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The Impact of the Ukraine War and Sanctions on Foreign Trade in Selected EU Countries

Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to analyse the impact of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus on the structure and dynamics of foreign trade of Poland and selected European Union countries. Particular attention is paid to changes in exports and imports and their consequences for the economies of the analysed countries.

The paper uses statistical data analysis from Eurostat databases and other international economic institutions. The study was conducted at the macroeconomic level using trade indicators and comparing data before and after the introduction of sanctions. The analysis is supplemented by case studies for key sectors such as energy, machinery and agriculture.

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The results indicate significant changes in the structure of trade, including the redistribution of trading partners and a decrease in exchange with countries covered by sanctions. The analysis also reveals differences in the economic effects for individual EU countries, resulting from their level of dependence on the Russian and Belarusian markets. In Poland, an increase in exchange with alternative partners was noted, which indicates the adaptation of the economy to new conditions.

Keywords: import, export, European Union, sanctions, data analysis

JEL: C13, F14, K22

1. Introduction

On 24 February, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an attack on Ukrainian territory. The so-called three-day special operation continues to this day.

After the initial shock, European countries and the United States of America began introducing so-called sanctions packages on both Russia and Belarus, which cooperates with the Russian Federation. There is no doubt that the war has had long-term consequences for most European Union countries.

This article attempts to present the impact of these sanctions on changes in the directions of the flow of goods by type according to CN codes.

The impact of sanctions on economic conditions was highlighted in the article by Gorynia, who states that after the initial hesitation of many commentators regarding the West's reaction to the war in Ukraine, the reactions, i.e. sanctions, are nevertheless decisive and, although they do not yield effects immediately and automatically, they have a chance to bring the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war closer (Gorynia, 2022).

It is important in the context of the data used in this article to be aware that Poland, when joining the EU in 2004, committed itself, like other members, to providing information on intra-Community trade through the Intrastat and Eurostat systems. The quality of these data is constantly monitored (Markowicz, Baran, 2019) and they form the basis for numerous scientific studies.

The literature emphasises that EU development plans must be modified due to the dynamically changing environment. These changes are dramatic in periods of crisis: during the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine (Zavrelova, MacGregor Pelikanova, 2024).

Similarly, Dariusz Prokopowicz in his article draws attention to the impact of sanctions, alongside inflation, as another significant threat to economic growth, which in his opinion will stagnate first due to inflation caused by the pandemic, and then due to the outbreak of war (Prokopowicz, 2023).

Steinbach (2023) argues that the war between Russia and Ukraine has considerably altered Russia's trade patterns, especially boosting its exports of mineral oil and gas to European and Asian markets. He notes that these shifts are mainly driven by rising import prices and vary significantly across different product categories and regions (Steinbach, 2023).

Walkowski also draws attention to the impact of sanctions on, among others, the agricultural market of the European Union and their possible repercussions, while emphasising that the European agri-food market is quite resistant to fluctuations and self-sufficient (Walkowski, 2024).

In his article, Błaszczuk-Zawiła points to the Ukrainian services market and the decline in both imports and exports due to the war and disrupted supply chains (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska et al., 2022; Błaszczuk-Zawiła, 2024).

An interesting study regarding the impact of the war in Ukraine on the activities of Polish companies was published by the Polish Economic Institute. We can read there, among other things, that 24% of Polish companies have felt strong effects of the war beyond the eastern border, primarily industrial processing companies, regardless of size, also trade and construction companies, including micro and medium-sized enterprises (Dębkowska et al., 2023).

Also worth mentioning are the perspectives on the impact of sanctions from other EU countries. For example, in their article 'EU Sanctions Against the Russian Federation and Their Implications for the Foreign Trade of the Czech Republic,' Malý, Cvik, and MacGregor Pelikánová assessed the impact of sanctions on the Czech Republic's foreign trade with the Russian Federation, pointing out that the first wave of sanctions had no significant impact on Czech foreign trade, while changes began to be noticeable after the sixth and seventh sanction packages. They highlight two aspects: a change in the commodity structure and a significant decline in Czech exports to Russia. However, they point to the effectiveness of the European Union's sanctions policy towards the Russian Federation (Malý, Cvik, MacGregor Pelikánová, 2023).

