hat Nietzsche’s philosophy should be interpreted not as just a new philosophy among others, but also a philosophy of a “new type”, makes certainly a problem. In the case of a “political” philosophy, our “natural” innervations are looking toward a system, if not just toward a holistic philosophical system, from which then the “subsystem politics” should derive without any difficulty. In the case of not only non-systematical, but a-, if not just anti-systematical philosophy, the task to reconstruct the politics appears differently.1

The more intense we study the hermeneutics of Nietzsche’s politically implemented philosophical perspectives, the stronger will be our insight that Nietzsche’s political philosophy is not only worth a correct and total reconstruction, but can also renew our concept of the evolution of the political thought as well as contribute, at the same time, immediately to the intellectual solution of a range of new theoretical problems.

Why might it have not been so for long, we can on the one hand give a response, while another deeper dimension of the answer is not yet guaranteed at all by new and adequate researches. Without a doubt, it is clear that the possibility of this new view immediately depends on a specific “dialectics of the compromise (Kompromittierung)”, on the “compromise of the compromise”, on Alfred Bauemler’s and Georg Lukács’ intellectual and moral disqualification.2 For a re-

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searcher, such as the author of these lines, the acts and diverse manipulations of Nietzsche’s unique compromise (*Kompromittierung*), in which, by the way, the peculiar thesis of the “social fascism” fully proved itself in an intellectual point of view, were a well known everyday experiment.

The disappearance of the moments of suspicion, always present and poked by the political apparatus against Nietzsche, began a new start. It is more complicated with the other and deeper level of this questioning. Namely, why were we not in a position to recognize and reconstruct Nietzsche’s “real” political philosophy also during the supremacy of Bauemler’s and Lukács’ global promise? On a deeper level, this question leads to systematically hermeneutical problems of principles.

It is above all about the structural position of the unique fundamental enunciations as well in Lukács as also in Bauemler, which have also radiated on the purely hermeneutical levels lying also beyond the politics, so that they allowed, in the true sense of the word, “hermeneutically” no possibility or no hermeneutical space to manifest any political questionings *independently* of the totalitarian options.

The challenge of the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s political philosophy, outgrown from the fundamental and general perspectivism of this philosophy, becomes only much greater, if we necessary realize the today concrete assessment of the diverse philosophical aspects. It namely becomes clear that, while some philosophical perspectives are already today the basis of diverse new paradigms, other philosophical perspectives are still occurring up to now either as amazingly new or in other cases as banal.³

The systematical location of Nietzsche’s reconstructed political philosophy generates new fundamental theoretical problems. The approach of the political philosophies is generally two-fold. One part thematizes essentially the problematic of the *constitution*, or questions of the other possible integrating institutions of the political community, or of their regulation. Another part of the political philosophies thematizes *against* the problematic of the *power* as focus of all theoretical problems of democracy. (The sketched dual typology could be completed, according to expectations, by the mediatized third type of the political philosophies, namely by the fully elaborated theories of the treaties which, according to expectations, are mediatizing between the *democratical-theoretical* and the *power-oriented* types also objectively and historically).

Nietzsche is now regarded first effectively as a political philosopher, who is interested, within the objective complex of the politics, above all in the widely understood problematic of the power. And thus, Nietzsche’s participation in the greatest groups of the typology of the political philosophy apparently comes already to its end.

In my paper I attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche, just as much rightly, has to be taken into consideration also for the democracy-theoretical type. Thus, through the fact that his political thought has been effectively concentrated on the problematic of power, Nietzsche represents a very rare mixture and synthesis between both types. For it is in fact rare amongst the pertinent representatives of the political philosophy that their interest could be balanced that way.4

Friedrich Nietzsche appears as a political philosopher, that primarily considers the political field as a core problematic of the political power, that can however conceive the present form of existence of the power in the Modern Age only in the framework of the democratic institutions.

“Europe’s democratization” is inexorable,5 enunciates his deepest and determining vision, that largely defines his attitude. Already now, the similarity has to be pointed out, that consists in the described character of this enunciation and in that of the sentence “God is dead”. Here, we however do not want to affirm any deeper correspondence between both enunciations “God is dead” or “the democratization is inexorable”, which would open in principle the possibility of multiple interpretations. It is only about the similarity in the attitude of the philosopher in both of these broadest problems of his world-historical time. In the realization of the fundamental similarity in the attitude, the interpretation between Nietzsche’s own initiatives and the facts he barely perceived, can make the right choice.

