



UNIVERSITY OF ŁÓDŹ

Interfaculty Interdisciplinary
Doctoral Studies in the Humanities
Faculty of Philology
Institute of English Studies
Department of Pragmatics

Doctoral Thesis

Discourse of conflict as political genre

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Doctoral thesis written under the supervision of
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Łódź 2015



Uniwersytet
ŁÓDZKI

UNIWERSYTET ŁÓDZKI

Międzywydziałowe Interdyscyplinarne
Humanistyczne Studia Doktoranckie
Wydział Filologiczny
Instytut Anglistyki
Zakład Pragmatyki Językowej

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Praca doktorska napisana pod kierunkiem

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Łódź 2015

*To my Mother
and Daniel*

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INTRODUCTION

In the very first words of the introduction to the volume *Discourses of War and Peace* (2013), Adam Hodges states that

humans never engage in war without the mediating force of discourse. From the rhetorical saber rattling that precedes conflict through the diplomatic overtures that sue for peace, discourse plays an integral role in the outbreak, conduct and disputation of armed political conflict around the world. (Hodges 2013: 1)

This short, yet meaningful quote underlines the essential role of discourse in social relations and, most importantly, the practice of conflict as an expressed struggle between at least two parties who contend with each other over specific values, power or resources. Although Hodges focuses here on armed conflicts, his observation signals the importance of discourse even before the outbreak of war or any other instances of military violence, and indicates that every conflict, irrespective of its dynamics, is assisted and shaped by specific discursive processes. Hence, the conflicting parties and other sides directly or indirectly involved in the struggle participate in the production and negotiation of meanings about the very process of struggling and the issues at stake to discursively (re)construct the reality they live in and to manage their actions.

Such a perception of discourse and its influence on various types of conflicts is also accentuated by some – although not many – scholars who are not directly affiliated with linguistics (cf. Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011), but who adopt different perspectives to investigate conflicts through a focus on their dimensions such as peace-building processes, reconciliation, reaction to terror, gender issues, ethics of intervention, dialogue, discourse, the influence of culture, etc. In such studies, discourse is viewed as “the chief linguistic form of intense political conflict once conflict parties have formed” (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 378), which entails that it develops with the antagonistic relations between the conflicting sides and serves as a tool in the struggle for supremacy.

Interestingly, however, the label of “discourse of conflict” is still to a large extent unpopular in the wide panorama of multidisciplinary (including linguistic) research on various types of conflicts. As the very title suggests, this dissertation comes as an attempt to increase the academic applicability and visibility of this label, although it primarily implies that discourse of conflict is approached here using strictly linguistic terms, i.e. as political genre. Nevertheless, the motivation for this has its source in the exact idea behind the role of

discourse that I described above and that can – and shall – be treated as an essential element of the practice of conflicts irrespective of the disciplinary affiliation of the analyst.

Following from that, in this research I assume that a long-lasting political/social conflict is a phenomenon determining potentially all communicative events in which political speakers representing the conflicted parties participate, irrespective of the individual time and place of these communicative events. The conflict that I deal with here is the Middle East conflict and, more specifically, the official Israeli stance in the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab struggle, as represented by the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 rhetoric. This is done on the assumption that, after over sixty years of conflict following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the parties engaged have developed their own, distinguishing ways in which they discursively (re)construct the situation in the Middle East, and that investigating their official voices might help trace major regularities that these discursive representations feature. Scholars such as Gelvin (2009), although – again – they are not affiliated with linguistics – argue that all sides to this conflict rely on similar means of expression and have created narratives that illustrate the uninterrupted origins of their nations to legitimize their right of statehood and actions taken as part of their struggle for recognition. Although the limitations of this dissertation make it possible to focus on the discourse of the Israeli side only, this research simultaneously signals the need to devote equal attention to the discourses of other sides of this long-lasting conflict in the future.

As far as these regularities in the discourse of conflict are concerned, the motivation for investigating them comes also from my previous studies in the Israeli political discourse (Królikowska 2009, 2011), which revealed repeatable patterns of persuasion and legitimization used by Israeli political leaders, and which inspired me to approach the image of conflict in the Israeli rhetoric holistically – as a cluster of conventionalized goal-oriented discursive forms. This has brought me to the linguistic scholarship on genres in political communication and, in particular, to the most recent theoretical developments in this domain (cf. Cap and Okulska 2013), which label discursive structures that follow some recognizable patterns and suit the accomplishment of identifiable goals as political genres.

This way, the very title of this dissertation presupposes my thesis statement, according to which in this research I list and analyze specific and (more or less) stable structural, content-related and functional characteristics of the discourse of conflict as typical for political genres and, thus, as features that enable to classify, analyze and interpret the discourse of conflict as a (potentially new) genre in political communication. This entails that in my study I take these regularities as constitutive of a potentially new generic category in

political communication, which is oriented at achieving specific goals in the context of the Middle East conflict. Following on from that, this research project has strong foundations in Critical Discourse Studies, which entails a critical perspective on the ‘micro’ considerations of the cognitive-pragmatic properties of the (Israeli political) discourse of conflict, and the ‘macro’ considerations of their larger social motivations and consequences (Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 2001; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009). The cognitive-pragmatic component of this approach entails that I focus on specific pragmatic parameters and pragmalinguistic devices as tools that perform recognizable functions in favor of the Israeli stance in the context of the Middle East conflict, that is, they activate non-linguistic cognitive processes that allow conflict-related ideology to influence local and global addressees/audiences through language.

Surprisingly, so far there have been no attempts at either conceptualizing the discourse of conflict as political genre, or approaching the phenomenon of conflict as a very specific, functional-contextual determinant of discourse. This might be caused by the generally diverse and fragmented methodology of genre analysis, which is indeed a major challenge to such research. Faced with this problem, based on some general consensus as to how communicative genres are characterized in linguistics, and how these properties relate to political genres, in this dissertation I also propose a model for analyzing potentially new genres in political communication, which is based on nine properties (five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria) highlighting those aspects of discourses surrounding and influenced by macro-scale contextual phenomena such as a long-lasting conflict that might be treated as (new) genre-constitutive.

The structure of this dissertation to a large extent reflects the way I approached this task theoretically and empirically, as it consists of six chapters in total and comprises a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical part includes three chapters, in which I explore the topics that are, in my opinion, relevant to the general conceptualization of the discourse of conflict as political genre. For these purposes, in Chapter 1 I concentrate on communicative genres and their characterization in as diverse fields and perspectives on linguistics as new rhetorical studies (cf. Russel 1997), Systemic Functional Linguistics (cf. Eggins 2004), applied linguistics (cf. Swales 1990), Critical Discourse Studies (cf. Fairclough 2001), sociolinguistics (cf. Hymes 1996) and, finally, linguistic pragmatics (cf. Paltridge 1997). This is done to illustrate that in nearly all theories communicative genres are perceived similarly, i.e. as recognizable, typified, staged, structured and goal-oriented patterns of social interaction, which are realized, identified and constructed by both linguistic (discursive) and

extra-linguistic (extra-discursive) means. Their properties are traceable and analyzable both on the level of structure-internal and structure-external parameters, and they are inherently connected to and imposed by situational, social and institutional constraints. Nevertheless, there I also illustrate that various discipline-situated approaches adopt different vantage points on how to analyze genres in communication and for what purposes such analyses are conducted.

In Chapter 2 I narrow down my interests to political discourse and political genres, to explore the similarities and differences between “political” and “communicative”, and to differentiate between “political communication” and “public communication”. These considerations are followed by my discussion of Political Linguistics in general and the Analysis of Political Discourse in particular, which are perceived and presented in this dissertation as the linguistic contributions to the development of the domains of political communication and political science. There, I also comment on some challenges in the analysis of political discourse that result from the interdisciplinary character of this empirical field, and that inevitably influence all studies conducted within this framework – including my study of the discourse of conflict as political genre. This is also a transition point to my theoretical considerations about genres in political communication, to which I devote the remainder of this chapter. Simultaneously, there I also elaborate on the theoretical core of this dissertation and provide specific criteria to be used to identify, analyze and interpret potentially new political genres.

Chapter 3, which concludes my theoretical considerations, is devoted to the phenomenon of conflict which I discuss from different angles. First, I concentrate on the theoretical approaches to conflict within various disciplines of social sciences and present an overview of selected, most prominent theories of conflict. In this account, I briefly present the primarily sociological and philosophical considerations of ‘social conflict’, trying to outline the main assumptions of models put forward by Marx, Weber, Simmel, Collins, Dahrendorf, Coser, Foucault and Bourdieu. Next, I move on to a short illustration of some ethnological considerations of conflict, where I try to highlight the differences between ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘social conflict’, as they are presented in anthropological scholarship on this subject. Additionally, I point to some general socio-psychological considerations of the phenomenon of ‘conflict’, which have implications for my perception and interpretation of the discourse of conflict in the empirical part of this dissertation.

Second, I direct my attention to how linguistics and, more specifically, discourse studies approach and analyze the discursive dimension of various social and socio-political

phenomena that to a lesser or greater extent involve the notion of ‘conflict’. This is done to illustrate a highly diversified panorama of discourse studies, some of which have ‘conflict’ as a background, i.e. as the context of social and socio-political phenomena connected with strangeness, enmity, violence and power, and some other – although not many – that have ‘conflict’ in their foreground, i.e. as the main subject matter of the analysis. This section is followed by my discussion of the importance and the potential descriptive and prescriptive applications of the analysis of the discourse of conflict in the multidisciplinary field of peace and conflict studies and the field of conflict management.

Third, I focus on the situation of Israel in the Middle East and, most importantly, the difficult history of the state of Israel and its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, which I do through outlining the background of the Middle East conflict and describing the so far efforts taken as part of the peace process. In this part of Chapter 3 I also briefly describe Zionism – the political movement and doctrine that led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and which still serves the purposes of maintaining national unity within the country and across the Jewish people living in Diaspora. This way, I provide the larger context of my research and the necessary background for the understanding of my discussion in Chapter 5.

The empirical part of my dissertation that follows, comprises two chapters. Chapter 4 is a more detailed presentation of methodology, which illustrates how the research procedure for the study of the discourse of conflict as political genre was designed and what relation it has to the thesis statement and specific genre theory-related endeavors that I took before I started analyzing my data. There, I also describe the process of data selection and comment on the rationale for analyzing the speeches of the current Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu as an exemplification of the discourse of conflict. Finally, I shortly discuss the relation of this research with potential future studies in the discourse of conflict or any other attempts at applying the model developed for the purposes of this analysis in researching other potentially new political genres, which is done to signal the way in which I perceived my study and, most importantly, to highlight how I would like my discussion in Chapter 5 to be perceived by my readers.

Chapter 5 is a detailed illustration and discussion of the results of my research, presenting five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria characterizing political genres, to which I matched my data in pursuit of generic properties of the discourse of conflict. This discussion is divided into two parts and each of these parts is organized in a different way. Part 1 devoted to macro-criteria is a more generalized account of five major characteristics (macro-criteria)

of the discourse of conflict that apply to all data that I have analyzed and that, in my model, are treated as must-haves, i.e. absolutely necessary characteristics of any linguistic material to be classified as political genre. Part 2, in contrast, deals with four micro-criteria characterizing the discourse of conflict as political genre, and as such it is a more particularized account that, first, supplements the general characteristics presented in Part 1 and, second, builds up on some claims presented there. This enables me to account for some idiosyncratic and dynamic properties of the discourse of the Israeli stance in the Israel-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, such as linguistic devices used by PM Benjamin Netanyahu to communicate specific messages in a way that was adjusted to the diverse predispositions of his addressees/audiences in the Knesset, at the United Nations General Assemblies and at the AIPAC Policy Conferences in the years 2009-2014.

The dissertation concludes with Chapter 6 – the Outlook – in which I comment on several genre theory-related topics that link my considerations in the theoretical part of the dissertation with the empirical chapters. There, I also comment of the relationship of this research with selected linguistic scholarship on the Middle East conflict and, generally, scholarship within peace and conflict studies. The popularization and elevation of the status of linguistic research in this multidisciplinary field of social science is an indirect, yet strong, motivation of mine in this project, as – following Suurmond (2005) – I perceive discourse analysis as a helpful and important resource not only for studying and managing conflicts, but also for the development of proactive ways of conflict prevention and resolution.

CHAPTER 1. Communicative genres

Traditionally, the term 'genre' belonged to the domain of literary studies and was defined by conventions of form and content of a particular text (Freedman and Medway 1994:1). Obviously, genres function beyond literature as well, since they regulate everyday communication in formal and informal contexts and, as such, their roles range far beyond the ones they have traditionally had.

Early linguistic research on media, scientific, business or political communication well-illustrate that studies of non-literary genres often relied on frameworks or notions rooted in literary studies, but due to the fact that communicative genres quite differ from their literary counterparts, many researchers ended up at theoretical and methodological crossroads trying to integrate well-established literary terms into their discussion of rapidly evolving and changing communication. This integration occurred to be a challenge verging on the impossible – as long as it could help see what form and content were used, it proved insufficient in answering the question why (for what purpose) these and not other genres were used. For this reason, current genre studies have adopted a different approach. As Freedman and Medway write

(...) without abandoning earlier conceptions of genres as 'types' or 'kinds' of discourse, characterized by similarities in content and form, recent analyses focus on tying these linguistic and substantive similarities to regularities in human spheres of activity. In other words, the new term 'genre' has been able to connect recognition of regularities in discourse types with a broader social and cultural understanding of language in use. (Freedman and Medway 1994:1)

As can be seen, the new approach to genre studies in linguistics has established a connection between the word and the world, i.e. between the language that is used and the actions that are thereby triggered. This conception occurred to be a major turn in genre studies that led to the development of numerous theoretical and methodological models for linguistic analysis of genres, and resulted in growing popularity of generic research conducted within as many linguistic fields and perspectives as there are.

The following chapter is an attempt to present this panorama in a way that reflects the developments of linguistic thought and approaches in communicative genres' studies. For these purposes, I have decided to organize my discussion here in two sections, in Section 1 starting from the origins of the literary-linguistic links in genre analysis established by Mikhail Bakhtin, and moving on to an overview of frameworks that various linguistic fields

have shaped on this basis over time. These will be presented in dedicated subsections illustrating the post-Bakhtinian developments of genre theory in new rhetorical studies, Systemic Functional Linguistics, applied linguistics, Critical Discourse Studies, sociolinguistics and, finally, linguistic pragmatics. Section 2, in turn, will be devoted to the most contemporary attempts at characterizing genres in communication as proposed by Cap and Okulska (2013), which will steer my general direction of approaching the concept of ‘genre’ in this dissertation, and will reverberate in my discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 in particular.

1. Communicative genres: Origins and developments

Even though Mikhail Bakhtin and his considerations of ‘speech genres’ occupy but one of several parts of my discussion in this section (i.e. subsection 1.1), I would like my readers to treat them as a necessary basis for the understanding of ideas proposed by linguists that came later and/or who anchored their observations at their field-specific interests, because the Bakhtinian ‘speech genre’ is to a large extent a term prototypically describing what is currently referred to as ‘communicative genre’. As we will see in subsections 1.2-1.7 that follow, some Bakhtin’s ideas will be recalled or constructively scrutinized by other researchers, presenting how the most prolific linguistic disciplines and perspectives have shaped conceptual similarities and theoretical-methodological differences in their approaches to genres in communication. New rhetorical studies, Systemic Functional Linguistics, applied linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis, sociolinguistics and linguistic pragmatics taken here as major elements of the panorama of linguistic research on this topic, will thus enable to illustrate, both, their meeting points and differences.

1.1. Bakhtin and speech genres

The first instance of investigating the linguistic conventions governing human communication in more depth can be traced as far back as 1950s and the first writings on genres in non-literary context by the Russian linguist and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin’s essay “The Problem of Speech Genres”, perceived as the first one that made an

analytic link between genres in literature and genres in linguistics, is also the first one – just as its title points out – that drew attention to the challenges arising from the complex functions of genres in communication.

Bakhtin (1986) opens his discussion of genres with a point that all human activity in all areas of life is connected with language that appears in the form of utterances. These utterances are organized according to the conditions and goals of each of such situations both at the level of content/style and at the level of structure. When it comes to content/style, Bakhtin defines them as thematic and stylistic elements of language; when it comes to structure, this a composition of all the aforementioned elements into patterns of utterances, and these patterns are exactly what he called “speech genres” (ibid.).

There are as many speech genres as there are areas of human activity and since new such areas come into being all the time, constantly new genres appear. Although the entire catalogue of generic structures is limitless, Bakhtin classifies them according to the domain of human activity – in that way we have, use and are surrounded by literary genres, rhetorical genres and everyday speech genres. Nevertheless, the key point here is the division into “primary (simple) speech genres” and “secondary (complex) speech genres” that Bakhtin introduces in order to illustrate the interplay between these three types of generic structures. Bakhtin defines them in the following words:

Secondary (complex) speech genres—novels, dramas, all kinds of scientific research, major genres of commentary, and so forth—arise in more complex and comparatively highly developed and organized cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, sociopolitical, and so on. During the process of their formation, they absorb and digest various primary (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated speech communion. These primary genres are altered and assume a special character when they enter into complex ones. They lose their immediate relation to actual reality and to the real utterances of others. (Bakhtin 1986: 62)

To give an example, he refers to novels where we can find rejoinders of everyday conversations or letters, which – although they are generally known to us as generic structures that we use on a daily basis – retain their particular sense and play their particular role only in the novel they are presented in; without it, they have no connection to the actual situations or people.

Another important Bakhtin’s point is that, both, primary and secondary genres, irrespective of their type or origin, are utterances. In consequence, they are carriers of worldviews and ideology, i.e. points where language meets life (and vice versa), so it is

crucial to analyze them considering the nature of utterance, because without it they become abstract structures with only minor reference to reality. For Bakhtin, utterances are the embodiment of language in individual form, with all the individual stylistic features of the speaker and the function- and condition-related requirements of a given communicative activity. All these aspects (individuality, functions and conditions) give rise to genres, which Bakhtin defines as “certain relatively stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic types of utterances” (1986: 64).

Apart from that, genres as utterances manifest changes that take place in language styles and, consequently, in social life, because they change together with them. This enables us to see that language is organically combined with life, and to analyze genres as real units of communication. In this respect, Bakhtin criticizes the 19th century linguistics that downplayed the communicative function of language and stressed the expressive function, according to which we use language mainly to give vent to our individual creativity. If it really was so, it would mean that we spend most of our time speaking for its own sake, and when the times comes to go to the shop or visit a doctor, we dedicate only a minor part of our linguistic competence and potential to it.

Furthermore, Bakhtin also criticizes the conventional speaker-listener relationship that was in his times used to account for how communication looks. For him there is no active-passive division of reactions, since the listener immediately reacts to meaning when he/she perceives and understands it – this done by agreement, disagreement, application/execution of what has been heard¹, etc. Everything that is said, every utterance, presupposes the existence of utterances that precede and follow it; however, they have their beginning and ending, which for Bakhtin is a point when the speaking subjects change. The same, of course, applies to genres: each such macro-scale utterance, be that a political speech or a conversation, has its clear boundaries that are signaled by some, again, usually stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic micro-scale utterances, i.e. phrases or expressions typically used to open and close such a structure. There are such boundaries even in complex and specialized genres such as scientific texts or artistic pieces. In this case, each such work, by its reference and commentary to other representatives and schools (of the same or of a different opinion), attempts to mark a boundary between the predecessors and the author. Moreover, each such work is written, composed or in any other way done to continue the

¹ Of course, Bakhtin refers the same to “written and read speech” as well (1986: 69).

