C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

Jakub Z. Lichański*

iD https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1943-5069

Rhetoric as a Tool for Studying Our Thoughts: What is *Téchne Rhetoriké*?

I understood every word in that sentence, but not the sentence itself.
Terry Pratchett, Carpe Jugulum[1]

Introduction

The motto with which I began my discussion offers a good illustration of the problem on which I wish to focus. The helplessness indicated by Pratchett is related to the fact that people talk "on two levels." The first one, strictly grammatical, enables one to understand words and their organisation within a sentence (that is the level of *lexis*), while the other, i.e. rhetoric, applies to the thought which one hides behind the words or which one wants to convey (that is the level of *dianoia*).[2] And that is where, usually, problems emerge.

To explain the reasons for this, allow me to begin by quoting the opinion of Immanuel Kant (1971, A 822 [p. 832]; 1957, A 822/B 850 [p. 566]):[3]

---

* Professor *emeritus*, University of Warsaw, Institute of Applied Linguistics, Chair of Rhetoric and the Media, e-mail: jakub.z.lichanski@gmail.com.

1 Cf. T. Pratchett, *Carpe Jugulum*, trans. P.W. Cholewa, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2015, p. 197: the described situation is not as funny as it might seem at first glance, and it indicates the difference between the *literal meaning* and the *allegorical meaning* of a sentence (suffice to consider the applications of idiomatic expressions).

2 Explanations of the notions and concepts – vide further on.

3 I applied two types of notes as in footnotes I generally focussed on the matters which would disrupt the main discussion making it not absolutely clear. It may be worth quoting what Theodor W. Adorno wrote about rhetoric and philosophy: "In philosophy, rhetoric represents that which cannot be thought except in language" (cf. idem., *Dialektyka negatywna*, trans. T. Krzemieniowa, PWN, Warszawa 1986, p. 86 [Unless indicated otherwise, English versions of quotations were translated from Polish]).

Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all).[4]

In other words, opinion (*Meinen*) as understood by Kant exhausts the argumentative procedure which exists in the ***theory of rhetoric***. The entire quoted passage from *The Critique of Pure Reason* indicates how instances of rhetorical reasoning transition into strictly logical reasoning. Kant's subjective sufficiency describes the fact that reasoning based on conviction (*Überzeugung*) is successful if it can convince me, and those who think like me, if you will. Yet in order to be certain, I must refer to knowledge.

Clive S. Lewis indicated that, e.g. strictly religious content is often "hidden" behind a veil of "all the licenses and all the formalities, the hyperboles, [based on] the emotional rather than logical connections."[5] In fact, those issues often resurfaced in the discussions by, e.g. researchers of rhetoric, yet they hardly triggered any other reflection than noting the fact that a creator, including a philosopher, etc., utilises such and such tropes, figures or compositional structures, including topoi.[6]

---

4   Cf. Ch. Perelman, *Rhetoriques*, *Éditions de l'Université* de *Bruxelles*, Brussels 1989, p. 67. **Perel-man** quoted the fragment from Kant's work, yet its meaning in French is somewhat different; additionally, in the translation there appears the notion of *persuasion*, while in the original there is the notion of *Überzeugung* ("conviction"). Please note that Walter Mesch discussed the problem in his article comprehensively – idem., "Überredung Überzeugung", [in:] *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Hrsg. G. Ueding, G. Kalivoda, Band 9: *St–Z*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 2009, col. 858-870.

5   C.S. Lewis, *Rozważania o Psalmach*, trans. A. Motyka, Wydawnictwo Esprit, Kraków 2011, p. 9 [English version: C.S. Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, Harper Collins, New York 1958].

6   Too many names come to mind at this point so I shall limit myself only to indicating those studies which attempted to summarise if not the entire then a considerable portion of the research into the matter. Those include: M. Fumaroli *Histoire de la rhetorique dans l'Europe moderne: 1450–1950*, P.U.F., Paris 1999; *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Bände 1–12, Niemeyer, De Gruyter, Tübingen 1992–2015; *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric*, ed. W.B. Horner, Columbia, London 1990 (more recent editions exist!); E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*, Bände 1–2, Verlag von B.G. Teubner, Leipzig 1898 (reprints and translations exist); J.Z. Lichański, *Retoryka od renesansu do współczesności – tradycja i innowacja*, DiG, Warszawa 2000, pp. 188–259 (state of research as of 2000). Some summaries were also published in such journals as: *Rhetorica*, *Rhetorik. Ein Jahrbuch*, *Forum Artis Rhetoricae*.

Finally, allow me to quote this observation by Plato, to whom, in my opinion, we continue to assign too little attention (PL., *Gorg.*, 503B): "the endeavour [of rhetoric], that is, to make the citizens' souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers." Plato only reminded us that rhetoric is inevitable in the communication process, but also in education, and that we can never avoid it – which he also indicated in *Phaedrus* when he stated that it exists both in public affairs, and in private matters, and it applies to all issues (PL., *Phaed.*, 261A–B).

