rest comprised auxiliary units and rear services. In addition to siege and fortress artillery, the Austrians had at their disposal 1,505 field pieces: 645 3-pounder cannons, 645 6-pounders, and 215 howitzers. GW, 26 January 1788, no. 8, supplement, p. [2]; 19 March, no. 23, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, January 1788, p. 73. Specification of the Habsburg army: GW, 18 June, no. 49, supplement, pp. [2–3]; PHP, July 1788, pp. 610–611. See W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 34, where very similar estimates of imperial strength are given – 250,000 troops. According to Western European literature, the Habsburg army deployed against the Porte initially numbered approximately 245,000 troops, later increasing to around 294,000. Cf., for instance, M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797*, London–New York 2013, p. 383 (where the number of field pieces is given as 898 and siege pieces as 252 – a total of 1,150); V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów 1700–1870. Oblężone imperium*, Oświęcim 2019, p. 154 (with identical data on the artillery); S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin, książę książąt*, Warszawa 2000, p. 463; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarski romans*, Warszawa 2013, p. 488; D. Beales, *Joseph II*, vol. II (*Against the World, 1780–1790*), Cambridge 2009, pp. 562, 575. Russian scholars, in turn, estimate the size of the Austrian army at between 120,000 and 187,000 troops. Cf. O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov*, vol. I, Moscow 2018, p. 107; M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armia v veke imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 25; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700–1814 gg.*), Moscow 1992, p. 149. Interestingly, A.N. Petrov (*Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 130–131) estimated the Austrian forces at merely 120,000 troops.

¹⁴ GW, 8 March 1788, no. 20, p. [1]. “The magazines [...] are so well stocked that the army, though so numerous, may have sufficient provisions for more than two years”, Świtkowski noted (PHP, January 1788, p. 73).

engines, contrived in lieu of chevaux-de-frise and made to advance ahead of the line¹⁵.

At Petrovaradin in Serbia, the principal arsenal of the time, a new 36-gun frigate was built. Moreover, portable hospitals capable of accommodating several hundred men were introduced for the first time in history. The army was reinforced with 180 commissary bakers and 300 field surgeons¹⁶. "In short, never has an army set forth to war with such caution, such might, and such arms as this one; and so, one must expect that its consequences will be most great, momentous, and extraordinary", Świtkowski concluded¹⁷.

On 9 February 1788, Joseph II declared war on Turkey¹⁸. 'Pamiętnik' reported that, before that came to pass, the Austrian forces had twice attempted to seize Belgrade¹⁹. That act brought disgrace on the emperor, as he had sought to gain new territories from his neighbour by guile, without issuing any formal notice of hostilities. Following the formal pronouncement, the imperial army, stretched in thin cordons along the vast frontier from Transylvania to the Adriatic, extending over 250 miles, crossed into Ottoman lands and commenced a siege²⁰. Commanding the corps in

¹⁵ PHP, March 1788, p. 255. Cf. GW, 20 October 1787, no. 84, supplement, p. [3], which reports that the army in Croatia received 10,000 air rifles, each capable of firing 15 shots per single charge.

¹⁶ GW, 20 October 1787, no. 84, supplement, pp. [2–3].

¹⁷ PHP, March 1788, p. 256.

¹⁸ The emperor's declaration of war: GW, 23 February 1788, no. 16, pp. [1–2]; PHP, January 1788, pp. 185–189. Cf. *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, pp. 32–33.

¹⁹ PHP, March 1788, p. 247. Incidentally, the Austrians attempted to capture Belgrade on the night of 2–3 December 1787 and again on 17 January of the following year. In both cases, the attack failed due to bad weather and poor visibility. Cf. E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 23–24; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, pp. 33–34; F. Fejtő, *Józef II...*, p. 305 (however, the date of the declaration of war – 8 February – is incorrect); M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I – Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789*, "International History Review" 2004, vol. XXVI, no. 2, p. 268; M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars...*, pp. 383–384; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin*, 3rd edn, Moscow 2016, pp. 436–437; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, p. 562; M. Karkocha, "Póki włosy w mojej brodzie nie zajmą się ogniem, póty nie poddam się". *Oblężenie i zajęcie Belgradu (1789) w relacjach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Twierdze osiemnastowiecznej Europy. Studia z dziejów nowożytnej sztuki wojkowej*, vol. IV, M. Trąbski, ed., Częstochowa 2022, p. 253.

²⁰ Those forces were divided into six corps: the main army, under the command of the emperor and Field Marshal Franz Moritz von Lacy (*sive* Lascy), operated in Hungary; the troops in Croatia, Dalmatia, and the coastal regions were led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Joseph Nikolaus de Vins; in Sirmia, Lieutenant Field

Croatia, Field Marshal Lieutenant Baron Joseph Nicolaus de Vins (1732–1798)²¹ ordered the fortified town of Dresnik (Drežnik) to be taken by storm. “It was a refuge of Turkish rogues and brigands, who had long concealed themselves there and raided the surrounding lands thence, so, efforts were made to destroy this nest of scoundrels first”, one newspaper recounted²². The defenders of the fortress were ordered to surrender, and when they answered with fire,

so vigorous was the assault upon said Dresnik that the place, battered by a mighty cannonade, was all but reduced to ashes, and the entire Turkish garrison perished upon the field, save but one Turk, who was taken captive, and a small handful of others, who sought refuge in Kula – Łuskina noted²³.

On 10 February, the assault was renewed. A total of 30 Ottoman soldiers were killed and 70 were taken prisoner. The opponent’s losses were minimal: one killed and one wounded²⁴.

The Austrians also succeeded in capturing Old Orsova in the Banat. Their attempt to seize the fortress of Gradiska (Gradiška) in Bosnia on 9 February proved less fortunate. Though its walls had been greatly weakened by artillery fire, the Turks put up a valiant defence, forcing the enemy to withdraw. Nowhere, however, were those initial military

Marshal Count Joseph Anton Mittrowsky; in the Temeswar Banat, Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Wilhelm Ludwig von Wartensleben; in Transylvania, General Michael von Fabris; and in Galicia and Bukovina, Prince Friedrich Josias von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld. GW, 19 March 1788, no. 23, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, April 1788, pp. 330–336. Cf. M. Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars...*, p. 383; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, p. 562. Composition of the imperial army deployed against the Porte: GW, 19 March 1788, no. 23, supplement, p. [2]; 18 June, no. 49, pp. [2–3]; PHP, July 1788, pp. 608–611. Biographical information on the Austrian commanders: GW, 23 April 1788, no. 33, pp. [1–3]; PHP, April 1788, pp. 330–336.

²¹ C. von Wurzbach, *De Vins, Joseph Nicolaus Freicherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon des kaiserthums Oesterreich, enthaltend die lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen kronländern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben*, vol. III (Cöremans–Eger), Wien 1858, pp. 273–274; J. Hirtenfeld, *De Vins, Joseph Nicolaus Freicherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden und seine Mitglieder: Nach authentischen quellen bearbeitet*, vol. I, Wien 1857, pp. 287–290.

²² PHP, March 1788, p. 248.

²³ GW, 23 February 1788, no. 16, p. [3].

²⁴ GW, 23 February 1788, no. 16, pp. [1–3]; 5 March, no. 19, p. [1]. Cf. E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, p. 29.

operations as disastrous for the imperial forces as at Dubica (present-day Bosanska Dubica) on the eastern frontier of Bosnia. The Austrians sought to take it by surprise and without bloodshed, as they had done with Old Orsova, yet the Turks, having received prior warning, stood prepared for the defence. 'Pamiętnik' reported as follows:

When the imperial troops silently approached the town and began to hew down the gates, they found them, on the other side, heaped high with dung and earth, and as they obstinately strove to remove and cast aside the obstruction, they suffered heavy losses from the Turks standing behind the walls and firing without pause, as 80 men were killed and 349 wounded²⁵.

They were unable to recover from that loss, as the sudden thaw made it impossible to bring in heavy artillery and commence a formal siege. For the same reason, the capture of Belgrade had to be postponed²⁶.

On 1 March 1788, Joseph II departed from Vienna to personally oversee military operations. He travelled to Trieste and from there followed the Dalmatian coast to the general headquarters in Futak (the town of Field Marshal Andreas Hadik), where he arrived on 25 March²⁷. Soon thereafter, Archduke Francis (1768–1835), the future King of Bohemia and Hungary and the first Emperor of Austria, followed suit, as did Field Marshal Count Franz Moritz von Lacy (1725–1801)²⁸, who exercised supreme command over the entire force²⁹. The main army, numbering 60,000 troops, was ordered by the emperor to lay siege to the small fortress of Šabac on the lower Sava, seven miles from Belgrade. Although the stronghold was poorly defended, with a garrison of only 800 men and 17 cannons, the Austrians spent an entire month in the effort to capture it. "The taking of that place – Łuskina noted – is of the highest consequence, for thereby all provision to the fortress of Belgrade by water may be cut off, and the way to Belgrade by land

²⁵ PHP, March 1788, p. 250.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 248–251; GW, 1 March 1788, no. 18, pp. [2–3]. Cf. E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 34–36.

²⁷ Derek Beales (*Joseph II...*, pp. 568–569) notes that the emperor left the capital on 29 February and joined his army on 20 March.

²⁸ C. von Wurzbach, *Lacy, Franz Moritz graf von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XIII (*Kosarek–Lagkner*), Wien 1865, pp. 464–469; J. Hirtenfeld, *Lacy, Franz Moritz Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 60–62.

²⁹ PHP, March 1788, pp. 254–255; GW, 5 April 1788, no. 28, p. [1]; 9 April, no. 29, p. [1]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 268.

is left open”³⁰. During the general assault on 24 April, Prince Józef Poniatowski (1763–1813), nephew of the Polish monarch and aide-de-camp to the emperor at that time, was severely wounded in the leg, while General of Artillery Johann Theodor Baron von Rouvroy (1727–1789)³¹ sustained a minor injury. Meanwhile, the commander of the engineering corps, General Johann von Bechard (1728–1788)³², succumbed to a gunshot wound to the arm. Notably, Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne (1735–1814)³³, a memoirist, distinguished himself with great bravery and was promptly awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa (Third Class) on the battlefield and promoted to lieutenant colonel. Seven hundred Turks were taken prisoner, not including some 2,000 women and children, who, in recognition of the garrison’s valiant defence, were permitted to leave the town with all their belongings and were escorted to Zvornik³⁴.

Almost simultaneously, on 18 April, the imperial corps under the command of Colonel Fabris inflicted a defeat on the Turks led by İbrahim Nasir Pasha. Two days later, they entered the Moldavian capital of Jassy (Iași), capturing the local hospodar, Alexander Ipsilanti (Ypsilantis)

³⁰ GW, 23 April 1788, no. 33, p. [2].

³¹ C. von Wurzbach, *Rouvroy, Johann Theodor Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XXVII (*Rosenberg-Rzikomsky*), Wien 1874, pp. 175–177. He died of fever in Zemun in 1789, as reported by GW, 28 October 1789, no. 86, supplement, p. [3].

³² C. von Wurzbach, *Bechard, Johann Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. I (*A-Blumenthal*), Wien 1856, pp. 205–206.

³³ Among the most significant works, see L. Dumont-Wilden, *La Vie de Charles-Joseph de Ligne, prince de l’Europe française*, Paris 1927; R. Quinot, *Charles-Joseph de Ligne, prince wallon et européen*, Gilly 1973; A. Bonnard, *Le Prince de Ligne*, Liège 1965; P. Grenaud, *Le Charmant Prince de Ligne: prince de l’Europe*, Paris 1999; Ph. Mansel, *The Prince of Europe: The Life of Charles-Joseph de Ligne, 1735–1814*, London 2003.

³⁴ Detailed report on the battles over the city: GW, 10 May 1788, no. 38, pp. [1–4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]. Cf. also GW, 24 May 1788, no. 42, pp. [1–2]; PHP, May 1788, pp. 446–447. Description of the castle, plan of the attack, and the progress of the siege in J. Gyalókey, *Šabac vára 1787–88-ban*, “Hadtörténelmi Közlemények” [Budapest] 1924, vol. XXV, pp. 207–219. See also W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 36; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 58–62; S. Askenazy, *Książę Józef Poniatowski 1763–1813*, 7th edn, Warszawa 1974, pp. 52–53; J. Skowronek, *Książę Józef Poniatowski*, Wrocław 1986, p. 27; R. Bielecki, *Książę Józef Poniatowski*, Warszawa 1974, p. 10; J. Czuby, *Książę Józef Poniatowski – życie i legenda*, [in:] *Książę Józef Poniatowski 1763–1813*, Warszawa 2013, p. 11; B. Lázár, *Turkish Captives in Hungary during Austria’s Last Turkish War (1788–91)*, “Hungarian Historical Review” 2015, vol. IV, no. 2, p. 426 (the author determined the total number of captured Turks at 684, including 35 officers and 32 non-commissioned officers).



2. Map showing the distribution of Austrian, Russian, and Turkish encampments in 1788, as well as the marching routes of the respective armies, 1790

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(c. 1724–1807)³⁵. The Austrians, however, were unsuccessful in their attempt to seize Dubica. Between 21 and 25 April, they mounted a second assault on the fortress, but were repelled, suffering a loss of several hundred men³⁶.

³⁵ GW, 17 May 1788, no. 40, pp. [2–3]; 21 May, no. 41, p. [3]; 31 May, no. 44, supplement, pp. [2–3]. Notably, the Austrians failed to hold Jassy for long. In early July, they were forced to withdraw in the face of a numerically superior enemy, but after two months, they managed to recapture the Moldavian capital. GW, 30 July 1788, no. 61, supplement, p. [2]; 27 September, no. 78, supplement, pp. [2–3]. On Alexander Ipsilanti and the role he played in the Danubian principalities at that time, see W. Miskewka, *Książę Konstantyn Ipsilanti w kontekście kwestii wschodniej: o niektórych aspektach działalności dyplomatycznej na przełomie wieku XVIII i XIX*, “Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny” 2014, vol. X, p. 199 ff. Cf. also idem, *Legăturile domnului fanariot Alexandru Ypsilanti cu Imperiul Habsburgic în ultimul sfert al secolului al XVIII-lea*, “Revista de Istorie a Moldovei” 2015, no. 4(104), pp. 62–80.

³⁶ During the attack on Dubica, more than 120 Austrian soldiers were killed, and over 400 were wounded. The Turks suffered between 300 and 400 casualties during the assault and approximately 600 in open-field battle. Łuskińska noted that women also joined in the defence of the fortress, “hurling stones upon the attackers and scalding them with boiling water”. GW, 14 May 1788, no. 39, pp. [2–3]; 17 May, no. 40, pp. [1–2]; 31 May, no. 44, supplement, p. [1] (quotation); PHP, May 1788, p. 446. Cf. *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, p. 36; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 70–71.

As for the Sublime Porte, its efforts were primarily focused on seizing the Crimea and defending the threatened fortresses of Ochakov and Belgrade. According to estimates from the Warsaw press, Turkey mobilized an enormous army of nearly 500,000 troops against the imperial courts³⁷. “It has armed nearly half of Asia, stirred all Tatar nations against Moscow, and as early as March, dispatched great hordes of wild and refractory men into Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia [Serbia – M.K.]”, Świtkowski reported³⁸. In mid-February 1788, the banner of Muhammad was raised before the grand vizier’s residence in Constantinople as a sign of an imminent campaign, and a month later, the main Ottoman forces, divided into three columns, began their march toward Adrianople. The first column, numbering 100,000 troops and commanded by Koca Yusuf Pasha, was to proceed to relieve Belgrade. The second column, 80,000 strong and led by the serasker of Silistra, was to advance into Bessarabia, while the last, consisting of approximately 60,000 men under the command of the reis efendi, was to march into Moldavia and Wallachia to defend Khotin. The naval forces under the command of Kapudan Pasha Gazi Hasan were directed towards the Dnieper Liman, tasked with capturing the fortress of Kinburn and opening the way to Kherson and the Crimea³⁹. In early May, the grand vizier’s army, advancing at a leisurely pace, reached Sofia⁴⁰, and by mid-June, it arrived in Vidin. Koca Yusuf Pasha was still encamped there in July 1788, showing no inclination to cross the Danube⁴¹.

³⁷ PHP, March 1788, p. 237. Cf. also GW, 28 November 1789, no. 95, supplement, p. [3]. It is difficult to determine the exact size of the Ottoman army. A well-informed French officer, André-Joseph Lafitte-Clavé, considered one of the most reliable eyewitnesses to those events, estimated the number of regular troops at 184,500 (including 150,000 janissaries, 24,000 cavalry, and 10,500 artillerymen). The Russians, on the other hand, assessed the enemy’s land forces at 280,000 men. Cf. A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo Starodubskogo polka*, St Petersburg [1908], p. 7; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria’s Security: Part I...*, p. 269.

³⁸ PHP, May 1788, p. 449.

³⁹ GW, 27 February 1788, no. 17, supplement, pp. [1–2]; 15 March, no. 22, p. [3]; 26 March, no. 25, supplement, p. [1]; 5 April, no. 28, p. [1]; 12 April, no. 30, pp. [2–3]; 7 May, no. 37, pp. [2–3]; 14 May, no. 39, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, March 1788, pp. 238–239; May 1788, p. 450. Cf. S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 113–114.

⁴⁰ GW, 30 July 1788, no. 61, p. [3]: “The grand vizier proceeds with his army in a most sluggish manner, for it happens but rarely that his army marches more than a mile and a half in a day”.

⁴¹ GW, 11 June 1788, no. 47, supplement, p. [1]; 18 June, no. 49, p. [2]; 12 July, no. 56, supplement, p. [2]; 23 August, no. 68, supplement, p. [3].

2. NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS

The government [of Russia] places its hope of sorely afflicting the enemy in the might of its navy, and therefore spares no effort to render it as vast as may be and to dispatch it with all haste unto the Mediterranean Sea.

PHP, MAY 1788, p. 448

The editors of the Warsaw newspapers – most notably Stefan Łuski⁴² – consistently kept their readers abreast of operations not only on land but also at sea. The rebuilt and expanded Ottoman Black Sea Fleet, commanded by Gazi Hasan, set sail in early April 1788 for Büyükdere, where it remained at anchor for several days awaiting favourable winds before proceeding into the Black Sea. It consisted of 66 vessels of various sizes, including 16 ships of the line, several frigates, 7 corvettes, 13 bomb ketches, and an appropriate number of transport ships⁴² carrying 18,000 troops. In early June, the fleet reached the vicinity of Kozlov on the western coast of the Crimea, and a few days later, it entered the waters of the Dnieper Liman. The kapudan pasha disembarked a corps of approximately 5,000 men at Ochakov before setting out to sea with a view to destroying the enemy fleet and resuming offensive operations in the Crimea⁴³.

On 18 June 1788, the Turkish admiral mounted an attack on the Russian Liman Flotilla, which comprised a number of oared artillery barges and bomb ketches and was commanded by Prince Karl Heinrich

⁴² It is difficult to determine the exact number of Turkish units. F. Anthing (*History of the Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworow Rymnikski, Field-marshal-general in the Service of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias: with a Preliminary Sketch of His Private Life and Character*, vol. II, London 1799, p. [33]), provides an estimate most consistent with contemporary newspaper reports, estimating the fleet of the kapudan pasha at 69 ships. According to the Russian historian Valerii Ganichev (*Ushakov*, Moscow 1990, p. 164), it consisted of 20 ships of the line and more than 20 frigates). The French aristocrat Roger de Damas, a participant in the second Russo-Turkish War, recorded in his memoirs, written years later, that the fleet comprised 92 vessels of various types (*Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama, "Starina i novizna: Istoricheskii sbornik"* 1914, vol. XVIII, p. 22). The same figures are provided by O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 450. According to A.N. Petrov (*Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 140), the Turkish fleet consisted of 13 ships of the line, 15 frigates, and 32 smaller vessels.

⁴³ GW, 25 June 1788, no. 51, p. [4]; 2 July, no. 53, p. [3] (on the composition of the Ottoman fleet); 5 July, no. 54, p. [3]; 16 July, no. 57, supplement, p. [3]; 6 August, no. 63, p. [4]; PHP, July 1788, pp. 645–647.

von Nassau-Siegen (1745–1808)⁴⁴, the successor to Mordvinov. However, he suffered a setback and, after four hours of engagement, withdrew to Ochakov.

Although the wind was so greatly against our squadron that our ships had to be towed by the Cossacks during the engagement – Potemkin wrote to Catherine – we nevertheless gained a most glorious victory over the enemy. Three of their principal ships were blown up, while the rest were driven in great disorder beneath the batteries of the fortress of Ochakov. And though the kapudan pasha did order fire upon his own ships so as to halt his fleeing men, yet it came to no avail⁴⁵.

Russian losses were slight – 6 killed and 21 wounded⁴⁶.

Elated by the victory, Catherine II decorated the soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle. Prince von Nassau-Siegen was made a knight of the Order of St George (Second Class), Rear Admiral John Paul Jones (1747–1792)⁴⁷, a hero of the American War of Independence, and Rear

⁴⁴ J. Bartoszewicz, *Karol de Nassau*, [in:] idem, *Znakomici mężowie polscy w XVIII wieku*, vol. I, Warszawa 1855, pp. 207–260; R.W. Wołoszyński, *Nassau-Siegen (książę Nassau Siegen) Karol Henryk*, [in:] *PSB*, vol. XXII, Wrocław 1977, pp. 591–595; N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety XVIII i XIX stolecia* (= *Portraits russes des XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*), vol. II, St Petersburg 1906, p. 93; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar' generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. II (L–Â), Moscow 2010, p. 194. Potemkin entrusted Nassau with the command of the oared flotilla in April 1788. Cf. S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 465; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 491; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov*, Moscow 2012, p. 154. According to Roger de Damas (*Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, p. 15), the Liman Flotilla consisted of 80 various sailing and oared vessels.

⁴⁵ GW, 30 July 1788, no. 61, supplement, pp. [1–2]. For a detailed account of the operations of the Russian fleet in the waters near Ochakov, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 140–144.

⁴⁶ GW, 12 July 1788, no. 56, pp. [1–2]; 30 July, no. 61, supplement, pp. [1–2]. Cf. J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie 1775–1851*, Warszawa 2001, p. 141; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich. Wiek żagla*, vol. I, Warszawa 1995, pp. 408–409; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 468; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 494; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. 24–25; R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853*, Princeton 1952, pp. 323–325 (reporting the presence of Gazi Hasan's fleet off Ochakov on the last day of May, and offering slightly different estimates of Turkish strength); V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 164–165; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus kniaz Suvorov*, vol. I, St Petersburg 1884, p. 320; L.G. Beskrovnnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 532.

⁴⁷ J.C. Fredriksen, *Jones, John Paul (1747–1792)*, [in:] *Naval Warfare: An International Encyclopedia*, S.C. Tucker, ed., vol. II (H–Q), Santa Barbara 2002, pp. 558–559; *Jones, John Paul*, [in:] B. Hannings, *American Revolutionary War Leaders: A Biographical Dictionary*, Jefferson, NC–London 2009, pp. 207–210; S.E. Morison, *John Paul Jones:*

Admiral Mordvinov were awarded the Order of St Anna. Major General José de Ribas y Bayons (1749–1800)⁴⁸ received the Order of St Vladimir (Third Class), while Brigadier Panagioti (Panaioti Pavlovich) Aleksiano (d. 1788)⁴⁹, a Greek in Russian service, was advanced to rear admiral. The French volunteer Count Roger de Damas (1765–1823)⁵⁰, Colonel of Engineers Nikolai Ivanovich Korsakov (1749–1788), and eight other staff officers were presented with golden swords bearing the inscription: “For distinguished valour in the naval engagement on the Liman, 7(18) June 1788”. The rank-and-file soldiers and Cossacks each received a rouble⁵¹.

On 28 June, the flotilla of light galleys, supported by a squadron of ships of the line under the command of Rear Admiral J.P. Jones, launched an attack on the kapudan pasha's fleet stationed by Ochakov. During the battle, the Turkish vanguard, consisting of eight ships of the line, ran aground on the shallows. The Russians encircled the immobilised enemy, set fire to four of the ships (including those of the admiral and vice-admiral), captured two others by boarding, and scattered the remainder. Before the flagship caught fire and exploded, Gazi Hasan transferred to a lighter vessel and fled the battlefield. The following day, Jones pursued the shattered enemy fleet, forcing it to resume the battle. He captured two ships of the line, while several smaller vessels were either sunk or burned. Pursued by the Russians, the kapudan pasha “fled in disgrace to Varna”⁵². Łuskina reported that General Suvorov made a significant contribution to the victory by ordering fire to be opened on the enemy from the batteries positioned on the Kinburn Spit, while Aleksiano was once again noted for his boldness. In the two-day battle on the Liman, the Turks lost over 3,000 prisoners and nearly as many killed. The Russian

A Sailor's Biography, Annapolis 1989. Cf. also S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 466–467; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 492–493; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 458–461.

⁴⁸ Cf. A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815*, New York 2005, pp. 327–328; N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. II, p. 34; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, pp. 398–399.

⁴⁹ *Aleksiano, Panaioti*, [in:] *Voennaia entsiklopediia*, V.F. Novitskov, ed., vol. I [A (*metka angliiskogo Lloida*) – *Alzhiriia piraty*], St Petersburg 1911, pp. 296–297; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I (A–K), Moscow 2010, p. 48.

⁵⁰ Roger de Damas entered Russian service in January 1788. He served as an aide-de-camp to Prince G.A. Potemkin and took part in the campaigns of 1788 and 1789. He left an account in French, which was also translated into Russian (*Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*).

⁵¹ GW, 16 August 1788, no. 66, supplement, p. [2].

⁵² GW, 9 August 1788, no. 64, supplement, p. [2].

casualties were not precisely recorded by the press, but were in fact minor (fewer than 100 men)⁵³.

‘Pamiętnik’ related as follows:

Thus, of the once-mighty Turkish force, which but recently numbered 60 vessels of various kinds and, through its terror, held the Russian fleet as if besieged within its ports, there remain but a scant dozen ships huddled together, which now must skulk and seek safety beneath the batteries of Ochakov⁵⁴.

Grigory Potemkin did not hesitate to act upon the Porte’s defeats. In early July, he led his forces across the River Boh, and by mid-month, he commenced the siege of Ochakov. To facilitate his efforts, he ordered Prince von Nassau-Siegen to destroy what remained of the Ottoman fleet anchored by the fortress, which was accomplished on 12 July. The Turks lost a total of 2 frigates, 3 smaller vessels, 5 50-oar galleys and 72 cannons. Seeking to support the operations of the Liman Flotilla, the Prince of Taurida mounted a feigned attack from the landward side. The Russian vanguard encircled the fortress, while the corps of Livonian skirmishers, under the command of Prince Volkonsky, seized the pasha’s gardens. Potemkin ordered that a battery be constructed without delay and personally directed

⁵³ GW, 12 July 1788, no. 56, p. [1]; 9 August, no. 64, supplement, pp. [1–2]; PHP, July 1788, pp. 647–648. For more details, see R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 325–327; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, pp. [38–47]; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 141; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich...*, p. 409; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. 26–28; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 450–451; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 167; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 321–322; S.S. Montefiore, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 495–497; idem, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 469–471 (according to the author, the Turks lost 10 ships and 5 galleys in the battle, with over 3,000 killed and 1,673 taken prisoner, while the Russians lost only 1 frigate, with 18 killed and 67 wounded); Z. Ryniewicz, *Leksykon bitew świata*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 141–142 (for similar estimates of losses); A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 145 (including information that the Turks lost over 6,000 killed and 1,763 taken prisoner, as well as 8 ships of the line and 8 smaller vessels. Russian losses were said to amount to only 13 officers and 73 non-commissioned officers and rank-and-file soldiers); Ch. King, *Dzieje Morza Czarnego*, Warszawa 2006, p. 176; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiiia...*, p. 532. Notably, Count Stepan Stepanovich Apraksin, who had the honour of delivering the news of that victory to the empress, was advanced to captain-lieutenant of the Guards, received a snuffbox worth 1,500 roubles, and was awarded 500 ducats. On 11 July, by order of the empress, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the cathedral church in St Petersburg to give thanks for the victory at the Dnieper Liman. GW, 16 August 1788, no. 66, supplement, p. [1]; 20 August, no. 67, p. [4].

⁵⁴ PHP, July 1788, pp. 648–649.

its fire, with Prince de Ligne and Franciszek Ksawery Branicki (c. 1730–1819)⁵⁵, Grand Hetman of the Crown, at his side, although the latter would soon be recorded in Polish history as an infamous Targowica traitor. Also present at the time were the generals-in-chief: Prince Nikolai Vasilievich Repnin (1734–1801)⁵⁶, Prince Yurii Vladimirovich Dolgorukov (1740–1830)⁵⁷, and Potemkin's distant cousin, Lieutenant General Count Pavel Sergeevich Potemkin (1743–1796)⁵⁸. The Russians lost “but one horse and one man, slain by a cannonball at the first discharge of the battery”⁵⁹, a mere four paces from the field marshal. Once the Ottoman vessels had been destroyed, the Russian flotilla turned its deck artillery on Ochakov, laying waste to the upper part of the town. However, the fortress itself was not to yield until December 1788, as will be discussed later⁶⁰.

On 29 June, a fleet of 2 ships of the line, 10 frigates, 20 smaller vessels, and 3 fireships set sail from the Crimean port of Sevastopol under the command of Rear Admiral Marko I. Voinovich. Its objective was to thwart any attempt of the main Turkish fleet, under the command of Gazi Hasan, to come to the aid of the Ottoman forces stationed near Ochakov. The battle took place on 14 July by the island of Fidonisi, east of the Danube Delta, as reported in Łuskina's newspaper. Although the kapudan pasha's fleet had recently suffered considerable losses, it still maintained an advantage in numbers over the Russians. It comprised 17 ships of the line, 8 frigates, 21 smaller vessels, and 3 fireships. Despite such numerical superiority, after several hours of engagement, the Turks were forced to retreat from the battlefield, losing one 25-gun vessel, while

⁵⁵ See W. Konopczyński, *Branicki Franciszek Ksawery*, [in:] *PSB*, vol. II, Kraków 1936, pp. 398–401.

⁵⁶ S.D. Maslovskii, *Repnin, kniaz Nikolai Vasilievich*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. XVI (*Reitern-Roltsberg*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1913, pp. 93–118; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 393.

⁵⁷ M. Rossiiskii, *Dolgorukov, kniaz Yurii Vladimirovich*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. VI (*Dabelov-Diadvorskii*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1905, pp. 570–573; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 469.

⁵⁸ A. Elnitskii, *Potemkin, graf Pavel Sergeevich*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. XIV (*Plavilshchikov-Primo*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1905, pp. 673–682; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 343.

⁵⁹ GW, 2 August 1788, no. 62, supplement, p. [1].

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*; PHP, July 1788, p. 649. Cf. R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, p. 328; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. 30–31; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 472; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 498; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 324; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 455; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 148–149.

the Russians suffered no losses. “Thereupon – Łuskina noted – the Russian admiral continued to chase the Turkish fleet, but the latter persistently avoided battle until 18 July, when it withdrew entirely towards the shores of Rumelia”⁶¹. Only then did Voinovich drop anchor near Kherson and send the four most damaged frigates back to Sevastopol⁶².

Despite his victory, Voinovich remained highly cautious and continued to show little initiative. As a result, on 9 August 1788, the Turkish fleet, consisting of 15 ships of the line, 10 frigates, 10 xebecs, 12 dispatch boats (Turk. *kırlangıç*) and 22 transport vessels, once again sailed into the waters of the Liman. Four days later, the Turks seized Berezan Island, a key fortified position on the outskirts of Ochakov, from which Gazi Hasan sent the janissaries, provisions and ammunition to the fortress. By order of Potemkin, a detachment of Cossacks recaptured it on 18 November 1788, after the surviving units of the Turkish fleet had withdrawn to Constantinople for the winter, depriving the island of naval support. The victors seized 11 standards, 40 cannons of various calibres and considerable supplies of ammunition and provisions. Four hundred soldiers were taken prisoner⁶³.

⁶¹ GW, 20 August 1788, no. 67, p. [1].

⁶² *Ibidem*. For further details, see R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 328–329; V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia Rossiiskogo flota*, vol. III (XVIII vv.), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 400–404; V. Ganichev, *Ushakov...*, pp. 165–167; V.D. Docenko, *Morskie bitvy Rossii XVIII–XX vekov*, 3rd revised edn, St Petersburg 2002, pp. 50–51; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, pp. 141–142; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich...*, pp. 409–410; S.Iu. Danilov, *Glavnye morskie srazheniia ot trier do avianoscev*, Moscow 2013, pp. 63–64; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, pp. 533–534; Z. Ryniewicz, *Leksykon bitew...*, p. 166; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 491; E. Kosiarz, *Bitwy morskie*, 4th edn, revised and expanded, Warszawa 1994, p. 132; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov*, “Voprosy istorii” 2002, no. 3, p. 60.

⁶³ GW, 22 October 1788, no. 85, supplement, p. [2]; 14 January 1789, no. 4, supplement, p. [1]; 17 January, no. 5, supplement, pp. [2–3]; PHP, December 1788, p. 1161 (with the date of the Russian recapture of the island erroneously stated as 12 November). Cf. J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 142; [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin, Field-marshal and Commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, Grand Admiral of the Fleets, Knight of the Principal Orders of Prussia, Sweden, and Poland, and of All the Orders of Russia etc. Comprehending Original Anecdotes of Catharine the Second, and of the Russian Court*, London 1812, p. 171; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. [56]–57; I. de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, London 1981, p. 404; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 482; *idem*, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 509; R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars...*, pp. 330, 332; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 483; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 177. See A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 205–208, for a more detailed discussion of the operations of Count Voinovich’s squadron. Łuskina recounted the capture of Berezan as follows:

3. THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

The common Russian soldier is assuredly no hero, yet he shows no fear of war. [...] he is a soldier fit for all things, with whom a worthy commander may well accomplish near-miraculous feats.

PHP, APRIL 1788, PP. 346–347

Meanwhile, operations on land proceeded rather sluggishly. After capturing Šabac on 24 April, the main Austrian army, instead of crossing the River Sava and besieging Belgrade as had been expected, entrenched itself near Zemun. In doing so, it squandered the entirety of May, June, and July – the most favourable months for campaigning – awaiting the arrival of the grand vizier's forces of 80,000 men, who were slowly advancing towards Vidin⁶⁴. The editor of 'Pamiętnik' attributed Joseph II's lack of urgency to his desire to first secure the entire country "against enemy incursions and depredations"⁶⁵. Additionally, the imperial army faced supply difficulties, and soldiers began to suffer from fever. Świtkowski reported as follows:

Excessive heat, drawing men to drink of the coldest water from the springs, brings upon the weary and the heedless a sudden loss, not only of health, but of life itself. Even at the very headquarters in Futak and its environs, the waters and the air wrought sickness among the men,

"On the morning of 18 November, the Cossacks, having drawn near to the island, with fearless courage withstood the mighty fire of the enemy's batteries, returning shot for shot with their own cannon and muskets, leapt into the waters, forced their way ashore, and with such fury fell upon the foe that they scattered them utterly. They seized the battery and pursued the fleeing foe even unto the very walls of the fortress, yet there they were met with a blast of canister shot. Only then did the Cossacks turn the enemy's battery by the shore against the fortress, and begin to shell it from their own cannons aboard the ships. That mighty fire, together with the manoeuvre executed at the fleet's first signal by our [Russian – M.K.] frigates, and the dispatch of vessels with artillery under the command of Brigadier Rybov [?], compelled the enemy to sue for terms". GW, 17 January 1789, no. 5, supplement, p. [2].

⁶⁴ PHP, July 1788, p. 636. According to the same newspaper, "The greatest cause of his [grand vizier's – M.K.] tardy march was said to be the great scarcity of provisions, especially in Serbia, from whence an immense multitude of people had fled into Austrian lands, leaving vast tracts of farmland fallow and uncultivated, whereby the procurement of victuals became most difficult" (PHP, August 1788, p. 727).

⁶⁵ PHP, July 1788, p. 640.

whilst among the horses such a pestilence raged that, in but a short time, 80 of the emperor's own steeds perished⁶⁶.

The editor of 'Gazeta Warszawska', in an article "From Semlin dated 16 July", noted that:

The great heat, which ceases not even by night, does now vex us exceedingly, the water here is utterly lukewarm, and as for flies of every kind, we are plagued with such multitudes that scarce may one bring a spoonful of food to one's lips untarnished. The poor horses suffer grievously, above all those of English breed, which cannot defend themselves against the swarming insects and may not be used here at all, thus all generals who had English horses were compelled to send them back. That, in such conditions, many soldiers grow weak and fall ill is but a thing most common⁶⁷.

Having learned that the main Ottoman army was preparing to cross the Danube near Kladovo, the emperor dispatched 10,000 troops to the Banat and an equal number to Transylvania. He also ordered reinforcements for the forces in Croatia, where Field Marshal Karl Borromäus, Prince of Liechtenstein (1730–1789)⁶⁸, encamped at Cerovljani, was repelling enemy attacks from the River Una and Turkish Dubica. By the end of June, the corps of Prince Friedrich Josias of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld (1737–1815)⁶⁹ advanced towards Khotin, surrounding it in the hope of starving it into submission. At the same time, the Russian army under the command of Rumiantsev crossed the Dniester and entered Wallachia. The field marshal dispatched 13,000 troops under the command of General Count Ivan Petrovich Saltykov (1730–1805)⁷⁰ to support Coburg. The allied forces began the investment of the fortress. The small

⁶⁶ PHP, May 1788, pp. 442–443.

⁶⁷ GW, 16 August 1788, no. 66, p. [2].

⁶⁸ C. von Wurzbach, *Liechtenstein, Karl Borromäus Joseph Fürst*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XV (*Leon–Lomeni*), Wien 1866, pp. 165–168.

⁶⁹ C. von Wurzbach, *Coburg-Saalfeld, Friedrich Josias Prinz*, [in:] *ibidem*, vol. II (*Bninski–Cordov*), Wien 1857, pp. 395–398; J. Hirtenfeld, *Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld, Friedrich Josias*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 245–250.

⁷⁰ A. Zaionchkovsky, *Saltykov, graf Ivan Petrovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. XVIII (*Sabaneev–Smyslov*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1904, pp. 76–79; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 449.

Khotin garrison of 4,000 men, in expectation of imminent relief, mounted a valiant defence⁷¹.

At the beginning of August 1788, the vanguard of Yusuf Pasha's army crossed the Danube, broke through the imperial forces' cordon stretched along the frontier⁷², and entered the Banat. "The place which the grand vizier chose for that incursion is the very last recess of the Banat, formed by the River Danube and the mountains that part Wallachia from the Banat", one of the newspapers reported⁷³. The defence of that territory was entrusted to Major General Paul Dimich von Papilla (1722–1802)⁷⁴,

⁷¹ PHP, July 1788, pp. 637–644; August 1788, pp. 721, 724; GW, 26 July 1788, no. 60, p. [1]; 2 August, no. 62, pp. [1–2]. Cf. A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, pp. 7–8 (with the strength of the Turkish garrison estimated at 6,000 men); L.G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armii...*, p. 536; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 151–153. Notably, Saltykov's corps had already joined the left wing of the imperial army under Coburg's command near Kamianets-Podilskyi in February 1788 and entered Moldavia alongside it. Soon, however, an order was issued to detach from the Austrians and reinforce Rumiantsev, who was tasked with shielding Bender from Turkish attacks. PHP, March 1788, p. 245; May 1788, p. 447.

⁷² GW, 2 August 1788, no. 62, p. [3]: "The main [...] camp between Semlin [Zemun] and Peterwaradin [Petrovaradin] must be held as the centre of our entire [imperial] army. The Slavonian and Croat corps, together with the corps stationed along the riverbank, form the right wing. The Banat corps, now reinforced anew with four battalions, along with the Wallachian and Transylvanian corps, make up the left wing. At the farthest end of the right wing stands General [Anton] Gazzinelli with 10,000 men, touching upon the shores of the Adriatic Sea, and shielding the maritime towns of Trieste, Fiume, Bukar-Karlovego [?], and Zengg [Senj]. The corps of troops under the command of Prince [Karl] de Lichtenstein in Croatia extends its right flank as far as Vacup [?], while its left reaches unto the River Sava. The corps of Count de Mitrowsky [Joseph Anton, Count Mittrowsky] in Slavonia spreads along the Sava, and these two corps have but a single point for their junction, at Gradiska and Banja Luka. General [Wilhelm Ludwig von] Wartensleben, with the Banat corps, stands in closest contact with the left wing of the great army. His corps leans upon the Danube, and at Mehadia it connects with Transylvania, where the corps under the command of Field Marshal-Lieutenant [Michael] de Fabris extends as far as Wallachia, holding fast those passes which lead into and out of Transylvania and Wallachia. Prince de Coburg guards Bukovina, the Transylvanian lands, and a portion of Poland, whence his military forays from Czernowitz extend farther. From this it is made plain that the various corps of the imperial and royal military force so disposed themselves as to maintain possession of the greater rivers; and the main army chose such a position that the separate corps may, in time of need, be reinforced with the utmost swiftness".

⁷³ PHP, September 1788, p. 832.

⁷⁴ C. von Wurzbach, *Dimich von Papilla, Paul Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. III, pp. 306–307; J. Hirtenfeld, *Dimich von Papilla, Paul Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 153–155.

who had earlier distinguished himself at the onset of the campaign by capturing Old Orsova without incurring any losses. This time, however, Papilla fell short of expectations. His corps, consisting of 5 infantry battalions, 1 battalion of skirmishers, and 100 hussars, was caught off guard by a 16,000-strong Ottoman force on 7 August and surrounded on three sides. Instead of swiftly making for the nearby mountains, the Austrian commander began a retreat through a ravine. Unfortunately, the first of the 13 cannons with which the imperial troops were retreating overturned, blocking the entire path. The Ottoman cavalry, undeterred by the heavy volley fire from the muskets, charged at the enemy with great force, threw their ranks into disarray, and scattered them. The remnants fled to Mehadia, where they joined the forces of Field Marshal Lieutenant Wilhelm Ludwig von Wartensleben (1734–1798)⁷⁵, who exercised supreme command in the Banat. The Austrian losses in killed and missing totalled 2,500 men. The worst fate befell the 600 sick, who, along with 12 field surgeons and the entire military hospital, were burned alive by the Turks. The surrounding villages were likewise set ablaze, and their inhabitants either mercilessly slaughtered or taken captive⁷⁶.

On receiving the news, Joseph II left the camp at Zemun and, at the head of an army numbering 42,000 troops (according to other estimates, 56,000 and 800 cannons), hastened to Wartensleben's aid. In the meantime, the Turks continued to cross the lower Danube – within three days, 26,000 Ottoman troops set foot on imperial soil.

First – Świtkowski recounted – they set upon all the strongholds and palankas enclosed with palisades that lay along the Danube; and though at great loss to themselves, they seized them nonetheless, putting the Austrians to the sword or compelling them to abandon their posts. Whole battalions of imperial troops garrisoned in those small fortresses fell prey to the unheard-of impetuosity of that foe, who, though driven back from the entrenchments four or five times, returned for the fifth and even sixth time – heedless of fields soaked in blood

⁷⁵ C. von Wurzbach, *Wartensleben, Wilhelm Ludwig Gustaw Graf*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. LIII (Wallnöfer–Weigelsperg), Wien 1886, pp. 109–113; J. Hirtenfeld, *Wartensleben, Wilhelm Ludwig Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 280–282.

⁷⁶ PHP, September 1788, pp. 830–834. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, pp. 274–275, where the strength of the Turkish forces is estimated at 12,000–13,000 men; *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, p. 39; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, p. 87.

and strewn with the corpses of his own men – and, with the garrison wearied from hours of resistance and thinned in number, cut them down to the last man⁷⁷.

Only the Veterani Cave (Peștera Veterani)⁷⁸ withstood the Turkish assault, defended by a small garrison under the command of Major Baron Friedrich Ludwig von Stein (1752–1790)⁷⁹. The pasha of Anatolia, who had unsuccessfully attempted to capture it for 15 days with a force of 7,000 men, ultimately granted the garrison free passage to Mehadia⁸⁰.

Having cleared the borderlands of Austrian forces, Koca Yusuf Pasha ordered the construction of two bridges over the Danube, across which 36,000 soldiers were led under the command of the serasker of Vidin. On 18 August, the Turkish army, numbering over 60,000 men, struck at Field Marshal Wartensleben's corps, encamped near Mehadia. "The attack was terrible and renewed six times", one newspaper reported. – Yet the imperial [troops – M.K.], drawing on their very last reserves of strength, withstood it and repulsed the enemy at a loss of 400 men"⁸¹. A week later, on 25 August, the Ottoman forces resumed their assault, but again they failed to prevail. Wartensleben dispatched courier after courier to the emperor, who was encamped at Weiskirchen, requesting immediate reinforcements. However, Joseph II's army, wearied by a long and sudden march, was in need of rest. When ammunition began to run low at the camp at Mehadia, and the Turks deployed their artillery on the surrounding hills, the field marshal resolved to abandon his position

⁷⁷ PHP, September 1788, pp. 835–836.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 836–837 (asterisked footnote): "The Veterani Cave, deriving its name from the Roman veterans who once took refuge therein and long defended themselves against the Dacians, is a cavern cut into the rock, into which there is no passage save from the Danube. Its entrance is so vast that an entire battalion may be drawn up within. That cave entirely commands navigation on the Danube, for all that appears in sight may be raked by cannon fire. At that time, it was occupied by two imperial battalions and eight cannon".

⁷⁹ C. von Wurzbach, *Stein, Major (Ou. 10)*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XXXVIII (*Stehlik–Stietka*), Wien 1879, pp. 43–44; J.R. Seeley, *The Life and Times of Stein, Or, Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age*, vol. I (1757–1807), Cambridge 2013, p. 21.

⁸⁰ PHP, September 1788, pp. 834–835; GW, 27 September 1788, no. 77, supplement, p. [2]; 4 October, no. 80, pp. [3–4] (a detailed account of the capture of the Veterani Cave). According to W. Kalinka (*Sejm...*, p. 35), the imperial forces sent to aid Wartensleben numbered 40,000 men. For an account of the battle, see E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 96–98.

⁸¹ PHP, September 1788, p. 837.

(on 28 August). The Austrian retreat was covered by the rearguard under the command of Major General Baron Siegbert Vécsey von Hajnáskeő (1739–1802)⁸², consisting of a cavalry regiment, three squadrons of hussars, and an infantry battalion. They were forced to endure a fierce attack by a Turkish detachment of 9,000 spahis and 2,000 janissaries, which was renewed no fewer than six times. The Turks only ceased their pursuit of the rearguard when it rejoined the rest of the army and stood in battle order. Świtkowski noted:

This retreat is esteemed in the army as a feat of superior tactics, redounding to the great honour of both generals and of the troops, most notably the cavalry, as well as the battalion of Stein, which lent its support, having but recently rejoined the army after being released by the Turks from the Veterani Cave upon terms of capitulation, for this reason, the rearguard was received by the rest of the forces with the utmost gratitude⁸³.

The serasker of Vidin did not content himself with merely driving the Austrians out of Mehadia; on 24 August, he dispatched a force of 7,000 men against Brza Palanka. That fortress served to maintain communication between the left wing of the imperial army and the remaining forces in the Banat, prompting Wartensleben to send reinforcements – seven infantry battalions and one of hussars – under the command of Major General Baron Franz Wenkheim (1736–1794)⁸⁴. A sharp skirmish ensued between the belligerents, forcing the Turks to retreat. During the battle, Major Lattermann⁸⁵ distinguished himself in the fray, as he was “fighting like a lion, and at the very moment when he ran a distinguished Turk through with his sword, was struck by a shot

⁸² C. von Wurzbach, *Vécsey von Hajnáskeő, Siegbert Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. L (*Vastag–Villani*), Wien 1884, pp. 51–52; J. Hirtenfeld, *Vécsey von Hajnáskeő, Siegbert Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 168–270.

⁸³ PHP, September 1788, pp. 836–840 (quotation on pp. 839–840); GW, 13 September 1788, no. 74, p. [3]; 17 September, no. 75, pp. [2–3]; 20 September, no. 76, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 24 September, no. 77, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 275; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 91–94.

⁸⁴ C. von Wurzbach, *Wenkheim, Franz Xaver Freih.*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. LIV (*Weil–Weninger*), Wien 1886, pp. 269–270; J. Hirtenfeld, *Wenkheim, Franz Xav. Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, p. 296.

⁸⁵ The identity of this figure remains uncertain.

to the head and fell upon the field”⁸⁶. Apart from said major, 23 rank-and-file soldiers were killed, and 75 were wounded. The enemy’s losses amounted to approximately 600 men. The following day, the Turks renewed their assault with 1,800 men and several cannons. They surrounded Palanka completely and continued shelling it until nightfall. Seeing that it would be difficult to defend the fortress while repelling the attack on his own camp, Wartensleben ordered the surrender of Palanka and had its garrison fall back to his lines (27 August). That same day, Koca Yusuf Pasha completed the crossing of the lower Danube with the remainder of his army (20,000 men) and joined forces with the serasker of Vidin. The Ottoman troops in the Banat now numbered 100,000 soldiers, while the imperial army stood at approximately 70,000 men and 400 cannons. On 3 September, the Turks struck at the Austrians guarding the Oituz Pass, cut them down to the last man, and thereby opened the path to Transylvania⁸⁷.

On 14 September 1788, near Slatina, there was another encounter between the forces of Joseph II, reinforced by Wartensleben’s corps, and the grand vizier’s army. The Austrians were once again defeated⁸⁸. The imperial army, afflicted by disease⁸⁹ and food shortages, and increasingly demoralised, withdrew to Lugoj. “This position was exceedingly strong and shielded the remainder of the Banat on that side, preventing the [grand] vizier from advancing further into the country unless he made a major assault on the imperial camp and forced a passage forward”, as related

⁸⁶ PHP, September 1788, pp. 840–841.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 840–843; GW, 20 September 1788, no. 76, p. [4]; 27 September, no. 78, p. [4] and supplement, p. [1]; 1 October, no. 79, p. [4].

⁸⁸ GW, 27 September 1788, no. 78, supplement, p. [3]; 8 October, no. 81, p. [4]; 11 October, no. 82, p. [2].

⁸⁹ In August 1788, nearly one-third of the Habsburg army stationed at Zemun suffered from fever, and the military hospitals of various armies held 30,000 patients. By the end of September, no fewer than 10,431 soldiers afflicted by the illness were recorded at the hospital in Zemun alone. GW, 17 September 1788, no. 75, p. [3]; 8 October, no. 81, supplement, pp. [3–4]; 29 October, no. 87, supplement, p. [1]; 12 November, no. 91, supplement, p. [1]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria’s Security: Part I...*, p. 273. Rev. Łuska noted: “Various letters from Hungary report that not only are all hospitals within the armies filled with the sick, but that far greater numbers must be lodged in village houses than all the hospitals together might contain. The Hungarian fever, as it is called, is most rife. Though this fever is but seldom mortal, yet it greatly weakens the body”. GW, 8 October 1788, no. 81, supplement, p. [3]. See also PHP, August 1788, p. 727. The Ottoman forces in the Banat were also ravaged by disease – in October 1788, 30,000 soldiers fell ill. GW, 1 November 1788, no. 88, p. [4].

by the publisher of 'Pamiętnik'⁹⁰. During the night of 20–21 September, Wallachian marauders spread rumours of the Turks approaching. They set several houses on fire, causing panic in the city. Soldiers fled in disarray, abandoning their weapons and equipment, followed by terrified civilians. The enemy was sighted everywhere – yet was nowhere to be found.

The confusion at this most woeful event is beyond all description – Łuskińska reported. – So many fleeing wagons, such a throng of horse and foot pressing together in tumult, that at every step one feared for one's very life. One of our [Austrian – M.K.] regiments, in the darkness of that march, stumbled upon another of our own. The officers of the former cried out: "Halt! Halt!" Yet the soldiers of the latter thought they heard the Turkish cry of "Allah! Allah!". They therefore opened fire and wounded many of their fellows⁹¹.

At last, the Ottoman forces did indeed arrive "and made slaughter among the fleeing". The victors seized the entirety of the artillery, wagons, ammunition, provisions, and even the imperial carriages. After some time, when Joseph managed to restore order among his troops, his cavalry and grenadiers charged at the Turks, striking down a thousand men⁹². This, however, did little to lift the monarch's spirits, as he grew increasingly despondent and lost the will to pursue the war. The ruler's health was also in decline; he had recently recovered from a bout of fever, but had not yet fully regained his strength⁹³.

⁹⁰ PHP, October 1788, pp. 947–948.

⁹¹ GW, 29 October 1788, no. 87, supplement, p. [2].

⁹² GW, 11 October 1788, no. 82, supplement, p. [2]; 25 October, no. 86, pp. [3–4] and supplement, p. [2]; 29 October, no. 87, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, October 1788, p. 953. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 35; F. Fejtő, *Józef II...*, p. 309; J. Skowronek, *Książe...*, p. 27; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, p. 573; *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, pp. 48–49. For an account of the battle, see E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 102–103; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 119. In his work, A.N. Petrov presented a highly critical assessment of the operations of the main Austrian army in the 1788 campaign. Cf. idem, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 180–182.

⁹³ "By means of a strict regimen, I preserved my life. I subsisted on nothing but fruit and water, adding a little vinegar thereto, and thus was spared from death", Joseph II wrote to one of his ministers. GW, 27 September 1788, no. 78, supplement, p. [1]. In a letter to his brother, Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany, Joseph II complained of a number of malaria-related ailments, cf. A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Jako monarcha i jako człowiek. Uwarunkowania personalne decyzji politycznych Józefa II Habsburga*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 69–70, 80, and 308 (footnotes 38 and 39).

The Austrians fared significantly better on both flanks of the main battlefield. At the end of July, Joseph II dispatched Field Marshal Baron Gideon Ernst von Laudon (*sive* Loudon) (1716–1790)⁹⁴ to Bosnia, instructing him to seize Turkish Dubica. He promptly undertook offensive measures. On 9 August, he drove the enemy from the camp near Dubica⁹⁵, and captured the fortress by the end of the month (26 August)⁹⁶. Inside, a large cache of weapons and ammunition was discovered, “but even more corpses and slain horses, rotting in the streets and exuding an unbearable stench”⁹⁷. On 1 September 1788, the Austrians took the Ottoman camp near Gradiska⁹⁸, and on 3 October, they stormed and seized a small but well-fortified stronghold of Novi (present-day Novi Grad) on the River Una⁹⁹. In Moldavia, where Prince Friedrich Josias von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld

⁹⁴ C. von Wurzbach, *Loudon, Gedeon Ernst Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XVI (*Londonia–Marlow*), Wien 1867, pp. 66–92; J. Hirtenfeld, *Loudon, Gideon Ernst Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 48–57; J. Kunisch, *Laud(h)on, Ernst Gideon Frhr.*, [in:] *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XIII (*Laven–Keller*), Berlin 1982, pp. 700–702.

⁹⁵ “The plan of that attack was so wisely devised that the commanders and officers executed their orders with the utmost precision and were so valiantly supported by the entire army that the Turks, assailed fiercely from both front and rear by the Austrians, were surrounded, driven from their batteries, thrown into disorder, and utterly defeated. The entire Turkish camp, with all that lay within, was bestowed by the commander as spoils on the troops, as a reward for their steadfast obedience. That victory, which cost the imperial forces fewer than a hundred men, yet deprived the Turks of several thousand lives or their liberty, brought about the ruin of Dubica, as afore recounted”. PHP, August 1788, pp. 731–732. Cf. E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 78–79.

⁹⁶ PHP, September 1788, pp. 843–845. Austrian war reports on the engagements at Dubica: GW, 30 August 1788, no. 70, supplement, pp. [1–2]; 3 September, no. 71, supplement, p. [1]; 13 September, no. 74, p. [4]; 17 September, no. 75, p. [4] and supplement, pp. [3–4]; 1 October, no. 79, p. [3]. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 36 (however, the date of the fortress’s capitulation is mistakenly recorded as 24 August); E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 81–84.

