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Opportunities Amidst Uncertainties China–EU Security Cooperation in the context of the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative¹

Abstract

How does China seek security cooperation on the vast Eurasian continent? For China, this geopolitical border is becoming more and more important. A new generation of Chinese leaders put forward the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) Initiative for the Eurasian continent has brought new opportunities for cooperation, but it also brings new security challenges. Is it possible for Europe to have more security cooperation and interaction with China? As an important power worldwide, China and the European Union (EU) could share common interests in maintaining international and regional peace and stability. As the security challenges are becoming increasingly complex and transnational, the EU and China will assume more responsibility for peace and security matters. This paper aims to have a general, yet strategic assessment of China’s security cooperation towards the European Union. It starts with a brief overview of China–EU security cooperation during the past decade, then analyze the opportunities and challenges of China and the EU’s security cooperation in the context of OBOR Initiative, and put forward some feasible suggestions for the future cooperation.

Key words: China–EU relations, security cooperation, OBOR Initiative.

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¹ Thanks for Dr. Thomas Kaminski’s valuable suggestions on revision, the writer is responsible for the consequences of this article.

Introduction

The new generation of Chinese leaders has shown strong interest in developing relations with European countries since its takeover of power in October 2012. In recent years, China–EU relations of cooperation are more closed. Numerous policy papers have been adopted during the last decade. In April 2014, China's government released the second Policy Document to the European Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation (MFAPRC 2014). China and the European Union, with frequent exchanges of leadership between the two sides and the bilateral relationship, is really warming up and making progress in these years. At the same time, China's government proposed the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative (*Yidai, Yilu* in Chinese, referred to as OBOR hereinafter) that focuses on the possibility of cooperation among countries, primarily in Eurasia. It aims to enhance China's position and influence global cooperation and economic development, which will have a positive effect in stabilizing the situation and preventing security issues of extremism and terrorism. It would also act as an opportunity for closer cooperation between China and the European Union (EU). On the other hand, its focus is for a strong Europe to strengthen the close and comprehensive cooperation. This is seen as a fundamental shift in Europe's diplomatic and security policy since 2003, and it is foreseeable that it will have a strong impact on the international security situation. In particular, the new strategy in the care of the surrounding areas of Europe at the same time, for Asia has also been clearly reflected (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2016).

When reviewing the Sino–EU relations, most of the analysis focuses on economic and trade issues, however, it could also provide an opportunity for security cooperation between China and the EU. Based on previous studies, analysis and perspective are mostly negative in the field of security cooperation between China and the EU. In spite of many common interests, there is no evidence that shows that security is becoming a solid pillar of the partnership (Holslag 2015). Diverging interests, competing structures, and external influences are obstacles for China–EU cooperation on security and in other related areas. From a geopolitical point of view, the EU in the Asia-Pacific region, there are no direct military interests, in addition, unlike the United States (US), the EU has not provided any policies yet, such as the 'Pivot to Asia' (Oliver 2014). Moreover, many uncertainties exist in the Sino–EU security cooperation, among all the dialogues established

between China and the EU, more than two-thirds fall under the second pillar, serving bilateral economic and trade ties (Men 2014).

Thus, this paper aims to examine the following arguments. First, during the past decade, what are the successful experiences of cooperation between China and the EU in the field of security? Second, what challenges will be encountered by Sino–EU cooperation in the field of security? Third, by China’s proposed OBOR Initiative, will it bring any opportunities for security cooperation to both sides? This paper aims to have a general, yet strategic assessment of China’s security cooperation towards the EU. It starts with a brief overview of China–EU security cooperation during the past decade, then focuses on the following issues. First, it analyzes various motivations and interests in Chinese and EU security cooperation during the past decade. Second, it identifies the major challenges and obstacles in China’s pursuit of its interests in Sino–EU security relations. Third, it discusses opportunities of China–EU security cooperation in the context of OBOR.