Definition of the problem

Therefore, the problem is simple, as Wilhelm Windelband stated in the early 20th c:

> […] Aus Grammatik und Rhetorik sollten die rechten Regeln des Denkens geschöpft werden, und eine vorwiegend sprachliche Bildung mit ihrem ästhetischen Formalismus erklärte es für die Aufgabe des gebildeten Menschen, sachgemäß über die Dinge reden zu können [thanks to grammar and rhetoric we should learn about the proper rules of thinking; and mainly thanks to linguistic education with its aesthetic formalism they [the rules] explained that the task of educated people is to be able to talk on [various] matters in the proper manner].[7]

The quoted remark appeared at the time (or a few years prior to) of a fundamental change in the approach to, e.g. language as a tool for **describing and interpreting reality.[8]**

---

[7]   W. Windelband, "Die neuere Philosophie", [in:] *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Hrsg. W. Wundt, Teubner Verlag, Leipzig 1909, p. 389 [382–541] (*Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, t. 1.5.).

[8]   "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis", [in:] *Veröffentlichungen des Vereines Ernst Mach*, Hrsg. vom Verein E. Mach, Artur Wolf Verlag, Vienna 1929, pp. 299–332 and the following; V. Kraft, *Der Wiener Kreis. Der Ursprung des Neopositivismus. Ein Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte*, Springer Verlag, Vienna 1990, pp. 21–77 and the following; T. Milewski, *Zarys językoznawstwa ogólnego*, part 1: *Teoria językoznawstwa*, Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze, Lublin–Warszawa 1947; B. Malmberg, *Nowe drogi w językoznawstwie. Przegląd szkół i metod*, trans. A. Szulc, PWN, Warszawa 1969; *Języki indoeuropejskie*, L Bednarczuk (ed.), vol. 1–2, PWN, Warszawa 1988. It is also worth mentioning the Vienna Circle (*Der Wiener Kreis*) which focussed on, among other things, the issues of language, as indicated by the studies by, e.g. Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein, cf. *Wissenschaftliche...*, pp. 299–332 and the following; V. Kraft, *op. cit*. I should probably also mention the seminal works by Ferdinand de Saussure, and Charles C. Pierce – cf. F. de Saussure, *Zametki po obszczej lingvistike*, trans. B.P. Narumov, commentary by N.A. Sljusarrva, Izdatel'stwo Progress, Moscow 1990; Peirce's views discussed after: M. Bergman, *The Secret of Rendering Signs Effective: the Import of C.S. Peirce's Semiotic Rhetoric*, 2017, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/renderingsigns.pdf [accessed on: 20.12.2018]

The problem, as I presented it above, could be summarised in the following hypothesis: **thanks to rhetoric we are able to not only prepare any given texts, but also analyse the thoughts which caused the text to be formed.**

Analysis

In order to verify the above hypothesis, I must refer to the remark of Wolfram Ax regarding the division of every expression into two spheres: *lexis* and *dianoia*.[9] The first one is the somewhat "empty" grammatical structure of an expression, while the other is the thought one "inserts" into that "empty" structure. Allow me to use the invocation from Virgil's *Aeneid*:[10]

> Arma virumque canō, Trōiae quī prīmus ab orīs
> Ītaliam, **fātō profugus**, Lāvīniaque vēnit
> lītora, multum ille et terrīs iactātus et altō
> vī superum saevae memorem Iūnōnis ob īram;
> multa quoque et bellō passūs, dum conderet urbem,   5
> inferretque deōs Latiō, genus unde Latīnum,
> Albānīque patrēs, atque altae moenia Rōmae.
> Mūsa, mihī causās memorā, quō nūmine laesō,
> quidve dolēns, rēgīna deum tot volvere cāsūs
> **īnsīgnem pietāte virum, tot labōrēs**   10
> impulerit. Tantaene animīs caelestibus īrae [emphasis J.Z.L.]?

Description and analysis

The literal layer, sometimes referred to as historical, is, or rather was for Virgil's contemporaries, the truth. The fact that for us it is no longer the truth is irrelevant for studying the work; moreover, it is also irrelevant for the problem I am analysing. Therefore, a problem arises when one moves to the matters of allegorical-mystical and moral meanings. The first problem one faces is the expression: *fato profugus* (*exiled by fate*).[11] The other is related to epistemological and ontological

---

and V. Colapietro, "C.S. Peirce's Rhetorical Turn", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 2007, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 16–52 (NB, access to the legacy of Ch.C. Pierce in Poland is not easy, and editors are only starting to consistently study and publish his surviving works).

9   W. Ax, *Lexis und Logos. Studien zur antiken Grammatik und Rhetorik*, Hrsg. F. Grewing, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 54–55 and the following; J.Z. Lichański, *Filologia – Filozofia – Retoryka. **Wprowadzenie do badań** (nie tylko) literatury popularnej*, DiG, Warszawa 2017, pp. 18–22.

10 Cf. http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/vergil/aen1.shtml [accessed on: 27.07.2017]. As a more complete analysis was published elsewhere, I shall present only some of the conclusions.