“dialogue” in a given field or discipline, i.e. to get a response and continue the chain of – what Bakhtin calls – “speech communion” (1986: 76).

Another important idea in his discussion of genres is that “we speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances have definite and relatively stable typical forms of construction of the whole” (1986: 78). This means that even when we do not think about it and we are engaged in the most unconstrained communicative activity, we still use utterances that are part of repeatable and definite generic structures. We learn them from infancy, just as we acquire language, and we develop our generic expertise simultaneously with our personal and professional development². What is more, we are able to “detect” genres – whenever we hear or read something, from the very first words we usually know what genre it may be, how long it will be, what compositional structure it will have, and how it may end. Still, however, Bakhtin does not forget about generic flexibility – a very important feature of communicative genres that will reverberate through various later linguistic approaches to this topic. Again, just as in the case of manifesting the individuality of the speaker, not all genres are equally flexible. Usually, those generic structures that allow for the greatest individuality can be characterized by the greatest flexibility. To illustrate, genres such as greetings or farewells leave little space for variations. The only aspect, in which they may openly vary is the situation (formal or informal), social position (lower, higher or equal social rank) and personal relations between the genre participants (colleagues, partners, strangers and any other social roles that we play). In contrast, genres such as, e.g. intimate conversations are more open to changes in style or structure, which makes them more open to individual creativity of the interlocutors. Nevertheless, at this stage Bakhtin draws attention to one important point: “to use a genre freely and creatively is not the same as to create a genre from the beginning; genres must be fully mastered in order to be manipulated freely (1986: 80).”

Undeniably, Bakhtin was the first one to propose a wider theoretical conception of genres that was finally sensitive to the fact that genres exist everywhere, i.e. not only in literature, but in any area of human activity in which language³ is used. Considering the fact

² A similar idea is present in (or presupposed by) most of the existing linguistic approaches to genres. It might also be referred to as ‘habitualization’ and as this term it will be addressed in the next subsections of this chapter.

³ Here, I am using Bakhtin’s terminology and the word ‘language’, but I would opt more for the term ‘discourse’, as it better fits with those areas of human activity in which multimodal genres are used, e.g. pictures or videos in TV news or newspapers as media genres.

that he came up with these observations in the early 1950s, the most surprising feature of his approach is atemporality. As I will try to illustrate in the next subsections of this chapter, Bakhtin's ideas inspired researchers from various linguistic fields and perspectives, and irrespective of the passage of time they still undergo constructive scrutiny. As a result, the inventory of post-Bakhtinian theories and methodologies is both sizeable and diverse, but although various theoretical and methodological models are adopted, the definitions of the term 'genre' are surprisingly consistent across approaches.

1.2. Genres in new rhetorical studies

The new rhetorical studies are associated with the North American scholars who incorporated the assumptions of the classical rhetoric into their approach towards analyzing human knowing, behavior and language use, contrasting it with the earlier 20th century humanist and social scientific thought. Within the latter approach, human beings were defined and differentiated only on the basis of one criterion: the ability to use language in a symbolic way. To compare, the former approach delved deeper into this issue and focused on the rhetorical, i.e. the persuasive potential of this symbolic use of language. This revival and development of classical rhetoric is attributed to the works of Kenneth Burke, who claimed that "language's symbolic action" is "exercised about the necessary *suasive* nature of even the most unemotional scientific nomenclature" (Burke 1950: 45, cit. in Freedman and Medway 1994: 3), which meant that we write or speak not only to record and pass information, but also, if not primarily, we "do things with words"⁴.

This "new rhetorical" perception influenced academic disciplines connected with teaching how to use language, e.g. composition and process pedagogy, and in turn, altered the perception of the characteristics and the roles of genres in communication, since genres were one of the core elements of teaching how to write. Nevertheless, before I explain what like this perception became, I would like to address one more factor that shaped this new rhetorical approach towards genres. This factor was the so called *social constructionism*, a sociological theory of knowledge which deals with examining the way in which social

⁴ This is the my conscious allusion to Austin's SAT model and the cornerstone book *How to Do Things With Words* (1962).

phenomena and objects of consciousness (i.e. social constructions) develop among members of society. Berger and Luckmann in their 1966 *Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* claimed that people and groups interact in the form of a social system and they gradually develop concepts and representations of each other's actions. These actions gradually habituate⁵ and become reciprocal among the members of the groups, and when big groups start using them in this manner, the process of institutionalization starts. In the course of this process the meanings of these actions are being consolidated in the society and its members consolidate their knowledge and conception of reality, i.e. the meaning that reality has for them. This is inextricably connected with what Rorty described as two ways in which people "try to give sense to their lives" (Rorty 1991: 21). The first way is by describing oneself as immediately related to a non-human reality (for example, through religion, science or philosophy), while the second way is by "telling the story of one's contribution to a community" (ibid.). That second way is in his view more relevant, because it enables to focus on the common (communal) constructions of reality, which further supports the social constructivists' claim that this is how knowledge is construed, i.e. in society and in response to shared needs, goals and contexts (Freedman and Medway 1994: 5).

Apart from knowledge, categories such as shared cognition, emotions, motivations, perceptions and memory are created (Geertz 1983: 153, cit. in Freedman and Medway 1994: 5) and in this respect genres play a key role, because they become dynamic, schematized constructs that create and consolidate the above mentioned elements of culture⁶ and activities in which the members of this culture are engaged. Hence, the new rhetorical approach defines genres as "purposeful, typified social actions which evolve as temporarily stable, yet flexible responses to recurring social events", and which are tied to both social practices and people involved in them (Miller 1994, cit. in Gruber 2013: 31). On a linguistic level, it means that by learning how to use particular discursive patterns and tools repeatedly, people learn how to communicate, interact and achieve goals in a particular socio-cultural group. This is connected to the Austinian approach to language, which Freedman and Medway (1994) briefly summarize in the following two points:

⁵ The issue of habitualization will also be a central element of the Systemic Functional Linguistic view of genres and their role in human communication (see section 1.3.).

⁶ Also within the Systemic Functional Linguistic approach the connection between culture and generic patterns will be even more visible than in the case of the new rhetoric studies (see subsection 1.3.).

First, language – and especially utterances – are ways of acting in the world. Second, for the utterance to be comprehended as an action, researchers must take the context into account and understand it in the way that it is understood by the participants. Context, and the participant's understanding of it, define the meaning (or at least the range of possible meanings). (Freedman and Medway 1994: 6)

Based on these two points – the first about the role of language and the second about the role of context – one may arrive at the following conclusion about genres: since language is a means of action in context, genres are linguistically-organized patterns of action in a particular socio-cultural context.

There is, however, yet another aspect of speech acts that makes them intertwine with the discussion of genres. Individual speech acts are microparameters which form greater entities such as speech events or macro speech acts, i.e. discourses and text structures which build the image of speaker's global intentionality, trigger compound effects and are inextricably tied to contexts (Cap 2011). To compare, since individual discursive strategies and tools form genres which are dynamic entities responding to and shaping socio-cultural contexts, the former are microparameters, and the latter are the macro- level ones. Going deeper into that, such deductive reasoning may lead to a conclusion that genres are speech events/macro speech acts, which is supported by works of sociolinguists such as Hymes (1972, 1974, 2003) or Duranti (1984), but these authors at the same time stress the importance of treating genres as analytically independent from the category of speech events. This independence will be further explored in Section 1.6 of this chapter, which discusses the sociolinguistic approaches towards genre analysis.

Irrespective of the fact that some elements of the speech act theory might seem too far-fetched in their correspondence to genres, they made a great influence on the new rhetoric approach and other linguistic fields theorizing on this subject. Another instance of this influence is the methodology of genre analysis put forward by Russell (1997), who integrated activity theory into the new rhetoric approach towards genres. Within this framework, Russell draws on Bazerman's (1994) research, in which he defines genres as systems of speech acts, and combines it with theoretical developments of the activity theory, first introduced by Russian social psychologists Vygotsky (1978) and then Leont'ev (1978, 1981). Just as in the Austinian or Serlian approaches, where speech acts are the basic units of analysis of how discourses are formed, in the activity theory the 'activity system' is the basic unit of examining how micro- instances of genre use relate to its meso- and macro- level of use, i.e. in institutional and macro-societal communication. Russell defines activity system as

any ongoing, object-directed, historically-conditioned, dialectically-structured, tool-mediated human interaction: a family, a religious organization, an advocacy group, a political movement, a course of study, a school, a discipline, a research laboratory, a profession, and so on. These activity systems are mutually (re)constructed by participants using certain tools and not others (including discursive tools such as speech sounds and inscriptions). The activity system is the basic unit of analysis for both groups' and individuals' behavior, in that it analyzes the way concrete tools are used to mediate the motive (direction, trajectory) and the object (the "problem space" or focus) of behavior and changes in it. (Russell 1997: 4-5)

Participants (individuals, groups or communities) learn how to use particular genres in order to achieve certain goals and, as a result, build genre systems which organize their interactions. What is important, within activity theory genres are differentiated not only based on some formal features, but also on the basis of the expectations that the participants have of tools to be used within a given genre (Russell 1997: 7). These tool-related expectations cause the circulation of genres within and between simple and/or complex activity systems and, by organizing interaction in these systems, they help reproduce, consolidate and/or change social structures and hierarchies.

Russell's theory came as a response to one of the problems that the earlier new rhetoric approach towards genres faced, i.e. how to relate and analyze the micro-, meso- and macro- level instances of genre uses. By introducing the division between simple and complex activity systems and examining their behavior "with genres", Russell's application of the activity theory enabled to structure this relationship, but with a relatively low differentiation between levels of social organization. Indeed, Russell seems to treat all complex activity systems the same, while there may be decisive differences between them and the ways in which they organize interaction between their constituents, i.e. participants. Engeström (2009) also draws attention to the fact that, although he sees genres and activities within the activity system just like Russell, i.e. as complementary concepts, for him Russell's concept of genre has one major limitation – its anchoring to writing and written communication, which is indeed a characteristic feature of the new rhetoric approach towards genres. Since a written text is only one of the available modalities, for Engeström it is not clear how to apply the new rhetorical concept of genre to the analyses of activities in which there are multiple modalities⁷ (Engeström 2009: 8), e.g. new media in which communication is multimodal and genres hybridize. Nevertheless, Engeström agrees that because of the

⁷ The issue of multimodality will be further addressed in Section 2 of this chapter, which is devoted to the characteristics of communicative genres.

flexibility and ability to circulate in the activity systems, genres are “directly relevant to our attempts to understand current historical transformations in the organization of human activities” (Engeström 2009: 9). This is connected to Bazerman’s view, in which genres need not be linguistic entities – rather than textual forms, they are social constructs: forms of life, ways of being, frames for social action and environments for learning and teaching (cf. Bazerman 1988, 1994).

1.3. Genres in Systemic Functional Linguistics

Systemic Functional Linguistics (henceforth SFL) defines genre as “a staged, goal-oriented, purposeful activity in which speakers engage as members of our culture” (Martin 1984: 25). The primary role of genres is to combine and linguistically realize the choice of situation-dependent topics, role relationships and modes of expression in order to reach the desired goal (Gruber 2013: 33). Again, as in the new rhetorical approach, genres are dynamic schemata responsible for both categorization and structuring of social actions/social processes which are subsumed under a common notion of “culture”. Therefore, within this view “culture” is perceived as a system of genres, which can be understood only with reference to two levels of context: “context of situation” and “context of culture”. The differentiation between these two has been introduced on the assumption that each situation is manifested through the unfolding text and at the same time works as a manifestation of a specific culture.

In this spirit, Eggins (2004) writes that “there are as many different genres as there are recognizable activity types in our culture” (p. 56) and introduces a classification based on the type of a social activity in which the user of a particular genre is engaged. Genres in her approach range from more complex ones, such as literary or education genres, to the simple, everyday genres such as “buying or selling things” (the so called “transactional genres”), “gossiping” or “making appointments” (ibid.), but the central question is how we recognize and distinguish genres. According to Eggins, each text has got three dimensions that help us decide in which genre *we are*.

The first dimension is the so called “register configuration”, or in other words, the configuration of specific topics, roles and modes of expression. This, in turn, is connected to the way social processes are formed and routinized, i.e. to the issue of habitualization, which – together with institutionalization – has already been mentioned in the previous subsection of

this chapter, when I briefly referred to social constructionism. As we already know, by doing something repeatedly our patterns of behavior habitualize, which means that we gradually do some things faster and put less (both physical and mental) effort into doing them. This is the case with, for example, learning how to tie up shoelaces or write an academic article – when we do any of these or other things for the first time, they always seem to be a challenge and consume a lot of time, but it is no longer so after we have done it a hundred times. Berger and Luckmann explain the role of habitualization in the following words:

Habitualisation carries with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed. While in theory there may be a hundred ways to go about the project of building a canoe out of matchsticks, habitualisation narrows these down to one. This frees the individual from the burden of ‘all those decisions’, providing a psychological relief. (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 71)

Habitualization applies to all spheres of our life including how and with what language we communicate, and this process helps us gradually build and develop a possibly non-finite set of patterns of behavior and communication. Although the idea of “non-finiteness” might seem vague, by that I mean that as long as the range of these patterns is probably unlimited, since new genres and new contexts emerge, individual genres and/or hybrids of these are still recognizable and analyzable.

How, then, is habitualization connected with register? As far as communication is concerned, its role is twofold: first, as has been mentioned, it enables us to learn and master genres; second, it enables us to learn and recognize register, i.e. communicative choices that we make in each of the following three dimensions of situation/context: field, tenor and mode. As a result, depending on a particular genre we know what type of register to use and how to organize our utterance for it to be meaningful and reach the desired goal. This helps us develop recurrent communicative practices and resort to them whenever we assume that the situation and context calls for the use of a specific genre. To illustrate, coming back to Eggins’s (2004) classification of genres, when we go to a grocery shop to buy carrots, we instantly know that it is a situation/context where we typically use transactional genres, and the register involves the field of ‘carrots’, the tenor of ‘customer/salesman’ and the mode of (usually) verbal, direct expression. One important point at this stage is to note that as long as register choices are static and limited in a given setting, genres are dynamic⁸, for there are

⁸ It should be mentioned, though, that some genres are **more** dynamic than others. I am purposefully stressing this point, because it will be explored in detail in further sections of this

many different ways in which we might act communicatively to reach a particular goal while still complying with the register constraints.

The second dimension that helps us recognize and distinguish genres is their schematic structure. Referring to what Bakhtin called “compositional structure”, Eggins writes that “genres develop linguistic expression through a limited number of functional stages, occurring in a particular sequence” (2004: 58). The motivation behind it is that it is impossible to communicate everything at once, so we organize our expression into a series of steps, all of which can be distinguished from each other. This is what Martin called “schematic structure”, i.e. a structure in which subsequent stages contribute to expressing the meaning and fulfilling the purpose of a particular genre (Martin 1985: 215, cit. in Eggins 2004: 59). In some cases it is enough to hear the first steps forming a particular scheme to be able to recognize what genre it is:

For example, when we hear *Once upon a time* we know that we are about to hear a narrative of mythical events; when we hear *Can I help you?* we expect a transactional genre; *A funny thing happened to me on the way to office* has us expecting a narrative of personal experience; and *Have you heard the one about the two elephants?* tunes us in for a joke. (Eggins 2004: 59)

This way of differentiating between genres brings us to the way genres are analyzed. There are two concepts that are crucial to the understanding of the “schematic structure” of generic forms: constituency and functional labeling. The term “constituency” refers to the idea that each text or utterance consists of constituents, be that sentences in the case of written communication or utterances/speech acts in the case of oral communication. As Eggins (2004) points out, the same applies to genres, which consist of discriminating steps or stages that help us see that the entire communicative task has its Beginning, Middle and End, which can (and, in fact, has to) be further divided into their subsequent constituents. The important thing is that, within SFL, such a division can be made based on two types of criteria: the formal and the functional ones (Eggins 2004: 60). Formal criteria entail a division into steps based on their form, which means that we organize constituents with respect to their type. Such an approach, however, is oriented at sameness, which in my opinion offers little analytic

chapter (in particular in section 2 of this chapter, where I describe the characteristics of communicative genres), and will underlie my discussion of genres in political communication in Chapter 2.

potential, because it does not explain why there are such steps within a given generic structure and, most importantly, what function they have (how they contribute to the whole).

A brilliant alternative to it is the second type of division, i.e. the functional one. As the name suggests, the functional approach entails a division of generic constituents on the basis of their function – but only on the assumption that these constituent stages play a role “relative to the whole” (Eggins 2004: 61), because if they do not, they are assigned “empty” functional labels. This is the case with, for example, Beginning (Introduction), Middle (Body) and End (Conclusion) of any text – as Eggins writes, any genre has got these three elements, so such labels have no explanatory power. Therefore, the researcher has to introduce a deeper level division within each of these three elements, and focus on the stages that can be assigned a functional label – a label as specific to that particular genre as possible. This is how the idea of “functional labeling” is unveiled – together with constituency, this concept helps structure the schemata of a particular genre and provide its analytic description.

In practice, it usually occurs that there are both obligatory and optional stages in a text or a talk exchange being examples of specific generic forms, so Eggins proposes the following definition:

A genre is thus defined in terms of its obligatory elements of schematic structure, and variants of a genre are those texts in which the obligatory schematic structure elements are realized, as well as perhaps some of the optional ones. (Eggins 2004: 65)

She further relates it to what Hasan (1985) referred to as (1) “generic structure potential” and (2) “actual generic structure” of a genre, i.e. the range of stages/elements which are (1) optional, and (2) obligatory for a given schematic structure to count as a representative example of a specific generic form.

Having briefly discussed register configuration and schematic structure as two out of three dimensions that, according to Eggins, enable us to recognize a genre, I now move on to the last one, i.e. the dimension called “realizational patterns”. This dimension entails the ability to relate particular functionally labeled stages of schematic structure to their linguistic realizations, and Eggins describes this step as the central procedure of the linguistic analysis of genres. Generic forms are always realized by certain defined discourse-semantic, lexicogrammatical and phonological patterns, all of which may be so varied that they become criteria for distinguishing one genre form another. What is more, these realizational patterns

might also help us distinguish particular elements of schematic structure, because the choice or configuration⁹ of words or structures will vary depending on stages within one genre.

All of the above described elements are characteristics of the SFL approach towards genres, which on balance appears as offering a potentially more systematic methodological procedure to follow than the frameworks presented in the preceding section on new rhetorical studies. Nevertheless, this approach seems to undermine one important property of genres, i.e. “genre hybridity”, as in her book *Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics*, Eggins (2004) treats hybridity as a characteristic feature of only two types of texts, that is, “fiction texts” such as J. K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter* series, which in her view blend various fantasy and realist genres, and “new journalism” texts (also referred to as “creative non-fiction”), where there is a blend of literary genres and journalism genres. Yet, genres hybridize in many other (and everyday) contexts of application as well – new media and politics are the most salient examples – and I shall account for this property in more detail in Section 2 of this chapter, where I delineate the most important properties of genres as they are in the contemporary communication.