⁹⁷ PHP, September 1788, p. 845. Cf. B. Lázár, *Turkish Captives...*, p. 428. Another newspaper reported: “The Turkish garrison, taken into captivity [...] is in a most wretched state. Though they are men of strong constitution, they are so gaunt and emaciated, so pale and foul-smelling, that our [Austrian – M.K.] soldiers shrank back in fear”. GW, 1 October 1788, no. 79, p. [3].

⁹⁸ PHP, September 1788, pp. 845–846.

⁹⁹ The garrison, numbering around 600 men, was taken captive. Women and children were allowed to leave freely. In the fortress, approximately 40 cannons of various calibres were found, along with a considerable quantity of ammunition and provisions. PHP, October 1788, pp. 949–951; GW, 8 October 1788, no. 81, supplement, p. [2]; 15 October, no. 83, supplement, pp. [3–4]; 22 October, no. 85, pp. [3–4]; 25 October, no. 86, supplement, pp. [3–4]. Cf. B. Lázár, *Turkish Captives...*,

was operating with the support of a Russian auxiliary corps under Count Saltykov, the Austrians, aided by the Russians, succeeded in retaking Jassy (3 September)¹⁰⁰ and compelling the long-besieged fortress of Khotin to surrender (29 September). The terms of capitulation were, however, most extraordinary. The garrison was permitted to depart with arms, horses, and full military honours, while the inhabitants, should they wish to leave, were granted ten days to withdraw from the city with all their movable property. During the evacuation, the victorious army pledged to supply provisions and oats for the horses, as well as 2,700 wagons for the transport of belongings. It also secured the line of retreat for both the garrison and the civilian population along the left bank of the Danube¹⁰¹. Together

p. 428 (with a mention of Laudon taking 590 Ottoman soldiers captive); *Jozef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, p. 42.

¹⁰⁰ GW, 27 September 1788, no. 78, supplement, pp. [2–3]; PHP, September 1788, pp. 846–848 (where the occupation of Jassy by General Gabriel Splény de Mihály is mistakenly dated to 23 September). Cf. A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, p. 9.

¹⁰¹ PHP, September 1788, pp. 848–850; GW, 8 October 1788, no. 81, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 18 October, no. 84, supplement, p. [3] (including an inventory of the military equipment found in the Khotin fortress). Accounts of the siege of Khotin: GW, 24 May 1788, no. 42, supplement, p. [1]; 28 June, no. 52, supplement, p. [1]; 2 August, no. 62, pp. [2–3]; 9 August, no. 64, p. [2]; 20 August, no. 67, p. [2]; 23 August, no. 68, p. [2]; 27 August, no. 69, pp. [2–3] and supplement, p. [1]; 30 August, no. 70, p. [2]; 3 September, no. 71, pp. [3–4]; 13 September, no. 74, supplement, p. [3]. “Thus far the Turks had been so distantly encircled – Świtkowski related – that they could graze their horses and cattle upon the nearby meadows. But from 20 July, the batteries of the united army, constructed by the besieging forces, deprived them of that advantage. Incessant fire, from 21 to the 24 July, having destroyed the outlying buildings and almost all the structures within the fortress itself, compelled the Turks to request a three-day truce from the imperial commanders, promising to surrender the fortress. However, after that interval had passed, they again sought an eleven-day suspension of arms. Prince de Coburg granted it only until 5 August, but when the garrison still refused to surrender after that respite, an attack was resumed upon the fortress with heated shot, grenades, and bombs, as relentless and vigorous as before. Yet, upon learning of the approaching relief force led by the new Moldavian hospodar, Manol Bey [Emanuel Giani-Ruset – M.K.], the Turks held out bravely until the 15th day of the month”. PHP, August 1788, pp. 724–725. On receiving the news of the capture of the Khotin fortress, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the Russian capital, accompanied by cannon salutes. GW, 26 November, no. 95, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 168–169; *Księga pamiętnicza majora A. Ptaszyńskiego 1769–1793*, prep. by A.J. [Rolle], Kraków 1881, pp. 24–26; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 36; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 511; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 403 (incorrectly recording the date of the capture as 15 September); V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów...*, p. 135 (where the terms of Khotin’s capitulation are mistakenly attributed to Jassy). For a detailed

with Khotin, the entire surrounding district – the Raya, comprising 260 villages – fell into Austrian hands¹⁰².

The editor of 'Pamiętnik' noted:

That conquest is of great moment to the imperial courts. With it, the whole of Moldavia has come under imperial dominion. An army of 30,000 is now unencumbered and hastens to the aid of Transylvania, so much so that the seizing of said Oitos pass from the Turks is now deemed no peril; for even should the serasker force his way thence from the Banat, he shall now find three corps positioned there, one under General Fabris, another led by Prince de Coburg, and a third of the Muscovites¹⁰³.

Meanwhile, the Prince of Taurida was gradually encircling Ochakov from the landward side. Świtkowski reported that his army had been expected to besiege the fortress at the beginning of the campaign season, but in March 1788, heavy snowfall rendered it impossible¹⁰⁴. In the first half of July, the Russians crossed the River Boh and drew a cordon around the fortress. Potemkin delayed a general assault until mid-December, but Suvorov did not wait and engaged the enemy in battle several times. 'Pamiętnik' reported that the heaviest engagement occurred on 29 August. During a sally, the forces of the Turkish garrison struck at the left wing of the Russian army under Suvorov's command, and had it not been for the manoeuvre of Prince N.V. Repnin, the entire wing "would have been hewn to pieces and scattered". The Russians suffered a loss of 2,000 men in battle, including 31 officers, while Suvorov was severely wounded.

discussion of the operations of the combined Austrian-Russian forces that resulted in the capitulation of Khotin, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 159–164, 171–180 (dating the fortress's capitulation to 18/29 September); E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 155–173.

¹⁰² GW, 10 January 1789, no. 3, p. [4]: "This land indeed befits the name bestowed upon it; for the word Raja means Paradise in the old Slavonic tongue. It is the fairest country one may imagine, where woods, fertile fields, valleys, and gentle hills, as well as most beauteous plains, are wondrously interwoven". In Turkish, however, the word *reaya* was associated with a tribute. During the Ottoman period, that part of Bessarabia was designated for the upkeep of the fortress of Khotin. Cf. J. Poradowski, *Kilka słów o Multanach (Mołdawii); napisane dla dzierżawców dóbr ziemskich*, "Tygodnik Rolniczo-Przemysłowy" 1846, vol. IX, no. 23, p. 184.

¹⁰³ PHP, September 1788, p. 850.

¹⁰⁴ PHP, March 1788, p. 246.

Following that attack, Potemkin repositioned his camp and adjusted the army's formation¹⁰⁵.

According to that same newspaper, the scorching summer and rainy autumn delayed Russian operations at Ochakov to such an extent that, in the opinion of impartial observers, the fortress was expected to remain in Turkish hands for a long time yet. The kapudan pasha fortified it so well that by late September, the Russians did not even seize the outer works, and the constant sallies of the garrison caused significant losses among their ranks. For the time being, an ultimate assault could not even be contemplated, as the artillery, "though surely as numerous and fine as had perhaps ever been assembled before any fortress", caused little damage to the mighty ramparts, while the garrison of 25,000 men continued to make sorties against enemy positions¹⁰⁶.

The Warsaw press reported that after the capture of Khotin, Coburg divided his forces into two corps: one he dispatched to Transylvania to support General Michael von Fabris (1739–1809)¹⁰⁷, the other to Wallachia to seize Bucharest. A Russian detachment under the command of Field Marshal Rumiantsev also made its way there. Meanwhile, the main imperial army remained encamped at Lugoj until mid-October, without engaging in any operations. The defensive conduct of the war stirred public discontent.

The common folk of Vienna are so displeased – Łuskina noted – that they have resorted to the most scurrilous libels against our great [Austrian – M.K.] commanders; some among them have even gone so far as to ravage the fine menagerie of Field Marshal Lacy in Dornbach¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁵ PHP, December 1788, pp. 1158–1159 (quotation on p. 1159). Cf. F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, pp. [47–50]; [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 167–168; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. 42–44; V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów...*, p. 155; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 475; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 501; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 456; O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov...*, pp. 122–123; L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov*, Moscow 2012, pp. 139–140.

¹⁰⁶ PHP, December 1788, pp. 1159–1161 (quotation on p. 1160). Cf. D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, CT–London 2006, p. 86; and L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov...*, p. 128 (both sources indicate that the fortress garrison consisted of 20,000 troops). The Russians had 200 cannons at Ochakov, including 45 24-pounders. GW, 25 October 1788, no. 86, p. [3].

¹⁰⁷ C. von Wurzbach, *Fabris, Michael von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. IV (*Egervari-Fürchs*), Wien 1858, pp. 128–129.

¹⁰⁸ GW, 29 October 1788, no. 87, supplement, p. [1].

The grand vizier, who had encamped his army at Karánsebes, less than 50 km from the Austrian forces, was also in no haste to bring about a decisive battle. He even proposed a six-month armistice to the emperor, but was told to “continue his military operations”¹⁰⁹. In reality, no major engagements followed. At the beginning of October, the Ottoman forces, plagued by inclement weather, disease, and a devastating loss of horses due to unhealthy fodder – with as many as 6,000 perishing in October 1788 alone – retreated to Mehadia¹¹⁰, and soon after withdrew entirely from the devastated Banat¹¹¹. The scorched-earth strategy proved disastrous for them. The Turks also abandoned the Danubian principalities. Koca Yusuf Pasha left observation corps stationed in Vidin and Belgrade, while the remainder of his army marched to winter quarters in Adrianople. The absence of any spectacular victories did not, however, prevent the sultan from assuming the title of “The Victorious” in October 1788¹¹².

In one of the November issues of ‘Gazeta Warszawska’, Łuskina remarked that, following the advice of Field Marshal Laudon, the

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, p. [3].

¹¹⁰ Citing reports from Temeswar, Łuskina wrote: “The incessant rain ruined the Turks’ entire plan for further warlike undertakings. They intended, as is now known, to strike at the rear of our great [Austrian – M.K.] army, yet the roads are now so spoiled and men in the Turkish army perish in such great numbers that the grand vizier shall be forced to turn back [...] Among the Turkish forces, no fewer than 30,000 men are sick, and their horses perish in droves”. GW, 1 November 1788, no. 88, p. [4].

¹¹¹ “The Turks now yielded nearly all of the Banat before the coming winter, yet it is hard to describe how much devastation they wrought upon that land. So many towns, villages, and other places plundered! So many laid to waste, destroyed, and burned! So many stone houses, which in past wars were spared, now violently torn asunder and reduced to mere rubble! So many churches first vilely profaned, then despoiled! So many church plate and fittings, copper roofs, and bells taken and carried off! So many provisions seized! So many put to the sword! So many maimed! So many thousands of residents stripped of all their possessions! More than three thousand souls, men, women, and children, taken alive into bondage! Such were the Turks. But what is there to say of those Wallachian hordes [...] of robbers who, taking advantage of the Turkish incursion into our Banat and finding the land laid open before them, plundered and burned it even more ruthlessly than the Turks themselves”. GW, 26 November 1788, no. 95, supplement, p. [2]. Joseph II noted that 100,000 Serbs fled to his dominions to escape the Turkish threat. Cf. D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, p. 574.

¹¹² GW, 29 October 1788, no. 87, supplement, pp. [1–3]; 5 November, no. 89, pp. [2–3]; 8 November, no. 90, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 15 November, no. 92, p. [4] and supplement, p. [1]; 26 November, no. 95, supplement, p. [1]; 10 December, no. 99, supplement, p. [3]; 17 December, no. 101, p. [4]; 30 December, no. 102, p. [4]; 14 January 1789, no. 4, pp. [2–3]; PHP, October 1788, pp. 947–952; December 1788, pp. 1155–1158.

emperor resolved to continue military operations through the winter. Consequently, the Austrian War Commission promptly ordered the production of a considerable quantity of “hooded cloaks, as well as felt boots and woollen gloves for the cavalry”¹¹³. However, a few issues later, the priest-editor noted that since the Turks had withdrawn from the Banat and other German provinces, the Austrian army, too, would march to its winter quarters. Joseph II divided his forces into four divisions, stationed along the Danube. The first one, under the command of Field Marshal Count Johann Georg von Browne (1741–1794)¹¹⁴, was to be positioned in Zemun and its vicinity; the second one, led by General of Cavalry Count Joseph Kinsky von Wchinitz und Tettau (1731–1804)¹¹⁵, near Buda; the third one, under the command of the emperor himself, Lacy, and Laudon, was to proceed to Pressburg, while the last one would be stationed in Linz. Coburg settled in Roman for the winter¹¹⁶. At the end of November, Joseph II concluded an indefinite armistice with the Turks, covering only the borders of Serbia. Both belligerents pledged to give ten days’ notice of any intention to resume hostilities¹¹⁷.

Summarising the battles in the eastern theatre of war, Świtkowski stated:

With the campaign of the year now concluded, it is evident that neither the emperor nor the grand vizier sought to undertake anything of consequence [...]. The grand vizier, finding himself unassailed, gave orders that the imperial forces be harried here and there, most notably in the Banat; yet never did he engage them with the full strength of his army – instead, he dispatched separate detachments against them, and when they chanced upon success, he would set light cavalry upon the retreating imperial troops, whilst he himself remained stationed by the Danube¹¹⁸.

¹¹³ GW, 22 November 1788, no. 94, supplement, p. [3].

¹¹⁴ C. von Wurzbach, *Browne, Johann Georg Graf*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. II, pp. 164–165; J. Hirtenfeld, *Browne, Johann Georg Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 250–251.

¹¹⁵ C. von Wurzbach, *Kinsky von Wchinitz und Tettau, Joseph Graf*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XI (*Károlyi – Kiwisch und Nachträge*), Wien 1864 pp. 296–298; J. Hirtenfeld, *Kinsky von Chinitz und Tettau, Joseph Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, pp. 144–146.

¹¹⁶ GW, 6 December 1788, no. 98, p. [4]; PHP, December 1788, pp. 1157–1158.

¹¹⁷ GW, 24 December 1788, no. 103, pp. [3–4]; 31 December, no. 105, supplement, p. [3]; 7 January 1789, no. 2, supplement, p. [4]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria’s Security: Part I...*, p. 279.

¹¹⁸ PHP, December 1788, p. 1153.

Łuskina, in turn, proclaimed the success of the Austrians, reprinting the following notice from 'Wiener Zeitung':

During this year's campaign, we [the Austrians – M.K.] became masters of the fortress of Khotin and of the adjacent land of Raya; we expelled the enemy from the land of Moldavia; we ceded the city of Jassy to the Russian army; we retained possession of the fortresses newly taken – Dresnik, [Šabac], Dubica, and Novi; and at length, we held firm at Sabarecs and Salesch in [Serbia]. Meanwhile, although the Turks were waging war with forces gathered in great number, they possess not a single part of our land, nor have they gained aught for themselves, save only those unforeseen incidents and the depredations they wrought in our Banat¹¹⁹.

In fact, Austria's successes were not nearly as substantial as the priest-editor suggested, and they came at considerable financial and human cost. Joseph II expended 70 million gulden¹²⁰ on the campaign, while his army suffered losses amounting to a third of its strength – 75,000 men, excluding those who died in Hungary at the end of 1788 due to an outbreak of the plague¹²¹. All that was gained were a few insignificant fortresses along the rivers Sava and Una. The capture of Khotin was a more notable achievement, though the terms of its capitulation would long remain a subject of derision across Europe¹²². Deeply demoralised and ailing, the emperor returned to Vienna in early December. Before his departure, however, he announced that, given the failure of the defensive strategy thus far employed against the Turks, Austria would, in the following year, adopt the enemy's own methods and resort to offensive measures¹²³.

¹¹⁹ GW, 26 November 1788, no. 95, supplement, pp. [1–2]. The locations of Sabrecs and Salesch could not be identified.

¹²⁰ Part of that sum was raised through loans: 2 million was obtained in the Austrian Netherlands, 2 million in Holland, 1 million in Germany, and the same amount in Genoa. GW, 1 October 1788, no. 79, p. [3]; 8 October, no. 81, p. [4]; 3 October 1789, no. 79, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 37; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, pp. 564, 585.

¹²¹ PHP, February 1789, p. 165. Austria's wartime losses were in fact much higher – amounting to 115,000 soldiers (45% of the army). Cf. J. Skowronek, *Książe...*, pp. 26–27; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 37.

¹²² W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 36.

¹²³ GW, 6 December 1788, no. 98, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Jako monarcha i jako człowiek...* p. 72; *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, p. 49.

4. THE SIEGE OF OCHAKOV

The enemy offered the most obstinate resistance, and when the Russians, in the space of an hour and a half [...] had already taken possession of the whole fortress [Ochakov], the Turks, however, held out so incessantly in individual houses that well-nigh every dwelling had to be stormed one by one.

GW, 24 JANUARY 1789, NO. 7, P. [3]

One of the final acts of the campaign then drawing to a close was the capture of the fortress of Ochakov by the Russians on 17 December 1788, following an almost six-month siege. The Warsaw press covered it in detail, reprinting Russian and Turkish military reports from foreign newspapers. Łuskina discussed it in several consecutive issues published in late January and throughout February 1789¹²⁴. Świtkowski featured the event in a substantial article in the February issue of his newspaper. The former cited letters from Potemkin to Catherine II and to her ambassador in Vienna, Prince Dmitrii Mikhailovich Golitsyn (1721–1793)¹²⁵, as well as the report of the commander of Ochakov, Hüseyin Pasha, dated to the day of the general assault and composed after he had been taken captive¹²⁶. Świtkowski did not disclose the source of his information; however, it may be inferred that he, too, relied on Potemkin's reports, as evidenced by the striking similarity between the two accounts. Notably, Łuskina's newspaper emphasised the bravery and valour of Russian soldiers, which was in keeping with the political views of its publisher¹²⁷. 'Pamiętnik', on the other hand, described the capture of Ochakov as "the bloodiest and most dreadful" event of the entire Russo-Turkish War,

¹²⁴ First mention: GW, 24 January 1789, no. 7, p. [3].

¹²⁵ GW, 31 January 1789, no. 9, supplement, pp. [1–2] (letter from Potemkin to Golitsyn); 21 February, no. 15, pp. [3–4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]; 25 February, no. 16, p. [4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]; 28 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [1] (report prepared for the empress on 7 January 1789). The career of D.M. Golitsyn is outlined in: S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 371.

¹²⁶ GW, 14 March 1789, no. 21, p. [4] and supplement, p. [1].

¹²⁷ GW, 24 January 1789, no. 7, p. [3]: "The victorious capture of that dreadful place, which was commenced on 17 instant [December – M.K.] and, against the fierce resistance of the enemy, could only be achieved at great cost in blood, casts new glory upon the courage and valour of the Russian army – an army that, under the illustrious reign of Catherine the Great, has so often proven its bravery".

or even of the entire eighteenth century, perhaps even in recorded history, and praised the tenacity of its defenders¹²⁸.

Potemkin doubted that the fortress could be taken, as it had been rebuilt and significantly reinforced before the war through the efforts of French engineers, including Major André-Joseph Lafitte-Clavè (*sive* André-Joseph de Lafitte)¹²⁹. Catherine II, however, insisted that it be seized regardless of the cost. In executing those directives, the Prince of Taurida mounted an assault with 14,000 infantry and 200 Cossacks¹³⁰. The plan envisaged a simultaneous attack on Hassan Pasha's castle (redoubt), the earthworks, and the fortress itself, so as to prevent the enemy from concentrating its forces in a single location. The Russian troops were divided into six columns – four were massed on the right flank and two on the left. Overall command of the first four was entrusted to Prince N.V. Repnin, while the remaining columns were led by General of Artillery Johann Meller-Zakomelsky (1725–1790)¹³¹.

The first column on the right flank, commanded by Major General Count Petr Alexeevich Palen (German: Peter Ludwig von der Pahlen) (1745–1826)¹³², consisted of the Tambov Infantry Regiment, a battalion of skirmishers, 1,000 dismounted, and 200 mounted Cossacks under the command

¹²⁸ PHP, February 1789, p. 137: "The 17th day of December of the year just ended was the most grievous day of the whole of the said year, and even the bloodiest of the entire century. Within the narrow confines of that place, in but a few hours, nearly 20,000 men lost their lives, and all the scenes of human misery, anguish, lamentation, terror, despair, and a frenzy of rage, savagery, and ghastly agony – all that is most dreadful, all before which human nature recoils – rendered it forever memorable. The capture of Ochakov, which befell on that day, is among the bloodiest and most terrible ever beheld by the world".

¹²⁹ GW, 28 February 1789, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]. Cf. Ch. Duffy, *Wojna oblężnicza 1660–1789. Twierdze w epoce Vaubana i Fryderyka Wielkiego*, Oświęcim 2017, p. 351; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 490; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 266.

¹³⁰ Very similar estimates – 15,000 soldiers – are cited by A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 149.

¹³¹ Also Müller or Möller-Zakomelsky. Biographical information on that commander: Meller-Zakomelski, [in:] *Voennaia entsiklopediia*, V.F. Novitskov, ed., vol. XV [*Lintulaks – Minnyi otriad Baltiiskogo flota*], St Petersburg 1914, p. 254; Ch. Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700–1800*, London 1981, pp. 120–121 ff.

¹³² A.N. Petrov, *Palen, von der, graf Petr Alekseevich*, [in:] *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, vol. XIII (*Pavel, prepodobnyi – Petr [Ileika]*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1902, pp. 138–139; A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, p. 291; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 272.

of Colonel Count Matvei Ivanovich Platov (1753–1818)¹³³, as well as Armenian volunteers. Its objective was to attack the lower part of the city, the outskirts, and the redoubt of Hassan Pasha. Like the other columns, it was assigned men with axes tasked with breaching the city gate (the Stamboul Gate). The second column was divided into two sections “so that it might more readily turn upon the Turkish entrenchments from both sides of the gate”¹³⁴. The first of those, led by Brigadier Andrei Lavrentievich Lvov (1751–1823)¹³⁵, comprised the Ekaterynoslav Grenadier Regiment and a battalion of Taurida grenadiers. The second column included two battalions of skirmishers from the Ekaterynoslav Corps and 50 skirmishers from the Elizavetgrad Light Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Vasilii Sergeevich Baikov (d. 1790)¹³⁶. The third column, commanded by Major General Prince Sergei Abramovich Volkonsky (1748–1788)¹³⁷, was formed from the Livonian Rifle Corps, a battalion of the Kherson Regiment, and 300 labourers from the same unit. The fourth column, under the command of Brigadier Baron Meyendorff (most likely Kasimir Ivanovich), comprised the Busk Rifle Corps, a battalion of Astrakhan Grenadiers, and 300 labourers from the same regiment. The first two columns were placed under the orders of Lieutenant General Prince Viktor Amadeus von Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburg-Hoym (1744–1790)¹³⁸, while the third and fourth reported to Lieutenant General Prince Vasilii Vasilievich Dolgorukov (1750–1812)¹³⁹.

¹³³ M. Kochergin, *Platov, Graf Matvei Ivanovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. XIV, pp. 21–35; A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 303–304; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 311.

¹³⁴ PHP, February 1789, p. 140.

¹³⁵ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 235–236; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 75.

¹³⁶ Baikov, Vasilii Sergeevich, [in:] RBS, vol. II (*Aleksinskii–Bestuzhev-Riumin*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1900, p. 421; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 99.

¹³⁷ Sergei Abramovich Volkonsky, [in:] *Voennaia entsiklopediia...*, vol. VII [*Voinskie nachalniki uездnye – Gimnastika voennaia*], St Petersburg 1912, p. 23; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 288.

¹³⁸ D. Clarke, *Officers of the Anhalt Duchies Who Fought in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1789–1815*, The Napoleon Series, June 2017, https://www.academia.edu/34436725/Officers_of_the_Anhalt_Duchies_who_Fought_in_the_French_Revolutionary_and_Napoleonic_Wars_1789-1815 (accessed 3 October 2019); *Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburgskii, prince, Viktor-Amadei*, [in:] RBS, vol. II, p. 108; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 56.

¹³⁹ Vasilii Vasilievich Dolgorukov, kn., [in:] *Voennaia entsiklopediia...*, vol. IX, p. 167; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 464–465.

On the left flank, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Nikolaevich Samoilov (1744–1814)¹⁴⁰, with Brigadier Khrushchov under his command, led the fifth column into battle. This column was composed of one battalion of grenadiers, one battalion of musketeers, a battalion of musketeers from the Alexandropol Regiment, along with 250 labourers drawn from its ranks. The sixth column, under the command of Brigadier Ivan Petrovich Gorich (the Great) (c. 1740–1788)¹⁴¹, was formed from the Fanagoria Grenadier Regiment, two battalions of grenadiers (under Fischer and Sukov), 300 artillerymen, 100 skirmishers from various regiments, 40 jägers from the Kherson Light Cavalry Regiment, 180 Busk Cossacks, 220 volunteers, and 250 labourers from the Polotsk Regiment. The remaining infantry and cavalry formed two reserve corps, positioned on both flanks. During the assault, the light cavalry was tasked with observing the Turkish forces stationed along the Dniester. The reserve corps on the right flank was commanded by Lieutenant General Khristofor Ivanovich Geiking, (Christoph Heinrich Heyking) (1731–1796)¹⁴², with its infantry under the command of Major General Turchaninov and its cavalry led by Major General Stepan Stepanovich Apraksin (1757–1827)¹⁴³. On the left flank, supreme command over the reserve was entrusted to Prince Sergei Fedorovich Golitsyn (1749–1810)¹⁴⁴. The infantry commander, Brigadier Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Volkonsky (1753–1821)¹⁴⁵, and the cavalry commander, Major General Andrian Karnovich Denisov (1763–1841)¹⁴⁶, served under his orders.

The assaulting columns were ordered “to commence the attack with all possible swiftness and, without engaging in gunfire, to charge straight at the enemy with bayonets”¹⁴⁷. The commanders and senior officers were instructed to maintain order, prevent confusion, and prohibit looting.

¹⁴⁰ N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. II, p. 25; vol. V, St Petersburg 1909, p. 51; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 452.

¹⁴¹ Gorich, Ivan Petrovich (Bolshoi) [in:] *Voennaia entsiklopediia...*, vol. VIII [Gimry – Dvigateli sudovye], St Petersburg 1912, p. 402; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 387.

¹⁴² S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 333.

¹⁴³ D.S., Apraksin, Stepan Stepanovich, [in:] *RBS*, vol. II, pp. 240–241; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 67–68.

¹⁴⁴ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 132–133; N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. II, St Petersburg 1906, p. 58; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 374–375.

¹⁴⁵ S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 287.

¹⁴⁶ B.T., Denisov, Adrian Karnovich, [in:] *RBS*, vol. VI, pp. 236–238; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 444.

¹⁴⁷ PHP, February 1789, pp. 142–143.

The Turks who surrendered were to be disarmed and sent to the Russian camp. Women and children were to be spared and likewise sent to the rear¹⁴⁸.

On 17 December 1788, at seven in the morning, in temperatures of more than twenty degrees below zero¹⁴⁹, Russian soldiers advanced to storm the enemy fortifications. The Turks responded with intense artillery fire. Major General Palen, leading the first column, forced his way into Hassan Pasha's entrenchment and seized it after a brief bayonet fight. The castle was still defended by 200 men, yet they, too, soon laid down their arms. Palen left a Cossack guard there and directed the rest of his troops towards the fortress. From the upper entrenchments, the Turks mounted a vigorous counterattack in considerable numbers. The Russians managed to defeat them with the support of a cuirassier squadron sent by Potemkin and 400 jägers under Colonel V.S. Baikov. The majority of the enemy fell on the battlefield, while 1,500 men were taken prisoner.

The second column, led by Prince Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburg-Hoym, attacked the entrenchments from the direction of the Black Sea and, after a short struggle, drove the enemy out. The Russians pursued the fleeing troops, surrounded them on the bridge by the gate of the fortress, and cut them down with the support of grenadiers from the sixth column, who had meanwhile forced their way into the city through a breach in the wall and opened the gate.

The third column, commanded by Prince S.A. Volkonsky, attacked the central earthen fortifications, encountering strong enemy resistance. The Turks defended the entrenchment with musket fire and swords. However, they failed to halt the advance of the Russian soldiers, who unhesitatingly leapt into the moat and began scaling the ramparts. During the assault, Prince Volkonsky distinguished himself for his bravery but was killed in action. Colonel Jürgens, who assumed command, noticed that a large number of Turks were rushing towards the newly captured redoubt. He swiftly formed a battalion, positioned it opposite the earthworks, and forced the enemy into retreat with a fierce volley of musket fire. He also ordered a breach to be made in the palisade, thus opening a clear passageway for his troops. Once they had secured the entrenchments, the Russians bayoneted the Turkish soldiers who remained there, with only a handful managing to flee to the fortress.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 138–143; GW, 28 January 1789, no. 8, supplement, p. [2]; 31 January, no. 9, supplement, p. [2]; 21 February, no. 15, p. [4] and supplement, p. [1–2].

¹⁴⁹ GW, 28 January 1789, no. 8, supplement, p. [2] reported that the temperature reached minus 27°C. However, Łuskina questioned the accuracy of that claim. A participant in the events, R. de Damas, noted: "The temperature was below 20–24 degrees" (*Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, p. 58).



3. Plan of the siege of Ochakov by Russian troops on 17 December 1788, drawn up by Christian von Mechel, c. 1790

The fourth column, under the command of Prince Dolgorukov, swiftly crossed the moat and captured the redoubt it had been assigned to take. Its commander then dispatched two battalions of skirmishers to clear the entrenchments of the enemy on both sides. The Turks fleeing towards the fortress were caught by the Russians at the gate and slain to the last man.

On the left flank, the fifth column approached the fortifications at the appointed time. The Turks greeted them with grape and solid shot. Undeterred, the Russian soldiers crossed the moat and, despite the high palisades, managed to reach the ramparts. During the assault, the defenders detonated a mine, yet they were unable to halt the enemy's advance, as the Russians stormed into the redoubt, nearly crushing the Ottoman soldiers beneath them. They then pressed on to the ruined bastion on the shores of the Dnieper estuary, forced their way inside, and assisted in the capture of the city. The Turks, "held out so incessantly in individual houses that well-nigh every dwelling had to be stormed one by one", 'Gazeta Warszawska' reported¹⁵⁰.

The last column, under the supreme command of A.N. Samoilov and led into battle by Brigadier I.P. Gorich, mounted an assault on the fortress the moment the Turks opened fire on the fifth column. The troops rushed at the walls. No sooner had Colonel Stanisław Francewicz Godlewski (1755–1806)¹⁵¹ set up a ladder than Gorich climbed it, only to be killed on the spot. Artillery Major Karl Meller and Colonel George Meller scrambled up the walls, followed by the rest of the assaulting force. Within fifteen minutes, the Russians seized the lower bastion. Samoilov divided the column into two sections and ordered that the upper and lower gates of the castle be broken down. Soon, the fortress was taken. The victors showed no mercy to the vanquished. They slaughtered everyone without exception – men, women, and children. They also turned to plundering wealthy houses and mosques. By Potemkin's own account, Ochakov fell under the onslaught of Russian soldiers in scarcely more than an hour!¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ GW, 24 January 1789, no. 7, p. [3].

¹⁵¹ S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. 1, p. 365.

¹⁵² PHP, February 1789, pp. 143–154; GW, 24 January 1789, no. 7, p. [3]; 28 January, no. 8, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 31 January, no. 9, supplement, p. [2]; 21 February, no. 15, pp. [3–4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]; 25 February, no. 16, p. [4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]. Cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 173–176; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama...*, pp. 59, 64–69. In the relevant historiography, the account of the events differs in details from that reported by the Warsaw press. Some scholars indicate a different number of assault columns (five or seven), or a different starting time for the attack and capture of the fortress

The spoils taken in that city are manifold – Łuskina noted. – So vast a quantity of arms was seized that several thousand light horsemen might be equipped therewith. Soldiers were selling them away by the cartload; and besides arms, many pearls, vessels and plate of pure gold and silver, rich garments, and coins were taken. The abundance of money may be judged by how the price of a Dutch ducat in that market for a time declined unto two roubles, and the Turkish lion thaler was brought down to but thirty kopecks¹⁵³.

The Russians also captured 180 banners along with 310 heavy cannons and mortars.

The losses on both sides were considerable, though naturally far greater for the Turks. According to Russian reports cited by the Warsaw press, 8,370 Ottoman soldiers (including 283 officers) were killed in battle, while a further 1,140 died of wounds. More than 4,000 garrison soldiers were taken prisoner, excluding the civilian population. Among the captives were the fortress commander, Serasker Hüseyin Pasha, 3 galley commanders holding the rank of pasha of two tails, as well as 448 field and artillery officers. On the Russian side, 1 major general, 1 brigadier, 3 staff officers, 25 senior officers, and 926 soldiers were killed. An additional 120 senior officers and 1,704 soldiers were wounded, more than 1,000 of whom later died. The total number of Russian casualties – both killed and wounded – was 2,780 men. However, these figures should be treated with caution, as they were most likely underestimated¹⁵⁴.

(7:00 in the morning, after four hours of relentless struggle). Cf., for instance, E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks: From the Beginning of Their Empire to the Present Time. Chiefly Founded on Von Hammer*, vol. II, London 1856, pp. 291–292; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 44; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 482–484; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 509–511; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 484–486; N. Bolotina, *Potemkin*, chapter 14 (*Prezident voennoj kolegii*), Moscow 2014, https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1035392/30/Bolotina_-_Potemkin.html (accessed 5 January 2020); L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov...*, p. 143; R.K. Massie, *Katarzyna Wielka. Portret kobiety*, Kraków 2012, p. 476; M. Astapenko, V. Levchenko, *Budet pomnit vsia Rossiia*, Moscow 1986, pp. 22–23 (on the battles of the Cossack regiment under the command of M.I. Platov). For a detailed account of the siege and capture of Ochakov, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 183–203; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 174–224; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 125–128.

¹⁵³ GW, 28 February 1789, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]. Cf. PHP, February 1789, p. 154.

¹⁵⁴ PHP, February 1789, pp. 154–155; GW, 28 January 1789, no. 8, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 31 January, no. 9, supplement, p. [2]; 12 February, no. 13, p. [4]; 28 February, no. 17, supplement, pp. [1–2]. Losses estimated at identical figures: [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, p. 176; Ch. Duffy, *Wojna*

Potemkin triumphed, as did Catherine II. With the capture of Ochakov, Kinburn, Kherson, and the entire Crimea were secured against a Turkish assault, and Russian trade on the Black Sea was freed. The prince sent the empress the keys to the fortress, a detailed plan of the attack, and an account of the siege. Lieutenant Colonel Bauer, who delivered those items to her, was rewarded with a costly ring, a thousand ducats, and advancement to colonel. Sent back to Potemkin, he brought him a gift of the highest military decoration of the time – the Order of Saint George, First Class, presented “on a golden tray, upon which the capture of Ochakov was engraved”¹⁵⁵ – as well as a gold sword with a hilt richly adorned with diamonds. Rewards were also bestowed on the officers. Lieutenant General Samoilov and Prince Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburg-Hoym were decorated with the Order of Saint George, Second Class; generals-in-chief Repnin and Sergei Golitsyn, along with Lieutenant General Pavel Potemkin,

oblężnicza..., p. 352; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 150; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 538; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 484; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 177–178; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, p. 223. Very similar figures: M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 27; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 332–333; V.I. Godunov, A.N. Korolev, *Istoriia 3-go Ulanskogo Smolenskogo Imperatora Aleksandra III-go polka, 1708–1908 g.*, part 1, Libava 1908, pp. 51–52; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 202 (where Turkish losses were estimated at 8,370 killed, including 283 officers, 1,140 who died of wounds, and 4,000 taken prisoner, not including civilians. During the siege of Ochakov, Russian losses were reported as 30 officers and 936 non-commissioned officers and rank-and-file soldiers killed, while 119 officers and 1,704 soldiers were said to have been wounded). Most scholars, however, maintain that both Russian and Turkish losses were significantly higher, with 2,500 to 3,000 Russians and 10,000 to 20,000 Turks (both soldiers and civilians) killed. Cf., for example, A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 492; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 483, 485; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 510–511. Cf. also H. Troyat, *Katarzyna Wielka. Nienasycona żądza życia i władzy*, Warszawa 2006, p. 265, where the estimates are markedly overstated (60,000 Turkish soldiers and 20,000 Russians killed). Notably, even Świtkowski himself questioned the reliability of the figures he reprinted, stating that the victors’ losses might have even exceeded 5,000 soldiers (PHP, February 1789, p. 155).

¹⁵⁵ GW, 14 February 1789, no. 13, supplement, p. [1]. Notably, in the twenty years following the establishment of that military decoration (1769) by Catherine II, only four individuals were awarded the Order of Saint George, First Class: Petr A. Rumiantsev-Zadunaitsky, Aleksei Grigorievich Orlov (1737–1808), Petr Ivanovich Panin (1721–1789), and Vasilii Mikhailovich Dolgorukov-Krymskii (1722–1782) – all for their victories in the first Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774). Potemkin was the fifth recipient. Cf. V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 199–200; and A. Shishov, *Vek slavy russkogo oruzhiia. Pervye nagrazhdeniye v voynakh imperatritsy Ekateriny II Velikoi*, [in:] idem, *Orden Sviatogo Georgiia “Za sluzhbu i khrabrost”*. *Vse o samoi pochetnoi nagrade Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow 2013, p. 75 ff.

were presented with gold swords; Suvorov received a diamond-plumed cockade for his hat; Geiking was granted vast estates in Livonia, and Palen was given 500 serfs. Lower-ranking officers and common soldiers were awarded silver medals¹⁵⁶.

The victory was much acclaimed in Vienna. Joseph II attended a service during which a solemn *Te Deum* was sung. He wrote a letter of congratulations to Catherine and ordered that her portrait, adorned with laurels, be illuminated in his chambers. Potemkin, the architect of that triumph, was presented with a diamond valued at 100,000 thalers¹⁵⁷.

In Constantinople, news of the fall of the most important fortress in the Black Sea region caused a great stir. Popular unrest ensued, though it was swiftly suppressed¹⁵⁸. Serasker Feiz Suleiman Pasha, former minister of foreign affairs and “the most notorious instigator of the present war”, was removed from office and exiled to Sinope, while his property was confiscated¹⁵⁹.

The loss of Ochakov was not the last misfortune to befall the Porte that winter. The newspapers reported that on 20 December, General Mikhail Fedotovitch Kamensky (1738–1809)¹⁶⁰, commanding the vanguard of the Ukrainian Army, struck the Turks at Gangura and again the following day at Salkutsa, after which he stationed his forces before the fortress of Bender in preparation for a siege. In the battles, approximately 400 Turkish soldiers were killed, and more than 80 were taken prisoner¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁶ PHP, February 1789, p. 157; GW, 28 January 1789, no. 8, supplement, p. [3]; 14 February, no. 13, supplement, p. [1]; 18 February, no. 14, supplement, p. [2]; 21 February, no. 15, p. [3]; 28 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]; 30 May, no. 43, p. [4] (complete list of recipients awarded by the empress's rescript of 25 April 1789). Cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, p. 178 (stating that Bauer held the rank of colonel and was granted command of a regiment for bringing news of the capture of Ochakov to St Petersburg); S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 485; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 511–512; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 492–493; M. Bogdanovich, *Ruskaia armiiia...*, p. 27; E. Gorb, *Belgrad–Oczaków...*, pp. 223–224.

¹⁵⁷ GW, 4 February 1789, no. 10, pp. [3–4] and supplement, pp. [1–2]; 28 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [3].

¹⁵⁸ GW, 1 April 1789, no. 26, supplement, p. [3].

¹⁵⁹ GW, 1 April 1789, no. 26, supplement, p. [3]; 11 April, no. 29, pp. [3–4].

¹⁶⁰ P. Geisman, A. Dybovskoi, *Kamenskii, graf Mikhail Fedotovitch*, [in:] RBS, vol. VIII (*Ibak–Kliucharev*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1897, pp. 412–423; A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 176–178.

¹⁶¹ PHP, February 1789, pp. 158–159; GW, 14 February 1789, no. 13, supplement, p. [3]; 18 February, no. 14, p. [2]; 28 February, no. 17, pp. [2–3] (where a detailed account

The publisher of 'Pamiętnik' stated that after those defeats, the sultan abandoned his demand for the return of the Crimea, seeking instead to conclude peace while retaining his existing conquests. However, the imperial courts, encouraged by their recent success, did not deign to reply to his proposal. Hopes for peace were dashed. Both belligerents began preparations for a new campaign with renewed vigour¹⁶².

of both engagements is provided). Cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, p. 180; Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt (10.II.1766 – 4.XI.1836), [in:] *Russkie memuary. Izbrannye stranitsy. XVIII vek*, E.M. Kostrova, ed., Moscow 1988, p. 265.

¹⁶² PHP, February 1789, pp. 159–160.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1789

1. WAR OR PEACE?

The hearsay of imminent peace has now persisted for near a fortnight; yet it seems to rest upon no other foundation but the bare wish of the public.

GW, 14 JANUARY 1789, NO. 4, P. [4]

In the early months of 1789, both periodicals – ‘Pamiętnik’ and ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ – discussed the preparations of the warring sides for the new campaign, focusing primarily on the armament of the Sublime Porte. The Turks amassed provisions, weapons, and ammunition, fortified strategically significant strongholds (Belgrade, Bender, Berbir, and Banja Luka), and mobilised the full strength of a state with several million inhabitants for war. In the winter of 1788/1789, various contingents arrived in the vicinity of Constantinople from every corner of Asia, in numbers greater than expected. Karaosmanoğlu Pasha, owner of vast estates and riches in Asia Minor, and the governor of Erzurum in the then Armenia raised an army of 48,000 troops – far exceeding the 7,000 to 8,000 men demanded by the Divan. The hope of great spoils prompted the sultan’s subjects to enlist in droves, eager to serve under the banners of the Prophet. One newspaper reprinted the Ottoman army’s muster roll, stating that in the third year of the war it numbered 381,000 soldiers, including 169,000 infantry and 212,000 cavalry. It is, however, difficult to ascertain how many of them took to the field¹.

¹ GW, 12 February 1789, no. 12, supplement, p. [3]; 28 March, no. 25, supplement, p. [2]; 11 April, no. 29, p. [4]; 15 April, no. 30, supplement, p. [2]; 25 April, no. 33, p. [4];

The fleet, which had suffered considerable losses in the operations of 1788, was also rebuilt – it comprised approximately 130 vessels of varying types and sizes². In issue 30 from mid-April, Łuskina reported: “In the shipyards, work continues day and night; they are also purchasing foreign vessels to increase their naval power. Three English frigates and one corvette were likewise acquired, being old, however, they are deemed of little use”³. A few issues later, he noted: “From Tsargrad comes word that more than 3,000 men are now toiling daily on the construction of boats. The kapudan pasha himself encourages the labourers and punishes the idle ones”⁴. Light, small vessels were being built, similar to those used by the Russians in the Black Sea. Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan intended to put 24,000 soldiers on board his ships and land them in the Crimea⁵.

Maintaining such numerous land and naval forces naturally required substantial financial means. The sultan’s council thus ordered the subjects in Europe to surrender all silverware, utensils, and decorations to the mint, where they were to be melted down into coins. The Greeks were to contribute 5,000 okkas (1 okka = 1.282 kg), the Armenians 4,000, the Jews 3,000, and the Turks 20,000⁶. The yield was estimated at 36 million piasters, and due to the lower intrinsic value and reduced weight of the new currency, that operation was expected to bring nearly 18 million in profit to the state treasury. Gazi Hasan and Koca Yusuf Pasha were among the first to comply with that order. The kapudan pasha donated all his silver for the war effort, while the grand vizier kept only two ornate sets of silverware for himself⁷.

The principal aim of the Ottoman Empire in the upcoming campaign was to secure its European possessions against enemy armies

29 April, no. 34, supplement, p. [1]; 11 July, no. 56, supplement, p. [3] (where the details of the Turkish army are provided); PHP, February 1789, p. 160; May 1789, pp. 501–503.

² GW, 18 July 1789, no. 57, supplement, p. [3].

³ GW, 15 April 1789, no. 30, supplement, p. [2].

⁴ GW, 29 April 1789, no. 34, supplement, p. [2].

⁵ GW, 21 January 1789, no. 6, supplement, p. [2]; 12 February, no. 12, supplement, p. [3]; 11 April, no. 29, p. [4]; 29 April, no. 34, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, February 1789, p. 160; May 1789, pp. 501–503.

⁶ 1 okka = 3 pounds and 7 ounces of Tuscan weight. For each okka of silver, 300 piastres were paid at the mint. GW, 18 April 1789, no. 31, p. [3]; PHP, May 1789, p. 503.

⁷ GW, 18 April 1789, no. 31, p. [3]; PHP, May 1789, pp. 503–504: “When one considers the vast quantity of silver the Turks possess in their tableware, horse trappings, swords, pistols, [...], and that their opulent mosques must surrender all their silver to the mint, one may well imagine how great a sum they shall have in a newly struck coin for this war”.

and to recapture Ochakov. The supreme commander, Yusuf Pasha, ordered the concentration of forces near Galatz (Galați), from where he intended to mount a defence of Bessarabia and Wallachia. He also instructed the pasha of Bender to defend the fortress in his charge to the last man. The latter replied that he would continue to repel enemy attacks until the Russians “wrest the weapons from his very hands, within the fortress itself”. The sultan ordered the grand vizier to approach Bender and engage the enemy in battle, deemed the sole means of preserving that crucial stronghold⁸.

Russia and its ally, Austria, also began preparing for war. ‘Pamiętnik’ reported that the estates of the nobility offered Catherine II 40 battalions of infantry and the same number of cavalry regiments, which she declined to accept. Instead, the Empress ordered a special conscription throughout the entire empire (one conscript per 1,000 souls), which was expected to provide 100,000 new recruits. She issued a rescript ordering the subjects to hand over silverware and utensils to the mint, in exchange for banknotes. Finally, she effected changes in the high command. Field Marshal Petr A. Rumiantsev was recalled to St Petersburg, and was succeeded by Prince Nikolai W. Repnin. The two armies – those of Ekaterinoslav and Ukraine – were united under the supreme command of Prince Grigory Potemkin, who, as a reward for taking Ochakov, was granted the marshal’s baton. The Russian forces were tasked with seizing Bender and the whole of Bessarabia, and with holding recently captured Ochakov⁹.

Equally extensive preparations were underway in the Habsburg Monarchy. The expenditures for the 1789 campaign were estimated at 60 million gulden¹⁰. To raise the necessary funds, Joseph II instituted an obligatory loan, taking over private deposits for a period of seven years and setting the interest rate at 5% *per annum*. He also introduced a special tax for military purposes, amounting to 40 million gulden annually. The Austrian army, which had suffered heavy losses over the winter due to an outbreak of putrid fever¹¹, was replenished. The emperor ordered

⁸ PHP, February 1789, pp. 161–162 (quotation on p. 162).

⁹ GW, 22 April 1789, no. 32, pp. [3–4]; PHP, February 1789, pp. 162–163; May 1789, p. 515. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm Czteroletni*, vol. I, Warszawa 1991, p. 474; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin*, 3rd edn, Moscow 2016, p. 490; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov*, Moscow 2012, p. 183; L.G. Beskrovnnii, *Ruskaia armia i flot v XVIII veke (Ocherki)*, Moscow 1958, pp. 539–540; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vol. II (1789–1791 gg.), St Petersburg 1880, pp. 23–28.

¹⁰ GW, 11 March 1789, no. 20, supplement, p. [1].

¹¹ The plague took its heaviest toll in the Slovak Corps, where in February 1789, 1,090 infantrymen and 79 cavalrymen perished. By the end of the month, 5,619 sick

the recruitment of 160,000 new recruits¹² and increased the army's total strength to 300,000 soldiers¹³. The 78-year-old Field Marshal Andreas

soldiers were housed in Croatian military hospitals, while the entire Croatian army at the time numbered slightly over 35,000 men; thus, nearly one-fifth of the force was unfit for battle. PHP, May 1789, p. 506. François Fejtö (*Józef II. Habsburg rewolucjonista*, Warszawa 1993, p. 313) and Mathieu Z. Mayer (*The Price for Austria's Security: Part I – Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789*, “International History Review” 2004, vol. XXVI, no. 2, p. 283) report that over 30,000 Austrian soldiers died during the winter of 1788/1789. Similar estimates in P. Nujić, D. Matanović, *Josephine Reform of the Military Frontier and the Austro-Ottoman War (1788–1791) on the Example of the Petrovaradin Regiment*, “Osmanlı Mirası Araştırmaları Dergisi / Journal of Ottoman Legacy Studies” 2023, vol. X, no. 28, p. 635. The high incidence of illness persisted throughout the spring and summer months. Łuskina noted: “In Upper Hungary and Croatia, many still perish from putrid fever. At the main hospital in Agram [Zagreb – M.K.] and in six other hospitals under its charge, from 1 April 1788 to 21 April 1789, 5,412 people succumbed to putrid fever and 100 wounded were recorded”. GW, 13 June 1789, no. 47, p. [3]. Łuskina presented an interesting, albeit fundamentally false opinion on the causes of the epidemic spreading within the imperial army: “One of the principal causes of those diseases, which wrought such devastation among our armies in the past campaign [of 1788 – M.K.], is attributed to the adulteration of wine. Experiments were undertaken in this regard, leaving little doubt about the matter [...] Accordingly, the local Academy was given orders to publish in its medical journal a method by which the adulteration of wine may easily be ascertained”. GW, 25 July 1789, no. 59, supplement, p. [2]. For a broader discussion on the causes, symptoms, and course of putrid fever (epidemic typhus), see A. Karpiński, *W walce z niewidzialnym wrogiem. Epidemie chorób zakaźnych w Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku i ich następstwa demograficzne, społeczno-ekonomiczne i polityczne*, Warszawa 2000, p. 48; T. Srogosz, *Choroby i śmierć żołnierzy armii koronnej i litewskiej w XVII wieku*, “Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej” 2016, vol. LXIV, no. 2, p. 192.

¹² PHP, June 1789, pp. 639–640: “The raising and dispatching of recruits to the Turkish frontiers is of considerable magnitude. From Vienna alone, as many as eight thousand have already been raised this winter. Yet this Turkish war appears to deplete men. Many regiments have already lost, chiefly to disease, half of their men since the commencement of this recent war, and thus must replenish half of their ranks”. The same newspaper (May 1789, pp. 506–507) reported that the Austrian army was joined primarily by volunteers from Hungary, where high prices prevailed and many had “no other means of subsistence but to take up arms”. The number of recruits was so great that, although a fourth battalion was established, their numbers exceeded the authorised strength across all regiments. Cf. D. Beales, *Joseph II*, vol. II (*Against the World, 1780–1790*), Cambridge 2009, p. 583.

¹³ Of that number, 260,000 were infantry and 40,000 cavalry. GW, 4 January 1789, no. 4, p. [4]; 14 February, no. 13, pp. [2–3]; 16 May 1789, no. 39, supplement, p. [3] (where details of the Habsburg army are provided). Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 286.

Hadik von Futak (1710–1790)¹⁴, who also served as president of the War Council, was appointed commander-in-chief of the land forces to replace the ailing Joseph Franz Moritz von Lacy. Meanwhile, Joseph Nicolaus, Baron de Vins took command of the troops in Croatia. His predecessor, the elderly Ernst Gideon, Baron von Laudon, was given command of a 70,000-strong army (formerly the corps of Wartensleben, Hohenlohe, and Coburg), which, along with the Russian corps, was to operate in the regions of Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Wallachia. The Austrians were planning to begin the campaign by capturing Belgrade¹⁵.

Reports on military preparations were occasionally interspersed with news of peace negotiations conducted through the courts of Madrid, Berlin, and Versailles. The Sublime Porte stipulated that Russia recognise the independence of the Crimea as a preliminary condition for any discussions. Furthermore, it demanded the return of the lost territories and fortresses (Ochakov, Khotin, Novi, Šabac, Dubica), as well as the Banat as compensation for war expenses (40 million roubles, according to some reports). In a note dated 17 March, Joseph II replied that since the sultan was unwilling to make concessions, he would receive nothing, and the war

¹⁴ GW, 21 March 1789, no. 23, supplement, p. [3]: “Although he is in his seventy-eighth year, he is of sound health and robust constitution”. The same periodical published a note from Joseph II, in which the emperor entrusted Hadik with the command of the main army: “My dear Field Marshal Hadik! My friendship for Field Marshal Lacy does not allow me to expose him to the dangers of a second campaign in Hungary, given his frail condition. You, Sir, were born in that country, and your expertise in waging war against the Turks is complemented by your knowledge of the terrain. I therefore wish that you do not refuse my request (that I may see the command of the Banat-Syrmia army in your hands), the more so as various circumstances prevent me from remaining with my army throughout this year, and as you, Sir, are most deserving of my full confidence. I shall endeavour, as far as possible, to lighten this burden upon you in consideration of your advanced age, and I shall gladly consent to any measures you propose to me in this regard. Joseph” (GW, 25 March 1789, no. 24, supplement, p. [3]). Biographical note on that commander: C. von Wurzbach, *Hadik von Futak, Andreas Graf*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon des kaiserthums Oesterreich, enthaltend die lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen kronländern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben*, vol. VII (*Habsburg [Magdalena-Wilhelmine] – Hartlieb*), Wien 1861, pp. 166–170. See also P.P. Bernard, *The Emperor’s Friend: Joseph II and Field Marshal Lacy*, “East European Quarterly” 1976, vol. X, no. 4, pp. 401–408.

¹⁵ GW, 7 February 1789, no. 11, p. [3]; 14 February, no. 13, pp. [2–3]; 7 March, no. 19, p. [4] and supplement, p. [2]; 14 March, no. 21, supplement, p. [3]; 21 March, no. 23, supplement, p. [3]; 25 March, no. 24, p. [3]; 28 March, no. 25, supplement, p. [2]; 4 April, no. 27, supplement, p. [3]; 15 April, no. 30, p. [2]; PHP, February 1789, p. 164.

would continue until its final resolution. Venice, as in previous years, declared its neutrality in the ongoing conflict¹⁶. By the spring of 1789, it became evident that the peace negotiations would fail. In issue 36 of his periodical, Łuskina observed: “It is certain that no thought need be given to any accord between the belligerent powers, for the Porte rejected the accommodation proposed by both imperial courts and the plan for an agreement put forward by the Spanish court in Tsargrad”¹⁷. Elsewhere, he noted: “All hope for peace has perished, and this year’s campaign shall doubtless be one of the bloodiest”¹⁸.

On 7 April, Sultan Abdülhamid I died unexpectedly at the age of 65. In the capital of Turkey, rumours spread that he had been poisoned or strangled. The publisher of ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ denied such claims, stating: “The Turkish emperor died of apoplexy, to which he had previously been prone”¹⁹. The late ruler was succeeded by his nephew, 27-year-old Selim III (1761–1807)²⁰, who favoured the continuation of the war. Shortly after assuming power, on 15 April, he convened a meeting of the Divan, at which it was resolved that military operations would be pursued “with the utmost vigour” and that negotiations with Vienna, mediated by the French ambassador, Count de Choiseul-Gouffier, would be broken off. The new sultan maintained that the Crimea must remain independent and that all Austrian and Russian territorial gains should be restored to the Porte. The war was declared a “holy war” (*jihad*), and a general mobilisation of men aged 16 to 60 was proclaimed throughout the empire. The Turkish army was “attired” in black to strike a “more fearsome countenance”. Following the decision to continue the conflict, personnel

¹⁶ GW, 7 March 1789, no. 19, p. [4]; 11 March, no. 20, p. [3]; 14 March, no. 21, p. [3] and supplement, p. [4]; 14 March, no. 21, supplement, p. [4]; 18 March, no. 22, p. [4]; 8 April, no. 28, supplement, p. [2]; 11 April, no. 29, supplement, p. [3]; 2 May, no. 35, p. [3]; 20 May, no. 40, p. [4]; 27 May, no. 42, supplement, pp. [2–3]; PHP, May 1789, p. 505.

¹⁷ GW, 6 May 1789, no. 36, supplement, p. [2].

¹⁸ GW, 29 April 1789, no. 34 supplement, p. [1].