11 There appears the problem of the well-known motto. In Loeb's English edition, the expression appears as: *exiled by fate*, cf. https://www.loebclassics.com/view/virgil-aeneid/1916/pb_LCL063.263.xml [accessed on: 28.07.2018]. Therefore, was Aeneas an *exile* (as intended by Fate) or did *Fate exile*

matters: one applies to the *trials sent onto the righteous man*,[12] and the other, i.e. is the ire of gods, or rather *is ire befitting of gods*.

Yet do deep theological and philosophical matters translate well into images? Can it be done through **association**, through **secondary modelling systems**, or maybe in some other way? Please note that non-fictional content, abstract possibly, once transformed into images, acquire, unfortunately, additional meanings. And those meanings may be completely detached from the content which one wishes to convey.[13]

Roman Ingarden did warn us:[14]

[...] **values** are supposed to be "subjective" in the sense that they are **truly not assigned** to objects of various kinds (items, **works of art**, people, modes of operation, e.g. moral acts, logical creations, e.g. theories), but **they constitute some illusions or fictions of individual people who assign them for various reasons to various items so that it appears as if the items truly were entitled to those** [emphasis J.Z.L.].[15]

---

him, sentencing him to *wandering*? The question is reasonable, cf. J. Henry, *Aeneidea*, Vol. 1, London 1873, pp. 123–130 (repr. G. Olms Vlg., 1969). The author indicated that the grammatical structure in Latin enables both readings. That reading can be found in Herman Broch's work *Der Tod des Vergil* (Death of Virgil). He wrote: "Hastened by fate, I could not become him [guide] myself, not to mention for others. Yet wherever you got thrust, you had always showed the way." (idem., *Death of Virgil*, trans. M. Kurecka, W. Wirpsza, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 1993, p. 338). In the original version, the passage was stronger: "Getrieben und schicksalgetrieben, war ich mir selber kaum Führer, geschwiege für andere. Wohin's dich auch immer getrieben, immer war's Weg, den du wieset" (idem., *Der Tod des Vergil*, DTV, Munich 1965, p. 253).

12 It resembles the problem that appeared in the *Book of Job*. Therefore, it is not only a question posed by Virgil, but a more serious problem.

13 In other words: at the *inventio* stage one knows they wish to express that content in a work, yet at the *elocutio* stage one has to find lexical equivalents, which inevitably may change the meaning of a text, e.g. by using tropes and figures which in turn are surely going to be read somewhat differently by different recipients, cf. notes 11 and 12.

14 During a discussion it was pointed out to me that Roman Ingarden supposedly assumed the objective (=non-subjective) nature of value; however, as was indicated by the philosopher himself and by his researchers, "[...] value [...] is a classification of the quality of an object [...] Aesthetic values emerge as classifications of aesthetic objects being the specifications of works of art dominant in specific acts of perception [...] Moral values are also determined in quality terms, yet they represent a quite different type of value; they are, too, independent, yet they require a different carrier. That carrier is a person being a conscious entity" (J. Makota, "Wartości estetyczne a wartości moralne w filozofii Romana Ingardena", *Etyka* 1988, issue 22, pp. 184, 185). In her continued discussion the author emphasised that the ontological and epistemological status of value in Ingarden's philosophy was unclear as the philosopher himself "[...] mentioned in passing the need to seek out some intermediary mode of [value's] existence (between real existence and purely intentional existence)" (cf. ibid., p. 191).

15 R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2017, p. 106.

Ingarden indicated a problem which is normally glossed over, i.e. what the nature of the values which apply to works of art is. However, before addressing this issue, one must pose a much more important question: are works of art entitled to any values per se? Is not actually the case, as Ingarden used to say, that those values are *subjective,* as they emerge in the process of reception?[16] A part of the problem was clarified by Henryk Elzenberg when he indicated that "[…] an image, under certain circumstances, enables the definition of a perfectly specific quality in a completely equal manner or with a higher approximation than a term."[17] Ingarden was extremely accurate in indicating the manner in which a creator links abstract and philosophical content with strictly linguistic problems. Of course, one must, in that case, describe the mode of "making" a literary image. Yet that is relatively simple as, e.g. some help is offered by the description of the elocutionary sphere of a work of literary art, including tropes, figures, and the style and its harmony. One could also use the study of W.A. Zariecki, who offered probably the most comprehensive discussion of the problem of literary images.[18] His general thesis was that **the meaning of a literary image** somewhat "grows" or "undergoes a constant transformation" as it is being read, when one receives new details.[19]

Please note that if any graphic form (I understand that notion broadly, to cover both photography and "motion pictures"[20]) is the dominant element, then there also exist other stimuli apart from those indicated by Ingarden, Elzenberg, and Zariecki. In the most general terms, I would define them as associations; those, in turn, constitute a **recipient's individual decisions**.[21]

Therefore, in the process of reception, there exists – and this is a trivial conclusion – a strong dependency between the **understanding of the content of a message** and not only the **individual decisions of a recipient** but **also their compe-**

---

16 An interesting approach to the matter was provided by Max Scheller, who discussed the fact of the creation of a "false reality" as, e.g. one indicates the subjective perception/experiencing of reality as its objective description, cf. M. Scheller, *Resentyment a moralność*, trans. J. Garewicz, PWN, Warszawa 1977, p. 81 and the following; also J. Tischner, *Etyka a historia. Wykłady*, foreword, edition by D. Kot, Instytut J. Tischnera, Kraków 2008, pp. 469–470, 479.