Nietzsche’s insight in the process of Europe’s inexorable democratization obviously corresponds to a large range of important historical facts and turns, that constitute the European history (which is, in this period, still essentially identical with the world history). We find however, also in the treatment of universally known European facts, some singular qualities of the Nietzschean thought.


The most important Nietzschean train and also most constitutive in the theory formation is a temporal train. His knowledge in the inexorable democratization occurs at a time when the revolutions in Europe are not just *not* achieving their objective, but also when operating and occasional even successful *non-democratic* political establishments are arriving on the scene. Exactly this time is characterized almost by a mastership of the *limitation* and *reduction* of democratic institutions (we have to mention Napoleon III or even Bismarck’s foundation of German Empire). Regarding the thesis of Europe inexorable democratization, Nietzsche showed *more intellectual imagination* than it would have been necessary earlier in any historical period.6

This also means, simultaneously, that Friedrich Nietzsche testifies, in this context, a theoretically generalized, nevertheless non-ideological view of the history. The question occurs immediately, whether Nietzsche cannot be conceived in many references precisely as the articulation of a new paradigm. For directly the aphorism 450 in *Human, All Too Human* “new and old concept of government” borders on the old paradigm and points in the direction of a new one. Here, Nietzsche debates of the change caused in the “government” “by the influence of the prevailing constitutional form of government”, i.e. generally in the ruling power exercise, of democratic or pre-democratic provenance. Nietzsche confronts the old and new modes of government” (i.e. of the “democratic power exercise”).

No doubt that Nietzsche describes here the characteristics of the specifically democratic exercise of the power directly from two different perspectives with a permanent validity. On the one hand, he points out the end of the bipolar structure of the “above” and of the “below”, which also saved up to the later times a leading, however outdated pertinence in the political consciousness. When critically eliminating an archaic idea or perception of the political reproduction, Nietzsche describes also a new phenomenon. It’s the new reality of the democratic exercise of the power, while the “above” and the “below” are not two spheres carefully separated from each other, but a sole complex, and invest in their reality a real result of real forces. This result has also a very clearly outlined theoretical concept. From this one however, the political life is explained in a vision of the history and of the society, for this new conception of the political distribution of the power lets make transparent also a social and political reality of the permanent reconstruction (no “above” and “below”, but a game of real forces in their concrete state, that abscond any precedent categorization).

6 E. Kiss, “Toward the Definition of Friedrich Nietzsche’s True political Philosophy”, 143.
Nietzsche’s often striking description of the new relationship between state and religion is also closely connected with his insight in this new historical context that is envisaged simultaneously in the sphere and only in the sphere of the inexorable democratization.

Despite the perception of religion as “opium of the people” (it needs to be emphasized that we are not interpreting the statement in the vulgar-Marxist sense, but rather in that original sense, which Marx adopted from Herder’s great philosophy of the history, according to which the “opium” refers to the extent of the earthly sufferings and not to the manipulation of rulers), and on the other hand, the hypothesis of a necessary, nevertheless fateful way of the secularized politics, Nietzsche formulates an almost breath-depriving thesis, or hypotheses about the real political motives of the secularization.

We could call Nietzsche’s approach “functional”, that he uses himself by the way in this quotation, since he recourses to the decisive functional change in the “government” for a functional questioning according to the new value of the religion. He describes this fundamental insight in an excellent way, as consequences of this “functional” turn deciding social phenomena (and the beauty defect of the political sciences and of the political theory since Nietzsche consists in the fact, that they have not yet debated with the same determining phenomena, so that Nietzsche thereby also gets the right to be regarded as a pioneer in the domain of the political theory).

Nietzsche thus describes, in the same context, the consequences for the religion, the process that necessarily shook the religion in its social function. When direct interventions of the force of the state are resolved, now they arise and are dispersing into the extreme. Later it is revealed that the religion of sects is hushed up, the process, such as religious attitudes are taken off, as well as the further consequence, that the politics contains an antireligious character. Almost as final word of this description, that can also been assessed and emphasized as autopoiesis of political and social processes. Not only the real historical process confirms many times later this description, but the whole reconstruction of this process is also unique and extremely strong in explanations for us.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s view on the modern democracy is, as we saw it, anything but hostile. He starts – and here we again point out the strategic analogy of “God is dead” – from the reality and necessity of the modern democracy. In his analysis, his view concentrated on the political power that is – totally consistently – oriented on the democratic context. So he does not consider the realized political democracy as a no longer questionable optimal reality, rather as a political and social reality.
Nietzsche’s first analytically deep point in the exploitation of the modern democracy is the problematic of the “short term”, said differently, the lack of possibility of a “long term” work construction. It is obvious, that this insight is primarily not only not politically concretized, but also not followed for political motives. It is a pure philosophy of the history, that debates with the new condition humaine of the humanity.

