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METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN LINGUISTICS

Reduced to a simple formula the difference between metaphor and metonymy in the current sense may be stated as follows:

1) A linguistic form B functions as a metaphor of a linguistic form A, if it is associated with A owing to the similarity of the respective referents (denoted objects) and used instead of A, e. g. *head* (of a department) for *chairman* (similarity of function).

2) A linguistic form B is a metonymy of a linguistic form A, if it is associated with A owing to the spatial or temporal contiguity (co-occurrence) of the respective referents and used for A, e.g. *Holy See* for *Pope*.

Similarity and contiguity play a fundamental role in the grammatical system of the language. The syntagmatic or "horizontal" arrangement of items, as represented by the syntactical patterns, is based on contiguity, temporal (in spoken language) or spatial (in written language). We thus distinguish, within a sentence or a syntactical group, central and marginal members, headwords and their determinants. Hence a special terminology: subject, predicate, attribute, complement, etc.

On the other hand, the paradigmatic or "vertical" arrangement of elements, as reflected by parts of speech and derivational subgroups or word-classes, is conditioned by similarity or rather identity of syntactical function. The latter is borne out by the possibility of commutation, compare:

John is running	*John is sleeping*
The boy is running	*The boy is sleeping*
The dog is running	*The dog is sleeping*

(*John — boy — dog ......; running — sleeping — eating ......*), where the replacement of a certain member of the sentence by a word belonging to the same part of speech or word-class is independent of the syntactical structure of the sentence and does not entail its change.

Metaphor in the linguistic sense of the term would be a synonym B of the form A, syntactically equivalent with A, e.g. substantive for substantive, for substantived adjective, for nominal group etc. Therefore a "linguistic metaphor"

need not be identical with a metaphor in the current sense. In the expression *to pay a visit to the Vatican*, linguistically a metaphor (*Vatican — Pope*), we have to do with metonymy in the current sense of the term.

A "linguistic metaphor" consists in the change of the semantic or stylistic value of the item, leaving intact its syntactical function. Now a substitution, called commutation, would be impossible in the case of a "linguistic metonymy". Metonymy being based on contiguity, a "linguistic metonymy" presupposes a "horizontal" shift of the word, i.e. its use in a syntactical function different from the original one.

At first blush one is of course reminded of the secondary syntactical functions of the parts of speech, as e.g. the use of the noun as apposition, the use of the adjective as autonomous noun, e.g. *le roi chevalier, the whites and the blacks in Africa*, and so forth. To apply the term "linguistic metonymy" to such cases would be, however, incorrect. The correct procedure is a permutation within the given structure without having recourse to a term introduced from outside (the latter procedure, viz. commutation, being a characteristic feature of the "metaphor"). Let us represent the syntactical structure by the positions $P_1 P_2 P_3 \ldots \ldots P_q$. The replacement of P_m by P_n would entail a lacuna in the position P_n and possibly a difference of referents denoted by the two expressions. Therefore a "linguistic metonymy" consists in the exchange of the syntactical positions of two terms: P_n replaces P_m and *vice versa* (permutation).

Take for instance the syntactical transformation of an active into the corresponding passive construction: *Shakespeare wrote "The Tempest"* and *"The Tempest" was written by Shakespeare*. The two sentences denote the same event, i.e. have the same referent. The difference is of a stylistic order, though the expressivity differs from that of a "linguistic metaphor". We have to do with a shift of stylistic "stress". If e.g. we consider the determining element (*wrote*) *"The Tempest"* as being originally the stressed one, then the transformation active ⟩ passive entails the shift of stress from *"The Tempest"* to *Shakespeare* (*by Shakespeare*). From the grammatical point of view the difference between the two constructions lies in the permutation of syntactical functions: the member *Shakespeare*, determined by *wrote "The Tempest"*, becomes a determinant in the new sentence (*"The Tempest" was written*) *by Shakespeare*; the member *"The Tempest"*, a determinant of *wrote*, becomes the determined member in the new sentence *"The Tempest"* (*was written by Shakespeare*).

A similar transformation occurs for syntactical groups consisting of adjective+ +noun, replaced by abstract (from adjective)+genitive (of the noun), e.g. (*I saw*) *the red light* ⟩ (*I saw*) *the redness of the light*. Here again the grammatical hierarchy is being reversed, the determinant *red* becoming the determined member (*redness*) and entailing the change of the determined member *light* into a determinant (*of the light*). Stylistically a shift of "stress" has taken place, from *red* to *light* and *vice versa*.

One is inclined to call the above transformations as examples of "metonymy" in the linguistic sense of the term. Its essential feature is the change of hierarchy within a syntactical structure, leaving intact its semantic constituents.