1. Evolution of China–EU Security Cooperation during the past decade

In April 2014, China carried out the second Policy Paper to the European Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation. China and the EU with frequent exchanges of leadership between the two sides and the bilateral relationship is really warming up and making progress in these years (MFAPRC 2014). Over the past decade, China and the EU have expanded their relations from a dominant focus on economic and trade issues to the sphere of politics. But security cooperation, as a new area of Sino–EU cooperation, is becoming a major aspect of China–EU relations. In view of the fact that today’s major international issues cannot be solved by unilateral action, the cooperation between the two sides is increasingly critical in maintaining regional and global security (EEAS 2016). Since 2003, when the two sides established a strategic partnership, during that year, two policy papers on bilateral relations were issued respectively by the EU and China. The EU’s policy paper “A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU–China Relations”² stated

² http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/september/tradoc_124565.pdf.

that “EU and Chinese interests converge on many issues of global governance, in particular as regards the key role of multilateral organizations and systems.”³ In November 2013, both sides jointly adopted the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (EEAS 2013). It provides a blueprint for the next decade based on four key pillars, with peace and security as the priority (Mariani 2016),⁴ in the context of such a framework, new areas of cooperation are emerging, highlighting the roles and responsibilities of China and the EU as global transaction participants, as well as the wishes of both sides to further deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Specifically, “Hold regular dialogues on defense and security policy, increase training exchanges, and gradually raise the level of EU–China dialogue and cooperation on defense and security, advancing towards more practical cooperation” as one of the key initiatives would be achieved.⁵ Moreover, China–EU high-level strategic dialogue is also as a new way for deepening the cooperation. During the Chinese president’s visit to Europe in March 2014, President Xi met with the presidents of EU institutions,⁶ and the ensuing Joint Statement reaffirmed and confirmed the outcome of the China–EU summit in November 2013.⁷ In order to further promote the institutionalization and regularization of China–EU cooperation, in 2014, China issued the second Policy Document to the European Union: Deepen the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation (MFAPRC 2014), this document is highly consistent with the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (EEAS 2013), which defines motivations and interests in Chinese policymakers’ mindset when dealing with Europe, including anti-terrorism. Generally, ‘security’ encompasses both rigid measures, such as national and military security, as well as soft elements, such as personal, environmental, and economic security. Therefore, what outcomes have been made during the past decade? As Bernardo Mariani in his speech in the China–EU

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³ Ibid.

⁴ Namely peace and security, trade and investment, sustainable development, and people-to-people exchanges.

⁵ http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.

⁶ President of European Council Herman van Rompuy, President of European Commission Manuel Barroso, and President of European Parliament Martin Schulz.

⁷ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140331_02_en.pdf.

Think-tank Summit in 2016 pointed out, there are currently four areas of cooperation that are constructive: nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and cyber security (Mariani 2016).

First, in nuclear security, China has made great progress not only in the construction of its nuclear safety system, but also has made great contributions to nuclear safety cooperation on a global scale.⁸ This is in line with the EU's so-called 'effective multilateralism' nonproliferation policy (Kissack 2010), which is committed and supports multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms and assists non-EU countries that join the relevant non-proliferation regime to live up to their commitments. China and the EU recognized the necessity for strategic cooperation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and signed a joint statement on non-proliferation and arms control at the 2004 China–EU Summit,⁹ which proposed a range of priorities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Iranian nuclear issue's cooperation is one example of this positive strategic partnership. Meanwhile, China and the EU cooperation on nuclear safety was officially launched in early 2014. The project aims to enhance and strengthen the Chinese nuclear safety regulatory framework to enhance its nuclear safety regulatory capacity building. This cooperation, while further deepening China–EU nuclear safety exchanges and cooperation, also contributed to the maintenance and improvement of the global nuclear safety level. In May 2015, China and the EU affirmed their cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue. On

⁸ China has signed a number of international treaties and conventions for the nuclear security cooperation, such as the Antarctic Treaty, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC), Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space (Launch Registration Convention), International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT), Proposed Internationally Legally-Binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty), etc.

⁹ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82998.pdf.

July 14, 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Germany, and the European Union jointly signed the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA),¹⁰ also known as the 'Iran Nuclear Agreement'. This was called a 'New Page' by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini. While cooperation between the two sides in the field of nuclear security is still at an early stage, the efforts of both sides in this regard are still visible.

Second, peacekeeping operations are also a good example of China–EU security cooperation. China is playing an increasingly important role as an important force in the maintenance of international peace, and it has attracted the attention and support from the EU. On the question of the importance of peacekeeping operations, China and the EU are important forces in the world to maintain peace, it fully demonstrates the common interests of China and the EU in peacekeeping capacity building and cooperation (Mariani 2016). The EU and China have considerable potential for cooperation in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. China is increasingly involved in the United Nations peacekeeping mission, plans to set up a standing force of 8,000 people.¹¹ The EU is a major supporter of the African Union and its peacekeeping activities. The two sides are ready to cooperate in the fight against piracy on the coast of Africa. China's peacekeeping operations in Mali have demonstrated that its new commitment to United Nations peacekeeping security cooperation. This action is worthy of attention because this is the first time the Chinese peacekeeping forces provide security services to foreign troops. China and the EU began to launch a vice-ministerial dialogue on international and regional security issues by the end of 2005, and in 2009, China began to participate in the escort activities in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia as required and authorized by the UNSC. Although not all of the reports on such cooperation are positive (Putten 2015), these developments show that with the continued expansion of China's participation in peacekeeping operations, the cooperation between China and the EU in peacekeeping will be further enhanced.

