

# The Social and Economic Consequences of the First Year of Russia's Fullscale Invasion of Ukraine

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## Abstract

This study aims to develop an analytical framework for understanding the social and economic outcomes of Russia's military invasion of Ukraine by studying its impact on the labor market and migration, the economy and trade, social capital, and volunteering in Ukraine. The main economic and social consequences include the following: the massive out-migration of refugees and internally displaced people; the change in demographic structure; the relocation and reopening of businesses and adapting to new conditions; the total collapse and de-industrialization of the occupied territories' economy; the interruption of supply chains; the reduction in trade volumes; the accumulation of social capital; and the development and spread of citizens' volunteer cooperation to solve urgent issues at the national and local community levels. This study is limited to the available data and the effects on Ukraine's economy and social sphere, excluding the impacts on the economies of European Union countries and the world economy in general.

**Keywords:** Ukraine, full-scale invasion, war, economy, refugees, volunteering, social capital

**JEL:** F22, F41, N34, N44, P24



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## Introduction

A comprehensive study of war and its consequences on different areas of life remains unexplored. Theoretical discussions have not been developed, and there is a lack of scientific studies. Understanding these phenomena is crucial. Therefore, research in this field can provide important lessons from the history of warfare around the world.

Research on the economic consequences of military conflicts shows that wars adversely affect business and national and international economies in general. Moreover, interstate conflict limits the value of international trade (Maher 2015). Jacks (2011) demonstrated that increased taxation was seen in various states during wartime, persisting even in the post-war period, along with increased price fluctuations during wars. Simultaneously, a study in Sweden, the UK, and the US concluded that wartime tax reforms resulted in extraordinary inflation (Torregrosa-Hetland and Sabaté 2022). Surprisingly, some businesses, such as the media, war zone contractors, and the weapons industry, can benefit during wartime (Naseem et al. 2023).

The latest and largest war within Europe started on 27 February 2014, when Russian troops captured strategic sites across Crimea (Shuster 2014; Weaver 2015). Later, a pro-Russian government was installed, and on 16 March 2014, Crimea's independence was declared as a result of the Crimean status referendum (Somin 2014). The military invasion started shortly after Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, which led to anti-revolution and pro-Russian protests in Donetsk and Luhansk. Thus, Russian-backed separatists seized Ukrainian government buildings and declared the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics (DPR and LPR) as independent states in April 2014 (Grytsenko 2014).

Simultaneously, Russia supported separatists with troops and weapons (Oliphant and Sabur 2015). In response to the military capture of territories, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive known as the Anti-Terrorist Operation in April 2014 (BBC News 2014a). In September of that year, Ukraine, Russia, the DPR, and the LPR signed the Minsk Protocol, a ceasefire agreement (BBC News 2014b). However, the Minsk Protocol failed, and heavy fighting resumed in January 2015. A new ceasefire agreement, Minsk II, was signed on February 12, 2015.

After the agreement, the war was called a frozen conflict, as the front line did not change, and Donbas remained a war zone (Tsvetkova 2015). However, in 2021, Russian forces amassed on Ukraine's borders (BBC News 2021), and on February 21, 2022, it officially recognized the DPR and LPR as independent states. It deployed troops to those territories (Gramer, Detsch and Mackinnon 2022), and shortly thereafter, on February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Thus, the following analysis focuses on understanding the social and economic consequences of the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, this study addresses the following research questions:

## What was the impact on the labor market and migration?

1. What was the impact on the economy and trade?
  2. What was the impact on social capital and volunteering?
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
## Discussion and results

### Labor market and migration

During the period of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the labor market was significantly disturbed for many reasons. For instance, with the beginning of military action in February 2022, the number of jobs available fell dramatically, reaching just 15% of the pre-war labor market size (referenced as 100%) in March 2022. During that time, many businesses were forced to reorganize their operations, relocate within Ukraine or abroad, and change their areas of specialization. According to data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, in 2022, GDP decreased by 14.9% in the first quarter, 36.9% in the second quarter, 30.6% in the third quarter, and 31.4% in the fourth quarter compared to the previous year (State Statistics Service of Ukraine n.d.). As military battles became localized, market recovery began, allowing businesses located far away from conflict zones to reopen, continue their activities, and hire a labor force. Thus, in October 2022, the labor market size was around 72% of the pre-war labor market and was growing further, reaching 109% of the pre-war labor market in June 2023 (Samoiliuk and Levchenko 2024).