Similarly, in the article 'Why Sanctions Against Russia Work,' Rácz, Spillner and Wolff argue that sanctions have indeed reduced Russia's economic and military capabilities, although they certainly have not led to an immediate shift in Kremlin policy. They emphasise that the role of sanctions should be viewed more broadly, not only economically but also politically, as a signal of Western solidarity against the aggression of the Russian Federation. They also point out that effective sanctions require constant tightening and sustained pressure to enhance their long-term effect (Rácz, Spillner, Wolff, 2023).

Another example of a voice from abroad, and one of the most recent, is Kizilov's article 'Lithuania's Economic Trajectory in the Shadow of the Ukraine Conflict.' Describing the conflict from a Lithuanian perspective, the author states that Lithuania, as a country with historical and political ties to Russia and Ukraine, has had to disrupt its established trade routes and find new markets and new energy sources. At the same time, defence spending has increased, creating more favourable conditions for the labour market, and sanctions have accelerated integration with Western markets (Kizilova, 2025).

2. Sanctions Packages

It should be remembered that sanctions against Russia were introduced after the annexation of Crimea, on 3 March 2014. The European Union countries that were to take part in the G-8 summit decided then to suspend preparations for the summit, which was to take place in June 2014 in Sochi. The Council agreed then to work on the rapid adoption of sanctions in the form of freezing and recovery of assets of persons responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian public funds (EU Council Regulation).

In March 2015, EU leaders decided to make the lifting of the existing sanctions conditional on the full implementation of the Minsk agreements, which was to take place by the end of December 2015. Since this did not happen, the Council extended the economic sanctions until 31 July 2016. Since July 2016, the economic sanctions have been successively extended for another 6 months. They are currently in force until 31 July 2025.¹

The list of the documents in which we can find information on sanctions includes:

- 1) Regulation 765/2006 – Council Regulation (EC) No. 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and Belarus's participation in Russia's aggression against Ukraine;
- 2) Regulation 269/2014 – Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine;
- 3) Regulation 833/2014 – Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine;
- 4) Sanctions Act – Act of 13 April, 2022 on specific solutions for counteracting support for aggression against Ukraine and protecting national security.

Economic sanctions target the Russian financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors, as well as services provided to Russia or Russians. They also apply to Belarus due to its participation in the actions of Russia and Iran in response to the production and delivery of drones. The website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration maintains and updates a list of entities subject to sanctions.

¹ The European Union introduced its first restrictive measures against Belarus on 24 September 2004. These initial sanctions targeted certain Belarusian officials believed to have been involved in the disappearance of opposition politicians. Additional sanction packages were imposed following the presidential elections of 2006 and 2011. Most of these measures were later suspended in 2015, as Belarus released all political prisoners and relations with the EU showed signs of improvement. However, after the contested presidential election of August 2020 and the subsequent violent crackdown on demonstrators, opposition figures and journalists by Belarusian authorities, the EU once again expanded its sanctions regime, adopting new restrictive measures directed at both individuals and legal entities (Council Regulation (EC) No. 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures against President Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus, Official Journal of the European Union. See also: EU Sanctions Map, Belarus, <https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main/details/2/> [accessed: 8.10.2025]). Then more sanctions were introduced following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the involvement of the Belarusian side in it.

For the purposes of our article, however, we will focus on the sanctions after Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Importantly, the first package of sanctions was adopted the day before the aggression, i.e. on 23 February, 2022. This was related to the decision of the Russian Federation to recognise the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine as independent entities and to send Russian troops to these areas. The sanctions included 351 members of the Russian State Duma and another 27 individuals, restrictions on economic relations with the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and limitations on Russia's access to EU capital and financial markets and services.