17 H. Elzenberg, *Pisma estetyczne*, editing and foreword by L. Hostyński, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 1999, p. 130.

18 W.A. Zariecki, "Obraz jako informacja", trans. L. Suchanek, *Pamiętnik Literacki* 1969, Year 60, col. 1, pp. 257–278.

19 I believe that suggestion could be expanded to apply to any work of art, possibly a cultural text, yet it is only a suggestion and the problem should be verified.

20 A notion of Terry Pratchett.

21 S. Skwarczyńska, "Językowa teoria asocjacji w zastosowaniu do badań literackich". [in:] idem., *Studia i szkice literackie*, IW PAX, Warszawa 1953, pp. 303–333.

tences. At this point, it is worth mentioning Yuri M. Lotman, who addressed the issue of whether and how recipients "decode" the meanings of messages.[22]

Finally, the time has come to consider **rhetoric** as a research tool. Some help comes from the studies of Sonja K. Foss, in particular her concise 1989 study. She explained:

> [...] the aim is to teach students how to think rhetorically–i.e. ask questions on the nature and function of symbols. The course is designed around on three major questions which students/critics are likely to ask: "What is the relationship between rhetoric and its context?", "How does a message construct a specific reality for the audience and the speaker?", and "What does rhetoric suggest about the rhetor?"[23]

As Foss continued: "[...] the questions are posed to develop knowledge on the rhetorical process: 'The study and the evaluation of rhetoric acts and artifacts in order to understand rhetorical processes.'"[24] In other words, the object of the analysis is both the rhetorical act itself and the artifacts (those could be literary texts, public presentations, advertisements, films, architecture, statues, etc.): generally speaking, as Burke wrote, symbols which we use throughout our lives.

Allow me to proceed to the description of the method proposed by Sonja K. Foss:

> One question emphasizes the context or the environment that spawned the rhetorical artifact: "What is the relationship between rhetoric and its context?" The relationship between a rhetorical artifact and its context is, of course, the subject of the continuing debate in the speech communication field. Some critics believed that contexts or situations call rhetoric into existencs, while others believe that the existencs of situation and how they are defined depend on the perspectives of the individuals involved. A middle view holds that the situation does not control the response of the rhetor, but neither is the rhetor free to create a situation at will.[25]

─────

22 J.M. Łotman, *Struktura chudożestvennogo teksta*, Moscow 1970 (Polish translation *Struktura tekstu artystycznego*, trans. A. Tanalska, PIW, Warszawa 1984); idem., *Uniwersum umysłu. Semiotyczna teoria kultury*, trans. B. Żyłko, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2008). I am omitting the fact that a creator/creators of films/games/comics may be "convincing for the convinced"; for other recipients the intentions of the creators may be unclear. Though the reception of Ingmar Berman's films (e.g. *Wild Strawberries* and *Seventh Seal*) seems to somewhat contradict that, I would consider it a mere exception proving the rule.

23 S.K. Foss, *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights IL. 1989, pp. 191–196.

24 Cf., ibid., p. 5.

25 Ibid., p. 92.

Therefore, the item one should define first is the context or rather the circumstances in which a rhetorical expression emerges or which impact(s) the subject of the debate. That item, clearly identified, constitutes the centre of communicative process.

In this specific example, the impact of the author on that which they present is both minor and not minor. That is because the author poses philosophical and theological questions. It is not because actually Aeneas' fate was nothing to be envious of: he lost his homeland, he wandered the seas, he met a woman with whom he fell in love, or so he thought, and, finally, he had to abandon his apparent stability to continue his search of a new homeland. Please note that the described situation assumed that the influence of the gods on human fate is obvious and not subject to debate; moreover, it was the gods who defined the direction of human life, whether people like it or not, cf. *Si gua fata sinant* […] *sic volvere Parcas* (VERG., *A.*, I.22, 26). But should one **show** that? We have become too secularised to simply accept that suggestion as an obvious and true judgement!

The second question is important:

> The second question covered in the course is: "How does a message construct a particular reality for the audience and the rhetor?" Here the critic's primary focus is on the message and on what happens within the message so that it generates a particular world view, reality, or perspectives for those in those involved with it.[26]

Foss stressed the vital problem of **the impact of an expression on the perception and interpretation of the world** both by a speaker and the audience. Plato's remark that Homer was the educator of Hellas was an excellent example of this, as it indicated that through Homer's works people organised their world and defined their place in it.[27]

This results from the obvious fact indicated by Burke when he spoke of the relationship between the meaning of, e.g. words and persuasion.

Finally, the third question:

> In some instances, the critic is interested primarily in the personal dimension of the artifact or in the artifact as an expression of its rhetor. Such a focus on the

---

[26]   Ibid., p. 192.