Third, the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda and the second Policy Document to the European Union all highlighted maritime security

¹⁰ https://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.

¹¹ From the United Nations.

cooperation, including anti-piracy. The degree of convergence of policy and practice between China and the EU is increasing. In 2009, in order to jointly carry out the anti-piracy mission in Somalia and maintain the safety of maritime access, China and the EU jointly launched the 'Atlanta Action', which achieved good results, accumulated strategic mutual trust, and increased cooperation experience, resulting in a good demonstration effect. Actions include extensive information sharing and joint exercises with the Chinese Navy, and are committed to enhancing China's organizational and commanding capabilities, cooperation and tactical capabilities, and the ability to carry out escort missions.¹² At the same time, China, the EU, and the joint maritime armed forces, which are composed of multiple countries, have also led international special forces to fight outside the Somali coast and pirates. It is expected that with the development of OBOR, China and the EU will further strengthen maritime security cooperation.

Fourth, another common interest between China and the EU points to the field of cyber security. China and the EU now established working groups aimed at enhancing networking, it is not only focusing on practical cooperation in the prevention and response to cybercrime but also in building a broader global governance and security norm, specifically targeting cyberwar and cybercrime. Such cooperation not only benefits for the positive role for both sides in global governance, but also promotes the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for both sides. In addition, the United Kingdom, and China have signed a cyber security agreement with the aim of ensuring that the two sides do not tolerate and do not engage in intellectual property and trade espionage.¹³ During the past, the interaction between EU member states and China in this area has been controversial, especially for China to launch network attacks accusations. Cyber security is a matter of concern for both China and the EU. More cooperation in this area also helps to resolve Europe's concerns about the so-called 'China threat'. It is time for both China and the EU to deepen their ties so that bilateral relations become more stable and more sustainable. Pragmatic cooperation on major projects is helpful in deepening bilateral relations.

¹² Such as Rear Admiral Barbieri and Rear Admiral Chen Qiangnan concluded the visit with talks on the EU and Chinese Navy's common efforts to strengthen maritime security in the region through joint planning and counter-piracy exercises.

¹³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-2015>.

2. The Uncertainties of China–EU Security Cooperation

China and the EU in security cooperation is still a weak link in bilateral relations, currently limited to a small number of policy summits. For example, China regularly participates in multilateral forums such as the Munich Security Conference, nuclear security is also limited to scientific and technological cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although many positive examples have been mentioned above, China and the EU still have much room for development in the field of security, such as promoting global peace and security. For example, compared with the extensive cooperation between China and the EU in trade and commerce, the practical cooperation in security in the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (EEAS 2013) has not yet seen more concrete measures. Although both China and the EU are committed to multilateralism, but in the context of different political systems, different ideologies, China and the EU have different and even contradictory explanations on the values and principles, such as the fundamental human rights, humanitarian intervention, etc. (Mariani 2016). Moreover, the EU arms embargo against China as the main obstacle that cannot usually be resolved in discussions on security cooperation between China and the EU. The EU is growing ties with China, yet it also has an ‘alliance’ with the US, the EU’s most important international ally. This has led to sometimes conflicting views in the EU on regional and international security issues.

During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the EU headquarters in 2014, President Xi proposed to develop partnerships for peace, growth, reform, and civilization (Xi 2014),¹⁴ but little progress has been made in this area, and without any further details. China’s Ministry of Public Security and the European Criminal Police Organization have established links, but China and the EU in the fight against transnational crime are still weak. The official outreach activities of the EU in the field of conventional arms and dual-use control in China have not yet transformed into concrete cooperative actions. China and the EU have not taken joint practical measures to contain the millions of illegal light and small arms circulating between the African continent, non-state armed groups, pirates, and other criminals. For the EU and its member states, there is no agreement on the arms control issues (Wendy 2014). In addition, the EU has not yet reached

¹⁴ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1351157.shtml.

an agreement with China on the issue of weapons, while the US believes that if the EU lifted the ban on China, there will be a technology transfer, giving the Chinese People's Liberation Army's military considerable strength. This is an opportunity to bridge the gap in the export of conventional arms, with a clearer definition of internationally accepted standards, and to raise common national standards in this field. So far, China has not signed and acceded to the treaty. In addition, although the dialogue between China and the EU on cyber security is regarded as an important measure to jointly combat cybercrime and prevent cyberwar, the differences in cyber policy between China and the EU cannot be ignored. This also raises issues such as content and information control, among other controversial issues (Mariani 2016).