As of this moment, i.e. February 2025, fifteen sanctions packages have been introduced by the EU Council. The last, 15th sanctions package was adopted on 16 December 2024 and included:

- 1) adding 54 individuals and 30 entities to the sanctions list;
- 2) prohibiting access to ports and providing services related to maritime transport for another 52 ships belonging to the so-called shadow fleet;
- 3) restrictions on the export of dual-use goods and technologies to 32 new entities, some located in third countries;
- 4) prohibiting the recognition or enforcement in the EU of judgments issued by Russian courts on the basis of Article 248 of the Arbitration Code of the Russian Federation;
- 5) a derogation allowing the release of funds held by central securities depositories in the EU;
- 6) extending the deadlines applicable to certain derogations required for the withdrawal of investments from Russia.

If we were to attempt to review the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, we would mention here:

1. In the financial sector, the sanctions include the exclusion of 10 Russian banks from the SWIFT system, restrictions on Russia's access to the EU capital and financial markets, and a ban on, among other things, transactions with the Russian Central Bank and the Russian Regional Development Bank, as well as on Russians making large deposits in EU banks and investing in projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
2. Sanctions in the energy sector include maritime transport of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, as well as a ban on, among other things, imports of crude oil, petroleum products and coal from Russia, the use of EU facilities for the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), and from December 2024, a ban on the import of propane, butane and mixtures (LPG).
3. In the transport sector, the sanctions include the closure of EU airspace to all Russian aircraft and EU ports to Russian ships, as well as a ban on the export of aviation, maritime and space goods and technologies to Russia, the export of all aircraft, including parts and jet fuel, and the provision of all related repair, maintenance and financial services to Russia.
4. The sanctions in the defence and technology sectors include a ban on the export to Russia of:
 - dual-use goods and technologies for military purposes,
 - drone engines and drone production components,
 - weapons and firearms for civilian use and their components,
 - ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment,

- computer, electronic and optical components,
 - chemicals, navigation devices, generators and thermostats,
 - cameras, lenses, toy drones, laptops and hard drives,
 - other goods and technologies that could enhance the potential of Russia's defence and security sectors.
5. Sanctions in the trade sector include a ban on the export of luxury goods to Russia, quotas on the import of potassium chloride (i.e. not a ban, which is important in the context of fertilisers) and a ban on the import from Russia of, among others, steel, iron and pig iron, cement, bitumen and asphalt, copper and aluminium wires, pipes and tubes, wood, paper, synthetic rubber and plastics or seafood, alcohol, cigarettes and cosmetics, jewellery and other goods that could increase Russia's industrial potential.

3. Economic sanctions include a ban on the provision of the following services to Russia and Russians: accounting, auditing, bookkeeping and tax consulting services, architectural and engineering services, IT and legal consulting or intellectual property rights or trade secrets (EU Council Regulation).²

This is also important because entrepreneurs should remember that they are obliged to verify whether their contractors are not on sanctions lists, also in the broader sense, i.e. whether goods are not sometimes re-exported from Russia to other countries, e.g., Turkey or Kazakhstan.

Table 1. EU Sanctions Packages against Russia – Packages 1–16

No.	Date of adoption/entry into force	The main elements of the sanctions package
1	23–24 February 2022	A ban on contacts with Duma deputies, sanctions against the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, financial restrictions.
2	25–26 February 2022	Freezing the assets of Putin and others, sanctions on the financial, energy and transport sectors, and technology export controls.
3	28 February–2 March 2022	A ban on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia, disconnection from the SWIFT system, a ban on flights and ports, accompanied by aid to Ukraine.
4	15 March 2022	Sanctions against state-owned companies, a ban on investments in the energy sector, restrictions on trade in steel, iron, and luxury goods.