War has a direct impact on a country's demography through changes in the birth and death rates and migration, which are interlinked (Kulu et al. 2023). From the beginning of the war, the death rate among men increased significantly, while many women with children migrated from unsafe regions to safer areas abroad. Men aged 18–60 were prohibited from crossing the borders.

In general, a refugee's desire to return home after the war greatly depends on the structural and political conditions of the country of origin. Peace and security are not guaranteed immediately after the war ends, nor is there respect for human rights or political freedom (Zakirova and Buzurukov 2021). Therefore, socioeconomic reintegration concerns are extremely important in the decision-making process, including the speed of rebuilding infrastructure and the pace of economic recovery of the affected regions (Kugler et al. 2013). Thus, considering the current state of out-migration from Ukraine, there will be demographic challenges for years to come. Furthermore, long-term political and economic instability after the war can lead to further out-migration of family members who stayed in Ukraine as they seek to rejoin their families abroad (Kulu et al. 2023).



**Figure 1.** Destination of refugees from Ukraine

Source: own elaboration based on Eisele 2023.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of refugees from Ukraine: a large share of refugees going to the Russian Federation is made up of people from the territories neighboring the front line; thus, when escaping from the active fighting, there was no alternative but to cross the border with the Russian Federation. The second main destination of refugees, where more than 1.5 million people migrated, is Poland, which borders the western regions of Ukraine. Almost one million people migrated further to Germany.

The probability of refugees returning to their country of origin depends on the location of the current country of residence; if they are in neighboring countries, they are more likely to return than those who migrated far from their homeland (Al Husein and Wagner 2023). In addition, the presence of children increases the cost of returning, reducing the incentive to return (Klinthäll 2007).

As a rule, the out-migration of people is viewed negatively, as one country loses its human capital while the country of the final destination gains this capital. The main destination of refugees from Ukraine is the European Union (EU), where an aging population is a common issue, meaning that the share of the working-age population is decreasing while the share of the retired population is increasing, increasing the tax burden on the working population. Under these conditions, rapid and massive in-migration can fill the gap in the labor market and strengthen the financial system. Moreover, migrants increase their overall consumption by spending their previous savings (Vinokurov 2023). Based on the available data, 25–55% of refugees, who comprise 0.8% of the total labor force of the EU, are employed or actively seeking jobs. Furthermore, similar cases evidenced that out-migration is not seen as a crucial issue, as the labor market and the economy in general transform and adjust (Pishchulina and Yurchyshyn 2023).

As the majority of refugees are women and children, they require additional financial expenditures from the national budget. For instance, 560,000 children are registered in Poland

as refugees; thus, EUR 2.2 billion was used for their education and EUR 1.5 billion for their healthcare.

In addition to people moving from Ukraine as refugees, millions were displaced within the country, mostly from the eastern (70%) and southern regions (14%) to the western regions (Table 1).

Table 1. The origin of displaced people

| Region of Ukraine | % of displaced people | Number of people |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| East              | 70                    | 3,733,000        |
| South             | 14                    | 734,000          |
| North             | 6                     | 345,000          |
| Kyiv              | 5                     | 259,000          |
| Central           | 3                     | 151,000          |
| West              | 2                     | 130,000          |

Source: own elaboration based on International Organization for Migration 2023.

Thus, according to the available data (Figure 2), at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than six million people were forced to relocate because of military action. In April 2022, when military combat was concentrated mostly in the eastern regions, more than 7.5 million people were relocated, and almost three million people were able to return to their permanent place of residence. In the following months, the number of people who returned to their permanent place of living increased to around 5.5 million per month, while the number of displaced stayed at around 6.5 million people. Notably, in January 2023, the number of people who returned was greater than the number of displaced people.




Figure 2. The number of displaced people and people who returned to their permanent place of residence

Source: own elaboration based on International Organization for Migration 2023.

While 64% of displaced people had lost their jobs, the rest were able to continue working remotely. Displaced people have lower competitive advantages in the labor market in their new place of residence, as they have lost their previously built social capital and connections, making it harder to find a paid job. Thus, the newly displaced people had to take low-paid jobs to survive, with former office workers now employed in unskilled positions. To address this issue,

the government has supported local businesses in areas where displaced individuals have settled by providing compensation for each employed person or offering preferential taxation. This approach helped stabilize the labor market, where the number of workers exceeded the needs of employers. In addition, displaced people were able to receive financial help from the state (Filipchuk and Syrbu 2022).