¹⁹ GW, 20 June 1789, no. 49, p. [3]. It is also discussed by W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, p. 474. Scholars are largely in agreement that the sudden illness and subsequent death of the sultan were caused by the news of the loss of Ochakov. Cf., for example, H. Topaktaş, *Osmarńsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne. Poselstwo Franciszka Piotra Potockiego do Stambułu (1788–1793)*, Kraków 2017, p. 66.

²⁰ Selim III, [in:] *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. X (*Reti-Solovets*), Chicago 1998, pp. 620–621; K. Şakul, *Selim III*, [in:] G. Ağoston, B. Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, New York 2009, pp. 514–515; especially P.J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971.

changes ensued. Gazi Hasan Pasha fell into disfavour and lost his position as commander of the fleet. He was appointed serasker of Izmail and ordered to retake Ochakov. The supreme command of the navy was entrusted to the sultan's brother-in-law, Hüseyin Küçük Pasha (1757–1803)²¹.

The Warsaw press also commented on the strengthening ties between the courts of Constantinople and Stockholm. The Porte was keen to prolong the Swedish-Russian conflict, which kept Catherine II's fleet engaged in the Baltic, preventing it from proceeding to the Mediterranean and attacking the Turkish forces from that front. It was therefore prepared to financially support its former ally. In June 1789, Łuskiński reported on the conclusion of a subsidy treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Sweden, under which the latter was to receive financial aid amounting to 12 million piasters, half of which was to be paid in 1789, with the remaining sum distributed over the following 3 years at a rate of 2 million annually²². Those reports, however, proved to be premature – the subsidy treaty between the two states was signed in Stockholm a month later, on 11 July. Under its terms, Sweden was to receive 1 million piasters per year for the entire duration of the war, as well as 10 million piasters on signing the peace treaty, provided that it did not enter into a separate agreement with Russia²³. Łuskiński addressed the matter again in issue 76 of his newspaper (published on 23 September), noting that the Swedish envoy demanded 3 million piasters *per annum*, a sum to which the sultan

²¹ GW, 10 January 1789, no. 3, p. [4]; 27 May, no. 42, p. [3]; 6 June, no. 46, p. [4]; 20 June, no. 49, pp. [3–4]; 24 June, no. 50, supplement, p. [3]; 1 July, no. 52, p. [3]; 22 July, no. 58, supplement, p. [3]; 19 August, no. 66, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, May 1789, pp. 517, 549; June 1789, pp. 632–633. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 285; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 185. Biographical note on the Turkish admiral: N. Göyünç, *Hüseyin Paşa, Küçük*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XIX, İstanbul 1999, pp. 6–8.

²² GW, 17 June 1789, no. 48, p. [4].

²³ Cf. Z. Anusik, *Dyplomacja szwedzka wobec kryzysu monarchii we Francji w latach 1787–1792*, Łódź 2000, pp. 256–257; idem, *France in Sweden's Foreign Policy in the Era of Gustav III's Reign (1771–1792)*, Łódź 2016, p. 226; H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, p. 250; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, Warszawa 1991, p. 137 (where the amount of subsidies is stated in thalers); S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Firat University], Elazığ 2012, pp. 110–112, <https://openaccesp.firat.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11508/14673/303671.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 20 November 2024). Transcript of the agreement: AGAD, AR, AORMP 180, ref. no. CXXXII/76, p. 161. Cf. also *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, G. Noradounghian, ed., vol. II (1789–1856), Paris 1900, no. 1, pp. [1]–3.

eventually agreed²⁴. A few issues later, the same periodical related that the Porte committed to paying Gustav III 10 million lion thalers over a period of 10 years and that part of the funds had already been disbursed to the monarch²⁵. Evidently, Łuski's account of the Swedish-Ottoman subsidy treaty was somewhat inconsistent and not entirely reliable.

2. THE FIRST SKIRMISHES AND CLASHES

*All hope for peace has now perished,
and this year's campaign shall doubtless be
one of the bloodiest.*

GW, 29 APRIL 1789, NO. 34, SUPPLEMENT, P. [1]

Spring floods, an epidemic among the imperial troops, and, above all, the illness of Joseph II²⁶ delayed the Austrian campaign. It was only at the turn of April and May that Field Marshal Hadik departed for Zemun to assume supreme command of the main forces²⁷. They were to shield the Banat from Turkish attacks and, if possible, to carry the war into Wallachia. The troops were stationed in three camps: near Mehadia, in the vicinity of Caransebeș, and between Vršac and Bela Crkva. Field Marshal Laudon also took to the battlefield at the head of an army 70,000 to 80,000 strong, intending to conquer Turkish Croatia and Bosnia²⁸.

Seizing on the enemy's delay, the Turks attempted to force their way into the Habsburg Monarchy at several locations. The first major

²⁴ GW, 23 September 1789, no. 76, p. [4].

²⁵ GW, 14 October 1789, no. 82, supplement, p. [4]; 17 October, no. 83, p. [3].

²⁶ On the emperor's health at that time (in spring and early summer), cf., for instance, GW, 20 June 1789, no. 49, p. [4]; 27 June, no. 51, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 1 July, no. 52, p. [3]; 4 July, no. 53, p. [3]; 8 July, no. 54, p. [2] and supplement, p. [3]; 11 July, no. 55, supplement, p. [3]; 18 July, no. 57, p. [2]; 22 July, no. 58, supplement, p. [3]; 25 July, no. 59, supplement, p. [1]; PHP, April 1789, p. 453; May 1789, pp. 507, 533 and 546. Cf. also F. Fejtő, *Józef II...*, pp. 314–315; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, pp. 587–589; *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski i Fryderyk Drugi król pruski monarchowie w iednym czasie panujący, prawdziwie wielcy. Pamiętnik dwóch geniuszów wieku XVIII sławnych*, Wrocław 1819, pp. 79–87. For a general discussion on Joseph II's health and past illnesses, as well as their impact on his overall policy, see A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Jako monarcha i jako człowiek. Uwarunkowania personalne decyzji politycznych Józefa II Habsburga*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 59–130, 59–90 in particular.

²⁷ GW, 13 May 1789, no. 38, p. [3]; 23 May, no. 41, supplement, p. [3] (indicating 27 April as the date of the field marshal's departure); PHP, May 1789, p. 507 (referring to May instead).

²⁸ GW, 3 June 1789, no. 44, supplement, p. [1]; 24 June, no. 50, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, May 1789, p. 506.

Turkish incursion was recorded along the route passing through the Lika region in Croatia. "It might have proved harmful to the imperial troops – Świtkowski related – but for the threefold discharge of cannon by the Turks that disclosed their intent to the Austrians, who thus swiftly assembled and stood ready to repulse them, to their detriment"²⁹. Another attempt to cross into the lands of Joseph II, made on 8 April in Transylvania, was considerably more forceful, although it, too, was unsuccessful for the Sublime Porte. 'Pamiętnik' noted:

on that day, 7,000 Turkish cavalry and infantry suddenly drew near to the place called Valli Muliri, upon the border of Transylvania, and having driven 200 imperial skirmishers thence, rushed onwards as far as Dicalu Hontili. There, said skirmishers, having found ground fit for defence, took their stand and received stout succour from several squadrons of hussars and five battalions of infantry. The imperial soldiers held their position in such a place that they could not be assailed but through a single narrow pass, which said skirmishers and well-positioned artillery rendered altogether impassable. Yet the Turkish cavalry, with unspeakable valour, forced their way through and, beyond the pass, began to engage the Austrians, who stood in good order of battle. Yet, finding themselves powerless against the dreadful artillery, which was ably seconded by numerous horse and foot, they were compelled to retreat through the same pass after three hours of fierce assault, leaving upon the field 235 men, whereas the imperial troops [...] had but a handful of wounded and dead³⁰.

In view of the limited success of Ottoman raiding parties in Transylvania and Croatia, Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha ordered the serasker of Anatolia, Hagy Solitary – who commanded a substantial cavalry corps in Wallachia – to advance towards the troops of Prince Friedrich Josias von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld, encamped near Roman in Moldavia. On 19 April, Austrian reconnaissance reported that a considerable detachment of Turkish cavalry was making its way along the beaten track towards Bacău. Colonel Andreas Count Karaczay de Vályeszáká (*sive* Karaiczay de Wallje Szaka) (1744–1808)³¹, commanding

²⁹ PHP, May 1789, p. 508.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 508–509. Those localities could not be identified.

³¹ J. Hirtenfeld, *Karaiczay de Wallje Szaka, Andreas Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden und seine Mitglieder: Nach authentischen quellen bearbeitet*, vol. I, Wien 1857, pp. 293–295; C. von Wurzbach, *Karaczay de Vályeszaka, Andreas*

the vanguard, ordered his troops stationed in Faraoni and the surrounding villages (three squadrons of cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and 200 Arnauts, numbering approximately 2,000 men) to take the field and furnished them with artillery. No sooner had he given orders for battle than 5,000 spahis appeared, having crossed a water-filled ditch and forcefully charged at the Austrians. Karaczay ordered his soldiers to fall back under the cover of the artillery, which fired volley after volley of canister and round shot. Ceasing the assault on the centre, the Turks struck at the enemy's left wing, only to be repelled once more. They reformed their lines and renewed the attack, now against the centre and the right flank. They managed to break through the cavalry ranks and reach the infantry, yet the intense artillery fire forced them to retreat. The spahis "leapt back across the ditch and meant to rest their horses and reform. But the Austrian cavalry allowed them no respite, and, charging upon them from both flanks with great force, compelled them to save themselves by flight"³². The Turks lost 40 men in the skirmish (or around 200, according to other sources) and 140 horses. The opposing side reported 14 killed and 32 others severely wounded³³.

Świtkowski noted as follows:

Once again, it was revealed what might be achieved in war through great discipline and tactics. The Turks numbered 5,000 cavalry, each man and horse of the highest order. The imperial troops, however, counted no more than some 1,100 horse and over 800 infantry. Yet blind and unbridled ardour, bent upon but a single aim, was of no avail against infantry arrayed in hollow squares and cavalry ever contending in tight ranks under the command of an experienced leader. The aged Karaiczay reaffirmed his renown for prudence, with which he so aptly selects both means and ground, that from the very start of this war he has either vanquished his foes or, at the very least, has never himself been vanquished³⁴.

The Turks also failed in their attempt to seize Stara Gradiska on the River Sava. However, they set several villages ablaze in Croatia and Transylvania.

Graf, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. X (*Jablonowski-Karolina*), Wien 1863, pp. 456–463.

³² PHP, May 1789, p. 512.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 509–513; GW, 3 June 1789, no. 44, pp. [3–4].

³⁴ PHP, May 1789, pp. 512–513.

The Russian forces, “almost always commencing their campaigns later than other nations”³⁵, began military operations in early spring, while Potemkin was still in St Petersburg receiving congratulations for the capture of Ochakov. The grand vizier intended to strike at the Russians as soon as they set out from their winter quarters in Jassy. That plan, however, was thwarted by the commander of the vanguard of the Ukrainian Army, Lieutenant General Otto Wilhelm Christoforovich Derfelden (1735–1819)³⁶, who, with no more than a few thousand men under his command, attacked a far superior enemy at Măximeni in the second half of April and dealt it a heavy defeat. Two pashas and several hundred soldiers were taken prisoner. In pursuit of the fleeing troops, the Russians advanced as far as Galatz, and, despite the valiant defence of the garrison, succeeded in taking it. In the last days of April, Derfelden withdrew to Bârlad and took up a vantage position, either to lend support to the Austrians should the need arise or to turn against the Turks, whose first contingents had begun crossing the Danube. Before doing so, however, he had “that fine city” plundered and burned to the ground³⁷.

Thus, having embarked on a new campaign, the army of the Empress of All the Russias took control of Muntenia and reached the Danube. The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ remarked that only a pitched battle fought by the grand vizier, encamped near Silistra, could prevent the Russians from seizing the remainder of Wallachia, Bender, and the entire Bessarabia. Yet the death of Abdülhamid I delayed Yusuf Pasha’s operations for some time, as he was forced to await new orders and merely observe as the enemy advanced on the opposite bank of the Danube³⁸.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 515.

³⁶ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815*, New York 2005, p. 75; P.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. I (A–K), Moscow 2010, p. 448.

³⁷ PHP, May 1789, pp. 515–516; June 1789, pp. 628–629; GW, 27 June 1789, no. 51, p. [3]. Cf. “The Gentleman’s Magazine” 1789, vol. LIX, no. 6, part 1, p. 557, where information on 400 Turkish soldiers killed and 100 taken prisoner at Măximeni is provided. See also A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus kniaz Suvorov*, vol. I, St Petersburg 1884, pp. 336–337; Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt (10.II.1766 – 4.XI.1836), [in:] *Russkie memuary. Izbrannye stranitsy. XVIII vek*, E.M. Kostrova, ed., Moscow 1988, p. 268; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (Ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700–1814 gg.), Moscow 1992, p. 150. For a detailed account of the operations of the Ukrainian Army at the beginning of the campaign season, see A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo Starodubskogo polka*, St Petersburg [1908], pp. 12–18; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 10–23.

³⁸ PHP, May 1789, pp. 516–517.

While the Russians were celebrating their initial triumphs, the imperial forces in the Banat and Croatia remained idle until summer, which the Warsaw press attributed to supply difficulties and inclement weather³⁹. Świtkowski noted that when Field Marshal Laudon arrived at the border at the beginning of May, “he found no magazines anywhere that would allow him to assemble a significant force and undertake anything of note against the enemy”⁴⁰. Although the Austrian commander punished those responsible for the neglect and set about organising supplies, the most favourable months for active campaigning were squandered to no effect, along with what may have been a singular opportunity to cover himself in glory.

Having overcome the difficulties caused by the shortage of provisions and ammunition, Laudon turned towards Slavonia with the intent of capturing Turkish Gradiska, also known as Berbir. On 20 June, the troops and artillery assigned to the siege arrived at (Austrian) Stara Gradiska on the left bank of the River Sava and began preparations for the crossing. During the night of 22/23 June, those forces crossed the river and pitched camp on Ottoman soil, with one wing positioned along the River Sava, the other by the Vrbas, while the remaining troops “stretched out before the fortress and encompassed it to form a triangle”⁴¹. Under cover of darkness, the Austrians positioned their batteries, and by morning, they began raising the first entrenchments. Laudon sought to act deliberately and with caution, as he commanded only 15,000 men against a Bosnian force twice that size, and reinforcements were also expected. Another testament to the Austrian general’s prudence was that “he did not besiege the fortress closely on all sides, but left an open passage on one flank, where there stood a great forest not far off, lest the garrison be driven to despair, which makes the Turks so dreadful and well-nigh unconquerable”⁴². This strategy soon proved effective. When General Johann Theodor Baron von Rouvroy, “the most adept in the art of artillery”⁴³, bombarded the fortress incessantly for several days with round shot, red-hot shot as well as sacks filled with gunpowder, and the expected relief failed to arrive, the Turks abandoned Gradiska on 9 July, fleeing in the direction of Banja Luka.

³⁹ GW, 6 May 1789, no. 36, supplement, p. [2]: “In Croatia, however, the theatre of war shall open somewhat later, for around this time of year, all roads are usually ruined by floods, rendering the transport of artillery and baggage impossible”.

⁴⁰ PHP, June 1789, p. 631.

⁴¹ PHP, July 1789, p. 713.

⁴² *Ibidem*, pp. 713–714.

⁴³ GW, 25 July 1789, no. 59, supplement, p. [2].

In the magazines, the Austrians found 35 bronze cannons, 4 iron ones and 4 mortars, as well as a considerable amount of ammunition. That victory was all the more valuable as it was won at little cost, with only 41 dead and 133 wounded⁴⁴.

3. FOCSANI

[...] the present campaign seeks not to spare human blood and shall be pursued with all possible vigour.

GW, 11 JULY 1789, NO. 55, P. [4]

The belligerent Selim III, deeply dissatisfied with the lack of victories, dismissed Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha in late May 1789 and appointed the serasker of Vidin, Cenaze Hasan Pasha (d. 1810)⁴⁵ in his place. With the armistice in force in the Banat and Syrmia, the new commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army turned against Transylvania and Moldavia. His troops, numbering approximately 40,000 men, crossed the Danube and joined the corps of the Wallachian hospodar, Nicholas Mavrogheni (1735–1790)⁴⁶. The combined force was divided into two groups, one of which was to march into Transylvania, while the other was to engage Coburg

⁴⁴ PHP, June 1789, pp. 630–631; July 1789, pp. 711–714, 744–745; GW, 4 July 1789, no. 53, p. [3]; 8 July, no. 54, supplement, pp. [1, 3]; 25 July, no. 59, supplement, p. [2]; 8 August, no. 63, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 15 August, no. 65, p. [4]: “His Imperial Majesty, upon the capture of the Turkish fortress of Berbir, was so overjoyed that he raised a toast thrice at the table: *Long live my Laudon and his valiant warriors!* Archduke Francis and Princess Elisabeth also followed suit. In light of that victory, the monarch ordered that ten buckets of wine be given to his court servants stationed in Luxembourg, numbering 200 in total, so that they too might drink to Laudon’s health”. For a detailed account of the siege and capture of the fortress, see F. Taubmann, *Vita e fatti eroici Barone Gedeone di Laudon, tradotta la prima volta dal tedesco*, part 1, Fridenze 1790, pp. 18–36; G.B. Malleson, *Loudon: A Sketch of the Military Life of Gideon Ernest, Freiherr Von Loudon, Sometimes Generalissimo of the Austrian Forces*, London 1884, pp. 223–226. See also W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 475, where an erroneous claim is made that the Austrians supposedly stormed Stara (sic) Gradiska.

⁴⁵ Also known as Meyyit Hasan Pasha or Kethüda Hasan Pasha (Turk. Kethüda Çerkes Meyyit Hasan Paşa). Cf. F. Emecen, *Hasan Paşa, Kethüdâ*, [in:] H. Nuhoğlu, *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, vol. I, İstanbul 1999, p. 544.

⁴⁶ D. Ghermani, *Mavrogheni, Nicolae (Nikolaus)*, [in:] *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, vol. III (L–P), M. Bernath, ed., München 1979, pp. 124–125; A. Vianu, *Mișcarea național-eliberatoare și Nicolae Mavrogheni (1787–1790)*, “Studii” 1956, vol. IX, no. 5, pp. 45–62.

and the Russians in Moldavia⁴⁷. The opposing armies clashed on 1 August 1789 near Focsani (Focșani). Both periodicals under consideration – ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ and ‘Pamiętnik’ – published detailed accounts of the battle based on Austrian court reports.

On receiving intelligence that Mavrogheni was advancing towards the Moldavian border with his forces and that over 20,000 Turks were stationed near Focsani, Coburg requested reinforcements from Suvorov encamped in the vicinity of Bârlad. In response to that request, the Russian commander, leading 6,000 troops, undertook a swift march, covering the shortest yet arduous mountainous route of 10 miles in merely 24 hours. It was one of Suvorov’s most brilliant crossings. On the evening of 28 July, the Russians joined the Austrian corps (15,000 soldiers), which was stationed in the area of Adjud on the River Seret. The following day was spent resting and preparing three pontoon bridges across the River Trotus (Trotuș): the first was shielded by Colonel Andreas Karaczay with his cavalry, while the remaining two were overseen by Colonel Samuel von Kepiro (1733–1799)⁴⁸, who commanded two hussar regiments and one infantry battalion. Both commanders – Coburg and Suvorov – agreed on the following arrangement of their forces. The Austrian infantry was to take position on the right flank, with five battalions in the first line and four in the second. Each of the battalions, formed in squares, was to be supported by five cannons. Reserve artillery would be deployed between the battalions, while cavalry was to form a third line behind the infantry. The Russian infantry was to occupy positions on the left flank, arranged in three squares in the first line and two in the second; the cavalry would take position in the third line. A small detachment under Colonel Karaczay was tasked with securing communication between the Russians and Austrians. The Arnauts were to be stationed behind the cavalry.

On 30 July, at three in the morning, the allied forces formed three columns, crossed the River Trotus, and began their march towards Focsani. The Russian column advanced covertly and was shielded by Austrian light troops under Colonel Karaczay in an effort to conceal Suvorov’s presence from the Turks for as long as possible. After a brief halt in Călimănești, they proceeded to Măreșești, where, after regrouping, they resumed their march at six in the afternoon in two columns – the right composed

⁴⁷ PHP, July 1789, pp. 717, 746; August 1789, p. 829; GW, 8 August 1789, no. 63, supplement, p. [2]; 19 August, no. 66, supplement, p. [2]; 29 August, no. 69, p. [4].

⁴⁸ C. von Wurzbach, *Kepiro, Samuel von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XI (*Károlyi – Kiwisch und Nachträge*), Wien 1864, p. 169.

of the Austrian forces, the left of the Russian troops⁴⁹. Reconnaissance reported the approach of a Turkish patrol 3,000 strong, followed by Osman Pasha with a force of 7,000 men. Suvorov dispatched 1,500 Cossacks and Arnauts, along with a detachment under Karaczay's command. Upon spotting their opponents, the Turks charged and scattered them. However, Major Michael Baron von Kienmayer (1755–1828)⁵⁰, commanding an Austrian regiment, in defiance of the enemy's numerical superiority, struck with great force, threw them into disarray, and forced their retreat. Around 100 spahis were killed, while 66 were taken prisoner. Kienmayer then pursued them to the River Putna, drove Osman Pasha from his camp, and set it ablaze.

Meanwhile, the Austro-Russian army continued its march. On reaching the Putna, it began constructing a pontoon bridge, covered by Colonel Karaczay's cavalry. As soon as the first three pontoons were put afloat, the Turks appeared on the opposite bank, attempting to thwart the crossing. However, artillery positioned in two locations drove them off, allowing the bridge to be completed without hindrance. A sudden rise in the water level following heavy rainfall made it impossible to lay a second bridge, so the entire army was forced to ford the river in a single column at four in the morning on 31 July. The Turks reappeared at the Putna, mounted an attack on the Russian vanguard, and scattered it. They then charged at Suvorov's corps but were repulsed. Despite having marched for eighteen hours, the allied troops covered another mile through terrain overgrown with bushes and thickets; when the dense vegetation made it impossible for the horses to haul the artillery, the men took their place at the traces. Having reached Focsani, where the main Turkish camp was located, they fell upon the enemy. The right flank of the opposing forces stood in a fortification "mounted with cannons", while the left, composed of cavalry, stretched across the plain. The Ottoman army, numbering over 30,000 soldiers, was commanded by the serasker of three tails, Derviş Pasha⁵¹.

⁴⁹ The first biographer of Suvorov from a century ago, Aleksandr Petrushevskii (*Generalissimus...*, p. 342), states that the allied forces spent the night in Călimănești and set out on their march the following morning, on 31 July.

⁵⁰ C. von Wurzbach, *Kienmayer, Michael Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XI, pp. 244–251; J. Hirtenfeld, *Kienmayer, Michael Freiherr von*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. II, Wien 1857, pp. 882–889.

⁵¹ The publishers of the Warsaw newspapers refer to that commander by different names – Derviş Mehmed Pasha or Osman Derviş Pasha. GW, 9 September 1789, no. 72, p. [2]; PHP, August 1789, p. 845. In available studies, he is referred to as Osman Pasha.

It was the imperial troops massed on the right flank that opened the attack. The Austrian cavalry, under the command of Colonel Massaros and supported by musket fire from Schröder's battalion, advanced towards the enemy's left flank and struck at the spahis with such force that they scattered at once, fleeing beyond Focsani. Three other hussar squadrons, with sabres drawn, charged the janissaries positioned on that flank, who fell back to the nearby fortified monastery of St Samuel. At the same time, the Russians and Karaczay's detachment assaulted the entrenched Turkish right flank, forcing the enemy to withdraw. Colonel Count Karl von Auersperg (1721–1789), commanding Schröder's battalion, attempted to seize the monastery where the janissaries had taken refuge but was shot dead while trying to break down the gate. On witnessing his fall, the soldiers ceased the assault. Shortly thereafter, Prince Coburg arrived at the monastery, leading a battalion of volunteers and artillery. He ordered that the attack be resumed. The Austrians forced their way through the monastery gates and stormed inside, cutting down the defenders. The remainder of the Ottoman troops dispersed, leaving behind their entire camp, artillery, and ample provisions. The victors captured 16 standards, 10 cannons, and 100 carts loaded with food and ammunition. The Turks lost approximately 1,500 men, with 96 taken prisoner. Russian casualties were not reported by the press, while Austrian losses were described as minor – 25 killed and 70 wounded. However, it should be noted that the official figures were in all likelihood understated.

After the battle, General Suvorov withdrew to his former position at Bârlad, while Coburg advanced into Wallachia, securing Transylvania against an enemy incursion. The scattered Turkish soldiers were again rallied by Mavrogheni and Derviş Pasha. Both commanders assembled in the field once again, six miles from Focsani, though without tents, wagons, or stores⁵².

⁵² PHP, August 1789, pp. 833–845; GW, 2 September 1789, no. 70, supplement, p. [3]; 5 September, no. 71, supplement, p. [2]; 9 September, no. 72, pp. [3–4] (with Coburg's report on the engagement); 12 September, no. 73, p. [4]; 26 September, no. 77, p. [3]. For a detailed account of the battle, see A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 340–345; F. Taubmann, *Vita e fatti eroici...*, pp. 47–50; F.C. Schlosser, *History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth Till the Overthrow of the French Empire with Particular Reference to Mental Cultivation and Progress*, vol. VI, London 1844, pp. 166–167; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworov Rymnikski, Field-marshal-general in the Service of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias: with a Preliminary Sketch of His Private Life and Character*, vol. II, London 1799, pp. [55–71]; A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, pp. 19–24; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 292; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*,

4. THE BATTLE OF RYMNIK

*If the past month was ill-starred for
to the Turks, this one proved yet more
calamitous [...]*

PHP, SEPTEMBER 1789, p. 944

In the wake of their defeat at Focsani, the Turks saw their grand vizier lead a 100,000-strong army across the Danube at Braila (Brăila) to encamp near Galatz. He intended to join forces with the Wallachian hospodar,

pp. 188–190; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, pp. 151–152; A.G. Elchaninov, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov*, [in:] *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. 1 (*Ot zarozhdeniia Rusi do voiny 1812 g.*), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 370–372; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiia...*, pp. 541–543. Cf. also A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka. Prawda i mit*, Warszawa 2012, p. 495; A.F. Pogosskii, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov, generalissimus russkikh voisk. Ego zhizn i pobedy*, St Petersburg 1914, p. 28. Historical studies offer different estimates regarding both the size of the forces that clashed at Focsani and the losses they suffered. The allied forces are estimated at a total of 25,000 soldiers, including 7,000–8,000 Russians. Turkish losses amounted to over 1,500 killed and approximately 100 taken prisoner. The Austrians suffered around 200 casualties, while Russian losses amounted to approximately 350 killed and wounded. Cf., for example, A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 345; A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, p. 20; I. de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, London 1981, p. 409; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, p. [71]; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. 1, p. 475; M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armiia v veke imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 27; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin, książę ksiąząt*, Warszawa 2000, p. 497; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarski romans*, Warszawa 2013, p. 525; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 292; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 189–190; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 151. Cf. also A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, p. 23, where the allied losses were estimated at 350 men, including 100 Russians killed and wounded. According to Andrzej Andrusiewicz (*Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 495), the Austrian commander had 12,000 infantry and cavalry under his command, while Suvorov commanded 5,000. Turkish losses amounted to 1,600 men, while the allies lost 400. Yet, Andrei N. Petrov (*Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 32–42) estimated the Turkish forces at 30,000 soldiers, the Austrian forces at 20,000, and the Russian contingent at 4,000 men. In the Battle of Focsani, the Russians were said to have lost 150 men, while the Austrians counted 200 killed and wounded. Turkish losses reportedly reached 1,500 killed and 100 taken prisoner. Notably, in recognition of the victory at Focsani, Joseph II presented Suvorov with a gold snuffbox set with diamonds, while the empress awarded him with a diamond cross and the star of the Order of St Andrew the Apostille the First-Called. Coburg received the highest military decoration of the time from the emperor – the Military Order of Maria Theresa, First Class – while Catherine II sent him an ornate snuffbox adorned with her likeness. The soldiers received monetary rewards. Cf. GW, 12 September 1789, no. 73, p. [2]; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 347; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 191; *Jożef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, pp. 58–60.

Mavrogheni, to deliver a final blow to Coburg's corps. To the Turks' misfortune, the Austrians intercepted a letter from Hasan Pasha, in which he disclosed his plans to Mavrogheni. On being informed of the danger, Suvorov promptly gathered his division, which had been stationed between the rivers Prut and Seret in Moldavia, and gave the order to march. On 21 September, an 8,000-strong Russian detachment joined the Austrian corps, numbering between 18,000 and 27,000 men, positioned along the road to Focsani, a mile from the Turkish camp. The following day, the allied troops crossed the River Rymna and mounted an attack against a vastly larger enemy force of 100,000 men⁵³. The battle lasted all day and covered the allied forces – especially Suvorov – in glory. Świtkowski published an extensive report on the engagement in 'Pamiętnik'. Łuski, by contrast, offered only a brief account and did not revisit the subject, as he usually did to underscore the significance of the events he described – all the more surprising, as this was a rare opportunity to extol the army of the Empress of All the Russias, whom he so ardently admired.

Allied reconnaissance reported that the Turks had set up camps between the rivers Rymna and Rymnik and did not anticipate an attack from the enemy. Having assumed command of the entire Austro-Russian force, Suvorov decided to undertake an offensive on 20 September. While the Russian corps, supported by two squadrons of imperial hussars, marched at night towards the village of Tyrgokukuli (Tyrgo-Kukuli) intending to strike at the Wallachian hospodar's camp, the Austrian troops, drawn up in three lines, moved towards the Rymnik, where the main Ottoman army was entrenched in a strong defensive position. The allied troops advanced in absolute silence and good order to take the enemy by surprise. On reaching the Rymna, Suvorov's troops rested and took refreshment before the bridge was completed. They then crossed the river, formed their battle array (the Russian infantry in six squares, with the Austrian hussars behind them), and proceeded towards the camp at Tyrgokukuli. An hour before dawn, the Turks spotted the approaching

⁵³ PHP, November 1789, p. 1126; January 1790, p. 90; GW, 28 October 1789, no. 86, p. [3]. Most studies indicate that Coburg had approximately 15,000 soldiers, Suvorov around 6,000, and the Turkish forces numbered 80,000 men. Cf., for example, O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 506–507; Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt..., p. 272. Slightly different figures (allied forces – 25,000 soldiers and 73 cannons, Turkish forces – 100,000 men and 85 guns) are stated by: A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 151 and D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, CT–London 2006, p. 86. Cf. also V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 194, where the number of Russian troops is estimated at 7,000–8,000 soldiers.

enemy and mounted a fierce assault. The Russians withstood the violent attack and then charged forward with sabres drawn. With two squadrons of hussars and six of carabinieri and Cossacks at his command, Major Matyushovskii struck at the enemy from the rear and one flank, forcing their retreat. The grand vizier dispatched 18,000 cavalry to aid Mavrogheni, who fell upon the Russian left flank. Coburg supported Suvorov from the right. The Turks were driven back and compelled to withdraw.

Meanwhile, the rest of the imperial corps forced their way through the dense thickets and faced the main Turkish camp, positioned in front of the fortified Kryngu-Maylor forest. The battle formation devised by the grand vizier called for the following arrangement of troops: the infantry (40,000 janissaries) took positions in front of the forest, while the cavalry was posted on both flanks. As soon as the Turks saw the enemy, they unleashed a barrage of cannon fire and charged their front. They also attempted to outflank the Russians on the left. While the janissaries attacked the left flank of the allied line, the grand vizier sent several thousand cavalry with six cannons to strike the right, where General Karaczay's brigade was stationed. The relentless spahis renewed their assault seven times, but they were repelled each time and finally retired to their entrenchments.

No sooner had the Austrian and Russian corps reunited than they received the order to form a semicircle and charge at the enemy. The soldiers responded with a joyful cry. Both commanders – Suvorov and Coburg – remained at the head of their armies throughout the attack and the entire battle. The Turks opened fire on their opponents with cannons and small arms. In an effort to minimise losses in their ranks, the commanders of the allied forces sent the cavalry against the Turkish infantry, which fell into disarray. The cavalry was followed by the infantry, which stormed the entrenchments, seized the artillery, and forced the Turks to flee. The tide of victory turned in favour of the allies, yet the beaten and dispersed opponent still had to be pursued at length to prevent it from regrouping and attempting to make a stand at Mărtinești, where the third-largest Turkish camp was located. However, on seeing the enemy giving chase, the Turks abandoned that camp as well and, as they were crossing the river, left behind all their artillery, tents, and supplies. In the waters of the Rymnik, the victors found “4,000 fully loaded wagons, some 50 cannons and mortars, carts of ammunition, barrels of gunpowder, rice,

camels, horses, buffaloes, and sheep, so entangled and heaped together that the river was all but dammed"⁵⁴.

The grand vizier remained in the Kryngu-Maylor forest throughout the battle, commanding the engagement from that position. On witnessing his soldiers in full retreat, he hastened to the camp and ordered canister shot to be fired at them to stop the rout. When it failed, he fled to Braila, crossing the river via a bridge, which he later ordered to be razed with gunpowder.

The battle began at sunrise and lasted nearly until sunset, with eleven hours of incessant cannon fire, which caused considerable damage, most of it suffered by the Turks. Some 4,000 Turks lay dead on the battlefield, while many drowned attempting to cross the River Rymnik. Only 39 were taken prisoner, as the defeated preferred death to begging for pardon. Austrian losses amounted to fewer than 600 dead and wounded, while Russian casualties were not recorded by the press. Victory over the main Turkish army, however, was achieved with minimal loss of life among the allies⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ PHP, October 1789, p. 1053.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 1043–1054; GW, 28 October 1789, no. 86, pp. [2–3]. For more on the subject, see *Erläuterter Plan von der berühmten Schlacht bei Martinjestie in der Wallachey: in welcher unter den Befehlen sr. Durchlaucht des Herzogs Friedrich Josias von Sachsenkoburg, k.k. Generals der Kavallerie (nunmehrigen Feldmarschalls,) und des militärischen Theresienordens Großkreuz, der Großvezier mit 100 000 seiner besten Truppen am 22. Sept. 1789 entscheidend geschlagen wurde*, Prag 1789, pp. 5–24; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 348–361; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraiia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 54–74; F. Taubmann, *Vita e fatti eroici...*, pp. 50–59; A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, pp. 24–32; F.C. Schlosser, *History of the Eighteenth Century...*, pp. 167–168; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, pp. [79–107]; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiiia...*, pp. 544–549; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, pp. 295–296; A.F. Pogosskii, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov...*, pp. 29–30; D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia...*, pp. 86–87; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 191–197; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, pp. 151–152; A.G. Elchaninov, *Aleksandr Vasilievich...*, pp. 373–376; E. Kholova, A.V. *Suvorov: Liubimyi polkovodets naroda*, Moscow 2017, pp. 117–[134]. Historical studies provide various estimates of the losses suffered by the warring armies. According to F. Anthing (*History of the Campaigns...*, pp. [106–107]), the Turks lost a total of 10,000 men, including 5,000 killed in battle, 2,000 killed in the forest or dead from wounds, and 3,000 drowned in the Rymnik. The opponent's losses were minor: the Austrians had 115 killed and 300 wounded, while the Russians recorded only 57 killed and 110 wounded. Very similar figures are cited by A.G. Martynov (*Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo...*, p. 32) and V. Lopatin (*Suvorov...*, p. 198). Numerous historians, including S.S. Montefiore (*Potiomkin...*, p. 499; *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin...*, pp. 526–527), A. Petrushevskii (*Generalissimus...*, p. 362), A.A. Kersnovsky (*Istoriia...*, p. 151) and I. de Madariaga (*Russia...*, p. 409), estimate the total losses of the Porte at 15,000 and those of the allies at approximately 600 soldiers. Other

The emperor openly rejoiced at the victory. He elevated Coburg to the rank of field marshal, awarded him a military decoration, and granted him a palace in Vienna. Catherine II, who had presented the general with an ornate snuffbox after the battle of Focsani, wrote to him following that new triumph, stating that “for the first time since she had become empress, she found herself unable to find a reward worthy of the prince’s great merits, and therefore declared that she would at least strive to express her utmost gratitude”.

Indeed, Prince de Coburg achieved more than had even been expected of him – Świtkowski remarked. – He had under his command only third battalions, composed for the most part of men of advanced years, and light cavalry regiments alone – that is, hussars and Bosniacs. And yet, these battalions, heartened by their affection for their commander, bore the hardships of war, while the hussars and uhlans broke the enemy ranks, charging upon the infantry like cuirassiers⁵⁶.

Łuskina reported that, in the Ottoman capital, the defeat at Rymnik was initially regarded as nothing more than an “ill-fated endeavour”. The Grand Vizier Cenaze Hasan Pasha made no mention of the reverse. He later informed the Porte that he had lost 20,000 soldiers, all his artillery, and baggage in battle. The sultan’s council was eager to understand how

studies (W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 475; M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armiia...*, p. 28; D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia...*, p. 87) report 20,000 killed on the Turkish side and just under 2,000 killed and wounded on the opposing side.

Notably, in recognition of his merits in the battle under discussion, the empress granted Suvorov the title of count, bearing the appellation “Rymnikski”, awarded him the Order of St George, First Class, adorned with diamonds, presented him with an expensive sword inscribed “To the vanquisher of the grand vizier” (the combined value of both gifts amounted to no less than 60,000 roubles), and advanced him to lieutenant colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. Joseph II, in turn, made him Count of the Holy Roman Empire. The officers and soldiers of both corps were also duly rewarded: the former received promotions and decorations, while the latter were granted monetary rewards. Those who had particularly distinguished themselves in battle were awarded a medal inscribed “Rymnik”. Cf., for instance, F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns...*, pp. [110–111]; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 364–365; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, p. 74; F.C. Schlosser, *History of the Eighteenth Century...*, p. 169; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 497; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 501; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin...*, p. 529; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 507–508; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 199–201; M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armiia...*, p. 28.

⁵⁶ PHP, November 1789, pp. 1125–1126 (both quotations on p. 1126).

an enemy so vastly outnumbered had managed to overcome a Turkish army of 100,000 men. Selim III dispatched trusted envoys to the battlefield with orders to survey the entire area, describe the commander's position and the disposition of the allied forces. The defeat was later attributed to the incompetence of the grand vizier, who was dismissed from office and exiled to Bozca. He was succeeded by the former kapudan pasha, seventy-eight-year-old Gazi Hasan, a proponent of peace. On receiving the grievous news, the Ottoman sultan, alarmed by the magnitude of the losses and the humiliation suffered, spent the entire night writing his *hatt-i şerif*. In that decree, he accused the pashas of "turpitude in contending with the infidels"⁵⁷, which endangered both the nation and the faith of Muhammad. He urged a mobilisation of forces and increased military preparations to recover from the recent failures. He also announced that he would personally take command of the army in the spring and either exact vengeance or perish on the battlefield⁵⁸.

5. THE FALL OF BELGRADE

How great was the emperor's joy at this conquest is beyond words; with Belgrade in his hands, he once more beheld himself the master of all of Serbia [Serbia], which in the year 1739 was severed from the House of Austria.

PHP, OCTOBER 1789, PP. 1042–1043

The main imperial army, operating in the Banat and numbering nearly 100,000 troops, could boast no comparable successes. Acting with caution, Generalissimo Hadik confined his efforts to securing key routes against enemy incursions⁵⁹. The inactivity of the empire's eldest field marshal was largely due to the aforementioned supply difficulties. His illness was also a contributing factor – early in the summer, he contracted a fever that significantly diminished his strength⁶⁰. Dissatisfied with the progress of the campaign, Joseph II dismissed Hadik from command

⁵⁷ PHP, January 1790, p. 91.

⁵⁸ GW, 26 December 1789, no. 103, supplement, p. [3]; 13 January 1790, no. 4, p. [3]; 27 January, no. 8, p. [2]; PHP, December 1789, p. 1244; January 1790, pp. 90–91.

⁵⁹ Cf., for example, GW, 30 May 1789, no. 43, supplement, p. [3]; 27 June, no. 51, supplement, p. [2].

⁶⁰ On Hadik's illness, see, for instance, GW, 18 July 1789, no. 57, p. [2]; 22 July, no. 58, supplement, p. [3]; 29 July, no. 60, p. [3]; 5 September, no. 71, p. [4]; 23 September,

and on 28 July instructed him to travel to Vienna for treatment. In his place, he appointed the hero of the Seven Years' War, Laudon, with orders to capture Belgrade. The troops were soon infused with new vigour. The commander-in-chief directed the concentration of forces near Zemun⁶¹, where he arrived on 3 September and established his headquarters. The following day, Archduke Francis arrived at the camp, accompanied by General of Artillery Count Karl Clemens Pellegrini (1720–1796)⁶². Preparations were underway for the siege of the Belgrade fortress, defended by a garrison estimated at between 8,000 and 25,000 troops⁶³. At Laudon's disposal were approximately 50,000 men⁶⁴, 700 pieces of heavy artillery, an abundance of ammunition and shells of various calibres, 140 mortars, as well as 150 armed vessels and 10,000 labourers tasked with constructing field fortifications. Oversight of the trenches, the erection of batteries, and the positioning of artillery was entrusted to Pellegrini, while General J.T. Rouvroy was placed in charge of the bombardment. Held in reserve was the corps of General François-Sébastien de Croix, Count of Clerfayt (1733–1798)⁶⁵, whose task was to repel the attacks of the former commander

no. 76, supplement, p. [3]. Field Marshal Hadik died on 12 March 1790 at the age of 79, as reported by the same newspaper: GW, 3 April 1790, no. 27, supplement, p. [3].


⁶¹ PHP, August 1789, p. 829: "Even more heavy artillery was sent down the Danube from Peterwardein and Vienna to Zemlin [Zemun – M.K.]; several thousand scaling ladders were brought in, a dreadful quantity of shells and great shot was loaded onto wagons, and a flotilla, outfitted with heavy pieces of artillery, was floated down to Zemlin".

⁶² C. von Wurzbach, *Pellegrini, Karl Clemens Graf*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XXI (O'Donnell–Perényi), Wien 1870, pp. 440–443; J. Hirtenfeld, *Pellegrini, Karl Clemens Graf*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 252–253.

⁶³ PHP, September 1789, p. 949; GW, 21 October 1789, no. 84, supplement, p. [3]. The given number (25,000) most likely represents the total population – both soldiers and civilians. This may be inferred from the account of the former governor of Belgrade, Osman Pasha (GW, 14 November 1789, no. 91, supplement, p. [2]), and indirectly from reports on the capture of the fortress (see footnote 71).

⁶⁴ The publisher of 'Pamiętnik' reported that the Austrian army consisted of 40 infantry battalions (40,000 troops) and 30 cavalry squadrons (9,000 men). According to Łuskina, the infantry was larger by 2 battalions. PHP, September 1789, p. 949; GW, 14 October 1789, no. 82, p. [4]. Cf. V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów 1700–1870. Oblężone imperium*, Oświęcim 2019, p. 156, where it is indicated that the besieging army numbered 62,000 troops, while the garrison consisted of 9,000. The same estimates were recorded by M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797*, London–New York 2013, p. 385.

⁶⁵ J. Hirtenfeld, *Clerfayt, Franz Sebastien Karl Joseph de Croix, Graf von*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 284–287; C. von Wurzbach, *Clerfayt*,



4. View of the fortress of Belgrade from the Serbian side on the Danube, contemporary print by Johann Hieronymus Löschenkohl

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of Belgrade, serasker Abdi Pasha, who was advancing with a relief force of 40,000 men from the direction of Semendria (Smederevo)⁶⁶.

The Warsaw press regularly informed its readers of the progress of the besieging army, publishing detailed reports from the camp before

Karl Graf, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. II (*Bninski–Cordova*), Wien 1857, pp. 384–386.

⁶⁶ PHP, August 1789, pp. 828–829; September 1789, pp. 946–949; GW, 5 September 1789, no. 71, p. [4]; 12 September, no. 73, pp. [2, 4]; 26 September, no. 77, p. [3]; 7 October, no. 80, supplement, p. [3]; 14 October, no. 82, p. [4] and supplement, p. [3]; 17 October, no. 83, supplement, p. [3]. Notably, the main imperial army operating in the Banat crossed the Danube above Ujpalanka (present-day Bačka Palanka) on 12 September 1789 and the following day forded the Sava. The vanguard crossed the river via a pontoon bridge during the night of 10/11 September. GW, 26 September 1789, no. 77, p. [3]; 10 October, no. 81, supplement, pp. [2–3] (report on the crossing of the Sava); PHP, September 1789, p. 947.

Belgrade. It praised Laudon's prudence and valour⁶⁷ while offering a critical view of the Turks' ability to defend strongholds. One issue of Łuskina's newspaper reported as follows:

The Turks in Belgrade have thus far shown themselves to be the same people who, in the art of defending and besieging fortresses, possess no experience whatsoever, just as their brethren in Novi and Berbir had previously demonstrated. They ought to have prevented our [imperial troops – M.K.] from crossing the River Sava – if not altogether, then at least by significantly hindering them. However, they allowed our forces to pass unmolested and did not even consider taking up positions on Dedina Hill or Vračar – both of great importance. Their want of skill in this matter is made clearer with each passing day, for though they fire frequently and in great volleys by day [...] at night, when they ought to bestir themselves the most, they do naught but cry “Halla, Halla!”, and never so much as think to cast light upon the field or to scatter and confound our nightly labours in the raising of batteries⁶⁸.

Świtkowski wrote in much the same vein:

[...] instead of defending the crossing or making bridges, instead of hindering the nightly raising of batteries, the Turks pray in the mosques and entrust their fortress to the Prophet. Only on 14 [September – M.K.] did their cannon and caiques seek to hinder the raising of the battery at the mouth of the Sava, when it was already complete and setting their outskirts aflame⁶⁹.

On 17 September 1789, Belgrade was placed under complete blockade, and on 29 September, Field Marshal Laudon gave the order for an assault. That evening, the artillery bombardment of the fortress began, and on the following morning, the Austrians mounted their attack in four columns. Within a short period of time, they seized all the outskirts, from the Danube to the Sava, and garrisoned them with their own troops. Laudon's emissary, sent to demand the surrender of the stronghold, received a defiant response from its commander, Osman Pasha:

⁶⁷ For example, GW, 21 October 1789, no. 84, p. [3]: “Field Marshal Laudon oft rides on horseback in close proximity to the batteries, and the flying shot does not trouble him in the least”.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. [2].

⁶⁹ PHP, September 1789, pp. 949–950.

“Not until the hairs of my beard are set ablaze shall I surrender”⁷⁰. On the night of 5 October, the commander-in-chief of the imperial army ordered the construction of new batteries. The following day, fire was opened, igniting several blazes in the city. Around noon, the pasha sent a letter requesting a 15-day cessation of hostilities. In response, Laudon instructed that the fortress be shelled with bombs and heated shot. The barrage continued throughout the night, inflicting significant losses on the defenders (1,200 dead). Shortly thereafter, on 8 October, the pasha signed the terms of capitulation. The garrison of 7,000 soldiers, along with their families and belongings, was granted free passage and escorted to Old Orsova by the Austrians. The right to evacuate from the fortress was also extended to Jews, Christians, and apostates. Deserters and imperial prisoners were handed over to the victors, while the property and provisions of private individuals were sold. The Austrians were strictly forbidden from approaching Turkish women or having any dealings with them. The entire artillery of the fortress fell into the hands of the victors, including 361 field pieces of various calibres, 34 mortars, 50 small cannons mounted on caiques, a large quantity of ammunition and provisions, 20 caiques, and 45 additional boats. During the siege, approximately 2,000 Turkish soldiers were killed, with nearly as many wounded. As for Austrian losses, the publishers of the Warsaw newspapers provided varying estimates. The editor of ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ reported 289 dead and 732 wounded, while Świtkowski noted some 500 dead and over 700 wounded⁷¹.

⁷⁰ GW, 28 October 1789, no. 86, supplement, p. [3].

⁷¹ PHP, October 1789, pp. 1037–1042; GW, 21 October 1789, no. 84, pp. [2–3]; 28 October, no. 86, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 4 November, no. 88, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 11 November, no. 90, p. [4]; 14 November, no. 91, supplement, pp. [2–3]. For more on the siege and capture of Belgrade, see *Józef Drugi cesarz rzymski...*, pp. 64–68; F. Taubmann, *Vita e fatti eroici...*, pp. 73–79, 109–122; G.B. Malleson, *Loudon...*, pp. 230–232; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, pp. 294–295, 296–297 (it is indicated on p. 295 that Laudon had 45,000 troops under his command and an artillery force of over 300 cannons); A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraja turetskaia voina...*, pp. 90–91; Ch. Duffy, *Wojna oblężnicza 1660–1789. Twierdze w epoce Vaubana i Fryderyka Wielkiego*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 345–346 (where, however, the date of the capitulation of the Belgrade fortress is mistakenly recorded as 10 October); in particular M. Karkocha, “*Póki włosy w mojej brodzie nie zajmą się ogniem, póty nie poddam się*”. *Oblężenie i zajęcie Belgradu (1789) w relacjach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Twierdze osiemnastowiecznej Europy. Studia z dziejów nowożytnej sztuki wojkowej*, vol. IV, M. Trąbski, ed., Częstochowa 2022, pp. 249–266. Cf. also W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 476.



5. The handover of the Belgrade fortress to the Austrians on 8 October 1789,
author unknown, 1789

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On hearing the news of the capture of Belgrade, the emperor was overcome with joy, as it was the first major success achieved by his army. On 14 October, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the metropolitan church in Vienna. Joseph II decorated Laudon with the Military Order of Maria Theresa, which bore a diamond-encrusted star and was valued at 60,000 gulden, and granted him the right to wear it – a privilege reserved solely for the Grand Master of the Order, the emperor himself⁷². One of the light cavalry regiments was named after Laudon. In addition, General of Artillery Christoph Baron von Wallis (1732–1793)⁷³ was advanced to field marshal and appointed governor of Belgrade and Serbia, while

⁷² As he sent the Military Order of Maria Theresa to Laudon, Joseph II remarked that “as a reward for his merits, he could give him nothing else but what he himself wore close to his heart”. The decoration was to remain in the field marshal’s family until the male line became extinct, after which it was to be returned to the state treasury for the sum of 120,000 gulden. GW, 14 November 1789, no. 91, supplement, p. [3].

⁷³ C. von Wurzbach, *Wallisch, Christoph Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. LII (Vrcevic–Wallner), Wien 1885, pp. 271–273; J. Hirtenfeld, *Wallisch, Christoph Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 196–198.

Field Marshal Lieutenant Johann Georg Count von Browne was raised to the rank of general of artillery and appointed commander of Belgrade. Major General Wilhelm Klebeck (1729–1811)⁷⁴, who brought the news of the fortress's capture, was rewarded with a gold snuffbox richly set with diamonds, valued at 2,000 ducats⁷⁵.

With the fall of Belgrade, the Danubian town of Semendria soon followed. It surrendered under similar terms granting the garrison free passage. The magazines contained 14 light pieces of artillery, 16 crates of gunpowder, and various other military supplies. On 12 October, the Turks also withdrew from nearby Pozarevac (Požarevac). The entire Danube, up to Orsova, now stood open before the Austrians⁷⁶.

6. FURTHER ADVANCES OF THE ALLIES IN SERBIA AND WALLACHIA

*There has scarcely ever been an example
of a war against so mighty a state as the
Turkish Empire that is now being waged
with such advantage by the imperial courts.*

PHP, NOVEMBER 1789, PP. 1114–1115

After the capture of Belgrade, Field Marshal Laudon set his sights on Old Orsova, an island fortress on the Danube near Mehadia, situated between the Banat, Serbia, and Wallachia, and regarded as the key to those three provinces. He ordered Wilhelm Ludwig, Count von Wartensleben, who commanded the forces in the Banat, to take the stronghold by storm. The editor of 'Gazeta Warszawska' reported that the fortress was not well fortified, and the Austrians expected to capture it shortly⁷⁷. Świtkowski, on the other hand, noted its defensive position, which made its seizure difficult⁷⁸. After a challenging march through mountainous and muddy

⁷⁴ C. von Wurzbach, *Klebeck, Wilhelm Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XII (*Klácel-Korzistka*), Wien 1864, pp. 26–27; J. Hirtenfeld, *Klebeck, Wilhelm Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 256–258.

⁷⁵ GW, 4 November 1789, no. 88, supplement, pp. [2–3]; PHP, October 1789, pp. 1042–1043. For an account of the celebrations in Vienna following the capture of Belgrade, see F. Fejtő, *Józef II...*, pp. 317–318.

⁷⁶ GW, 4 November 1789, no. 88, supplement, p. [2]; 14 November, no. 91, p. [4]; 18 November, no. 92, p. [3]. Incidentally, the capitulation of Semendria took place on 16 October. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 298.

⁷⁷ GW, 25 November 1789, no. 94, p. [4].

⁷⁸ PHP, December 1789, p. 1242: "That fortress, built upon an isle on the Danube, is altogether inaccessible, its walls rising almost directly from the water. Within stand

terrain, Wartensleben's corps reached Orsova on 24 October and occupied the adjacent Allion Mountain without delay. That same day, two officers were sent to the commander to demand the surrender of the fortress; when he refused, the bombardment began on 28 October. The siege was personally led by Archduke Francis, to be later awarded the Grand Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa⁷⁹.

In an effort to compel the fortress to yield, the commander-in-chief ordered General Domenico Tomiotti de Fabris, Count di Cassano (1725–1789)⁸⁰, to cross the Danube and seize the heavily fortified castle at Kladovo, which provided the defenders with food supplies. On 11 November, the garrison was summoned to lay down arms. "At first, the Turkish commander would not hear of capitulation, then demanded three days of respite for deliberation, and upon this being permitted, he ultimately surrendered [...] without firing a single shot", Łuskina reported⁸¹. The garrison, consisting of one pasha of three tails, one pasha of two tails, a janissary agha, a sipahi agha, 324 cavalry, and 153 janissaries, was granted free passage to Vidin. The magazines contained 27 bronze cannons, 4 iron ones, vast amounts of ammunition, and provisions. Along with Kladovo, the Austrians also took control of the "fine and, throughout this war, hitherto unscathed"⁸² district of Krajina, comprising more than 150 towns and villages⁸³.

but few buildings, all of stone, there is nothing for the bombs to set ablaze, whilst the casemates wherein the garrison takes shelter are so stoutly fashioned that even hundred-pound shells cannot pierce them".

⁷⁹ GW, 2 December 1789, no. 96, p. [4]; PHP, November 1789, p. 1026. In a letter dated 23 November 1789, General Laudon wrote to Joseph II: "With the deepest reverence, I take the liberty of recommending to Your Imperial Majesty's favour His Serene Highness Archduke Francis, your nephew, and of humbly requesting that he be decorated with the cross, which is bestowed as a reward for valour. [...] I dare avouch to Your Imperial Majesty that not only did the archduke display the courage befitting his birth, but also sought out danger, faced it with a steady brow, encouraged the soldiers both by example and by word, and thus rendered great service to Your Imperial Majesty". GNiO, 12 January 1791, no. 4, p. 14.

⁸⁰ *Fabris, Dominico santo Tomiotti de Comte di Cassano*, [in:] *Oesterreichisches Militär-Konversations-Lexikon. Unter Mitwirkung mehrerer Offiziere der k.k. Armee*, J. Hirtenfeld, ed., vol. II (D–G), Wien 1852, pp. 268–269; idem, *Tomiotti de Fabris, Conte di Cassano, Dominik*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 107–108.

⁸¹ GW, 16 December 1789, no. 100, supplement, p. [2].

⁸² PHP, November 1789, p. 1126.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, pp. 1120–1122; GW, 16 December 1789, no. 100, supplement, p. [2]. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 476; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 298.