² The above-presented list is not exhaustive. In order to make life easier for entrepreneurs and not get lost in the thicket of sanctions lists that change from time to time, the EU Council has enabled searching for goods covered by sanctions on European Commission, 2025.

No.	Date of adoption/entry into force	The main elements of the sanctions package
5	8 April 2022	A ban on the import of raw materials (coal, timber), a ban on the transit of trucks and ships, a ban on aviation fuel.
6	3 June 2022	A ban on imports of oil and petroleum products, further SWIFT restrictions.
7	21 July 2022	A ban on gold imports from Russia, further financial and technological restrictions.
8	5 October 2022	Bans on steel, precious metals, and the export of military technology, along with oil price ceiling.
9	16 December 2022	Export bans on drone engines, dual-use technologies, and mining investments.
10	25 February 2023	A ban on the export of advanced technology, access to gas storage facilities, an obligation to report frozen assets.
11	23 June 2023	An expanded scope of trade and technology sanctions.
12	18 December 2023	An import ban on diamonds, lithium batteries, chemicals; export restrictions and sanctions against individuals and entities added.
13	23 February 2024	The new round of sanctions covers nearly 200 entities, the list of individuals was expanded.
14	17 May 2024	Sanctions against disinformation and war propaganda; also dual-use technologies.
15	16 December 2024	More shadow fleet ships, export bans, protection of European companies from Russian arbitration.
16	24 February 2025	A comprehensive package: a ban on aluminium imports; additional sanctions against individuals, companies, and financial firms; restrictions on technology and energy exports; measures against disinformation and transport infrastructure.

Source: own elaboration based on the Consilium of the EU Council

4. Fight Against Sanctions Evasion

In Poland, the following entities are obliged to control the proper compliance with sanctions:

- 1) Heads of Customs and Tax Offices verify compliance with sanctions in the territory of the country as part of customs and tax inspections – the establishment of so-called sanction teams;
- 2) General Inspector of Financial Information – in relation to obligated institutions referred to in the Act of 1 March 2018 on counteracting money laundering and terrorism financing;
- 3) Polish Financial Supervision Authority – in relation to entities supervised by it.

The Heads of Customs and Tax Offices, by way of an administrative decision, may impose a fine for failure to comply with sanctions of up to PLN 20,000,000. Violation of prohibitions resulting from sanctions, as well as actions aimed at circumventing these prohibitions, constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of three years.

According to data from the National Revenue Administration (NRA, KAS in Polish), in the area of potential violations (evasion) of sanctions, the KAS authorities initiated:

in 2022 – two customs and tax inspections;

in 2023 – 72 customs and tax inspections. 19 remain pending;

in the period from 1 January to 31 August 2024 – 113 customs and tax inspections. 92 remain pending.

By 3 September 2024, the KAS authorities issued 27 decisions imposing a fine for a total amount of over PLN 21 million. By the end of 31 December 2023, two decisions were issued for a total amount of over PLN 70 thousand. Ten proceedings remain pending. This shows an almost abrupt increase in inspections conducted in this area by the Heads of the Customs and Customs Office.

However, it should be remembered that the regulations do not provide for a separate procedure for sanctions controls, and therefore any doubts related to compliance with sanctions must be verified as part of ordinary customs and tax controls. The authorities therefore examine whether entrepreneurs have made efforts to prevent participation in the procedure of avoiding sanctions, i.e. whether they have demonstrated 'due diligence' in making business decisions (Pogroszewska, 2024).

5. Changes in the Directions of Import and Export of Selected Groups of Products

5.1. Oil

Oil, as essential for the development of the economies of the European Union countries, was not covered by a complete embargo. The first ban on the import of Russian oil by sea was introduced on 5 December, 2022, further sanctions, on refined products, were introduced on 5 February, 2023. Moreover, the coalition of EU countries, the G7 and Australia introduced a maximum price of \$60 per barrel transported by sea to limit Russia's income. However, there are exceptions, no ban on the use of oil pipelines was introduced, so countries such as Slovakia or Hungary can use oil pipelines (mainly Druzhba). This was limited only by Ukraine, which stopped allowing Russian oil to transit through its territory at the end of 2024.