3. The Opportunities of China–EU Security Cooperation in the context of OBOR

In the context of globalization, the degree of interdependence between China and Europe has deepened in the 21st century, the contacts between China and Europe in the field of non-traditional security have been increasing, and bilateral communication and consultation mechanisms have been improved. Nowadays, the EU has maintained a low profile on hard security issues in Asia and the Pacific. Geopolitical competition, disputes over islands and waters, and historical disputes between countries have created a marginal political form that makes a dangerous risk of inter-state conflict. Escalating military action and expansion of defense spending, as well as militant remarks on the issue of South China Sea have confirmed this point. Whether the EU can use its 'soft power' to be involved in the Asia-Pacific region, or whether the EU's involvement in regional security policies could be perceived as unrelated, unpopular, or even rejected by China's government, differences exist among Western scholars on these issues.¹⁵ However, some scholars believe that China

¹⁵ See China, Japan and the European Community (Taylor 1990); Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific: change, continuity and crisis (Bridges 1999); European and Asia-Pacific Integration: Political, Security, and Economic Perspectives (Shaw 1998); the European Union and East Asia: Inter-regional Linkages in a Changing Global System (Dent 2003); the European Union's Commercial Policymaking towards China (Tseng 2001); and the European Union and East Asia: Inter-regional Linkages in a Changing Global System (Preston 2001).

is interested in the EU's security policy and experience in the field of security multilateralism (Men 2014). The EU has some room for more active participation in Asian security matters, such as ASEAN. While the EU would normally be present at these occasions, it may sometimes have dispatched lower-levels of delegation. However, it has reasons to be optimistic for the cooperation in the field of security. In the case of the EU, for example, it has already supported the enhancement of ASEAN capabilities, such as the establishment of the situation room, which facilitated a range of emergency information sharing, including violent escalation, geopolitical instability and epidemic outbreaks, as well as a more rapid and consistent response to the early warning (Mariani 2016).

The OBOR initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping (Xi 2012) that aimed at connecting Eurasia, is a new opportunity for cooperation between China and Europe. This initiative includes rail, road, aviation and navigation, pipelines, and transmission networks, will be a better to link China and Europe, and even a wider world, which will make it easier for China and the EU to develop a strategic partnership at the practical level. As many countries along the OBOR may be affected by conflict, it is a new way for closer cooperation between China and the EU. At the official level, it is an inevitable that the first step for China and the EU will exchange information on how to carry out activities in unstable regions and countries along OBOR. Such analysis is particularly important when it comes to the bridge between China and Europe. The OBOR links west of China with neighboring Central Asian countries. It should be noted that although China has a territorial dispute with India, generally its borders are relatively stable in the Central Asian region. At the same time, China insists by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs to the other countries, which limits its ability to protect its interest and citizens in crisis zones abroad. Similarly, China and EU cooperation by institutions could set opportunities for introducing more information exchange and collaboration mechanisms that promote joint efforts in upstream conflict prevention and development.

OBOR is a new bridge between China and the EU, although many areas of cooperation have been carried out, there are still differences, especially for such a sensitive area as is security. How to take OBOR to achieve further cooperation between China and the EU? It will be easier if existing mechanisms were used to find a commonality between China and the EU in strategy or policy. Such mechanisms could be combined with reality and

built by the 2030 agenda for sustainable development.¹⁶ This agenda could have proposed goals for the creation of cooperation as both China and the EU member states for the future sustainable development. As one of the focuses of the agenda is peace, such as Goal 16,¹⁷ the EU and China have agreed to closer cooperation for the achievement of sustainable development goals.¹⁸

Moreover, from China's perspective, territorial disputes with neighboring countries are one of the most important security challenges facing OBOR, the deeper involvement of the EU in exploring is supporting the 'road map' process (Wendy 2014) to reduce regional tensions and build mutual trust, therefore, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been able to take appropriate step-by-step corrective measures in all aspects to manage and minimize conflict sources and mutual mistrust.¹⁹ Obviously, the progress of this roadmap will be gradual and it will not eliminate all the contradictions, but it will enhance the trust between China and the EU.