[27]   That also applied to the discussed example. Virgil referred to the perception and interpretation of reality common in his time. At the same time, the questions the poet posed were no "decorations"; those were, surely, questions posed by regular Romans. Since I am religious, etc., why do the gods keep burdening me with such difficult tasks? An interesting attempt at answering (from the perspective of a pious Roman) a slightly differently phrased question was offered by Steven Saylor, e.g. in the novel *Wrath of the Furies*.

rhetor is guided by the question: "What does a rhetorical artifact suggest about the rhetor?" The critic who is interested in the artifact as reflective of its rhetor generally seeks to discover how rhetors perceive and interpret the world, what their inner life, and how their perspectives motivate them to act as they do; rhetor's symbol use provides clues to help answer these questions.[28]

This issue is particularly important, and an excellent example of such an analysis is Burke's famous analysis of *Mein Kampf*.[29] Such an analysis enables one to present or rather reveal the true intentions of a speaker who even in a seemingly objective expression includes some more or less hidden thoughts, which they intend to convey to the audience. Therefore, did Virgil somehow "present" himself in the quoted fragment? Yes, as he became a prophet, as suggested by Horace in Ode 3.1 (*Odi profanum vulgus*), and by Plato before that in the Apology of Socrates, where he suggested that "sometimes a god enters a poet" (PL., *Apology* 22C). The questions in the *Invocation* suggested that the epic poem would also include answers to those questions; because it was never finished, those questions have remained without unequivocal answers.

However, did the indicated example, or examples, indicate a path to understanding the hypothesis stated in the title? I believe so. In fact, the earlier remarks and mainly the proceedings indicated by rhetorical criticism enable one to "transcend the veil of words."[30]

The problem which the theory of rhetoric tries to solve is the "translation" of thoughts into words, into syntactical constructs, into tropes and figures, topoi, and a comprehensive whole. The fifth volume by Quintilian indicates how that "translation" occurs (QUINT., V, *passim*).[31] However, it is worth "reading" Quintilian through Lewis and Lotman;[32] then one acquires the answer to the title hypothesis. Thus, a thought (*dianoia*), which is "inserted" by a creator into "empty" grammatical structures of an expression being prepared, is always determined by

---

28 Ibid., p. 194.

29 Cf. K. Burke, "Retoryka Mein Kampf", [in:] *Nowa Krytyka. Antologia*, selection H. Krzeczkowski, trans. M. Szpakowska, PIW, Warszawa 1983, pp. 344–377 (it is a chapter of Burke's book, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, The University of California Press, Berkeley et al. 1973, pp. 191–220).

30 Kenneth Burke had a very similar approach to those matters, yet, as I believe, he did not formulate such categorical conclusions, cf. K. Burke, "Lexicon Rhetoricae", [in:] *Critiques and Essays in Criticism, 1920–1948*, selected by R.W. Stallmann, New York 1949, pp. 234–240 (Polish translation in: *Teoria badań literackich za granicą*, S. Skwarczyńska (ed.), vol. 2, part 2, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1981, pp. 606–627).

31 S. Śnieżewski, *Terminologia retoryczna w Institutio Oratoria Kwintyliana*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2014, pp. 113–147.

32 J.M. Łotman, *Struktura...*, *op. cit.*; idem., *Uniwersum umysłu...*, *op. cit.*; C.S. Lewis, *Rozważania o...*, *op. cit.*

---

those elements which were indicated by Lotman, and Lewis (and many others, e.g. R.E. Curtius) in their studies. The rhetorical analysis of expression enables one to indicate those determining factors; I presented this in the study of *Niobe* by Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński, and in the volume *Filologia – Filozofia – Retoryka*.[33]

Conclusions and discussion

The conclusions are obvious (they conclude the previous chapter of the study), yet has the hypothesis truly been verified? I could try and avoid answering that by indicating, e.g. the detailed studies of similar problems which can be found in the works of, e.g. Barbara Bogołębska.[34] However, that would not constitute a complete answer as those studies confirmed only the accuracy of the application of rhetorical tools in analysing various expressions, including artistic ones. They did not offer an answer to the posed question as that was not Bogołębska's task.

It is by the theory of rhetoric that one **shapes an expression, by using the rhetorical tools of that image**. Yet the operation can be "reversed." A speaker or, more generally, a creator of any text cannot hide their intentions; they may make it extremely difficult to read them (consider the rather obvious example of *Finnegan's Wake* by James Joyce), yet provided that one knows the language system in which the text was written and they are familiar with culture codes,[35] the intentions behind a text can always be read. Today, in fact, it is so much easier as we know much about the expectations of recipients, about their perceptions of the world, about the conventions of both creating and receiving text, etc.

