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Scenes of Silence: *Titus Andronicus* and Nietzsche's Concept of *Oneness*

"These mysterious and intricate creatures of nature act before us, in his plays, as though they were clocks whose dial and cabinet are made from crystal; they display and determine the running of hours, while, at the same time, the clockwork that powers them can be discerned".[1] With these words, from *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, Goethe (1944: 171) describes Shakespeare's characters, how the staging of the plays shows, at the same time, the action performed by the characters and, as though these were transparent, the functioning of the dramatic elements that allow its enactment. In this article I shall focus on the functioning of the Shakespearean "crystal clocks" in a particular play in order to understand how what they display on stage can be related to the tragic elements underlying the text. Namely, I analyse silence in *Titus Andronicus* in its relation to oneness and tragedy as conceived by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* (henceforth, BT) and illustrated in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (henceforth, Z).[2] My aim is to

[1] My translation into English. In the original: *Diese geheimnisvollsten und zusammengesetztesten Geschöpfe der Natur handeln vor uns in seinen Stücken, als wenn sie Uhren wären, deren Zifferblatt und Gehäuse man von Kristall gebildet hätte, sie zeigen nach ihrer Bestimmung den Lauf der Stunden an, und man kann zugleich das Räder- und Federwerk erkennen, das sie treibt.*

[2] Nietzsche's works are cited through the abbreviation of their English titles followed by the section number (BT: 4, for example). I cite BT and Z from the translations by, respectively, S. Whiteside (Penguin, London 1993) and W. Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1966), showing in brackets, when necessary to a better understanding of my discussion, Nietzsche's original terms in German. For the German terms as well as for the excerpts from Nietzsche's *The*

demonstrate how silence, by being related to oneness, becomes an important tragic element in the play.

Let it be clear that my intention is not to carry out the practice of studying a certain Shakespeare play in order to provide "examples" for philosophical concepts, as though philosophy should be simply "applied" to literary texts, dramatic or not, for its own sake. Instead, the present essay is grounded on the assumption that, since tragedy is common to philosophy and literature, an analysis of specific theoretical signification produced and conveyed by tragic elements in a playwright as complex as Shakespeare can profit considerably from philosophical thinking.

Nietzsche's Concept of Oneness in Tragedy and Silence

Nietzsche conceives oneness as the primal unity (*Ur-Eins*) (BT: 1, 9, 22) which, until its fragmentation by what Schopenhauer calls the **principium individuationis** (BT: 1)[3], was a unique being (*Einssein*) (BT: 9, 24). Being fragmented, oneness, or primal oneness (*Ur-Eins/Einssein*), originates the multitude of organisms in the world, as well as language and representation (Müller-Lauter 1999: 53, 66). Thus, oneness indicates, for Nietzsche, a unique proto-being, "the primal non-individuated 'one'" (Carvalho 1998: 189), which existed as a unity (*Einheit*) (BT: 2, 10) in a proto-linguistic condition.

In order to explain oneness and its fragmentation, Nietzsche cites the myth of Dionysus. He sees Dionysus as symbolising the suffering from individuation (*Leiden der Individuation*) that, originated in the fragmentation of the primal unity, since, as a child, the god was dismembered by the Titans (BT: 10). Nietzsche also illustrates fragmentation and the suffering from individuation by contrasting oneness (*Einheit*) to the "three-ness" (*Dreiheit*) (BT: 9) symbolised by Oedipus, someone who **becomes**, in his tragic myth, three at the same time, namely: the one who has solved the riddle of the Sphinx, the murderer of his father, and the husband of his mother.

In contrast to the Dionysian desire for oneness as a condition free from the suffering from individuation, Nietzsche considers Apollo, "the glorious divine image of the *principium individuationis*" (BT: 16) and the Apollonian principle, which celebrates the individuation and the objectivity (*deutlichkeit*) of daylight forms (BT: 1) as well as the appearance (*Schein*) (BT: 1, 16) that shines in the uniqueness of individuals.

Dionysian View (DW) (which is part of his *Unpublished Writings*) quoted in the present essay, the edition used is the *Sämtliche Werke*. Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).

[3] The *principium individuationis*, or principle of individuation is, as S. Whiteside explains in the annotation to his translation of BT into English, "...Schopenhauer's term for the way in which all our experience comes to us parcelled up, especially including the awareness of ourselves" (1996: 119).