There is a clear decline in oil imports (CN 2710) from Russia and an increase in oil imports from countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the USA, and Norway (Figures 1–3). There was a huge increase in oil imports from the United Arab Emirates, in 2022 alone in Denmark there was an increase of 255,888,716%, in Romania of 12,544,715%, in Austria and Poland of over 3 million %.

It is worth noting here that currently the largest oil producer in the world is the USA, which in 2024 produced 13.4 million barrels per day, while Russia produced 9.6 million barrels and Saudi Arabia 8.9 million barrels. The largest increase in oil imports from the USA in 2022 was recorded by Poland, an increase of 2221%, and in Finland, an increase of 1566%, while in 2023 Lithuania recorded an increase of 41,828% and Latvia an increase of 14,482%.

In addition, the import of oil from Norway, especially for Poland, was influenced by the launch of the Baltic Pipe pipeline on 27 September, 2022.




Figure 1. Oil imports to EU countries in 2021 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 2. Oil imports to EU countries in 2022 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 3. Oil imports to EU countries in 2023 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)

5.2. Plywood

Another example of change in the directions of product import is related to plywood CN 4412. Wooden plywood, especially from deciduous trees, is one of the main components of furniture. Poland is one of the largest furniture producers in Europe, in 2023, this sector generated about 6% of Polish GDP and encompassed over four thousand enterprises (*Ogólnopolska Izba Gospodarcza Producentów Mebli...*, 2024). Thus, the introduction of the import ban together with the 5th package of sanctions on 10 July, 2022 became a serious problem for Polish producers. However, individual EU countries have found new suppliers of plywood, mainly from Kazakhstan, but also from Turkey and Kyrgyzstan (Figures 4–6). Interestingly, the only country that imported plywood from Kyrgyzstan in 2023 was Poland – EUR 332 thousand for over 600 thousand kg of plywood. Similarly, the only country that, according to Eurostat data, imported plywood from Belarus in 2023 was also Poland.

The problem when it comes to importing plywood from countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is that we have little forest cover there (approx. 3–5% of afforestation) and an almost non-existent wood industry. Hence, it can be assumed that it was actually Russian plywood. In connection with this, in May 2024, the EU extended anti-dumping duties on birch plywood to products from Turkey and Kazakhstan. This is related to the scale of the increase in imports, e.g., the increase in plywood imports from Turkey to Poland amounted to 2134% in 2022, it was higher only in Finland and amounted to 5791%.

Despite the visible changes in the directions of the flow of goods, the European Union, through the voice of its representative David O'Sullivan, the EU's international envoy for sanctions, assured already in 2023 that it does not intend to impose sanctions on Kazakhstan due to the republic's cooperation with Russia (Ochman, 2023). Also, the deputy

head of the Kazakhstan Presidential Office Timur Suleimenov stated almost at the very beginning of the war that his country would not be a tool to circumvent the sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and the EU.

Life, however, does not tolerate a vacuum. Already in 2022, journalists described a huge increase in wood imports from Kazakhstan of 9926.8%. However, Kazakhstan has almost no wood industry. In 2022, almost 24 thousand tons of probably Russian plywood reached the European Union, more than half of which went to Poland. In 2023, about 84 thousand cubic metres of alleged Russian plywood reached our country, which is almost a quarter of the Polish market (Chlebosz, 2024). It is worth mentioning here that plywood from Russia was covered by anti-dumping duties from November 2021, then after the outbreak of the war by sanctions (from July 2022). After that date, a sudden increase in plywood imports from Kazakhstan or Turkey can be seen. It is impossible for the industries of these countries to switch to this type of production so quickly. The European Commission investigation confirmed this. In addition, the District Prosecutor's Office in Gdańsk is conducting proceedings concerning a violation of the ban on purchasing and then transporting to the European Union timber and timber products from Belarus (*Kazachskie drewno...*, 2024).