The conclusion is clear: rhetoric offers the tools not only for creating and analysing texts, but also for describing the thoughts which lay at the foundation of those texts. In fact, if one correctly reads the remarks by Aristotle and Quintilian, and the study by Leonhard von Spengl, the above conclusion becomes ob-

---

33   J.Z. Lichański, "*Niobe* Konstantego Ildefonsa Gałczyńskiego: 'Ty jesteś moja światłość świata...'", Universitas, Kraków 2015; idem., *Filologia...*, *op. cit.*

34   B. Bogołębska, *Studia o stylistyce i retoryce*, Studia Graf, Zgierz 2001; idem., *Od tradycji do nowatorstwa, od transgresji do adaptacji na wybranych przykładach literackich i publicystycznych*, Primum Verbum, Łódź 2013; idem., *Retoryka, genologia i stylistyka tekstów literackich i dziennikarskich*, Primum Verbum, Łódź 2015. Cf. also *Forum Artis Rhetoricae* 2015, 3 (42), pp. 53–61, which offers prof. Bogołębska's complete bibliography.

35   I made this reservation to avoid the accusation that texts composed using the linear A writing system disprove my argumentation; I would like to indicate a study devoted to reading hieroglyphics, where the author discussed how Champollion read hieroglyphics as apart from "reading" the signs of the language, he also "read" the culture in which the language existed, cf. D. Meyerson, *Tajemnica hieroglifów. Champollion, Napoleon i odczytanie Kamienia z Rosetty*, trans. M. Witkowska, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2015.

vious (ARIST., *rhet.*, I.1354a1-3; 1355b26-27; QUINT., V.10.54).[36] It is also worth adding this remark by Aristotle from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (ARIST., *eth.nic.*, I.3.1094b23-30):

> In the same spirit, therefore, each type of statement should be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Therefore, the attitude of a speaker, or an author, should be based on ethics. Without it our thoughts (and, in turn, our speech) will be devoid of any major value; they will be mere chaff and insults to the gods.

Bibliography

Adorno T.W., *Dialektyka negatywna*, trans. T. Krzemieniowa, PWN, Warszawa 1986.

Ax W., *Lexis und Logos. Studien zur antiken Grammatik und Rhetorik*, Hrsg. F. Grewing, Stuttgart 2000.

Bogołębska B., *Od tradycji do nowatorstwa, od transgresji do adaptacji na wybranych przykładach literackich i publicystycznych*, Primum Verbum, Łódź 2013.

Bogołębska B., *Retoryka, genologia i stylistyka tekstów literackich i dziennikarskich*, Primum Verbum, Łódź 2015.

Bogołębska B., *Studia o stylistyce i retoryce*, Studia Graf, Zgierz 2001.

Broch H., *Der Tod des Vergil*, DTV, Munich 1965.

Broch H., *Śmierć Wergilego*, trans. M. Kurecka, W. Wirpsza, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 1993.

Burke K., "Lexicon Rhetoricae", [in:] *Critiques and Essays in Criticism, 1920–1948*, selected by R.W. Stallmann, New York 1949, pp. 234–240 (Polish translation in: *Teoria badań literackich za granicą*, S. Skwarczyńska (ed.), vol. 2, part 2, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1981, pp. 606–627).

Burke K., "Retoryka Mein Kampf", [in:] *Nowa Krytyka. Antologia*, selection H. Krzeczkowski, trans. M. Szpakowska, PIW, Warszawa 1983, pp. 344–377 (it is a chapter of Burke's book, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, The University of California Press, Berkeley et al. 1973, pp. 191–220).

Colapietro V., "C.S. Peirce's Rhetorical Turn", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 2007, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 16–52.

---

[36] L. von Spengel, "Die Definiton und Eintheilung der Rhetorik bei der Alten", *Rheinisches Museum für klassischen Philologie* 1863, vol. 18, pp. 481–526.

de Saussure F., *Zamietki po obszczej lingvistike*, trans. B.P. Narumov, commentary by N.A. Sljusarrva, Izdatel'stwo Progress, Moscow 1990.

Elzenberg H., *Pisma estetyczne*, editing and foreword by L. Hostyński, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 1999.

Forum Artis Rhetoricae 2015, no. 3(42).

Foss S.K., *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights IL. 1989.

Fumaroli M., *Histoire de la rhetorique dans l'Europe moderne: 1450–1950*, P.U.F., Paris 1999.

Henry J., *Aeneidea*, vol. 1, London 1873 (repr. G. Olms Vlg., 1969).

Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, Bände 1–12, Niemeyer, De Gruyter, Tübingen 1992–2015.

Ingarden R., *Książeczka o człowieku*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2017.

Języki indoeuropejskie, L Bednarczuk (ed.), vol. 1–2, PWN, Warszawa 1988.

Kraft V., *Der Wiener Kreis. Der Ursprung des Neopositivismus. Ein Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte*, Springer Verlag, Vienna 1990.

Lewis C.S., *Rozważania o Psalmach*, trans. A. Motyka, Wydawnictwo Esprit, Kraków 2011.

Lichański J.Z., *Filologia – Filozofia – Retoryka. Wprowadzenie do badań (nie tylko) literatury popularnej*, DiG, Warszawa 2017.

Lichański J.Z., "*Niobe* Konstantego Ildefonsa Gałczyńskiego: 'Ty jesteś moja światłość świata…'", Universitas, Kraków 2015.