Attic tragedy, in its turn, is conceived by Nietzsche as an effect of the Dionysian through the Apollonian, for the latter allows the former to manifest itself on the stage in an understandable (*deutlichkeit*) manner through *dramatis personae* who, representing the Dionysian suffering from individuation, feature the Apollonian celebration of individuation (BT: 9). Thus, as "the most insistent voice that bids us return to our own sources", tragedy reveals, according to Wole Soyinka's reading of BT, "the harrowing drives between uniqueness and Oneness" (Soyinka 2000: 40), for what is conveyed on the tragic stage is the duality (*Zweitheit*) (BT: 1) between the Dionysian will to oneness (the proto-linguistic condition prior to the suffering from individuation) and the Apollonian celebration of individuation (the uniqueness of individuals).

As well as in tragedy, oneness can manifest itself in the reunion between individuals and nature, the "proto-mother" (*Urmutter*) (BT: 16), which represents, as close as possible, a condition similar to oneness. This Dionysian reunion would lead to a restored oneness (*wiederhergestellten Einheit*) (BT: 10) which Nietzsche considers as part of the "doctrine of the tragic mysteries" (BT: 10), in which the most important characteristics are: "the basic understanding of the unity of all things"; individuation as "the primal source of evil"; and art as "the joyful hope that the spell of individuation can be broken, as a presentiment of a restored oneness" (BT: 10). In the light of these principles, individuals who are under Dionysian intoxication (*Rausch*) (BT: 1) experience "the loss of individuality and stability" (Jenkins 1998, 222) that leads them to attempt to restore oneness, the "unity of all things":

> Not only is the bond between man and man sealed by the Dionysian magic: alienated, hostile or subjugated nature, too, celebrates her reconciliation with her lost son, man... Now, with the gospel of world harmony, each man feels himself not only united, reconciled, and at one with his neighbour, but one with him, as if the veil of Maya had been rent and now hung in rags before the mysterious primal Oneness (*Ur-Einen*). (BT: 10)

Individuals attempt to be at one with each other ("the bond between man and man") and with nature (in relation to which they are "lost sons", that is, fragments of the primal unity) in an effort to "break the spell of individuation" (BT: 10) and, surrounded with the rags of the Veil of Maya (the veil symbolising representation as conceived in Schopenhauer's *Will and Representation*), restore oneness. The Dionysian worshippers, while intoxicated, gradually forget how to walk and how to speak (BT: 10), and silence, which is "perhaps [...] the great Dionysian art" (Crawford 1998: 338), replaces language (speech) and approaches the proto-linguistic nature of oneness, since individuals, at least while the intoxication lasts, do not to perceive the suffering from individuation.

The Dionysian "longing for the primal and the natural" (BT: 8) disclosed in restored oneness can also be fulfilled in death, as Nietzsche explains (BT: 3) from the perspective of Silenus. After being incessantly chased by King Midas, Silenus is eventually caught and asked about the most desirable thing for humankind, to which question he answers: "The best of all things is something entirely outside your grasp: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second-best thing for you – is to die soon" (BT: 3). By not being (born), one could avoid the condition of individuality and its uniqueness as well as the suffering from individuation; to die indicates the possibility of a reunion of individuals with nature. A dead body can be reunited with nature as organic matter promptly absorbed by earth, a body in which the everlasting silence of death – contrasted with the silence of the Dionysian intoxication, which, as Crawford (1998: 339) maintains, is transient – replaces language definitely and, therefore, approaches the proto-linguistic condition of oneness.

Thus, as one of the means of restoring oneness, death discloses the tragic conflict between the Apollonian celebration of the uniqueness of individuals (individuation) and the Dionysian desire for oneness. This is the conflict that Nietzsche illustrates in Zarathustra's "Stillest Hour" (Z: 2), during which Zarathustra, motivated by the desire for overcoming human limitations, experiences silence as a means of approaching oneness, which is "the highest potential of what it means to be human" (Crawford 1998: 338). Aware of the Dionysian principle,[4] Zarathustra attains a crucial instance of silence which, instead of leaving him in a state of bliss, leads him to despair, particularly when he realises that his face bleeds – "and the blood left my face..." (Z: 2) – thereby indicating a potential threat to his life (his uniqueness as an individual)[5]. This is the moment at which Zarathustra screams to break his silence, which shows how individuals who are not under Dionysian intoxication become terrified when the will to restore oneness threatens their uniqueness.