On receiving the news of the capture of Kladovo on 10 November, Laudon sent a messenger to Orsova to demand the fortress's surrender. The Turks raised white flags and requested a few days for deliberation. On 19 November, the Austrian commander renewed his demand for capitulation. The reply came in the form of artillery fire. A prolonged siege ensued, which eventually evolved into an investment of the fortress. The editor of 'Gazeta' reported that the imperial army stationed at Orsova

had to endure much discomfort due to the bitter frosts prevailing in those parts – so severe, indeed, that the sentries were relieved every half an hour. Yet the soldiers did not falter in spirit, for by special arrangement of the monarch, they were amply supplied with provisions and wine, gratis⁸⁴.

Joseph II also ordered iron stoves to be brought to the camp to heat the tents and casemates. The fortress, however, would not fall until April 1790, as will be discussed in due course⁸⁵.

Meanwhile, in Transylvania, Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Friedrich Wilhelm von Hohenlohe-Kirchberg (1732–1796)⁸⁶, commanding 6,000 soldiers, attacked a superior enemy force of 10,000 men under Kara Mustafa on 7 October, striking at their camp near Porcseny. "The Turks contended bravely and twice renewed the battle, yet were at length overthrown and put to flight, leaving 1,200 men and 6 cannons upon the field"⁸⁷. Hohenlohe then advanced into Wallachia, capturing Craiova, while Coburg seized Bucharest on 10 November, to the delight of its inhabitants⁸⁸. This marked the end of the 1789 campaign for the Austrians.

⁸⁴ GW, 23 January 1790, no. 7, p. [4].

⁸⁵ GW, 16 December 1789, no. 100, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 23 December, no. 102, p. [3]; PHP, November 1789, pp. 1122–1123.

⁸⁶ C. von Wurzbach, *Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, Friedrich Wilhelm Prinz*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. IX (*Hibler-Hysel*), Wien 1863, pp. 196–197; *Hohenlohe-Kirchberg (Friedrich Wilhelm, Fürst)*, [in:] *Oesterreichisches Militär-Konversations-Lexikon...*, vol. III (*H-Kulm*), Wien 1852, pp. 354–356.

⁸⁷ PHP, October 1789, p. 1054. Cf. GW, 4 November 1789, no. 88, supplement, p. [2], noting that the Turks lost 1,500 soldiers and 5 cannons in the battle. Cf. also W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 475; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part I...*, p. 298.

⁸⁸ PHP, November 1789, p. 1124: "The clergy, the Arnauts, and all the people went forth to meet the army, displaying great joy, and the church bells were rung. The imperial troops, in response to such welcome, fired their cannons several dozen times".

The army established a cordon from Zvornik to Focsani, “ensuring tranquillity” for Serbia and Wallachia. Laudon proceeded to Vienna, and Coburg passed the winter in Bucharest⁸⁹.

With regard to the Russian forces, Prince Potemkin remained encamped with the main army at Ochakov until the end of August, prepared to defend the hard-won fortress. However, seeing that the Turkish fleet of 100 sails, having accomplished little in the area, returned to Varna, he divided his forces into two detachments. With one, he marched towards Bender, aiming to cut off supplies to the fortress, while the other, under the command of Prince Repnin, was sent against the advancing serasker, Gazi Hasan. A battle ensued on 20 September. The Turkish army, “hardly harmed, yet much dismayed”, fled beyond the Danube, leaving all of Bessarabia at the mercy of the enemy. The former kapudan pasha lost 3,000 men in the engagement⁹⁰.


With the Turks gripped by fear, Potemkin advanced along the coast with his army. By late September, he seized Kaushany (Căușeni) and stormed the walled port of Hadjibey (Khadjibey), where Odessa would later be established, though putting up little resistance at the time. The fortress commander and 80 men were taken prisoner, while the rest of the small garrison of 200 men was killed. The Russian battery positioned on the shore forced the enemy fleet to retreat. During the engagement, one Turkish ship was burned, while another was captured⁹¹. The Russians also took the castle of Palanka at the mouth of the Dniester on 3 October and compelled the heavily garrisoned fortress of Akerman (present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), held by 1,500 soldiers, to surrender. The victors took possession of over 80 cannons and “a remarkable stock of war provisions”⁹².

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 1123–1125; GW, 9 December 1789, no. 98, p. [4]; 16 December, no. 100, supplement, p. [2]; 16 January 1790, no. 5, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 476.

⁹⁰ PHP, October 1789, p. 1054; November 1789, pp. 1116–1117; GW, 23 September 1789, no. 76, p. [4]; 17 October, no. 83, p. [3]. Cf. V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 193, where a different date of the battle – 10/21 September – is indicated; and A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 151, stating that the battle took place on 7/18 September.

⁹¹ GW, 24 October 1789, no. 85, supplement, p. [2]; 31 October, no. 87, supplement, p. [3]. For more on the capture of the Hadjibey fortress, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 76–79; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie 1775–1851*, Warszawa 2001, p. 143.

⁹² PHP, November 1789, pp. 1117–1118 (where 11 October is indicated as the date of Akerman’s capitulation); GW, 31 October 1789, no. 87, supplement, p. [3];



6. Map of the fortress of Bender in 1789, by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790

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Having cleared the coastal areas of enemies, Potemkin marched on Bender. It was a well-fortified stronghold, with a garrison of 7,000 to 10,000 troops⁹³. The fortress fell in early November following a two-week siege.

The numerous garrison and mighty fortifications – the publisher of ‘Pamiętnik’ noted – would at any other time have rendered the siege

28 November, no. 95, p. [2] (indicating that the fortress surrendered on 9 October); 26 December, no. 103, supplement, p. [4]. Cf. V.I. Godunov, A.N. Korolev, *Istoriia 3-go Ulanskogo Smolenskogo Imperatora Aleksandra III-go polka, 1708–1908 g.*, part 1, Libava 1908, p. 52; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 80–83; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 475; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 508; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 198; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 409 (the author notes that the fortress capitulated on 9 October); M. Astapenko, V. Levchenko, *Budet pomnit vsia Rossiia*, Moscow 1986, pp. 23–24 (noting that Akerman, defended by 3,000 troops, surrendered on 2/13 October).

⁹³ PHP, November 1789, p. 1119; GW, 2 May 1789, no. 35, p. [3]; 25 November, no. 94, p. [4]. According to R.K. Massie (*Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 476), 20,000 Ottoman soldiers were stationed in the fortress.

and capture of that important fortress most arduous and would have cost much blood. Yet now, with the main Turkish forces routed and scattered, the commander, seeing that no relief could be expected and that the people had no will to defend themselves, did what was most prudent and surrendered the fortress⁹⁴.

The Russians granted the garrison free passage and took control of the city, home to nearly 30,000 inhabitants. They found over 300 cannons, a year's supply of ammunition and provisions, and 2,000 cavalry horses⁹⁵. The empress rewarded Potemkin with a golden laurel wreath and sent 100,000 roubles to the troops. That remarkable success marked the conclusion of the third Russian campaign of the war. The Turks were only left with Kilia and Izmail in the Danube Delta. As the approaching winter made further military operations impossible, Potemkin ordered his forces into winter quarters. Four infantry regiments under the command of Lieutenant General Mikhail Nikitich Krechetnikov (1729–1793)⁹⁶ remained in Bender, while the rest of the infantry was stationed across Bessarabia, and the cavalry was quartered in the frontier governorates of White Russia (*sic*)⁹⁷.

On a different front, in the Kuban region, the Russians did not fare as well. In one of the September issues of his newspaper, Łuskina reported

⁹⁴ PHP, November 1789, pp. 1118–1119.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem* (noting that the fortress surrendered on 5 November); GW, 25 November 1789, no. 94, p. [4]; 23 December, no. 102, p. [4]. Cf. A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 83–87; A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia...*, p. 152 (both studies record a different date for the capitulation of Bender – 3 November); W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, p. 495; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 198 (stating instead that the fortress was captured on 4 November); S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 499–500; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin...*, p. 527; J.T. Alexander, *Catherine the Great. Life and Legend*, New York 1989, p. 279; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 409 (indicating that the Turkish garrison numbered 20,000 troops); A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 497; *Zapiski grafa Rozhera Dama*, “Starina i novizna: Istoricheskii sbornik” 1914, vol. XVIII, pp. 97–98. Notably, the commandant of Bender was beheaded for surrendering the fortress to the Russians, and his head, with the words “Traitor to the realm”, was put on public display in Constantinople. A similar fate befell 16 officers of the Bender garrison. GW, 21 April 1790, no. 32, supplement, p. [2]; 12 May, no. 38, p. [2].

⁹⁶ N.C., *Krechetnikov, Mikhail Nikitich*, [in:] *RBS*, vol. IX (*Knappe–Kiukhelbeker*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1903, pp. 430–432; P.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 720–721.

⁹⁷ GW, 13 January 1790, no. 4, pp. [3–4]; 23 January, no. 7, supplement, p. [3].

on the defeat of Russian forces by Batal Pasha, allowing the Turks to enter the Crimea and seize the coastal fortress of Yenikale. Elsewhere, the Lesgian and Kabardian Tatars broke through the Russian lines between Ekaterinograd and Mozdok and razed the fortress of Saint George⁹⁸.

7. NAVAL OPERATIONS

A Turkish squadron set out in the Archipelago to lay waste to the Russian flotilla under the command of Captain Cazzioni [Katsonis]; yet instead of taking to flight, he fell upon it, scattered it twice over, whereupon it had to take refuge in Constantinople [...]

PHP, SEPTEMBER 1789, P. 950

The naval theatre of the war was scarcely covered by the editor of ‘Gazeta Warszawska’, and was all but ignored by Świtkowski. As has previously been noted, in 1789 the naval forces of the Porte comprised approximately 130 vessels of various sizes, including 20 ships of the line, 46 frigates, 4 fireships, 40 armed sloops, and 15 dispatch boats (Turk. *kırlangıç*). Most were to operate in the Black Sea, while only a number of them (initially 15, later 22) were assigned to the Adriatic⁹⁹. The entire fleet was placed under the command of Grand Admiral Hüseyin Küçük Pasha, appointed to replace the dismissed Gazi Hasan. On 10 May, the Turkish Black Sea Fleet set sail, heading towards Berezan. The initial aim was to reclaim the island, lost in the previous campaign, without which the siege of Ochakov could not be sustained¹⁰⁰. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea, under the command of Rear Admiral Marko Ivanovich Voinovich, consisted of 7 ships of the line and 22 frigates. Additionally, the Russians had a flotilla in the waters of the Dnieper Liman, comprising 24 galleys and 187 boats of various types. They also managed to form several highly effective

⁹⁸ GW, 16 September 1789, no. 74, p. [2]. For more on the operations in the Kuban, see P.O. Bobrovskii, *Kubanskii egerskii korpus 1786–1796 gg.*, St Petersburg 1893, pp. 43–45; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 88–89.

⁹⁹ GW, 8 July 1789, no. 54, p. [3]; 18 July, no. 57, supplement, p. [3]; 5 August, no. 62, p. [4]; 11 November, no. 90, supplement, p. [2]. Similar figures (17 ships) are cited by L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 523. Cf. P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich. Wiek żagla*, vol. I, Warszawa 1995, p. 411, where slightly different information is provided regarding the size of the Turkish squadron in the Adriatic (3 ships of the line and 8 frigates).

¹⁰⁰ GW, 5 August 1789, no. 62, p. [4]; 11 November, no. 90, supplement, p. [2].

privateering squadrons in the Adriatic, commanded, among others, by a Greek in the service of the Empress of All the Russias, Major Lambros Katsonis (*sive* Katsones, Kachioni) (1752–1805)¹⁰¹. His operations at sea proved so disruptive to Ottoman naval activity that part of the Black Sea fleet had to be transferred to the Mediterranean. In September, Katsonis dispersed a Turkish squadron twice, which withdrew to Constantinople for the winter. He also seized the island of Kea in the Aegean Sea to serve as his headquarters¹⁰².

Summarising the naval operations of 1789, the editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ stated:

The war at sea between the Turks and the Muscovites yielded no events of note. The Turkish fleet departed from Constantinople on 10 May, yet attempted nothing of consequence. It merely cruised the Black Sea, making some feeble efforts to land in the Crimea, but to no avail; for that land had been all but forsaken by its former inhabitants, the Tatars, and a handful of new settlers preferred to live under Russian rather than Turkish rule¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ Katsonis (Katsones, Kachioni) Lambros, [in:] P.R. Grinevetsky, I.P. Zonn, P.P. Zhiltsov, A.N. Kosarev, A.G. Kostianoy, *The Black Sea Encyclopedia*, Berlin–Heidelberg 2015, pp. 398–399; J.K. Vasdravellis, *Klephts, Armatoles and Pirates in Macedonia During the Rule of the Turks, 1627–1821*, Thessaloniki 1975, p. 90; P. Earle, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary*, London 1970, p. 269; in particular Yu.D. Priakhin, *Lambros Katsonis v istorii Gretsii i Rossii*, St Petersburg 2004.

¹⁰² GW, 23 May 1789, no. 41, supplement, p. [2]; 11 July, no. 55, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 25 November, no. 94, p. [4]; PHP, September 1789, p. 950. For more on naval operations in 1789, see J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, pp. 143–144; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich...*, pp. 410–411. For more on the operations of Russian privateers in the Mediterranean during the war, see P. Özdemir Gümüş, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Akdeniz'deki Rus korsanlığı*, “Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi” 2016, vol. IX, no. 44, pp. 470–483; L. Sicking, *Islands, Pirates, Privateers and the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, [in:] *Seapower, Technology and Trade, Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, D. Couto, F. Günergün, M. Pia Pedani, eds, İstanbul 2014, pp. 249–250; G.L. Arsh, *Rossiiskaia flotiliia Lambrosa Katsonisana v Sredizemnom more: popytka osvobozhdeniia Gretsii (1788–1792)*, [in:] *Rossii i borba Gretsii za osvobozhdenie: ot Ekateriny II do Nikolaia I*, Moscow 2013, pp. 73–96; and D. Amore, *Napoli, San Pietroburgo e il Mediterraneo, 1777–1861*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Naples Federico II], 2017, pp. 133–136, http://www.fedoa.unina.it/12121/1/Amore_Dario_30.pdf (accessed 2 July 2020).

¹⁰³ PHP, February 1790, pp. 117–118.

CHAPTER IV

THE YEAR 1790

1. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRUSSO-OTTOMAN MILITARY ALLIANCE

In unione salus (In unity lies salvation).

GW, 24 JULY 1790, NO. 59, P. [4]

In the aftermath of the Turkish defeat at Rymnik, Selim III intended to take personal command of the army to redress the dishonour and secure the final victory. In October 1789, he issued a *hatt-ı şerif* calling upon the faithful to wage a religious war, summoning all men aged 15 to 60 (or from the age of 18, according to other accounts) in a general levy and, to fund the war effort, he ordered the surrender of silver and gold vessels to the imperial mint. However, news of the loss of Belgrade, Akerman, and above all, Bender, as well as reports of the declining morale within the Ottoman army, led him to contemplate peace. In the Divan, the anti-war faction gained the upper hand and a decision to end the hostilities was reached. High-ranking officials who had advocated for continuing the war were removed from the imperial council. The former kapudan pasha, Gazi Hasan, was appointed the new grand vizier. The office of mufti was entrusted to Amud Molla, an experienced diplomat renowned for negotiating the subsidy treaty with Sweden¹. With the sultan's approval, the grand vizier authorized an agha² to initiate discussions with Prince Potemkin regarding a six-month armistice, during which preliminary articles were to be agreed. The Prince

¹ GW, 26 December 1789, no. 103, supplement, p. [3]; 13 January 1790, no. 4, p. [3]; 20 January, no. 6, supplement, p. [2]; 23 January, no. 7, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, December 1789, pp. 1243–1244; January 1790, pp. 91–93.

² The Warsaw press did not record his name. However, it is known that he was the head doorkeeper, Hajji Bekir Agha. See H. Topaktaş, *Osmarńsko-polskie stosunki*

of Taurida stipulated the release of the Russian ambassador, Iakov Ivanovich Bulgakov, as a condition precedent to diplomatic engagement. He further instructed the Sublime Porte to dispatch its representative to Bender, Jassy, or Bucharest to commence peace negotiations.

The gravely ill Joseph II, already disheartened by the failure of his policies in Belgium and Hungary, was also in favour of a swift end to the war. The emperor proposed Bucharest as the venue for future negotiations. He sent Baron Franz Maria von Thugut (1739–1818)³ to the city with instructions and ordered the internuncio, Baron Peter Philipp von Herbert-Rathkeal, to prepare for departure. He suggested to the courts in London, Berlin, and Paris that they assume the role of mediators and dispatch their representatives to the congress. Finally, he implored Potemkin “not to stand unyielding before the Turks pleading for peace”⁴. In January 1790, Serenissimus informed Joseph that the sultan’s envoys were primarily engaged in delaying tactics rather than in the pursuit of peace and that the Porte was demanding the return of all lost territories. Under those circumstances, Herbert remained in Vienna, while Thugut was appointed commissioner to the Wallachian hospodar and sent to Jassy⁵.

In the early months of 1790, the Warsaw press repeatedly touched upon the subject of peace negotiations but provided few details. The talks were held at Potemkin’s headquarters in Jassy, where, at the beginning of January, Bulgakov arrived following his release from Turkish captivity. The Ottoman delegation, consisting of over 30 dignitaries, was led by the reis efendi. In issue no. 7 of 23 January 1790, Łuskina reported that the sultan reconciled himself to the loss of the occupied territories, save for Wallachia, demanded a ceasefire for the duration of negotiations, and proposed peace for a term of six years. Joseph II replied that

dyplomatyczne. Poselstwo Franciszka Piotra Potockiego do Stambułu (1788–1793), Kraków 2017, p. 253.

³ C. von Wurzbach, *Thugut, Franz Maria Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon des kaiserthums Oesterreich, enthaltend die lebensskizzen der denkwürdigen personen, welche seit 1750 in den österreichischen kronländern geboren wurden oder darin gelebt und gewirkt haben*, vol. XLV (*Thugut–Török*), Wien 1882, pp. 1–6; K.A. Roeder, *Baron Thugut and Austria’s Response to the French Revolution*, Princeton 1987.

⁴ PHP, December 1789, p. 1244.

⁵ PHP, December 1789, pp. 1243–1244; January 1790, pp. 92–93; GW, 6 January 1790, no. 2, p. [3]; 23 January, no. 7, p. [4].

though he is inclined towards peace, his sword shall not rest until the Porte solemnly cedes to His Imperial Majesty all the territories seized by that very sword, and until the Porte consents to a peace of fifty years⁶.

A few issues later, the same editor noted that the emperor asserted a claim to Croatia together with Khotin, and 17 million in compensation for the losses incurred, while he was willing to relinquish the rest of the conquered territories, including Belgrade. Catherine imposed harsh conditions on the Ottoman Empire and refused to make any concessions. She demanded that Russia be granted the Crimea, the Kuban and Ochakov, while her Austrian ally was to acquire Belgrade and Khotin along with its adjoining territories. She also insisted on the establishment of an independent polity comprising Moldavia and Wallachia, to be governed by an Orthodox prince. Finally, she sought to have Turkey acknowledge that it had unjustly brought war upon the Russian Empire⁷.

Potemkin's negotiations with the Sublime Porte, conducted through a Georgian negotiator, Sergei Lazarevich Lashkaryov (Laskarov, Laskarev) (1739–1814)⁸, were still underway in the summer⁹. The prince called a halt to the proceedings as soon as he received word of the Russo-Swedish peace treaty signed in Värälä on 14 August 1790¹⁰, which concluded the two-year

⁶ GW, 23 January 1789, no. 7, p. [4].

⁷ GW, 26 December 1789, no. 103, supplement, p. [4]; 6 January 1790, no. 2, p. [3]; 20 February, no. 15, supplement, p. [2]; 24 February, no. 16, p. [4]; PHP, February 1790, pp. 171–172. For a discussion on the peace negotiations in Jassy, see S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin, książę książąt*, Warszawa 2000, pp. 502, 511–512, 515–516; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarzski romans*, Warszawa 2013, pp. 530, 539–540; I. de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, London 1981, p. 410; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin*, 3rd edn, Moscow 2016, pp. 518–520; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov*, Moscow 2012, pp. 208–209 (indicating that the Russian side also demanded war reparations); R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór Polski*, 2nd edn, Warszawa 1984, pp. 87–89; K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLIII, İstanbul 2013, p. 343; Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Değişen Dengeler ve Yaş Antlaşması*, “Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi” 2017, vol. XXXII, no. 2, pp. 470–471; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Firat University], Elazığ 2012, p. 149, <https://openaccess.firat.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11508/14673/303671.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 20 November 2024).

⁸ N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety XVIII i XIX stoletii* (= *Portraits russes des XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*), vol. V, St Petersburg 1909, p. 113.

⁹ GW, 16 June 1790, no. 48, supplement, p. [2]; 14 August, no. 65, supplement, p. [3]; 23 October, no. 85, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, October 1790, p. 1264.

¹⁰ It provided for the restoration of peace based on the *status quo ante bellum* principle, for the exchange of prisoners, and for certain economic privileges to be

war between said states¹¹. With Russia's land forces no longer entangled in a conflict with Sweden, they could now march towards the Turkish theatre of war to secure the final victory over the enemy.

granted to Sweden in Russian ports. Moreover, Russia was to refrain from interfering in Sweden's internal affairs, which meant in fact that Catherine II recognised the amendment to the Swedish constitution made in February 1789. For further details on the Swedish-Russian peace negotiations and the treaty itself, see Z. Anusik, *Dyplomacja szwedzka wobec kryzysu monarchii we Francji w latach 1787–1792*, Łódź 2000, pp. 282–283, 286–287; idem, *O szwedzki alians. Karta z dziejów stosunków politycznych pomiędzy Sztokholmem a Warszawą w dobie Sejmu Czteroletniego*, "Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica" 1996, no. 57, p. 100, fn. 74; W. Kalinka, *Sejm Czteroletni*, vol. II, Warszawa 1991, pp. 137–138, 142–143. The terms of the peace treaty of Värälä were discussed by Rev. Łuskiński: GW, 15 September 1790, no. 74, supplement, p. [3]; 18 September, no. 75, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 4 December, no. 97, supplement, p. [2]. The text of the treaty is available in the AGAD collections, APP, no. 227, pp. 724–726. Incidentally, the peace agreement between Sweden and Russia provoked a strong reaction in Constantinople, as reported by Łuskiński's newspaper. The Swedish envoy, Gerhard Johann von Heidenstam, was denied an audience. A note dated 27 September 1790, signed by Heidenstam and Sweden's special envoy Baron Georg Josef von Brentano, stated that in negotiating the terms of the treaty with Catherine II, the Swedish monarch had also taken into account the interests of the Ottoman Empire. The conditions set for peace with Russia were: (1) the return of the Crimea to Turkey; (2) the signing of a joint peace treaty between Russia, Sweden, and the Sublime Porte. The empress consented to both conditions, yet "remonstrated how greatly this peace would preoccupy other powers, particularly the court of Berlin, [...] and that for this reason she had instructed Potemkin to initiate separate negotiations with the Porte". As Gustav III would not hear of separate negotiations, on 13 August the Russian minister assured the Swedish side that the empress would sign a treaty with the Porte under the following conditions: (1) Russia would return to Turkey the territories seized during the war; (2) the Crimea was to be recognised as a sovereign entity; (3) the fortresses of Ochakov and Bender would be dismantled. Lacking the financial means to continue the war, the Swedish ruler ultimately resolved to sign the peace. However, he sought to ensure that the treaty contained no reference to the Peace of Åbo (1743), which forbade Sweden from entering into alliances "inconvenient" to Russia and thereby nullified Sweden's former ties with the Porte under the 1739 agreement. Some time later, the Swedish envoy presented three additional memoranda to the imperial council, which the Ottoman side forwarded to representatives of England, Holland, and Prussia. The Swedish envoy's request for an audience was once again refused. His stipend of 130 piastres per day (tain) was revoked, and the number of his honour guard was reduced. GW, 20 December 1790, no. 104, supplement, pp. [1–3] (containing the text of the note dated 27 September); 8 January 1791, no. 3, p. [3]; 12 January, no. 4, p. [4]; 2 February, no. 10, p. [2]. Cf. H. Topaktaş, *Osmalısko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, p. 251 (where, however, the Swedish note is dated a day earlier – 26 September).

¹¹ GW, 9 October 1790, no. 81, p. [4].

The Warsaw press also reported on the frequent conferences held in Constantinople between representatives of France, Spain, Prussia, and Sweden and the Divan concerning an end to the war. Already in November 1789, the French and Spanish envoys offered to mediate, but the Porte declined. At the same time, the Swedish ambassador was assured that Turkey would do nothing to jeopardise the interests of Gustav III and would not conclude a separate peace with Russia¹². In issue no. 19 of 6 March 1790, Łuskina noted yet another shift in the balance of power within the sultan's council, where the war faction had gained the upper hand¹³. Two issues later, the priest-editor observed that while the envoys of France and Spain were seeking to persuade Selim III to make peace, other ministers were encouraging him to believe that, in light of the revolution in the Austrian Netherlands¹⁴ and the support of European powers, the war might still be won by the Porte¹⁵. The "other ministers" mentioned by Łuskina included the Prussian ambassador in Constantinople, Heinrich Friedrich von Diez (Dietz) (1751–1817)¹⁶, who was carrying out the instructions formulated in Vienna, more widely known as Hertzberg's "alternative plan" or "grand plan". Without delving into detail, let it be noted briefly that it was intended to secure territorial acquisitions for Prussia through diplomatic means, without recourse to arms. Diez was tasked with urging the Divan to yield Moldavia and Wallachia to the emperor, and Bessarabia along with the lands around Ochakov to Russia; in return, the Sublime Porte was to receive an international guarantee of the inviolability of the remainder of its territory (with the new Turkish-Russian border running along the Danube and the Una) as well as the promise of a defensive treaty with Prussia following the conclusion of peace. Austria, in turn, was to return Galicia to Poland, which would

¹² GW, 10 February 1790, no. 12, p. [4]; 20 February, no. 15, p. [4].

¹³ GW, 6 March 1790, no. 19, p. [4].

¹⁴ On that subject, cf. M. Dąbrowski, *Dzieje założenia państwa belgijskiego*, Kraków 1910, pp. 100–110; J. Łaptos, *Historia Belgii*, Wrocław 1994, pp. 113–117; H. Benedikt, *Als Belgien österreichisch war*, Wien 1960, pp. 232–239; M. Wawrykowa, *Dzieje Niemiec 1648–1789*, Warszawa 1976, p. 182. For a discussion of the events in Belgium as reported in the Warsaw press, see M. Paszyn, *Rewolucja brabancka w latach 1789–1790 w świetle relacji "Gazety Warszawskiej" i "Pamiętnika Politycznego i Historycznego"*, "Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Historica" 2001, no. 70, pp. [61]–81. For a discussion of the Josephinian reforms in Belgium, see W.W. Davis, *Joseph II: An Imperial Reformer for the Austrian Netherlands*, The Hague 1974.

¹⁵ GW, 13 March 1790, no. 21, supplement, p. [3].

¹⁶ J.A. von Reiswitz, Diez, *Heinrich Friedrich v.*, [in:] *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. III (*Bürklein–Ditmar*), Berlin 1957, pp. 712–713.

then cede Gdańsk and Toruń, together with certain borderland districts of Greater Poland, to Prussia¹⁷. However, for the plan to succeed, it was necessary to persuade the sultan to accept the mediation of the Berlin court in the peace negotiations – an aim which Diez actively pursued.

As events unfolded, the instructions for the Prussian minister were revised. In September 1789, he was ordered to offer the Sublime Porte an unconditional offensive and defensive alliance and to affirm that Frederick William II would take the field with the full strength of his forces in the spring. In return, however, Turkey was expected to refrain from entering into any peace agreements. In accordance with those directives, in mid-February 1790¹⁸, Diez negotiated an alliance with the Ottoman Empire (consisting of five articles), which the sultan promptly signed; following its ratification, the document was delivered by courier to Berlin.

By this treaty – as related in ‘Pamiętnik’ – both parties guaranteed each other the possession of their lands, pledged to offer every assistance against their common enemies, and undertook not to permit any power to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland; furthermore, they not only guaranteed her present possessions, but even pledged to seek the restoration of Galicia¹⁹.

¹⁷ For a comprehensive discussion of the political concepts of Count Hertzberg and attempts to implement them, see M. Hochedlinger, *Krise und Wiederherstellung Österreichische Großmachtpolitik zwischen Türkenkrieg und “Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution” 1787–1791*, Berlin 2000, Historische Forschungen, vol. LXV, p. 202 ff.; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. I, Warszawa 1991, pp. 49–55, 476–478; S. Askenazy, *Przymierze polsko-pruskie*, 2nd edn, Warszawa 1901, pp. 18–20; *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)*, B. Wachowiak, ed., Poznań 2010, pp. 631–641; J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane. Wiek XVIII*, part 1 (*Polityka zagraniczna Sejmu Wielkiego*), selected, edited, and introduced by M. Kornat, Kraków 2019, p. 68 ff. See also I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 398; C. Jany, *Armia Fryderyka Wielkiego. Od zakończenia wojny siedmioletniej do śmierci Fryderyka Wilhelma II*, Oświęcim 2018, p. 227.

¹⁸ PHP, April 1790, p. 362; GW, 14 April 1790, no. 30, p. [4]. The Ottoman-Prussian alliance was in fact concluded two weeks earlier – on 31 January 1790. See, for example, S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 512; H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, pp. 174, 256; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, p. 13; D.M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648–2008*, vol. I, Washington 2009, p. 99; D. Beales, *Joseph II, vol. II (Against the World, 1780–1790)*, Cambridge 2009, p. 631; W. Konopczyński, *Polska a Turcja 1683–1792*, Kraków–Warszawa 2013, p. 264. Text of the treaty: *Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman*, G. Noradounghian, ed., vol. II (1789–1856), Paris 1900, no. 2, pp. 3–6; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLIV, İstanbul 2013, p. 467. Copies of the treaty (in French) held at AGAD, AR, AORMP, 180, ref. no. CXXXIV/76, pp. 166–174.

¹⁹ PHP, April 1790, p. 362. On the course of negotiations and the terms of the agreement, see H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*,

Unwilling to accept the loss of his most valuable dominions and confident in the support of his Prussian ally, Selim III resolved to continue the war. Reports in the press indicated that, owing to Ramadan falling in May, military operations could not be expected to begin before June²⁰.

2. MILITARY PREPARATIONS

The Porte, seeing that peace could be had from Moscow only at the cost of half the finest land it held in Europe, dared once more to muster all her strength and take the field this year against the imperial courts with the utmost force.

PHP, APRIL 1790, p. 361

Amid peace talks, the warring powers continued their preparations for the next, penultimate campaign. As in previous years, the press under Stanislas Augustus focused chiefly on the mobilisation of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks were acquiring food and ammunition, intending to begin military operations in early spring. Troop enlistment was underway throughout the provinces of the empire. Łuskina related

pp. 252–256 (where the text of the third article of the treaty is also included, pp. 256–257); W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, pp. 11–14; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 107–108; and K. Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifâkı (Meydana Gelişi-Tahlili-Tatbiki)*, İstanbul 1984. Notably, the authorities in Berlin were dissatisfied with the final form of the agreement. It stipulated that Prussia would declare war on both Austria and Russia and would not conclude peace until Turkey regained the Crimea. For this reason, Frederick William II delayed its ratification until 20 June 1790, the very end of the five-month term designated for that purpose. Diez was accused of exceeding the limits of his authority and was dismissed in September 1790. Cf. H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, pp. 257–258. In a letter to Diez dated 12 March, Hertzberg wrote: “What possessed you, Sir, to bind the King to waging war against both Russia and Austria, and to laying down arms only once the Crimea had been regained? Of such a matter there is not the least mention in the instructions, and I now find myself at a loss as to how to proceed with the ratification and its execution. We wish to fight Austria, not Russia; to promise the Crimea to the Turks is altogether inconceivable. I hear that the Turkish ministers boast of having ensnared you through your own vehement insistence. And indeed, they have pledged nothing – while you have pledged all. I truly cannot say how we are to honour it, but as there remain five months until ratification, I shall await the turn of events”. Cited in W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, pp. 15–16. The ratification of the treaty in Berlin was reported by Rev. Łuskina, although he did not specify the exact date. GW, 15 December 1790, no. 100, p. [4].

²⁰ PHP, January 1790, p. 93; April 1790, pp. 361–363; GW, 30 January 1789, no. 9, p. [2]; 24 March, no. 24, p. [2].

that the Greeks alone were ordered to provide 50,000 soldiers, and that considerable forces were likewise expected from Asia²¹. Initially, the sultan planned to take personal command of a 300,000-strong army assembling near Adrianople. However, under pressure from his subjects, who feared for his life, he resolved not to act on the intention. Şerif Hasan Pasha (d. 1791)²², formerly governor of Vidin, was appointed grand vizier and supreme commander of the Turkish land forces. His predecessor, Gazi Hasan Pasha, a proponent of peace, was poisoned in March 1790²³. Selim III demanded that the religious establishment contribute to the war effort, as it was proclaimed a religious war. The clergy pledged to donate five million piastres for that purpose²⁴.

The Russian war preparations received little coverage in the press, though they were carried out on a scale comparable to that of the Ottomans. In his April reports on the Russo-Turkish War, Świtkowski noted: “No word has, as yet, arrived this month as to what designs Moscow may harbour for the present campaign. Yet it appears she is bent on greatly extending the theatre of war”²⁵. The same newspaper related that, to avoid delays in dispatching reports to St Petersburg, the empress appointed Grigory Potemkin supreme commander of both the Russian land and naval forces. She also conferred upon him the title of Grand Hetman of the Cossack Host, Ekaterinoslav, and the Black Sea, with which came the command of a further 60,000 men²⁶. In a May article, the publisher of ‘Pamiętnik’

²¹ GW, 6 March 1790, no. 19, p. [4]; 21 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [2].

²² F. Sarıcaoglu, *Hasan Paşa, Şerif*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XVI, İstanbul 1997, pp. 340–341.

²³ PHP, May 1790, p. 474; GW, 9 June 1790, no. 46, supplement, p. [2]: “The Grand Vizier Hasan Pasha has passed away in the 75th year of his age. His yearly income exceeded 700,000 piastres, and he left behind great wealth, which, he having died childless, falls to the Crown. Upon his death, several millions in ready coin were found in his possession”. Another view holds that Gazi Hasan may have fallen ill as a result of the harsh winter conditions during his inspection of the Ottoman army, which ultimately caused his death. Cf. L. Kirval, *The Era of “Ghazi Hasan Pasha of Algiers” (1713–1790) and Its Aftermath: The Last Visionary Ottoman Grand Admiral (Grand Vizier)*, [in:] *Seapower, Technology and Trade, Studies in Turkish Maritime History*, D. Couto, F. Günergun, M. Pia Pedani, eds, İstanbul 2014, p. 178. Notably, the press initially reported that Koca Yusuf Pasha succeeded Gazi Hasan as grand vizier. GW, 10 April 1790, no. 29, supplement, p. [1]; PHP, May 1790, p. 475.

²⁴ GW, 24 February 1790, no. 16, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, March 1790, p. 273.

²⁵ PHP, April 1790, p. 364.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 365. It took place in 1790. Cf. S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 514; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 543; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 522–523; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 208–209.

reported that the Russians “made the very capital of the Ottoman state the primary objective of this campaign, intending to attack it from one side with the Black Sea fleet and from the other with the flotilla then assembling in Trieste under the command of the Russian admiral [Antonio – M.K.] Psaro, with intent to seize the city – or, failing that, to put it to the torch”²⁷.

As regards Austria, its internal political situation and international position changed. The reforms planned by Joseph II in the ecclesiastical, administrative and judicial systems²⁸ met with resistance from the Hungarian estates and culminated in an open rebellion in Belgium in October 1789. With the Habsburg monarchy facing internal unrest, Frederick William II sought to expand the territory of his state and raise its prestige on the international stage²⁹. In an effort to compel the emperor to accept the mediation of the Berlin court in the conflict with Turkey and to make territorial concessions in line with Hertzberg’s concept, the Prussian ruler ordered the concentration of troops in Silesia. The prospect of an Austro-Prussian war became increasingly tangible when, on 10 June 1790, the Prussian monarch arrived at his headquarters in Schönwald, accompanied by princes, diplomats, and invited guests, to personally oversee the proceedings of the War Council³⁰. Faced with

²⁷ PHP, May 1790, pp. 475–476. Cf. S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 517; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 545–546.

²⁸ On the Josephinian reforms, see, for instance, H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, Wrocław 1986, pp. 146–154; T. Cegielski, *Absolutyzm w Prusach i w Austrii*, [in:] *Europa i świat w epoce oświeconego absolutyzmu*, J. Staszewski, ed., Warszawa 1991, p. 307 ff.; idem, *Józefinizm*, [in:] *Austria–Polska. Z dziejów sąsiedztwa*, W. Leitsch, M. Wawrykowa, eds, Warszawa–Wiedeń 1989, pp. 41–72; W.W. Davis, *Joseph II...*; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria’s Security: Part II – Leopold II, the Prussian Threat, and the Peace of Sistova, 1790–1791*, “The International History Review” 2004, vol. XXV, no. 3, pp. 475–478; M. Paszyn, *Reformy józefińskie w świetle relacji prasy polskiej okresu stanisławowskiego*, Łódź 2015.

²⁹ M. Wawrykowa, *Dzieje Niemiec 1789–1871*, Warszawa 1980, p. 10.

³⁰ GW, 30 June 1790, no. 52, p. [3]; PHP, June 1790, p. 571. The newspapers of interest consistently reported on the mobilisation of the Prussian army and its concentration in Silesia: GW, 17 April 1790, no. 31, p. [2]; 21 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [2]; 28 April, no. 34, p. [4]; 5 May, no. 36, pp. [2–3]; 22 May, no. 41, p. [2] and supplement, p. [2]; 4 June, no. 45, supplement, p. [2]; 16 June, no. 48, p. [3]; 7 July, p. [2]; PHP, April 1790, pp. 367–368; May 1790, p. 477; June 1790, pp. 571–572. The press recorded that the forces Prussia mobilised against Austria numbered 250,000 troops, including 60,000 cavalry and 13,000 artillery. Initially, they were organised into four corps, but it was later decided they should be divided into three armies, commanded by King Frederick William II, who was accompanied by Lieutenant General Wichard Joachim Heinrich von Möllendorf (*vide* Möllendorff, Moellendorff); the reigning Duke of Brunswick, Charles William; and Prince Frederick William, son

the threat of attack from its northern neighbour, Austria had to detach part of its forces – 120,000 troops – from the Turkish theatre of war³¹.

Adding to the turmoil, on 20 February 1790, Joseph II died after a prolonged illness – an event widely reported in the Warsaw press³². 'Pamiętnik' noted that in his final days, driven by a strong sense of duty, the emperor had issued directives concerning the Turkish war and the anticipated attack from Prussia, which had entered into a new alliance with the Porte. The late monarch had entrusted supreme command over the troops in Galicia, Bohemia, and Moravia to Field Marshal Baron Ernst G. von Laudon, while placing the forces operating in the eastern theatre under the authority of Prince Friedrich J. von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld and granting "these commanders full power to conduct themselves as they shall judge most fitting for the welfare of the monarchy, until such time as the heir to the throne arrives in Vienna and orders otherwise"³³. In order to protect the hereditary lands from Turkish incursions, he had instructed Coburg to assemble the largest possible army in early spring, take control of Galatz, Vidin, and the remaining Ottoman territories on the left

of the former. Two additional armies, composed of East and West Prussian units, were held in reserve. The first was commanded by Lieutenant General Viktor Amadeus, Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, and the second by Lieutenant General Adolph Detlef von Usedom. GW, 5 June 1790, no. 45, supplement, p. [2]; 3 July, no. 53, p. [3]. For a detailed account of Prussia's war preparations in the spring of 1790, see C. Jany, *Armia Fryderyka Wielkiego...*, pp. 230–236.

³¹ PHP, May 1790, p. 476. Walerian Kalinka (*Sejm...*, vol. II, p. 117) indicates that the Austrian forces assembled in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia numbered 149,000, while the Prussian forces in Silesia amounted to 163,000. Similarly, R.H. Lord (*Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 81) estimates Leopold II's army at 150,000 troops. In turn, M.Z. Mayer (*The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, pp. 494–495) maintains that by early June, the Prussian invasion force consisted of 127,000 infantry and 36,000 cavalry, whereas the Austrian army comprised 117,800 infantry and 31,200 cavalry.

³² GW, 10 March 1790, no. 20, p. [4]; 20 March, no. 23, p. [3]; 24 March, no. 24, p. [4] and supplement, p. [2] (offering a description of the funeral ceremony); PHP, February 1790, pp. 163–169. Cf. Józef Drugi *cesarz rzymski i Fryderyk Drugi król pruski monarchowie w iednym czasie panujący, prawdziwie wielcy. Pamiętnik dwóch geniuszów wieku XVIII sławnych*, Wrocław 1819, pp. 102–122; D. Beales, *Joseph II...*, pp. 632–638; F. Fejtő, *Józef II. Habsburg rewolucjonista*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 332–337; A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, *Jako monarcha i jako człowiek. Uwarunkowania personalne decyzji politycznych Józefa II Habsburga*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 130–133. For a general discussion on the funerals of the Habsburg royal family, see M. Hengerer, *The Funerals of the Habsburg Emperors in the Eighteenth Century*, [in:] *Monarchy and Religion: The Transformation of Royal Culture in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, M. Schaich, ed., Oxford 2007, pp. 367–394.

³³ PHP, February 1790, p. 165.

bank of the Danube, then advance across the river, confront the grand vizier in a decisive battle, and promptly make peace with him, without recourse to foreign mediation. Świtkowski speculated that the natural boundary between Austria and the Porte would then be “the Haemus Mountains [Stara Planina – M.K.], which stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and are exceedingly difficult to traverse, thereby shielding Austrian lands from Turkish raids”³⁴.

The late emperor was succeeded by his younger brother, Archduke Leopold (1747–1792), a man of considerable experience, having ruled the Habsburg secundogeniture of Tuscany for 25 years³⁵. He proved to be a master of compromise and diplomacy³⁶. The initial measures undertaken by the new ruler, King of Bohemia and Hungary (until his election as emperor)³⁷, sought to subdue internal opposition, reclaim the Southern Netherlands, and avert the threat of conflict with the Kingdom of Prussia³⁸. Leopold II also resolved to continue the war against the Ottoman Empire in alliance with Russia³⁹.

In his April reports on the war in the East, Świtkowski noted:

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ PHP, March 1790, p. 269.

³⁶ M. Wawrykowa, *Dzieje Niemiec 1789–1871...*, p. 9. An American historian, Robert H. Lord, in his monumental study on the downfall of Poland, characterised Leopold II as follows: “He possessed a clear, dispassionate, and independent judgment; a keen instinct for the practical, coupled with a complete indifference to the ambitious plans and love of glory that had haunted his brother; as well as firmness, prudence, and tact. Having lived in Italy and not being accustomed to confide his inmost thoughts to all comers, he could scarcely hope to escape the reproach so often cast upon him of being a ‘new Machiavelli’” (idem, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 72).

³⁷ Leopold was elected emperor on 30 September 1790, four days later, he made his solemn entry into Frankfurt am Main, followed by his coronation on 9 October. Less than a month later – on 15 November in Pressburg – the Hungarian Palatine placed the Crown of St Stephen upon his head. He donned the Bohemian crown on 6 September 1791 in Prague. Extensive reports on the events were published in Łuski's newspaper. Cf. GW, 23 October 1790, no. 85, pp. [1–2] (election); 27 October, no. 86, pp. [2–4] (solemn entry into Frankfurt am Main); 3 November, no. 88, pp. [3–4] and supplement, p. [3] (imperial coronation ceremony); 11 December, no. 99, pp. [1–4] (entry into Pressburg and coronation as King of Hungary); 21 September 1791, no. 76, p. [4]; 24 September, no. 77, p. [4] (solemn entry into Prague); 1 October, no. 79, p. [2] (coronation as King of Bohemia).

³⁸ M. Wawrykowa, *Dzieje Niemiec 1789–1871...*, p. 8; R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 72.

³⁹ GW, 10 April 1790, no. 29, p. [3]. According to R.H. Lord (*Drugi rozbiór...* p. 73), Leopold II sought to intensify military operations against the Turks in the hope of forcing a speedy peace. He also wished to ascertain the readiness of its ally, Russia, to provide assistance should an urgent need arise.

The Austrians command far less strength against the Turks than in years past. Two parts of the army that had warred against them were now sent to Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia. Thus, the Turks might well prove most formidable against the Germans. Yet Austria flatters itself that the Hungarians, encouraged by the restoration of their former honours and liberties, shall rise in a general levy and, in the number of 60,000 men, shall defend their country, their wives, their children, and their estates against the Turks⁴⁰.

The publisher of 'Pamiętnik' further stated that in Croatia and Bosnia, mountains garrisoned by small detachments of soldiers would halt Turkish incursions, while Prince Coburg, commanding 50,000 men and supported by a Russian auxiliary corps, would not only be able to defend Transylvania and Wallachia but also seize Vidin and the lands as far as Stara Planina. The article also mentioned that Austria was expanding its army by raising a fourth battalion for each regiment. It had no shortage of funds for the war effort, as Genoa had granted it a loan of 8 million gulden, and Leopold, during his years of rule in Tuscany, had saved 20 million thalers, which he could now use to finance the war. Significantly, the courts of Vienna and St Petersburg were not left to fend for themselves. After years of hesitation, Venice finally aligned itself against the Ottoman Empire. Świtkowski speculated that the coalition of states forming the anti-Turkish alliance might soon be joined by Spain and the Kingdom of Naples⁴¹.

3. THE REICHENBACH CONVENTION. ARMISTICE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND TURKEY

They say that Austria, with Russia's assent and approval, is to enter into a separate accord with Prussia and conclude peace with the Porte [...]

GW, 21 JULY 1790, NO. 58, SUPPLEMENT, P. [3]

Eager to avoid hostilities on two fronts, Leopold II sought to reach an agreement with Prussia. Almost immediately upon his arrival in Vienna on 12 March 1790, he addressed a conciliatory letter to Frederick William II,

⁴⁰ PHP, April 1790, pp. 363–364.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 364, 369. Łuskińska, in turn, reported that Spain was in favour of maintaining neutrality in the Turkish war, which was in keeping with its financial situation. GW, 19 May 1790, no. 40, p. [4].

expressing his intent to preserve peace and improve mutual relations⁴². The Warsaw press, and particularly Łuskina, followed the Austro-Prussian peace negotiations with keen interest and gave regular accounts of the exchange of dispatches between the courts in Vienna and Berlin⁴³. According to ‘Gazeta Warszawska’, the King of Hungary, with the mediation of England and Spain, hoped to avert war with Prussia⁴⁴. The same periodical reported in one of its July issues:

There is, thus far, no decision concerning war or peace. Upon the arrival of the courier from Berlin, a grand conference was convened at court yesterday; what was debated thereat remains secret and is yet unknown to the public, nonetheless, it is widely asserted that our King Leopold is strongly inclined towards peace, and that peace, in keeping with the prevailing sentiment, shall indeed ensue⁴⁵.

A supplement to that issue read as follows: “All letters from Vienna, Berlin, London, and The Hague do affirm and report that peace is now secured. Leopold and Frederick William, in full concert with their allies, reached an accord on the articles of agreement”⁴⁶. Yet the news proved premature, as just a few issues later, it was noted that the Prussian court rejected the proposals put forward by the imperial privy councillor, Baron Anton von Spielmann (1738–1813)⁴⁷.

The publisher of ‘Gazeta’ first reported in issue no. 52 of 30 June that the negotiations between Austria and Prussia – with the involvement of friendly courts: Britain, the United Provinces (Holland), and Poland – were to take place in Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów) in Silesia, near the Prussian headquarters⁴⁸. Yet, in one of the subsequent issues, he cast doubt

⁴² GW, 3 April 1790, no. 27, supplement, p. [3]; 1 May, no. 35, supplement, p. [3].

⁴³ E.g., GW, 22 May 1790, no. 41, p. [2]; 2 June, no. 44, p. [2]; 10 July, no. 55, p. [4].

⁴⁴ GW, 19 May 1790, no. 40, p. [3].

⁴⁵ GW, 10 July 1790, no. 55, p. [4].

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, supplement, p. [3].

⁴⁷ GW, 28 July, no. 60, p. [4]. On A. von Spielmann and the role he played in the Austro-Prussian negotiations, see Kaunitz, *Philipp Cobenzl und Spielmann. Ihr Briefwechsel 1779–1792*, H. Schlitter, ed., Wien 1899; idem, *Spielmann*, [in:] *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, edited by the Historical Commission of the Royal Academy of Sciences, vol. XXXV (*Spalatin–Steinmar*), Leipzig 1893, pp. 168–171. For a detailed account of the Austro-Prussian negotiations from late March to June 1790, see R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, pp. 75–77.

⁴⁸ GW, 30 June 1790, no. 52, p. [3].

on that claim, suggesting that the talks might, in fact, be held in Wrocław⁴⁹. Ultimately, however, the peace congress convened in Reichenbach, where, in late June and early July, delegates of the participating courts assembled. Austria was represented by Baron Spielmann and the Austrian ambassador to Berlin, Prince Heinrich XIV Reuss zu Plauen (1749–1799). Representing Frederick William II at the negotiating table were Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg, Prussia's chief diplomat since the Peace of Hubertusburg; General Wichard Joachim Heinrich von Möllendorff (1724–1816)⁵⁰; and Prussian ambassador to Warsaw, Margrave Girolamo Lucchesini (1751–1825)⁵¹. The negotiations were also attended by British minister Joseph Ewart (1759–1792)⁵², Dutch minister Baron Arend Willem van Reede (1747–1815)⁵³, and Polish envoy to Berlin, Prince Stanisław Paweł Jabłonowski (1762–1822)⁵⁴, all of whom acted as mediators⁵⁵. Notably, the peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two German powers was of particular interest to the Dutch, as it would spare them the obligation of disbursing a war-time subsidy to Prussia. For this reason, alongside Britain, they exerted pressure on the Prussian monarch to pursue that course⁵⁶.

⁴⁹ GW, 14 July 1790, no. 56, p. [2].

⁵⁰ B. von Poten, Moellendorff, Wichard von, [in:] *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XXII (*Mirus – v. Münchhausen*), Leipzig 1885, pp. 120–121; S. Hartmann, Moellendorff, Wichard, [in:] *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XVII (*Melander–Moller*), Berlin 1994, p. 629.

⁵¹ P. Bailieu, Lucchesini, Girolamo Marchese, [in:] *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XIX (*von Littrow–Lysura*), Leipzig 1884, pp. 345–351; Lucchesini Girolamo, [in:] *The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information*, 11th edn, H. Chisholm, ed., vol. XVII (*Lord Chamberlain to Mecklenburg*), New York 1911, pp. 95–96. On Lucchesini's diplomatic activity during the Great Sejm, see H. Kocój, *Misja posła pruskiego Lucchesiniego w Warszawie grudzień 1791 – sierpień 1792*, PNH 2006, vol. V, no. 1(9), pp. 291–322 (a brief biographical note of that politician on p. 293).

⁵² H.M.S., Ewart, Joseph, [in:] *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. XVIII (*Esdaile–Finan*), New York–London 1889, pp. 90–91. On Ewart's participation in the negotiations in Reichenbach and the position of the London court on the Austro-Prussian conflict, see J. Black, *British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions, 1783–1793*, New York 1994, pp. 260–263.

⁵³ [W.M.C.] Regt, Reede Arend Willem, baron van, [in:] *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, P.C. Molhuysen, P.J. Blok, eds, part 3, Leiden 1914, pp. 1001–1002.

⁵⁴ H. Wereszycka, Jabłonowski Stanisław Paweł, [in:] *PSB*, vol. X, Wrocław–Warszawa 1962–1964, pp. 239–241.

⁵⁵ GW, 30 June 1790, no. 52, p. [3]; 14 July, no. 56, pp. [2–3]; 21 July, no. 58, supplement, p. [3]; 28 July, no. 60, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder*, vol. III (1764–1815), O.F. Winter, ed., Graz–Köln 1965, p. 86.

⁵⁶ M. Wawrykowa, *Dzieje Niemiec 1789–1871...*, p. 10.

Regrettably, the Warsaw press did not record the terms under which Leopold II was prepared to maintain peaceful relations with the Prussian ruler. However, 'Pamiętnik' did recount the demands of the opposing camp. Prussia insisted on granting Poland most of Galicia while securing Gdańsk and Toruń for itself (Hertzberg's "alternative plan"). Austria was to return Moldavia and Bessarabia, including Khotin, to Turkey while retaining minor territorial acquisitions as defined by the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718). Frederick William II was willing to leave Belgium under Austrian rule and pledged to support Leopold in the upcoming imperial election. Austria was prepared to cede Galicia to Poland but was unwilling to relinquish its Turkish conquests. If it were to restore Wallachia to the Sublime Porte, it was determined to retain Galicia, Khotin, and the surrounding lands of Belgrade. For her part, Catherine II had no intention of returning the territories seized from the Turks, nor did she consent to the cession of Gdańsk and Toruń to Prussia⁵⁷.

Growing impatient with the protracted negotiations, Frederick William II resolved to adopt a firmer policy towards the Habsburg Monarchy and on 21 July, the court of Vienna received an ultimatum in which the Prussian king demanded a final response within ten days as to whether Austria would agree to relinquish the territories seized from the Turks beyond the Danube and the Sava, in return for which the Sublime Porte was to be persuaded to cede Croatia up to the Una. Leopold promptly convened the great council, which unanimously determined that Prussia's terms should be accepted and war avoided. It was insisted, however, that Old Orsova remain under Austrian control as a bulwark for the Banat, and the district on the left bank of the Una was to serve a similar purpose. Belgrade and other fortresses were also to be razed before being yielded to the Turks, though the matter was not vigorously pursued⁵⁸.

The terms of the Austro-Prussian agreement in Reichenbach were drafted on 25 July 1790 and signed in the evening two days later. The swift ratification of the treaty (on 2 August in Vienna and three days later in Berlin) attests to the parties' intent to bring the conflict to an immediate close⁵⁹. Łuskiński announced the conclusion of the congress in issue no. 64 of 11 August 1790. Relying on reports from Berlin, he noted:

⁵⁷ PHP, June 1790, pp. 570–571.

⁵⁸ PHP, August 1790, pp. 1025–1026.

⁵⁹ GW, 18 August 1790, no. 66, p. [2]; 25 August, no. 68, supplement, p. [3]; 28 August, no. 69, pp. [3–4].

Just now, most favourable and certain intelligence has arrived that on 25 instant [of July – M.K.], a convention was concluded at Reichenbach between our [Berlin] court and that of Vienna. Though not all its articles are yet known, it is already manifest that an armistice between Austria and the Ottoman Porte is included therein⁶⁰.

He would revisit the matter on several occasions, publishing provisional accounts concerning the terms of the agreement⁶¹. The Reichenbach convention was reprinted in issue no. 73 (11 September) from the English court newspaper ('The London Gazette'). It provided for an armistice between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, with a view to a peaceful settlement of the conflict based on the *status quo*, as well as the withdrawal of the emperor's support for Russia if hostilities were to continue. In return, Leopold was to receive the assistance of the Triple Alliance (Prussia, England, and Holland) in restoring his authority in the Netherlands, on the condition that the former constitution and privileges be reinstated. The inhabitants of that province were promised amnesty, provided they voluntarily surrendered and returned under Habsburg rule. Until the conflict between Russia and the Sublime Porte was resolved, the fortress of Khotin was to remain in Austrian hands. The treaty allowed for minor adjustments to the Austrian-Ottoman border, with Prussia to receive compensation from Upper Silesia. Those provisions were guaranteed by King George III of Great Britain (1738–1820) and the States General of the United Provinces⁶².

⁶⁰ GW, 11 August 1790, no. 64, supplement, p. [3].

⁶¹ GW, 14 August 1790, no. 65, supplement, p. [2]; 18 August, no. 66, pp. [2–3]; 28 August, no. 69, supplement, p. [2].