Lichański J.Z., *Retoryka od renesansu do współczesności – tradycja i innowacja*, DiG, Warszawa 2000.

Lotman J.M., *Struktura chudożestvennogo teksta*, Moscow 1970 (translation into Polish *Struktura tekstu artystycznego*, trans. A. Tanalska, PIW, Warszawa 1984).

Lotman J.M., *Uniwersum umysłu. Semiotyczna teoria kultury*, trans. B. Żyłko, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2008.

Makota J., "Wartości estetyczne a wartości moralne w filozofii Romana Ingardena", *Etyka* 1988, issue 22, pp. 183–194.

Malmberg B., *Nowe drogi w językoznawstwie. Przegląd szkół i metod*, trans. A. Szulc, PWN, Warszawa 1969.

Mesch W., "Überredung Überzeugung", [in:] *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Hrsg. G. Ueding, G. Kalivoda, Band 9: *St–Z*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 2009, col. 858–870.

Meyerson D., *Tajemnica hieroglifów. Champollion, Napoleon i odczytanie Kamienia z Rosetty*, trans. M. Witkowska, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2015.

Milewski T., *Zarys językoznawstwa ogólnego*, part 1: *Teoria językoznawstwa*, Towarzystwo Ludoznawcze, Lublin–Warszawa 1947.

Norden E., *Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*, Bände 1–2, Verlag von B.G. Teubner, Leipzig 1898.

Perelman, *Rhetoriques*, *Éditions de l'Université* de *Bruxelles*, Brussels 1989.

Pratchett T., *Carpe Jugulum*, trans. P.W. Cholewa, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2015.

Scheller M., *Resentyment a moralność*, trans. J. Garewicz, PWN, Warszawa 1977.

Skwarczyńska S., "Językowa teoria asocjacji w zastosowaniu do badań literackich". [in:] idem., *Studia i szkice literackie*, IW PAX, Warszawa 1953, pp. 303–333.

Śnieżewski S., *Terminologia retoryczna w Institutio Oratori*a *Kwintyliana*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2014.

The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric, ed. W.B. Horner, Columbia, London 1990.

Tischner J., *Etyka a historia. Wykłady*, foreword, edition by D. Kot, Instytut J. Tischnera, Kraków 2008.

von Spengel L., "Die Definiton und Eintheilung der Rhetorik bei der Alten", *Rheinisches Museum für klassischen Philologie* 1863, vol. 18, pp. 481–526.

Windelband W., "Die neuere Philosophie", [in:] *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Hrsg. W. Wundt, Teubner Verlag, Leipzig 1909, pp. 382–541.

Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, [in:] *Veröffentlichungen des Vereines Ernst Mach*, Hrsg. vom Verein E. Mach, Artur Wolf Verlag, Wien 1929, pp. 299–332.

Zariecki W.A., "Obraz jako informacja", trans. L. Suchanek, *Pamiętnik Literacki* 1969, Year 60, col. 1, pp. 34–56.

Sources

ARIST., *eth.nic.* – Aristotle, *Etyka nikomachejska*, trans. D. Gromska, PWN, Warszawa 1955 (also: PWN, Warszawa 2007).

ARIST., *rhet.* – Aristotle, *Retoryka*, trans. and editing by H Podbielski, PWN, Warszawa 1988.

Kant 1957 – Kant I., *Krytyka czystego rozumu*, trans., introduction and notes R. Ingarden, vol. 2, PWN, Warszawa.

Kant 1971 – Kant I., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hrsg. R. Schmidt, Sachregister Theodor Valentiner, Reclam Verlag., 4th edition as per 1930 edition, Leipzig.

PL., *apol. Socr.* – Plato, *Obrona Sokratesa*, trans. W. Witwicki, PWN, Warszawa 1956.

PL., *gorg.* – Plato, *Gorgiasz*, trans. W. Witwicki, PWN, Warszawa 1958.

PL., *phaed.* – Plato, *Fajdros*, trans. W. Witwicki, PWN, Warszawa 1958.

QUINT. – Quintilianus, Marcus Fabius, *Institutione Oratoriae*, ed. L. Radermacher, vol. 1–2, Teubner Verlag, Lipsiae (translation into Polish: Kwintylian, *Kształcenie mówcy (ks. I, II, XII)*, trans. M. Brożek, Ossolineum, Wrocław; Kwintylian, *Kształcenie mówcy*, trans. S. Śnieżewski, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2012).

VERG., *A.* – Wergili, *Eneida*, vol. 1 (any edition).

Internet resources

Bergman M., *The Secret of Rendering Signs Effective: the Import of C. S. Peirce's Semiotic Rhetoric*, 2017, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/rendering-signs.pdf [accessed on: 20.12.2018].

http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/vergil/aen1.shtml [accessed on: 27.07.2017].

https://www.loebclassics.com/view/virgil-aeneid/1916/pb_LCL063.263.xml [accessed on: 28.07.2018].

Jakub Z. Lichański

Retoryka jak narzędzie badania naszych myśli: czym jest *téchne rhetoriké*?