To sum up, Nietzsche conceives oneness in two fundamental aspects: first, oneness as the primal unity consisting of a unique proto-being before its fragmentation by the **principium individuationis**; second, oneness as restored oneness, especially in the terms of the reunion between individuals and nature. Both oneness and restored oneness are related to the Dionysian

[4] Intrinsically related to BT, Z is "...the direct reflection and the message of the Dionysian essence" (Colli 1980: 413). My translation into English.

[5] In more than one occasion Zarathustra reflects the awareness of death as a means of reunion with nature, as, for instance: "Thus I want to die myself [...] and to earth I want to return (*wieder werden*) that I may find rest in her who gave birth to me" (Z: 1 "On Free Death"). Dead, Zarathustra would "re-become" (the literal translation of *wieder werden*) part of nature, that is to say, would be at one with nature again.

principle as well as to a foremost Dionysian element, silence, which, close to the proto-linguistic condition of the primal unity, is essential for restoring oneness, although it reveals, like in Zarathustra's "Stillest Hour", the tragic conflict between uniqueness and oneness.

Silence and Physical Mutilation in Titus Andronicus

Titus Andronicus begins in the aftermath of war, when the alarums have ceased and peace is thought to exist alongside silence: "There greet in silence as the dead are wont, / And sleep in peace, slain in your country's wars" (I.i. 90–91); "Here lurks no treason, here no envy swells, / Here grow no damnéd drugs, here are no storms, / No noise, but silence and eternal sleep" (I.i. 153–155). An everlasting silence is manifested as eternal sleep, the "sleep in peace" of warriors, who in death are free from the suffering caused by treason, envy, damned drugs, storms, and noise. Yet, death, the final silence, is soon associated with physical mutilation in the play, when Alarbus, Tamora's son, is killed and dismembered: "Alarbus' limbs are lopped/And entrails feed the sacrificing fire, / Whose smoke like incense doth perfume the sky" (I.i. 144–145). Unlike the peacefulness of the eternal sleep of warriors, Alarbus is abruptly silenced by being violently murdered.

Body parts with violence, as well as words and action,[6] start being increasingly united in the play. Following the lines above, references that associate body parts and violence begin to be recurrent, as observed in Aaron's declaration that "Vengeance is in my heart, death in my hand, / Blood and revenge are hammering in my head" (II. iii 38–39). At this point in the plot, there would be nothing unusual in these lines or in judging them as typical of the rhetoric recurrent in Elizabethan drama, Shakespearean or not. However, a different perspective on the elements introduced in the first scenes of the play (silence, physical mutilation, words and violence) is required as the plot unfolds. The rhetorical effect suggested

[6] The word "action" is used throughout the present article in the sense of the enactment of events in drama, that is to say, their translation into scenic elements and the verbal discourse of the dramatic text. In this sense, action also corresponds to its usage in the Elizabethan expression "in the action", meaning something that is acted upon the stage, performed, staged, as, for instance, N. M. Bawcut observes in John Ford's dedication of his *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* to John Mordaunt, first Earl of Peterbrough: "Your noble allowance of these first fruits of my leisure in the action..." (Ford 1966: 3). In fact, of the many aspects of the conventions of Elizabethan drama, the most important, in the context of the present article, are " 'counterfeiting' nature" and "playing a part 'to the life' with 'lively action'" (Gurr 1970: 74). They describe the fundamental conception of Elizabethan theatre as a means of imitating nature, in the Aristotelian sense, with particular emphasis of life as motion, or, more accurately, life as *action* in the theatre of the world (*theatrum mundi*).

in Aaron's line above surpasses the limits of dramatic conventions and, unexpectedly, silence and physical mutilation are united in a performance that does not separate words from action. Characters begin to be silenced through the severing of body parts related to speech (heads and tongue) and to writing (hands). This is what happens to Lavinia, who, after having her tongue cut, enters the stage without hands with her condition described by Demetrius and Chiron:

> Demetrius – So, now go tell, an if thy tongue can speak,
> Who 'twas that cut thy tongue and ravished thee.
> Chiron – Write down thy mind, bewray thy meaning so,
> An if thy stumps will tell thee play the scribe.
> Demetrius – See how with signs and tokens she can scrawl. (II. iv 1–5)

Although kept alive, Lavinia has her speech replaced with a silence imposed on her through the mutilation of her tongue. In this environment, in which silencing someone means to mutilate his or her body in order to prevent words from being produced orally or in writing, Titus's offer to Aaron – "lend me thy hand, and I will give thee mine" (III.i 186) – is actually staged through the giving of a severed hand.