1.4. Genres in applied linguistics

When it comes to applied linguistics, genre studies in this discipline have originated from the academic settings (i.e. teaching of academic writing), but many of their findings range beyond the field of English for Specific Purposes. Among the most notable applied contributions to this topic are those of Swales (1990, 2004, 2009) and Bhatia (1993, 2002, 2004), some of whose concepts also draw on notions already known from Systemic Functional Linguistics. This is the case with, for example, Swales’ definition of genres as classes of communicative events that share a common purpose or a set of purposes (1990: 45). Hence, just like in Systemic Functional Linguistics, genres are communicative vehicles used for the achievement of purposes, but Swales draws attention to the fact that this overarching

⁹ ‘Configuration’ is a more precise word here, because as Eggins (2004) rightly points out, “we have only one language to use to realize all these different stages, [and] it cannot be a question of stages using totally different words, or totally different structures from each other. Rather, we would expect to find that different stages use different configurations of words and structures, different clusterings of patterns” (p. 66).

and transdisciplinarily-present notion of “purpose” may constitute a real analytical challenge if taken as the main element defining a given genre. As long as there are genres, the purposes of which are very easy to spot, e.g. a recipe, the purpose of which is to enable its reader to succeed in the solitary challenge of cooking at home, there will be genres that have multiple purposes which are distinct from one another – or genres, the purposes of which are of secondary importance to their analysis. A good example of the former, i.e. a multi-purpose genre, is a political speech: commonsense and communicative purposes of this genre include presenting policy in as convincing a way as possible and/or ridiculing the policies and personalities of opposition parties. Nevertheless, doing justice to the changes in this genre caused by the pressure connected with the television coverage and the access to large audiences that it opens, Swales gives the example of the British Parliament and the practice of journalists who started measuring the length of ovations following speeches of major MPs (ibid.: 47). The length of these ovations has become a major success factor and, as a result, it has become another purpose of practicing the ‘political speech’ genre in the UK, for it has a strong influence on how these political speeches are written and delivered.

In contrast, a good example of the latter, i.e. genres with a lesser (communicative) purpose-orientation, are the poetic genres, in the case of which Swales claims the following:

Although there may be overt political, religious or patriotic tracts put out in the form of verse, the poetry that is taught, remembered, known and loved is rarely of that kind and inevitably makes an appeal to the reader or listener so complex as to allow no easy or useful categorization of purpose. Poems, and other genres whose appeal may lie in the verbal pleasure they give, can thus be separately characterized by the fact that they defy ascription of communicative purpose. (ibid.: 47)

Notwithstanding this heterogeneity, the notion of purpose is still a crucial element of the analysis of genres in communication. This is because it is strictly connected with the idea of genres as classes of communicative events. Swales (1990) defines communicative events as those “in which language (and/or paralanguage) plays both a significant and an indispensable role” in the fulfillment of a particular purpose within a given discourse community (p. 45)¹⁰. The concept of a discourse community¹¹ was first introduced by a sociolinguist Martin

¹⁰ As a consequence, events such as working out at a gym, doing housework, listening to music or looking at a picture are not perceived as communicative ones, because language does not play any major role in them.

¹¹ A New Rhetoric term related to ‘discourse community’ is the one of ‘rhetorical community’ (Miller 1994: 67-68).

Nystrand (1982) and further explored by Swales in his discussion of genres, where he defines it as a group of members with shared goals, means of communication and at least a basic institutional organization. Any discourse community can be characterized by at least the following 6 features (Swales 1990: 24-27):

1. Discourse community has common goals.
2. Discourse community members have common mechanisms of internal communication.
3. Discourse community members participate in it primarily to provide information and feedback.
4. Discourse community uses and, consequently, owns at least one genre to achieve its goals through communication.
5. Apart from the ownership of genre(s) discourse community members have also acquired specific lexis.
6. Discourse community has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content and discursual expertise.

Each of us is a member of a number of discourse communities every day, and participates in many communicative events. To give an example, today I have been the member of the following discourse communities: graduate students writing their doctoral dissertations (I am writing my dissertation now and I have contributed to a discussion list for PhD candidates), shoppers in a supermarket (an hour ago I bought bread and cigarettes), employees of a translation agency (I have submitted a progress report related to my current translation project), etc. In each of these cases I have been aware of what to say/write and how to say/write it in order to achieve my communicative purpose, but of course, it results from my experience – or in Eggin’s terms – ‘habitualization’ of particular linguistic practices, which, I believe, is rather an individual matter not only in the case of genres. For an opera singer, my discourse communities of translators or PhD candidates might be as inaccessible as the discourse communities of nuclear engineers or World of Warcraft gamers are for me. This is connected with the fact that some genres are more specialized than others and, as a result, membership in discourse communities that use them requires much more effort and expertise. To mark this difference, Swales (2009) has briefly divided genres into two categories: the public/open genres and the occluded/supporting genres. Open genres are those that are publicly available and often published, so it is relatively easy to gain competence in using them and join their discourse communities. Occluded genres, however, are quite the contrary. They are reserved for more specialized contexts and discourse communities, because by

nature they are not public and there are fewer examples of them available. Swales refers to such an occluded genre discussing the case of ‘statement of purpose’ (SOP), also referred to as ‘personal statement’ (PS), which is a document that graduate students have to submit when they apply for a PhD program in the USA. This example is also a good illustration of Swales’ model of analyzing genres, i.e. the ‘move analysis’, according to which each genre is realized by a number of moves (consisting of more or less optional steps) which help categories the text units according to the purpose of the respective moves and, consequently, the entire genre¹². Bekins, Huckin and Kijak (2004, cit. in Swales 2009: 8) conducted a move analysis of the SOP/PS documents from a graduate medical school, and proposed a classification that was followed in 60-70% of texts authored by graduate students who were accepted. The classification looks as follows:

- Move 1: Hook (a narrative to grab the reader’s attention)
 - Move 2: Program (why this particular specialization/location)
 - Move 3: Background (evaluation of skills, landmarks of achievement)
 - Move 4: Self-promotion (distinctive individual qualities)
 - Move 5: Projection (personal professional goals/career trajectory)
- (Bekins, Huckin and Kijak 2004, cit. in Swales 2009: 8)

These moves, however might not serve as a sufficiently representative example of this genre, because in the case of SOP/PS there are at least four factors which make writing it a challenging task.

Firstly, there are two different names for this genre, each of which implies a different focus of the document – the ‘statement of purpose’ sounds more future-oriented, while the ‘personal statement’ sounds more as a summary of so far achievements and academic interests rather than a declaration of future activities as a PhD candidate. Hence, the ultimate content or orientation of such a document may vary depending on how its name is interpreted.

Secondly, there are very few resources explaining how to write a successful SOP/PS, and the above mentioned Bekins, Huckin and Kijak’s classification is one of them, so graduate students have to take the risk and rely on what they deem fit and appropriate in their case. Obviously, a SOP/PS for a PhD program in new technologies will be different from a SOP/PS for a PhD program in Classical Philosophy.

¹² The model has been introduced and popularized under the name of Creating a Research Space model, which was based on the analysis of the introductory sections of research articles, and it has served as both a descriptive and prescriptive account of this part of the ‘research article’ genre.

Thirdly, and in connection with the previous point, SOP/PS is a document, the purpose of which is to convince the reader that I, as a graduate student, am good enough to be accepted for a particular PhD program. Nevertheless, my readers might have various expectations of what the PhD candidate should be like, and these factors will influence their reception of my SOP/PS – be that a matter of the internal requirements of academic institutions that I apply to, a matter of specificity of the scientific discipline that my readers represent, or even (in extreme cases) a matter of their subjective personal preferences. As a result, again, there is no one recipe for writing a successful SOP/PS and in many cases Bekins, Huckin and Kijak's classification may prove insufficient or even misleading.

Finally, any SOP/PS might be influenced by some extra-linguistic factors, such as the cultural background of its author. Based on his experiences at the University of Michigan, Swales has made an observation that the conventions and traditions of the culture which a particular graduate student represents, manifest themselves in strategies he/she uses in their SOP/PS. To illustrate, Scandinavians are exceptionally modest and instead of boasting about their achievements they prefer listing the activities and projects they were engaged in. East Asian graduate students outline even the early educational records and heavily rely on numbers, including a lot of ranking data to present themselves as legitimate candidates. Although this classification by Swales was meant to be largely jocular, there is more than a grain of truth in it, not only with respect to the occluded genres. In the recent years much attention has been paid to examining how a particular genre is realized in different cultures and some of contributions to this topic include the comparisons of: English and Spanish book reviews (Moreno and Suarez 2008), German and American lectures (Schleef 2009) or English and Chinese business faxes (Zhu 2013).

Many of the above mentioned concepts are also included within Bhatia's applied approach towards genres (1993, 1999, 2002) and framework for genre analysis, which integrates revisited Swales' considerations and selected concepts from New Rhetorical Studies and Systemic Functional Linguistics combined with those that come from disciplines such as ethnography and sociology, among others. The core Bhatia's motivation for offering such a wide and interdisciplinary perspective is that, in his view, the existing applied genre analysis models place different – and according to him, uneven – emphasis on aspects, which should be treated as complementary, i.e. the textual and extra-textual ones. On the one hand, he sees the way Swales joined linguistic and sociological concepts in his genre analysis model as insufficient, because this approach focuses primarily on linguistic factors, while

psychological or sociological factors are underplayed (Bhatia 1993). On the other hand, however, referring to the research of Lave and Wenger (1991), he claims that this framework does not help understand and explain the textual properties of genres in use, as it analyses mostly the practices and organization within discourse communities, which leaves space for some socio-critical and cultural considerations, but at the same time pushes the linguistic considerations to the background (cf. Bhatia 2002).

To distribute these analytic interests more evenly, Bhatia offers a genre analysis model (which is a development of Swales' framework) consisting of seven analytic categories divided into two groups. The first group includes two text-internal categories oriented at examining the linguistic properties of a given genre, i.e. the factors that influence text construction and interpretation. The second group includes five text-external socio-cultural categories, the role of which is, as the very name suggests, to examine "the wider context of the disciplinary community and culture in which the text is used and interpreted" (Bhatia 2002: 56).

Certainly, Bhatia's approach has a strong advantage over other existing approaches, as it tries to balance the linguistic and socio-critical dimensions of genre analysis, but in practice, however, text-internal and text-external categories may sometimes overlap, since the analysis the textual factors is usually linked to the wider disciplinary and social context of their use. Hence, attempts to make a clear-cut distinction between what is only textual and what is not, might be forced and unrealistic.

Bhatia's framework has received some criticism for "additionalism", which Gruber explains as "a tendency to adopt all relevant aspects of established genre theories while simultaneously neglecting the theoretical differences between them" (Gruber 2013: 37), but I think that any approach that aims to reconcile the differences between models from various linguistic fields and perspectives runs this risk. As long as genres do have a set of common properties¹³ irrespective of the linguistic field or perspective that they are analyzed in, there might be different motivations for genre analysis. Bhatia himself draws attention to this issue in following words:

¹³ Common properties of genres across various fields and perspectives on linguistics will be discussed in details in the second part of the following chapter.

Long term investment in and affiliation to different linguistic frameworks and to some extent geographical distances have encouraged people to define and pursue generic research to somewhat differing conclusions. Oftentimes, such a variation in approaches has also been prompted by different motivations for the analysis: a specific application of findings, a more socio-critical look at what people do with language, or a theoretical issue or focus. (Bhatia 2002: 4)

I think that these words serve as a useful summary of this section on genres in applied linguistics, but they would also serve well as a summary to the entire overview of approaches to genres across research disciplines and fields described in this chapter (subsections 1.1- 1.7). As has already been mentioned, there are many theories and methodologies of genre analysis, so various results are achieved and different conclusions are arrived at. Therefore, the choice of framework should always depend on our motivation as researchers and the data that we decide to use. When it comes to Bhatia's model, this is an approach particularly useful to those studies that investigate the ways in which power or ideology link to genre practices in a given discourse community.

Such links become even more salient in the case of CDA, sociolinguistics and pragmatics in particular, as these three domains of linguistic research can be characterized by a greater emphasis on the social and/or ideological dimension of communication than in the case of New Rhetorical Studies, Systemic Functional Linguistics or applied linguistics in general. This, of course, results from different orientation of these six research disciplines, so the CDA, sociolinguistic and pragmatic approaches to genres inherently deal with more socio-critical aspects of genres (and genre analysis) than the majority of approaches briefly discussed in the preceding subsections. Nevertheless, as I continuously try to illustrate in this theoretical-methodological overview of genre research, the frameworks of different researchers have long been and still are mutually-inspiring for them (either as a result of pure incorporation or constructive criticism), irrespective of the disciplines, under which they are classified. To list just a few of such inspiration, so far we could see that some sociolinguistic Nystrand's considerations have been reflected in Swales' framework of applied genre analysis. In the New Rhetorical School perspective on genres, the ideas of Hymes or Duranti have reverberated through the leading approaches. Finally, Bhatia's approach, although traditionally classified as an applied linguistic one and much inspired by the applied linguistics-oriented Swales' considerations, has undoubtedly moved into the direction of CDS, sociolinguistic and pragmatic research through its focus on power, ideology and change as essential aspects of analyzing genre practices in discourse communities.

On my part, this is an implicit argument against setting clear-cut and discipline-situated boundaries between models, and an argument for adopting a broad perspective of genres, i.e. such that gives credits to the discipline-situated origins of particular concepts, but allows to arrive at some inter-/transdisciplinary conclusions. In this vein, my brief discussion of Bhatia's approach serves as a transition between to the more socio-critical frameworks of generic research, as this is the orientation that drives my research on political communication in general, and the discourse of conflict as political genre in particular. Of course, notwithstanding this change of direction, in the next subsections of this chapter there will still be instances of theoretical considerations that draw on ideas already referred to in my earlier discussion, but CDS, sociolinguistics and pragmatics offer potentially the greatest theoretical and methodological potential of analyzing the socio-ideological dimension of genres in political communication.

1.5. Genres in Critical Discourse Studies

Many of my considerations in this section will be devoted to Fairclough's approach to the ways in which language and social practices are interconnected, and the ways in which they are bound and realized by genres (cf. Fairclough 1989, 1993, 2006). This is motivated by the fact that Fairclough, as one of the founders of Critical Discourse Studies, has published extensively on the topic of language and ideology, and most importantly, introduced the notion of 'discourse' into genre studies. Surprisingly, the notion of discourse is absent from many approaches to genres (cf. Lee 2001; briefly discussed in subsection 1.6) or appears there only in a very general sense (cf. Bhatia 2004). In the light of the fact that in the contemporary research in both humanities and social sciences discourse is a real buzz word, it is even more astonishing that it has appeared so rarely in the analyses of genres, because, after all, across linguistic fields and perspectives they are rather uniformly defined as staged utterance groups in discourse that are used to accomplish certain social goals (cf. Cap and Okulska 2013).

When it comes to Fairclough's approach, he draws on what Bakhtin (1986) called 'dialogism' and explained as explicit or implicit interconnectedness and referencing of

various discourses at every level of social life¹⁴. In Fairclough's view, this idea appears under the name of 'dialectic' (or 'dialectics'), which is a term that in his framework describes the coexistence and mutual influence of language and society. Hence, language and society are dialectically related and in this relationship discourse is an important form of social practice. He then further expands this argument by stating that there are three ways of operation in social life; these are genres, discourses and styles, which are also dialectically related. Nevertheless, before I elaborate on this idea, two more notions should be clarified to understand Fairclough's perception of genres.

The first notion is the one of 'social practices'. Fairclough (2003) defines them as more or less stable and durable forms of social activity, which are articulated together to constitute social fields, institutions, and organizations. This notion has already been referred to in the subsection devoted to genres in *New Rhetorical Studies*, but in my opinion in the CDS perspective social practices are perceived more broadly – as categories mediating between social structures and social events. As long as for example Miller (cf. subsection 1.2 of this chapter) saw them mostly as sets of regularized ways of acting in societies (including 'communicative acting' organized by genres), the CDS view draws attention to the idea that social practices reflect and further consolidate hierarchies and relations of power that function in these societies. It is done by means of discourse, or more precisely, by discursive practices, which at the same time reflect the conventions functioning in these societies and influence social practices. Fairclough provides the following explanation of this mutual relationship:

Linguistic phenomena are social in the sense that whenever people speak or listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have social effects, and (...) social phenomena are linguistic, on the other hand, in the sense that the language activity which goes on in social contexts (as all language activity does) is not merely a reflection or expression of social processes and practices, it is a part of those processes and practices. (Fairclough 2001: 19)

Thus, languages and other semiotic systems are social structures and they become tools in the hands of those in the position of power. This is central to the general motivation of CDS studies, for which discursive practices are used to produce and reproduce unequal distribution of power, and for this reason approaches labeled as CDS-grounded adopt the perspective of

¹⁴ Since 1970s these ideas of Bakhtin were perceived as congruent and complementary with concepts such as "intertextuality" (cf. Kristeva 1980).

the oppressed social groups in order to unveil their role in the creation of hierarchies and power relations.

Another notion important to the discussion of genres in CDS is the one of ‘semiosis’. This concept has been introduced by an American philosopher, logician and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce, who defined it as any form of activity, conduct, or process that involves signs and production of meaning. Fairclough perceives semiosis in a similar way – as “a category which designates the broadly semiotic elements (as opposed to and in relation to other, non-semiotic, elements) of social life (language, but also visual semiosis, body language etc.)”, but he points out that in many cases this definition is erroneously used with reference to the notion of discourse (ibid.: 453). In simple terms, semiosis is the process of signification in language, while discourse is a category used to designate representations of particular aspects of social life. Thus, as long as semiosis is about pure signification, discourse is about representation, which is never neutral, because it always assumes a particular point of view. Additionally, Fairclough stresses the idea that there are many discourses, as there are various representations of the same social phenomena and problems.

Drawing on these assumptions, we may move on to the presentation of the role of genres in CDS. Here, as we already know from my introductory remarks to this section, genres are perceived as one of three interconnected elements of operation in social life, i.e. discourses, styles and genres. The plural form of discourse means here sets of various representations of particular social phenomena created by various ideological actors, i.e. institutions, organizations or groups that hold power and/or address large audiences. ‘Styles’ are defined as properties of texts used in these discourses, which can be characterized by some identifiable meanings and forms that make them distinguishable from each other (e.g. styles of business managers or politicians). Finally, ‘genres’ are defined as diverse ways of acting and understanding discourse, which may be used to manipulate and frame it, and in consequence, to force particular representations and maintain the set distribution of power.