⁶² GW, 11 September 1790, no. 73, p. [2]; 6 October, no. 80, p. [2]. For further information on the conference in Reichenbach and the agreement reached (the text of the treaty, preliminary agreements, instructions for the plenipotentiaries), see, for instance, *Traité de Reichenbach ou actes authentiques conventions préliminaires conclues a Reichenbach, Sur les Affaires générales de l'Europe, suivi Des Traités du 9 Janvier et 10 Décembre 1790. Avec Des Notes et Observations d'un Publiciste impartial, propres à diriger les differens Negociateurs et Intéressés; le tout appuyé sur des autorités, qui conduisent à prédire l'avenir*, Bruxelles 1791; *Actes authentiques des conventions préliminaires conclues a Reichenbach, Entre Sa Majesté le Roi d'Hongrie et de Bohême, et les Cours Médiatrices*, La Haye 1791; *Declaration Fait à Reichenbach le 27 Juillet 1790. Copie D'une instruction de la proper main du Roi, au Comte de Hertzberg, en date de Schoenwalde du 25 Juillet 1790. Reserve Que Messieurs les Ministres des Cours de Londres et de La Haye ont lue et remise à la conférence du 25 Juillet 1790*, Mons [n.d.]. See also P. Ritter, *Die Konvention von Reichenbach* (27. Juli 1790), Berlin 1898; M. Hochedlinger, *Krise und Wiederherstellung...*, pp. 353–367; idem, *Austria's Wars*

Świtkowski, in turn, advised his readers of the conclusion of the Reichenbach negotiations as early as July 1790, in a closing article of the volume entitled 'Negotiations concerning peace. New circumstances in various countries'⁶³. A month later, he published an extensive piece, 'The conclusion of the negotiations in Reichenbach between the courts of Vienna and Berlin', in which he discussed the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Reichenbach convention. Commending the emperor's conduct, the editor of 'Pamiętnik' observed:

of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797, London–New York 2013, p. 393; R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, pp. 82–84; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, pp. 118–125; H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, pp. 189–190 and 395–396, fn. 115; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, pp. 499–501; K.A. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question 1700–1790*, Princeton 1982, pp. 188–190; Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde Değişen Dengeler ve Zıstovi Antlaşması*, "Gazi Akademik Bakış" 2018, vol. XI, no. 22, p. 268; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 145.

⁶³ PHP, July 1790, pp. 969–970: "The unparalleled diplomacy that for so many months held back the war – despite all preparations having already been made between Austria and Prussia – has at last succeeded in warding off this dreadful scourge from Germany and Poland. Leopold and Frederick William have agreed to keep peace between them. Austria returns to the Turks all that it conquered, disregarding the vast sums expended and the many lives lost. It also entirely renounces its alliance with Moscow, which has cost it so dearly and to no avail. However, it retains all of Galicia and the entirety of the Netherlands". Further, Świtkowski observed that one of the reasons why the King of Bohemia and Hungary resolved to maintain peace with Prussia was the death of Laudon, who had been diagnosed with acute urinary retention. The field marshal underwent a major operation, after which he never regained his strength. He died at the headquarters in Nový Jicin (Nový Jičín), Moravia, on 15 July 1790 (in fact, on 14 July) (*ibidem*, p. 970). News of Laudon's passing was also reported by Rev. Łuskiński: "Melancholy intelligence has arrived from Neutitschein, headquarters of the army assembled in Moravia, that Field Marshal Baron de Laudon, having suffered from haemorrhoidal colic, died on 14 instant [of July] after a brief illness, in the 75th year of his life. The services rendered by the late field marshal to the Austrian monarchy are so numerous, and the renown of his heroic deeds so widely known to the world, that it would be in vain to attempt to describe in words the greatness of that man or to express the profound sorrow that his death so deeply stirred in all". GW, 11 August 1790, no. 64, p. [3]. Notably, the field marshal's body was brought to Vienna on 17 July and shortly thereafter interred in the family tomb. The king granted his widow a pension of 4,000 gulden. The lavish insignia of the Military Order of Maria Theresa, bestowed upon Laudon by Joseph II, were returned to the treasury, for which the widow received substantial compensation (30,000 gulden). GW, 14 August 1790, no. 65, supplement, p. [3]; 21 August, no. 67, p. [2]. The impact of the field marshal's death on Leopold II's decision was also noted by W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, p. 125.

Just as Frederick William enjoys the admiration of all, so too may many be inclined to censure Leopold II for his singular forbearance. Yet justice must be done to this prudent monarch. What could he have undertaken, finding his treasury empty, with no prospect of aid from the Russian army – unpaid, ill-clad – and his own forces, though numerous, composed in half of newly levied troops, opposed to the sturdy Prussian army, for the support of which up to 200 million thalers had been set aside, and which could therefore well endure several campaigns? Consider the situation in the Netherlands, which Austria would likely have lost forever; the disturbances in Hungary, Tyrol, and Carniola; the vacillations in Galicia; and, lastly, the want of men to make up an army of 350,000 in future – and we shall acknowledge that Leopold acted wisely in seeking peace, though it be at the dearest cost⁶⁴.

Further on:

Thus, while Austria gains nothing from the Turks, it nonetheless loses nothing of its hereditary lands; on the contrary, had it ventured into a new war with Prussia, it might not have held fast to its recent conquests, and would doubtless have lost some of its former territories⁶⁵.

In the Ottoman capital, news of the Austro-Prussian agreement was favourably received⁶⁶. Before long, an armistice was concluded between Prince Coburg and the grand vizier, mediated and guaranteed by the King of Prussia⁶⁷.

Yet this [armistice] is most peculiar – Świtkowski observed – the pashas send word to the Austrian commanders almost daily, urging them to flee the country and issuing dreadful threats; elsewhere, without the slightest

⁶⁴ PHP, August 1790, pp. 1027–1028.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 1029.

⁶⁶ GW, 13 September 1790, no. 82, p. [3]. Cf. S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 146.

⁶⁷ There is a discrepancy in the Warsaw press as to the date on which the armistice was announced. Rev. Łuski (GW, 29 September 1790, no. 78, p. [4]; 30 October, no. 87, p. [4]) specifies two dates: 21 August and 19 September. According to 'Pamiętnik' (August 1790, p. 1168), it took place on 1 August. Kemal Beydilli (*Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 468) states that the armistice agreement was signed on 18 September by the grand vizier, and three days later by Coburg. For more on the armistice negotiations, see S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 146–148.

warning, they fall upon the Austrians, carry off whole guard detachments and pickets, and storm the entrenchments as though at war⁶⁸.

The Viennese court, angered by such conduct, ordered that the destruction of the new batteries in Belgrade and other fortresses be stopped. Regiments not yet on the march were instructed to remain at their former positions. The transport of ammunition down the Danube to Orsova resumed, and officers were compelled to buy back the horses they had already sold⁶⁹. Only after the armistice was confirmed in Constantinople did military operations fully cease⁷⁰.

The aforementioned armistice, composed of six articles, was discussed in detail in 'Gazeta Warszawska'. It was agreed that on 19 and 21 September, all hostile measures between Austria and Turkey, on land and at sea, would be halted, and immediate notifications would be sent to the border authorities. Furthermore, "should, unexpectedly, any act of hostility be committed or any damage inflicted by either party after the proclamation of this armistice, immediate satisfaction and reparation shall be granted". The ceasefire was to remain in effect for nine months from the date of signing, until June 1790. The Habsburg forces were prohibited from entering the fortresses on the left bank of the Danube – Turnu (present-day Turnu Măgurele), Gyurgevo (Giurgiu), and Braila – while the Ottoman troops were barred from Wallachia and the settlements occupied by the Austrians. It was further stipulated that both parties would enjoy free navigation along the Danube within the stretches they controlled, and mutual communication was restored. By virtue of that agreement, a significant portion of the imperial army was withdrawn from Wallachia to Transylvania⁷¹.

⁶⁸ PHP, September 1790, p. 1168.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 1168–1169.

⁷⁰ PHP, October 1790, p. 1265.

⁷¹ GW, 10 November 1790, no. 90, p. [2] (mistakenly stating that the agreement consisted of 16 articles). Cf. K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 468; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 147–148.

4. ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE THE *STATUS QUO* ON RUSSIA

Catherine declared that she would sooner be buried beneath the ruins of her own state than give her assent to the Reichenbach convention [...]

PHP, FEBRUARY 1791, P. 192

Upon conclusion of the Reichenbach convention, Prussian and Austrian envoys were promptly sent to Potemkin's headquarters in Jassy to persuade Russia to renounce its territorial gains and make peace on the strict *status quo* basis⁷². Catherine II, however, had not wavered on the matter since January 1790. She demanded that Turkey relinquish all claims to the Crimea and the Kuban, and that Russia be granted Ochakov together with the territories between the Boh and the Dniester⁷³. She also sought the establishment of independent Danubian principalities under the rule of an Orthodox prince⁷⁴. She remained steadfast in these demands throughout the year and into the early months of the next one⁷⁵.

Russia also refused to accept the mediation of the Triple Alliance in negotiations with the Sublime Porte⁷⁶. Over the autumn, envoys from the allied courts repeatedly renewed their proposals for mediation, always to no avail. In October 1790, Rev. Świtkowski reported that, encouraged by Prussia to conclude peace with Turkey on the same terms as the Viennese court, the Empress of All the Russias was said to have replied, "that she desired peace

⁷² PHP, August 1790, p. 1033; GW, 20 November 1790, no. 93, supplement, p. [2].

⁷³ Notably, Ochakov had a decided strategic importance and as long as it remained in hostile hands, it formed a constant menace to Russia's newly acquired possessions in the Crimea. The adjacent territory as far as the Dniester was at that time almost an uninhabited desert; but it was of considerable value as affording a broader frontage on the Black Sea and controlling the outlets of several important navigable rivers. Cf. R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 87.

⁷⁴ PHP, February 1790, pp. 171–172; GW, 24 February 1790, no. 16, p. [4].

⁷⁵ See, for example, GW, 20 October 1790, no. 84, p. [4]; 26 March 1791, no. 25, supplement, p. [2]; 4 May, no. 36, supplement, p. [2]; 28 May 1791, no. 43, pp. [2–3]; PHP, October 1790, p. 1264; March 1791, p. 282. Incidentally, and slightly ahead of the events discussed above, after another round of negotiations with the Triple Alliance states in the spring of 1791, the empress accepted the London court's proposal that the fortresses of Ochakov and Akerman be dismantled and that the lands between the Dnieper and the Dniester be left desolate and uninhabited, creating a buffer zone between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. PHP, April 1791, pp. 389–390; GW, 21 May 1791, no. 41, pp. [3–4]. Cf. R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 107.

⁷⁶ At the end of 1790, the Kingdom of Naples also presented an offer of mediation in the ongoing conflict to the Sublime Porte. GW, 20 December 1790, no. 104, p. [3].

but would never allow anyone to meddle in its conclusion”⁷⁷. Catherine II’s intransigence prompted Frederick William II to resort to military pressure, dispatching an army of nearly 100,000 troops under the command of Field Marshal Möllendorf to the Courland border⁷⁸. Britain, too, was preparing for war with Russia, arming its ships and recruiting sailors. The empress, however, refused to be intimidated; she ordered the ports in Riga and Reval to be fortified and amassed 60,000 troops in Livonia and White Russia⁷⁹.

Meanwhile, the empress sought to persuade Leopold II to provide her with military assistance – 20,000 troops, as stipulated in the former treaty of alliance – offering him “grand promises” in return. Informed of this, the King of Prussia instructed his envoys to ascertain the emperor’s position on the matter. Leopold declared that he “would faithfully uphold the Reichenbach convention, which brought happiness to nations, and had no intention of affording any occasion for the conflagration of war to spread”⁸⁰. Having to rely on her own resources, on 30 September, the empress issued a decree ordering a new levy for the army (4 recruits per 500 souls) to continue the war against Turkey⁸¹.

⁷⁷ PHP, October 1790, p. 1265.

⁷⁸ Notably, after the agreement was concluded in Reichenbach, a cabinet order of 15 October 1790 led to the demobilisation of regiments from the Margraviate of Brandenburg, the Duchy of Magdeburg, and most of the Silesian forces. During the winter of 1790/1791, only troops from East and West Prussia, Pomerania, three Neumark regiments, and a number of Silesian detachments remained on a war footing. Cf. C. Jany, *Armia Fryderyka Wielkiego...*, p. 236. The intention of the King of Prussia to muster an army of some 100,000 troops to be used against Russia is also noted by J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, p. 172; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia i flot v XVIII veke (Ocherki)*, Moscow 1958, p. 551.

⁷⁹ PHP, October 1790, pp. 1265–1266; November 1790, p. 1362; January 1791, pp. 85–87; February 1791, p. 185; October 1791, p. 951 (which notes that the Prussian army mobilised for war against Russia numbered approximately 80,000 troops); GNiO, 1 January 1791, no. 1, p. 2; GW, 23 February 1791, no. 16, p. [3]; 26 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [3]. “Throughout the summer, work was carried out in Reval to fortify the town, and especially its port – Świtkowski noted. – A great Russian fleet, composed of 30 ships of the line, is to remain at anchor there and keep watch over the English fleet, should it dare to set sail for Petersburg in the spring. Riga has been reinforced even further. A great force of galleys, sloops, and prams equipped with heavy artillery is to be stationed there, prepared to shield Riga from the sea and to strike Pillau, Königsberg, and the Prussian batteries near Danzig. As for the English squadron bound for the Black Sea, the Muscovites fear it not, for they know that an English ship of 74 guns cannot enter those waters, unless its artillery be first unloaded”. PHP, February 1791, p. 194.

⁸⁰ PHP, November 1790, p. 1362.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 1361–1362; GW, 6 November 1790, no. 89, supplement, p. [2].

5. THE AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGN

*By the end of May, our military force
[of Austria] stood at 446,000 men, 60,000
of whom were in hospitals.*

GW, 14 JULY 1790, NO. 56, P. [2]

With regard to military operations, it is notable that the Austrian army commenced its campaign relatively late – in June 1790. The months of April and May were spent by both belligerents on preparations for war and mutual observation⁸². They awaited the outcome of the Austro-Prussian negotiations in Reichenbach, with the naval powers (Britain and Holland) among the participants – as noted above. The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ reported that, alongside the hope for peace, the inactivity of the enemy forces was also attributed to

the extreme drought, which has prevailed since nigh the first days of winter in Poland, Germany, and Italy, and likewise in Hungary, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and deprives the cavalry of all means to take the field, where naught is growing, obliging them to remain in their winter quarters and close by the magazines⁸³.

The fact that Prince Coburg suffered from “tertian fever” was also of considerable consequence; it was not until 6 June that he left Bucharest and set out for the camp to assume supreme command of the Habsburg forces⁸⁴.

However, in April, the Austrians succeeded in storming and capturing the long-besieged fortress of New Orsova. The Habsburg troops had spent upwards of six months by its walls, losing several hundred men

⁸² PHP, June 1790, p. 534. In his May reports on the Russo-Turkish War, Świtkowski remarked: “This month, too, was scant in warlike occurrences between the Porte and the imperial courts beyond all expectation. Oberleutnant Bey of Prince Coburg’s corps had, as early as 18 April, taken 250 Turks who had crossed the Danube to harass the Austrian patrols, and of these, fifty he either put to the sword or drowned in the river. Yet this was but a single warlike incident of the entire campaign”. PHP, May 1790, p. 473. A month later, the priest-editor noted: “Between the Turkish forces on one side and the Russian and Austrian on the other, no significant engagement took place; even this month, the contending parties merely assembled troops in their camps, gathered forage, and kept one another under observation”. PHP, June 1790, p. 534.

⁸³ PHP, May 1790, p. 474.

⁸⁴ PHP, June 1790, p. 535; GW, 26 June 1790, no. 51, p. [2].

to cold and hardship before their victory could be proclaimed. In early 1790, the Pasha of Vidin, Kara Mustafa, brother of the commander of New Orsova, set out to relieve the town under siege. Taking advantage of a spell of milder weather (as the bitter cold of January had somewhat abated), the Turks crossed the River Timok and “fell upon the imperial volunteers with such vehemence that the latter, having left some 100 men on the field, could but barely seek refuge in Kladova [Kladovo – M.K.]”⁸⁵. Soon after, a force of 5,000 janissaries emerged before Kladovo, demanding that the fortress be yielded. Its commander, Lieutenant Anton von Liptay (*sive* Liptai, Liphay) (1745–1800)⁸⁶, marched out against them on 6 January with 4 battalions and 11 squadrons of hussars. “The Turks attacked him four times, but were repelled on each occasion and, in the end, scattered so completely that, having abandoned their wagons laden with provisions, they fled to Vidin. Yet even this failed to compel the Turks confined in Orsova to surrender”, Świtkowski reported⁸⁷.

At the beginning of March, Łuskina’s newspaper carried the news that the Turks managed to transport supply ships up the Danube and safely moor them at New Orsova, thereby provisioning the fortress with food and ammunition for some time⁸⁸. The commander of the investment, Colonel Count Karl von Auersperg (1750–1822)⁸⁹, once again called upon the defenders to surrender. In reply, the Turks declared that “having once sworn loyalty to Muhammad, they must keep their word and would rather be buried in the ruins of the fortress than relent to the Germans”⁹⁰. The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ observed that the Austrians were particularly intent on capturing the stronghold, as they were unable to reach Vidin, the main aim of that year’s campaign, by water. Therefore, construction of floating batteries began. However, when it became evident that they could neither transport heavy artillery and ammunition, nor adequately

⁸⁵ PHP, January 1790, p. 94.

⁸⁶ J. Hirtenfeld, *Liphay, Anton von*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden und seine Mitglieder: Nach authentischen Quellen bearbeitet*, vol. I, Wien 1857, pp. 243–244; C. von Wurzbach, *Liphay, Anton Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XV (*Leon–Lomeni*), Wien 1866, pp. 235–236.

⁸⁷ PHP, January 1790, pp. 94–95 (passage quoted above); GW, 30 January 1790, no. 9, supplement, p. [3]; 13 February, no. 13, supplement, p. [3] (indicating that the emperor, as a reward for that exploit, promoted Liptay to the rank of colonel).

⁸⁸ GW, 6 March 1790, no. 19, supplement, p. [3].

⁸⁹ J. Hirtenfeld, *Auersperg, Karl Fürst*, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 282–283.

⁹⁰ PHP, March 1790, pp. 269–270.

shield the men from enemy fire, the undertaking was abandoned. Instead, a flotilla of several dozen armed vessels was assembled⁹¹.

The artillery bombardment from Allion Mountain proved incapable of damaging the fortifications of New Orsova hewn into the rock; thus, the Austrians resolved to destroy them with explosives. Before it came to pass, however, hunger compelled the defenders to yield. The fortress capitulated under the same terms as those granted in Belgrade. The victors seized 154 cannons, 18 mortars, and a vast supply of gunpowder. The Turkish garrison, consisting of two pashas of two tails and 1,927 soldiers, marched out of the city unmolested. As a reward for the hardships endured during the investment, the victorious corps received a month's pay. In addition, the rank-and-file soldiers were each granted a gold ducat, while Colonel Auersperg was advanced to major general⁹².

As previously noted, in the spring of 1790, the main Habsburg forces, numbering between 120,000 and 136,000 men⁹³, were massed in Bohemia and Moravia in anticipation of war with Prussia. They were under the command of Field Marshal Laudon, who proceeded to inspect the troops in May⁹⁴. In the Turkish theatre of war, the emperor retained 100,000 soldiers, with Prince Coburg exercising supreme command. The corps in Transylvania and Wallachia was led by Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne, appointed in place of Prince Friedrich Wilhelm von Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, while the forces in Serbia were commanded by General of Artillery Johann Georg Count von Browne, who replaced Field Marshal Christoph von Wallis. The press reported that the Austrians intended to begin hostilities by seizing Vidin, defended by a strong Turkish garrison. In its vicinity, Grand Vizier Şerif Hasan Pasha gathered an army far exceeding that of his adversary, numbering 200,000 men. In addition, the Turks were assembling

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 269–273.

⁹² PHP, April 1790, p. 370 (which states that the fortress capitulated on 18 April); GW, 28 April 1790, no. 34, supplement, p. [2]; 15 May, no. 39, p. [3] (which instead reports that the fortress surrendered to the Austrians on 15 April); 26 May, no. 42, p. [2]; 5 June, no. 45, p. [4]. The exact date of the capitulation of New Orsova is difficult to determine, as the available studies offer two conflicting dates: 16 and 17 April. Cf., for example, M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 491; J. Hirtenfeld, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, p. 282. Łuskińska noted: "The Turkish garrison feared the summer more than the winter, for as the heat waxed stronger, the stench in the barracks would have doomed them". GW, 26 May 1790, no. 42, p. [2].

⁹³ PHP, May 1790, p. 476; GW, 24 April 1790, no. 33, supplement, p. [3]. Robert H. Lord (*Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 81) estimated the size of that army at 150,000 troops.

⁹⁴ PHP, May 1790, p. 476; GW, 5 June 1790, no. 54, p. [4].

troops in Bosnia and reserve forces near Adrianople, seeking to strike from all sides against an opponent in a precarious position, threatened by a Prussian invasion⁹⁵. However, with no artillery yet in place, the execution of these plans proved impossible⁹⁶.

In July 1790, Świtkowski noted that the Austrians abandoned their intention to besiege Vidin, following demands from the court of Berlin during the Reichenbach negotiations that imperial troops refrain from any operations on the right bank of the Danube. Prince Coburg's new plan envisaged the capture of Turkish fortresses in Wallachia, with Gyurgevo to be taken first. The editor of 'Pamiętnik' observed:

As that fortress stands in the very midst of the border traced by the Danube between Wallachia and Bulgaria, its capture would prove most advantageous to the Austrians. From thence, they could either readily cross the Danube towards Adrianople or menace Vidin on the right and Brail on the left⁹⁷.

The undertaking was all the more difficult as the besieged could easily receive assistance from either of the said two cities or from the grand vizier himself, who was encamped almost directly opposite in Rushchuk (Ruse). From his main camp at Frusinesti (Fruşineşti), Coburg dispatched a small corps which encircled the fortress on 2 June and commenced its bombardment the following day, reducing the suburbs to rubble. The Turks made several sallies, but failed to inflict significant losses on their adversaries. On the evening of 8 June, after the Austrians had completed their batteries, the Ottoman troops fell upon them with such force that they were driven from their entrenchments. The Austrians sustained 3,000 fatalities, with 400 men wounded and 300 taken prisoner. They also lost all their artillery – more than 30 cannon of various calibres – along with many ammunition wagons. The loss of their artillery made it impossible for the Austrians to continue the siege, which had to be postponed⁹⁸.

⁹⁵ PHP, April 1790, pp. 369–370; May 1790, pp. 475–476; GW, 7 April 1790, no. 28, supplement, p. [1]; 17 April, no. 31, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 21 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [2]; 24 April, no. 33, p. [3].

⁹⁶ The Turks lost a significant part of their artillery in the battles of Mărtineşti, Kladovo, and New Orsova; that is why the grand vizier was forced to await the arrival of cannons from Sofia. GW, 14 July 1790, no. 56, p. [3]; PHP, June 1790, p. 535.

⁹⁷ PHP, July 1790, p. 965.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 964–966; GW, 17 July 1790, no. 57, supplement, p. [2]; 21 July, no. 58, p. [2]; 28 July, no. 60, p. [2]; 21 August, no. 67, p. [2]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 491; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 535.

Taking advantage of the temporary setback suffered by the imperial forces, the grand vizier led a sizeable force across the Danube near Gyurgevo. The Wallachian hospodar, Nicholas Mavrogheni, who commanded the vanguard, crossed the river near Vidin and entrenched himself in the vicinity of Calafat. On 26 June, General François-Sébastien de Croix, Count of Clerfayt, mounted an attack against him, killing 1,500 soldiers and capturing the entire camp train, save for the artillery, which the enemy managed to ferry across to the opposite bank. The Turks also lost part of their flotilla.

Meanwhile, the centre of the grand vizier's army completed the construction of two bridges opposite Nicopolis and began to cross the river.

General Karayczay [Andreas Karaczay – M.K.], stationed 6 miles away, was apprised of it in good time – Świtkowski reported. – And as the area was thickly overgrown, he approached the Danube with 2,500 cavalry and infantry, remaining entirely unobserved. Promptly, 10 cannons were positioned against the bridges, and when some 1,000 Turkish cavalry crossed to this side, the bridge was torn apart by artillery fire within 9 minutes, while the Turks who had already crossed were either cut down or routed⁹⁹.

A few days later, the grand vizier led the remainder of his army – a total of 120,000 men – across the Danube. Coburg took no action in response, having barely 35,000 troops at his disposal and awaiting the arrival of the Russian auxiliary corps under General Alexander Suvorov (10,000 strong)¹⁰⁰.

In another theatre of war – in Croatia – on 25 June, Field Marshal Wallis laid siege to the heavily fortified castle of Cetin (Cetinje) and “soon reduced nearly all its buildings to ashes with bombs and artillery”¹⁰¹. A week later, on 1 July, the siege began. That day the defenders, reinforced with fresh troops, struck the Austrians with such force “that only heroic steadfastness could withstand the dreadful onslaught”¹⁰². Gravely wounded, Wallis handed over command of the siege to Major General Daniel Peharnik-Hotkovich (1745–1794)¹⁰³, who carried the fortress by storm

⁹⁹ PHP, July 1790, pp. 967–968.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 966–968; GW, 31 July, no. 61, p. [4]; 14 August, no. 65, supplement, p. [3]; 21 August, no. 67, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus kniaz Suvorov*, vol. I, St Petersburg 1884, pp. 376–377.

¹⁰¹ PHP, July 1790, p. 968.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*, p. 969.

¹⁰³ C. von Wurzbach, *Peharnik-Hotkovich, Daniel Freiherr*, [in:] idem, *Biographisches Lexicon...*, vol. XXI (O'Donnell–Perényi), Wien 1870, pp. 427–428; J. Hirtenfeld,

on 20 July 1790¹⁰⁴. This marked the final success of the imperial forces in the war. Shortly thereafter, the Reichenbach convention was concluded, under which Austria withdrew from the conflict with the Ottoman Empire, pledging to promptly agree to an armistice and to enter into peace negotiations. Deprived of a valuable ally, Russia now stood alone against the Sublime Porte and the European coalition.

6. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

As the compact concluded at Reichenbach did not extend to Moscow, the war between the Porte and Moscow thus continued without cease.

PHP, AUGUST 1790, p. 1065

As Piotr Świtkowski aptly remarked, “The Muscovites, true to their custom, spent the summer in repose, and only with the coming of autumn did they begin to show that the war with the Turks was yet ongoing”¹⁰⁵. Indeed, Prince Potemkin kept his forces idle throughout the spring and summer while conducting secret negotiations with the grand vizier. By mid-May, his troops were still in their winter quarters in Jassy, where General Prince Nikolai V. Repnin arrived to coordinate military plans¹⁰⁶. While the land army squandered the most favourable months for campaigning, naval operations were already underway in late spring. Notably, significant changes took place within the Russian naval command. In March 1790, Potemkin reassigned Rear Admiral Marko Ivanovich Voinovich, who had been locked in an acrimonious dispute with Rear Admiral Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov (1745–1817)¹⁰⁷, to a distinctly subordinate position as commander of the Caspian Sea Fleet, while placing the latter in charge of the Black Sea Fleet. Supreme command over

Peharnik-Hotkovich, Daniel Freiherr, [in:] idem, *Der Militär-Maria-Theresien-Orden...*, vol. I, pp. 330–331 (on p. 331 the exploits of that general at Cetin are discussed).

¹⁰⁴ PHP, July 1790, pp. 968–969; GW, 18 August 1790, no. 66, p. [4]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 492. For a more detailed account of all Austrian military operations against the Turks in the 1790 campaign, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vol. II (1789–1791 gg.), St Petersburg 1880, pp. 113–118.

¹⁰⁵ PHP, November 1790, p. 1356.

¹⁰⁶ GW, 26 June 1790, no. 51, supplement, p. [2].

¹⁰⁷ S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar' generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. II (L–Ä), Moscow 2010, p. 628; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov*, “Voprosy istorii” 2002, no. 3, p. 62.

the Mediterranean flotilla, composed of privateering units formerly led by Lambros Katsonis and Guglielmo Lorenzi¹⁰⁸, was entrusted to a Greek by birth, Captain Antonio (Anton) Psaro¹⁰⁹.

According to dispatches from Constantinople relayed by the publisher of 'Gazeta Warszawska', on 16 May, a Turkish squadron operating in the Adriatic, supported by Algerian xebecs, attacked the Russian flotilla commanded by Major Katsonis. They captured four enemy ships and sank two of them. Katsonis's own vessel was lost, and he barely escaped with his life. The Turks also seized Russian magazines on the island of Kea off the coast of Attica and imposed a war contribution on the island of Tinos (Tenos) in the Aegean Sea¹¹⁰.

On 17 and 18 May, Katsonis's flotilla clashed with the enemy squadron (comprising 17 ships) yet again, this time to his advantage, as the Turks were forced to withdraw. The following day, the Ottoman fleet, reinforced by Tunisian vessels (33 sails in total), attacked the Russian formation near the island of Andros in the Aegean Sea. Five enemy vessels, including the flagship, were sunk. The Russian admiral, aboard one of the smaller ships, fled to the island of Cerigo (Kythira)¹¹¹.

In the second half of May, Ushakov, commanding the Russian flotilla, raided the enemy coastline¹¹². He made port at Sinope, where the Turks busied themselves with the loading of 15 large merchant ships. Some of them were compelled to surrender, while the remainder were either sunk or burned by the Russians. On Ushakov's orders, the magazines and other

¹⁰⁸ A. Blondy, *Guglielmo Lorenzi, corsaire cap corsin, grand amiral moscovite*, [in:] *La Corse, La Méditerranée et la Russie*, Ajaccio 2014, pp. 29–48; J. Rogoziński, *The Wordsworth Dictionary of Pirates*, Ware 1997, p. 204.

¹⁰⁹ GW, 5 June 1790, no. 45, supplement, p. [2]; 16 June, no. 48, supplement, pp. [1–2]; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie 1775–1851*, Warszawa 2001, p. 144; V.D. Docenko, *Morskie bitwy Rossii XVIII–XX vekov*, 3rd revised edn, St Petersburg 2002, p. 51; V. Ganichev, *Ushakov*, Moscow 1990, p. 172; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, p. 522. On A. Psaro's life and career, see N.Ch. Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries*, Thessaloniki 1991, pp. 86–88; I.M. Zakharova, *Anton Konstantinovich Psaro*, "Voprosy istorii" 2015, no. 11, pp. 19–33; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 358.

¹¹⁰ GW, 18 August 1790, no. 66, p. [4]. Cf. E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks: From the Beginning of Their Empire to the Present Time. Chiefly Founded on Von Hammer*, vol. II, London 1856, p. 298.

¹¹¹ GW, 21 July 1790, no. 58, pp. [3–4]. Cf. E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks...*, p. 299.

¹¹² P.P. Wieczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich. Wiek żagla*, vol. I, Warszawa 1995, p. 411; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 415; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 553.

port structures were bombarded and reduced to ruins. An estimated 300 Turkish soldiers were taken prisoner¹¹³.

Less than two months later, the Turks attempted a landing operation in the Crimea, seeking to divert part of the Russian forces from the territories under threat of their advance. The fleet dispatched to the Black Sea under Hüseyin Küçük Pasha consisted of 18 ships of the line and 12 frigates. In response, Rear Admiral Ushakov set out from Sevastopol at the head of a squadron comprising 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, and 13 lighter vessels. The Turks attacked their weaker opponent but were repelled and, having sustained losses, were forced to flee. The Russians lost 4 frigates in the engagement¹¹⁴.

Meanwhile, on land, following the news of the Reichenbach convention, Suvorov's corps withdrew from Bucharest and relocated to the River Seret, which now marked a line of demarcation. From that point onwards, the Russian army could operate only within a limited area along the lower Danube, where the mighty fortress of Izmil towered over the landscape. 'Pamiętnik' reported that the grand vizier, at the head of 30,000 troops, began crossing the Danube, intent on attacking the outnumbered enemy, but part of the janissaries mutinied and clashes erupted within the Ottoman ranks. Potemkin reinforced Suvorov with the reserve corps of Prince Sergei

¹¹³ GW, 14 August 1790, no. 65, p. [3]. Cf. J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, pp. 144–145; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiia...*, p. 554; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov...*, p. 62.

¹¹⁴ PHP, August 1790, pp. 1065–1067 [incorrect page numbering]; GW, 9 October 1790, no. 81, p. [3]. The battle was fought on 19 July 1790 in the Kerch Strait. It revealed the military genius of Ushakov, who employed several new tactics against the Turkish fleet. For that victory, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet was awarded the Order of Saint Vladimir, Second Class. For further details, see V. Ganichev, *Ushakov...*, pp. 173–174; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiia...*, pp. 554–555; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 121–126; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov...*, pp. 62–63; V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia Rossiiskogo flota*, vol. III (XVIII vv.), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 410–414 (indicating that the Ottoman fleet comprised 10 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 36 auxiliary transport vessels and 110 cannons, while the Russian fleet consisted of 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, and 17 smaller vessels with 860 cannons. The Turks suffered significant losses in ships and men, whereas its opponent recorded 29 killed and 68 wounded); S.Iu. Danilov, *Glavnye morskie srazheniia ot trier do avianoscev*, Moscow 2013, p. 65 (where similar estimates of forces and losses are provided) and V.D. Docenko, *Morskie bitvy...*, p. 52 (according to the author, the Russian squadron comprised 5 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 17 smaller vessels); J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, pp. 145–146. Cf. also P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich...*, p. 411; E. Kosiarz, *Bitwy morskie*, 4th edn, revised and expanded, Warszawa 1994, pp. 133–134; Z. Ryniewicz, *Leksykon bitew świata*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 250–251.

Fedorovich Golitsyn, and Şerif Hasan Pasha resumed peace negotiations. These, however, were soon broken off. Serenissimus ordered an assault on Izmail, which stood as a major impediment to his army's progress into the interior of Romania¹¹⁵.

The advance of the Russian army towards the Balkans required naval support. Accordingly, the command intended to transfer the oared flotilla under Major General José de Ribas y Bayons, stationed in Ochakov, to the waters of the Danube. Ushakov was tasked with shielding its passage. Fearing that enemy vessels would emerge on the flank of their army, the Turks resolved to thwart that plan and directed their fleet towards the Dnieper Liman. By the end of August, it anchored between the Tendra Spit and Hadjibey. It comprised 10 ships of the line and 4 frigates. On 8 September, the Sevastopol flotilla (6 ships of the line and 14 frigates) appeared before Hüseyin Pasha's fleet, then lying at anchor, compelling it to engage in battle. The engagement began at two in the afternoon and lasted until evening. Unable to withstand the artillery fire, the Turks began retreating seaward, and the Russians gave chase. As night fell, Ushakov had to moor his ships near Berezan Island. The following day, the Russian fleet mounted another attack on the Turks, destroying the admiral's flagship *Kapudana* carrying 74 cannons. Two other vessels – a ship of the line under the command of a pasha of three tails, Said Bey (600 men, 66 guns), and a frigate with 200 men on board – were captured by the Russians. Along with “the finest sailor of the Turkish fleet”, Said Bey, several “distinguished” officers and the fleet's chief commissioner were taken prisoner. The Russians suffered only 12 casualties, while enemy losses were not specified in the press, though they were considered to have been substantial. That victory allowed Ribas's squadron to enter the waters of the Danube Delta and take part in the capture of Izmail¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁵ PHP, August 1790, p. 1067; September 1790, p. 1167; GW, 9 October 1790, no. 81, p. [4].

¹¹⁶ GW, 16 October 1790, no. 83, pp. [2–3]; 6 November, no. 89, pp. [3–4]; PHP, September 1790, pp. 1167–1168; October 1790, pp. 1264–1265. The relevant historiography provides differing estimates regarding the fleets engaged in battle and the losses they suffered. Witalij D. Docenko (*Morskie bitvy...*, pp. 53–54) states that the Ottoman flotilla comprised 14 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 14 smaller vessels, while the Russian fleet consisted of 5 ships of the line, 11 frigates, and 20 smaller ships. The Ottomans lost 2 ships of the line, several smaller vessels, and over 2,000 men. On the Russian side, 21 men were killed and 25 wounded. Similar figures are provided by V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia...*, p. 420; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich...*, p. 412; S.Iu. Danilov, *Glavnye morskije srazheniia...*, p. 67; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov...*, pp. 63–64. Ushakov's biography, V. Ganichev

The press reported that after the battle near the Tendra Spit, Potemkin travelled through Akerman to Hadjibey to inspect the Black Sea Fleet and see for himself what “advantages” it had gained over the Turks. Having ascertained on site that, owing to the damage sustained, the enemy’s naval forces would pose no further threat to the Russian fleet that year¹¹⁷, he devised a plan for further operations. On returning to Bender, where he had relocated his headquarters in August, he instructed General of Artillery Johann Meller-Zakomelsky to march on Kilia with a corps of 10,000 men and to begin its siege as soon as the oared flotilla arrived. The editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ offered a rather critical assessment of the fortress’s defences, stating: “Kilia, like other Turkish strongholds, is but a small town enclosed by walls, with somewhat extensive suburbs, surrounded by meagre earthworks”¹¹⁸. Łuskina, by contrast, remarked that the fortress

(*Ushakov...*, p. 175), estimates the Turkish forces at 14 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 4 small vessels. According to other authors, the commander of the Russian squadron had 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, and 21 smaller vessels under his command. Cf. L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiia...*, pp. 556–557; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 145–146 (reporting that the Turks lost approximately 800 men in that battle); J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 146; E. Kosiarz, *Bitwy morskie...*, pp. 133, 135; Z. Ryniewicz, *Leksykon bitew...*, p. 485. For the latest findings on the events near the Tendra Spit, see A.A. Lebedev, *Novyi shtrikh k izvestnym srazheniiam Chernomorskogo flota*, “Gangut” 2018, no. 107, pp. 64–82. Notably, although the outcome of the battle was unfavourable for the Turks, the sultan granted Hüseyin Pasha the title of Gazi (Victor), presented him with a diamond-inlaid dagger, a small landholding (a single village), and allowed his solemn entry into Constantinople. GW, 6 November 1790, no. 89, p. [4]; 8 December, no. 98, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 25 December, no. 103, p. [3]. Świtkowski noted the following: “The [Kapudan] Pasha returned to Constantinople and, although he had accomplished nothing in this campaign, nay, he lost 6 ships of the line, 3 great caravels, and left his fleet all but ruined, he was nonetheless welcomed in triumph by the Grand Sultan, who, besides bestowing upon him the title of *victor*, presented him with considerable gifts” (PHP, December 1790, p. 1454). Ushakov, in turn, was awarded the Order of St George, Second Class, and granted 500 souls in White Russia. Cf. V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia...*, p. 421; V.D. Docenko, *Morskie bitvy...*, p. 54; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 539–540.

¹¹⁷ Following the defeat suffered at Tendra, the kapudan pasha’s fleet endured further losses during a storm on 26 September 1790, after which it sought refuge in Büyükdere. It then comprised 10 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 4 bomb vessels, and 5 gunboats. The Turks lost 4 ships of the line, several corvettes, and 8,000 men killed and wounded in battle against the Russians and due to the storm. GW, 8 December 1790, no. 98, supplement, p. [2]. On the damage sustained by the Turkish fleet in 1790, see A.A. Lebedev, *Chernomorskie srazheniia F.F. Ushakova: neizvestnye itogi izvestnykh pobed*, “Gangut” 2013, no. 76, p. 33.

¹¹⁸ PHP, November 1790, p. 1357.

was well fortified and that its seaward access was defended by a squadron of ten ships and three fire ships, under the command of French officers in Ottoman service. During the first, unsuccessful assault on 15 October, the Russians suffered heavy losses, as de Ribas had not yet destroyed the Ottoman Danube flotilla, and the kapudan pasha attempted to land an expeditionary corps. Some 700 Russian soldiers were killed, while the renowned General Meller-Zakomelsky was wounded in the chest and died a few days later. Fearing the consequences of another enemy attack, the fortress garrison, 5,000-strong, surrendered Kilia on 18 October. The Turkish commander remained inside the fortress, afraid to return to Constantinople¹¹⁹.

On 11 October, Major General Ivan Ivanovich Herman (Ger. Johann Hermann von Fersen) (c. 1744–1801)¹²⁰, operating on the opposite shore of the Black Sea in the Kuban, distinguished himself by defeating numerically superior forces under Batal Pasha. Some 3,000 Turks and Tatars were killed, while 2,000 were taken prisoner. The entire camp, over 30 cannons, and the serasker himself accompanied by his considerable retinue, fell into the hands of the victors¹²¹. In recognition

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 1356–1359; December 1790, p. 1454; GW, 28 August 1790, no. 69, p. [2]; 16 October, no. 83, p. [3]; 30 October, no. 87, supplement, p. [3]; 4 December, no. 97, pp. [2–3] and supplement, p. [3]; 8 December, no. 98, p. [4]; 25 December, no. 103, p. [3]. Cf. Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt (10.II.1766 – 4.XI.1836), [in:] *Russkie memuary. Izbrannye stranitsy. XVIII vek*, E.M. Kostrova, ed., Moscow 1988, pp. 274–275; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 149–150; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 523; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 552; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 216.

¹²⁰ N.K. Aleksandrovich, *German, Ivan Ivanovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. V (*Gerberskii-Gogenloe*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, Moscow 1916, pp. 45–48; A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 153–154; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I (A–K), Moscow 2010, p. 342.

¹²¹ PHP, November 1790, p. 1359; GW, 14 December 1790, no. 97, p. [2]. Cf. L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 564; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 523; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 552 (according to the author, the defeated Turkish army numbered 25,000 troops); [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin, Field-marshal and Commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, Grand Admiral of the Fleets, Knight of the Principal Orders of Prussia, Sweden, and Poland, and of All the Orders of Russia etc. Comprehending Original Anecdotes of Catharine the Second, and of the Russian Court*, London 1812, p. 234 (where different estimates of the Turkish forces – 30,000 men – are reported); V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, p. 216 (with an estimate of Batal Pasha's forces at 40,000 soldiers); A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700–1814 gg.*), Moscow 1992, p. 153 (the number put at 50,000 men). General Herman left an account of the Caucasian campaign: *Zhurnal kampanii po Kavkazskoi linii pokoinogo generala ot infanterii i kavalera Ivana Ivanovicha Germana 1790 goda, ot 22 Sentiabria po 30 chislo*, "Otechestvennye zapiski"

of his achievements, the empress awarded Herman the Order of St George, Second Class, and granted him estates in the province of Polotsk¹²².

By Potemkin's order, Lieutenant General Baron Vladimir Ivanovich Rosen (1742–1790)¹²³ crossed the River Kuban on 3 October and advanced into Ottoman territory, setting abandoned dwellings ablaze. Four days later, he forded the River Marta, destroying ten settlements. On 9 October, he reached the River Pshisha, having razed 28 Turkish villages along the way. When the Turks attempted to prevent his crossing, "he gave a bloody repulse upon them, leaving 300 dead on the field and took the village of Cuzcukbable (well supplied with munitions and provisions) by force"¹²⁴. On 22 October, a detachment of Cossacks engaged in a skirmish with the local mountaineers, scattering them and seizing substantial spoils. The Russians' successes against the Caucasian population prompted the arrival of the autonomous prince Durka and Mitchosha Audzugure Ismail in the Russian camp, seeking the empress's protection. General Rosen "received them graciously and, having heard their oath of allegiance, accepted a pledge from among them as security for the agreement"¹²⁵. Following the example of the aforementioned beys, the Nogai Tatars requested permission to relocate their settlements to the right bank of the Kuban, which was duly granted. Rosen, having extended Catherine II's dominion over the northwestern Caucasus, returned to his previous position on 13 November 1790¹²⁶.

In the early days of November, Major General de Ribas's oared flotilla forced its way into the waters of the Danube, capturing two Turkish

1825, vol. XXIV, no. 66, pp. 352–382. Notably, in one of the February issues of his newspaper, Łuskina published false information claiming that General Herman seized Turkish Anapa on the Black Sea coast. However, that important fortress was captured on 3 July 1791 by troops under the command of General Ivan Gudovich. GW, 9 February 1791, no. 12, supplement, p. [4]. Cf. N.S. Kiniapina, M.M. Bliev, V.V. Degoev, *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii: vtoraiia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX veka*, Moscow 1984, p. 75; and P. Olszewski, *Polityka Rosji wobec Kaukazu w okresie panowania Katarzyny II (1762–1796)*, "Piotrkowskie Zeszyty Historyczne" 2008, vol. IX, p. 55.

¹²² GW, 26 February 1791, no. 17, supplement, p. [1].

¹²³ Rozen, *baro Vladimir Ivanovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. XVI (*Reitern–Roltsberg*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1913, pp. 388–389; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 411.

¹²⁴ GW, 26 February 1791, no. 17, supplement, p. [1]. The locality could not be identified.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. [2].

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. [1–2]. For a more detailed discussion of the Caucasus campaign, see A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraiia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 157–164.

batteries comprising several heavy guns that defended the mouth of the river. It shattered the enemy's riverine squadron (some 50 vessels of various types) and compelled it to retreat towards Isakcha (Isaccea). A few days later, the Russians occupied Tulcha (Tulcea), situated on the right bank of the Danube opposite Izmail. Without incurring significant losses, they seized 25 cannons and some provisions. De Ribas's oared vessels also took control of the nearby island of Sulina, cutting Izmail off from the river.

On 24 November, the Russian flotilla headed towards Isakcha. On seeing the enemy, the Turks opened a heavy cannonade from their land batteries and oared flotilla (over 30 boats), which had taken refuge there after being driven from the mouth of the Danube. The Russians returned fire and emerged victorious. They burned 21 Ottoman war vessels (including a dispatch boat on which Admiral Hasan Pasha made short journeys) and seized the rest. The Turks abandoned their ships, the coastal batteries, and the fortress itself, which served as the main magazine for the entire Ottoman army. Within the stronghold, the Russians found 60 cannons of various calibres, a mortar "for hurling 480-pound bombs", and, above all, a substantial stock of provisions, sufficient to sustain the fleet and a significant part of the Russian forces for a year. By the end of November, the entire lower Danube up to Galatz was in Russian hands – except for Izmail. Potemkin therefore ordered that the fortress be taken¹²⁷.

¹²⁷ GW, 15 December 1790, no. 100, supplement, p. [3]; 5 January 1791, no. 2, supplement, p. [3]; 8 January, no. 3, supplement, pp. [3–4]; PHP, December 1790, pp. 1453–1454; January 1791, pp. 70–73; GNiO, 5 January 1791, no. 2, p. 7; 8 January, no. 3, p. 10. Cf. A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 151–157; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 148; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 524; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 553. Świtkowski noted the following about the capture of Isakcha: "The garrison of that fortress was greatly alarmed by the tales of fugitives who, having escaped Tulcha with their lives, could not cease speaking of the formidable and irresistible force of the Muscovites, whose might on land and at sea lays waste to all that dares to resist it. No marvel, then, that fear took hold of all those in Izaccia [Isaccea] when the Russian flotilla loomed into view, formed for battle and with an imposing stance. Without awaiting an attack, the Turks abandoned the fortress entrusted to them, spreading word as they went that 100,000 Muscovites were following close behind, ravaging all with fire and sword. Thus, the Cossacks entered Izakka without the feeblest resistance". PHP, January 1791, pp. 70–71.

7. IZMAIL

That bloody and dreadful slaughter did not cease until the whole town of Izmail lay in Russian hands.

GW, 22 JANUARY 1791, NO. 7, SUPPLEMENT, PP. [1–2]

The press under Stanislas Augustus provided extensive coverage of the siege and capture of Izmail – the most formidable Turkish fortress in the Black Sea region. Rev. Świtkowski wrote a lengthy article on the event, published in the January issue of his newspaper. Stefan Łuskina, interestingly, exercised greater restraint in that regard, publishing only a brief note on the commencement of the siege¹²⁸ and a report on the assault itself¹²⁹, which amounted more to a list of enemy casualties than to a detailed account of what had taken place. The editor of ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ revisited the subject a month later (in the issue of 23 February)¹³⁰, printing information on the overall Turkish losses. The publishers of ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ gave the event the least attention, publishing a single report on the assault, spanning merely half a column. It pointed to the brutality of the Russian forces, who all but annihilated the civilian population, and the resolve of the tsarist commanders, who disregarded their own losses in order to achieve the objective set by Potemkin. Concurrently, emphasis was placed on the heroism of the fortress’s defenders¹³¹. Notably, the Warsaw newspaper reports on the attack on Izmail do not always fully align as to the specifics.

¹²⁸ GW, 8 January 1791, no. 3, supplement, p. [4].

¹²⁹ GW, 22 January 1791, no. 7, supplement, pp. [1–2].

¹³⁰ GW, 23 February 1791, no. 16, supplement, p. [3].

¹³¹ GNiO, 15 January 1791, no. 5, p. 19: “The Turks fought like lions, not only mounting a valiant defence at the ramparts but also making the victors pay dearly for their triumph once they entered the town, for each Turk held his ground fiercely, yielding only in death; thus, of 16,000 troops of the Turkish host, the Muscovites did not take only one pasha and 400 common soldiers captive, the rest chose to be buried beneath the ruins of their refuge. For three days, the Muscovites slaughtered the townsfolk, civilians rather than soldiers, their wives and children, and up to 12,000 perished. What cruelty it is to kill innocents! Human nature should recoil at such a heinous act! [...] It should come as no surprise that the fortress fell; for when one is determined to take a stronghold and is willing to risk so many men, no fortress can resist for long. Yet the courage of the Turks and their love of their homeland, how they defended it, may serve as an example to us, as did that at Thermopylae for the Greeks”. Łuskina justified the bloody massacre of the Turks by their own actions: “The enraged victors, incensed by the treachery and dishonesty of the enemy

Izmail was a mighty stronghold in the northern part of the Danube Delta, with ancient walls and a deep moat, which had been reinforced during the war by French and German engineers, rendering it nearly impregnable. It was encircled by eleven earthen bastions and thick palisades. Within the fortifications stood two tall bastions, and access was provided by four gates: the Constantinople Gate and the Khotin Gate to the west, the Bender Gate to the northeast, and the Kilia Gate to the east. Its defence was bolstered by a formidable artillery force of over 260 cannons of various calibres and some 18,000 troops. The Ottoman Danube fleet was stationed just outside its walls¹³².

Prince Nikolai V. Repnin, leading an 18,000-strong force and supported by a corps under Suvorov (13,000 men), made an attempt to seize Izmail at the beginning of September 1790. However, the effort proved unsuccessful, and he was forced to withdraw¹³³. Following the capture of Kilia and Tulcha, the Russian general once again laid siege to the fortress in mid-November. This time, he commanded 25,000 troops, supported from the sea by a flotilla under Major General J. de Ribas. A month later, Potemkin ordered Repnin to mount a general assault without delaying for a formal siege. The prince considered such an attack both risky and costly, and did not hesitate to express his reservations to the commander-in-chief. Potemkin then

(who, after ceasing their resistance upon the capture of the citadel by the Russians, suddenly resumed fire) could not restrain themselves and spared no one”.

¹³² PHP, January 1791, pp. 72–73; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, p. 148; L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov*, Moscow 2012, pp. 149–150; A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 379. Notably, A. Gladkii contributed an article on Russian reconnaissance at Izmail to the proceedings of a conference held in memory of M.I. Kutuzov. The author analysed the information gathered by Kutuzov about this Turkish fortress and concluded that all the documents indicate the garrison's size was between 10,000 and 15,000 men, not 35,000 as stated later in the official report on the capture of the fortress (see A.I. Gladkii, *Razvedyvatelnaia deiatelnost M.I. Kutuzova pod Izmailom*, [in:] *M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Proceedings of the scholarly conference in commemoration of the commander*, St Petersburg 1993, pp. 30–31). This information, however, did not gain wider recognition in academic circles, as evidenced by the latest works on the subject, which contain inflated estimates (30 to 35,000 troops). Cf., for example, O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov*, vol. I, Moscow 2018, p. 126; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 524; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 553; D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, CT–London 2006, p. 87; R.M. Vvedenskii, V.V. Malandin, E.A. Kolesnikova, G.V. Talina, G.A. Artamonov, A.I. Komissarenko, *Istoriia Rossii XVII–XVIII vv.*, Moscow 2008, p. 363; V.A. Volkov, V.E. Voronin, V.V. Gorsky, *Voennaia istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XIX veka*, Moscow 2012, p. 121; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 217, 224.

¹³³ Cf. PHP, October 1790, p. 1265, providing a false report on the capture of the fortress.

summoned Suvorov, who was stationed near Galatz with 36,000 troops, and instructed him to take the city at any cost. Repnin was meanwhile assigned to a different command.

On his arrival at the camp before the fortress, Suvorov promptly convened a war council, where he stated that an immediate assault was essential. Some argued that for the attack to succeed, the fortress would have to be approached both from land and from the river, where the Turkish flotilla was stationed. Suvorov thus ordered Ribas to destroy the enemy vessels or force them to retreat towards Galatz. The Spanish commander in the service of the empress, having gathered around 70 vessels of various types, struck at the enemy fleet, which comprised 28 large river galleys and a number of smaller boats, some of which he destroyed, while the rest were driven into a narrow branch of the Danube. He then demolished the Turkish batteries positioned along a half-mile stretch of the riverbank. With the fortress now exposed from the river, it was stormed from all directions¹³⁴.

That assault, described as “the most ferocious since the Turks captured Constantinople”¹³⁵, began on 22 December at five in the morning and, after eight hours, ended in the slaughter of the inhabitants. The Russian infantry was divided into 7 columns, each with 2,500 soldiers. Ribas, leading a column of dismounted Cossacks attacking across the Danube, twice breached the palisades and was twice forced to retreat. The Turks, no less resolute, held their ground on the landward side. For three hours, the attacking columns came under intense canister fire. Eventually, the cavalry had to dismount and support the faltering columns. Generals and officers inspired courage in their troops by personal example. Yet nothing contributed more to the Russian victory than the Orthodox clergy, who, bearing crosses, marched at the head of the columns and were the first to climb the ladders. The sight of priests defying death filled the attackers with heroic resolve. The Russians mounted a third assault on the ramparts and soon seized them. The Cossacks under General Ribas were the first to break into the bastions, followed by two other columns of grenadiers. After a fierce struggle, the fourth column – formed from the Fanagoria Grenadier Regiment – took three further bastions, putting their defenders to the sword. By noon, the Russian troops had full control of all ramparts and earthworks, and hostilities moved into the fortress. The Turks held out

¹³⁴ PHP, January 1791, pp. 73–75; GNiO, 15 January 1791, no. 5, p. 19. Cf. A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 386.

¹³⁵ PHP, January 1791, p. 75.

for another hour before succumbing to the fury of the victors. Fewer than 10,000 civilians survived, having hidden in their homes, and emerged only after several days¹³⁶.