The silencing through physical mutilation in *Titus Andronicus* is better understood in the context of the entanglement between words and action, indications of which can be found in the "unmetaphoring" process identified in the play by Rosalie Colie – in her book *Shakespeare's Living Art*, here paraphrased by Barber and Wheeler (1994: 95) – when Shakespeare "... repeatedly translates metaphors back into enactment as events" (Barber and Wheeler 1994: 95), as though attempting to make of words and action **one**. Such "unmetaphoring" is in agreement with L. N. Danson's assumption that, in *Titus Andronicus*, Shakespeare discloses the "... struggle to turn the language of words into the language of action" (Danson 1994: 51) and also with A. H. Tricomi's view of the play as a Shakespearean effort "... to unite language and action in an endeavour to render the events of the tragedy more real and painful" (Tricomi 32).

This struggle to unite silence and physical mutilation in the context of Shakespeare's uniting words and action in *Titus Andronicus* is corroborated by Terry Eagleton's assumption that Shakespeare aspires to an "organic unity" between body and words. This is a unity that would enable a full representation of the body on stage in the shape of a "linguistic body" (97), which would be a body ideally representable in its entirety and plainness, as if reversing the fact that the word "kills the thing".[7] That is to say, it

[7] To conceive the Shakespearean "linguistic body", Eagleton considers representation from the Lacanian perspective, according to which, in rather general terms, the real cannot be apprehended in itself, and, therefore, by naming things (that is to say, biological, physical as

would be a "real" body that has organic matter and the abstractedness of words at the same time, although that is, in the end, unattainable (Eagleton 1994: 97 and 101). If such a "linguistic body" cannot be achieved, it can still be "silenced," for, in the context of a play in which words and action are intertwined, when a character silences another through physical mutilation, he or she unites language and body by destroying them together in the common impossibility of their being united.

The enactment of silence through physical mutilation is one of the manifestations that I call scenes of silence, namely, the very moment at which characters have their tongue or head mutilated, and the silence brought about by such mutilation becomes "visible" in the mutilated body, thus realising itself scenically (visually). The effort to unite words and body indicates, especially in tragedy, manifestations of oneness in its Nietzschean description.

A "Map of Woe" – Scenes of Silence, Fragmentation and Suffering from Individuation

The silencing through physical mutilation demonstrated above in *Titus Andronicus* leads the play into interesting circumstances. Severed body parts resulting from the silencing by means of physical mutilation become dumb stage props:

> Worthy Andronicus, ill art thou repaid
> For that good hand thou sent'st the Emperor.
> Here are the heads of thy two noble sons,
> And here's thy hand in scorn to thee sent back. (III.i 233–236)

The unpleasant feeling provoked by these body parts made into scenic objects[8] can be explained by the Nietzschean description of scenic elements

well as social elements), one is *ipso facto* leaving them ungrasped, for the word cannot *be* the thing and, by replacing it in representation, prevents the thing itself from being apprehended. In Eagleton's words (1966: 97), "The symbol, as Jacques Lacan once remarked, is the death of the thing. In language, we deal with the world at the level of signification, not with material objects themselves", which makes impossible the existence of a "linguistic body" that could unify organic matter and language, language which, by referring to organic matter itself, produces signification, thereby "killing the real thing". In this context, "...To heal the cleavage between signs and things" (Eagleton 1966: 95) is what lies at the core, according to Eagleton, of the Shakespearean attempt at the "linguistic body".