The change of co-ordination (parataxis) into subordination (hypotaxis) or of two independent sentences into a main clause determined by a subordinate one, will also belong here. Cf. 1) *I was reading the letter when John arrived* and 2) *John arrived when I was reading the letter.* The choice of 1) or 2) is conditioned by stylistic factors. The objective situation conveyed by these constructions is identical, unless we consider the subjective stress, reflected by the difference of syntactical subordination, as a part of information. This, however, is only a question of terminology. The objective referent and the subjective attitude of the speaker are to be neatly distinguished.

Another example: *When I had finally sorted out the unnecessary typescripts, I told the maid to burn them* versus *Having finally sorted out the unnecessary typescripts, I told* etc. Such a replacement of subordinate clause by a participial construction shows a further weakening of the stylistic "stress" from "primary" (sentence or main clause) to "secondary" (subordinate clause) to "tertiary" (syntactical group with participle).

Similarly, the intrinsic relation of cause and effect existing between two paratactic sentences may be rendered explicit in a twofold way, either by a causal or by a consecutive clause. Thus a text like *Frost had set in early. The river was frozen* may be transformed into 1) *Since frost had set in early, the river was frozen.* 2) *Frost had set in early, so that the river was frozen.* The stress lies on the effect or on the cause, respectively.

Though such a definition of "linguistic metonymy" does not seem an important contribution to linguistics itself, it may prove useful in stylistics. The essential trait of metonymy is the shift of stylistic "stress", implemented by permutation or subordination but leaving intact the semantic content, whereas in the case of the metaphor it is just the semantic content of one the syntactical positions (P) which is modified. The referent of the new expression remains the same in both cases.

A stylistic device like *pars pro toto*, e. g. *four thousand bayonets* or (*the enemy*) *burnt our thatches*, presupposes an underlying external complex structure (*armed men, thatched huts*), expressivity being achieved by stressing one of its parts. But the whole structure is always present to the mind of the hearer or of the reader, since poetical language would not be intelligible without a constant confrontation of two levels, colloquial and poetical language, hence the latent structure of the *pars pro toto*, the *totum* being only virtual, and the *pars* directly presented (hence stylistically "stressed").

A still greater analogy exists between the "linguistic metonymy" and *pars pro parte* as illustrated by examples of poetical metonymy and numerous examples of semantic change due to association by contiguity: *part of the body* 〉 *corresponding part of the garment* (e.g. French *col* 〈 Lat. *collum*), *place* 〉 *inhabitants* (e.g. *court, action*

⟩ *agent* (e.g. *counsel, government*), *action* ⟩ *result* (e.g. *building, painting*), *action* ⟩ *object* (e.g. *drink, bit*), *action* ⟩ *place of action* (e.g. *entrance, drive*), and so forth.

At any rate a (poetical) metonymy is actualized by the representation of a certain complex structure consisting of parts. There is no essential difference between *pars pro toto* and *pars pro parte*:

I. *totum*　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II. *totum*
↕　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　↗↖
pars　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*pars₁* ...... *pars₂*

the association between $pars_1$ and $pars_2$ being mediated via *totum*.

Returning to "linguistic metonymy" one may compare I. to the reduction of the type *sentence* ⟩ *subordinate clause* or *subordinate clause* ⟩ *syntactical group* (reduction of stylistic "stress" enhancing the main clause), whereas II. would be parallel to transformations like *active* ⟩ *passive* or *the red light* ⟩ *the redness of the light* (shift of stylistic "stress"). The common denominator is a change in the stress-relation of the components.

Starting from linguistic concepts, which are more clearly defined than metaphor and metonymy in the current sense, let us try to grasp the mutual relation of these two fundamental stylistic devices. Tropes like hyperbole (exaggeration), litotes (understatement), euphemism, etc., are normally implemented by metaphors or metonymies.

A "linguistic metaphor" is perceived and understood as such only within the semantic (and/or situational) context, the latter itself presupposing a transparent syntactical structure. Therefore the interpretation of the metaphor proceeds from syntactical structure via semantic context to the word or expression in question. But already in the first stage of this analysis (syntactical structure) we may have to do with "a linguistic metonymy". "Linguistic metonymy", a syntactical phenomenon, has thus a status hierarchically superior to that of the "linguistic metaphor", which is purely semantic.

How is this relation to be applied to the metaphor and the metonymy in the current sense? An object, a situation or an event is also a structure composed of elements. They may be expressed by terms whose referents do not belong to the structure in question, but have been borrowed from another structure owing to a similarity of the components (metaphor, e.g. *white hair*: *snow*). Or the terms may originally refer to elements of the same structure (metonymy: *pars pro toto, pars pro parte*). Therefore, to account for the metaphor, we also must envisage a certain structure, i.e. perceive and interpret a metonymy, An expression like *copper--beard* (Lat. *ahenobarbus*) is to be interpreted 1) *beard* = 'bearded man' (metonymy); 2) *copper* = 'red' (metaphor). Neglecting the metonymy we run the risk of misinterpreting the metaphor ('beard made of copper').