With the gradual development of the OBOR Initiative, China and the EU could focus on the more consensual interests of global security, in particular, the non-traditional security threats of growing importance in China and the EU, such as, among others, climate and energy issues. China and the EU should understand the common causes to alleviate crises, in order to prevent conflicts and establish peace and stability in conflict countries. In terms of further cooperation, crisis response is a relatively uncontroversial good starting point. How to work together to deal with terrorism, religious and cultural conflict will be a good opportunity in the context of OBOR, especially in the context of Central

¹⁶ The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by world leaders in September 2015 at an historic United Nations Summit officially came into force. Over the next fifteen years, with these new goals that universally apply to all, countries will mobilize efforts to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities, and tackle climate change, while ensuring that no one is left behind.

¹⁷ Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E (last accessed by Dec 10th, 2016).

¹⁸ For example, China and the EU adopted a joint statement in 2015 for the way forward after forty years, and "agreed to explore operational development coordination in synergy with local partners, including in Africa."

¹⁹ The 'road map' should focus on the issues of common interest and concern to the countries of the region, which include but are not limited to: non-proliferation, strategic arms control, maritime security, in particular the management of military ships in exclusive economic zones, prevention of unnecessary arms competition, including arms race in outer space and networks, military policy, and posture for regional and global security influences.

Ausa. For example, in 2015, a Chinese warship helped hundreds of foreign nationals, including European citizens, evacuate from the war in Yemen. In 2011, Chinese citizens also helped with evacuations during the crisis in Libya. This action was as a great model for the security cooperation between China and the EU (Mathieu & Bates 2012), which also laid the foundation for future cooperation between the two sides.

As the global agenda for human security evolves from a military peacekeeping mission to a more comprehensive peace-building process, China, and the EU, will be the key powers in promoting post-conflict countries. Closer cooperation is possible in areas, such as deepening consultations and theoretical discussions, providing staff training and examining the building of local peacekeeping capacity in conflict-affected areas, such as the Middle East. This will help to achieve the new vision of international peacekeeping, such as reduce military-oriented responses and reflect human-centeredness more. In particular, both China and the EU need to consider increasing civilian concerns and civil expertise in peace support operations and invest more in crisis prediction and the protection of civilians. The current review of United Nations peacekeeping systems and operations provides an international context for future of EU–China cooperation. The increasingly focused conflict prevention operations are the complementary to the needs of militarily-oriented peacekeeping operations, even in the ideal situation where the former takes precedence over the latter. China may enhance their role and play a greater part the wider United Nations-led conflict prevention operations, though this depends on whether China maintains a constructive participation in the arms trade treaty process. The EU is likely to share more experience with China, thereby enhancing China’s practical capacity in arms and dual-use export controls, in particular, to prevent the transfer and compliance of commercial export controls (Mariani 2016).

Conclusion

The EU is China’s comprehensive strategic partner. During President Xi’s visit, the EU, together with the EU leaders, decided to build the four major pillars of the Sino–EU partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization, and pointed out the strategic direction for the Sino–EU relations in the new era. During the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU in 2015, the two sides decided to push forward the development strategy of the OBOR initiative with the European Investment

Plan, and set up the China–EU co-investment fund and the interconnection platform to further establish a new framework for EU–China pragmatic cooperation. Today, China–EU relations are in the best period of historical development, facing an unprecedented historical opportunity.

In the context of OBOR, Sino–EU relations can be confined not only by trade and investment, but also in the field of security. It is also a great opportunity to deepen mutual trust between China and the EU. There are many factors that affect China and the EU's cooperation on the issues of peace and security in the context of the OBOR initiative. It is clear that China and the EU are divided and sometimes have different priorities in terms of what peace and security should include and the issues of sovereignty and non-intervention, however, the strategic partnership between Beijing and Brussels is evolving over time, and the EU is also China's largest trading partner. While the current cooperation is fruitful and there is a possibility of further cooperation, substantial progress will depend on whether the parties can make reasonable arrangements for the focus in the competitive field. There is no doubt that the partnership has created a number of useful cooperation projects for both parties, but whether the partnership arrangement is comprehensive and whether the strategy is reasonable is still a question that needs to be answered in the future.

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