Turkish losses were immense. Citing reports from the victors, the editor of 'Pamiętnik' noted that 24,000 Turkish soldiers were killed and 10,000 taken prisoner¹³⁷. Łuskina provided even more staggering figures: approximately 31,000 killed and 13,000 captured (including Turks, Christians, and Jews)¹³⁸. Many high-ranking Ottoman and Tatar commanders perished, including Serasker Aidos Mehmed Pasha, who was in charge of the fortress, and Kaplan Giray, brother of the Crimean khan, together with his five sons, as well as Prussian and British artillery officers

¹³⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 75–77; GNiO, 15 January 1791, no. 5, p. 19; GW, 22 January 1791, no. 7, supplement, p. [1]. For more on the assault and capture of Izmail, see A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, pp. 387–396; N.A. Orlov, *Shturm Izmaila Suvorovym v 1790 godu*, St Petersburg 1890; F. Anthing, *History of the Campaigns of Count Alexander Suworow Rymnikski, Field-marshal-general in the Service of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias: with a Preliminary Sketch of His Private Life and Character*, vol. II, London 1799, pp. [131–173]; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 165–187 (providing a detailed account of all Russian military operations at Izmail, culminating in the assault and capture of the fortress); S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 524–528; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 553–557; [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 215–217; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 217–225; L.G. Beskrovnnii, *Russkaia armia...*, pp. 559–563; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka. Prawda i mit*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 496–497 (where, however, an entirely unfounded claim is made that Izmail was captured by the Russians in 1789!); I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, pp. 415–416; W. Kalinka, *Sejm...*, vol. II, pp. 474–476; E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks...*, pp. 299–303; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie...*, pp. 148–149; W.A. Serczyk, *Katarzyna II carowa Rosji*, Wrocław 1989, pp. 265–266; V.H. Aksan, *Wojny Osmanów 1700–1870. Oblężone imperium*, Oświęcim 2019, p. 157; Ch. Duffy, *Wojna oblężnicza 1660–1789. Twierdze w epoce Vaubana i Fryderyka Wilhelma*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 353–354; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 550–553; V.I. Godunov, A.N. Korolev, *Istoriia 3-go Ulanskogo Smolenskogo Imperatora Aleksandra III-go polka, 1708–1908 g.*, part 1, Libava 1908, pp. 53–54; M. Astapenko, V. Levchenko, *Budet pomnit vsia Rossiia*, Moscow 1986, pp. 26–30; E. Kholova, A.V. Suvorov: *Liubimyi polkovodets naroda*, Moscow 2017, pp. 137–153. For a detailed account of the engagements on the left flank, where one of the assault columns was commanded by Kutuzov, see O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov...*, pp. 144–148; A.F. Pogosskii, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov, generalissimus russkikh voisk. Ego zhizn i pobyedy*, St Petersburg 1914, pp. 30–32; L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov...*, pp. 151–153; A.G. Elchaninov, *Aleksandr Vasilievich Suvorov*, [in:] *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot zarozhdeniia Rusi do voiny 1812 g.*), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 378–385 (where a detailed overview of the deployment and tasks of individual assault columns is provided).

¹³⁷ PHP, January 1791, pp. 77–78.

¹³⁸ GW, 22 January 1791, no. 7, supplement, p. [2]; 23 February, no. 16, supplement, p. [3].

whose support for the Porte cost them their lives. Russian casualties (according to their own calculations) numbered 6,000 killed and wounded, including nearly 200 officers. The toll was in fact far greater – possibly reaching 15,000 – as reported by the editors of ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’¹³⁹. Those who died included Brigadier Ivan Stepanovich Ribopier (c. 1750–1790)¹⁴⁰ and Colonel Jacuński, commander of an infantry regiment, “a Pole educated at the Cadet Corps, who served with distinction under Field Marshal Rumiantsev throughout the first [Turkish – M.K.] war and suffered eleven wounds in various engagements”¹⁴¹. Before his death, he reportedly regretted not dying in battle for his fatherland. Among the wounded were Major General Ilia Andreevich Bezborodko (1756–1815)¹⁴², Colonel Andrey L. Lvov, the French volunteer Colonel de Beaumillon¹⁴³, Charles (1759–1792), the son of Prince de Ligne, and Armand-Emmanuel du Plessis de Richelieu (1766–1822)¹⁴⁴, duc de Fronsac and grandson of a Marshal of France. The victors seized immense spoils: 264 heavy-calibre cannons, 436 banners, several dozen ships, and immeasurable riches and plunder. Storehouses of merchandise were transported to Izmail from fortified locations that had previously surrendered. As a result, vast quantities of all manner of goods were amassed in the town. Russian soldiers scarcely knew what to do with the looted wealth of Izmail, selling it off for a pittance to anyone willing to have it¹⁴⁵.

¹³⁹ GNiO, 15 January 1791, no. 5, p. 19. A.N. Petrov states, in turn, that the Turks lost 30,860 men killed and over 9,000 soldiers taken prisoner at Izmail. Russian casualties, on the other hand, are said to have amounted to merely 1,815 killed and 2,400 wounded. See idem, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 187–188.

¹⁴⁰ P. Maikov, *Riboper, Ivan Stepanovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. XVI, pp. 179–180; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 399.

¹⁴¹ GNiO, 8 January 1791, no. 3, p. 10. See also the same newspaper (26 February 1791, no. 17, p. 68), which features a private letter praising the bravery of Poles during the assault on Izmail: Jacuński and Lieutenant in the Life Guards Hołyński.

¹⁴² *Bezborodko, graf Ilia Andreevich*, [in:] RBS, vol. II (*Aleksinskii–Bestuzhev–Riumin*), published under the supervision of A.A. Polovtsov, Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1900, pp. 641–643; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 128–129.

¹⁴³ His first name could not be determined.

¹⁴⁴ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 328–329; N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. IV, no. 3, St Petersburg 1908, p. 152; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. II, p. 405.

¹⁴⁵ PHP, January 1791, pp. 77–79; GNiO, 8 January 1791, no. 3, p. 10; 15 January, no. 5, p. 19; GW, 22 January 1791, no. 7, supplement, pp. [1–2]: “The spoils [...] were beyond belief: even the lowest military servant received at least 50 roubles”. Notably, the relevant historiography offers varying estimates of casualties among the belligerents – 26,000 Turks killed and 9,000 taken prisoner, as well as between

The rewards for seizing the fortress were plentiful, matching those bestowed in recognition of the triumph at Ochakov. Officers and soldiers were awarded distinctions: "Officers shall wear epaulettes different from those of others, while non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall bear a red ribbon at the button" – one newspaper reported¹⁴⁶. Colonel Valerian Alexandrovich Zubov (1771–1804)¹⁴⁷, brother of Catherine's new favourite, who brought the long-awaited news of the fortress's capture to St Petersburg, received the Order of St George, a valuable snuffbox, and 2,000 ducats. The young Prince de Ligne was presented by the empress with a snuffbox bearing her likeness and generously set with diamonds. Naturally, Potemkin received the greatest share of the rewards. The monarch awarded him the Order of St Andrew, lavished him with gifts, and even repurchased the Tauride Palace to settle his debts¹⁴⁸.

2,500 and 10,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded. Similar discrepancies are noted in the reported numbers of captured cannons and banners. Cf. the publications cited in footnote 136. Slightly different figures regarding Turkish losses (30,000 killed and 10,000 taken prisoner) are offered by M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armia v veke imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 31.

¹⁴⁶ GNiO, 19 March 1791, no. 23, p. 91.

¹⁴⁷ N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. I, St Petersburg 1905, p. 112, and vol. V, p. 120.

¹⁴⁸ GNiO, 19 February 1791, no. 15, p. 59; 19 March, no. 23, p. 91; 4 May, no. 36, p. 143. Łuskinia reported: "Our Catherine the Great, the Empress of Russia, deigned once more to convey to Count Suvorov-Rymnikskoy, General-en-Chef, in a letter penned in the most gracious terms, her imperial satisfaction at the taking of the town and fortress of Izmail, instructing him to issue, on Her Majesty's behalf, Letters of Commendation to more than 500 members of the staff and senior ranks who had distinguished themselves in that assault. Furthermore, numerous officers on the staff were made Knights of the Military Orders of St George and St Vladimir for the taking of Izmail; others were granted gold-hilted swords; all remaining superiors were advanced in rank, and many sergeants and warrant officers were appointed to commissioned rank – to the extent that several hundred men partook of this imperial grace". GW, 21 July 1792, no. 58, supplement, p. [1]. Incidentally, Suvorov was granted the honorary rank of lieutenant colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment (the empress herself held the rank of colonel of all the Guards regiments). Potemkin also proposed awarding the victor a medal bearing his likeness, to which Catherine gave her consent. It was struck in 1791 at the St Petersburg Mint by the court medallist Karl Lebrecht. The obverse featured an accurate likeness of Suvorov. Notably, a personalised medal was an exceptionally rare and highly prestigious award. Meanwhile, Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, who commanded one of the assault columns, was promoted to lieutenant general and awarded the Order of St George, Third Class. A commemorative medal was instituted for the officers, while rank-and-file soldiers were given silver roubles. Cf. A. Petrushevskii, *Generalissimus...*, p. 403; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 530; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 560; J.T. Alexander,

Following the capture of the stronghold, the Russians ravaged a six-mile stretch of the right bank of the Danube and even burned Tulcha and Isakcha so that the Turks could no longer keep their footing across the river. Suvorov, hailed for his recent success, returned to the camp near Galatz. He expected that after such a resounding victory, Potemkin would order him to storm Braila, which remained under blockade. For the time being, however, the field marshal sent the army to winter quarters and proceeded to Jassy¹⁴⁹. In early February 1791, he set out for St Petersburg to confer with the empress in person. In his absence, Prince Repnin assumed temporary command of the troops¹⁵⁰.

In Constantinople, the news of the loss of Izmail “caused no small consternation at the court of the sultan and among his ministers”¹⁵¹, for the fortress had been considered impregnable. Panic spread throughout the city. The Ottoman government issued orders to “shield” the capital and secure the surrounding areas against enemy incursion. The grand vizier reinforced the garrisons in Varna and Silistra, then withdrew with 60,000 troops towards Adrianople, where he awaited the Russian advance. Orders were dispatched to Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, and Rumelia, commanding all janissaries and spahis to take up arms. A levy was also proclaimed in the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, “but as the Asiatic soldiers derived no benefit from previous campaigns, they still refuse to enlist in military service, citing sundry causes”, Łuskina reported¹⁵². To encourage Christian subjects to enter the ranks of the Ottoman army, it was announced – on the advice of the empire’s allies – that any man

Catherine the Great. Life and Legend, New York 1989, p. 286; M. Bogdanovich, *Russkaia armia...*, p. 31; O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov...*, p. 155; V. Lopatin, *Suvorov...*, pp. 230–231, 234; L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov...*, p. 159.

¹⁴⁹ The Russian forces encamped for the winter near Jassy and Bender. Potemkin, accompanied by the main army, was stationed in Jassy on 24 January 1791. General Westphal remained in Bender with 6 infantry battalions and 3 regiments of Cossacks; General A.N. Samoylov was posted in Kilia with 6 infantry battalions; General Kutuzov in Izmail, with 8 battalions and 3 Cossack regiments; while General Suvorov was quartered in Bârlad, commanding 18 cavalry regiments and 2 regiments of Cossacks. GW, 5 March 1791, no. 19, p. [3] and supplement, p. [3]; 16 March, no. 22, p. [3]; PHP, February 1791, p. 193.

¹⁵⁰ PHP, January 1791, p. 79; March 1791, p. 266; GW, 2 March 1791, no. 18, p. [4]; 12 March, no. 21, supplement, p. [3]; 23 March, no. 24, supplement, p. [3]; 6 April, no. 28, p. [3]; GNiO, 26 February 1791, no. 17, p. 66; 2 April, no. 27, p. 107. Cf. O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 558–559; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 529–531; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 559–561.

¹⁵¹ GW, 9 March 1791, no. 20, p. [2].

¹⁵² *Ibidem*, p. [3].

who reported to the grand vizier's camp under arms would be exempt from taxation for ten years and ennobled according to merit. The Porte's precarious situation led many senior courtiers, as well as the people of the capital, to demand an end to the hostilities. In consequence, the sultan instructed the grand vizier to resume negotiations with Russia, consenting to conclude peace without foreign mediation, to recognise the autonomy of the Danubian principalities, to relinquish the Crimea, and to accept the Passarowitz borders as the basis for a treaty with Austria¹⁵³. Potemkin agreed to enter into negotiations but rejected the proposal for a three-month armistice – or even one lasting six weeks – as urged by the Porte¹⁵⁴.

It remains to be said that the Russo-Ottoman peace negotiations were soon broken off. Selim III had no intention of signing an unfavourable treaty, as Prussia had pledged to uphold the alliance concluded the previous year, and Britain, alarmed by Russia's growing influence in Eastern Europe, was preparing to bombard St Petersburg¹⁵⁵. The sultan dismissed the ineffective grand vizier, Şerif Hasan Pasha, and ordered his execution

¹⁵³ PHP, January 1791, pp. 80–81; March 1791, p. 266; GW, 9 February 1791, no. 12, supplement, p. [4]; 26 February, no. 17, supplement, p. [3]; 9 March, no. 20, pp. [2–3]; GNiO, 19 February 1791, no. 12, p. 46; 5 March, no 19, p. 74.

¹⁵⁴ GW, 16 March 1791, no. 22, p. [3]; GNiO, 12 March 1791, no. 21, p. 81.

¹⁵⁵ See, for instance, PHP, March 1791, pp. 268–270. Notably, relations between Great Britain and the Russian Empire began to sour following Catherine II's proclamation of the policy of "armed neutrality" and the expiry of the Anglo-Russian trade treaty in 1786, which was soon followed by the conclusion of a Franco-Russian treaty the next year. British politicians, led by Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, came to believe that the country ought to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies and strengthen trade ties with Poland. Concern in London also grew over Russia's rising influence in Eastern Europe, especially after the fall of Izmail, which seemed to presage a victorious peace with the Sublime Porte. Once the crisis with Spain over the Nootka Sound incident had been defused, Pitt's government sought to build a system of alliances with Prussia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, partly as a means of compelling Russia to accept the strict *status quo ante*. Had Catherine II refused to surrender Ochakov and other Ottoman conquests, she would have faced a British naval attack and a Prussian campaign on land. In the end, however, neither Britain nor Prussia chose to go to war with the empress. Pitt had to abandon his plans due to strong opposition in Parliament and mounting pressure from British merchants and manufacturers, who regarded Russia as one of Britain's most valuable trading partners. Cf. S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 531; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 560–561; D. McKay, H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Power, 1648–1815*, London–New York 1983, p. 241. On W. Pitt's political projects, the attempt to form the Northern Coalition and the collapse of the Triple Alliance, see R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, pp. 92–101, 105–109. The newspapers of interest reported that Britain was preparing for war with Russia for commercial reasons,

(February 1791), citing both his failure to defend Izmail and the brutal murder of the Wallachian hospodar, Mavrogheni¹⁵⁶. In his stead, he appointed the bellicose Koca Yusuf Pasha, who had distinguished himself during the first Austrian campaign, and tasked him with raising a new army¹⁵⁷. Once again, he proclaimed a holy war and summoned all males aged fifteen and above to arms, promising double pay (120 piastres *per annum*). He further decreed the expansion of the Black Sea Fleet to 70 vessels and the recruitment of 10,000 sailors for service in the Adriatic¹⁵⁸. To bring Turkey to heel, the Empress of All the Russias once more resolved to seek a decisive outcome on the battlefield¹⁵⁹.

and that a portion of the British public was opposed to it. See, for example, PHP, April 1791, pp. 388–389; GW, 21 May 1791, no. 41, p. [3]; 28 May, no. 43, pp. [2, 4].

¹⁵⁶ GW, 6 April 1791, no. 28, supplement pp. [1–2]; PHP, March 1791, p. 267; GNiO, 5 March 1791, no. 19, p. 75; 9 March, no. 20, p. 77; 16 March, no. 22, p. 85.

¹⁵⁷ PHP, March 1791, pp. 267–268; GNiO, 2 April 1791, no. 27, p. 107. “This nomination – Łuskina reported – brought great joy to the Turks, for that same Yusuf [Koca Yusuf Pasha – M.K.] opened the present war and led the first campaign in the Banat of Temeswar with great valour, and was ever held a brave and prudent vizier”. GW, 19 March 1791, no. 23, supplement, p. [3]. A few issues later, the priest-editor noted: “this nomination has far more effect upon the minds of the Ottomans than all the imperial decrees together. Indeed, it is affirmed that the very echo of this commander’s name, who arrived to Shumla [Şumen – M.K.] from Bosnia with a swiftness scarcely to be believed, made so strong an impression that the troops ordered to assemble set forth in gladness from every quarter, while others, who received no such orders, willingly take up arms and hasten to join him, eager to serve their country under his command and fortune”. GW, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. [4].

¹⁵⁸ Subjects of the Greek nation were to provide 1,400 men for naval service, and the Armenians 400. Each sailor was to receive 150 piastres from the state treasury in addition to the regular pay. GW, 6 April 1791, no. 28, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. 111.

¹⁵⁹ GW, 26 March 1791, no. 25, supplement, p. [2]; 14 May, no. 39, p. [2]; GNiO, 23 March 1791, no. 24, p. 96; 11 May, no. 38, p. 152; PHP, March 1791, p. 266.

CHAPTER V

THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR

1. NEGOTIATIONS IN SISTOVA. PEACE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND TURKEY

The Porte, having finally chosen the village of Sistova in Bulgaria on the Danube, instructed the grand vizier to conclude peace with Austria.

PHP, DECEMBER 1790, p. 1453

The convention signed in Reichenbach on 27 July 1790 stipulated an immediate armistice, followed by the conclusion of a definitive peace treaty between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, to be negotiated at a conference attended by the states of the Triple Alliance (Prussia, Britain, and Holland) on the strict *status quo* basis. Leopold II sought to have the negotiations take place in Bucharest, which was occupied by Habsburg troops, and where, in early August, Marquis Girolamo Lucchesini travelled as Prussia's envoy extraordinary¹. The grand vizier, on the other hand, proposed that they be held either at his quarters in Rushchuk or in nearby Gyurgevo². Ultimately, after some delay, the High Porte designated the border town of Sistova (Svištov) on the right bank of the Danube, in present-day Bulgaria, as the site of the future congress, to which

¹ GW, 1 September 1790, no. 70, supplement, p. [2].

² GW, 27 October 1790, no. 86, p. [4].

the court of Vienna consented³. In an article from March 1791, the editor of 'Pamiętnik' published a brief description of that settlement:

Chistova, or rather Sistova, [...] lies between Nicopolis [Nikopol – M.K.] and Rudshuk [Ruse], near the Danube, where Wallachia is parted from Bulgaria. Built upon two hills, it contains close to 4,000 humble houses, roofed with tiles and enclosed by walls, so that the women may not be seen. The streets are narrow and ill-paved. The inhabitants, numbering as many as 20,000, are peaceable and decent people. Those of means trade chiefly in hides and oil. There are several Turkish mosques and a Greek church. The surrounding country is most agreeable. Behind the town, the hills and fertile mountains yield grain and wine better than that of Wallachia. It is commonly believed that here, as throughout all Bulgaria, the air is clear and healthy, as are the local waters. There is no want of provisions at present, as supplies are brought in from all quarters. The whole town and its environs are ruled by a single Turkish officer⁴.

On 3 November 1790, Marquis Lucchesini set out for the congress from Vienna. In early December, he arrived in Sistova, where he was ceremoniously received by the Ottoman representatives⁵. By mid-month,

³ GW, 15 November 1790, no. 91, p. [2]. See Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde Değişen Dengeler ve Zıstovi Antlaşması*, "Gazi Akademik Bakış" 2018, vol. XI, no. 22, p. 269; K. Beydilli, *Zıstovi Antlaşması*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLIV, İstanbul 2013, p. 469. Turkey refused to allow the negotiations to be held in Bucharest, anticipating that it would be occupied by the Russians as soon as the Austrians withdrew from Wallachia. PHP, November 1790, pp. 1360–1361.

⁴ PHP, March 1791, pp. 261–262.

⁵ One of the newspapers reported: "As soon as the said envoy learned that his lodging had been prepared, on 3 December he set off from Bucharest and, by the evening of the 4th, reached the village of Simnica, situated on the left bank of the Danube, opposite Sistova, where he notified the dragoman, or interpreter, [Zygmunt] Pangali, of his arrival. On the following day, at eleven in the morning, he was welcomed by the mihmandar, or the Porte's commissioner, accompanied by the interpreter Pangali. They arrived in two covered boats, while numerous other vessels came to carry the envoy's carriages and baggage. Each of the covered boats carried three cannons and a Janissary guard assigned to the envoy. Having boarded the boats and crossed the river, Mr Lucchesini was greeted on the shore with a triple cannon salute. Upon his arrival in Sistova, he was met by the Porte's chief dragoman, Mr Muraso [Alexander Moruzi – M.K.], who welcomed him on behalf of the reis efendi, the camp müktübschü, and the Mollah of Mecca – all three appointed as the Porte's plenipotentiaries at the congress. Thereafter, mounting the horse of the reis efendi, he was escorted to the town's foremost residence, where the defterdar, or grand treasurer, who held the office of usher of envoys, was already

the remaining delegates arrived: the Austrian delegates – Peter Philipp Herbert, Baron von Rathkeal; a British envoy – Sir Robert Murray Keith (1730–1795)⁶; and a Dutch representative – Baron Reinier van Haeften (Häften) (1729–1800). The Ottoman Empire was represented by reis efendi Abdullah Berrî Efendi, an army judge (Turk. *ordu kadısı*) İbrahim İsmet Bey, a treasury secretary (Turk. *ruzmançe-i evvel*) Mehmed Dürri Efendi (d. 1795)⁷, and Alexander Moruzi (1750–1816)⁸, son of the Moldavian

awaiting him. This minister, speaking on behalf of the three plenipotentiaries, expressed his satisfaction at the envoy's arrival and declared that the Porte placed all its hopes and reliance upon its sincere ally, His Majesty the King of Prussia. Thereafter, sweetmeats, coffee, sorbet, and scents were brought forth, and after half an hour of repose, the said envoy was escorted in a grand retinue of mounted men to his designated lodging, where the defterdar remained until cannon fire was heard from the ruined fortress of Sistova. Once the defterdar had departed, Margrave Lucchesini, following custom, dispatched the legation counsellor, Mr Tarack, accompanied by the interpreter Pangali, to present his regards to the reis efendi, informing him of his reception and expressing his desire to make his acquaintance without delay. The reis efendi received Mr Tarack [*sic*] most cordially and instructed him to convey to the Prussian plenipotentiary his satisfaction that the envoy of the Porte's true ally had been the first to arrive at the site of the congress. [...] An hour later, the Porte's chief dragoman arrived with thanks on behalf of the reis efendi for the dispatch of the secretary of the legation, with apologies that no more comfortable lodging could be found for the envoy, and with an invitation for the Prussian plenipotentiary to attend a conference with the Ottoman ministers on the following day. Before departing, he presented His Lordship with the customary gifts of sweetmeats and fruit" (most of the individuals named could not be identified). Furthermore, "The reis efendi is soon to dispatch an invitation to Baron Herbert to attend the congress, and all plenipotentiaries are to be received in the same manner as described herein". GNiO, 5 January 1791, no. 2, pp. 5–6. Cf. GW, 8 January 1791, no. 3, supplement, p. [4], which suggest that Lucchesini arrived in Sistova four days earlier, on 1 December 1790. Kemal Beydilli (*Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 469) asserts that the Prussian envoy arrived in Sistova on 5 December, thus corroborating the report from GNiO. Notably, the Prussian envoy met with the Ottoman delegates prior to the official commencement of negotiations on 10 December. The discussions of 19 December 1790 were also attended by British and Dutch diplomats, and the representatives of all three states resolved that the agreement was to be concluded based on the articles requested by the Ottoman Empire. See Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, p. 270; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 469.

⁶ H.M.C., *Keith, Sir Robert Murray (1730–1795)*, [in:] *Dictionary of National Biography*, S. Lee, ed., vol. XXX (*Johnes–Kenneth*), New York–London 1892, pp. 329–330.

⁷ E.L. Menchinger, *The First of the Modern Ottomans. The Intellectual History of Ahmed Vasif*, Cambridge 2017, p. xix.

⁸ G. Penelea Filitti, *Cronici de familie. Moruzi: din satul Moruzanda – în scaunele domnești de la București și Iași*, "Magazin Istoric", Martie 1997, pp. 59–63; N. Djuvara,

hospodar and later ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia, acting as an interpreter (dragoman). At the end of February 1791, the assembly was joined by Count Franz Esterházy von Galántha, who had been appointed by the emperor as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary for Hungary, as the Hungarians had insisted on being represented at the negotiations. Catherine II, by contrast, did not send any delegate to the congress, believing that it had been convened solely to exert diplomatic pressure on Russia. Moreover, she opposed its principal tenets. Leopold II, under the Reichenbach convention, had pledged to return to the Turks all territories taken during the war, including Wallachia, which had been seized with the aid of Suvorov's troops. The empress, however, sought to bring that province under Russian control even before the Austro-Ottoman peace talks had concluded⁹. Notably, as the proceedings were conducted on Turkish soil, the High Porte covered the expenses of the foreign ministers in attendance, granting them a daily stipend of 250 piastres from the state treasury¹⁰.

Între Orient și Occident. Țările române la începutul epocii moderne, Bucharest 1995, p. 190 ff.

⁹ GW, 27 October 1790, no. 86, p. [4]; 18 December, no. 101, p. [4]; 26 February 1791, no. 17, supplement, p. [3]; 16 March, no. 22, p. [3]; PHP, January 1791, pp. 83–84; GNiO, 12 March 1791, no. 21, p. 81; 30 April, no. 35, p. 137; 14 September, no. 74, p. 295. Cf. Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, pp. 269–270; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 469; H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne. Poselstwo Franciszka Piotra Potockiego do Stambułu (1788–1793)*, Kraków 2017, p. 436, fn. 120; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II – Leopold II, the Prussian Treat, and the Pace of Sistova, 1790–1791*, “International History Review” 2004, vol. XXVI, no. 3, p. 502. Notably, the Warsaw press did not report on the efforts undertaken by Poland to secure a representative at the congress – a request ultimately denied by the sultan's council due to Austrian objections. For more on the subject, see H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, p. 208; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 469; M. Kucharski, *Działalność dyplomacji polskiej w Berlinie w latach 1788–1792*, Katowice 2000, pp. 98–101; Z. Libiszowska, *Misja Ogińskiego w Londynie*, [in:] *Wiek XVIII. Polska i świat. Księga poświęcona Bogusławowi Leśnodorskiemu*, A. Zahorski, ed., Warszawa 1974, pp. 181–183; and in particular, D. Nawrot, *Działania dyplomacji polskiej w Wiedniu w latach 1788–1792. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-austriackich w dobie Sejmu Czteroletniego*, Katowice 1999, *Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach*, no. 1819, pp. 58–63.

¹⁰ GNiO, 15 June 1791, no. 48, p. 193; GW, 18 June 1791, no. 49, p. [2]; 19 November, no. 93, p. [1]. Elsewhere, Rev. Łuskińska noted that throughout the negotiations, the delegates of foreign courts received 6,000 piastres per month from the sultan's treasury, amounting to 200 piastres per day (GW, 1 October 1791, no. 79, p. [2]). Similar estimates – over 200 leva per day, i.e. approximately 800 zlotys – are provided by PHP, June 1791, p. 560. Notably, the expenses for the negotiations in Sistova

The progress of the negotiations in Sistova was closely followed by the publishers of the Warsaw newspapers. In February 1791, the editor of 'Pamiętnik' even introduced a new section entitled 'Congress in Chistova' or 'Further Negotiations Concerning Peace', in which he published detailed accounts of the deliberations. 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' discussed the matter at greater length, while 'Gazeta Warszawska' offered it the briefest mention. Incidentally, in reporting on the congress, the Warsaw press drew upon private correspondence far more often than in its coverage of other events.

The proceedings opened on 30 December 1790¹¹. It was resolved that sessions would be held twice weekly, on Thursdays and Sundays. The initial meeting concerned the verification of the credentials of the diplomats in attendance, along with various ceremonial obligations. 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' reported as follows:

at eleven in the morning, the plenipotentiaries of the mediating powers, having been invited by the grand dragoman of the Porte, assembled in the chamber adjoining the conference hall. The Turkish and imperial ministers withdrew to separate rooms and declared themselves ready to commence negotiations. Thereupon, all ministers entered the conference hall together, and the congress was opened with the reading of the plenipotentiary instruments of all ministers, which continued for a considerable time. The second conference was appointed for Sunday, being the second day of January in the year 1791¹².

At the second session, the imperial plenipotentiary Baron Herbert-Rathkeal presented an ultimatum on behalf of the Viennese court,

amounted to a considerable sum of 600,000 piastres. See K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 472.

¹¹ GNiO, 26 January 1791, no. 8, p. 31; GW, 9 February 1791, no. 12, supplement, p. [3] (mistakenly claiming that the congress was opened on 1 January 1791); PHP, February 1791, p. 191 (where the opening of the proceedings is also dated to January 1791). See K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 469; Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, p. 270; H. Topaktaş, *Osmanlı-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, p. 208; M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 502; M. Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence. War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797*, London–New York 2013, p. 394; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Fırat University], Elazığ 2012, p. 149, <https://openaccess.firat.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11508/14673/303671.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 20 November 2024).

¹² GNiO, 26 January 1791, no. 8, p. 31.

causing astonishment among the other delegates. It stipulated that the strict *status quo* principle, adopted at Reichenbach as the basis for the definitive peace treaty, was to apply not only to territories but also “to all matters subsisting between the Porte and the court of Vienna”¹³. In other words, Austria demanded the reaffirmation of previous treaties and commercial agreements: the 1783 convention, in which the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the security of the Austrian flag against Barbary corsairs, and the 1784 commercial treaty, which assured imperial subjects the freedom of navigation on the Danube and the Black Sea, along with the restoration of the pre-war frontier. “Though these demands were well-founded” – Świtkowski noted¹⁴, the Ottoman envoys refused to accept them. The Turks maintained that Austria should refrain from sailing on their waters, at least for the duration of the ongoing war. They also insisted on the suspension of Austrian consular missions to Moldavia and Wallachia. As the Reichenbach convention contained no such provisions, the ministers of the mediating courts attempted to persuade the Porte to renounce its claims. Ultimately, after more than two weeks of deliberations, on 27 January, the High Porte agreed to the interpretation of the *status quo ante* as proposed by the emperor. It confirmed both agreements, while the Prussian, British, and Dutch representatives undertook to uphold them on behalf of their respective courts¹⁵.

Having agreed on the article concerning the strict *status quo*, the delegates began drafting the treaty. At that stage, another difficulty arose. Baron Herbert declared that the Viennese court would not accept any reference to the Reichenbach convention in the proposed agreement. The negotiations were temporarily suspended, as the envoys of the allied courts had no instructions on the matter and had to await new directives¹⁶.

At the end of February, Count Esterházy arrived at the congress as a deputy of the Hungarian Crown and took up residence in a house near Herbert's. For several days, the envoy,

¹³ GNiO, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. 109.

¹⁴ PHP, March 1791, p. 264.

¹⁵ PHP, February 1791, pp. 191–192; March 1791, pp. 263–265; GNiO, 26 January 1791, no. 8, p. 31; 29 January, no. 9, p. 36; 16 February, no. 14, p. 55; 19 February, no. 15, p. 59; 6 April, no. 28, p. 109; GW, 9 March 1791, no. 20, p. [3–4] and supplement, p. [3]; 16 March, no. 22, p. [3]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 502; Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, pp. 270–271.

¹⁶ GNiO, 19 February 1791, no. 15, p. 59; 6 April, no. 28, p. 109; 13 April, no. 30, p. 118.

richly arrayed in Hungarian garb and accompanied by Baron Herbert, made courtesy calls upon the other ministers assembled at the congress, both European and Ottoman. Thereafter, the ceremonial for his entrance into the congress was settled; and at the first conference, he took his seat to the left of Monsieur de Herbert – as one of the newspapers reported¹⁷.

At much the same time, on his way to the camp in Shumen (Şumnu), Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha halted in Sistova. All the ministers of the congress, without exception, presented themselves before him for an audience, during which, apart from formal greetings and ceremonial etiquette, no discussions of peace were held. The reason, as the grand vizier stated, was that he was not authorised to enter into negotiations until he had received explicit instructions from the Divan¹⁸.

In issue no. 38 of 11 May 1791, the editors of 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' published the following notice:

The letters from Sistova bring no new intelligence regarding the negotiations; only sorrowful news has come that Monsieur de Herbert, the imperial envoy, has suffered a stroke and is gravely ill. The hope for his recovery is all the weaker, as Sistova has neither a physician nor an apothecary¹⁹.

Before long, however, the imperial envoy's health improved sufficiently for him to attend the conferences, as reported by the same newspaper²⁰. Yet, the negotiations proceeded slowly, as frequent dispatches had to be sent by Herbert and the envoys of the Triple Alliance to their respective courts for further directives²¹. The same applied to the Turkish ministers. Although they had received extensive instructions for concluding peace with Austria, they repeatedly sought counsel from the grand vizier or requested new guidance from the Divan²².

¹⁷ GNiO, 30 April 1791, no. 35, p. 137. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 503 (incorrectly stating that Count Esterházy joined the proceedings in April 1791).

¹⁸ GNiO, 30 April 1791, no. 35, p. 137.

¹⁹ GNiO, 11 May 1791, no. 38, p. 152.

²⁰ GNiO, 14 May 1791, no. 39, p. 158.

²¹ See, for example, GW, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. [3]; GNiO, 16 February 1791, no. 14, p. 55.

²² GW, 5 March 1791, no. 19, p. [3].

After the trade articles had been agreed, throughout April and much of May, deliberations at the congress concerned the future Austro-Turkish border. The emperor wished to retain Old Orsova and the territory up to the River Una “to achieve a more regular delineation of his Croatian frontier”²³; in return, he was prepared to cede Roermond in the eastern part of Gelderland to the King of Prussia. At the session of 19 May²⁴, held without the Turkish envoys in attendance, Baron Herbert and Count Esterházy presented a new draft treaty between Austria and the Ottoman Empire to the ministers of the allied courts. “The mediating ministers found many particulars in the draft disagreeable to them, along with a number of unexpected claims”, ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’²⁵ reported. It was unanimously agreed that the proposal would be read the following day at the general session in the presence of the Turkish envoy, which was carried out accordingly. “The Turkish minister listened with the greatest astonishment to claims never before expected”²⁶. He asserted that he lacked the authority to sign such an agreement and would have to consult the Divan, as would the delegates of the Triple Alliance with their respective courts. As a result, the congress was extended until new instructions arrived from London, The Hague, Berlin, and Vienna.

The peace treaty between Leopold II and Selim III, as proposed by Austria, contained the following articles. While consenting to the strict *status quo*, Austria construed that principle to apply not only to the present war but also to previous treaties and agreements. On that basis, the borders between the two states were to be determined in accordance with prior treaties. The emperor demanded the Croatian lands up to the River Una as well as the district of Old Orsova. Furthermore, he insisted that the article of the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) prohibiting the House of Austria from constructing fortresses along the Danube and the Sava be rendered null and void “as contrary to the rights of nations”. The Porte was to guarantee the security of imperial subjects on Turkish waters and to compensate them for the losses they had suffered before the war as a result of attacks by African corsairs. The fortress of Khotin and Wallachia were to remain under Austrian control until the end of the Russo-Turkish War²⁷.

²³ GW, 27 November 1790, no. 95, p. [2].

²⁴ GW, 6 July 1791, no. 54, supplement, p. [3]; 16 July, no. 57, p. [1]. According to reports in GNiO (29 June 1791, no. 52, p. 208), that session took place a day earlier – on 18 May. See K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 470.

²⁵ GNiO, 29 June 1791, no. 52, p. 208.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ GW, 18 May 1791, no. 40, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 29 June 1791, no. 52, p. 208; PHP, June 1791, pp. 558–560.

At the session of 25 May, the envoy of the grand sultan, without awaiting directives from Constantinople, forcefully countered Austria's territorial demands. While he did not deny that, under the Treaty of Belgrade, the River Cerna and the fortress of Orsova ought to belong to the Principality of Wallachia, he argued that Austria had already been compensated for any claims arising thereunder by the cession of Bukovina in 1775²⁸. He also opposed the construction of fortresses along the border, as it was contrary to "the spirit of the existing treaties". Thus, the Ottoman minister contested all the articles of the treaty, yet offered no specific proposals for resolving the disputed issues²⁹.

In early June 1791, the negotiations reached an impasse. Convinced that no agreement with the Turks could be achieved, the Austrian delegates declared on 7 June that, under such circumstances, they had no choice but to leave Sistova. At the grand vizier's request, however, they resolved to remain at the congress for two more days and to attend the next session. During the proceedings on 9 June, the Ottoman minister announced that the High Porte would never accept the emperor's understanding of the *status quo* and would not yield so much as a span of its land to Austria. That same day, the imperial envoys departed for Bucharest. Before leaving, they penned letters in which they denied any intention to bring the congress to a close and expressed their willingness to return, should the High Porte consent to sign the treaty on the terms acceptable to Austria³⁰.

Selim III, who had expected to conclude peace with Austria shortly, was greatly astonished when informed that the emperor was demanding acquisitions in Croatia and the district of Old Orsova. He instructed the grand vizier to go to war rather than accede to territorial concessions. Soon, Turkish forces began to assemble near Silistra and Vidin, threatening to cross into Austrian territory. Unexpectedly, however, the Turkish diplomats in Sistova received an order to sign the agreement on any terms. This sudden acquiescence of the Divan was prompted by three unfavourable tidings that reached Constantinople on the same day.

²⁸ See A. Sorel, *Kwestia wschodnia w XVIII wieku. Pierwszy podział Polski i traktat kainardżyjski*, Warszawa 1981, pp. 236–239.

²⁹ GNiO, 6 July 1791, no. 54, p. 216; GW, 6 July 1791, no. 54, supplement, p. [3].

³⁰ GNiO, 13 July 1791, no. 56, p. 224; GW, 13 July 1791, no. 56, p. [2]; 16 July, no. 57, pp. [1–2]. Cf. M.Z. Mayer, *The Price for Austria's Security: Part II...*, p. 505; Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, p. 271; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 470 (noting that the Habsburg delegates left Bucharest a day later – on 10 June); S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 150.

The Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, Azmi Said Efendi (d. 1821)³¹, reported that, despite his best efforts, he had been unable to persuade Frederick William II to honour the alliance and that no significant diversion could be expected from Prussia. The second courier brought word that the imperial plenipotentiaries had left the peace congress, while the third delivered news of the Turkish army's defeat at Matchin (Măcin) in Dobrudja (9 July) and the capture of the fortress of Anapa in the Kuban by the Russian forces (3 July), a matter to be addressed in due course³².

In the second half of July 1791, Baron Herbert and Count Esterházy returned to Sistova, resuming the negotiations that had been interrupted³³. On 1 August, the articles of the definitive peace treaty between Austria and the High Porte were drawn up, based on the *status quo ante bellum* principle, as stipulated in the Reichenbach convention³⁴. "Due to the multitude of copies of the two originals, in French and Turkish, and having to preserve the customary alternation of titles between the King of Prussia and the King of England"³⁵, the treaty was formally signed three

³¹ The envoy arrived in Berlin on 16 February 1791 and was received with great ceremony by the Prussians. A report on his entry into the Prussian capital and the official welcoming ceremony was published in GNiO, 5 March 1791, no. 19, p. 75; 9 March, no. 20, p. 78; and GW, 9 March 1791, no. 20, supplement, p. [3]. Incidentally, in the Warsaw press, that ambassador was sometimes referred to as Azmi Ahmed Efendi. The same name is also recorded in the relevant historiography (see, for instance, H. Topaktaş, *Osmańsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne...*, p. 202; F.M. Göçek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century*, New York 1987, p. 20 ff.). Both forms of the name are recorded in *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder*, vol. III (1764–1815), O.F. Winter, ed., Graz–Köln 1965, p. 459, noting that Azmi Said Efendi is the more frequently attested form. On the mission itself, see G. Karamuk, *Ahmed Azmi Efendis Gesandtschaftsbericht als Zeugnis des osmanischen Machtverfalls und der beginnenden Reformära unter Selim III*, Frankfurt 1975; Ch. Minaoglou, *Harassing the Enemy's Diplomats: The Embassy of Azmi Effendi Travelling through the Austrian-Occupied Balkans and Habsburg Lands during the Austro-Ottoman War (1787–1791)*, "Das Achtzehnte Jahrhundert und Österreich" 2011, vol. XXVI, pp. 15–26; idem, *Entertainment instead of Negotiations? The Ottoman Embassy in Berlin (1791)*, [in:] *Politische Kommunikation zwischen Imperien: Der diplomatische Aktionsraum Südost- und Osteuropa*, G. Barth-Scalmani, H. Rudolph, Ch. Steppan, eds, Innsbruck 2013, Innsbrucker Historische Studien, vol. XXIX, pp. 275–288; idem, *An Ottoman Embassy Returning from Its Mission: Ahmed Azmi Effendi Travelling Through Central and South East Europe in 1792*, "Civitas Gentium" 2020, vol. VIII, no. 1, pp. 186–207.

³² PHP, July 1791, pp. 665–666.

³³ GNiO, 3 August 1791, no. 62, p. 249; 10 August, no. 64, p. 257. See Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, p. 273; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 471.

³⁴ GW, 7 September 1791, no. 72, p. [2].

³⁵ GNiO, 17 August 1791, no. 66, p. 263.

days later. 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca' first provided a summary³⁶, then published the full text of the agreement³⁷. Łuski's periodical likewise reprinted individual articles³⁸.

The aforementioned treaty comprised 14 articles. The first one stipulated that the two empires established a perpetual peace, renewed their former friendship, and granted full amnesty to their subjects, particularly those residing in Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia. The second article declared that peace was concluded on the strict *status quo* basis. It confirmed the validity of all previous treaties and conventions: the Treaty of Belgrade of 18 September 1739; the agreements of 9 November 1739 and 2 March 1741 pertaining to the provisions of the Treaty of Belgrade; the act of 25 May 1747 perpetuating the peace of Belgrade; the settlement of 7 May 1775 regarding the annexation of Bukovina; and, lastly, the agreement of 12 May 1776 concerning the delimitation of that territory. The following article renewed and confirmed previous trade agreements: the contract (Turk. *sened*) of 8 August 1783, in which the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the safety of German merchant vessels from attacks by North African corsairs; the *sened* of 24 February 1784 concerning the free navigation and trade of imperial subjects on all seas and rivers under Ottoman rule; and the sultan's decree (Turk. *ferman*) of 4 December 1786, which ensured that Transylvanian shepherds could graze their cattle and pass freely through Wallachia and Moldavia. In Article IV, the emperor pledged to relinquish all territorial acquisitions. Fortresses, castles, and palankas were to be restored in the condition in which they had been at the time of their capture, together with the artillery found therein. Article V stipulated that the fortress of Khotin and the district of Raya would remain under Austrian control until the end of the Russo-Turkish War. Pursuant to Article VI, Austrian troops were to be evacuated from Wallachia and 5 Moldavian districts within 30 days from the date of the exchange of ratifications, and from other territories within 60 days. Subsequent articles addressed the unconditional release of all imperial prisoners by the Sublime Porte (as Ottoman prisoners of war had already been liberated), without ransom and within two months of the treaty's

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 265.

³⁷ GNiO, 10 September 1791, no. 73, p. 291 (Arts I–V); 14 September, no. 74, p. 295 (Arts VI–XIV).

³⁸ GW, 10 September 1791, no. 73, supplement, p. [3] (Art. I); 14 September, no. 74, supplement, p. [3] (Art. II); 17 September, no. 75, supplement, p. [3] (Art. III); 21 September, no. 76, supplement, p. [3] (Arts IV–IX); 24 September, no. 77, supplement, p. [3] (Arts X–XIV).

ratification (Article VII)³⁹; a general amnesty for Ottoman subjects who had sworn allegiance to Leopold II during the war, as well as for imperial subjects who had recognized the sultan's authority (Article VIII); the resumption of trade relations between the two empires (Article IX); the restoration of security and order along the frontiers (Article X); freedom of travel across the two states and unimpeded passage along rivers for the subjects of the other party (Article XI); the protection of Christians and their places of worship in Ottoman lands, the right to pilgrimage to the holy sites in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and the formal recognition of the emperor as the official protector of the Catholic faith in the Ottoman Empire (Article XII). Pursuant to the penultimate article, both parties undertook to dispatch ministers of the second rank to consolidate their friendship and announce the enthronement of Leopold II and Selim III. Finally, two originals of the treaty, one in French and the other in Turkish, both equally authentic, were to be exchanged through the plenipotentiaries of the mediating powers and transmitted to the imperial courts. The ratified documents were to be delivered within 40 days (Article XIV). The treaty was signed by Baron Peter Philipp Herbert von Rathkeal on behalf of the emperor, and by Reis Efendi Abdullah Berrî Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Bey, and Mehmed Dürri Efendi on behalf of the grand sultan. It was guaranteed, on behalf

³⁹ Rev. Łuskina reported that from 1788 until the end of September 1790, a total of 25 officers were taken captive by the Turks, "one of whom was freed by the English envoy, another died, a third turned Turk, while the others were duly released". He also noted that 1,326 rank-and-file soldiers were captured. "Of these, 610 died, 92 were freed through the efforts of foreign envoys, that is, 19 at the request of the French envoy, 19 through the intervention of the Prussian envoy, 52 by the Polish envoy, and one by the Dutch envoy. Furthermore, 32 sailed away on men-of-war, ten deserted, and 33 turned Turk. Thus, by the war's end, 550 soldiers still remained in Turkish captivity, but they were released as was customary". GW, 22 October 1791, no. 85, p. [2]. Cf. GNiO, 19 October 1791, no. 84, p. 337. A separate issue concerned the captives who had been sold into slavery, whose number was estimated at 18,000. In November 1791, the imperial envoy to Constantinople, Baron Herbert, initiated negotiations on that matter with the reis efendi. As a result, the Porte issued an order requiring anyone in possession of such a captive to hand them over to the designated commissioners in exchange for a payment of 100 piastres. However, the enforcement of the decree proved difficult in relation to women, as they were sold at slave markets for 3,000 to 5,000 piastres, and many had converted to Islam or were held in seraglios, from which their release was challenging. GW, 21 January 1792, no. 6, p. [3]; GNiO, 18 January 1792, no. 5, p. 28; 21 January, no. 6, p. 34. Incidentally, the regular exchange of Turkish prisoners lasted from the autumn of 1789 until the spring of 1791. For a comprehensive account, see B. Lázár, *Turkish Captives in Hungary during Austria's Last Turkish War (1788–91)*, "Hungarian Historical Review" 2015, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 434–440.

of the Triple Alliance, by Marquis Girolamo Lucchesini, Sir Robert Murray Keith, and Baron Reinier van Haeften⁴⁰.

On 4 August, in the absence of the envoys of the allied courts, a separate Austro-Ottoman convention of seven articles was concluded. Under its provisions, Leopold II retained Old Orsova with its district up to the River Cerna – a Turkish bridgehead north of the Danube. That territory was to remain demilitarised in perpetuity, while a small plain between Old and New Orsova was to be a neutral zone between the two states; neither party was permitted to claim, fortify, or cultivate that tract of land (Article II). Austria also acquired a strip of Croatian land up to the River Una, including the fortresses of Cetin and Dresnik. The regions of Sterniza and Sturlitz (Sturlich) remained under Ottoman rule. In the territory ceded to the Habsburgs, no new defensive structures were to be erected, nor were existing ones to be reinforced (Article III). The emperor pledged to return the occupied fortresses and palankas in the condition they stood at the time of the agreement, without destroying their new fortifications (Article V). Austrian troops were to be evacuated from the Danubian principalities within 30 days, and from the remaining territories within 60 days of the treaty's conclusion, rather than its ratification, as stipulated in Article VI of the peace treaty. The period allowed for the approval of the principal agreement was shortened from 40 to 15 days (Article VI). The instruments of ratification for both – the treaty and the convention – were to be exchanged on the same day, though separately (Article VII)⁴¹.

⁴⁰ GNiO, 17 August 1791, no. 66, pp. 263, 265; 14 September, no. 74, p. 295; GW, 7 September 1791, no. 72, p. [2] and supplement, p. [2]; PHP, August 1791, p. 767. See M. Karkocha, *Kongres pokojowy w Szyszowie (1790–1791) na łamach prasy warszawskiej*, [in:] *Władza i polityka w czasach nowożytnych. Dyplomacja i sprawy wewnętrzne*, Z. Anusik, M. Karkocha, eds, Łódź 2020, pp. 208–209; M. Hochedlinger, *Krise und Wiederherstellung Österreichische Großmachtpolitik zwischen Türkenkrieg und "Zweiter Diplomatischer Revolution" 1787–1791*, Berlin 2000, *Historische Forschungen*, vol. LXV, pp. 409–410; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 150–153. Text of the treaty: *The Parliamentary Register; Or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons [...]*, vol. XXXI, London 1792, pp. 93–111 (in French and English); *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, G. Noradounghian, ed., vol. II (1789–1856), Paris 1900, no. 3, pp. 6–12; as well as in the appendix hereto. For an analysis of its provisions, see *Histoire abrégée des traités de paix entre les puissances de l'Europe depuis la paix de Westphalie par C.G. de Koch. Ouvrage entièrement refondu, augmenté et continué jusqu'au congrès de Vienne et aux traités de Paris de 1815 par F. Schoell*, vol. XIV, [Paris 1818], pp. 490–493; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 155–156; and recently, Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, pp. 276–279.

⁴¹ GNiO, 17 August 1791, no. 66, pp. 263, 265; GW, 7 September 1791, no. 72, p. [2] and supplement, p. [2]; 14 September, no. 74, p. [2]; 24 September, no. 77, supplement,

Świtkowski noted: “[...] for 120,000 men lost and 120 million Rhenish gulden spent, the emperor gained from the Turks but a small town of Old Orsova and a narrow wedge of Croatia up to the River Una”⁴². Aside from minor territorial acquisitions, the limited benefits Austria derived from that unnecessary war may reasonably be considered to include: the confirmation of trade rights; the release of all prisoners of war (a practice that had no precedent at the time); the acceptance of Ottoman citizens who had fled and settled in Habsburg lands, acknowledging them as imperial subjects; the protection of Ottoman Catholics, with the emperor recognised as the official protector of the Roman Catholic faith in Turkey. Nevertheless, such gains fell far short of compensating for the war that had dragged on for three and a half years and the scale of losses it had entailed. The Treaty of Sistova brought an end to Austria’s centuries-long struggle with the Ottoman Empire and ushered in a more durable partnership between the two states. Freed from the strain of a two-front war, the Porte could now marshal its strength and resources for the conflict with Russia.

The news of the peace treaty with Austria reached Constantinople on 9 August. The delighted sultan ordered that the delegates of the mediating powers be handsomely compensated for their efforts⁴³. Each received “a fine, well-trained horse richly adorned” and 30,000 piastres, while the Prussian envoy was granted twice that amount for his special endeavours. Three Austrian interpreters, among whom only the chief interpreter, Bartholomäus Testa (1723–1809), was mentioned by name in the newspapers, were each gifted 2,500 piastres and furs. Leopold II proved equally generous, presenting the envoys of the Triple Alliance with diamond-studded rings valued at 18,000, 20,000, and 22,000 gulden. Additionally, Margrave Lucchesini was given a golden snuffbox adorned with diamonds and bearing the emperor’s likeness. The scale of the monetary and material rewards bestowed upon

p. [3]. See M. Karkocha, *Kongres pokojowy w Szystowie...*, pp. 208–209. Text of the convention: *Histoire abrégée des traités de paix...*, pp. 493–494; *Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman...*, no. 4, pp. 13–16; *Recueil de traités de la Porte Ottoman avec les puissances étrangères depuis 1536*, I. de Testa, ed., vol. IX, Paris 1898, pp. 166–169; *The Parliamentary Register...*, pp. 112–120. Discussion of the provisions: Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, pp. 274–275; K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, p. 471.

⁴² PHP, August 1791, p. 767.

⁴³ In fact, the envoys received a “treasury bond” to be redeemed at a later date, as cash bonuses could not be disbursed due to the financial difficulties of the Ottoman Empire. Cf. K. Beydilli, *Ziştovi Antlaşması...*, pp. 471–472.

those involved in the peace negotiations suggests that both parties were thoroughly satisfied with the agreement reached⁴⁴.

On 14 September 1791, Austria returned Bucharest to the Turks. The following day, a general amnesty was proclaimed in the city, along with a two-year exemption from the *jizya*⁴⁵. At the beginning of the following month, on 5 October, New Orsova was ceded to the Sublime Porte ("but only after Old Orsova had, in solemn manner, been first taken into possession in the name of Leopold II, together with the territory extending as far as the River Cerna, and after the imperial eagles, bearing Hungarian coats of arms, had afore been duly set in place")⁴⁶. "Certain German families who had settled [in the fortress] when our troops took possession of it remained in residence, having received assurance of safety and protection from the Turkish pasha", Łuski's newspaper recounted⁴⁷. Two weeks later, on 22 October, Belgrade was ceremonially surrendered⁴⁸. At that time, the new border in Wallachia was marked without incident. Some difficulties, however, arose during the delimitation of the Croatian border. The following was reported in 'Gazeta Narodowa i Obca':

According to the line determined at Sistova, a sizeable tract of forest falls within the lands to be ceded, a concession to which the Porte assented. Yet the pasha of Bihac opposed it with all his might, as the fortress under his charge has no other source whence to obtain timber; the Turks nonetheless proposed ceding another place, should they be permitted to retain possession of the said forest; no lesser disputes are wanting in the matter of demarcation, since the marks of the former border are no longer to be found in the place where they were fixed at Sistova⁴⁹.

⁴⁴ GNiO, 10 September 1791, no. 73, p. 293; 28 September, no. 78, p. 313; 3 December, no. 97, p. 389; 7 December, no. 98, p. 393; GW, 14 September 1791, no. 74, p. [2]; 1 October, no. 79, p. [3]; 19 November, no. 93, p. [1]; 17 December, no. 101, supplement, p. [3]. Cf. Z. Koçak, *Son Osmanlı-Avusturya Mücadelesinde...*, p. 281.

⁴⁵ GW, 5 November 1791, no. 89, p. [1].

⁴⁶ GW, 16 November 1791, no. 92, p. [2]. Cf. GNiO, 9 November 1791, no. 90, p. 362.

⁴⁷ GW, 16 November 1791, no. 92, p. [3].

⁴⁸ GW, 19 November 1791, no. 93, supplement, p. [3]. The fortress was to be surrendered on 8 October, "but the Pasha of Nissa [Niš – M.K.], named governor of Belgrade, could not depart from the city of Nissa due to the unrest that had arisen there and thus failed to arrive at the appointed time; consequently, the surrender of Belgrade was deferred to a later date" (*ibidem*, supplement, p. [2]).

⁴⁹ GNiO, 19 November 1791, no. 93, p. 373.

The court of Vienna was willing to relinquish a small portion of Croatia, which had been granted to it under the peace treaty, in return for an equivalent in Moldavia – the fortress of Khotin and the district of Raya. Austrian diplomacy made overtures to that end in both Constantinople and St Petersburg, but Catherine II refused to approve the exchange. The Croatian border was not finally demarcated until the summer of 1792⁵⁰. Notably, the restoration of the Danubian principalities to Ottoman suzerainty prompted protests from their inhabitants, who submitted an appeal to the empress seeking her protection⁵¹.

Pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty of Sistova, with a view to establishing amicable relations between the two powers, the Ottoman envoy Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (Abū Bakr Rātīb Efendi) (1750–1799)⁵², a military official and seasoned statesman, arrived in Vienna on 11 February 1792. On 20 February, he was granted a formal audience with Vice-Chancellor Prince Franz de Paula Gundaccar von Colloredo-Mannsfeld

⁵⁰ GNiO, 14 December 1791, no. 100, p. 402; PHP, April 1792, p. 370; GW, 30 November 1791, no. 96, p. [4]; 17 December, no. 101, p. [3]; 1 August 1792, no. 61, p. [4]; 8 August, no. 63, supplement, p. [3]; KW, 25 August 1792, no. 50, p. 440.

⁵¹ GW, 23 November 1791, no. 94, p. [2]: “The return of Moldavia and Wallachia once more under Turkish dominion struck the inhabitants of those two provinces with fear and dread, as they trembled lest the Turks, through sundry oppressions, violences, and cruelties, should now avenge themselves upon them for the inclination they had shown towards the victors at the time of the invasions. Many of the wealthier boyars withdrew beyond the border, whilst those who remained in the country did, in a supplication laid before Prince Potemkin, most earnestly beseech that Her Majesty the Empress might deign still to extend her protection unto them”. The Porte appointed Michael Soutzos (c. 1729–1803) as the new Wallachian hospodar, much to the satisfaction of the province’s inhabitants. He replaced Nicholas Mavrogheni, who had been executed on the orders of the grand vizier, as previously noted. Meanwhile, Alexander Moruzi ascended the throne of Moldavia. GW, 28 September 1791, no. 78, supplement, p. [3]; 14 March 1792, no. 21, p. [1]; GNiO, 12 November 1791, no. 91, p. 366. Cf. J. Demel, *Historia Rumunii*, Wrocław 1970, p. 242.