[8] The condition of "object" of these body parts is reinforced by the exchange value attributed to them, especially when one recalls that, for Shakespeare, the body is not a "crude biological datum [but, rather,] an inseparable unity of fact and value" (Eagleton 101). Also according to Eagleton, "Shakespeare's ideological dilemmas "...do not take the form of 'simple' contradictions, in which each term is the polar opposite of the other", but, rather, in them "...each term seems confusingly to consider for a moment the contradictory nature of exchange

as appealing directly to reality through the principle of similarity (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*, that is, what appears, *scheint*, to be real or true, *wahr*) not transfigured by the aesthetic illusion (*kunstvollen Schein*) that allows the pleasure of representation (*Lust des Scheines*) to be aroused in drama (DW: 4). Similar to decorative elements – plants, as Nietzsche exemplifies, or, say, a single cardboard tree used to represent a whole wood in the Elizabethan theatre – the heads and the hand above are directly related to **real** body parts, which turns them into painful elements of reality devoid of aesthetic pleasure and a constant reminder of fragmentation on stage. This unpleasant effect increases when these body parts are carried by Titus, Marcus and Lavinia on the stage, which reinforces their condition as detached objects:

> Come, brother, take a head,
> And in this hand the other will I bear.
> And Lavinia, thou shalt be employed.
> Bear thou my hand, sweet wench, between thine arms.[9] (III.i 278–81)

Thus, fragmentation is **made visible**, "staged" in "scenes in which limbs are lopped, entrails burned, trunks decapitated, hands amputated, throats slit, and bones pulverized" (Cunningham 65). Such scenes of silence have as an epitome Lavinia's mutilated body, since Titus's daughter eventually becomes the "map of woe, that thus dost talk in signs" (III.ii 12), the **embodiment** of the suffering from individuation, or the "picture" (the meaning of "map" in Elizabethan English) of the effect of silencing through physical mutilation.

Dumb, Lavinia is made into the **locus** where silence, an attempt to reach a condition similar to the proto-linguistic nature of primal oneness, is inscribed through violence. Lavinia becomes a living symbol, open to the interpretation of her fellow characters, signifying in her "silent walks" (II. iv 8) the fragmentation and the suffering of individuation, as explained by K. Cunningham:

> [...] like the subject of a Renaissance anamorphic painting, which can be seen from one point of view as a vital, dynamic figure, and from another point of view as a decaying corpse, Lavinia is indeed a "changing piece", a cipher and repository of meaning continually reinterpreted through the observations and voices of others. (1994: 70)

By comparing Lavinia to an anamorphic painting, Cunningham reinforces the visual importance of her mutilated body, in which speech has been replaced by the visual expression of fragmentation. The consequences of

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value" (Eagleton 1966: 97–101), as revealed, say, in these scene of *Titus Andronicus* or in *Measure for Measure*, in which play Isabella "[...] is prepared to exchange Claudio's head for an intact hymen" (Eagleton 1966: 50).

[9] The First Folio has "teeth" instead of "arms" in this line.

gazing at this symbol of fragmentation and suffering from individuation can be observed in Marcus's fearing the consequences that the sight of Lavinia would have on her father – "For such a sight will blind a father's eyes" (II. iv 53). Lavinia signifies, above all, the fear that the other characters (especially the Andronici, in whom the effects of silence are more conspicuous) could also be fragmented, by the silencing through physical mutilation, into dumb scenic objects, "visions of maimed flesh" (Cunningham 1994: 66) signifying, in silence, their fragmentation. Thus, Lavinia's body becomes an indication of the violence that "...threatens to silence her family by transforming them into the image that anticipates the scene's macabre conclusion: 'Or shall we bite our tongues, and in dumb shows/Pass the reminder of our hateful days?' (III.i. 131–132)" (Cunningham 1994: 74).

Mutilated, Lavinia is open to the effort, by the other characters, to verbalise the suffering that she silently **embodies**. Verbalisation is nevertheless soon frustrated, since words are fragmentary in themselves and unable to cope with the suffering from individuation originated in a process – the fragmentation of primal oneness – prior to language itself. Lavinia becomes, therefore, "a reservoir of half-glimpsed truths and insufficient syllables" (Cunningham 1994: 73), which corroborates L. N. Danson's assumption that *Titus Andronicus* is "a play about silence, and about the inability to achieve adequate expression for overwhelming emotional needs" (49). Yet, if the suffering from individuation cannot be fully represented in words, its recognition, which remains essential to tragedy, is readily demonstrated by Titus as soon as he realises the fragmentation symbolised in Lavinia's silent body:

> Witness this wretched stump, witness these crimson lines,
> Witness these trenches made by grief and care,
> Witness the tiring day and heavy night,
> Witness all sorrow . . . (V.ii 22–25).