Contrary to some of the previously mentioned linguistic traditions, however, in CDS there is an argument against defining and naming genres according to their purpose. This is motivated by the fact that Fairclough sees them as activities that may have more than one purpose (and in such cases these purposes may be organized hierarchically), and emphasizes that in this respect genres cannot be treated as equal, because some of them are more purpose-

driven than others¹⁵. For example, if we consider a small talk and a political interview, we instantly feel a difference between these two, and we realize that as long as the range of purposes of the latter activity may be vast and varied, the former one seems so simple that it cannot play any major role in social life – which is not necessarily the truth. This is connected to Habermasian division of social (inter)actions into ‘strategic’ and ‘communicative’ ones, according to which the first type of actions is targeted at understanding, while the second type is targeted at getting results, but this dichotomy may not hold water if we try to label interactions as only strategic or only communicative. Even the simplest exchange of information may be more than just communicative and a good example of it may be a small talk in MacDonald’s, where the fact that the staff says ‘Have a nice day’ may be imposed by the company’s marketing strategy and play a (strategic) role in creating the customer’s impression of friendliness. Of course, a small talk cannot be put on a par with a political interview with respect to purposes it is assumed to serve or results it is meant to achieve, but in each of these cases there are elements which are communicative, and those that are strategic. It is only their degree that differs. This point will be further explored in Chapter 2, where I comment on the nature of communication in general and political communication in particular, and where I argue that almost anything can be political and strategic.

Coming back to the discussion of genres, another important point made by Fairclough is that generic structures reflect and constitute social relations between agents that use them, i.e. individuals, organizations or groups, at all levels of interaction. This, in turn, is connected with the sociolinguistic considerations of Brown and Gilman (1960), who outlined two dimensions, in which social relations vary. The first dimension is the one of power and refers to the ways in which social hierarchies are construed and maintained in discourse, while the second dimension is the one of solidarity and the ways in which social distance and intimacy are created. As Fairclough points out, communication between organizations (e.g. governments, institutions) and individuals has always been highly hierarchical, involved uneven distribution of power and could be characterized by large social distance. Nowadays, however, due to the process that Fairclough calls ‘conversationalization of public discourse’, influential social actors in their struggle for legitimation and support resort to using less formal genres, discourses and styles to give the impression of a more even distribution of

¹⁵ Again, this is an argument already presented in my discussion of genres in applied linguistics in section 1.4 of this chapter.

power and a reduced social distance between them and individuals. As a result, within CDS genres are perceived mostly as vehicles for ideologically imbued content that reflects all these inequalities and changes – even if it seems that power and hierarchy are pushed to the background by means of conversationalized discourse, informal style or simple genres.

In Fairclough's approach, texts and discourses are analyzed, first, with respect to 'genre chains' and 'genre mixtures', and at the last stage, with respect to individual genres that are present in them. By this, Fairclough analyses their interdiscursive (i.e. dialectic) character and the ways in which genres, discourses and styles mix and relate to each other at various levels of text organization. He links it with the concept of "disembedding of social material from particular social contexts and practices, so that it becomes available across different fields" and suggests that genres undergo this process as well, as they restructure, rescale and hybridize in all contexts of communication and social practices (p. 67). He also introduces a division of genres depending on how abstract as categories they are; in this vein, he defines 'pre-genres' as the most abstract ones (e.g. narrative or argument), 'disembedded genres' as less abstract (e.g. interview), and 'situated genres' as those that are most easily linkable to particular social practices (e.g. ethnographic interview). This division helps to analyze genres in the first two steps, i.e. as chains and as mixtures, as he believes that in texts there are usually combinations of many generic structures. When it comes to the analysis of individual genres, Fairclough proposes the following:

The individual genres of a text or interaction can be analyzed in terms of: Activity, Social Relations, and Communication Technology – what are people doing, what are the social relations between them, and what communication technology (if any) does their activity depend on? (Fairclough 2003: 70)

In the case of the analysis of Activity, the focus is placed mostly on its discursive aspect, although Fairclough distinguishes between social activities in which a) discourse plays a primary role (e.g. a lecture, an interview), and those in which b) discourse is only ancillary (a game of football or a car repair). When it comes to social relations, the already discussed issues of power and hierarchy come into play, and the researcher's task is to see how these two are manifested in this particular genre. Last but not least, the influence of communication technology is an important element of analyzing those genres that indeed derive from and depend on it, e.g. blogs (cf. Kopytowska 2013) or online advertisements (cf. Mackay 2013), as they also illustrate the impact of multimodality on contemporary communication and the structure of genres. Due to the fact that CDS is a group of interdisciplinary approaches that

use eclectic methodologies, multiple genres and public spaces are studied in a variety of ways – but always with a focus on their socio-ideological dimensions. To name just a few of the most contemporary CDA-informed contributions to genre studies, there are analysis oriented at examining how persuasion is achieved through the use of hybrids of genres in the contexts of politics (cf. Motek-Kozakowska 2013), or how particular genres function in different social fields, e.g. through the comparison of the genres of meetings in political institutions and in business organizations (cf. Wodak 2013).

To conclude, much of the theory that CDS draws on in the research on genres, comes from fields such as Systemic Functional Linguistics or applied linguistics, but without doubts Fairclough's focus on discourse and genres as locus of power and ideology is a very important addition to the earlier existing approaches, as it stresses that genres are ways that text producers use to manipulate and frame the opinions of text receivers. The next subsection will partly continue in this vein, as it is devoted to approaches to genres that are classified as primarily sociolinguistic, although it has to be remembered that many Fairclough's ideas are rooted in this field as well – I have described them in this section only because of Fairclough's primary affiliation with (critical) discourse studies and his tremendous influence on Critical Discourse Studies as we know it today.

1.6. Genres in sociolinguistics

Sociolinguistics deals primarily with analyzing the relationships of language and society, and the impact social factors such as, e.g. cultural norms, ethnicity, level of education, gender or age, have on communication. William Labov, a very influential figure in the history of American sociolinguistics, called this discipline 'secular linguistics', and justified this name by stating that it came to life "in reaction to the contention among many linguists working in a broadly Chomskyan framework that language can be dissociated from its social functions" (Labov *unknown date*, cit in. Chapman and Routledge 2005: 174). Thus, sociolinguistics adopts roughly the same perspective as CDA, but enriched with analysis of phonological, syntactic and semantic factors, and with a generally more descriptive and less critical orientation of research.

When it comes to genres, we could already see some sociolinguistic influences on approaches to genres in frameworks discussed in the paragraphs on Systemic Functional

Linguistics or CDS. When it comes to influences **on** sociolinguistic approaches to genres, the important sources of ideas are considerations of Hymes (1967, 1972, 1974, 1975) and, again, Bakhtin. Within linguistic anthropology, which is historically closely related to sociolinguistics, and which has inspired many its considerations through direct application or criticism, there are basically two orientations of approaches to genres. One of them sees genres as discourse-classifying and discourse-ordering tools, while the other one pays attention to ambiguity and dynamism of genres in communication (cf. Briggs and Bauman 1992). Generally speaking, however, genres are perceived as concepts that seem too fuzzy and too global to allow for a detailed formal and functional linguistic analysis. This is attributed to the fact that, as many researchers point out, genres originate from literary studies, and as such they seem unsuitable for everyday conversations and the linguistic side of social interaction. Indeed, these are broad empirical categories and given their literary heritage, definitely the greatest number of linguistic studies of genres uses them as units to classify discourse. This problem has already been addressed by Bakhtin in his discussion of speech genres as disparate from their literary ancestors, and these insights together with the development of frameworks of ethnography of speaking (cf. Hymes 1996) or performance-oriented approaches to verbal art (cf. Bauman 2006) inspired models that paid growing attention to social, cultural, ideological or political-economic factors underlying genres in communication. This, in turn, also results from the impact intertextuality makes on genres – generic structures hybridize and develop to suit the accomplishment of (not only) communicative goals of text producers in any domain of social life.

In my discussion of New Rhetorical Studies-based approaches to genres I drew attention to a conceptual congruency of genres and speech events, and this is the right moment to clarify why some scholars claim that this is only an apparent confluence. In his writings on genres Dell Hymes used the Austinian terminology of speech acts and speech events to show how these are interrelated with generic structures. As Briggs and Bauman (1992) point out, he offered three complementary perspectives:

(1) genre as category of type of speech act or event; (2) genre as a nexus of interrelationships among components of the speech event; (3) genre as a formal vantage point on speaking practice. (Briggs and Bauman 1992: 574)

Thus, when it comes to (1), genres do not equate with speech events, as each genre can be realized by multiple speech acts, and in a particular speech event multiple genres can be used.

The argument in (2) refers, again, to the idea of intertextuality and the fact that generic components in one speech event are mutually related, which – due to significant hybridization¹⁶ of genres in communication – means that in majority of cases a speech event could equate with a ‘generic hybrid’, but not with an individual genre. Finally, (3) shows that genres have a different orientation than speech acts. Genres focus on the more or less routinized and conventionalized organization of the structure of language, i.e. something that ranges beyond the scope of a sentence. By contrast, speech acts as utterances that serve a function in communication, focus on speaking as a means of social action, but an individual speech act could never be categorized as a genre, because it is too short to allow for such a categorization. Rather, we can arrive at some patterns of speech acts or classes of speech acts within a particular genre, and examine to what extent these patterns are routinized and conventionalized in the communicative practices of a given group or community or a given generic structure.

These considerations bring us to the sociolinguistic definition of genre, which can be described as “conventionalized yet highly flexible organization of formal means and structures that constitute complex frames of reference for communicative practices” (Briggs and Bauman 2009: 221). In this view, genres are seen as arising from the organization of discourse and the organization of the event in which they are employed, because they serve as a way of selecting the discursive forms that may be used in speaking or writing. In sociolinguistics, this makes them connected to a wide range of discourse features that seem relevant for any communicative situation, e.g. form, function or effect, content, orientation to the world, truth value, tone, social distribution, and manner or contexts of use (cf. Briggs and Bauman *ibid.*: 223).

When it comes to analyzing genres, in the early writings in the ethnography of speaking and sociolinguistics much attention has been paid to examining how genres transfer from one context to another, and which generic structures are more prone to this transferability. Alternatively, researchers focused on strict correlations between a particular genre and a particular social event in a particular society (cf. Abrahams 1976), but such studies contributed to the perception of genres as static structures, which quite contradicted the general view held by Hymes. Nevertheless, with the development of the discipline,

¹⁶ In Hymes’s terms, the process of combining elements or features of different genres which leads to genre transformation is called “metaphrasis” (cf. Hymes 1975).

sociolinguistic studies have turned their eye to the potential of analyzing generic intertextuality on the assumption that by this interconnectedness genres play an important role in the societies. Briggs and Bauman explain this originally Bakhtinian idea in the following words:

(...) generic intertextuality provides a powerful means of ordering discourse in historical and social terms. Genres have strong historical association – proverbs and fairytales have the ring of the traditional past, whereas electronic mail (E-mail) is associated with the ultramodern. Genres also bear social, ideological and political-economic connections; genres may thus be associated with groups defined by gender, age, social class, occupation, and the like. Invoking a genre thus creates indexical connections that extend far beyond the present setting of production and reception, thereby linking a particular act to other times, places and persons. (Briggs and Bauman 2009: 226)

As a result, we may see that texts aimed at creating the impression of authority, and the function of which is persuasion or legitimization, often rely on well-established, traditional genres and incorporate elements of or references to texts already perceived as sources of wisdom or authority. This practice is so common that it occurs that any social, cultural, ideological or political-economic factors underlying any instance of generic intertextuality and the resulting communicative practices are targeted at shaping the society and history. Thus, just as it was in the case of CDS, genres are associated with order and power, and hierarchies of genres are tied to social hierarchies.

As far as the formal aspect of intertextuality is concerned, Briggs and Bauman point out that “texts may be aligned to different genres or classified as a mixed genre, and in each case the resulting relations may be [either] fixed or emergent and open-ended” (Briggs and Bauman *ibid.*: 234). This is also connected to an interesting idea of “intertextual gaps” that are places usually intentionally left for the readers to fill in or for the audience to reconstruct. Let us consider, for example, the performances of stand-up comedians and the genre of stand-up comedy – in this case two most popular types of intertextual gaps are understatements and (purposeful) silence. Each of these gaps, however, is meant to, first, be filled in by the audience, and then, most importantly, make the people laugh.

Another aspect of intertextual gaps that is important in the discussion of genres, is the relation between the frequency of such gaps and, say, rigidness of a genre. When intertextual gaps appear frequently, are maximized and highlighted, it means that a given genre has a more loose and open-ended structure; when they are minimized, the genre is meant to serve as a manifestation of order. Bauman connects this idea to the ideology and politics of genre in the following words:

Within any speech community or historical period, genres will vary with regard to the relative tightness or looseness of generic regimentation, but certain genres may become the object of special ideological focus. Prescriptive insistence on strict generic regimentation works conservatively in the service of established authority and order, while the impulse toward the widening of intertextual gaps and generic innovation is more conducive to the exercise of creativity, resistance to hegemonic order, and openness to change. These factors will be closely tied as well to hierarchies of value and taste (which genres are evaluated as relatively higher, better, more beautiful, more moral) and to the social regimentation of access to particular generic forms (who can learn them, master them, own them, perform them, and to what effect). (Bauman 2004: 8)

Hence, both at the level of form and the level of content genres serve as an ample source of information about people, places and times they are used in. In this respect the sequence “ideology and politics of genre” could also be supplemented with the notion of “anthropology” of genre, as also the genres used in contexts other than politics and governance, tell a lot about the cultures, values and customs they represent, and their changes that take place over decades or ages. An interesting example of it is the genre of a wedding request. Contemporarily, in the so called Western world such a genre can be generally characterized by a rather loose regimentation. Of course, there is a standard question-answer sequence, in which the traditionally asked question and the expected answer have rather stable forms and content, but over time more and more creative and open applications of this generic structure appear to serve as an example of innovativeness and uniqueness that are perceived as values in our high-tech modern societies.

Thus, to summarize this section, it is important to once again stress that, following Bakhtin, sociolinguistics sees genres as socially constructed and conventionalized structures that reflect the ways communities are organized and the changes that take place in social life. Genres are internally and mutually related by means of intertextuality, which either links texts to some generic traditions or opens space for new generic possibilities. As such, they bear information about groups that use them and reflect culture, gender, age or profession-driven differences in communication patterns. As a result, many sociolinguistic studies of genres evolve around comparative analyses of the same generic structure used in, for example, different cultural contexts or by different gender (cf. Beeching, Armstrong and Gadet 2009; Herring and Paolillo 2006), but always with the overarching goal of examining how social factors influence language acquisition, communication and linguistic activity of individuals and groups.

1.7. Genres in linguistic pragmatics

The last subsection of my general overview of approaches to genres across various fields and perspectives of linguistics presents one that, together with CDS, beacons this entire dissertation and my research conducted for its purposes. This is linguistic pragmatics that – starting from this point and continuing through succeeding sections and chapters – shall steer the direction of my genre-related considerations, as my perception of the discourse of conflict as political genre results primarily from criteria that are inherently cognitive-pragmatic.

Criteria of the same kind have motivated other researchers to seek models for genre analysis that would embrace both social and cognitive aspects of language comprehension and production, and would allow to examine both the linguistic and extra-linguistic facets of genres as structures regulating and governing our communication. As we could so far see, CDS and sociolinguistic approaches to genre analysis have partly contributed to this topic with their focus on social factors as elements underlying and influencing particular discourses and genres. Nevertheless, the pragmatic perspective on language (and language studies) has called for a greater and more transdisciplinary integration of these and other factors – including the cognitive ones – to accommodate those aspects of communication and genres that range beyond the realm of language.

The beginnings of such a pragmatic approach to genres date back to mid 1990s, when Paltridge (1995) attempted at presenting a cognitively and socially sensitive perspective on analyzing generic structures. Although his framework that I will briefly present here is just one of a number of pragmatic models available up to now, he was probably the first to pave the way for pragmatics in genre studies. Notwithstanding these two decades that have passed since the publication of his first paper on this topic, his then insights still serve as a representative account of how genres are perceived in pragmatics and why this perception is so distinguishing from approaches already existing in other disciplines and empirical fields of linguistics.

First and foremost, Paltridge (1995) states that pragmatic genre analysis should focus on examining relationships between social and cognitive aspects of comprehension and production of communicative events, because these are the factors that enable users to recognize what generic structure they are in. The same socio-cognitive criteria enable discourse communities to label communicative events as instances of particular genres and classify even quite discriminatory texts/events as examples of the same generic category, i.e.

to do something that would be impossible if in this classification we relied on purely linguistic aspects only. This is workable thanks to three concepts: prototypicality, intertextuality and inheritance (1995: 394).

Prototypicality is a term that stems from prototype theory (cf. Rosch 1973, 1975), according to which people and cultures group ideas, concepts and phenomena based on how congruent they are with some prototypical images they have in their mind. Any such image in our cognitive system has its prototypical realization that results from our common expectations as to what conditions are necessary to decide that something represents A and not B. Paltridge claims that the same refers to genres and takes place on two levels. The first level is the lexico-grammatical one: we tend to categorize individual language items (mostly lexical and syntactic ones) based on comparison and contrast with some prototypical models that we conceive of, to decide what genre they represent. The second level is the socio-cognitive one and boils down to all extra-linguistic prototypical properties that we treat as *this-and-not-that-genre-characteristic* in a given communicative event: in vast majority of cases we (are expected to) know which contexts, social fields and domains of life entail which genres (and which roles and goals are *this-and-not-that-genre-specific*), and we use these information in our genre-detection processes. It should be noted, though, that these two types of prototypical properties are not defining properties, i.e. they do not assume a strict classification of generic structures according to unalterable criteria, because if they did, it would mean that any deviation from the cut-and-dried set would require a new generic label. Rather, they allow for and are open to a substantial degree of flexibility and exclusion of some prototypical properties as long as the general socio-cognitive ones remain. Paltridge illustrates this with an example of the genre of ‘research article’, which may be quite differently realized depending on the discipline, country or journal a particular text comes from. As experience shows, such differences may be so significant that on a micro-level or lexico-grammatical texts it may be impossible to compare them, but still they are all treated and classified as research articles. How does it happen? When language-based criteria fail, a wider cognitive approach comes into play:

A prototypical theory of categorization (...) allows for the inclusion of such cases within the umbrella of the one single genre by basing deviations from the central prototypical core on **how the world sees particular instances of a genre**, rather than much less flexible approach held in classical theories of categorization where “entities are classified into sets with clear-cut boundaries and where an entity is seen as either belonging or not to a set” (Forbes 1992: 378-379 cit. in. Paltridge 1995: 395, my emphasis).

Thus, much of our communication is largely flexible and meaning is dependent on structures that range beyond language, so genres should be identified not only based on their internal, purely linguistic properties, but also – if not primarily – based on their external aspects that are inherently pragmatic and perceptual.