Ukrainian businesses faced unprecedented challenges, specifically at the beginning of the full-scale invasion when production and infrastructure facilities were destroyed or damaged. In response, some businesses relocated to safer regions; thus, more than 600 enterprises relocated to the western regions, 390 of which were able to reopen (Filipchuk and Syrbu 2022). Furthermore, international business activities were limited as the borders with Russia and Belarus were closed, ports were occupied, and the capacity of western borders was limited because of the massive movement of refugees; thus, previously established supply chains were disturbed.

In addition, as imports from Russia and Belarus were restricted, Ukrainian producers captured market share and substituted imported goods with domestic ones. However, a rapid reduction in household income decreased the demand for goods, resulting in lower sales for businesses. It is estimated that direct losses incurred by Ukrainian businesses due to the war amount to approximately USD 13 billion, with indirect losses exceeding USD 33 billion (Kyrychenko 2023). The massive out-migration of workers is seen as another issue for businesses, as there is a lack of qualified specialists available.

The negative social effects of these events should be considered when discussing the contraction of the labor market and forced displacement. According to a survey conducted by Info Sapiens (2023), the unemployment rate increased from 8.6% in February 2022 to 29.5% in March 2022, reaching 30.7% in May 2022. Although the situation slightly improved, with the unemployment rate dropping to 17.7% in May 2023, this figure remains significantly higher than the pre-war level.

At the same time, military battles interrupted the routine supply chains, leading to shortages of consumer goods and increased food insecurity among the population. By May 2023, 22.9% of respondents reported that they faced food insecurity, compared to approximately 11.4% in February 2022 (Info Sapiens 2023).

## **Economy and trade**

During the active stage of the military conflict, the population was evacuated or forced to relocate, and businesses were not able to continue their commercial activities, resulting in a rapid contraction of the economy. In response to these challenges, foreign countries provided financial aid and other grants to stabilize and minimize financial losses of the economy. As of June 1, 2023, Ukraine had received USD 26.5 billion in additional financing, including USD 8.1 billion from the EU, USD 6.7 billion in domestic bonds, USD 6 billion from the USA, USD 2.7 billion from the International Monetary Fund, USD 1.8 billion from Canada, USD 0.5 billion from the World Bank, USD 0.5 billion from the UK, and USD 0.2 billion from Germany, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Iceland, and Estonia (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 2023).

In this context, in March 2023, the government of Ukraine increased budget spending to finance the army; thus, despite the shrinking economy, budget expenditures increased. Therefore, foreign financing was used to cover the budget deficit and debt repayments (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Data on the budget deficit, debt repayments, and foreign financing, billion USD

Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2023); National Bank of Ukraine n.d.

Recent empirical research on the occupied territories reveals that Russia applies varied economic policies based on the assessed geostrategic and economic value of that territory, as well as the associated military and political costs of the conflict. Russia has demonstrated consistency in its occupation tactics, previously tested in Moldova, Georgia, and East Ukraine, including societal destabilization, population segregation, and violence (Malyarenko and Wolff 2018). The occupied territories are experiencing de-modernization as a result of the export of Russian political and economic institutions, which are more centralized than in Ukraine. Additionally, Russia purposely implements de-modernization policies to weaken the economic and political potential of the territory (Malyarenko and Kormych 2023).

Occupation policies vary across different territories. For example, in the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR, Russia implements an even more autocratic regime than in Russia itself, without even a semblance of parliamentarians, an independent judiciary, or free media (Marandici and Leşanu 2021). In particular, investments in DPR/LPR industry and infrastructure were minimal, amounting to approximately USD 8 billion over eight years. They were primarily used to pay pensions and salaries to members of government agencies, the army, the police, and education and healthcare workers. In contrast, investments in Crimea amounted to USD 24 billion between 2014 and 2021 (Kommersant 2022).

A survey conducted between February 8 and 18, 2014, showed that 41% of Crimea's residents were in favor of unification with Russia, compared with 33% in Donetsk, 24% in Luhansk and Odesa, 6% in Kyiv, and almost no support in the western regions (Paniotto 2017). Thus, the subsequent establishment of a more rigid autocratic political regime in the DPR/LPR can be understood as a means of maintaining control over these territories and their partly disloyal population.