Figure 4. Plywood imports to EU countries in 2021 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 5. Plywood imports to EU countries in 2022 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 6. Plywood imports to EU countries in 2023 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)

5.3. Coal

Another example of change in the direction of commodity import is related to coal (CN 2701). The ban on coal import from Russia was introduced on 10 August, 2022, together with the 5th package of sanctions, voted into force on 8 April, 2022 (Council Regulation). In Poland, the Sejm adopted a law introducing a ban on coal import from Russia and Belarus from 16 April, 2022, i.e. before the EU sanctions. However, this can be considered a political move, because the introduction of sanctions by one EU country in a common EU market would not stop coal imports to Poland, as coal could come to us from another EU country (Figures 7–9).

The tables below show how coal imports from Russia decreased and increased from other directions, mainly from Kazakhstan, but also from countries such as the USA and South Africa. It is worth mentioning here how large producers we are dealing with in comparison to the Polish market. South Africa extracts over 220 million tons of coal per year, and exports a quarter of it, in 2023, over 4.5 billion tons of black coal were produced in China, which gives an average daily extraction of 13.3 million tons – where in Poland we extracted 49 million tons in 2023, which is as much as China does in four days. On the other hand, the two largest open-pit coal mines in the world are North Antelope Rochelle and Black Thunder in Wyoming. The former extracted 60 million tons of coal in 2022, with its resources of 1.4 billion tons and about 1 thousand people employed. The latter extracted also 60 million tons with resources of 700 million tons.

This shows the scale and possibilities of import from other countries, so replacing Russian coal with another source was not particularly difficult. Another issue is that most coal in Poland has been imported from Kazakhstan and there are doubts as to whether it really comes from the Karaganda district or whether it is perhaps Russian coal, as it is exported through the territory of Russia in ports in the north (mainly Vyborg) or in the south. The problem with coal import is that there is no physical possibility of analysing each lump of coal to check whether it comes from a mine in the Russian Federation or the Karaganda district in Kazakhstan. However, there are no such doubts about coal from the USA, China, South Africa or Colombia.




Figure 7. Coal imports to EU countries in 2021 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 8. Coal imports to EU countries in 2022 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 9. Coal imports to EU countries in 2023 (in million euros)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)

5.4. Yachts

The EU Member States, in cooperation with the US, very quickly extended Russian sanctions to luxury goods, including recreational boats. The 4th package of sanctions of 15 March 2022 concerned, among other things, a ban on the export of luxury goods – including ‘yachts and other recreational or sports vessels; rowing boats and kayaks’ covered by the tariff code CN 8903 00 00 (Council Regulation). This is important from the Polish point of view, but also for other EU countries involved in the production of yachts, such as Lithuania. In Poland, we have many companies producing yachts, so losing the Russian market would be a threat to their existence. For this reason, after the introduction of sanctions, the export of yachts to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

(Jarco, 2023) is noticeable. It is obvious that there was no economic justification for this change, as there was no sudden emergence of a new trend of spending free time in such a way in the two countries, but these companies had to find a way to sell their goods.

French or Italian companies did not have such a problem, as they exported most yachts to Turkey before the outbreak of the war, and this did not change after February 2022. Therefore, for the purposes of showing the change in the direction of export in the tables below, the data do not include exports from these countries, because they distorted the view of the change in the direction of export (Figures 10–12).




Figure 10. Yacht exports from EU countries in 2021 (in million euros, excluding France and Italy)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 11. Yacht exports from EU countries in 2022 (in million euros, excluding France and Italy)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)




Figure 12. Yacht exports from EU countries in 2023 (in million euros, excluding France and Italy)

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (n.d.)