Another important notion in Paltridge's pragmatic perspective on genre analysis is intertextuality. Again, this term has already been referred to in previous subsections of this chapter, but in his conceptualization this idea becomes central to the interpretation of communicative events as genres. Whenever we encounter texts, we interpret them always in relation to other texts that we know and to the prototypes that we have as individuals, groups or cultures. Furthermore, each of us interprets texts based on our individual reading, which means that there is no such thing as correct, right or single meaning. It is always shaped by our perception, our experiences and the culture that we belong to. All of these aspects make interpretation intertextual, so the classification of genres turns, again, more flexible than in classical approaches. The same applies to the production of texts: a text never comes out of the blue – in the sense that it is so distinctive and novel that it cannot be classified as belonging to or drawing on any existing generic category. This argument is stressed by deconstructionists who claim that the influence of precursors on our writings is so great that we cannot escape it even if wanted to. Thus, even if we produce a text that is a strong deviation from the prototype, it may still – through interpretation – be categorized as a given genre, as it is world that may see it this and not the other way.

The third concept that is essential to the understanding of mutual relations within and between genres is inheritance. Paltridge draws on de Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) definition, according to which inheritance is a transfer of knowledge between items whose types or sub-types are the same or similar. There are three types of such a transfer: 1) an instance inherits all characteristics of its class, unless expressly cancelled, 2) subclass instances inherit from superclass instances only those characteristics that the narrower specification of the subclass allows, 3) instances inherit from those instances that they stand in analogy (Paltridge 1997: 61).

The first type of inheritance could be illustrated by the following example: we all assume that Elvis Presley had toes, because he was an instance of the class of 'human beings'. The second type of inheritance can be seen when we look at 'hens': this is a subclass of the 'birds' superclass and although there are many shared characteristics of hens and birds in

general, there is one major difference – hens cannot fly. As for the third type of inheritance, Paltridge illustrates it with the following example:

For example, researchers in cognitive science and artificial intelligence make assumptions about the human mind in analogy with the computer. Without claiming that minds and computing machines are the same things, they can still discover comparable characteristics that are helpful in building models of cognition (ibid.)

When it comes to the role of inheritance in genre analysis, we can see that this is what makes some texts more and other texts less similar to a particular generic prototype. Thus, inheritance is always *there* and any text represents one of the three inheritance types.

In Paltridge's approach, prototypicality, intertextuality and inheritance play a central role in how a communicative event is identified and classified as a genre, but there is just one more type of criteria that works to this end lest the three mentioned concepts provide an insufficient number of properties for genre identification and classification. These are felicity conditions, i.e. pragmatic criteria that we are already familiar with from the Austinian Speech Act Theory and that are typically applied to speech acts. According to Paltridge, felicity conditions also work well in the case of genres, because they enable those genre identifications and classification that would be impossible when the number of, for example, linguistic or stereotypical properties of a given text is too small to assign generic category membership. To illustrate, the following felicity conditions for a text to be identified and classified as belonging to a prototype of a scientific report genre could be listed:

(...) a piece of research must have been carried out in order to write a report on it. The research also must include the testing of some hypothesis by means of a particular research procedure. The person carrying out the research and reporting on it must be a scientist, academic or research worker and must have a knowledge of the area in question, including related previous research (...). The resultant text, further, must appear in a scientific journal. (Paltridge 1995: 399).

Thus, as Paltridge points out, the research “must be carried out and reported on by the right person, in the right place and at the right time, with a specific intent” in order to conform to the requirements of genre and be recognized as a representation of this genre (ibid.). As we know, these felicity conditions are essentially extra-linguistic, which proves particularly helpful in understanding two aspects of communicative genres, namely i) that genre analysis ranges beyond the analysis of language, and ii) that pragmatic aspects of texts/instances/communicative events are genre-assigning even when the properties of these texts/instances/communicative events are non-prototypical. These pragmatic conditions of

classification also draw on what Paltridge calls “institutional understandings” (1995: 401). Basically, these are ideology and beliefs of a given discourse community and its shared prototypical perceptions and expectations of particular genres. These institutional understandings also refer to status and power relations between the sender and the receiver(s), and some shared knowledge that they have and that enables them to decide what is appropriate, accepted or clear for all members of the discourse community.

Paltridge arrived at these observations as a result of a study that he conducted analyzing the Introduction section of research articles. One of the interesting conclusions that he reached as a result of adopting this pragmatic perspective was that there were no lexical items/lexico-grammatical patterns that would repeatedly occur in all texts under analysis and serve as this genre-specific; still, however, all texts under analysis were, through felicity conditions, accepted as examples of the ‘research article’ genre. Hence, pragmatic criteria turn helpful in the light of the fact that genres are flexible and varied structures that may regulate communication and accomplish communicative goals through different linguistic means. This serves as an ultimate argument against analyzing genres as linguistically-shaped structures only, which is congruent with Biber’s view that “[g]enres are defined and distinguished on the basis of systematic nonlinguistic criteria, and they are valid in those terms” (Biber 1989: 39).

Furthermore, Paltridge’s considerations well illustrate the currently mainstream views that pragmatically-oriented integrated and trans-disciplinary approaches are particularly effective in genre analysis, as they enable to draw general conclusions about genres analyzed without the necessity to disregard or overlook some irregularities that appear in them. This is particularly important considering the fact that that communicative genres are flexible macrostructures that leave room for some arbitrariness and evolve with the changing communicative environment: technology develops, new forms, structures and modes of communication appear and the existing ones hybridize or are suppressed, the influence of cultural factors on how we communicate is substantial, socio-political changes take place, new orders, standards and hierarchies replace the existing ones. These are phenomena that, on the one hand, range beyond language and, on the other hand, shape it, so linguistic research has to keep pace with all these changes and employ methods and theories that will be sensitive to these extra-linguistic factors and influences. Therefore, it seems that the more pragmatically-oriented trans-disciplinary research frameworks we adopt in our studies, the bigger the chances are that we will be able to correctly categorize, interpret and understand all that emerges as new.

The most current contributions to genre studies continue in this vein in a growing manner, since researchers employ more and more inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches that integrate ideas, theories and methodologies from various disciplines and empirical fields. Due to the fact that my research interests that evolve around political discourse, I shall provide some examples of the most up-to-date studies that come from this field and use integrated frameworks that embrace pragmatics as one of the supplementary perspectives on analyzing genres. The first example of such research is Fetzer and Bull's (2013) analysis of the genre of political interviews. As their discussion shows, this generic structure has attracted particularly diverse theoretical conceptualizations, but as the authors claim, any of the available frameworks can be applied as they are not mutually exclusive. Fetzer and Bull's approach is a compositional methodological one that draws on ethnomethodological conversation analysis, Critical Discourse Studies, social psychology, media studies, pragmatics and sociopragmatics. All these areas and empirical fields are allied to analyze political interviews with respect to the extent to which this genre reflects the characteristics of media communication and professional discourse.

Another example of such an integrated and pragmatically-driven genre research comes from Mackay (2013), who addresses the topic of legitimization in online political spot ads based on data from 2008 American presidential elections. In this case the well-established genre of political speech is placed in a new – multimodal – setting of online advertising and the study shows what legitimization patterns are used in the new media context. This study of the pragmatic function of legitimization as the overarching goal of the genre of political spot ads illustrates how a change of communicative setting alters the hierarchy of legitimization tools and, most importantly, shows how multimodal genres suppress those typical ones that rely on text and talk only.

Another interesting contribution, as it has already been briefly mentioned in a couple of times in this chapter, comes from Kopytowska (2013) who deals with only quite recently emergent genres, i.e. political blogs, in an attempt to establish their structural and functional profile as a generic form. Two most prominent political blogs in Poland and in England were analyzed and compared to illustrate how the mechanism of proximization leads to the replacement of the uni-directional media communication with a multi-directional interaction of media and the audience. Both empirically and theoretically the study offers an important contribution to the research of the latest phenomena in political communication and reveals the potential of political blogs as a highly effective element of mediatized politics. In this case

the theory of proximization that embraces concepts from pragmatics, cognitive linguistics and critical approaches, is taken as set of strategies purposefully shaping the reduced temporal, spatial, axiological, emotional and cognitive distance between the blogger and the audience, which has a tangible influence on the content and the form of the genre of political blogs.

These and other current research efforts that employ pragmatics as one of the components of their integrated approaches are often targeted at grasping the essential novelties and developments in the ways people communicate. As it has already been mentioned, the motivation behind applying a pragmatic and a cognitive glass to genre research is mostly caused by the fact that the content of all our communicative activity (in any social fields, domains of life and disciplines) is more and more heterogeneous. In effect, new challenges for the researchers arise, since communicative genres that we are exposed to often transgress their original fields and migrate to other fields, where they change their, gain new functions and lose their original ones. Nevertheless, still the notion of ‘function’ remains central to genre studies, as communication and structures that regulate it are never an art for art’s sake – in this respect I conform to the view that all utterances are performative (in line with the Searlian tradition), so all communicative activity of ours is function-driven.

I would like to conclude this entire section and my overview of the most influential approaches to genre studies presented in subsections 1.1-1.7 with some general remarks on the panorama of generic research that I described so far; this will also pave the way for my brief discussion of some common characteristics of communicative genres across disciplines and empirical fields, which will occupy the remaining pages of this chapter.

As we could see, in nearly all theories genres are perceived as recognizable, typified, staged, structured and goal-oriented patterns of social interaction that are realized, identified and constructed by both linguistic (discursive) and extra-linguistic (extra-discursive) means. Their properties are traceable and analyzable both on the level of structure-internal and structure-external parameters, and they are inherently connected to and imposed by situational, social and institutional constraints. Nevertheless, as has been discussed, various discipline-situated approaches adopted different vantage points on the how to analyze genres and for what purposes such analyses are conducted.

Frameworks under the new rhetoric approach focused their attention primarily on contexts of genre use (micro-, meso- and macro- levels of genre use in activity systems (cf. Russel 1997) and generic structures that are anchored in writing and written communication. As a result, they received some criticism for, for example, being insensitive to other

modalities, which in the light of the current changes in communication forms and modes makes them difficult to apply in the analysis of generic structures that entail more than a mere textual form. Still, however, new rhetoric contribution to genre studies is influential, as it integrated well-established classical rhetoric notions with the early 20th century developments in humanist and social scientific thought, thus illustrating the validity of and the need for interdisciplinary considerations.

Systemic Functional Linguistics, in turn, directed the focus on the contexts of genre use to two levels – the level of situation and the level of culture – and the ways in which people gain their ability to identify and use genres. In this view, genres are classified based on either i) the type of social activity genre users are engaged in, or ii) the function of a particular generic structure; however, in the latter case on the assumption that all genre constituents play a role relative to the whole. Nevertheless, some SFL approaches to generic research tend to underplay the role of hybridity in the process of creating genres (cf. Eggins 2004), which seems to stand in opposition to the current views, according to which hybridity is a common property of all communicative genres, and a strong factor shaping the changes and developments in contemporary generic structures.

Applied linguistic studies in this topic originated from the academic settings, which made them initially oriented primarily at genres typical of written communication. Further contributions to genre studies have, however, shed a light on other modalities as well, and eventually led to the perception of genres as events “in which language (and/or paralanguage) plays both a significant and an indispensable role” (Swales 1990: 45). This served as a significant inspiration for other researchers to examine the influences of culture, context or situation on the genre use and interpretation, which paved the way for the analysis of both linguistic and socio-critical dimensions of generic structure. This is a significant contribution, as such a wider perspective on genres has enabled to see the links between power, ideology and genre practices in discourse communities, which, in turn, inspired researchers from disciplines such as CDS, sociolinguistics and pragmatics to continue in this vein and offer models that embrace various aspects of genre use and address the larger social consequences of it.

This idea is particularly visible in the ways in which Critical Discourse Studies conceptualize genres. Within this discipline they are understood as diverse ways of acting and understanding discourse that are used to manipulate and frame it, and in consequence, to force particular representations and maintain the established distribution of power. As a result, even

the most ordinary and everyday genres such as a small talk MacDonalD's might occur to have a larger strategic purpose. CDS also draws attention to the new phenomena that take place in communication such as 'conversationalization of public discourse' (cf. Fairclough 2001) which plays, again, a strategic role in shaping generic structures, discourses and styles, all of which become new tools for conveying ideology and influencing social relations.

Genre studies conducted within sociolinguistics have much in common with linguistic anthropology and, in particular, with one of the ways in which genres are conceptualized in this field. In linguistic anthropology there are basically the following two perspectives on genres: i) a static one, according to which genres are perceived as discourse-classifying and discourse-ordering tools, and ii) a dynamic one, which sees them as varied and changing structures of communication. With the development of frameworks of ethnography of speaking (cf. Hymes 1996) and performance-oriented approaches to verbal art (cf. Bauman 2006), this dynamic perception has been enriched with the interest in social, cultural, ideological or political-economic factors underlying genre use, and the role of intertextuality in the production and reception of generic structures. Moreover, considerable attention has been paid to what we could call "anthropology of genre", i.e. the comparison generic practices in different cultures.

Finally, developments in genre studies that come from the borderland of cognitive linguistics and pragmatics, which delineate the general disciplinary orientation of this dissertation, attempt to examine both the linguistic and extra-linguistic facets of genres as structures regulating and governing communication. In this venture they incorporate mainly social and cognitive aspects of language comprehension and production to encompass even those quite discriminatory texts and communicative events that we encounter every day under some common generic categories that would enable to understand how and for what purpose genres evolve. Again, intertextuality is placed in the foreground, and it, together with some other criteria, is employed to facilitate the classification of texts/communicative events into generic categories. The pragmatic perspective on genres manifests itself in a variety of elements, but one of its origins is definitely the proposal to, e.g. apply the notion of felicity conditions in the process of genre detection, reception and classification (cf. Paltridge 1995, 1997). Most contemporary genre studies that draw on pragmatics and cognitive linguistics deal primarily with political and media discourse as the domains in which considerable generic creativity takes place and large audiences are engaged in, which enables to analyze

the functional side of generic structures as means to exert influence, persuade and/or legitimize.

As we could see, the motivations for generic research are heterogeneous and studies have been conducted from as many linguistic perspectives as there are. With the passage of time it has not changed, as the number of theoretical and methodological approaches is still growing, which might occur problematic and lead us to analytic crossroads especially when we intend to analyze the contemporary image of communicative genres, i.e. content that is varied and in many cases lacks established taxonomy (e.g. new media and the general productivity of the Internet in the process of creating and promoting new forms, methods and channels of communication, and – in consequence – many new genres). In most of the cases researchers struggle for high levels of generic classification proposing hyper-genres and functional macrostructures which in the light of general significant heterogeneity of the content might turn subjective and arbitrary. Thus, macro-level top-down and theory-driven analyses are inherently more difficult to conduct and verify using different data, so alternatively we may adopt a bottom-up, data-driven orientation to see what functions generic microstructures play, what (if any) patterns they form and what potential meso- or macrostructures they create. As we will see in Chapter 2, this is the orientation behind many genre studies in political communication as yet another one highly interesting and productive (but heterogeneous and thus challenging) domain of communication.

For the time being, however, I would like to put the peculiarities of political genres aside until the next chapter and focus on what is common to communicative genres in general, because irrespective of the theoretical-methodological diversity of studies in generic structures at least five common characteristics of communicative genres can be listed.

2. Characteristics of communicative genres

Having discussed the most notable theoretical and methodological contributions to the concept of genre in various domains and empirical fields of linguistics we could see that even in the different field-specific writings on this subject and the consequent diversity of theories available, there is some general consensus as to how communicative genres are defined.

Thus, to give a workable definition that will reflect this interdisciplinary uniformity and shall, from now on, beacon all my genre-related considerations I am borrowing the one

proposed in the opening paragraph of the introduction to the newly published Cap and Okulska's (2013) book *Analyzing Genres in Political Communication*, according to which genres are "conventional uses of stable utterance groups which follow recognizable patterns that suit the accomplishment of certain social goals" (Cap and Okulska 2013: 1). In my opinion, this definition is, on the one hand, i) detailed enough to grasp the essential relationship between language and context or, rather, discourse and social context¹⁷ as it is manifested and executed by genres, and, on the other hand, ii) general enough to accommodate the contemporary diversity and non-linearity of some generic structures in those social fields that can be characterized by the greatest dynamism and communicative hybridity (e.g. politics, media including the so called "new media" or advertising).

Following this definition, Cap and Okulska (ibid.) proposed five candidate characteristics common to communicative genres in general, all of which may as well be perceived as challenges that we may encounter on our analytic way if we focus on generic structures from power-based social fields that I mentioned in point ii) above. In this vein, in the next subsections I shall briefly outline these characteristics and, as a matter of transition from communication in general to political communication in particular, following the authors of this characterization, I shall draw attention to challenges that arise when our main field of interest and source of data is political discourse.

2.1. Genres as abstractions

As Cap and Okulska point out, across approaches genres are perceived as abstractions, i.e. "clusters of conventionalized and goal-oriented communicative acting arising from imperatives posed by constantly evolving socio-cultural situations" (2013: 3). This means that they are mostly dynamic entities which work both on the level of language and at the more abstract level of functions this language is to play in social context. Of course, as we already know, some generic structures are more dynamic and open to changes than others, but generally speaking we may assume that in the entire world there is no single genre that has not evolved at all since the times it was created.

¹⁷ These, I believe, are more fortuitous formulations regarding the discipline in which this dissertation is situated.

The extent to which dynamism works as a driving force depends only on the scale and number of functions a given generic structure is meant to play. Hence, the lower the functional impact of it, the more stable a given genre is; but, the more large scale these functions are, the bigger the probability that this genre will evolve and accommodate new structures, tools and strategies to achieve its goals. To see this difference, we can compare a rather simple genre such as arranging an appointment at the dental surgery with a highly complex and heterogeneous genre of a political interview. Obviously, as far as the former one is highly conventionalized, the latter one is a perfect example of all that escapes easy classification: political interviews may be like talk shows or like personal informal conversations; they may be multimodal – with supplementing music, video or images – or may rely on the more traditional form of a direct, one-to-one talk exchange between the journalist and the politician who interact in a typical question-answer sequence. The list of potential options and resulting differences that we may see analyzing political interviews is infinite.

This poses a challenge for us as researchers, because it leads to a dilemma of what methodology to apply. The general choice is between data- and theory-driven approaches, but in practice it often turns out that to provide a comprehensive image of, for example, political communication as a discourse domain, we need to employ both methods of analysis in a synergetic relationship. Without it, i.e. adopting only one of them we will either a) gather only those data that are comparable (and end up rejecting all that cannot be compared), or b) start from theorizing a priori and then try to support our claims by searching for matching data. Although Cap and Okulska (2013) point out that “it seems quite pointless to emphasize which genres within the domain are “fixed enough” or ceasing to evolve or expiring, and which will continue to change, hybridize and migrate” (pp. 3-4), we may analyze individual genres, but it will always lead us to results and findings that will be applicable mostly to the analyzed generic structure and its surrounding context. Any large scale considerations like those about the general nature of political communication have to reconcile the two approaches. Thus, the key to it is to find a golden methodological mean – a compromise between what data shows and what we assume at the beginning of our research, because this seems to be the only way to see how a given domain of discourse conventionalizes its genres; especially when it is as open to all that is unconventional as political communication.

2.2. Genres and situational contexts

Irrespective of how unconventional a realization of a given genre is, it always possesses some language forms that are stable enough to inform the genre participants of what communicative situation they are currently involved in, i.e. to help them recognize what genre it is. Thanks to it, they know how to respond to it and further contribute to this particular communicative situation. This way, through such stable language forms, genres activate situational contexts while simultaneously being realized in them (Cap and Okulska 2013: 4).