⁵² S. Arıkan, *Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. X, İstanbul 1994, pp. 277–278; F. Yeşil, *Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Katibi Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (1750–1799)*, 1st edn, İstanbul 2011; idem, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, [in:] *Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE*, K. Fleet et al., eds, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ebubekir-ratib-efendi-COM_26125?s.num=1 (accessed 18 May 2019); A. Uçman, *III. Selim’in Viyana Elçisi Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi’nin Nemçe Sefâretnâmesi*, [in:] *Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi / Selim III and His Era from Ancien Régime to New Order*, İstanbul 2010, pp. 625–638. On that diplomat’s mission to Vienna, see, for instance, C.V. Findley, *Ebu Bekir Ratib’s Vienna Embassy Narrative: Discovering Austria or Propagandizing for Reform in Istanbul?*, “Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes” 1995, vol. LXXXV, pp. 41–80.

(1731–1807), on 22 February, with Chancellor Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz (1711–1794), and on 26 February, with the imperial court in Vienna. However, his conduct on that occasion was somewhat lacking. It transpired that he had forgotten to bring his second letter of credence, and after delivering his address, he failed to kiss the hem of Leopold II's garment, as required by court protocol. When later asked about that breach of etiquette, he explained that "his instructions directed him to kiss the hem of the emperor's cloak; but as the emperor wore no cloak, only a uniform, he deemed himself absolved of that duty"⁵³. In turn, Baron Herbert proceeded to Constantinople in the autumn of 1791 as imperial envoy⁵⁴.

2. THE OCHAKOV CRISIS

At the dreadful threats of Prussia, England, and Holland, Moscow issued her final reply: that although she had not entered into this war of her own accord, she was yet willing to bring it to an end – so long as none presume to dictate the terms of peace unto her.

PHP, MARCH 1791, p. 265

As previously noted, following the loss of the fortress of Izmail, Selim III was inclined to accept Russia's territorial demands and thereby bring an end to the war that was ravaging the country. Encouraged, however, by hopes of support from Britain and Prussia, he mobilised another army, appointing the capable Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha as its commander-in-chief. The sultan was planning to field an army of 400,000 troops⁵⁵.

⁵³ GNiO, 22 February 1792, no. 15, p. 85; 29 February, no. 17, p. 100; 3 March, no. 18, p. 105 (account of the visit to Kaunitz); 10 March, no. 20, p. 117; 31 March, no. 26, p. 153 (as cited above); GW, 7 March 1792, no. 19, supplement, p. [2]; 10 March, no. 20, supplement, p. [2]; 17 March, no. 22, p. [2]; 24 March, no. 24, p. [4] (account of the audience at the Austrian court) and supplement, pp. [1–3] (address of the Turkish envoy to Leopold II). Cf. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter...*, vol. III, p. 458. On that diplomatic mission, see L. Gibson, *Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's Mission to Vienna, 1792*, <https://www.marshallplan.at/images/All-Papers/berkeley/Gibson.pdf> (accessed 20 January 2021).

⁵⁴ He arrived in Constantinople on 17 October 1791. A week later, in Shumen, he was granted a ceremonial audience with the grand vizier, who presented him with a costly sable fur and a horse. GW, 21 December 1791, no. 102, supplement, p. [4]; GNiO, 7 December 1791, no. 98, p. 393.

⁵⁵ GW, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. [4]; GNiO, 2 April 1791, no. 27, p. 107.

Although levies were conducted in both the European and Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and the beys of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli pledged military assistance⁵⁶, ultimately, no more than 160,000 men were successfully enlisted⁵⁷.

While preparations for the final campaign were underway in Turkey, the court of St Petersburg sought to forestall the looming prospect of war with the Anglo-Prussian-Dutch coalition. In the spring of 1791, Frederick William II was mustering an army to invade Livonia and lay siege to Riga, while Britain was arming its navy: around 30 ships of the line, 13 frigates, and a number of smaller vessels, under the command of Admiral Samuel Hood (1724–1816), were to sail to the Baltic, while over 10 ships of the line stood ready to set sail for the Black Sea⁵⁸. It was all intended to compel

⁵⁶ GNiO, 16 April 1791, no. 31, p. 123; GW, 9 March 1791, no. 20, p. [3]; 20 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [3].

⁵⁷ The Warsaw press did not record the precise number of Ottoman troops involved in that campaign. In the spring of 1791, the editors of ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ reported that the grand vizier commanded 80,000 troops in Bulgaria and a further 30,000 near Varna, and that he intended to expand the army to 200,000. GNiO, 30 April 1791, no. 35, p. 137; 4 May, no. 36, p. 143; 4 June, no. 45, p. 180; 18 June, no. 49, p. 197. Elsewhere, the same newspaper noted that 100,000 fresh recruits were marching from Asia, while the High Porte had 60,000 troops stationed in its European provinces. GNiO, 23 April 1791, no. 32, p. 130. Cf. GW, 22 June 1791, no. 50, supplement, p. [2]. A comparable estimate (150,000 soldiers) is provided by a contemporary Turkish historian, Serhat Kuzucu (*1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 90), who also notes that Ottoman sources do not allow for a precise determination of the number of troops deployed against the Russians and Austrians in 1791. Reports of difficulties in mobilization within the Ottoman Empire were published by PHP, May 1791, pp. 478–479: “The Muslims, who once eagerly flocked beneath the banners, now, seeing no certain gain in the military profession – nay, considering that a vast number of their comrades had either perished or returned maimed from the field, and hearing on every side the lamentations of widows and orphans mourning their husbands, fathers, or sons killed in the war, have taken to the forests and mountains to avoid the soldier’s trade”; as well as by GNiO, 14 May 1791, no. 39, p. 158: “In Constantinople, despite a considerable rise in soldiers’ pay, recruitment progresses but slowly”. The newspapers also reported on the shortages of food, funds, and artillery in the Ottoman army, for instance, PHP, May 1791, pp. 481–482; GNiO, 25 June 1791, no. 51, p. 205; GW, 18 May 1791, no. 40, supplement, p. [2].

⁵⁸ The publishers of the Warsaw newspapers reported varying numbers of ships of the line to be sent to the Baltic: 29 (GW, 20 April 1791, no. 32, supplement, p. [3]); 30 (GNiO, 20 April 1791, no. 31, p. 126; GW, 9 April 1791, no. 29, p. [4]; 16 April, no. 31, p. [4]; PHP, March 1791, pp. 268–269); 32 (GW, 4 June 1791, no. 45, pp. [2–3]); 33 (GNiO, 4 May 1791, no. 36, p. 144); or 35 ships of the line (GNiO, 7 May 1791, no. 37, p. 150). Robert H. Lord (*Drugi rozbiór Polski*, 2nd edn, Warszawa 1984, p. 102) established that the British fleet preparing to set sail for the Baltic Sea was composed of 35 ships of the line, while 10 to 12 such vessels were to be sent to the Black Sea. Meanwhile,

Catherine II to accept the strict *status quo ante bellum* and to relinquish her gains from the war against the Porte. Prime Minister Pitt expected Holland to join the naval demonstration, along with Denmark and King Gustav III of Sweden, who had been promised substantial subsidies⁵⁹.

S.S. Montefiore (*Potiomkin, książę książąt*, Warszawa 2000, p. 532; *Katarzyna Wielka i Potiomkin. Cesarski romans*, Warszawa 2013, p. 561) estimates Hood's forces gathered in Portsmouth at 36 ships of the line and 29 smaller vessels. Other works indicate between 35 and 40 ships of the line. See, e.g., G. Figiel, *Europejska polityka Williama Pitta Młodszego (1788–1806)*, Lublin 2013, p. 206; Y. Bağçeci, *İngiltere Başbakanı Genç William Pitt ve Özi Krizi*, "Tarihin Peşinde" 2014, no. 12, p. 367. For a list of the vessels comprising Hood's fleet in the spring of 1791, see R. Winfield, *British Warship in the Age of Sail 1793–1817: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates*, London 2005, pp. 437–438 and A.A. Lebedev, *Maloizvestnye momenty russko-angliiskogo krizisa 1791 goda*, "Gangut" 2015, no. 89, pp. 52–53. According to the Russian ambassador to London, Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov (1744–1832), the British fleet prepared for operations against Russia consisted of 36 ships of the line, 12 frigates, and an equal number of brigs and cutters. As reported by A. Woronzoff-Dashkoff, *Simon Vorontsov and the Ochakov Crisis of 1791*, [in:] *Intellectual and Political Elites of the Enlightenment*, T.V. Artemyeva, M.I. Mikeshin, eds, Helsinki 2014, Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. XVI, p. 172.

⁵⁹ GNiO, 5 February 1791, no. 11, p. 44; 6 April, no. 28, p. 110; PHP, March 1791, p. 270. Cf. J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane. Wiek XVIII*, part 1 (*Polityka zagraniczna Sejmu Wielkiego*), selected, edited, and introduced by M. Kornat, Kraków 2019, pp. 127–128. Notably, Catherine II was also seeking the support of the Swedish monarch at that time. As a result of her diplomats' efforts, on 19 October 1791, in Drottningholm, Gustav III concluded a "treaty of friendship, alliance, and assistance" with Russia. Both courts pledged to provide military aid to each other in the event of an attack by another state. Sweden was to supply 8,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 6 ships of the line, and 2 frigates, while Russia was to contribute 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 9 ships of the line, and 3 frigates. The treaty further stipulated that if both countries were drawn into a common war, they would not conduct separate peace negotiations or conclude an independent armistice. The alliance was to remain in force for eight years and could be extended for six months before its expiry. A secret article attached to the treaty stated that Sweden would receive Russian subsidies amounting to 300,000 roubles annually for the duration of the agreement. GW, 12 November 1791, no. 91, p. [2] and supplement, p. [3]; 16 November, no. 92, supplement, p. [2]; 10 December, no. 99, p. [2]; GNiO, 12 November 1791, no. 91, pp. 365–366. Text of the treaty (21 articles): GW, 14 January 1792, no. 4, pp. [2–3]; and GNiO, 4 January 1792, no. 1, supplement, pp. 5–6 (Arts I–VII); 7 January, no. 2, p. 9 (Arts VIII–XX). On 24 November 1791, the ratification of the treaty by Russia reached Stockholm, and on 7 December, the approved documents were formally exchanged between both courts. GNiO, 14 December 1791, no. 100, p. 402; 31 December, no. 105, p. 419. For an extensive discussion of the reasons that persuaded Gustav III to seek rapprochement with Catherine II, as well as the treaty itself, see Z. Anusik, *Dyplomacja szwedzka wobec kryzysu monarchii we Francji w latach 1787–1792*, Łódź 2000, pp. 439–442.

Moreover, the London court sought to gain Austria's support for its plans. Thomas Bruce, Earl of Elgin (1766–1841)⁶⁰, serving as envoy extraordinary in Vienna at the time, was instructed to inquire about the emperor's views on the matter. Leopold II declared that

he shall strictly adhere to the *status in quo* with the Turks, and is even prepared to offer a friendly intercession at Petersburg, urging the empress to accept the conditions proposed by the allied courts, setting his own example before her as one to be followed⁶¹.

However, should Catherine persist in her former demands, and if the states of the Triple Alliance attempted to compel her to make concessions by military means, the court of Vienna would not oppose it⁶².

In early March 1791, Denmark joined the mediation efforts, proposing a compromise peace on the limited *status quo* basis. Russia was to retain Ochakov and the lands along the Dniester, provided that the fortifications of the fortress be demolished and the surrounding territories demilitarised⁶³. Frederick William gave a *provisoriè* reply that he “accepts the *bona officia* of the Danish court and, once he has conferred with his allies, shall provide a definitive answer to the proposal”⁶⁴. He directed that the British government be informed of his demand for a clear declaration on the matter. Should Denmark's offer be rejected, the Prussian monarch urged the immediate dispatch of the British fleet to the Baltic, as the Prussian army had already reached full readiness. The king intended to proceed to the front, accompanied by his two sons and Field Marshal Joachim Heinrich von Möllendorf. He ordered the royal carriages to be sent to East Prussia without delay. Finally, he proposed that the younger son of the British monarch, Frederick Augustus of Hanover (1763–1827), who was soon to become his son-in-law, assume command of a Prussian corps during the war with Russia⁶⁵.

⁶⁰ W.W. [Warwick William Wroth], *Bruce, Thomas*, [in:] *Dictionary of National Biography*, L. Stephen, ed., vol. VII (*Brown–Burthogge*), New-York–London 1886, pp. 130–131.

⁶¹ GNiO, 16 February 1791, no. 14, p. 55.

⁶² *Ibidem*. Cf. R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 98.

⁶³ For details, see PHP, May 1791, pp. 462–468. Cf. Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Değişen Dengeler ve Yaş Antlaşması*, “Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi” 2017, vol. XXXII, no. 2, p. 477.

⁶⁴ GNiO, 6 April 1791, no. 28, p. 110.

⁶⁵ GNiO, 6 April 1791, pp. 109–110; 30 April, no. 35, pp. 137–138 (on p. 138, text of the Danish court's note of 8 March 1791 regarding the limited *status quo ante*); 4 May, no. 36, p. 142; 7 May, no. 37, p. 150; PHP, May 1791, p. 469.

Although Catherine II was inclined to accept the Danish proposal, William Pitt's cabinet opposed any territorial concessions in her favour. On 27 March, the British prime minister sent an ultimatum to St Petersburg via Berlin, granting the empress ten days to accept the strict *status quo* and threatening to resort to ultimate measures should she refuse⁶⁶. The prospect of war on several fronts did not dismay the empress; rather, the mounting pressure from Britain and Prussia only served to harden her resolve. In Russia, preparations were underway to repel the anticipated assault by land and sea. Disbanded units received orders to remobilise, and the division stationed near Kiev was reinforced. The Russian fleet, composed of 38 ships of the line, was divided into two squadrons – 26 vessels at Kronstadt and 12 at Reval – and tasked with securing the coastline against enemy incursions. Oared vessels under the command of Prince Karl Heinrich von Nassau-Siegen (amounting to 136 light galleys) stood poised to set sail for the Baltic Sea. Russia “was mustering such power as if it were embarking upon war after a long peace”, the editor of ‘Pamiętnik’ observed⁶⁷.

It would soon become evident that the empress secured a diplomatic and moral victory, for the British lost their will to continue the war. The day after the ultimatum was sent to Berlin (28 March), a royal address was read in Parliament, stating that George III had found himself compelled to expand the naval forces in order to lend weight to the arguments he and his allies had presented to the empress, urging her to bring hostilities with the Ottoman Empire to an end⁶⁸. On 29 March, the first parliamentary

⁶⁶ GNiO, 13 April 1791, no. 30, p. 118; 23 April, no. 33, p. 130; 4 May, no. 36, p. 143; PHP, May 1791, p. 469. Cf. J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, p. 133; I. de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, London 1981, p. 417; Y. Bağçeci, *İngiltere Başbakanı Genç...* p. 368.

⁶⁷ PHP, May 1791, p. 469; June 1791, pp. 554–555 (as cited above); GW, 18 May 1791, no. 40, pp. [3–4]. Cf. A.A. Lebedev, *Maloizvestnye momenty...*, *passim*; J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, pp. 135 and 139 (providing details on Russian forces stationed to guard the borders against the Prussian army). In response to reports that the English Parliament had passed a resolution on armament, Catherine issued a decree stating that “the king’s address to Parliament regarding the arming of the fleet has indeed astonished the empress, yet it has not alarmed her. The empress shall not deviate from the plan she presented to Turkey, nor does she fear the harm with which the English fleet threatens her shores. The monarch is preparing for a resolute defence, arming her ports and coasts as she deems appropriate under the circumstances”. GW, 22 June 1791, no. 50, p. [2].

⁶⁸ GNiO, 16 April 1791, no. 31, p. 123: “His Majesty deems it necessary to inform the Lower House that the endeavours which he has unceasingly pursued in concert with his allies, in order to expedite peace between the Porte and Moscow, have

debate on measures of armament against Russia was held, as recounted in detail by ‘Gazeta Warszawska’ and ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’. Opposition MPs criticised the government for failing to keep the public duly informed about the purpose of the mobilisation. They asked whether the country, burdened with a public debt of over £240 million⁶⁹, could afford a conflict with the Russian Empire, and whether the balance of power would in fact be affected if the Ottoman Porte were to lose part of its territory. The Whig leader, Charles James Fox (1749–1806)⁷⁰, delivered a passionate speech in which he challenged the weak arguments in favour of a naval expedition against Russia, insisting on an explanation of what British interests the government sought to defend in Ochakov⁷¹. Meanwhile, Edmund Burke (1729–1797)⁷² attacked Pitt for supporting “that despicable nation” – the Turks⁷³. Over the following days, British public opinion turned against the cabinet’s war plans. Parliament was inundated with petitions and letters from trading companies, concerned citizens, and entire counties, demanding a vote against the government’s policy. In industrial cities such as Leeds, Manchester, Norwich, and Birmingham, public meetings were held, at which remonstrances against the war were drafted.

hitherto proved fruitless; and that the consequences which may ensue from the further prosecution of this war, both to the interests of Great Britain and her allies, as well as to those of all Europe, are of such weight and moment that His Majesty deems it unavoidable to augment yet further his military forces, that greater authority may be lent to his representations. His Majesty reposes entire confidence in the zeal and fidelity of the Lower House, being well assured that it shall readily grant its assent to the necessary expenses of armament, as both the welfare of the realm and the preservation of peace and good order of Europe require”. Cf. [W. Cobbett], *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803*, vol. XXIX (*From the Twenty-second of March 1771 to the Thirteenth of December 1792*), London 1817, pp. 31–32.

⁶⁹ GW, 15 June 1791, no. 48, p. [2].

⁷⁰ Cf., for example: L. Reid, *Charles James Fox: A Man for the People*, Columbia 1969; L. Mitchell, *Charles James Fox*, Oxford 1992.

⁷¹ Grateful for that and other anti-war addresses, Catherine II ordered a marble bust to be made for Fox, placing a copy of it in her Cameron Gallery in Tsarskoye Selo among the most renowned orators of antiquity, Demosthenes and Cicero. GNiO, 31 August 1791, no. 70, p. 280; GW, 31 August 1791, no. 70, supplement, p. [1]. Cf. L. Reid, *Charles James Fox...*, p. 275; A. Woronzoff-Dashkoff, *Simon Vorontsov...*, p. 179.

⁷² For a notable biography of that politician, see F.P. Lock, *Edmund Burke*, vol. I (1730–1784), 1st edn, Oxford 1999; idem, *Edmund Burke*, vol. II (1784–1797), 1st edn, Oxford 2006; R. Bourke, *Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke*, 1st edn, Princeton 2015.

⁷³ GNiO, 23 April 1791, no. 33, pp. 131–132.

The discontent of merchants and businessmen, anxious about the potential loss of profits from their lucrative trade with Russia, began to impact parliamentary decisions⁷⁴. Although Pitt succeeded in retaining a majority in the subsequent votes, his margin was markedly narrower than usual. Unwilling to risk the collapse of his government, he resolved to yield⁷⁵.

⁷⁴ Notably, throughout the eighteenth century, Europe, especially Western Europe, was Britain's largest export and import market. However, from the 1750s onwards, the Baltic region gained in importance. Trade with Russia was particularly significant, with imports from the Tsarist state outweighing exports. In terms of British exports, Russia had outpaced the other countries of that region by the mid-eighteenth century. Towards the end of the century, British exports to Russia increased sharply; for instance, in 1787, they amounted to approximately £257,000, whereas by 1800, they had risen to around £557,000 (as recorded by J. Blow Williams, *British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, 1750–1850*, Oxford 1972, pp. 169–171; see also P. Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783*, Oxford 1992, p. 169; P. Robak, *Angielski handel zewnętrzny [i kolonialny] w dobie wojny o imperium [1740–1765]*, PNH 2016, vol. XV, no. 1, pp. 60–61). Britain ran a trade deficit with Turkey. From the 1720s onwards, England ceased to be the Empire's most important trading partner, and from at least the 1750s, there was a noticeable decline in trade volume between the two countries, as was the case with the Italian states. France took Britain's place (particularly following the Capitulations of 1740). The value of French Levantine trade amounted to 2.9 million livres in 1716 (just over 7% of total foreign trade) and had risen to 63.3 million livres by 1787 (nearly 11% of total foreign trade). However, the trade consistently maintained a negative balance: in 1787, exports to the Levant stood at 25.6 million, while imports reached 37.7 million livres (as recorded by P. Butel, *L'économie française au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris, 1993, p. 88). By the late eighteenth century, the total trade of French merchants with the Sublime Porte exceeded that of both the Dutch and the British. After 1789, a significant shift occurred when Turkey's trade with the German states surpassed its overall trade volume with France. Cf. H. Inalcik, D. Quataert, *Dzieje gospodarcze i społeczne imperium Osmańskiego 1300–1914*, Kraków 2008, pp. 628–629; P. Robak, *Angielski handel...*, p. 63; H. Sée, *L'évolution commerciale et industrielle de la France sous l'ancien régime*, Paris 1925, pp. 230–231; G. Holmes, D. Szechi, *The Age of Oligarchy. Pre-industrial Britain, 1722–1783*, London–New York 1993, p. 380; Ph. Deane, W.A. Cole, *British Economic Growth, 1688–1959. Trends and Structure*, 2nd edn, Cambridge 1967, tab. 22. Cf. also *English Historical Documents, 1714–1783*, D.B. Horn, M. Ransome, eds, vol. X, London 1957, pp. 502–503.

⁷⁵ GNiO, 30 April 1791, no. 35, p. 140; 4 May, no. 36, p. 141; 14 May, no. 39, p. 158; GW, 27 April 1791, no. 34, pp. [1–3]; 4 May, no. 36, pp. [3–4]; 14 May, no. 39, pp. [1–2]; 21 May, no. 41, pp. [3–4]; 25 May, no. 42, pp. [1–2]; 28 May, no. 43, pp. [2–4]; PHP, May 1791, pp. 470–472. For more on the subject, see J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, pp. 154–164; Y. Bağçeci, *İngiltere Başbakanı Genç...*, pp. 368–376; G. Figiel, *Europejska polityka...*, pp. 210–216; D. McKay, H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Power, 1648–1815*, London–New York 1983, pp. 241–242; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 542; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 572–573; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin*, 3rd edn, Moscow 2016, pp. 566–568; R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, pp. 105–106; E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks:*

In late April 1791, a special British envoy, William Augustus Fawkener (Fawkner) (c. 1750–1811)⁷⁶, made his way to St Petersburg. He carried new proposals for resolving the Ochakov crisis based on the modified *status quo*. At the same time, Joseph Ewart was to approach The Hague and Berlin to secure support from both courts, while the Earl of Elgin travelled to Italy, hoping to ultimately persuade Leopold II, then attending the imperial coronation, to endorse the allies' plans⁷⁷. The first note proposing a compromise resolution to the dispute, presented in St Petersburg on 26 May, was rejected. The Warsaw press did not disclose its contents but published the empress's response, in which she demanded

From the Beginning of Their Empire to the Present Time. Chiefly Founded on Von Hammer, vol. II, London 1856, pp. 307–308; J. Ehrman, *The Younger Pitt and the Ochakov Affair*, "History Today" 1959, vol. IX, issue 7, pp. 462–472; A.B. Sokolov, "Ochakovskoe delo". *Anglo-rossiiskii konflikt 1791 goda*, "Otechestvennaia istoriia" 2002, vol. IV, p. 15 ff.; A. Cunningham, *The Ochakov Debate*, "Middle Eastern Studies" 1965, vol. I, no. 3, pp. 209–237. Speeches by Pitt, Fox, and Burke in: [W. Cobbett], *The Parliamentary History of England...*, vol. XXIX, pp. 52–79. The significant role of the Russian ambassador S. Vorontsov in stirring British public opinion through extensive propaganda efforts merits particular consideration, as it led to widespread opposition to military operations intended to force Russia into concessions. See J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, pp. 147–151; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 419; R.H. Lord, *Drugi rozbiór...*, p. 106; G. Figiel, *Europejska polityka...*, pp. 208–210; J. Black, *A History of Diplomacy*, London 2010, p. 137; O.Iu. Zakharova, *Graf S.R. Vorontsov – posol Rossiiskoi imperii*, Simferopol 2005, pp. 96–98; in particular A. Woronzoff-Dashkoff, *Simon Vorontsov...*, pp. 175–180. Notably, Pitt's shift in policy regarding the planned war resulted in a split within his cabinet. The then Foreign Secretary, Francis Godolphin Osborne, Duke of Leeds (1751–1799), unable to reconcile himself with that defeat, resigned from office. He was succeeded by William Wyndham Grenville (1759–1834), a staunch advocate of a peace-oriented policy and a future prime minister of Great Britain. The Lord President of the Privy Council, Charles Pratt, Earl Camden, also relinquished his ministerial post. GNIÖ, 14 May 1791, no. 39, p. 158; 18 May, no. 40, p. 161; PHP, May 1791, p. 472.

⁷⁶ His role and mission to Russia are recorded in a biographical entry on his father, diplomat Everard Fawkener (1684–1758): W.P.C. [William Prideaux Courtney], *Fawkener, Sir Everard*, [in:] *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. XVIII (Esdale–Finan), New York–London 1889, pp. 262–264. For a detailed discussion on the subject, see J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, pp. 187–197.

⁷⁷ GNIÖ, 18 May 1791, no. 40, p. 161; GW, 14 May 1791, no. 39, p. [2]; 21 May, no. 41, p. [4]; 28 May, no. 43, p. [3]; PHP, June 1791, p. 553; July 1791, pp. 668–671. Fawkener arrived in the Russian capital on 24 or 25 May (I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 421; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 552; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 582; J. Łojek, *Pisma wybrane...*, p. 187; G. Figiel, *Europejska polityka...*, p. 221; A.B. Sokolov, "Ochakovskoe delo"..., p. 19). However, it was not until 30 June that he was granted a formal audience with the empress. GW, 2 July 1791, no. 53, supplement, p. [3].

that the border be established along the Dniester⁷⁸. A month later, on 29 June, representatives of Britain – William A. Fawkener and Charles Whitworth (1752–1825)⁷⁹ – and Prussia – Leopold Heinrich, Count von der Goltz (1745–1816)⁸⁰ – submitted a new proposal. They suggested that the lands between the rivers Boh and Dniester were to remain a neutral zone separating the two empires, or that Ochakov and its surrounding district be ceded to Russia, on the condition that free navigation along the Dniester be guaranteed and no fortifications erected on its Russian bank. Should Catherine II refuse to accept these terms, both courts were prepared to concede to her the Ochakov district stretching from the Boh to the Dniester, with the fortress of Ochakov to be demolished, the entire area demilitarised, and navigation on the Dniester left unrestricted⁸¹. In response, on 20 July, the court of St Petersburg declared that the empress

cannot depart from the moderate and impartial terms she has hitherto put forward for the sake of pacification. Of the three proposals contained in the note of 29 June, the third appears to be somewhat closer to the empress's intentions, however, the condition that the fortresses of Ochakov be dismantled and that no other strongholds be erected within that district is contrary to the full authority and rightful possession inherent in the district's cession to the empress. It would also run counter to the principle of absolute parity, or reciprocity, given that Her Majesty leaves the Turks at liberty to maintain all their fortresses along their border and to erect new ones at their discretion [...]. The empress, on her part, is not only willing to place no impediment on free navigation along the Dniester but indeed intends to afford it her full protection. Lastly, Her Majesty trusts that, should the Porte obstinately refuse to accept these conditions for peace, the English and Prussian courts will no longer concern themselves with its fate and will allow the war to continue,

⁷⁸ PHP, July 1791, pp. 668–671. Cf. GNiO, 28 July, no. 60, p. 239. Copy of the memorial dated 15/26 May and the Russian response dated 6/17 June: *The Parliamentary Register...*, pp. 77–81.

⁷⁹ T.S., *Whithworth, Charles, earl Whithworth*, [in:] *Dictionary of National Biography*, S. Lee, ed., vol. LXI (*Whichcord–Williams*), London 1900, pp. 163–166; D.B. Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1689–1789*, London 1932, pp. 94, 119; S.T. Bindoff, *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1789–1852*, London 1934, pp. 108–109.

⁸⁰ L. von Zedlitz-Neukirch, *Pantheon des Preussischen Heeres*, Berlin 1835, p. 93.

⁸¹ GW, 3 September 1791, no. 71, p. [3]; GNiO, 16 July 1791, no. 57, p. 228. See Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında...*, pp. 478–479. Copy of that memorial: *The Parliamentary Register...*, pp. 81–84.

leaving its course to the workings of fortune and circumstance and letting the consequences unfold therefrom⁸².

On 22 July, the ministers of the allied courts submitted another memorandum to the empress, acknowledging all of Russia's claims. It stated that in insisting on the demolition of the fortifications of Ochakov and the demilitarisation of the district, both courts had merely sought to provide stronger guarantees for free navigation along the Dniester. Those precautions, however, were now deemed unnecessary, as the empress had pledged not to impose any restrictions and to uphold unhindered passage along the river. It was further declared that Britain and Prussia would call upon the Sublime Porte to concede the Ochakov district to Russia and to accept the terms offered. Should the Porte refuse to do so, the allies undertook to withdraw from the war altogether. It was finally proposed that Catherine allow the Turks four months for deliberation and promptly declare an armistice when they agreed to peace. Five days later, on 27 July, the Russian ministry replied that the empress approved the proposed delay and that, as soon as the Porte accepted the terms presented to it, she would authorise an armistice. Thus ended the negotiations between the representatives of Britain and Prussia, and the advisers of Catherine II in the Russian capital. With the threat of a new war in Northern Europe averted, the Ochakov crisis came to a close⁸³.

⁸² GW, 3 September 1791, no. 71, pp. [3–4]. Cf. GNiO, 6 August 1791, no. 63, pp. 251–252; Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında...*, p. 479; A.B. Sokolov, “*Ochakovskoe delo*”..., p. 20; and *The Parliamentary Register*..., pp. 84–88, providing a copy of the note by Count Ivan Andreevich Ostermann, Russian Vice-Chancellor, dated 9/20 July.

⁸³ GW, 3 September 1791, no. 71, p. [4]; 7 September, no. 72, p. [4]. For more on the negotiations in St Petersburg, see R.H. Lord, *Drugí rozbiór...*, pp. 107–108; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 419 ff. (both works erroneously record 26 July as the date on which the final instrument was signed); Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında...*, p. 479. Copies of both documents, the memorial dated 22 July and the Russian note dated 27 July in *The Parliamentary Register*..., pp. 84–92. Notably, before leaving Russia, Fawkener received an ornate snuffbox set with diamonds from the empress. GW, 7 September 1791, no. 72, p. [2].

3. THE DEFEATS OF THE TURKISH ARMY AND NAVY

In Constantinople, whosoever but hinted that it might be expedient to reconcile with Moscow was forthwith cast into the sea without mercy.

PHP, MAY 1791, PP. 479–480

In his May reports on the operations in the Turkish theatre of war, Świtkowski first observed:

The Porte, finding itself freed from the Austrians through Prussian offices, and the Muscovite forces drawn off by the diversion to be made upon the Baltic Sea by the allied courts in its defence, resolved to muster all its strength and therewith compel Moscow, thus preoccupied, to accept such a peace as it, in concert with the allied courts, would dictate⁸⁴.

However, Selim III's hopes proved ill-founded. The 1791 campaign began with a series of Turkish setbacks, which by summer culminated in a crushing defeat, as extensively covered by the Warsaw press, especially in 'Pamiętnik'. On 8 April, General-Lieutenant Prince Sergei Fedorovich Golitsyn, crossing the Danube with his troops aboard the flotilla of Major-General José de Ribas y Bayons, defeated a 7,000-strong Turkish force encamped near Matchin. The Turks lost nearly 2,000 men, several cannons, and all their camp equipment, while Russian losses were minimal. In pursuit of the enemy, the Russians entered Matchin, plundered the town, captured the local commander, Mehmed Pasha, together with two pashas of two tails, and then withdrew to the left bank of the Danube⁸⁵.

The following day, on 9 April, Prince Golitsyn led his troops to the Kuntsefan Peninsula situated opposite Braila. There, he encountered the oared flotilla under Major-General Ribas, which had landed two battalions of grenadiers on the promontory, under the command of Colonel Ribas. The Turks promptly abandoned the redoubt they had constructed at that location and withdrew to the entrenchments on the opposite bank, defended by 1,900 janissaries and 20 cannons.

⁸⁴ PHP, May 1791, pp. 473–474.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 475; GNiO, 11 May 1791, no. 38, p. 152. Cf. A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g.*, vol. II (1789–1791 gg.), St Petersburg 1880, pp. 198–202; O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov*, vol. I, Moscow 2018, pp. 156–157.

Despite heavy fire from the enemy batteries, General de Ribas successfully ferried a Russian detachment across the Danube under cover of darkness. To assist Colonel Ribas, Golitsyn sent two battalions of infantry and several hundred dismounted Cossacks under the command of Brigadier Boris Borisovich Lezzano (1740–1827)⁸⁶. He also ordered the construction of a battery on the shore of the peninsula, opposite the Turkish fortifications. On 11 April, the Russians opened fire, and the Cossacks launched an assault on the enemy entrenchments, capturing them within three-quarters of an hour. The Turkish vessels, caught in a crossfire, were completely destroyed or seized. The Russians claimed 26 cannons, 27 colours, and 5 banners as trophies. Approximately 4,000 Turks were killed or drowned in the Danube. Only 15 soldiers survived by swimming across the river⁸⁷.

The victory enabled the capture of the outer entrenchments of Braila, with the town still under siege by Suvorov's corps. However, the fortress itself could not be taken, as the grand vizier had greatly reinforced the garrison (10,000 men) and dispatched a powerful corps to the area. This compelled the Russian troops to abandon the siege and withdraw to Galatz on 14 April⁸⁸.

Exactly two months later, on 14 June, the corps of Mikhail I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, 5,000 strong, crossed the Danube near Tulcha and attacked the enemy encamped at Babadag (Babadağ), four miles beyond the river (23,000 Turks and Tatars under Seraskers Ahmed Pasha and Abaza Mehmed Pasha, as well as Baht Giray Khan). It was the cavalry that tipped the scales in this engagement. After its swift assault, and before the arrival of the Russian infantry, the enemy withdrew towards Matchin, abandoning a heavily fortified camp along with vast supplies of gunpowder and bread. The Turks and Tatars suffered over 1,500 casualties, while the Russians lost only a few men. It was a sobering lesson for the grand vizier. Yet, Koca Yusuf

⁸⁶ N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety XVIII i XIX stoletii* (= *Portraits russes des XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*), vol. IV, no. 3, St Petersburg 1908, p. 79; *Lecano, Boris Borisovich*, [in:] RBS, vol. X (*Labzina-Liashchenko*), Imperial Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg 1914, p. 363; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar' generalov i admiralov ot Petra I do Nikolaia II*, vol. II (*L-Â*), Moscow 2010, p. 45.

⁸⁷ PHP, April 1791, p. 391; May 1791, pp. 476–478; GNiO, 4 May 1791, no. 36, p. 144; GW, 30 April 1791, no. 35, supplement, pp. [3–4]. See A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 202–205 (citing the exact same figures for Turkish military losses. In the battle at Braila, 80 Russian soldiers were killed and 222 wounded).

⁸⁸ PHP, May 1791, p. 480; June 1791, p. 556; GNiO, 25 May 1791, no. 42, p. 168; 28 May, no. 43, p. 174; GW, 1 June 1791, no. 44, p. [3].

Pasha, who was assembling the main army by the Danube, was readying for an offensive⁸⁹.

Anticipating his movements, on 9 July, Prince Nikolai V. Repnin struck at the Turks near Matchin, routing Koca Yusuf Pasha's troops of 80,000 and preventing the junction of the two Ottoman armies. The battle was fierce, lasting over six hours, and ended in a decisive Russian victory. The Turks lost between 4,000 and 5,000 men, their entire camp, 30 to 40 cannons, and 15 standards. The opposing side counted 150 killed and approximately 300 wounded. Among the captured was Mehmed Arnaut, a pasha of two tails. On the Danube, the Ottoman land forces were supported by a squadron of 30 ships, which sailed into the Matchin branch of the river. The Russians blew up three enemy vessels, sank another three, and forced the rest to retreat. There are only a few instances in history where a nation, exhausted by a four-year war, proved such overwhelming military and moral superiority over a strong opponent⁹⁰.

⁸⁹ PHP, June 1791, pp. 556–557; GW, 29 June 1791, no. 52, supplement, p. [2]. Cf. A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 211–212; O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov...*, p. 157; L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov*, Moscow 2012, pp. 160–161; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiiia i flot v XVIII veke (Ocherki)*, Moscow 1958, p. 566; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 136; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 555 and idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 585–586 – both publications record a different date (19/30 June) and provide an alternative estimate of the Porte's forces (20,000 men); I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 425 (indicating that the Russian forces numbered 12,000, while the Turkish forces totalled 15,000). See also [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin, Field-marshal and Commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, Grand Admiral of the Fleets, Knight of the Principal Orders of Prussia, Sweden, and Poland, and of All the Orders of Russia etc. Comprehending Original Anecdotes of Catharine the Second, and of the Russian Court*, London 1812, p. 235, where the Turkish forces were estimated at 15,000 troops.

⁹⁰ GW, 20 July 1791, no. 58, supplement, p. [2]; 10 August, no. 64, supplement, pp. [1–2]; PHP, July 1791, p. 667; GNiO, 20 July 1791, no. 58, p. 232. More on the subject, cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 235–237; A.G. Martynov, *Istoriia 12-go Dragunskogo Starodubskogo polka*, St Petersburg [1908], pp. 33–37 (the author estimates Turkish losses at 4,000 killed, and Russian casualties at 141 killed and approx. 300 wounded); A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 213–224 (according to whom Turkish casualties were under 4,000 killed, with only 34 taken prisoner, as the Russians reportedly refrained from capturing enemy troops. Russian casualties were said to amount to 141 killed and just under 300 wounded); O. Mikhailov, *Kutuzov...*, pp. 160–169 (estimating the Porte's losses in killed and wounded at 5,000 men); L. Ivchenko, *Kutuzov...*, pp. 162–163; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanli-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 137. Cf. also L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiiia...*, p. 567; S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, p. 555; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, p. 586; I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 425 (where the date of the battle is mistakenly recorded as 10 July); E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks...*, p. 305 (suggesting that

Koca Yusuf Pasha's scattered army retreated in disarray to Shumen, where the grand vizier was nearly hacked to pieces by his own soldiers and was forced to flee. After the battle, the Ottoman Albanians turned against the janissaries, and "inflicted upon that corps a defeat greater than that dealt by the enemy in the skirmish itself"⁹¹ as Łuskina reported. The commander of the janissaries sought protection from the ministers in Sistova, while a considerable number of Albanians entered Russian service⁹².

Meanwhile, on 3 July, General-in-Chief Ivan Vasilievich Gudovich (1741–1820)⁹³ stormed Anapa, the most powerful Ottoman fortress in the Kuban region. A total of 71 cannons, 9 mortars, and 100 standards fell into the hands of the victors. Taken prisoner were Mustafa Pasha, a pasha of three tails (the son of Batal Pasha, the fortress commander captured in 1790), the renowned Chechen warrior Sheikh Mansur⁹⁴, and 14,000 soldiers and civilians⁹⁵. Shortly afterwards, the Russians took the fortress

the grand vizier's forces numbered 100,000, while the Russian army – 40,000 men); A.A. Kersnovsky, *Istoriia russkoi armii*, vol. I (*Ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700–1814 gg.*), Moscow 1992, p. 155; D.R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, CT–London 2006, p. 87 (the latter two works estimate the Russian forces at 30,000 men). Incidentally, GNiO (10 September 1791, no. 72, p. 291) reprinted a false report on the Russian defeat at Matchin, sourced from 'Hamburgische Correspondent'. It did not escape the attention of Rev. Łuskina, who remarked: "As for the letter from Galatz, published in that issue and describing the battle between the Russians and the Turks at Matchin, we do not insert it in our paper, as it presents a relation wholly contrary to all authentic reports and to the various public accounts published in foreign journals, and can, therefore, find no credit with us" (GW, 14 September 1791, no. 74, supplement, p. [3]).

⁹¹ GW, 27 August 1791, no. 69, supplement, p. [2].

⁹² *Ibidem*.

⁹³ A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815*, New York 2005, p. 142; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I (A–K), Moscow 2010, p. 413.

⁹⁴ He was transported to St Petersburg, where he was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment. He died on 13 April 1794 in the Shlisselburg Fortress, a notorious tsarist prison. Cf. P. Olszewski, *Polityka Rosji wobec Kaukazu w okresie panowania Katarzyny II (1762–1796)*, "Piotrkowskie Zeszyty Historyczne" 2008, vol. IX, p. 54; A. Lieven, *Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power*, London 1998, p. 306; S. Ciesielski, *Rosja–Czeczenia. Dwa stulecia konfliktu*, Wrocław 2003, p. 31; P. Grochmalski, *Czeczenia. Rys prawdziwy*, Wrocław 1999, p. 36; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaia voina*, vol. I (*Ot drevneishikh vremen do Ermolova*), Moscow 2006, https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1013400/14/Potto_-_Kavkazskaya_voyna._Tom_1._Ot_drevneyshih_vremen_do_Ermolova.html (accessed 30 August 2019).

⁹⁵ GW, 27 July 1791, no. 60, supplement, p. [3]; 10 August, no. 64, supplement, p. [2]; PHP, July 1791, p. 668. Cf. [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince*

of Sudzhuk Kale on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, where, in the early nineteenth century, a settlement was founded to later grow into the port of Novorossiisk. Both strongholds – Anapa and Sudzhuk Kale – were razed by the Russians, and their inhabitants (14,000 men and 6,000 women) were removed to the Crimea to settle the region. The surrounding lands were ceded to the Circassians, provided they no longer recognised the authority of the Turkish sultan⁹⁶.

The Ottoman Empire also suffered setbacks at sea. Newspapers reported that on 29 April 1791, two Russian men-of-war under the command of Rear Admiral Marko Ivanovich Voinovich and Colonel Guglielmo Lorenzi encountered six Turkish merchant vessels sailing for Constantinople (or for Alexandria, as suggested by other accounts). After a brief engagement, the already badly damaged Ottoman ships fled and found refuge off the coast of Rhodes. One vessel, unable to keep pace with the others, was captured by the enemy⁹⁷.

In the summer of 1791, a skirmish took place near Argentiera in the Adriatic Sea between a Russian flotilla of 5 men-of-war, commanded by Colonel Lorenzi, and an Ottoman squadron of 18 vessels, as reported by ‘Gazeta Warszawska’. After a fierce four-hour engagement at sea, the Russian ships were forced to retreat. Despite their numerical advantage, the Turks did not give chase⁹⁸.

On 11 August, near cape Kaliakra on the southeastern coast of Bulgaria, Vice Admiral Fedor F. Ushakov, commanding the Russian Black Sea Fleet, took the Turkish fleet of Hüseyin Küçük Pasha by surprise and inflicted a defeat upon it. While ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’ published only a brief account of the battle, Łuskina’s newspaper reprinted extensive excerpts from Russian and Ottoman court reports. The Turkish fleet consisted of 18 ships of the line, 17 frigates, and numerous auxiliary vessels. It was anchored in the bay under the protection of coastal batteries. Ushakov had 16 ships of the line

Potemkin..., p. 234; A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 206–211 (indicating that during the engagement at Anapa, 23 officers and 1,215 soldiers were killed, while 71 officers and 2,401 Russian soldiers were wounded); S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, p. 142.

⁹⁶ GW, 10 August 1791, no. 64, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 3 September 1791, no. 71, p. 284. Cf. N.S. Kiniapina, M.M. Bliev, V.V. Degoev, *Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii: vtoraia polovina XVIII – 80-e gody XIX veka*, Moscow 1984, pp. 74–75.

⁹⁷ GNiO, 6 July 1791, no. 54, p. 216; GW, 9 July 1791, no. 55, p. [2].

⁹⁸ GW, 14 October 1791, no. 74, p. [2].

and 23 smaller vessels under his command⁹⁹. To prevent the opponent from avoiding engagement, he resolved to mount an attack without even assuming a line of battle. The risky manoeuvre, which involved steering the Russian ships between the shore and the anchored enemy vessels, proved successful, and the Turks began a disorderly retreat towards the Bosphorus. As the kapudan pasha lost control over the fleet, his deputy, the gallant Algerian Said Ali, attempted to rally several ships of the line around him to halt the pursuit. Ushakov struck at his flagship, inflicting serious damage on it, and then scattered the Turkish vessels that still offered resistance.

The battle lasted three and a half hours (or, as many as eight, according to some reports). The Russians pursued the fleeing enemy, but nightfall and a sudden calm at sea prevented a complete rout. During the night, the wind rose sufficiently for the victorious fleet to resume the chase, nearly reaching the Bosphorus. It then set course for Cape Emine, where it remained for three days. From there, Ushakov dispatched ships to seek out scattered Ottoman vessels, which had either been driven aground, sunk, or burned. Only the squadron from Algiers managed to reach Constantinople. Łuskina noted:

six Algerian ships, among them the admiral's vessel, entered the Bosphorus by night. The admiral's ship, having run aground, made signals for succour. Its cannon discharges and cries for aid struck fear and dread into the sultan and the capital entire. On the morrow, the sultan himself went to behold those ships, which were all most grievously damaged and all but dismasted and bereft of cordage. The admiral's vessel alone was said to have carried, besides the dead, 450 wounded aboard¹⁰⁰.

The number of Russian casualties was exceptionally low: 17 dead and 18 wounded¹⁰¹.

⁹⁹ A list of the units comprising the fleet commanded by Ushakov is provided by A.A. Lebedev, *Sobytiia 12–15 iuliia 1791 g. na Chernom more i ikh rol v istorii pobed F.F. Ushakova*, “Gangut” 2013, no. 75, p. 49.

¹⁰⁰ GW, 12 October 1791, no. 82, supplement, p. [2].

¹⁰¹ GW, 8 October 1791, no. 81, p. [2] (where the date of the battle is mistakenly recorded as 13 August); 12 October, no. 82, supplement, pp. [2–3]; GNiO, 12 October 1791, no. 82, p. 330. For more details, see V. Ganichev, *Ushakov*, Moscow 1990, pp. 176–177 (the author notes a new tactical manoeuvre employed by Ushakov – an attack from the shore. A similar manoeuvre was used at Aboukir in 1798 by the English admiral Horatio Nelson); A.N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina...*, pp. 225–228; L.G. Beskrovnii, *Russkaia armiiia...*, p. 568; A.G. Satskii, *Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov*, “Voprosy istorii”

The Battle of Cape Kaliakra was the last engagement of the war. It brought Ushakov glory and the Order of Saint Alexander Nevsky, and ushered in the much-coveted peace for Russia¹⁰². Following his victory, Ushakov intended to set course for Varna to destroy the Ottoman fleet harboured there and then proceed to Constantinople. However, on 19 August, he received orders to cease further hostilities and directed a return to Sevastopol¹⁰³.

4. THE PEACE OF JASSY

[...] upon learning of the signing of the preliminary articles of peace with the Porte, [Potemkin] rushed with such urgency to finalize this endeavour that, having left his entire wardrobe behind on the way, he had to resort to wearing his valet's linen.

GNiO, 24 SEPTEMBER 1791, NO. 77, P. 310

The failures of the Turkish forces on land and at sea compelled the grand vizier to resume peace negotiations. They were held at Repnin's headquarters in Galatz, where the Russian army had withdrawn due to food shortages beyond the Danube. The High Porte was prepared to conclude peace on the terms agreed in St Petersburg in July 1791 by the ministers of the allied courts. It consented to ceding Ochakov and the lands between the rivers Boh and Dniester to Russia, provided that the remaining articles of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca were upheld. However, Repnin put

2002, no. 3, p. 66; J. Gozdawa-Gołębiowski, *Wojny morskie 1775–1851*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 150–151 (stating that the Russian fleet comprised 7 ships of the line, 11 frigates, 20 smaller vessels, and 1 fireship, while the Ottoman fleet consisted of 18 ships of the line and 17 frigates. The Turks lost 2,000 men in combat, whereas the Russians had 17 killed and 27 wounded); S.Iu. Danilov, *Glavnye morskie srazheniia ot trier do avianoscev*, Moscow 2013, pp. 68–69 (providing a similar breakdown of the forces and casualties of the opposing sides); V.D. Docenko, *Morskie bitvy Rossii XVIII–XX vekov*, 3rd expanded edn, St Petersburg 2002, pp. 55–56 (indicating that Ushakov's squadron consisted of 6 ships of the line, 12 frigates, 3 bomb vessels, and 17 smaller ships); V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov, *Tri stoletia Rossiiskogo flota*, vol. III (XVIII vv.), St Petersburg 2003, pp. 424–429; P.P. Wiczorkiewicz, *Historia wojen morskich. Wiek żagla*, vol. I, Warszawa 1995, pp. 412–413; E. Kosiarsz, *Bitwy morskie*, 4th edn, revised and expanded, Warszawa 1994, pp. 133, 136–137.

¹⁰² GW, 7 January 1792, no. 2, p. [2]; GNiO, 4 January 1792, no. 1, p. 6.

¹⁰³ GW, 12 October 1791, no. 82, supplement, p. [3].

forward further demands. He insisted on: 1) the demolition of the fortress of Khotin; 2) a prohibition on fortifying Bender and Akerman; 3) the Porte renouncing its right to dismiss the Wallachian hospodar and, should any accusations arise, having him tried by the Divan convened in Moldavia in the presence of a Russian envoy; 4) the release of prisoners of war without ransom; 5) the abolition of Turkish subjects' right to exploit the salt mines at Kinburn; 6) the recognition of the Russian protectorate over Georgia, Mingrelia, and Imereti, as well as over all the free peoples along the Caucasus who had voluntarily submitted to the authority of Catherine II; 7) free passage through the Bosphorus for Russian men-of-war carrying more than 36 guns; 8) the establishment of Russian consuls in Ottoman ports; 9) separate warehouses in the Ottoman capital for Russian merchant ships; 10) the payment of only a 5% duty on imports and 2% on Russian goods in transit¹⁰⁴. After brief negotiations, on 11 August, the peace preliminaries were signed, and an eight-month truce was declared. The grand vizier accepted the initial terms, save for the article concerning the Danubian principalities, which was withheld for further negotiation¹⁰⁵.

Świtkowski observed:

Thus ended this cruel war, which cost up to half a million lives, laid waste to several provinces, impoverished and burdened several great powers with debt, and nearly spread the blaze of conflict across all of Europe. What, then, did the warring powers gain for so much blood shed, so many millions squandered, for such toil, calamity, and peril? Moscow – a patch of land which, compared to what it already possesses, is but a mere speck; Austria – a few barren rocks and a wretched town; the Porte – nought but grief and shame, for instead of vengeance, it has suffered further losses¹⁰⁶.

Yet, the news of the war's end proved premature. On 17 August, just a day after the preliminary articles of peace were signed¹⁰⁷, Prince Potemkin

¹⁰⁴ PHP, November 1791, pp. 1056–1058; GNiO, 15 October 1791, no. 83, p. 333.

¹⁰⁵ GW, 24 September 1791, no. 77, supplement, pp. [2–3]; 28 September, no. 78, supplement, p. [2]; 8 October, no. 81, p. [2]; 15 October, no. 83, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, August 1791, p. 767; September 1791, pp. 813–814; GNiO, 5 November 1791, no. 89, p. 357. For more on the subject, see S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 559–560; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 590–591; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 584–585; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 159–162; specifically K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XLIII, İstanbul 2013, pp. 343–344 (discussing the preliminary terms of the peace treaty and the armistice).

¹⁰⁶ PHP, September 1791, pp. 814–815.

¹⁰⁷ I. de Madariaga, *Russia...*, p. 425.

arrived in Galatz¹⁰⁸. He deemed the conditions agreed by Repnin too lenient towards the Ottoman Empire and promptly broke off the negotiations. The talks resumed at the end of September¹⁰⁹ and continued until 9 January 1792, when the definitive peace treaty was signed in Jassy. Potemkin, however, did not live to witness it. He died of putrid fever on 16 October, while en route to Nikolaev, some eight hours from Jassy by land, as extensively reported by ‘Gazeta Warszawska’¹¹⁰. Word of his death reached St Petersburg six days later in the evening. Catherine was preparing for a ball at the Hermitage when the court marshal announced to the guests gathered that grief over such a great loss would not allow the empress

¹⁰⁸ GNiO, 17 September 1791, no. 75, p. 302.

¹⁰⁹ GW, 2 November 1791, no. 88, supplement, p. [2].

¹¹⁰ GW, 26 October 1791, no. 86, supplement, pp. [1–2]: “News has arrived by courier that, on 16 instant [of October – M.K.], Prince Grigory Potemkin of Taurida bade farewell to this world in his 52nd year, in an open field on the way to Bender, 35 versts from Jassy, after several weeks of illness. Born of a family once Polish, he was field marshal general of Her Imperial Majesty of Russia; commander-in-chief of the Russian armies engaged in the southern theatre of war; chief of all regular and irregular light cavalry; grand admiral of the fleets on the Azov, Caspian, and Mediterranean Seas; senator; president of the Military Collegium; governor-general of Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Kharkov; adjutant-general; chamberlain; inspector general of the army; lieutenant colonel of the Preobrazhensky Life Guards Regiment; chief of the Cavalry Guard Corps; chief of his own Cuirassier Regiment; chief of the Petersburg Dragoons; chief of the Ekaterinoslav Grenadiers; supreme overseer of the arms manufactory; grand hetman of the Russian Cossacks of Ekaterinoslav and the Black Sea; knight of the Russian Orders of St Andrew, St Alexander Nevsky, St George, and St Vladimir (First Class); knight of the Polish Orders of the White Eagle and St Stanislaus; knight of the Prussian Order of the Black Eagle; knight of the Danish Order of the Elephant; knight of the Swedish Order of the Seraphim and St Anna; in short, a man who sustained the entire vast political and military apparatus of Russia for so long, so unfalteringly, and so gloriously for his sovereign, to the admiration of all Europe, until the very moment of his death – a merit even his greatest foes cannot deny him: *Virtus, etiam in hoste laudanda*”. Notably, the fever which claimed Potemkin also affected Repnin, Prince Karl Friedrich von Württemberg (the brother-in-law of Tsarevich Pavel), Colonel Ribas, and Colonel Count Jan Nepomucen Gurowski (b. 1764), along with a great portion of the Russian army in Moldavia. Prince Württemberg, as well as Colonels Ribas and Gurowski, succumbed to the disease. One newspaper remarked on the causes of the raging epidemic in Jassy: “Following the signing of the preliminary articles of the treaty, the Turks permitted the free delivery of provisions to the Muscovite army. Among other goods, great quantities of fruit were brought in; and as the officers and soldiers partook of them immoderately, dysenteries and putrid fevers ensued”. GNiO, 21 September 1791, no. 76, pp. 305–306 (quotation on p. 305); 11 January 1792, no. 3, supplement, p. 18; GW, 7 December 1791, no. 98, supplement, p. [2].

to attend it, “nor to endure that joy should be had at such a moment”¹¹¹. The guests took their leave. The grief-stricken monarch underwent bloodletting, a procedure recommended by physicians at the time as a remedy for melancholia, and then withdrew to her study, where she tirelessly wrote letters concerning affairs of state for fifteen hours. She later dispatched a courier with a rescript to General-in-Chief Mikhail Vasilievich Kakhovsky (1734–1800)¹¹², instructing him to assume temporary command of the army. Count Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko (1747–1799)¹¹³, a privy councillor, was sent to Jassy to conclude peace with the Turks as swiftly as possible. Finally, she confirmed the credentials of Aleksandr Nikolaevich Samoilov, José de Ribas y Bayons, and Sergei Lashkarev, whom Potemkin had appointed shortly before his death as the Russian representatives for the peace negotiations¹¹⁴.

¹¹¹ GNiO, 9 November 1791, no. 90, p. 362.

¹¹² A. Mikaberidze, *The Russian Officer Corps...*, pp. 175–176; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, pp. 631–632.

¹¹³ N. Mikhailovich, *Russkie portrety...*, vol. II, St Petersburg 1906, p. 9; S.V. Volkov, *Generalitet Rossiiskoi Imperii...*, vol. I, p. 129.