The main economic consequences of the Russian occupation of the Ukrainian territories are: 1) the transfer of production assets such as capital, labor, land, and natural resources from

Ukraine to Russia; 2) the adaptation to the Russian economy and economic system, and the associated interruptions in the supply chains, which led to economic degradation through productivity and efficiency reduction; and 3) the out-migration of the occupied territories' labor force (Olekseyuk and Schürenberg-Frosch 2019).

Thus, there was a de-modernization of the occupied territories, as the data show that in 2017, the industrial output of the occupied territories of the DPR was three times lower than the government-controlled part of the Donetsk region; before the war, they were almost equal (Mykhnenko 2020).

Moreover, historically, many businesses located in Donbas had similar production technologies and product ranges as Russians, allowing them to compete in the international market. Therefore, to eliminate this competition, Russian investors took control of Ukrainian producers and brought them to bankruptcy by dismantling and selling equipment from the occupied territories or transferring technologically advanced enterprises to Russia while selling the remaining equipment for scrap (Decyk 2022).

During the occupation, Russia financed territories through public sector salaries, pensions, welfare payments, and energy supply. Simultaneously, these occupied territories became sales markets for Russian food and mostly low-quality consumer goods. Therefore, investments and the development of local production were not of interest to Russia (Malyarenko and Kormych 2023).

Additionally, local occupation administrations orchestrated the total “nationalization” of Ukrainian banking infrastructure and its cash holdings, along with property belonging to state monopolies and private owners. This can be seen through the fifty-fold increase in food exports from Crimean ports following its occupation. Before the occupation, between March and June 2022, the volume of exports was approximately 462,200 tons of agricultural goods such as grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils, pulses, and proteins. In contrast, the overall export of comparable products in 2021 was only 8,000 tons (Quinn 2022).

Therefore, the economic organization under the occupational administration shows that territories are going through de-industrialization, marked by a significant shift towards a resource-based economy with undeveloped financial and credit systems.

Next, regarding the impact on trade, according to the Central Bank of Ukraine, the trade deficit increased from USD 0.1 billion in January 2022 to USD 3.2 billion in July 2022, reaching a peak of USD 4.3 billion in December 2022, as with the start of the full-scale invasion, the transportation channels were greatly disrupted (Figure 4).




Figure 4. The trade balance, USD billions

Source: own elaboration based on National Bank of Ukraine n.d.

Special attention should be paid to trade volumes through various means of transportation. According to the available related data (Figure 5), maritime transportation accounted for over 90% of total trade in 2021. However, with the onset of the full-scale invasion, all seaports were blocked, rendering maritime transportation impossible. As a result, from January to March 2022, trade dropped rapidly from USD 6.5 billion in the pre-war period (December 2021) to USD 0.5 billion. Starting in April 2022, trade was partially restored using rivers, railways, and trucks. Later, on July 22, 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul, Turkey (United Nations 2022). This agreement guaranteed the safety of transportation by sea and led to an increase in trade volumes in the following months.




Figure 5. Trade volumes by mode of transportation, USD billions

Source: own elaboration based on Samoiliuk and Levchenko 2024

Recent studies have evidenced the persistent disruption of Ukraine's trade in agricultural products and base metals because of exporters' limited access to foreign markets. The empirical results show that exports from Ukraine decreased significantly by 47.3% from February to August

2022. It was also shown that Ukrainian exporters continued exporting higher-priced varieties while reducing exports of lower-valued products. Nonetheless, this disruption of exports from Ukraine has only a limited effect on the global market for most commodities, and the adjustment of the global market is driven by various price hikes depending on the product group and region (Fang and Shao 2022; Ahn, Kim, and Steinbach 2023; Bentley et al. 2023; Borin et al. 2023; Steinbach 2023).

## Social capital and volunteering

Trust is considered to be the foundation of social capital and its accumulation. Therefore, changes in the public's trust in the main institutions illustrate social capital development at the country level. Thus, according to a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center between 2021 and 2023 (Figure 6), the overall trust in Ukraine's main state authorities increased. In particular, trust in the armed forces increased from 68.3% in 2021 to 95.8% in 2023, trust in the president increased from 36.2% in 2021 to 82.9% in 2023, and trust in the government increased from 21.5% in 2021 to 50% in 2023. These improvements stem from public satisfaction with the state's position, policies, and actions during Russia's full-scale invasion of the country. In addition, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, there was a critical need for volunteer organizations to provide support and solve various issues in local communities. Volunteer organizations are considered a reliable way of solving issues at the local level; hence, the level of trust increased from 63.6% in 2021 to 87.9% in 2023.