The word "witness" suggests the realisation of the body fragmentation indicative of the suffering from individuation that Nietzsche contrasts, in his study of tragedy, with the fragmentation of primal oneness. Rhetorically repeated, "witness" reaffirms in words the fragmentation of the human body already visible in its parts (a "wretched stump", "crimson lines", "trenches made by grief and care") made into scenic objects by the silencing through physical mutilation.

Central to the play, fragmentation and its recognition are not restricted to the Andronici, as can be observed in Demetrius, Chiron and Aaron. After being silenced through decapitation, Demetrius and Chiron are made into "powder small", the organic powder used by Titus to cook Tamora

the human-flesh paste: "Receive their blood, and when that they are dead/Let me go grind their bones to powder small [...]" (V.ii 196–197). Aaron, in his turn, is the one who recognises silence as a central element to the rage that causes fragmentation and death in the play: "Ah, why should wrath be mute and fury dumb?" (V.iii 183).[10]

Restored Oneness Being at One with Nature in Scenes of Silence

Silence has proved a hazardous element for the uniqueness of individuals in *Titus Andronicus*, not because it replaces speech – which in fact, from a Nietzschean perspective, is a desirable aspect of restoring oneness –[11], but because it occurs, as in Zarathustra's "Stillest Hour", through physical mutilation. Besides physical mutilation, however, silence begins to reveal itself in the play through the desire of individuals to be at one with nature. This can be observed, for instance, when Marcus (II. iv 16–57) "compares Lavinia to a tree whose branches have been cut, her blood to a river [...] her lost hand, once more, to the leaves of a tree [...] pleasant and familiar images [that] oblige us to see clearly a suffering body [while] they temporarily remove its individuality, even its humanity, by abstracting and generalizing" (Waith 1997: 28). In this case, silence does not occur through violence, but, rather, as the possibility of changing characters into natural elements (a tree, a fountain, leaves) devoid of language and, consequently, of the capacity for representation and signification that allows them to perceive the suffering from individuation originating in their condition of fragments of primal oneness.

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[10] The recognition of fragmentation and the suffering of individuation in silenced/mutilated body parts in *Titus Andronicus* is similar to Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, a work in which violence "...is itself transformed ... into an object of interested but detached contemplation [since] our minds are turned away from the individual as a whole to a minute contemplation of what has happened to one part of his body" (Waith 1957: 23). This assertion has special relevance to *Titus Andronicus*, for, as widely known, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* are an important source that Shakespeare reveals conspicuously through the tale of Philomel "A crafter Tereus, cousin, hast thou met, / And he hath cut those pretty fingers off / that could have better sewed than Philomel" (II. iv 41–43) as well as by making of Ovid's book itself a scenic element when it is taken on stage (IV. i). Furthermore, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* also reveal primal oneness: "*Ante mare et terras et, quod tegit omnia, caelum Unus erat toto naturae vultus in orbe*" (I, 5–6), or, in Golding's famous fourteeners: "Before the Sea and Lande were made, and Heaven that all doth hide, / In all the worlde one onely face of nature did abide..."

[11] The ability to speak was indeed considered "natural" (that is, expected to be present in every human being and a differentiation from other life forms) by Elizabethans. As Thomas Wilson writes in his *Rule of Reason* (1551), "*Homo est animal ratione praeditum, loquendi facultatem habens.* A man is a liuing creature endewed with reason, having aptness by nature to speake" (qtd. in Danson 1994: 45). Therefore, the prevention from speech, caused by either a physical, physiological or mental disorder, innate or acquired, or by physical mutilation, would impose an "unnatural" aspect on individuals.

The desire for reunion with nature is eventually expressed by Titus when, after the recognition ("witness") of the suffering from individuation in Lavinia, he states: "I am the sea" (III.i 224); "She [Lavinia] is the weeping welkin, I the earth" (III.i 225). In ideal terms, by **becoming** the sea, the earth or the sky, one would be gently **silenced** into the natural condition in which the suffering from individuation is not realised. Furthermore, being at one with nature can be even closer to the nature of primal oneness when this change of individuals into natural elements is a transformation from the organic into the inorganic, as can be observed when Marcus becomes "even like a stony image, cold and numb"(III.i 139), since "a stone is silent and offendeth not" (III.i 137).[12] If an individual can be at one with nature by becoming an inorganic element, a stone, so to speak, he or she would not only be **silenced** (therefore, closer to the proto-linguistic nature of primal oneness), but also approach the inorganic condition which, according to Müller-Lauter (1999: 66), Nietzsche attributes to the primal unity. Whatever the case, organic or inorganic, individuals desire, above all, to be at one with nature:

> You sad-faced men, people and sons of Rome,
> By uproars severed, as a flight of fowl
> Scattered by wind and high tempestuous gusts,
> O, let me teach you how to knit again
> This scattered corn into one mutual sheaf,
> These broken limbs again into one body. (V. iii 66–71)

Thus expressed by Marcus in his horror at the suffering from individuation and fragmentation, the desire for unity (oneness) does not merely concern the wish, say, to put Lavinia's limbs back together, but rather to make individuals and natural elements become **one**. By **knitting** fragments of primal oneness (individuals and natural elements alike) back into a unity ("scattered corn" changed into "one mutual sheaf"; "broken limbs" made again into "one body"), one attempts to attain, in Nietzschean terms, a restored oneness (*wiederhergestellte Einheit*) (BT: 10) in its completeness "unsilenced" and "unmutilated".

[12] This can be also observed in Tamora's death: "Her life was beastly and devoid of pity, / And her being dead, let birds on her take pity" (V.iii 198–199), which "...leave[s] no doubt of her complete assimilation into the animal kingdom" (Waith 1994: 25)", an assimilation through her final silence into the realm of non-linguistic living fragments of nature.

Conclusion

The analysis of what I here term "scenes of silence" in *Titus Andronicus* has demonstrated the occurrence of two significant manifestations of silence in its relation to oneness in the play: silence occurring through physical mutilation and silence as a means of fulfilling the desire to be at one with nature. When enacted through physical mutilation, silence is depicted in a severed body made into scenic objects as well as in mutilated characters, pictures of mutilation that (having in Lavinia their epitome) lead characters to the recognition of the suffering from individuation, thereby arousing their desire for reunion with nature. Bybecoming natural elements destitute of the linguistic (representational) ability to realise suffering, they would experience, through silence, what Nietzsche conceives as restored oneness.

In conclusion, if examined in the light of Nietzsche's concept of oneness, silence emerges in *Titus Andronicus* as a tragic element indicative of the fragmentation of primal oneness and, since it is realised in physical mutilation and fragmentation, also of restored oneness as the desire for reunion with nature.[13] This does not entail that Shakespeare approaches oneness as a philosophical problem to be discussed as an abstract concept, but rather that he depicts oneness in *Titus Andronicus* by turning silence – the theme of the play (Danson) – into a foremost tragic element **visible** on stage. Thus, Shakespearean characters enact silence in *Titus Andronicus* at the same time that as though they were transparent as in Goethe's metaphor of crystal clocks – silence displays in them its own tragic functioning central to the play.

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[13] This might explain why violence is, to some extent, "willed" (Paster 1994: 247) in *Titus Andronicus*. Perhaps, what is "willed" is not exactly violence, but, rather, the final silence of death that ceases the suffering from individuation. Since silence is enacted through physical mutilation (violence) in important scenes of the play, this makes the latter "willed" because of the former. A willingness that can also be observed in the assumption that the tomb on stage – referred to by Titus as "sacred receptacle of my joys" (I.i 92) – is "...in effect a womb of death – in which he [Titus] takes deep satisfaction!" (Barber and Wheeler 1994: 82). It seems that the tomb visually translates some possibility of individuals being at one with nature, when, **silenced** and devoid of the suffering from individuation, they would return to the womb of mother nature. This conveys the possibility of reuniting two conditions named by Silenus, the unborn and the dead, which have silence in common: in the former, as the silence in the womb that precedes birth and the acquisition of language; in the latter, as the final and everlasting silence of death symbolised by the tomb. This aspect of silence as an element shared by the unborn and the dead is indeed mentioned in a source particularly significant to *Titus Andronicus*, Seneca, who writes in *The Trojan Women* (II, 30 qtd. in Montaigne 17) "*Quaeris quo iaceas post obitum loco? / Quo non nata iacent*" ("Inquirest thou about the place where thou shalt lie after death? / It is where the unborn lie". My translation into English), which echoes Andromache in Euripides's *Troades* (638 qtd. in Croally 1994: 217), one of the Greek plays adapted by Seneca, *το μη γενεσξαι τω ξανειν ισον λεγω* ("I say that not to be born and to die are the same". My translation into English).

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