Streszczenie

Retoryka jest nie tylko metodologią nauk humanistycznych; jest najważniejszą z nauk, jaką zostawili nam antyczni myśliciele. Określa ona nie tylko metody argumentacji z przesłanek niepewnych, jest nie tylko teorią tekstu, ale przede wszystkim – jest narzędziem do organizowania naszych myśli i przygotowywania tekstów, których celem ma być przekonywanie, ale tak, aby *uzyskać wiedzę* a nie *mniemanie* (Kant).

Jednakże jak wiemy, język, którym się posługujemy, jest niezwykle zawodny. Ostrzegali przed tym i Platon, i Arystoteles. Zarazem oni zbudowali podwaliny *téchne rhetoriké*, której kształt systemowy zawdzięczamy Kwintylianowi. Retoryka – jak twierdzili jej zarówno antyczni, jak i współcześni badacze – nie jest *słownikiem chwytów* (Volkmann); jest raczej *analogonem logiki* (Volkmann). Jak powiada Wilhelm Windelband, „dzięki gramatyce i retoryce poznaliśmy prawidłowe reguły myślenia".

Autor sięga nie tylko do tradycji badań nad retoryką, ale i nad językiem, głównie odnosząc się do tradycji Koła wiedeńskiego (*Der Wiener Kreis*). Acz dorobek współczesnego językoznawstwa, a także współczesnych badań nad filozoficznymi podstawami badań nad językiem będą uwzględnione, to jednak perspektywa zarówno wyznaczona przez Immanuela Kanta, jak i badaczy z kręgu *Der Wiener Kreis* jest dominująca.

Celem niniejszego studium jest nie tylko przypomnienie tezy Windelbanda, ale i jej pełniejsze dowiedzenie.

Słowa kluczowe: retoryka, język, językoznawstwo, metodologia nauk, M.F. Quintilianus, W.C. Booth, I. Kant, R.E. Volkmann, W. Windelband, der Wiener Kreis.

Rhetoric as a Tool for Studying Our Thoughts: What is *Téchne Rhetoriké*?

S u m m a r y

Rhetoric is not only a methodology of the humanities. It is the most important of the sciences the ancient thinkers left us. It defines not only the methods of argumentation from uncertain premises, and not only is it a theory of text, but most of all it is a tool for organising our thoughts and preparing texts, the aim of which is to convince, but in a way which ensures knowledge and not opinion (Kant).

However, the language that we use often fails us. Both Plato and Aristotle warned us about this. At the same time, they developed the foundations for *téchne rhetoriké*, the systemic shape of which we owe to Quintilian. Rhetoric, as posited by its ancient as well as contemporary researchers, is not a *lexicon of gimmicks* (Volkmann). It is rather an *analogue of logic* (Volkmann). As Wilhelm Windelband said: "thanks to grammar and rhetoric we have learnt the correct rules of thinking."

The author discusses not only the history of the studies of rhetoric, but also of language, mainly referring to the traditions of the Vienna Circle (*Der Wiener Kreis*). Though the achievements of contemporary linguistics and the contemporary studies on the philosophical foundations of linguistic studies are considered, the perspectives defined by Immanuel Kant and the researchers from the Vienna Circle are dominant. The aim of this study was not only to reiterate Windelband's thesis, but also to verify it more comprehensively.

Keywords: rhetoric, language, linguistics, science metgodology, M.F. Quintilian, W.C. Booth, I. Kant, R.E. Volkmann, W. Windelband, der Wiener Kreis.

Jakub Zdzisław Lichański – professor, specialist in philosophical sciences (Polish philology, history of literature, popular literature and culture, history, theory and practice of rhetoric). Major publications: *Retoryka od średniowiecza do baroku. Teoria i praktyka* (1992), *Łukasz Górnicki – Sarmacki Castiglione* (1998), *Retoryka od renesansu do współczesności – tradycja i innowacja* (2000), *Opowiadania J.R.R. Tolkiena o krawędzi epok i czasów* (2003), *Retoryka. Historia – teoria – praktyka* (2007), *"Niobe" K.I. Gałczyńskiego* (2015), *Filologia – Filozofia – Retoryka. O narzędziach badań (nie tylko) literatury popularnej* (2017), *Niepopularnie o popularnej. O narzędziach badań literatury* (2018). Editor of volumes: *Od Oświecenia ku Romantyzmowi. Kultura polska ok. 1800* (1996), *J.R.R. Tolkien: recepcja polska* (1996), *Retoryka i badania literackie* (1998), *Retoryka i krytyka retoryczna: kompendium retoryczne* (2012). Author of many papers published in, e.g.

Literatura i Kultura Popularna, and in the collected volumes of the *Fantastyczność i cudowność* (Zielona Góra, Poznań) and *POPKultura – POPLiteratura* (Uniwersytet Wrocławski) series. One of the authors of the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* group. Member of the Polish Philosophical Association, Association of the Friends of History, International Society for the History of Rhetoric, editor-in-chief of *Forum Artis Rhetoricae*. Vide also Wikipedia entry (Jakub Z. Lichański).