Figure 6. Trust in different institutions, %

Source: own elaboration based on Razumkov Center 2023.

As discussed before, as a result of the full-scale invasion, the economy was disturbed; thus, average household incomes fell dramatically, and many people lost their jobs as businesses were relocated or even closed down. In addition, there was a shock in the labor market caused by the rapid, massive out-migration of refugees. In this context, there was a need to collaborate to solve the essential problems of households with limited income and to support the defense forces with the necessary equipment. Consequently, many volunteering organizations were formed by neighbors with mutual goals and geographical location. The main aims of these organizations include dealing with pressing issues such as providing food banks to poor people, building heating shelters during the winter months when there were problems with electricity supplies throughout the country, organizing the evacuation of the elderly or people with disabilities, helping with paperwork for these vulnerable groups, and sharing and redistributing scarce goods, specifically at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Additionally, the main sociological motivations for participating

in volunteer activities included patriotism, empathy, and a sense of self-worth. Patriotic feelings are extremely sensitive, especially in times of severe threat of hostile action (Reznik 2023).

In countries with a highly bureaucratic state sector, volunteering is seen as a way to react to issues quickly and directly, complementing the existing policies and procedures of governmental support. The development of volunteering activities also holds political significance, as involvement in volunteering fosters the formation of group identities and solidarities that can enhance awareness of political opportunities to influence the government, especially when there are critical differences between public and governmental priorities (Maier, Meyer, and Steinberithner 2016).

In addition, survey results indicate that the likelihood of participating in volunteer activities increases with higher income levels (Figure 7). Moreover, wealthier people tend to help financially rather than physically. In general, there are no significant differences in participation levels in volunteering activities between respondents who reported having enough income for life and those who are more financially secure. Only the most disadvantaged Ukrainians have limited opportunities to participate in volunteering.




Figure 7. Participation in volunteer activities in different income groups, December 2022, %

Source: own elaboration based on Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2023.

There was also an obvious difference in how the analyzed groups assessed the Euromaidan events. Among those who viewed the events on the Maidan in late 2013 and early 2014 as a Revolution of Dignity – a just uprising of the people against the authoritarian government – a total of 68.2% were involved in volunteering activities. In contrast, among those who considered these events to be an illegal coup d'état, a seizure of power by a group of armed individuals, only 38.1% participated in various types of volunteering. Hence, those whose perceptions of the Euromaidan events align with the Russian narrative have formed a certain identity that does not foster resistance against the Russian invaders, at least through volunteering (Reznik 2023).

Accordingly, among the most crucial areas of activities of volunteering organizations are:

- Helping the military on the front line. The Defense Forces constantly need cars, ammunition, drones, thermal imagers, tactical medicine equipment, walkie-talkies, communication systems, and much more (Come Back Alive Foundation 2024; Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation n.d.).

- Ensuring the work of humanitarian units: Food, clothing, medicine, and accommodation for internally displaced people (Dobro.ua. n.d.; Palyanytsya n.d.; SpivDiia n.d.).
- Information protection: countering disinformation and propaganda, blocking unreliable information sources, spreading true information through mass media, the Internet, and social networks, information protection, and cyber security (Anti-Crisis Media Center 2022).
- Helping the elderly, children, and those who have difficulty taking care of themselves. These people need food, medicine, moral support, communication, empathy, and attention (Children's Villages n.d.; Enjoying Life n.d.; UNICEF Ukraine n.d.).
- Helping animals: evacuating animals, providing shelters with everything necessary, and searching for new homes (Charity Fund Happy Paw n.d.; UAnimals n.d.).
- Reconstructing buildings: restoring damaged buildings to habitable conditions, clearing rubble, covering roofs, and replacing windows (Anti-Crisis Media Center 2022).
- Medical assistance: donating blood, working in medical facilities, lecturing on tactical medicine, and medical evacuation activities in hotspots (All-Ukrainian Association of Donors of Ukraine n.d.; Pirogov First Volunteer Mobile Hospital n.d.).
- Psychological help: free online consultations and help for people who are experiencing anxiety, panic attacks, or depressive states (Worth Living Foundation n.d.).
- Legal assistance: free legal consultations for people affected by the full-scale invasion, recording and documenting war crimes (UA.Support n.d.).