Nevertheless, the situation may become more complicated in, again, political communication, where the standard activation of context (which, in fact, happens as if automatically) does not necessarily entail a standard realization of it. Let us consider the example of inaugural addresses of American presidents (cf. Cap 2002). By means of some obvious extra-linguistic factors such as 1) the news that a new president has been elected, and/or 2) our knowledge that traditionally his/her first official speech is called the inaugural address, we will know what situational contexts for this genre is. Additionally (or alternatively), even if we miss the news about the new president, but we listen to the radio and hear some typical language forms such as, for example, the tone-setting introduction or the act of thanking the predecessor, we will instantly recognize the genre and, all in all, its situational context will be activated.

Context realization, however, lies on the part of the speaker: he/she may either decide to follow the standard and conventional pattern of such a speech or change it to highlight his/her distinctive political identity – something that counts in politics. This is connected to what Fairclough emphasized as ‘strategic’ use of language (cf. section 1.4), which I shall expand on in Chapter 2, where I argue that in political communication there is no space for randomness – everything, apart from being communicative, is essentially strategic.

From the point of view of a researcher these differences between context activation and context realization pose another challenge, as they require additional analytic work. They have to be investigated to help us understand why and for what (strategic) purpose(s) the speaker decides to stick to or depart from the conventional form/content of a particular genre, because it may tell a lot about the entire discourse domain.

2.3. Genres as flexible macrostructures

Genres are flexible macrostructures that can be realized by either monologic or dialogic patterns comprising of both obligatory and optional elements (stages) that occur in a set order (Cap and Okulska 2013: 5). This means that various structures can be classified as genres, but the general assumption is that they always have to be at least basically organized in a particular manner to allow us to identify, use and contribute to them.

Any genre has its predefined order and stages that can and cannot be omitted in its production. This is the case with, for example, a research article, which conventionally comprises of: a title, an abstract section, a keywords section, the body of the article (with a variable number of constituent sections, subsections and paragraphs), a conclusion section, and a references section. As a whole, this is a macrostructure realized by a definite number of microstructures that may themselves be treated as sub-genres, but due to quite strict conventions governing the domain of scientific communication, it seems not much flexible.

The challenge would appear if we were to specify the exact number of paragraphs to be written for the text to count as a research article, which, of course, is impossible or at least pointless. The general rule of such texts is to be comprehensive enough to exhaust the subject matter. Nevertheless, through such reasoning we may assume that there are genres which are particularly open to flexibility. Let us, again, consider the political interviews. On the one hand, in the evening news reports we have mini-interviews with politicians who briefly answer questions about the current political or economic situation. On the other hand, after the news we might have an evening political studio, in which politicians are interviewed about the same or a different topic. As long as in the former case the interview may last 30 seconds, in the latter case it may be 20 minutes or even more. So, it shows that since there is neither a predefined length of an interview, nor a predefined number of questions to ask, this macrostructure is highly flexible in the ways it is realized. As a consequence, some functionally-important novel tools and elements may be employed to realize it, and the more of them, the lower the chance of describing the macrostructure as a genre.

Thus, flexibility as a characteristic feature of genres has a great impact on how generic structures can be analyzed and what levels of generality we may reach in describing them. In this respect the prototype theory comes in handy (cf. section 1.7), because it gives us the necessary and useful theoretical background which allows us to work out at least a tentative

prototypical realization of this genre to use it as a benchmark in tracking and analyzing new generic components and their functions in a given macrostructure as a whole.

2.4. Genres are interrelated in social fields

In a given social field or discourse domain all genres are interrelated, which means that they coexist and independently contribute to the “hyper-genre” of this field (Cap and Okulska 2013: 5). In domains such as scientific communication they rarely overlap – it is difficult to mistake, for example, a research article with a review. Nevertheless, when the domain is more dynamic, complex and open to flexibility – as it is in the case of political communication – its genres intertwine and hybridize through intertextuality. They undergo “the process by which a dominant text assimilates, for some strategic purpose, elements of another genre” (Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 17). This is the case with, e.g. committee meetings, during which the members discuss ideas that are later incorporated into written policy documents, political speeches that are written to be told or multimodal political advertising that relies on text, images and music (all of which play strategic functions in it and contribute to the overall impact it has). For researchers, it poses the following analytic challenges: 1) can we still use the traditional tools in our research or maybe we have to come up with something completely new?; 2) when we analyze such data should we focus on the main genre (e.g. a committee meeting, a political ad, a political speech) and treat the intertextual elements as an important addition to it or maybe we should come up with a new genre name that will account for all these intertextual elements as a new or hybridized variant of the well-established “new genre”?

It seems that there is no answer to these questions. This is a largely individual matter whether we decide on one and not the other practice, but in any case our work has to be supported by both data and theory. Irrespective of this analytic problem, however, as I have already mentioned, intertextuality plays a crucial and – let me highlight it once again – strategic role in shaping genres. Presumably, with the development of new technologies and new media this role will grow bigger, as it has already become a powerful tool in the hands of politicians, journalists and advertising experts.

2.5. Genres assign interpersonal roles

As I have already mentioned in point 2.2 about the relationship between genres and situational contexts, familiar language forms enable genre participants to identify what generic structure they are in, and respond to it in a given way. Situational contexts and these genre-specific language forms have yet another function, though, as they assign interpersonal roles to people either engaged in a particular talk exchange (when it is a dialogic generic pattern) or ‘exposed’ to a given genre (when it is a monologic generic pattern).

Interpersonal roles of the participants are reflected and constructed by language forms they are meant to use, but they also shape their distinctive identities in the situational contexts and, on a larger scale, in the social fields their interactions take place. As far as simple transactional interactions such as a visit to a shop are concerned, the division of roles is stable and highly conventionalized, because we all know what to say and how to behave when we are clients, and we know the standard behavior and expressions used by the shop assistant.

Nevertheless, in complex domains of discourse such as political communication, this division may no longer apply. As Cap and Okulska point out, there are many situations, in which “participants suspend their prototypical roles and assume other roles which seem more relevant and more rhetorically effective in a given moment” (2013: 6). This happens during, for example, political debates, when instead of responding to the questions the host asks, the invited speakers start asking questions to each other/to the host. This role reversal always has some strategic function(s): to avoid response, to redirect the audience’s attention and/or to attack the opponent. In this struggle the one who wins is the one who has the greatest rhetorical skills and, of course, the ability to take the floor from the host.

A similar idea applies to the language that genre participants are expected to use. As long as we know what to say in a shop when we buy bread and milk or how to address our boss in an e-mail (and, in both cases, what not to say/write), in political communication we may encounter a greater variety. It often happens that politicians decide to speak or write in an unconventional way, if they deem it more effective and powerful in a particular context. In some cases this is manifested by what Fairclough calls “conversationalization of public discourse” (cf. section 1.5), i.e. the strategy of using less formal genres, vocabulary and style to give the impression of a more even distribution of power and a reduced social distance between an influential social actor and individuals.

This way, rather than specific interpersonal roles, politicians exercise a whole range of roles to match the changing situational requirements. In consequence, in research on genres in complex discourse domains interpersonal roles should be perceived as “hierarchies of behavioral patterns, involving more and less typical and expected behaviors, manifested through different language arsenals” (Cap and Okulska: *ibid.*).

All the ideas connected with political communication that I presented in this brief characterization of communicative genres will reappear throughout the next chapter of this dissertation, in which I focus on this discourse domain at length. There I will also compare and contrast political communication with public communication, trying to further illustrate that all that is political is always strategic. Most importantly, however, in Chapter 2 I will finally concentrate on political genres in detail and provide their characterization. For this purposes, I will list and discuss specific criteria that may be used to classify and characterize political genres pointing out to, both 1) their differences in comparison to communicative genres (which is, to some extent, a follow-up of this section), and 2) the potential they have in successful identification, classification and interpretation of both the existing and the new generic structures in political communication. This way, as my discussion will show, political genres will be presented as essentializing communicative genres and, most importantly, the challenges behind countering their heterogeneity with typologies and hierarchies consistent enough for the researchers to develop methodological procedures that could be repeatedly followed – and that would still account for the distinctive features of political communication in comparison with communication in general.

CHAPTER 2. Political discourse and political genres

This chapter will be fully devoted to the relationships of language and politics and, thus, will serve as an overview of concepts and ideas that are fundamental to the research field of this dissertation, i.e. political communication and the analysis of political discourse. My discussion will be arranged in such a way that it will enable me to move from some general considerations about politics and political discourse to more detailed and this research-specific ones, i.e. considerations related to political genres both with respect to theory and methodology of analyzing them.

Thus, I will start the first part of this chapter from a comparative-contrastive account of ‘political’ and ‘communicative’ as attributes of human action and interaction in social relations. Having established firm links between politics and everyday life, and – most importantly – between language and politics, I will move on to characterizing political communication and public communication pointing out to differences between and overlaps in these two domains of communication. Next, I shall focus my discussion on Political Linguistics in general and the Analysis of Political Discourse¹ in particular, which are perceived and presented here as the linguistic contributions to the development of the domains of political communication and political science. This part of Chapter 2 will conclude with my overview of some challenges in the analysis of political discourse which result from the interdisciplinary character of this empirical field and inevitably influence all studies conducted within this framework – including the one presented in this dissertation.

The second part of Chapter 2 will be devoted to theoretical considerations about the specific topic of this dissertation, i.e. political genres. Quite deliberately, I will start from the discussion of theoretical and methodological challenges that lie ahead of the analyst whenever genres in political communication become the topic of study, which is done on the assumption that all these problematic aspects have to be considered necessarily before the research starts. Many of these observations will signal how political genres should be characterized and

¹ Following Okulska and Cap (2010), in the following dissertation the term ‘Analysis of Political Discourse’ is purposefully used instead of the term ‘Political Discourse Analysis’, which is also present in the literature on this topic (cf. Hodges and Niple 2007). This is motivated by the fact that the abbreviation of the latter term is used for ‘Positive Discourse Analysis’ (cf. Martin and Rose 2003), so the former term lends itself to less terminological ambiguity and enables to avoid potential interpretation as a field that introduces an element of evaluation to its studies.

represented in relevant typologies, which will enable me to move on to the theoretical core of this research, i.e. description of specific criteria that can be used to identify, analyze and interpret generic structures in political communication. The concluding section of this chapter will touch upon the topic of typologies of political genres, where I will signal both the problematic issues and the potential behind constructing such classifications for the purposes of analyzing generic structures in political communication. In this section I will also specify what requirements have to be met for the criteria from the preceding section to serve their purpose in this and any other research on political genres.

1. Political communication: a domain of life and a domain of research

The following section is an attempt to clarify several issues connected with how political communication is perceived in linguistics in general and in the following research in particular. For this purpose, I shall try to answer the following four questions: i) What can be described as ‘political’ and what as ‘communicative’ (in the spirit of at least a tentative classification and discrimination between these two)?; ii) What is the relationship between political communication and, generally speaking, public communication?; iii) How political communication is studied within Political Linguistics and, most importantly, the Analysis of Political Discourse, and finally; iv) What challenges are there when we deal with the analysis of political discourse?

1.1. ‘Political’ versus ‘communicative’

In a common and ordinary understanding, ‘politics’ can be defined as the domain of social life associated with governance of a country or area on an individual, civic and international level, performed by selected individuals – political actors – through some conventionalized legislative procedures driven by either the agreed or the imposed system – the political system. Although we may come across such a definition in numerous introductions to political science books, it shows that, both, in academic terms and in our everyday life the meaning of this word is much broader. It ranges far beyond mere governance and manifests itself in all aspects of our lives – both as individuals and as

members of communities and societies. Since this broader meaning is what underlies this research, I shall approach the word ‘political’ on a few complimentary levels, to provide, in that way, a more detailed illustration of why politics is everywhere and how it relates to various dimensions of our daily life.

First and probably the broadest meaning of the word ‘political’ follows from the relationship politics has with language, which – as we will see – will reverberate through all the other explanations presented in this section. This politics-language relationship originates from the classical Greco-Roman philosophical thought and the writings of Plato, Cicero and Aristotle, whose insights gave grounds to the western scholarly tradition in domains such as political sciences, sociology and linguistics, to name just a few.

It was Aristotle who called humans ‘political animals’ and attributed this exceptional property of ours to our ability to speak:

Speech serves (...) to indicate what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. (*The Politics*, 1253a7, translated T.A. Sinclair 1992)

Thus, speech gives us the means of expression that has many more applications than the mere ‘voice’ possessed by animals. This way speech allows us to exchange views, share perceptions and values, and – on this basis – form communities, i.e. *polis*, consisting of individuals who have similar motivations and values. On a larger scale such communities form states, which of course does not happen on a zero-one principle, as in a state (and in a community as well) there may be fractions with contrasting viewpoints. This is the point at which language enters the stage once again and becomes indispensable and irreplaceable means of signifying the ‘political’, i.e. communicating, promoting and contesting what we and others have (or do not have) in common. Although Aristotle’s writings do not elaborate on that, it is the work of other scholars that paved the way for treating language as an essential element of politics. Chilton and Schäffner (2002) draw attention to this long-standing academic concern in the following words:

Plato feared the fictive power of language within the ideal state. The whole classical tradition of rhetoric from the sophist to the enlightenment wrestled with the relationship between persuasion, truth and morality, carrying a deep suspicion of the power of language. In the twentieth century the fables of George Orwell focused attention on the language of power. The present academic concern with language and politics shares and recycles many of these perspectives. (Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 1).

Currently, primarily Political Linguistics analyses the language-politics relationships and deals with uncovering them in a diligent way (see Section 1.3, this chapter). For this reason, as the following research is anchored at Political Linguistics as a field and Analysis of Political Discourse as a sub-field, in my further discussion I shall in a more and more detailed manner illustrate how politics performs itself through language and – partly in the spirit of the Aristotelian argument about speech – why the former cannot do without the latter.

Another way of understanding the word ‘political’ stems from the general consensus that there is no politics without language: as long as physical actions such as coercion, warfare, waving a white flag or purposeful absence from an event perceived as internationally important (for example President Obama’s decision not to participate in the official inauguration of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Russia) are also ways of doing politics, they are always preceded or followed by language. Sooner or later, any such situation is accompanied by verbalized and/or textualized reactions to that has happened or is about to happen, which accentuates our human ability and urge to express our decisions, opinions, motivations or objections. On the other hand, it seems that most of politics relies primarily on language, as – fortunately – we experience more warnings and threats of attacks than physical attacks. This way, language becomes performative for politics, which falls in line with the major tenets of the Speech Act Theory. This becomes even more salient when we notice that states that we live in function based on written (and this way codified) law, political actors struggle for power and legitimation mainly through their rhetorical skills, and the daily operations of parliaments and governments revolve around activities that are inherently performed through language: meetings, debates, voting, press conferences, etc. Thus, they use and function in political communication understood as all communicative practices linked with governance, power and legitimation.

Following on from this, there is yet another dimension of what ‘political’ means: if we look at politics as a domain dealing with power relations and struggles for superiority and dominance, we instantly notice the consequence it has for us both as individuals and as members of communities or nations, since all that is ‘political’ involves and affects potentially large groups of people (cf. Okulska and Cap 2010). On the one hand, these can be the large-scale influences such as a declaration of war or a transformation of the political system, but on the other hand it can also be the daily activity of opposing political forces that is to shape public moods and preferences for the sake of upcoming elections or legal acts that will be introduced. Since we live in a world where individuals, communities and cultures

constantly compete with each other, contesting what makes them ‘political’, i.e. their opinions values, motivations and decisions, it occurs that in each of the above mentioned cases politics involves something that is crucial to the topic of this dissertation: a conflict. In this respect as well, language serves as the main tool for doing politics, since it becomes the weapon with a large striking distance and, as such, it both reflects and shapes the world around us together with the ways we perceive it and react to it (cf. Searle 1979). As Cap an Okulska (2010) point out, “it (...) echoes the Bakhtinian (cf. 1981, 1986) idea that language is never neutral as perceived from any *current* perspective” (p. 4).

Third, and somehow following from the previous point, the label ‘political’ can be given to all types of activities that we are exposed to and engaged in. On the one hand, these are the higher level activities such as: elections, wars waged, legislative processes, party conferences, state-governed procedures, changes in institutional organization and the organization itself, migrations or nationalism, all of which Chilton (2002) calls ‘institutional politics’ (p. 6). On the other hand, however, there might be a lower level as well, which is what Chilton (ibid.) calls ‘everyday politics’, i.e. the daily struggles between man and woman, policemen and black youths or any other individuals who have contrasting views. This second level might sound controversial for some scholars, as – to give a least one contrasting opinion – van Dijk (1997) argues that such a broad perception of the domain of ‘political’ is might overlap with the domain of the ‘public’. He puts forward an argument that representatives of fields such as business or education also make decisions and function within discourses that have a large social influence, which makes them ‘political’ to some extent, but in his view their activity has possible political effects only. This means that all such actions are not inherently oriented at and resulting from political motives, which van Dijk contrasts with those activities that are by design conducted by political actors in political processes, political systems, political relations and political ideologies. He continues in this vein by stating that although he may subscribe to a “well-known feminist slogan that personal is political” (1997: 15), he does not consider all interpersonal talk including that of gender or race political.

This difference in viewpoints may result from the fact that there are many different ways of categorizing people and their practices, so if we once again draw on the Aristotelian “speech” argument and see ourselves as members communities or citizens who are inherently (even if not voluntarily) involved in and influenced by thousands of political processes daily, it becomes more difficult to contradict the existence of this type of politics. It becomes even more rational, if we consider the following: any of us, at least once in his/her life has had or

will have (voluntarily or not) an exchange of views with someone who has a contrasting opinion. Will it also be ‘political’? Yes, because in line with the Aristotelian tradition it will imply the exchange and mutual imposition of opinions on what is good and what is bad. Conversely, assuming that we agree with each other, when we share our viewpoint with a person of similar beliefs, there are at least the two of us, which makes us feel stronger and encourages to form an alliance. A perfect literary example may be found in Daniel Defoe’s novel *Robinson Crusoe*: until the main character was alone on the island, there was no politics, but when Friday appeared, everything became political.

Fourth, my perception of the centrality of language to politics is also largely based on Chilton’s (ibid.) idea that “language would have evolved to perform social functions – social functions that would in fact correspond to what we understand as ‘political’” (p. 2). This is connected to what I have already discussed in Chapter 1 stressing the functional aspect of communicative genres as structures that regulate communication and, this way, help people *do things with words*. Considering the fact that: i) nearly all our communicative activity is purposeful and goal-oriented, ii) we are always engaged in social relations that have a varied power differential, and iii) we try to respond and shape our positions and discursive practices of ours and others in these configurations in a given manner, it seems that almost everything in our communicative acting can be perceived as ‘political’ – but essentially both ‘political’ and ‘strategic’.

This is connected to what I have already mentioned in Chapter 1 pointing out to the Habermasian (cf. 1999) division of social (inter)actions into ‘strategic’ and ‘communicative’ ones. According to Habermas, strategic activity is oriented at getting results, while the second type of activity is oriented at understanding. This division and my discussion of its influence for communication in general and political communication in particular will serve as a transition between the discussion of the meaning of ‘political’ and the meaning of ‘communicative’.