Recently Jakobson has treated the problem of metaphor and metonymy in the last chapter (p. 76—82) of the stimulating work *Fundamentals of Language*,

written jointly with M. Halle. Starting with experimental data on aphasia and with psychological tests he establishes the preference for metaphor or metonymy as the chief criterion characterizing the style of the individual, both in the extralinguistic and in the linguistic plane. Hence his use of four different terms: s i m i l a r i t y and c o n t i g u i t y, s e m a n t i c and p o s i t i o n a l (i.e. s y n t a c t i c a l). Thus in the expression *thatch* for *hut* we state the combination and the contrast of positional similarity (identity of syntactical function, both terms being nouns) with s e m a n t i c c o n t i g u i t y (metonymy). The choice and the combination of linguistic and extra-linguistic possibilities provides a variety of individual styles.

Our own remarks aim at something different, viz. the hierarchy within each of the two pairs of concepts as well as the essence of metonymy. When analysing grammatical or stylistic functions we contrast the derived forms with the basic forms or, respectively, the stylistically marked expressions with the colloquial ones. Since the functions of the linguistic forms are either semantic or syntactical, the introduction of the notion "linguistic metonymy" has proved useful. A "linguistic metonymy" is a structure differing from the basic form only by a shift of stylistic "stress", not by synonyms. The parallelism drawn between the current and the linguistic concepts of metaphor and metonymy makes us define (poetical) metonymy as a stylistic "stress" within represented complex structures or situations. On the other hand, the subordination of the semantic under the syntactical field in language throws a light on the mutual relation of metaphor and metonymy, t h e l a t t e r b e i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a n d o v e r a l l p h e n o m e n o n.

METAFORA I METONIMIA W JĘZYKOZNAWSTWIE

STRESZCZENIE

Narzędziami stylistycznymi leżącymi u podstaw tropów, jak hiperbola, litotes, eufemizm itp., są metafora i metonimia. Użycie formy językowej *B* zamiast formy *A*, skojarzonej z nią na podstawie p o d o b i e ń s t w a d e n o t a t ó w, jest metaforą, podczas gdy metonimia opiera się o skojarzenie na podstawie s t y c z n o ś c i d e n o t a t ó w w przestrzeni lub czasie.

Pojęcia metafory i metonimii mogą być uściślone i zastosowane w lingwistyce. Pod „metaforą lingwistyczną" rozumieć będziemy użycie formy *B*, synonimu formy *A*, mającej i d e n t y c z n ą f u n k c j ę s k ł a d n i o w ą z formą *A*, a różniącą się od formy *A* funkcją semantyczną, a ściślej: stylistyczną (ekspresywnością). „Metafora lingwistyczna" polega na k o m u t a c j i *A* z *B*, *C* itd., np. *Adam Mickiewicz* : *autor „Pana Tadeusza"*: *ojciec Władysława Mickiewicza* itp. „Metonimia lingwistyczna" polega natomiast na p e r m u t a c j i, tj. przestawieniu funkcji składniowych przy zachowaniu informacji semantycznej, np. (*widziałem*) *zielone światło* : (*widziałem*) *zieleń światła*. Człon określony *światło* staje się członem określającym (*światła*), i odwrotnie, człon określający *zielony* przechodzi w człon określony *zieloność*. Ekspresywność polega tutaj na p r z e n i e s i e n i u a k c e n t u s t y l i s t y c z n e g o (ze: *światło* na: *zieloność*); informacja odnosząca się do sytuacji zewnętrznej pozostaje ta sama. Ekspresywność tej „metonimii lingwistycznej" ma więc inny charakter niż komutacja „metaforyczna" w *ojciec nie wraca* : *tato nie wraca*, gdzie funkcje składniowe pozostają nietknięte.

Przy analizie zdania dostrzegamy „metaforę lingwistyczną" poprzez pole syntaktyczne, suponujące sensowną konstrukcję składniową, a dopiero następnie przez kontekst semantyczny (ewentualnie konsytuację), pozwalający zinterpretować nowe użycie wyrazu. Hierarchia jest więc następująca: I. konstrukcja składniowa→II. kontekst semantyczny. Ale „metonimię lingwistyczną" napotykamy już w stadium I. Wynika z tego nadrzędność „metonimii" w stosunku do „metafory lingwistycznej".

Zastosowanie powyższych pojęć do metafory i metonimii w sensie potocznym pozwala na ściślejsze ujęcie wzajemnego stosunku tych narzędzi stylistycznych. *Pars pro toto* i *pars pro parte* suponują strukturę odnośnego denotatu składającego się z części, ale i metafora suponuje przeniesienie nazwy jakiegoś szczegółu z jednej struktury do drugiej. Tak jak *strzecha* zamiast *chata* odsyła do struktury *chata pokryta strzechą*, podobnie *śnieg* zamiast *siwe włosy* opiera się o struktury *ziemia pokryta śniegiem, głowa pokryta siwizną*.

Wynika z tego nadrzędność metonimii jako narzędzia stylistycznego niezależnego, podczas gdy metafora zasadniczo implikuje ukrytą metonimię.

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