Closely related to this, Nietzsche analyzes the abolition of the contrast “private and public” as the direct consequence of the new European democracy. The qualities of this insight cannot at all be measured solely by the factual contents of the insight, but show themselves in their true dimensions, only together with their entire intellectual context. For the analysis started with the affirmation of the changed relation between “above” and “below”, continued through the proof of the lost function of the religion for the government, explained the extreme, the self-organisational successful increase of the competition between state and religion. The thesis (and the analysis) about the “abolition of the contrast” between private and public dimensions gets only in this whole context its entire importance. It does not reveal as a pure “idea”, as an appropriate perspective maybe born at random from the workshop of a great thinker, but in principle as a consequence of any relevant development of the most important motives and components of the European politics and of the European societies. These ideas are not dictated by diverse and unknown impressions or passions, they are the outflow of a long and strained analytical work.

The thesis contains no “criticism” of the democracy, it is the description of one of its most essential tendencies, that precisely seems to have been in our days realized (Nietzsche could probably not have foreseen this) through the concretization of the neo-liberal conception of the state. For the vision of the “private entrepreneurs”, who take care of the “old work” remaining from the old “government”, adopts in our days a serious and worthy form. It is quite particularly important for Nietzsche’s comprehension, that he does not conceive himself this final product of his analyzes as an analysis of the value ideas.

It is a particularly favorable moment also in that respect, that the extent of the relevance of the human image becomes here visible in Nietzsche. For the main tendencies in the development of the state or of the democratic institution are no mechanical determinations or otherwise fatalistic components for the mankind or for the society, but “opportunities”, with a somewhat more modern

\[\text{KSA 2, 305.}\]
language “challenges”, to which man or the society gives answer. It is, as said,
a very productive moment, because it makes transparent any superposed de-
pendence of the human image and (amongst other) of the political philosophy,
which is rather rarely expressed in Nietzsche through explicit formulations.

At this point, it is important to us, in a period of Nietzsche’s research when
Alfred Baeumler’s and Georg Lukács’ shadows can still be alive from time to
time, that Nietzsche’s real positions become obvious even in the context of the
most critical points of the modern democracy.

Nietzsche’s fundamental vision on the democracy does not contain only the
clear idea realized in this process, but also the idea of a political mechanism, that
above all fell strongly into the theoretical oblivion because of the history of the
twentieth century not has’t stand in sign of the undivided ruling democracy.
According to the fundamental thesis (“Europe’s democratization is inexorable”),
which, as we have seen, gives its fully validity to Nietzsche’s political philosophy,
it however sets itself through the announcement of this political mechanism so
fallen in oblivion.

Nietzsche clearly describes the specificity of the democracy, that it can
problemless build its opposition in its own deployment, a kind of “dynamical
totalitarianism” of the democratic institution, that can create the opponents.
The criticism of the democracy, the fears enthusiasmg it were revealing in the
course of the history already over and over again as effective enough to reinforce
the establishment, or the system of the democratic institution.

That the strengths and the ability of implementation of the Nietzschean theo-
ry of the democracy or (because this theory of the democracy is still in a non-elab-
orated form), of Nietzsche’s political philosophy, consist in the fact that Nietzsche
even assigns to the institution of the political democracy a definite position in
a positively conceived overall human development (what guarantees immediately
his commitment in this institution already from the beginning).

This work applies as an essay of reconstruction of Nietzsche’s political phi-
losophy on the basis of his perspectivistic philosophy. Its efforts were directed
toward demonstrating that, for Nietzsche, the institution of the modern democ-
archy was not only an evidence, that he had rather incorporated already many
times in his historical-philosophical option. Nietzsche is however not simply
one of the most pertinent political philosophers, who put up their conceptions
in the framework of the modern democracy, but one, that could formulate,
through his main interest in the political power, also numerous new theoretical
insights about this system.
These insights function as transitions to the reconstruction of Friedrich Nietzsche’s other political-philosophical positions, for his analysis of the *power* and *socialism*, of the *mass* and *liberalism*, or of the *etatism* and *utopia*.

References