Habermas claimed that advanced capitalist societies and their different parts function based on different types of ‘instrumental (strategic) rationality’ of state and economy systems. This orientation at instrumentality leads to the popularization of interactions that can be called ‘strategic’ and are aimed at efficiency and forcing people to do things in a particular way and for a particular range of purposes. The public side of such societies (in Habermasian terms, the ‘lifeworld’), i.e. the everyday life of ordinary people has been largely influenced by this type of rationality, which leads to increased control politics and business have over our daily

existence. Nevertheless, as Habermas claims, we manage to maintain a degree of independence from it, which we exercise through what he calls ‘communicative rationality’, the role of which is to allow us to communicate in a less determined and less purpose-driven manner. Also, in some cases, we take part in or perform activities that are both communicative and strategic, and these are only situational factors that balance the dominance of one type of activity over another.

In my opinion, which – in line with the Searlian tradition – is grounded in a pragmatic perception of all utterances as performative, this dichotomy works best when we look at it in an integrated way (i.e. in relation to one another) and apply it to political communication. First and foremost, as long as there may be a different degree of ‘purpose-drivenness’ in an informal chat with an old friend and in a press conference, taking into account all that in this topic has been so far said about communicative and political genres, it seems that nearly all political-communicative acting is strategic. Let us encapsulate five ideas from Chapter 1 to illustrate this claim:

- 1) even in the most seemingly ordinary communicative genres there may be elements which play a strategic role in the interaction as a whole, e.g. a small talk as a part of ‘buying food’ transaction in MacDonald’s, the role of which is to foster the customer’s impression of friendliness and this way encourage him/her to come back;
- 2) public discourse undergoes the process of conversationalisation (cf. Fairclough 2001, Fetzer and Weizman 2006) which plays a strategic role of reducing social distance between influential social actors and the audience by using less formal language forms;
- 3) in some political genres the speakers tend to purposefully refrain from conforming to the standard pattern of genre realization with a strategic purpose of outlining their distinctive political identity; this is the case with, for example, inaugural addresses of American presidents (Cap 2002) and more generally, with political genres surrounding events such as elections, i.e. political ads, debates, etc.;
- 4) prototypical roles assigned by some political genres, e.g. debates or political interviews, may be suspended in favor of other roles; genre participants may decide that such a change of roles is potentially more rhetorically effective at a given moment, which makes this decision a strategic one;
- 5) intertextuality as a common property of all genres becomes an essentially strategic property of political genres, which directly follows from Chilton and Schäffner’s (2002) definition of intertextuality as a process, in which “a dominant text assimilates, for some strategic purpose,

elements of another genre” (p.17), e.g. in multimodal political ads, the aim of which is to grasp the audience’s attention through a range of channels.

The Habermasian understanding of the term ‘strategic’ seems to perfectly embrace the above mentioned ideas taken from political communication, since in his discussion of strategic actions, the overall motivation of the speakers is to achieve their individual goals – which is surely the case with political speakers. As a consequence, as Habermas points out, strategic actors have no intention of reaching consensus or mutual understanding, because this is usually secondary or even unrelated to what they want to achieve. Instead, they may pretend to give the impression that they care for mutual well-being and recognition, while in fact their governing intention will be to manipulate the reception of their words and deeds to ensure the achievement of their paramount goal. This is the reason why Habermas perceives strategic action as parasitic (cf. Cooke 1997, Schaefer et al. 2013), which – in the light of the fact that this type of action is prevalent in contemporary political communication – is in my opinion very representative of this social field and the times we live in.

What is, thus, ‘communicative’? According to Habermas, the basic function of communication – and, as a consequence, communicative action – is reciprocal understanding. This idea stems from the assumption that language is a fundamental form of coordinating action, which requires us to have a practical attitude to each other, i.e. an attitude which will allow us to coexist and cooperate in a way which is reasonable and merit-worthy to (preferably all) the actors engaged in it. Thus, communicative actions (or ‘strong communicative actions’, which is a notion introduced in later works² of Habermas) entails social cooperation based on a wider consensus as to what is acceptable and right in this particular context. On a larger scale, it coordinates the functioning of the lifeworld, which makes it an indispensable element of living in a society. As members of it, we are expected to be consciously orientated at action and coordinate our individual plans, which allows us to accomplish some the most important social goals, i.e. cultural reproduction and socialization, among others. As such, communicative actions become the binding force of the society and the guarantee of its integration and functioning based on reasonable rationale.

Hence, in this broad perception, the ‘communicative’ is a term that refers to the potentially most objective and least detrimental form of coexistence and cooperation between people. Nevertheless, it by no means excludes the term ‘political’. Rather, these two are

² The notion ‘strong communicative action’ has been introduced in Habermas’ (1996) work “Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality”.

complementary on the assumptions that: i) the ‘communicative’ is a broader concept that houses the ‘political’, and ii) the ‘political’ essentializes all the changes that take place in modern communication. This way, the changes that take place in this specific field influence the general domain of the ‘communicative’ and, in turn, influence us, our mutual relations and the world that we live in. The second argument is particularly pertinent to my discussion of political genres as structures exceptionally vulnerable to the processes of intertextuality, hybridization and the generally rapid evolution in comparison to genres from other social fields. Thus, I shall perceive the ‘communicative’ as an umbrella category that embraces the ‘political’, but at the same time leaves space for the perception of politics as an idiosyncratic and heterogeneous domain of social life. In such a conceptualization, political communication becomes a magnifying glass that visualizes how strategic and complex communication may be and to what extent – whether we like it or not – politics affects as in various aspects of our life.

1.2. Political communication and public communication

Having distinguished between ‘political’ and ‘communicative’, I have assumed a stance in which the links between politics and everyday life, and the links between language and politics are perceived as crucial, immense and inseparable. To continue in this spirit, I shall now provide a more detailed characterization of political communication and public communication followed by a short discussion of the relationship between these two.

In general terms, ‘political communication’ is defined as a sub-field of political science and communication which deals with the analysis of **how** – both through media and interpersonally – messages are produced, disseminated and processed within a political context, and **what** effects it has for both the recipients and the producers. The interests of political communication lie in the research on the discourse of media, political actors and individuals or groups that influence political processes in a given context. In the theoretical and the practical dimension alike, political communication deals with the ways, the means and the effects of expression of a political nature, and focuses on the intentions and the goals message senders have in this process (cf. Denton and Woodward 1998).

The research in this field deals with answering questions such as: Who has the authority (and why)? How are authority and legitimation construed and gained? Who has the

right to allocate public resources (and why)? Who has the right to make decisions (and why)? How is political or national identity construed? This list of questions is, of course, much longer, as these are only the general ones that may help understand the scope this domain covers. Nevertheless, the most important assumption that underlies all political communication studies is the primary focus on the content and the purpose of the communicated political message, and only the secondary focus on its source, i.e. the message sender.

According to Swanson and Nimmo (1990) – which is in line with my perception of the ‘political’, following on from Fairclough’s discussion of the Habermasian approach to communication – political communication is a **strategic** use of various communicative means to influence and shape public knowledge, opinions, beliefs and actions related to politics. As a result, due to the fact that the idea of political communication as strategic is emphasized, in many cases persuasion becomes the main topic of studies – in political discourse in particular. What is important, though, the research in this domain is by no means limited to texts, verbal and visual messages (which is largely the task of Political Linguistics and Analysis of Political Discourse), as it also focuses on essentially extra-linguistic factors such as personal appearance (i.e. dress, hairstyle, etc.) or visual identity (i.e. logo, colors, etc.) of, for example, political parties or election candidates, because these are also highly powerful elements of political images/identities they build (e.g. Barry 1997, Bennet 2004, Bennet 2007, McNair 2011). As a consequence, political communication is a largely interdisciplinary domain that, apart from political science and linguistics, inspires studies in and borrows ideas from journalism and media studies, sociology and social psychology, among others³.

A similar, broad view of political communication is the one held by Okulska and Cap (2010), who treat it as a domain that covers all kinds of communicative activity which representatives of different social groups and institutions perform to force their needs, beliefs, values and aspirations. What is significant, to fulfill these goals individuals and groups have to cooperate and compete in interaction, which one the one hand makes them ‘political’, and on the other hand exercises the already mentioned Habermasian approach to communication, illustrating that all they do is both – but to a varied degree – ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic’. Through such a continuous cooperative and competing activity, they negotiate the distribution

³ A more detailed discussion of the distribution of political communication research interests in Political Linguistics and the Analysis of Political Discourse will be provided in Section 1.3 of this chapter.

of power between them, that is, they either try to maintain or reorganize the existing power differential.

Okulska and Cap (ibid.: 7) single out at least three domains of social life, in which political communication occurs; the division goes as follows:

1. the state-political system at a national and trans-national level, i.e.: governments, parliaments, political parties, elections, debates, etc.,
2. governmental and non-governmental social institutions, i.e. NGOs, businesses, educational organizations, workplaces, extraparliamentary campaigns and social movements,
3. the media system, i.e. all media and representatives of the media present on the local, national and trans-national level, both mainstream and not.

This tripartite division, however, ascribes a particularly significant role to media: they are seen as connecting the former two domains, which they do by what the authors call “‘depoliticizing’ the settled practices of the stabilized political structures of the state and simultaneously ‘politicizing’ the unstable fluctuating, emergent tendencies and interests of the ‘lifeworld’ or ‘civil society’” (Okulska and Cap *ibid.*, also Fairclough 2006).

When it comes to ‘public communication’ as a term, it refers to the practice of communicating ideas to the broader public (cf. Eunson 2006). This definition entails a broader scope of social fields in which both senders and their potential addresses (i.e. the public) are included, as it applies to communication in political environment (thus referring to what has been mentioned above), business environment (corporate and organizational communication), advertising, public relations and fundraising, among others. Similarly to political communication, public communication is an activity performed by both linguistic and extra-linguistic means: through verbal, written and visual messages or visual representation tools such, again, logos and other brand elements (particular colors, shapes, materials, etc.). Nevertheless, what makes it distinguishing is that it refers to the communication of ideas by organizations – even if represented by individuals – to the wider public(s), who are audiences that are named and defined depending on a particular social field, e.g. consumers, opponents, proponents, fans, electorate, citizens, patients, etc. In the case of political communication, the process of message production, dissemination, processing and (strategic) functioning entails communicating ideas that are inherently or at least collaterally ‘political’, and can potentially be communicated in the direction of ‘public-to-organization’ (e.g. “grassroots” initiatives or social movements). Moreover, as I have already mentioned a couple of paragraphs before, the essential difference between these two

lies in the effects public and political actions trigger: in the case of public communication these effects are only possibly political, while in the case of political communication they are primarily – even if not exclusively – political.

Irrespective of that, however, in these two domains of communication there will be some overlaps and synergies; obviously, because of the fact that – as I have just mentioned – political communication partly belongs to the area of public communication. Although, as Eunson (2013) points out, the latter one is mostly associated with the field of public relations (henceforth ‘PR’), it can be easily spotted that PR is a common and highly important element of politics as well. Just as in any other domain, in politics we have ‘spin’ (Pitcher 2004, Isikoff and Corn 2007, Baggini 2010), defined as “the angle, emphasis or distortion put on an event of person in order to influence public opinion” (Eunson 2013: 552), and perceived as either the dark side or the *real* role of public relations. Politicians and political parties are advertised like any other products on the market, governments and institutions generate PR-driven press releases, both governmental and non-governmental organizations employ staff that specializes in ‘communications’ (essentially in plural) – these are just several examples. Turner, Bonner and Marshall (2000) see it as a part of a larger phenomenon that also affects media:

The ‘fourth estate’ [the press] is in danger of being overwhelmed by the ‘fifth estate’, the growing number of ‘PR merchants and spin doctors’ influencing the news agenda... In his account of the contemporary situation, Franklin (1997) cites the editor of the British magazine *PR Week* who estimates that over 50% of the content of every section (except sport) of every broadsheet newspaper would be PR-generated. (Turner, Bonner and Marshall 2000: 30)

As a consequence, the influence on media entails the influence on all domains of social life, especially when we recall Okulska and Cap’s argument of media’s role of “(de)politicizing” practices, tendencies and interests, and the generally immense influence media potentially have due to reaching large audiences.

The problem becomes even more salient in the light of initiatives such as the one described by Turner (2006):

A government-funded study which tracked the takeup rate of press releases emanating from government departments in Queensland (...) established that an alarming amount of press release material is run without corroboration and in some cases without any significant changes in wording. In [this] study, 279 press releases from government were traced; 200 were taken up by newspapers, 140 of them without significant changes in wording. (Turner 2006: 232)

Although the above mentioned study was conducted on the Australian market, it is highly probable that figures in other markets would be comparable. One cannot omit the arguments of the defenders of PR, who argue that, as long as the existence of spin and ‘spin doctors’ is undeniable, there is a variety of PR models and only some of them are purposefully concerned with not telling the truth and promoting such activity (Grunig and Hunt 1984, Grunig and Grunig 1992, Grunig, Grunig and Dozier 2002).

Nonetheless, the general characteristics of both public and political communication further supports the claim that there is no space for randomness in communicating in contexts of power, business and money. The idea of messages being mainly ‘strategic’ is a strong motivating factor in conducting research on these domains, as it promises findings that may enable us to keep pace with the changing times and more and more complex reality of current communication. This way, we are able to track and uncover the multi-faceted persuasion that governs the choices of communicators, and understand the mechanisms they (or their PR staff) employ to achieve, first, the rhetorical success and, second, some more materialized goals. This is particularly interesting if we treat it as a type of ‘competence’ communicators should have: their (in)ability to use different language arsenals, play different interpersonal roles and dynamically and flexibly react to the changing reality in a way that will be both profitable for them and acceptable by the majority determines their success (or lack thereof) on the political or business scene.

1.3. Political communication, Political Linguistics and the Analysis of Political Discourse

As has already been mentioned, political communication is a largely interdisciplinary domain of research that requires the analyst to reach for concepts and theories coming from different disciplines and empirical fields. Some of them include: political science, social psychology, sociology, media studies, anthropology, and last but not least, linguistics. Of course, the selection of concepts from other disciplines depends on the data analyzed, but in nearly all the cases of studies conducted up to now, the number of interdisciplinary approaches incorporated in the research is large and it is still growing. Due to the fact that topic of this dissertation is rooted in political discourse, I shall discuss how political communication is approached within Political Linguistics and studies under the common name of the Analysis of Political Discourse.

Resulting from the afore mentioned argument about the progressive interdisciplinarity of political communication studies is the current image of Political Linguistics as a research field. It incorporates concepts, methodologies and major topics analyzed from numerous disciplines, which has made it a particularly heterogeneous and fragmented domain (Okulska and Cap 2010). Irrespective of this diversity and broadness, however, researchers define Political Linguistics quite consistently, i.e. as a field that deals with analyzing language in mainly (but not exclusively) political settings (cf. van Dijk 1997, Okulska and Cap 2010, Chilton 2010 and others). What underlies such a conceptualization is the assumption that language serves as means of gaining power and struggling for superiority and dominance in the broadly perceived political, official and institutional contexts. Hence, studies conducted within the Analysis of Political Discourse touch upon the following: socially-oriented research on polity and/or policies which focuses on political/social institutions and the discourses that they use (cf. Hodge and Kress 1993), CDS research dealing with the discursive (and in this respect, also visual) aspects of gaining and maintaining power (cf. van Dijk 1993), cognitively driven studies in the discursive representations of political reality (cf. Chilton 2004), analyses that integrate cognitive science with social communication, political science and the evolution of language (cf. Dirven et al. 2001), etc. As to the major themes and topics of research, Okulska and Cap (2010) provide the following range:

Considered 'political' within APD are at the same time studies on violence and war, on social identity construction, on migration, racism, and nationalism. Moreover, the label also embraces investigations into state-governed procedures, such as elections and referenda, language planning and standardization, as well as research into operations within/among state-promoted/controlled systems, including public institutions, education, the media, and many more. (Okulska and Cap 2010: 4)

Most recently, within Political Linguistics the topic of political genres also attracts a lot of attention, which is caused by two interconnected reasons. First of all, the entire domain of political discourse is particularly dynamic and prone to new forms and means of communication that often breach the existing conventions in pursuit of more effective tools in the struggle for power and legitimation. Currently, political communication with its hybridization, multimodality and complexity features so elaborate and innovative discursive structures that to approach them holistically (to see the larger image to attempt at drawing some global conclusions or to go beyond the level of analyzing selected strategies) researchers use the term 'genre' and show that new genres emerge. Irrespective of how controversial it may seem, there is probably no other and no better label for discursive

structures that are varied, yet follow some recognizable patterns and suit the accomplishment of identifiable social goals, and in this respect the term ‘discourse’ is far too broad and general to provide explanation of what, in what patterns and for what purpose is communicated.

Second – as a consequence of the previous argument and assuming that the label of ‘genre’ is suitable here – the existing theories of communicative genres are not always able to grasp the creativity, flexibility and novelty of current forms and structures of political discourse. That is why the research on genres in political communication awakes more and more interest, as it enables to both analyze bigger, yet coherent discursive structures, and enrich the existing theoretical and methodological resources on this topic with new and fresh insights from other disciplines, which definitely contributes to the general development of Political Linguistics and its more and more interdisciplinary character.

Just as the research on communicative genres (cf. Chapter 1), apart from social and applied sciences, Political Linguistics is also informed by numerous linguistic fields such as Critical Linguistics (cf. Fowler 1996), Systemic Functional Linguistics (cf. Halliday 1985), Cognitive Linguistics (cf. Hart 2010, 2014), Critical Discourse Analysis/Studies (cf. van Dijk 1997, 2002, 2003; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Chilton 2010) and Linguistic Pragmatics (cf. Cap 2013). Critical scholarship, in particular, provides it with tools and means to analyze the discursive representations of the existing social problems and, this way, enables researchers to draw wider attention to them and increase awareness of how powerful a tool language has become. This way, it enables to analyze how socio-political action is performed through language, and see how politics – in Chruszczewski’s (2003) terms – “shapes various discursive practices of interpersonal communication” (p. 103).