¹¹⁴ GNiO, 5 October 1791, no. 80, p. 321; 9 November, no. 90, p. 362; GW, 23 November 1791, no. 94, pp. [2–3]; 7 December, no. 98, supplement, p. [2]; 17 December, no. 101, p. [2]; PHP, November 1791, pp. 1055–1056. Rev. Łuskiná noted: “The news of Prince Potemkin’s death was received with utmost dismay here [in St Petersburg – M.K.]. One may easily imagine how deeply Her Imperial Majesty was afflicted by the loss of this ever-victorious hero, in whom she had placed the greatest – and never-failing – trust for so many years. Yet, this illustrious monarch received even this sad news with her great steadfastness and in submission to the will of Divine Providence. She could barely be persuaded by her physicians to be bled, in order to avert any ill effects that might follow from the shock of such sorrowful tidings. After the bloodletting, she promptly turned her thoughts to the affairs of state. Upon receiving the news, the entire Privy Council came to her Majesty, but the empress sent word that they might disperse, for she herself, being in the best of health even now, would consider what measures were to be undertaken at this juncture. She then withdrew to her study, where she wrote uninterruptedly for fifteen hours, not even taking the time to change out of her court attire, which she had donned that evening for a ball at the palace, not expecting such sorrowful news”. GW, 30 November 1791, no. 96, supplement, pp. [2–3]. Similarly, though for different reasons, the news of the Prince of Taurida’s death produced a strong reaction in Constantinople, as the same newspaper reported: “The news of Prince Potemkin’s death, as unexpected as it was, has greatly moved the minds of many. The Turkish ministry believes that the signing of the peace treaty with Russia will be hastened by this event; yet many Greeks, whose wealth and fortune were owed to the aforementioned Prince, and who through him attained prosperity, deeply mourn his loss. In the meantime, the Turkish government is making every effort to strengthen both its fleet and army, solely to avoid being left at the mercy of its

Count Bezborodko reached Jassy on 13 November. "His entry was saluted by the firing of all cannons and the ringing of all bells", one newspaper reported¹¹⁵. Two weeks earlier, a delegation from the High Porte had arrived there, accompanied by a sizeable retinue of 400 in total¹¹⁶. The sultan had appointed the same representatives as at the congress of Sistova to negotiate the treaty with Russia: Abdullah Berrî Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Bey, and Mehmed Dürri Efendi. Alexander Moruzi, who would later become hospodar of Moldavia, served as chief interpreter¹¹⁷. Before Bezborodko's arrival in Jassy, two conferences had already been held between the plenipotentiaries of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, followed by sessions three times a week. On 1 December, Prince Repnin joined the negotiations, having been appointed by the empress as commander-in-chief of the Russian army in Moldavia as soon as he had recovered from a debilitating fever¹¹⁸. "The peace negotiations are proceeding most

enemies". GW, 11 January 1792, no. 3, supplement, p. [2]. Potemkin's body was brought to Jassy for an autopsy and embalming, then placed in the local patriarchal church until the completion of a mausoleum in Kherson, where he was buried on 24 October. The funeral ceremonies were reported by GNiO, 19 November 1791, no. 93, pp. 372–373; 23 November, no. 94, p. 378. Cf. GW, 24 December 1791, no. 103, supplement, p. [3]. For more on Potemkin's illness and death, as well as his funeral in Jassy and Kherson, see S.S. Montefiore, *Potiomkin...*, pp. 561–573, 579–583; idem, *Katarzyna Wielka...*, pp. 592–606, 612–616; [G. Aleksandrovich Potemkin], *Memoirs of the Life of Prince Potemkin...*, pp. 240–242; *Lev Nikolaevich Engelgardt (10.II.1766 – 4.XI.1836)*, [in:] *Russkie memuary. Izbrannye stranitsy. XVIII vek*, E.M. Kostrova, ed., Moscow 1988, pp. 282–287; O. Eliseeva, *Grigorii Potemkin...*, pp. 587–593, 599–600 (on the reaction of his contemporaries to the field marshal's death and his possible poisoning, see also pp. 601–606).

¹¹⁵ GNiO, 17 December 1791, no. 101, p. 406.

¹¹⁶ GW, 2 November 1791, no. 88, supplement, p. [2]. Kemal Beydilli (*Yaş Antlaşması...*, p. 344) indicates that the Ottoman delegation arrived in Jassy on 2 October, and the negotiations planned for 18 October were postponed due to Potemkin's death. The first session of the talks, of which there were a total of fifteen, began on 10 November 1791.

¹¹⁷ GNiO, 17 September 1791, no. 75, p. 302; PHP, May 1792, p. 451. Cf. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter...*, vol. III, pp. 459–460; K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması...*, p. 344; Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında...*, p. 481; H. Topaktaş, *Osmanlı-Rusya ilişkileri...*, p. 438, fn. 126, which mentions two other Turkish delegates participating in the negotiations (Mehmed Hakky Bey and the janissary secretary Râtib Efendi) and states that the same representatives of the Triple Alliance who had taken part in the discussions in Sistova also participated in the peace negotiations in Jassy.

¹¹⁸ GW, 10 December 1791, no. 99, p. [2]; 21 December, no. 102, supplement, p. [3]; 28 December, no. 104, supplement, [2]; 7 January 1792, no. 2, p. [2]; 11 January, no. 3, supplement, p. [3]; PHP, November 1791, p. 1056.



7. *The Death of Potemkin*, engraving by Gavriil I. Skorodumov, 1791–1792

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favourably”, Łuskina commented¹¹⁹. The same publisher wrote that, due to an outbreak of the Asian fever raging in Jassy and across southern Europe – which had claimed the life of Prince Potemkin and left several delegates bedridden, among them generals Samoilov and Ribas, as well as the Turkish reis efendi and dragoman A. Moruzi – there was discussion of relocating the congress¹²⁰. Notably, despite the ongoing negotiations, both sides kept their armies on a war footing¹²¹.

The peace treaty between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Porte, signed on 9 January 1792, was based on the preliminaries agreed in Galatz. Świtkowski’s periodical was the only one to reprint the full text of the treaty (comprising 13 articles) in May that year¹²², whereas other newspapers published only a general summary of its provisions¹²³. The first article declared that mutual friendship was to be restored, that subjects of both

¹¹⁹ GW, 7 January 1792, no. 2, p. [2].

¹²⁰ GW, 7 December 1791, no. 98, supplement, pp. [2–3].

¹²¹ GW, 11 January 1792, no. 3, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 7 January 1792, no. 2, supplement, p. 12. For a detailed discussion of the peace negotiations, see K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması...*, pp. 344–347; Z. Koçak, *1787–1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında...*, pp. 481–483; S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 164–166.

¹²² PHP, May 1792, pp. 450–468. See also appendix 2 to this study.

¹²³ GNiO, 18 January 1792, no. 5, p. 28; 11 February, no. 12, p. 69; GW, 18 January 179, no. 5, supplement, p. [1].

states were granted general amnesty and a “general pardon”, and that those held in galleys or prisons were to be released. The second article reaffirmed the terms of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and subsequent agreements, including the convention of Ainali-Kavak of 21 March 1779¹²⁴, the manifesto on the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Taman of 19 April 1783¹²⁵, the commercial treaty of 21 June 1783¹²⁶, and the final act concerning peace, trade, and borders, signed in Constantinople on 8 January 1784. The third article stipulated that the new border between the two states was to be established along the Dniester. The fourth article, expanding on the previous one, stated that the empress would return Bessarabia to the Porte, along with the fortresses of Bender, Akerman, Kilia, and Izmail (all with their fortifications destroyed)¹²⁷, as well as the occupied Moldavia. Russia was to observe the articles of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and the explanatory convention concerning the Danubian principalities, from which the Turks would not demand any overdue contributions. In view of the devastation wrought by the war, the inhabitants of those lands were to be exempt from taxes for two years from the time of the exchange of the newly concluded treaty, and families wishing to settle elsewhere were to be allowed to relocate with all their possessions. In the subsequent article, the High Porte pledged to instruct the Ottoman pasha on the northeastern border not to mount any attacks, on whatever pretext, either covertly or openly, against Kartli, which was ruled by the tsar in Tiflis. This effectively meant recognition of the Russian protectorate over eastern Georgia. In Article VI, the Ottoman Empire relinquished all claims to the Crimea and Taman and vowed to prevent all incursions by Caucasian tribes into the Kuban. The next article confirmed its commitment to Article VI of the 1783 commercial treaty, relating to joint efforts to suppress Mediterranean corsairs. In Article VIII, both sides undertook to exchange prisoners of war

¹²⁴ Text of the treaty in Russian: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, vol. XIX (1775–1780), St Petersburg 1830, no. 14851, pp. 800–805; in French – *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, G. Noradounghian, ed., vol. I, Paris 1897, no. 38, pp. 338–344; *Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535–1855*, London 1855, pp. 480–486.

¹²⁵ Text in Russian: *Polnoe sobranie...*, vol. XXI (1781–1783), St Petersburg 1830, no. 15708, pp. 897–898.

¹²⁶ Text of the treaty: *ibidem*, no. 15757, pp. 939–956; *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman...*, vol. I, no. 41, pp. 351–373; *Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers...*, pp. 486–508.

¹²⁷ On the demolition of the fortifications of those strongholds and the resettlement of the inhabitants of Bessarabia and Moldavia to Ochakov and the Crimea, see GNiO, 19 October 1791, no. 84, p. 337; 5 November, no. 89, p. 358.

without ransom¹²⁸. Article IX obliged the commanders of both armies to promptly notify their subordinates about the conclusion of peace. Article X provided for the exchange of ambassadors plenipotentiary. The final articles stipulated that the Russian army would withdraw from the occupied territories and the fleet would leave the Danube estuary no later than on 26 May 1792 (Article XI)¹²⁹; the ratifications were to be exchanged between the grand vizier and the Russian privy councillor within fourteen days (Article XII), with confirmation to follow from the empress and the sultan within five weeks (Article XIII)¹³⁰.

As provided for in the treaty, Bezborodko and the grand vizier exchanged the instruments of ratification on 25 January 1792, as did the two courts in mid-February¹³¹. Newspapers reported that Selim III's joy was all the greater as he was not required to pay war reparations¹³², and the inhabitants of the Kuban were declared free¹³³. As expected,

¹²⁸ For more on the subject, see W. Smiley, *The Rules of War on the Ottoman Frontiers: an Overview of Military Captivity, 1699–1829*, [in:] *Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople*, P. Mitev, I. Parvev, M. Baramova, V. Racheva, eds, Berlin 2010, pp. 69–70 (stating that by August 1792, Russia had released over 10,000 Turkish prisoners, but the Porte suspected that thousands more were still being held and pressed for their release); idem, “After being so long Prisoners, they will not return to Slavery in Russia”: An Aegean Network of Violence between Empires and Identities, “Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies” 2014, vol. XLIV, pp. 221–234.

¹²⁹ The Russian garrison left Izmail in early March 1792. GNiO, 28 March 1792, no. 25, p. 148.

¹³⁰ PHP, May 1792, pp. 452–468. Cf. W. Serczyk, *Katarzyna II carowa Rosji*, Wrocław 1989, p. 266; A. Andrusiewicz, *Katarzyna Wielka. Prawda i mit*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 498–499; E.S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks...*, pp. 498–503 (on pp. 310–311, an analysis of Article V); S. Kuzucu, *1787–1792 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı...*, pp. 166–170 (where, however, the date of the Peace of Jassy – 10 January – is incorrect). Text of the treaty in French: *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman...*, vol. II, no. 5, pp. 16–21. Copy of the treaty in Italian: AGAD, AR, AORMP 180, ref. no. CXXXIV/131, pp. 191–198.

¹³¹ GW, 22 February 1792, no. 15, supplement, p. [3]; 21 April, no. 32, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 11 February 1792, no. 12, p. 69. Cf. K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması...*, p. 347, stating that on 27 January the ratifications were exchanged between Bezborodko and the grand vizier, and on 10 February 1791, between the courts.

¹³² GNiO, 18 January 1792, no. 5, p. 28 reported that Catherine demanded a payment of 12 million piastres as compensation. According to Modest I. Bogdanovich, the Porte committed to paying Russia 220 million piastres (approx. 7 million roubles in silver). After the peace treaty was signed, Catherine II magnanimously waived all war reparations. See idem, *Russkaia armiia v veke imperatitsy Ekateriny II*, St Petersburg 1873, p. 31.

¹³³ GW, 17 March 1792, no. 22, supplement, p. [2]; GNiO, 17 March 1792, no. 22, p. 130. Importantly, the issue of the Kuban border was one of the earliest and most

the occasion was not without lavish gifts for the ministers plenipotentiary and a number of other persons. The High Porte presented Russian dignitaries with gifts worth nearly 50,000 roubles.

Among the gifts bestowed – Łuskina reported – there was a most splendid ring valued at 20,000, a snuffbox priced at 8,000, a watch estimated at 7,000, and an embroidered pavilion set at 6,000 roubles, a Salonican rug, 28 puds of Mocha coffee, balsam, exquisite incense, and horses with rich trappings, etc.¹³⁴

Count Bezborodko received jewels worth 100,000 roubles from the sultan and a small box containing precious rose essence from the chief Turkish plenipotentiary¹³⁵. Following the ratification of the treaty, members of the Ottoman delegation were presented with fur robes of honour and gifts of diamonds. The courier who brought the news of the peace to Constantinople on 17 January was awarded “5,000 sequins in gold, a fine fur robe of honour, and an annual pension of 4,000 piastres”¹³⁶. In turn, Catherine II awarded Bezborodko the Order of Saint Andrew and a gift of 50,000 roubles. Samoilov received the same decoration and 30,000 roubles. The chief interpreter at the congress, A. Moruzi, was presented with a gold snuffbox adorned with the empress’s portrait and a valuable black fox fur¹³⁷.

On 2 April, Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha made a solemn entry into Constantinople, bringing with him the Banner of the Prophet. The sultan “rode out to meet him four miles away and presented him with a costly fur robe of honour”¹³⁸. Before long, however, Yusuf Pasha fell from favour and was relieved of his office (4 May). He was succeeded

crucial issues discussed in Jassy, sparking a debate on the Crimean treaty. The Turkish side emphasised that the treaty did not include the annexation of the Kuban, as Russia sought to interpret it, but rather that the River Kuban marked the border. The claim that the Kuban tribes, seeking refuge with the empress, demanded independence is entirely rejected. That article remained unresolved until the final session of the peace negotiations (7 January 1792). See K. Beydilli, *Yaş Antlaşması...*, p. 345.

¹³⁴ GW, 28 March 1792, no. 25, supplement, p. [2].

¹³⁵ On receiving it, he declared that “his conscience would not permit him to accept a gift of such immense worth, one befitting none but the great Russian monarch herself, and that he would dispatch it to her forthwith”. GNiO, 22 February 1792, no. 15, p. 85.

¹³⁶ GW, 17 March 1792, no. 22, supplement, p. [2]. Cf. GNiO, 17 March 1792, no. 22, p. 130.

¹³⁷ GNiO, 3 March 1792, no. 18, p. 105; 28 March, no. 25, p. 148; GW, 14 March 1792, no. 21, pp. [1–2].

¹³⁸ GW, 26 May 1792, no. 42, supplement, p. [3].

by the sultan's brother-in-law, the 80-year-old Melek Mehmed Pasha (1718–1802)¹³⁹, who had served as *kaymakam* (deputy) in the grand vizier's army during the previous war with Russia and later as the commander of Khotin¹⁴⁰. The incumbent admiral of the fleet, Hüseyin Küçük Pasha, was likewise dismissed. Selim III removed several other high-ranking officials and embarked on sweeping reforms in administration, finance, and the military (the New Order, *Nizam-ı Cedid*), intended to transform Turkey into a modern state¹⁴¹. After the war, there was an exchange of ambassadors: General Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov was appointed envoy extraordinary to Constantinople, while Mustafa (Mehmed) Râşid Efendi was sent to St Petersburg¹⁴².

¹³⁹ F. Yeşil, *Melek Mehmed Pasza*, [in:] *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XXIII, 3rd edn, Ankara 2019, pp. 244–245.

¹⁴⁰ GW, 26 May 1792, no. 42, supplement, p. [3]; 27 June, no. 51, p. [2]; 30 June, no. 52, p. [2]; GNiO, 16 June 1792, no. 48, p. 285.

¹⁴¹ There is a substantial body of scholarship on the subject. Among the more significant works, see S.J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971, pp. 71–199; idem, *The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III*, “Journal of Modern History” 1965, vol. XXXVII, no. 3, pp. 291–306; idem, *The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807*, “Oriens” 1965/1966, vol. XVIII/XIX, pp. 168–184; F. Yeşil, *Nizâm-ı Cedid Ordusunda Talim Ve Terbiye (1790–1807)*, “Tarih Dergisi” 2010, vol. II, no. 52, pp. 27–85; K. Üstün, *The New Order and Its Enemies: Opposition to Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789–1807*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation], Columbia University, 2013, <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D80Z79P1> (accessed 20 August 2020); *Nizam-ı Kadim'den Nizam-ı Cedid'e...*

¹⁴² The Russian court initially intended to send General Aleksandr Samoilov, nephew of Prince G. Potemkin, to Constantinople as an envoy. However, following Samoilov's appointment as Procurator-General in September 1792, the decision was ultimately made to entrust that mission to Kutuzov. GW, 28 March 1792, no. 25, supplement, p. [2]; 4 April, no. 27, supplement, p. [3]; no. 56, 14 July, p. [2]. Cf. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter...*, vol. III, p. 460. Cf., for instance, works discussing both missions: C. Bilim, *Mustafa Rasih Paşa'nın Rusya Sefaretnamesi*, “Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi” 1996, no. 7, pp. 15–36; V. Morkva, *Russia's Policy of Rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire in the Era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1806*, [unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at Ankara University], Ankara 2010, pp. 35–83, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52925456.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2021).

CONCLUSION

Thus, Dear Reader, this study approaches its conclusion. It is now time to take stock and reflect on the principal findings. To begin with, the terms of the Treaty of Sistova and the Treaty of Jassy fell far short of the pre-war hopes and aspirations of the imperial courts. If the otherwise reliable reports of the Warsaw press are to be believed, the war cost Austria nearly 260 million gulden and the lives of approximately 140,000 soldiers. Catherine II spent no less than 50 million roubles on the war effort between 1787 and 1789 alone¹. Austria's modest territorial gains and a small stretch of Black Sea coastline between the rivers Boh and Dniester that were ceded to Russia could hardly be said to offset the vast sums expended. Yet, it must be acknowledged that the Treaty of Jassy marked an important stage in Russia's consolidation of power in the Black Sea basin. The Black Sea Fleet served not only as a guarantor of the empire's southern security but also as a vehicle for the expansion of its influence in the region. The Crimea held a particularly prominent position in this respect, while Sevastopol became both the principal base of the Black Sea Fleet and a centre for shipbuilding. In addition, the Russo-Turkish War also revealed the military talents of several Russian generals and admirals, including Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov and Fedor F. Ushakov, while the victories won by Alexander Suvorov brought him renown across Europe. Moreover, few would contest the notion that the Treaty of Jassy sounded the death knell for Catherine II's Greek project.

Notably, contrary to the assumptions of successive generations of historians, Russia's cessation of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire did not usher in the beginning of the end for Poland. In early 1792, the fate

¹ GW, 1 September 1790, no. 70, supplement, p. [3]; 14 May 1791, no. 39, p. [2]; PHP, February 1790, p. 171; August 1791, p. 767.

of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was by no means a foregone conclusion. Catherine II resolved to dispatch her troops to Poland only once she was certain of its complete isolation on the international stage. It was not Prussia's ostensible support for the empress's plans, but rather the news of Emperor Leopold II's death, the passing of King Gustav III of Sweden, and the declaration of war by France against Austria that ultimately swayed the Petersburg court. Even in the spring of 1792, there were still advisers in Catherine II's entourage – including Aleksandr A. Bezborodko and Ivan A. Ostermann – who, fearing strong Polish resistance, sought to dissuade their sovereign from a new war. However, a far more influential faction, aligned with the empress's favourite, Platon Alexandrovich Zubov, emerged as the most forceful proponent of war, with Zubov assuring Catherine that the Russian armies would encounter only token resistance in Poland. Its efforts were further reinforced by the incentives and empty promises offered in St Petersburg by the architects of the notorious Targowica Confederation. Ultimately, only a few months after the conflict with Turkey ended, Russia instigated yet another war. This time, it was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that became the object of Russian aggression².

As to the primary focus of this study, it should first be acknowledged that the eighteenth-century Warsaw press offers invaluable insights into both Polish and general history. Its greatest strength lies in its reliability. At the time, it was a common editorial practice to report facts without commentary or personal judgement. It is also a source of considerable appeal to researchers, offering a vivid reflection of the period in which it was produced. One may only hope that the Warsaw press under Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski will in future receive greater scholarly attention from both Polish and foreign historians in future.

The outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1787 prompted the editors of the Warsaw periodicals to follow developments in the Black Sea region with heightened interest. Coverage from the theatre of war soon established itself as a regular feature of the Warsaw press. On occasion, such reports were so extensive that they dominated the foreign news sections. The editors of the Warsaw newspapers paid close attention to the movements of both belligerents, providing regular and timely updates not only on military operations but also on diplomatic initiatives and

² For more on the subject, see Z. Anusik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Rosji w ostatniej fazie obrad Sejmu Wielkiego (1791–1792)*, PNH 2017, vol. XVI, no 2, pp. 71–118 (secondary literature cited therein) (= *The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the Final Stage of the Great Diet [1791–1792]*, PNH 2017, vol. XVI, no. 3, pp. 71–115).

other war-related events taking place in Constantinople, St Petersburg, and Vienna. As a result, readers of the Warsaw press were offered a relatively comprehensive and – more importantly – reliable account of the progress of the Russo-Turkish War. Equally notable is the fact that the publishers made no attempt to attach greater or lesser importance to the material printed in the Warsaw periodicals. Alongside genuinely significant matters, they reported on those of minor or even negligible consequence. They also did not shy away from including anecdotes and incidental curiosities. Yet even such items contributed to a fuller understanding of the war and helped Polish readers grasp virtually every aspect of the conflict unfolding near the Polish borders. Concurrently, one cannot but appreciate that the editors of the Warsaw gazettes were remarkably well-informed not only about military operations, but also about both public and clandestine diplomatic negotiations. Particular emphasis should be placed on the fact that most press reports from the theatre of the Russo-Turkish War were factually accurate and have since been corroborated by other sources.

Although the editors of the Warsaw newspapers addressed a sweeping range of subjects, not all issues attracted the same level of their interest. Affairs of a military nature were undoubtedly the most thoroughly documented in the Warsaw-based periodicals, which provided broad coverage of the measures undertaken by the opposing armies. They recounted the course of major land and naval battles, while also featuring reports on smaller-scale engagements and skirmishes. Polish readers could likewise follow the progress of sieges and were kept informed of troop movements, as well as matters relating to the upkeep, provisioning, and billeting of soldiers involved in the war. No less important for understanding the broader context of the conflict were the reports concerning enemy troop strength, weaponry, and the costs of maintaining the armies. Finally, it is to be noted that the Warsaw press provided thorough information on all diplomatic initiatives.

With regard to the specifics, it bears repeating that the first reports from the theatre of war were published in the periodicals of interest shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. The engagements in the Dnieper Liman and in the Kuban area were faithfully chronicled. News was also carried about efforts undertaken as early as 1787 to mediate between the belligerent parties. Readers were able to follow the situation that developed after Austria entered the war in February 1788. They were likewise kept informed of both naval engagements and land operations, the latter culminating in the capture of Ochakov by the Russian army. In early 1789, the publishers of the Warsaw newspapers reported on diplomatic negotiations intended

to bring the recently initiated war to an end. When those efforts failed to produce any results, the editors began to closely chart the course of the military campaign. As a result, the Polish public could learn of the major confrontations at Focsani and the River Rymnik. The Warsaw press also covered the Austrian army's capture of Belgrade and the advances made by the imperial allies in Serbia and Wallachia. It also consistently carried accounts of naval operations conducted by the Russian and Ottoman fleets in the Black Sea.

In 1790, the primary focus of the Warsaw gazettes was on matters of diplomacy. The publishers informed their readers of an attempt to open formal peace negotiations between the warring parties, as well as of the conclusion of a Prussian-Ottoman military alliance. As it became evident that no agreement would be reached between the Ottoman Empire and the imperial courts, the Warsaw press described the preparations undertaken by both sides for another round of military operations. The new emperor Leopold II astonished contemporary political observers by accepting the Prussian ultimatum and deciding to abandon the eastern policy pursued by his late brother and predecessor. The Reichenbach negotiations, which culminated in the signing of an armistice between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, were therefore given sustained attention in the Warsaw newspapers. The diplomatic initiative of the Triple Alliance (Britain, Holland, and Prussia) to persuade Russia to follow Austria's example, to compel it to withdraw from the war, and to seek peace with Turkey on the *status quo ante* basis was also extensively discussed. Once it was understood that Catherine II would not agree to the demands addressed to her, the Warsaw press once again offered detailed accounts of the military developments of 1790. The most significant event of that stage of the war, as assiduously documented by the Warsaw periodicals, was Alexander Suvorov's capture of the formidable Ottoman fortress of Izmail in late December of that year.

In 1791, the peace negotiations in Sistova were a prominent feature in the Warsaw press. They resulted in the pacification of Austro-Turkish relations and were formalised by a treaty ending the war between the emperor and the sultan. Reports also recounted the Russian victories in the final phase of the Russo-Turkish War at length. The negotiations in Jassy, which brought the war to a close with the signing of the Russo-Ottoman peace treaty, marked the concluding stage of the campaign and were duly recorded by the Warsaw press.

Last but not least, the approach of the editors of the Warsaw newspapers towards the belligerents in the Russo-Turkish War warrants

closer examination. It must be clearly stated that the periodicals aligned – whether directly or indirectly – with the reformist camp of the Four-Year Sejm consistently favoured Turkey. This was particularly true of ‘Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny’ and ‘Gazeta Narodowa i Obca’. ‘Gazeta Warszawska’, by contrast, adopted a different view: its editor, Rev. Stefan Łuski, was an avowed supporter of Catherine II and, from the beginning of the war, consistently expressed pro-Russian sympathies. The leanings of said editors, however, had little bearing on the substance of their reports published in the newspapers in question. The Warsaw press, as a rule, provided careful and well-informed accounts of developments in the Black Sea theatre of war. Errors and inaccuracies, when they occurred, were more often attributable to the unreliability of the original source than to editorial intent.

In conclusion, the analysis of the Warsaw press between 1787 and 1792 affords an interesting insight into the subject explored in this study. The periodicals published in Warsaw carried numerous detailed reports concerning the Russo-Turkish War, both in direct and more incidental form. Manifestly, substantive news was at times accompanied by trivia of little consequence. It is important to emphasise, however, that the representation of the conflict offered in this dissertation – while fully consistent with the historical record – is ultimately hypothetical, made possible only by compiling separate press accounts that had likely never been previously juxtaposed. Such a thorough understanding of the Russo-Turkish War could only have been gained by a particularly meticulous, consistent, and attentive reader of the Warsaw newspapers, as it would have required considerable effort and dedication. Nevertheless, it is quite plausible that, in late eighteenth-century Poland, there were individuals who may well have developed such an informed view of the conflict under examination.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY
AND THE OTTOMAN PORTE. SIGNED AT SISTOVO, 4 AUGUST 1791

SOURCE: GNiO, 10 SEPTEMBER 1791, NO. 73, P. 291 (ART. I-V); 14 SEPTEMBER, NO. 74, P. 295 (ART. VI-XIV).

Article I. There shall be a perpetual and universal peace between the two empires, by land, and on the sea and the rivers; the former ties of friendship are thus renewed, all hostilities ceased, and a full and mutual amnesty granted to the subjects of both powers, especially to the inhabitants of Montenegro, Bosnia, Servia [Serbia – M.K.], Wallachia, and Moldavia.

Article II. The common basis of the present pacification is the strict *status quo*, as it existed anterior to the war declared on the 9th of February 1788. In consequence whereof, both parties renew and confirm the Treaty of Belgrade of the 18th of September 1739, the Convention of the 9th of November of the same year, and that of the 2nd of March 1741, in explanation of the Treaty of Belgrade, the Act of the 25th of May 1747, perpetuating the peace of Belgrade, the Convention of the 7th of May 1775, on the cession of the Bukovina, and lastly the Convention of the 12th of May 1776, for the demarcation of the said province.

Article III. In particular, the Sublime Ottoman Porte renews and confirms the *Sened*, or Contract of the 8th of August 1783, containing the obligation to procure for the German merchant ships, sailing from the ports of the imperial court, security against the corsairs of Barbary and other Ottoman subjects, and a reparation for all the losses they may sustain therefrom. The *sened* of the 24th of February 1784, regarding the free trade and navigation of the imperial and royal subjects on land, at sea, and on the rivers of the Ottoman dominions.

The *firman* of the 4th of December 1786, concerning the passing, repassing, and residence of the shepherds and flocks of Transylvania, in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as also all other *firman*s, acts, and agreements mutually recognized and which were in force prior to the 9th of February 1788 shall remain in full and entire force and vigour.

Article IV. The Imperial and Royal Court shall restore to the Ottoman Porte, completely and without any partition, all the possessions, fortresses, and palancas it conquered, including the Principality of Wallachia and the districts of Moldavia occupied by its troops, strictly according to the same ancient limits which divided the two empires at the epoch of the 9th of February 1788. The fortresses, castles, and palancas shall be restored in the state in which they were, and with the Ottoman artillery found therein, at the time of their reduction. (This provision of the treaty was later amended under a separate convention, whereby the Imperial and Royal Court pledged not to demolish the fortresses that had been repaired and fortified after their reduction, and to restore them to the Porte not in the state in which were but in which they are).

Article V. Khotin and its district la Raya shall be restored to the Ottoman Porte on the same conditions as are agreed upon for the other fortresses, but not till after the Sublime Ottoman Porte shall have concluded a peace with Russia and after the fortresses conquered by Russia have been restored. Till which time, the Imperial and Royal Court shall retain the city, without intermeddling any further in the present war, or furnishing any further succours, directly or indirectly, to Russia.

[Article] VI. After the exchange of the ratifications, both parties shall proceed to the evacuations, and to the repossession respectively of all conquests whatsoever, as well as to the re-establishment of the former limits of the two empires. The commissaries, being chosen and appointed according to the 13th Article of the Treaty of Belgrade: some shall proceed with the re-establishment of the limits of Wallachia and the five districts of Moldavia in the space of thirty days from the exchange of the ratifications, and the others, having repaired to the Upper Una, shall re-establish the limits of Bosnia, Servia, and the ancient Burgh of Orsova with its suburbs in the space of two months; the whole according to the strict *status quo* of the respective possessions prior to the 9th of February 1788.

[Article] VII. All the Ottoman prisoners and captives, as well civil as military, having, without any exception, been released by the Imperial and Royal Court, whilst only such of the imperial and royal subjects and soldiers as were in the public prisons, or in the power of certain Bosnian lords have been restored in exchange, and as a considerable number

of them still remain in domestic slavery in Turkey, the Sublime Ottoman Porte engages, in the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications, to restore to the Imperial and Royal Court all prisoners of war and slaves, of any age, sex, or condition, wherever they may be found, without any price or ransom whatsoever, so that no subject of either party shall be a slave under the dominion of the other, excepting those only who have voluntarily embraced the Christian religion on the one side, or the Mahometan religion, on the other.

[Article] VIII. Those who, before the war or in the course thereof, may have retired upon the lands of the other, submitted to that government, and remain there of their own accord, shall not be claimed by their natural sovereign but shall be considered and treated as subjects of the power to which they have given themselves. In return, such individuals, as possess lands under both empires may fix their habitations on either side, at their convenience, without any opposition being given to them, but having once made their choice of abode, they must sell the possessions they may have under the other empire.

[Article] IX. Being desirous to renew as early as possible the intercourse of trade between the two powers, both contracting parties declare that the interval of the war ought not to cause any prejudice to merchants or to the respective subjects, that is to say, it is lawful to the subjects of both empires to resume their affairs in the same state in which they were left at the time of the declaration of war, to prosecute all their rights and claims, etc. etc., and to claim, in all such cases, the assistance of the respective tribunals and governments, which shall render speedy and impartial justice.

[Article] X. The orders shall be given to the commandants and governors on the borders of both empires, rendering them personally answerable for their execution, as to the speedy re-establishment of the general police, public tranquillity, and good neighbourhood, according to the rules and principles fixed by the preceding treaties, in order that all things may be restored to their former regular and peaceable state.

[Article] XI. It shall be at the same time seriously recommended to them to protect the subjects of the other party, whose commerce or affairs shall oblige them to travel in the interior of the provinces, to pass freely by land and water, extending to them the offices of hospitality, protection, and assistance, according to the treaties confirmed in the 2nd and 3rd Articles.

[Article] XII. The Catholic Christian religion, its priests, churches and adherents shall have the freedom in the Ottoman Empire of the frequentation of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and other parts, and

the exercise of liberties and privileges, according to the rule of the strict *status quo*, the 9th Article of the Treaty of Belgrade, and the *firmans* and acts issuing under its authority.

[Article] XIII. Ministers of the second rank shall be sent on each side, as well upon the occasion of this happy peace, as to announce the accession of the sovereigns to the thrones. These ministers shall be received with the ceremony accustomed between the two courts and shall enjoy, in virtue of the strict *status quo*, all the privileges of the law of nations and immunities according to the articles of the treaties. The same rule shall be observed with regard to the imperial internuncios in Stamboul, their subalterns, attendants, and servants etc., even couriers, whose perfect security and protection shall be guaranteed.

[Article] XIV. Two original instruments of the present treaty, one in the French language, signed by the two imperial and royal ministers plenipotentiary, and the other in the Turkish language, signed by the three Ottoman ministers plenipotentiary, shall be exchanged by the intervention of the mediating ministers plenipotentiary and sent to the two imperial courts. Within the space of forty days, or sooner, the acts of ratification, signed by the two august sovereigns shall likewise be exchanged through the means of the same mediating ministers plenipotentiary etc.

APPENDIX 2

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE, SIGNED AT JASSY, 29 DECEMBER 1791 (9 JANUARY 1792)

SOURCE: PHP, MAY 1792, PP. 450–468.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God!

Her Most Puissant Imperial Majesty, the Empress of All the Russias, and His Most Puissant Ottoman Emperor, desirous of restoring the peace that has been broken by certain occurrences and of bringing to a close the war that has hitherto endured between their respective states, by establishing peace, friendship, and concord upon solid foundations, have deemed it appropriate to entrust this laudable and salutary endeavour to the zeal and wisdom of their plenipotentiaries – that is to say, on the part of His Most Mighty Ottoman Emperor, His Excellency Yusuf Pasha [Koca Yusuf Pasha – M.K.], grand vizier of the Sublime Porte, and on the part of Her Imperial Majesty, His Excellency Count Aleksandr Bezborodko, actual privy councillor and knight of the orders of Russia. In order to pursue this negotiation, Their Majesties have duly

selected and vested with full powers the following persons: on the part of the Ottoman Emperor, the most excellent and most learned Reis Efendi Es-seid Abdullah Birrî; Ordu Kadısı, invested with the dignity of Stambol Kadısı, Es-seid Ibrahim İsmet Bey; and Ruznameci-i evvel Mehmed Dürrî Efendi; and on the part of Her Imperial Majesty, His Excellency Alexander Samoilov, Lieutenant General of the Russian forces, Chamberlain to Her Majesty, director of the Chancellery of the Senate, and knight of several orders; Joseph de Ribas, major general, commander of the galley fleet at Rakues, and knight of several orders; and Sergei Laskarev, state councillor and knight – who, having assembled at Jassy in order to conclude a lasting peace between the two empires, have respectively agreed upon and adopted the following articles.

ARTICLE I

All hostilities and enmities shall cease henceforth and forever between His Highness the Grand Seigneur and Her Imperial Majesty, the Empress of All the Russias, their heirs and successors, as likewise between their respective empires and subjects; they shall be consigned to eternal oblivion, a constant amity and enduring concord shall be established and maintained, so long as the present articles of the Treaty of Peace are observed with openness and sincerity, in such manner that neither Party shall undertake any enterprise or expedition, whether in secret or in the open, against the other. In consequence of the renewal of so sincere a friendship, both High Contracting Parties do mutually grant a general amnesty and pardon to all their respective subjects, without exception, who may have offended either Power, restoring liberty to those of their subjects who are detained in galleys or prisons, and shall further permit all persons who have removed themselves or been banished to return to their homes, promising to restore to them, following the peace, the property and honours which they previously enjoyed, without their suffering the least insult, prejudice, or offence, but rather that each of them may live, like all their fellow countrymen, under the protection of the laws and customs of the land.

ARTICLE II

The Treaty of Peace signed on 10 July 1774, that is, on 14 Djemazi-ul-Evvel 1188; the Explanatory Convention of 10 March 1779, that is, on 20 Djemazi-ul-Akhir 1193; the Treaty of Commerce of 10 June 1783, that is, on 20 Redjeb 1197; and the Act regarding the incorporation of the Crimea and the Isle of Taman into the Russian state, which fixes the river Kuban as

the boundary and was concluded on 28 December 178[3]¹, that is, on 15 Şafar 1198 – are hereby confirmed by the present Treaty of Peace in all their articles, except for those which have been altered either by the present instrument or by previous treaties, and the two High Contracting Powers solemnly pledge to observe them with the utmost fidelity and to enforce them with exactitude and good faith.

ARTICLE III

By virtue of Article II of the Preliminaries, wherein it was stipulated: “that the Dniester shall serve as the boundary of the Russian Empire and that its territories shall henceforth extend as far as that river”, both High Contracting Parties have agreed and irrevocably determined by the present Act that the Dniester shall forever remain the boundary between the two Empires; accordingly, all territory situated on the right bank of the Dniester shall be restored to the Sublime Porte and shall remain henceforth and incontestably under its dominion, whereas, conversely, all territory situated on the left bank of the same river shall remain forever and incontestably under Russian dominion.

ARTICLE IV

In pursuance of the aforesaid clause respecting the limits of the two Empires, and in view of Article IV of the Preliminaries, which provides: “that all other boundaries of the two Empires shall remain as they were at the commencement of the present war, and that all territories which, during the hostilities, were taken by the Russian troops, together with all the fortifications therein and in the state in which they now stand, shall be restored to the Sublime Porte”. Her Majesty the Empress restores to the Sublime Porte the province of Bessarabia, together with all fortresses and strongholds of Bender, Akerman, Kilia, and Izmael [Izmail – M.K.], and all towns and villages contained within that province.

Furthermore, Her Majesty the Empress restores to the Sublime Porte the province of Moldavia, together with its cities, villages, and all it contains, under the following conditions, which the Sublime Porte undertakes to fulfil.

1. To observe and faithfully execute all that has been stipulated in favour of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia in the Treaty of Peace concluded on 14 Djemazi-ul-Evvel 1188, that is, on 10 July 1774; in the Explanatory Convention concluded on 20 Djemazi-ul-Akhir 1193, that

¹ Incorrect year (1786) in the source. All dates are in Old Style.

is, on 10 March 1779; and in the Act concluded on 15 Şafar 1198, that is, on 28 December 1783, all of which were signed by the grand vizier on behalf of the Sublime Porte.

2. Not to demand from those provinces any repayment of arrears of debts, of whatever nature they may be.

3. Not to require from those provinces, for the entire duration of the war, any contributions or payments; but rather, in consideration of the damage and devastation they have suffered during the war, to exempt them, for a period of two years from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty, from all charges and impositions whatsoever.

4. To permit those families who may wish to leave their native land and remove themselves to another place to do so freely and to take their property with them; and, in order that they may have time to inform their fellow subjects of the Ottoman Empire, to sell their movable and immovable goods according to the laws of the land to other subjects of the said Empire, and to arrange their affairs, a term of fourteen months shall be granted to them, computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

In order to demonstrate the sincerity with which the two High Contracting Powers desire not only to restore peace and good harmony between themselves for the present, but to consolidate it for the future and to remove all that might furnish even the slightest pretext for discord, the Sublime Porte, in renewing the *firman* which it has already issued, promises to strictly forbid the pasha of Akhaltsikhe or Akhiska, who commands the frontier from troubling, henceforth and under any pretext whatsoever, whether secretly or publicly, the lands and inhabitants under the dominion of the tsar of Tiflis [Russified designation of Tbilisi – M.K.], that is Kartli, with an express order to the said pasha never to disturb the concord and friendly relations of neighbourhood.

ARTICLE VI

As Article II of the present Treaty has confirmed, among other previous treaties, the Act of 28 December 1783 concerning the incorporation of the Crimea and the Isle of Taman into the Russian Empire, which fixed the river Kuban as the boundary between the two High Contracting Parties, as further proof of the sincerity with which the Sublime Porte earnestly desires to remove without delay all that might disturb the tranquillity and good harmony between the two Empires, it solemnly

promises and undertakes to employ its full authority and every suitable means to restrain and keep in good order the frontier tribes dwelling on the left bank of the Kuban, so that they may not make incursions into the Russian dominions, nor, whether secretly or openly and under any pretext whatsoever, commit acts of depredation, theft, or damage against the subjects of the Russian Empire, their dwellings, lands, or possessions, nor reduce any persons to slavery. To this end, the Sublime Porte shall issue the most express orders to those concerned, and shall, under threat of the severest penalties, command the promulgation of a most stringent prohibition, to be publicly proclaimed, following the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, in the very places concerned. Should it happen that, notwithstanding the undertakings set forth in the present Treaty and the prohibitions issued to the said tribes, any individual from among them should dare to make incursions into the dominions of the Russian Empire, to commit acts of harm or injury, to carry off cattle or any other property, or to reduce Russian subjects to slavery, then, upon complaint being made, prompt justice shall be rendered, and the stolen property shall be restored. No impediment shall be raised with regard to the discovery and release of Russian subjects should they have been carried off; likewise, any losses sustained shall be compensated, and the perpetrators of such incursions shall be punished with severity, in the presence of the Russian Commissioner who shall have been appointed for that purpose by the frontier governor. Should, contrary to all expectation, such justice not be rendered within the space of six months from the date of the complaint, the Sublime Porte undertakes to pay, within the space of one month following the formal representations made by the Russian Minister, full satisfaction for all losses occasioned by the said marauders; it being understood that, notwithstanding such indemnifications, the penalties above mentioned against those who disturb the peace and good neighbourhood shall be immediately applied.

ARTICLE VII

As commerce constitutes the truest and most constant bond of mutual harmony, the Sublime Porte, in order to demonstrate its sincere desire that it may flourish as much as possible and be carried out with safety and advantage by the subjects of both Empires, hereby renews Article VI of the Treaty of Commerce relating to the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and expressly stipulates that should a Russian subject encounter corsairs from Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli and be taken captive, or should these corsairs seize his vessel or any goods belonging to Russian

merchants, the Sublime Porte shall use its influence with the said Regencies in order to obtain the liberation of Russian subjects who may have been reduced to slavery, the restitution of their vessels and goods, and to provide full indemnification for the losses sustained, and if it be established, upon trustworthy reports, that the *firmans* issued in this regard have not been executed by the aforementioned Regencies, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, the Sublime Porte undertakes, upon the representation of the Russian minister or *chargé d'affaires*, and within the space of two months from the date of such claim, or sooner, if it be possible, to pay the amount of the indemnity from its imperial treasury.

ARTICLE VII[1]

All prisoners of war and other slaves of both sexes, of whatever condition, who are found within both Empires, excepting those who, in the Ottoman Empire, may have embraced the Mahometan religion, and likewise those who, in the Russian Empire, may have embraced the Christian religion, shall, promptly upon the exchange of the present Treaty, be set at liberty and restored without opposition and without ransom. Likewise, all other Christians who have fallen into slavery, and in particular Poles, Moldavians, Wallachians, inhabitants of the Peloponnese and the islands, Georgians, and all others without exception, shall be released without ransom. In the same manner, all Russian subjects who, by any event whatsoever, should fall into slavery after the conclusion of the present Treaty and be found within the Ottoman Empire, shall be set free, and Russia promises to act with perfect reciprocity towards the Ottoman subjects.

ARTICLE IX

To the end that no untoward incident may arise following the happy conclusion of the peace negotiations, promptly upon the signing of the present Treaty, the grand vizier of the Ottoman Porte shall notify the Ottoman armies and fleets, and likewise, the minister plenipotentiary and actual privy counsellor of Her Imperial Majesty shall inform the commanders of the Russian armies and fleets that peace and friendship between the two great imperial powers have been fully restored.

ARTICLE X

With a view to more firmly cementing the happy peace and true friendship between the two Empires, envoys extraordinary shall, on both sides, be solemnly dispatched at such time as shall be mutually determined by the two Courts. These envoys shall be received at the frontiers with

all the honours and ceremonial customarily accorded by both Courts to the envoys of the most favoured Powers in such matters. Through the said envoys, gifts befitting the dignity of the respective Empires shall be made on both sides.

ARTICLE XI

Upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between the two great Imperial Powers and the exchange of ratifications by the Sovereigns, the Imperial Russian troops and the fleet stationed at Racues shall proceed to evacuate Ottoman territory. However, as obstacles arising from the season make it necessary to defer the evacuation of the troops and the fleet at Racues, the two High Contracting Parties have agreed to fix the final term for evacuation as 15 May of the following year 1792, Old Style, by which time all troops of Her Imperial Majesty shall have withdrawn beyond the left bank of the Dniester, and the entire fleet at Racues shall have departed from the mouth of the Danube. So long as the Imperial Russian troops continue to occupy the territories and fortresses which, by virtue of the present Treaty, are to be restored to the Ottoman Porte, the administration and order of affairs shall continue as established under their authority, and the Ottoman Porte shall not intermeddle in any manner until the complete withdrawal of the Russian forces. Until the final day of their evacuation, the Imperial Russian troops shall continue to receive all provisions, supplies, and necessities as have been furnished to them hitherto.

ARTICLE XII

Fourteen days after the signing of the present Treaty of Peace by the plenipotentiaries at Jassy, the grand vizier on behalf of the Ottoman Porte, and on behalf of Her Most Serene Imperial Majesty, the Empress of All the Russias, her actual privy councillor and chief plenipotentiary, shall exchange the instruments of this Treaty through the said plenipotentiaries, or sooner, if it be possible, whereby this happy and salutary act shall obtain its full force and effect.

ARTICLE XIII

The present Treaty, happily concluded and ensuring perpetual peace between the two Empires, shall be confirmed by the solemn ratifications signed in their own hand by His Most Serene Majesty, the Grand Sultan, and Her Most Serene Imperial Majesty, the Empress of All the Russias. These ratifications shall be exchanged by the plenipotentiaries who have

signed this Treaty in the space of five weeks, or sooner, if it be possible, computed from the day of its conclusion. All the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and, having affixed their seals thereto, have effected a reciprocal exchange thereof.

Done at Jassy, on 29 December 1791 (Old Style), being 15 Djemazi-ul-Evvel 1206.



10. Four maps showing Russian actions at Dresnik, Turkish Gradiska (Berbir), Gradistie and Old Orsova in February 1788, engraved on a single plate by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790

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11. Austrian attack on Turkish Gradiska on 21 February 1788, resulting in an Austrian victory, engraving by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790

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13. Plan showing the location of Belgrade and Semlin on the Danube, published in 'Pamiętnik', June 1788, after p. 572



14. Naval battle in the Dnieper estuary, in the stretch of water between Fort Kinburn (shown in the foreground bottom right), and Ochakov (top left, to the west) on 28–29 June 1788. This was one of the minor naval skirmishes in this area of the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792. Etching by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790

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15. A view of Austrian and Turkish Dubica showing the positions of the two armies during the five-month-long siege of the fortress of Dubica in 1788, etching and engraving by Carl Schütz, 1788

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16. Map of Dubica by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790. A vignette, bottom right, shows the shelling of Turkish Dubica, from the batteries shown on the map to the west on the left bank of the Una, during the capture of the town by the Austrian army in August 1788

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17. Turkish assault on the Veterani Cave in 1788, by Johann Thomas von Trattner, c. 1790. The cave lies on the left bank of the Danube, between the villages of Dubova and Plavischewicza, about five and half hours upstream of New Orsova. The cave is named after the Austrian General Frederico Antonio Veterani (d. 1695) who fought during the Great Turkish War of 1683–1699 and fortified the cave in the late seventeenth century. This view shows the Turkish assault on the temporary fortifications of the Austrians. The Austrians surrendered on 31 August 1788

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18. Siege of the fortress of Khotin by the Austrian and Russian forces in 1788,
by Christian von Mechel, 1788

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19. Siege of the Turkish fortress of Ochakov by the Russian forces on 17 December 1788, ending in a massacre of the inhabitants; painting by January Suchodolski, 1853. Courtesy of the Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps, Saint Petersburg
(Военно-исторический музей артиллерии, инженерных войск и войск связи, САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГ)



20. Decisive battle of Prince Friedrich Josias von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld and Russian General Alexander V. Suvorov against Grand Vizier Hasan Pasha at the River Rymnik on 22 September 1789; copper engraving by Mark Quirin, 1789

© MORAVSKÝ ZEMSKÝ ARCHIV, BRNO, G 126 SBÍRKA RYTIN A OBRAZŮ, BOX 6, INV. NO. 705



21. The siege of Belgrade under the command of Field Marshal Laudon in September 1789 until the surrender on 8 October 1789, published by Johann Hieronymus Löschenkohl, 1789, Wien Museum, inv. no. 179052, CC0
([HTTPS://SAMMLUNG.WIENMUSEUM.AT/OBJEKT/396156/](https://sammlung.wienmuseum.at/objekt/396156/))



22. Marching out and embarkation of the Turks from Belgrade on 12 October 1789,
published by Johann Hieronymus Löschenkohl, 1789, Wien Museum,
inv. no. 85724, CC0

([HTTPS://SAMMLUNG.WIENMUSEUM.AT/OBJEKT/154663/](https://sammlung.wienmuseum.at/objekt/154663/))



23. The storming of Czettin under the command of Baron de Vins on 20 July 1790,
published by Johann Hieronymus Löschenkohl, 1790, Wien Museum,
inv. no. 85840, CC0

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*FLAGRANTE BELLO. LA GUERRE RUSSO-TURQUE DANS
LES INFORMATIONS PARUES DANS LA PRESSE DE VARSOVIE
(1787-1792)*

RÉSUMÉ

L'ouvrage présente l'image de la guerre russo-turque des années 1787-1792 dans la presse de Varsovie, en langue polonaise, de la même époque. L'auteure a surtout voulu montrer ce qu'un lecteur moyen pouvait apprendre sur le conflit mentionné ci-avant, en lisant certains journaux choisis. Les césures chronologiques sont déterminées de manière parfaitement univoque. La césure du début est la déclaration de guerre à la Russie par le sultan turc en août 1787, et celle de la fin la signature du traité de paix de Jassy au début de janvier 1792.

L'auteure a puisé les informations dans des périodiques publiés en langue polonaise, à Varsovie, dans les années 1787-1792. C'étaient notamment « *Gazeta Warszawska* », « *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny* » et « *Gazeta Narodowa i Obca* ». L'introduction est consacrée à l'histoire de la presse varsoviennne et à la présentation des titres de presse précités. C'est également là que nous trouverons un aperçu sur l'état de la recherche sur l'histoire de la guerre russo-turque. Le livre est problématique et de nature chronologique. Outre l'introduction il comprend cinq chapitres, la conclusion, les annexes et les index.

Les chapitres de fond ont été classés par ordre chronologique. Dans chacun d'entre eux, l'auteure a présenté les informations de presse concernant les années consécutives de la guerre. Il faut souligner le fait que, depuis l'éclatement de la guerre, les rédacteurs des journaux publiés à Varsovie suivaient avec un grand intérêt les agissements des deux parties au conflit. Ils informaient systématiquement et presque en temps réel, non seulement sur le déroulement des opérations militaires, mais aussi sur les initiatives diplomatiques ou d'autres événements liés à la guerre,

ayant lieu à Istanbul, Saint Pétersbourg et Vienne. Un lecteur de la presse varsovienne disposait donc d'une information relativement complète et – ce qui est encore plus important – fiable, sur l'évolution de ce conflit armé. Il convient de noter que la grande majorité des communiqués de presse arrivant du théâtre de la guerre russo-turque correspondaient à l'état réel et ont trouvé leur confirmation dans d'autres sources.

Sans aucun doute, dans la presse varsovienne, les questions le mieux documentées ont été celles de nature militaire. Les journaux publiés dans la capitale de la Pologne informaient de manière détaillée sur le déroulement des actions entreprises par les deux armées. Ils fournissaient les rapports sur les batailles navales et terrestres les plus importantes, mais ne négligeaient pas d'informer leurs lecteurs des affrontements et des accrochages de moindre importance. Un lecteur polonais pouvait également suivre les progrès des opérations de siège. Il était aussi informé des mouvements de troupes et de tous les problèmes liés à l'entretien, l'approvisionnement et l'hébergement des soldats combattant lors de cette guerre. Les informations sur les effectifs des deux armées, sur leur équipement et celles sur les frais de leur entretien n'étaient pas non plus négligeables. Il est à noter que la presse varsovienne informait minutieusement ses lecteurs de toutes les initiatives de nature diplomatique.

Il faut aussi tenir compte de l'attitude des éditeurs de journaux varsoviens à l'égard des parties participant à la guerre russo-turque. Visiblement, les journaux directement ou indirectement liés au camp des réformes de la Grande Diète sympathisaient avec la Turquie. Il s'agit de « Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny » et de « Gazeta Narodowa i Obca ». De l'autre côté, « Gazeta Warszawska » a adopté une position contraire. Son rédacteur, l'abbé Stefan Łuskina, a pris une position prorusse, dès le début du conflit. Il importe de dire tout de suite que les sympathies des éditeurs n'ont pas eu une grande influence sur le contenu des informations publiées dans les périodiques qui nous intéressent. Généralement, les journaux varsoviens informaient équitablement leurs lecteurs de tous les événements ayant lieu au théâtre de la guerre sur le littoral de la mer Noire. S'il y avait des erreurs ou des déformations, elles étaient dues à l'inexactitude de la source de l'information et non à la mauvaise volonté d'un tel ou tel rédacteur.

Pour conclure, ajoutons que l'analyse de la presse varsovienne des années 1787–1792 fournit une image intéressante du problème étudié, car les périodiques paraissant à Varsovie publiaient vraiment beaucoup d'informations détaillées, liées directement ou indirectement à la guerre russo-turque. En lisant ces articles, un lecteur polonais pouvait assez

facilement se faire une opinion sur la grande guerre menée près des frontières de la Pologne. Il convient toutefois de préciser que l'image du conflit, présentée dans cette dissertation, quoique parfaitement conforme à l'état réel, n'est toutefois qu'une image hypothétique, fonctionnant ici et maintenant grâce au fait d'avoir rassemblé les informations dispersées qui probablement n'ont jamais été mises ensemble. Il en est ainsi parce que son obtention demanderait un très grand effort et beaucoup d'engagement de la part du lecteur. Il ne peut cependant pas être exclu qu'en Pologne de la fin du XVIII^e siècle il y avait des gens disposant d'un tel savoir sur la guerre russo-turque.

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This publication offers an account of the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792), which Austria joined in February 1788 as an ally of Russia. It was one of the largest armed conflicts of the eighteenth century, with more than half a million troops engaged on both sides. The author presents those events as viewed from Warsaw, through reports published in Polish-language periodicals printed in the capital of Poland – an entirely new perspective with no counterpart in European historiography to date. Drawing on contemporary press accounts, the work delivers a vivid and detailed depiction of the successive campaigns, with particular emphasis on the battles that proved decisive for the outcome of the war. The author also examines the diplomatic talks and negotiations intended to restore the long-desired peace in southeastern Europe, and discusses the circumstances and provisions of the peace treaties concluded in Sistova and Jassy. The study will undoubtedly attract the attention of specialists – scholars of eighteenth-century and military history. It will also appeal to researchers of the press interested in how the conflict was represented in Polish periodicals, as well as to a wider readership of military-history enthusiasts.



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