6. Conclusions

Trade restrictions with Russia and Belarus have forced companies to seek new suppliers and markets. There is a visible decline in EU countries' trade with Russia and Belarus, which has led to a significant change in the directions of import and export – the importance of partners from Asia, the Middle East and North America has increased, including countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the USA, Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE. This change is a direct result of the introduction of successive sanction packages in connection with Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

EU countries are still trying to limit the possibility of earning money by Russian and Belarusian companies. The European Union is considering introducing sanctions on artificial fertilisers imported from Russia and Belarus without the unanimity principle (without the consent of Slovakia and Hungary). This would consist not so much in including these products on the sanctions list, for which unanimity was required, but in introducing prohibitive customs duties, where unanimity during voting is no longer necessary (*Przełom w sprawie tanich nawozów...*, 2025). It is worth mentioning that cheap fertilisers imported despite numerous sanctions are one of the reasons for the financial problems of Polish companies producing fertilisers, such as Grupa Azoty. It would therefore be a significant nod to the Polish producer of this product.

What might be the future implications for global politics? Scholarly publications are already highlighting the risk of food sanctions impacting food security (Abay et al., 2023). Others, such as Geis and Schröder (2024), argue that the liberal international order as we know it is in retreat. At the same time, current geopolitical shifts are dividing the world into new spheres of influence, pitting democracies against autocracies at the global level and in regional conflicts. Other authors note that while Western countries sought to isolate Russia through sanctions and trade restrictions, Russia cooperated with a number of other countries, including China, India, Iran, and Turkey, which have their own reasons for trading with Russia, such as importing Russian

oil (Dodds et al., 2023). It seems that the sanctions, which initially might have been perceived rather through the prism of solidarity between Western countries and Ukraine, may have a much deeper impact on both political and economic conditions.

Although the possible end of the war could create conditions for partial unblocking of trade, a return to previous patterns seems unlikely. Many companies have already permanently diversified their supply chains, becoming independent from eastern markets. New trade relations and geopolitical tensions may cause the structure of trade in Europe to remain changed for longer. It can be assumed that after the possible end of the war, EU trade with Russia and Belarus will increase, but it is difficult to expect it to return to the size it was before February 24, 2022.

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Wpływ wojny w Ukrainie i sankcji gospodarczych nałożonych na Rosję i Białoruś na handel zagraniczny Polski i wybranych krajów UE

Streszczenie:

Celem artykułu jest analiza wpływu konfliktu zbrojnego na Ukrainie oraz sankcji gospodarczych nałożonych na Rosję i Białoruś na strukturę oraz dynamikę handlu zagranicznego Polski i wybranych państw Unii Europejskiej. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono zmianom w eksporcie i imporcie oraz ich konsekwencjom dla gospodarek analizowanych krajów. W pracy zastosowano analizę danych statystycznych pochodzących z baz Eurostatu i innych międzynarodowych instytucji ekonomicznych. Badanie przeprowadzono na poziomie makroekonomicznym z wykorzystaniem wskaźników handlowych oraz porównania danych przed

i po wprowadzeniu sankcji. Uzupełnieniem analizy są studia przypadków dla kluczowych sektorów, takich jak energia, przemysł maszynowy i rolnictwo.

Wyniki wskazują na znaczące zmiany w strukturze handlu, w tym re-dystrybucję partnerów handlowych i spadek wymiany z krajami objętymi sankcjami. Analiza ujawnia także różnice w skutkach ekonomicznych dla poszczególnych państw UE, wynikające z ich poziomu uzależnienia od rynków rosyjskiego i białoruskiego. W Polsce odnotowano wzrost wymiany z alternatywnymi partnerami, co świadczy o dostosowaniu się gospodarki do nowych warunków.

Słowa kluczowe: import, eksport, Unia Europejska, sankcje, analiza danych

JEL: C13, F14, K22