2022 marked a unique time for Ukrainian citizens, characterized by unprecedented involvement in volunteering activities. In the first months of the liberation struggle, the population felt mortal danger. Traditionally distrustful of state institutions, many individuals spontaneously engaged in various types of activities based on their capabilities and resources.

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## Conclusion

The main contribution of this study is the analysis of the economic and social consequences of the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, thereby expanding the existing literature. The main economic consequences include the massive out-migration of refugees and internally displaced people, which directly limits the efficiency and size of the economy. Additionally, the demographic structure has changed significantly, as women with children make up the majority of migrants. Simultaneously, businesses were forced to relocate their production facilities. While the majority were able to reopen, a significant negative impact remains invisible as it occurs in the temporarily occupied territories. Specifically, these territories have experienced the total degradation and de-industrialization of the economy and the whole system, and they are now seen as resource suppliers to Russian industries. Production facilities and other properties of the temporarily occupied territories were effectively "nationalized" by Russia.

Trade has also been greatly affected as the supply chains were interrupted, imports from Russia and Belarus were limited, border capacity was insufficient to manage the massive migration

and transportation of goods, and maritime transportation of goods was limited as ports were blocked and occupied. However, maritime trade was partially restored following the agreement on the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

The social sphere has also been affected by the full-scale invasion, specifically through social capital formation caused by the increased trust in state authorities and the volunteer cooperation among citizens to solve urgent issues at both national and local community levels.

The findings of this study offer significant value to business managers by providing a comprehensive understanding of the potential economic and social impacts associated with crises and instability. This knowledge equips managers with the insights necessary to structure business operations with flexibility, enabling them to adapt effectively to external changes and mitigate potential negative consequences.

Furthermore, policymakers can also benefit from this study's insights, as it shows that the state's role is crucial during wartime and other conflicts. The flexibility and readiness of the state's sector and policy, in general, make a great difference in meeting and satisfying the public's economic and social needs and expectations during crises. Thus, to prevent widespread interruption during wartime and other conflicts, state priorities should be officially declared and followed during unforeseen crises.

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## Limitations and future studies

This research is limited to the available data, as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is ongoing, and the economic and social situations are constantly changing. In addition, the study focused on the effects on Ukraine's economy and social sphere, excluding impacts on the economies of EU countries and the world economy in general. Therefore, future research opportunities include investigating the invasion's impact on the economic and social spheres of the EU and the world economies, analyzing the economic and social conditions of refugees and displaced people, and conducting related field studies. These areas of study would greatly contribute to our understanding of wartime economic dynamics.

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## Spółeczne i ekonomiczne konsekwencje pierwszego roku pełnoskalowej inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę

Niniejsze badanie ma na celu opracowanie ram analitycznych pozwalających zrozumieć społeczne i gospodarcze skutki inwazji wojskowej na Ukrainę poprzez zbadanie jej wpływu na rynek pracy i migrację, gospodarkę i handel, kapitał społeczny oraz wolontariat. Do głównych konsekwencji gospodarczych i społecznych zalicza się: masową migrację uchodźców i osób wewnątrznie przesiedlonych, zmianę struktury demograficznej, przenoszenie przedsiębiorstw oraz dalsze ponowne otwarcie i przystosowanie się do nowych warunków, całkowitą degradację i deindustrializację gospodarki terytoriów okupowanych, przerwanie łańcuchów dostaw, zmniejszenie wolumenu handlu, akumulację kapitału społecznego oraz rozwój i upowszechnianie wolontariackiej współpracy obywateli na rzecz rozwiązywania pilnych problemów na poziomie społeczności krajowej i lokalnej. Ponadto niniejsze badanie ogranicza się do dostępnych danych oraz wpływu na gospodarkę i sferę społeczną Ukrainy, z wyłączeniem wpływu na gospodarkę krajów UE i ogólnie gospodarkę światową.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Ukraina, inwazja na pełną skalę, wojna, gospodarka, uchodźcy, wolontariat, kapitał społeczny