Nevertheless, Political Linguistics and the Analysis of Political Discourse should also inform other academic disciplines, because studies conducted under these two supplemental labels, by characterizing the language of politics, identify and describe phenomena that take place in the socio-political world. For this reason van Dijk (1997) argues that research on political discourse

should not merely be a contribution to discourse studies, but also to political science and the social sciences more generally. This means, among other things, that [APD] should be able to answer genuine and relevant political questions and deal with issues that are discussed in political science. (van Dijk 1997: 11-12)

Some analyses attempt to complete this responsible task, but to make this contribution more common there needs to be more interest and mutual trust both on the part of linguists and on

the part of political scientists. Despite the fact that more than fifteen years have passed since van Dijk (1997) formulated his plea for a broader use of discourse analysis in political science, academic conferences, publications on the market, and university curricula show that there still a lot to do in this respect. Although it seems obvious that most of politics is done through text and talk, it turns out that this argument appeals mostly to discourse analysts. Politics is a largely interactional practice that involves at least two parties: 1) the politicians and 2) various recipients of political communicative events, i.e. the people, and irrespective of how obvious it sounds, without the latter there would be no politics at all. It is oriented at the audience, because the audience is the electorate, that is, the most important and the biggest guarantor of power. With no support and legitimation from the audience, no politician will succeed, so to get what they want, politicians need force: in some political systems this is primarily physical force supported by the force of arguments, although in majority of cases this relation is exactly opposite, i.e. the force of arguments is the only thing that counts in ruling people's hearts and minds. van Dijk (1997) has unequivocally located politics and its discourses in the public sphere, which clearly calls for incorporating discourse approaches in all academic disciplines whose interests lie in all the aspects of formation and functioning of communities, be that minority groups, societies, citizens, demonstrators, dissidents, pressure groups or issue groups (cf. Verba et al. 1993). These, combined with organizations, institutions and media, as I have already mentioned, are all participants in political processes, and as such they illustrate how vast the scope of politics is and in how many different political practices language plays a key role.

As a consequence, political discourse comes into view as a demanding and compelling domain of research and as such it should not be degraded to a mere and for some shallow study of sentences uttered or written by a particular politician on a given more or less formal occasion. Political discourse encompasses the past, the presence and the future of doing politics through language, which essentially means that it has played and will still play an irreplaceable part in all important historical political events in the world and in all routine everyday political activity alike. It even plays its part when it is performed through silence, that is, when an influential political actor or institution gives no commentary to political events that they initiated or are in/directly involved in. This was the case with, for example, the Russian Federation president Vladimir Putin who refrained from commenting on the Ukrainian protests on the Maidan in Kiev during the Sochi Olympics, and who waited for

around five days before he publicly commented on the State Duma's unanimous approval of his request to send troops into Crimea.

1.4. Challenges in the analysis of political discourse

The great challenges of how to raise the awareness of multidisciplinary applicability of discourse analysis and how to encourage political and social scientist to incorporate it in their studies are only some of many challenges that lie ahead of linguists dealing with political discourse, but out of the general ones, these are probably two greatest challenges.

Another challenge is that anyone who takes up the analysis of political discourse has to struggle with highly diversified and fragmented methodology, and accept that for such research to be complete and serve its important purposes, the researcher will often have to go through theories and ideas that have their roots in philosophy, political science, social psychology, sociology, anthropology and various linguistics disciplines and empirical fields.

Yet another challenge, which simultaneously results from the previous one, is connected with correct conceptualization of those terms that underlie or are used in the research. This is even more important, considering the fact that for an interdisciplinary (but still mostly discourse) analysis to be applicable to other academic disciplines and for it to be valid and interesting for their representatives (i.e. political scientists, among others), the concepts, notions and terms referred to have to be properly defined. This means that their definition or understanding has to be either uniform across the disciplines under consideration, or at least clear enough to be communicable and comprehensible. This challenge is particularly great considering how diverse viewpoints about the same phenomena humanities and social science may have – and do have. To experience it, it is enough to attend an interdisciplinary conference on political systems, the European Union, or migration, and try to find common ground (or rather common language) with scholars who represent other disciplines, but deal with the same topic and/or social phenomenon. Such endeavors and confrontations may meet with the mixture of ignorance and interest, but in the end they will always be productive for all the parties concerned and, in my deep belief, ultimately they will, first, help promote the perception of Political Linguistics as a compelling domain of research that deserves attention of both humanities and social sciences, and second, they will help unify the understanding of some key concepts, notions and terms. Generally speaking, in the

case of the analysis of political discourse any researcher has to have a good command and understanding of the following concepts⁴: social domain/field (or in van Dijk's (1997) terms, "societal domain/field), political systems, political values, political ideologies, political institutions, political organizations, political groups, political relations, political process, political actions, political discourse, political cognition. These concepts well-serve as criteria in distinguishing political discourse from all other forms, orders and domains of discourse that we participate in and are exposed to in all and often overlapping contexts of everyday life. Of course, this is by no means a finite list, and depending on the specific topic of research it may be expanded to cover other concepts, notions and terms that are important. Nevertheless, the overarching motivation behind providing them is to refer to ideas that will be interdisciplinarily communicable and comprehensible.

The same difficulty, and yet another challenge, applies to operationalization of abstract notions that will serve as factors and variables in the particular study of political discourse. For the purposes of conducting the analysis in a correct way and providing insights that will be valid and interesting for both linguists and scholars representing other academic disciplines, such notions also have to be defined, i.e. operationalized, in a communicable and comprehensible way. Such operational definitions, that is, description of factors that enable to empirically identify, measure and/or classify particular data or behavior as representative of the subject matter that we deal with, are of crucial importance. To illustrate, if the study deals with the discursive representations of religiousness in, for example, political speeches of Israeli politicians (cf. Królikowska 2009, 2011), we first need to provide an operational definition of "religiousness" together with particular expressions and strategies that will manifest it in the data. Due to, for example, cultural differences, such a term may be conceptualized and understood in various ways, so an operational definition is the only means to achieve verifiable results and comply with theories and ideas from other academic disciplines⁵. This, of course, again requires the discourse analyst to refer to some theories rooted in philosophy, social psychology or political sciences, and apply them in the discourse analysis.

⁴ Some of these concepts have already been described in this chapter, but for the purposes of providing a complete conceptualization of them, in Appendix 1 there is a glossary, in which all general terms crucial to the analysis of political discourse have been included.

⁵ Operational definitions of notions that are key to the subject matter of this dissertation, i.e. in the analysis of the discourse of conflict as political genres, are presented in Chapter 4 that describes the methodology used in this study.

To conclude, the analysis of political discourse is an inherently interdisciplinary domain of research that implies a lot of effort, work and sensitivity at both the stage of working with theory and the stage of analyzing data. Nevertheless, what may serve as a motivation to take the challenges described in this section is that, first, the need for interdisciplinary analyses is growing, and second, such analyses promise the most interesting findings, that is, findings that provide a wide perspective on socio-political activities and phenomena.

2. Political genres: Challenges, characteristics, typologies

This part of Chapter 2 will serve – as far as the existing constraints allow – as a comprehensive profile of political genres in theory and in research, in which I will try to lay the specific theoretical grounds for my approach to generic structures in political communication and illustrate how complex and challenging an undertaking the analysis of political genres is. Quite deliberately, I will start this overview with the discussion of theoretical and methodological challenges that lie ahead of the analyst whenever genres in political communication become the topic of study, which is done on the assumption that all these problematic aspects have to be considered necessarily before the research starts. Additionally, many of these observations will signal how political genres should be characterized and represented in relevant typologies – which will enable me to consistently link section 2.1 with two following sections of this chapter. This way, in section 2.2 I will include an expanded discussion of characteristics of political genres that I have briefly brought up in Chapter 1 presenting some common properties of communicative genres, and emphasize those theoretical rationale that leave room for approaches such as the one presented in this dissertation, i.e. attempts to address some political genres in a different, but hopefully novel and convincing way. In section 2.3, which will conclude this chapter, I will touch upon the topic of typologies of political genres and provide a brief account of, both, the problematic issues and the potential of considerations over the need for constructing them for the purposes of analyzing generic structures in political communication. There, I will also try to specify what approach in this respect I have decided to adopt in my analysis of discourse of conflict as political genre.

2.1. Challenges in the analysis of political genres

Resulting from the so far discussion of political communication is the image of a highly diversified domain of practice and theory of influencing other people. Political genres are the means of managing communicative activity in this domain, providing the speakers with some structures into which they can organize content and thus pursue their goals by means of language. Nevertheless, due to the fact that in politics and political communication speakers continually struggle for new, more creative and, most importantly, more effective ways to gain and maintain power, political genres undergo significant evolution which for an analyst means that the existing theories and methodologies of genre research either no longer apply or need serious revision. The postulate that underlies these considerations of mine and links ideas presented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this dissertation is that the analysis of political genres may offer findings that range beyond their political anchor and apply to everything that communicative genre theories and research practices have to offer.

This presupposes three general tenets in my approach. First, that all communicative activity taken up to pursue individual and/or collective goals that result from and are oriented at maintaining or contesting the existing distribution of power can be classified as political communication (which implies a broad view of this domain). Second, that ‘communicative’ is treated as an umbrella category for the word ‘political’, since it is impossible to mark a clear-cut boundary between these two. Third, that political communication is perceived here as a magnifying glass visualizing how strategic and complex communication may be and to what extent – whether we like it or not – politics affects us in various aspects of our life including the language we use. The third tenet is even more important in the light of the fact that political genres reflect all the characteristics of modern communication. They evolve, migrate and hybridize across channels, contexts and social fields to meet the requirements of effective (and always goal-oriented) communicative acting, which makes them legitimate testers of the changes and developments in both political communication and communication in general.

Nevertheless, to serve this purpose, studies in political genres and endeavors oriented at revising the existing genre theories or offering new theoretical contributions have to consider and rise to at least several challenges that lie ahead whenever the topic of genres in politics is addressed.

The first challenge results from heterogeneity of political genres and the consequent difficulty to propose a typology and a hierarchy of such structures that would be consistent enough to apply and follow it in the studies. As I tried to illustrate in Chapter 1, this is the case with communicative genres as well, since they also escape easy classification – their typologies depend on the linguistic field they are analyzed in and vary in the criteria of identification and classification. What seems to be the two common denominators there is 1) the definition of the term ‘genre’ consistent across approaches, and 2) five properties of communicative genres (cf. Sections 2.1-2.5 in Chapter 1) that can be found in all disciplines and empirical fields that I have discussed in the previous chapter. Still, however, it leads to a situation in which it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to decide which genre typology fits best or should be taken as prevalent. In the case of political genres, which are particularly prone to dynamic reconstruction, evolution and hybridization, proposing a typology might seem pointless, as there is no chance to list all the possible evolutions a given generic structure may undergo. This, in turn, means that there is no one way to approach genres methodologically, because to design procedures that could be repeatedly followed in studies of political genres, we would first need a point of reference, i.e. a canonical, commonly accepted classification of generic structures that includes characteristic (and – within the bounds of possibility – mutually exclusive) features of particular genres, according to which the analyst could identify and group the material to be analyzed. Undoubtedly, without it maintaining analytic consistency is a challenge.

What makes such endeavors even harder – both with respect to working out a typology and with respect to the very analytic work – is the process of mediatization. Political genres when they are mediatized, i.e. broadcast by the media or supplemented by multimodal elements, simultaneously lose some of their original features and gain new ones. As a consequence, it is unclear whether we may still approach them with the same framework that would apply to their original form, because the changes caused by mediatization might have altered the genre to such an extent that a new generic being has been constructed. Of course, this depends on the number of multimodal elements introduced to the original genre, but there is no way to, for example, count them and in any objective way decide which genre particular material belongs to. Cap and Okulska (2013) argue that to overcome this challenge with political genres, one has to “identify the common function carriers at the textual and extra-textual level” (p. 8) on the assumption that they all contribute to the same overall goal of the communicative activity performed through a given genre, but – as they rightly point out –

not in every case this will apply. In political communication it is common that even inherently non-mediatised genres such as policy documents or press releases have their mediatised counterparts or continuations. In the case of the former these can be broadcast political speeches on new laws introduced, and in the case of the latter these can be press conferences or media reports following or drawing on press releases. As a result, some genres form “chains” or “networks”, i.e. sequences of supplementing generic structures, which communicate the same message in a different way – and potentially for a different purpose:

One could say, in Bourdieu’s words, that the “linguistic market” (Bourdieu 1992, 1993, 2005), involving constant mediatization and recontextualization of content, continually updates the “value” of the original “linguistic capital” the political speaker possesses to maintain or change power relations through his/her discourse. (Cap and Okulska 2013: 9)

This, in fact, means that the more the content migrates, the more the original message and the original goals of the speaker change. Due to the fact that, i) these two effects are inevitable consequences of changing the genre, and that ii) content migration has definitely become a common property of political communication, defining lasting/stable features that would apply to any genre content verge on the impossible.

Another challenge results from what I have signaled discussing common properties of communicative genres in Chapter 1 and illustrating that they not always apply to genres in political communication. Cap and Okulska (2013) argue that it does not mean that “political genres undermine the rationale for the consensus” (p. 9) as to the applicability of these properties across various linguistic disciplines and empirical fields. Instead, they stress the importance of treating political genres with extra caution and encourage to abstract their distinctive functional and linguistic features based on, both, the analyst’s theoretical preconceptions, and the conclusions drawn from the data. Only then can we check whether in the particular political genre under analysis a given pre-conceptualized feature is in force or not. To illustrate, one of the important points here is to treat context-activation and context-realization as disparate stages of the workings of genre, because in the correct identification and interpretation of political genres it is typically the latter that counts more. This is because context realization lies on the part of the speaker and it may differ from context that is typically activated by and for the audience. Another important point here is that political speakers tend to change the established generic conventions to, for example, highlight their distinctive political identities, and it is the analyst’s task to check what new genre elements

have been used and for what strategic purpose. What follows from that is another checkpoint on the analyst's list, which refers to the conventional stability of generic structures as they are presented in the theory, and their actual dynamism and openness to hybridization. In practice, one political genre can be realized in a potentially infinite number of ways, some of which will be closer to the prototype described in the theory, other being highly creative, unconventional and, thus, demanding a new generic name and a new method of analysis. Still, however, all novel elements are function carriers, so the analyst can check whether they fall in line with the original function of a given genre or not; if they do not, the task of the analyst is to see what other functions they play and how – as optional stages – they contribute to the accomplishment of the overall goal of the genre under analysis. This is connected to yet another important point: although, generally speaking, genres are interrelated in social fields, in political communication they often literally intertwine, which happens through the processes of intertextuality. Irrespective of whether they work at the level of form or at the level of content, intertextual references and elements shape the communicative activity in the domain of politics in a very powerful and persuasive way, and they also manifest themselves in the genre 'chains' and 'networks' that I have already mentioned. There, intertextuality shapes the process of content migration and the resulting modification of the message and the original goals of the speaker. These changes also apply to interpersonal roles assigned and taken up in genres: as long as in the communicative genres there are usually stable and permanent roles, in political genres they turn out to be only the prototypical ones. Just as we have some prototypical realizations of a given (political/communicative) genre, there is a set of prototypical roles assigned to by it to particular participants. As the practices of politicians show, these roles are often suspended, shifted or replaced by different ones, to maximize their rhetorical efficiency, and the analyst's task is to see what hierarchies of communicative acting such role shifts construe.

Another problematic issue is connected with understanding that some political genres may contribute to the realization of specific macro-goals in political communication, which would mean that there is space for something that we could call a hyper-genre (cf. Cap and Okulska 2013). Let us consider the following example: at the level of national politics some of the most typical macro-goals of politicians would be to win the elections, to gain support for a specific cause, to discredit political opponents. In each of these cases, macro-goals are realized by numerous and varied communicative practices, all of which contribute to the accomplishment of both their respective micro-goals and the overarching goal of the domain –

the hyper-goal of legitimization. To illustrate, if we take winning the elections as such a macro-goal, all the political genres used during the election campaign work both individually and collectively for the success (or failure) of a given politician in the election race. Simultaneously, each of these genres – be that, among others, an election campaign speech, an online ad or a debate – has its own more or less typical (macro-)structure and specific (micro-)function carriers which are the exact bits and pieces that build this macrostructure. This brings us to an important question: at which level is it best to indentify, name and classify a genre? Is it the micro-level, at which these constituent generic structures are most transparent? Or will it mean that this way we can only analyze them individually and without a clear reference to any higher-level goal? Alternatively, do we have the right to assume that these generic macro-structures form a hyper-genre of political communication, since its hyper-goal of legitimization is without doubt collectively realized by the individual goals? Whether this is a too far-fetched conclusion or not, the idea behind it is quite logical. On the one hand, Cap and Okulska argue (2013) that such a hyper-genre of political communication is such a broad and highly abstract concept that it would offer little explanatory power. When we refer to pragmatic research on genres (cf. Bauman 1992, Lauerbach 2004) or various studies in ‘activity types’ (cf. Levinson 1992, Bazerman 2004), ‘speech events’ (cf. Grundy 1995, Goldsmith and Baxter 1996), ‘communicative projects’ (cf. Linell 1998), which are conceptually close to what I take here as genres, the analysts argue that there would be no end to such a hierarchy of communicative structures and goals they realize. On the other hand, however, if the concept of political communication as a hyper-genre was introduced, it would enable to embrace in one classification all studies in political genres, including those that point at drawing more global conclusions, but often struggle with the levels of generality they can reach and still remain consistent. Although Cap and Okulska (ibid.) remain skeptical about it, there is, I believe, a point in looking for such higher level classifications, with political communication as hyper-genre. The potential of such attempts lies in several observations.

First, in my opinion, such generic macro- or hyper-categories would reflect something that already takes place on the micro-level of analysis and interpretation: hybridization of genres, mediatization and increasing multimodality of communicative practices often inspires the analysts to come up with new generic names that grasp the essential novelty in the material analyzed and challenge the classification of such discourse constructs into the existing canonical generic categories. Therefore, if this motivation for naming new generic

beings is already authorized, why would not it be authorized at the macro- and/or hyper-level?

Second, if at the micro-level genres are generally characterized as abstractions (cf. section 2.1, Chapter 1), i.e. clusters of conventionalized goal-oriented communicative activity dynamically shaped by changing socio-cultural requirements, which over time are realized in increasingly stable forms, why would it be too abstract to perceive them in the same way at the higher levels of identification and interpretation? Irrespective of how many various political genres serve as constituent elements in the realization of such a macro-goal as the one I have mentioned referring to winning the elections, they are all abstractions, so it seems that ontologically there would be no conflict between them and the macro-/hyper- category. This seems even more reasonable if we understand that even at the micro- level the dynamic relationship between the linguistic and the functional side of a given genre works as a driving force in the evolution and accommodation of new structures, tools and strategies by some genres. The higher level considerations here would involve a dynamic relation between both 1) the linguistic and the (micro-)functional side of individual genres (which is already familiar, as it is an inherent property of communicative genres), and 2) the linguistic and the macro-functional side these individual genres and the macro-/hyper- genre.

Third, introducing such a broad concepts as a macro- or hyper-genre would potentially enable researchers to look at some familiar political-communicative practices from a broader perspective: analyzing, for example, speeches delivered by the same politician in a specific time span and related to a specific socio-political situation such as a long-lasting conflict (that inevitably influences his/her communicative choices which reflect and adopt to the changing situational requirements), one could this way arrive at a macro-goal all these communicative practices and see how the same yet changing generic structure worked to realize it – and, thus, became a broader new generic category with its own macro-goal(s). This observation, I hope, will be best illustrated in the empirical part of this dissertation which presents an undertaking of exactly the same type.

Regardless of skepticism, Cap and Okulska (ibid.) also expand on the potential of employing macro- and/or hyper-genre considerations in the research on political communication. Interestingly, they see that in some cases particular political genres form complex constructs that might even range beyond their original domain. As a matter of illustration, they discuss the studies conducted by Lauerbach (2013) and Malkmus (2013), both of which are related to election night broadcasts. In each of the cases the broadcast

scenario consisted of multiple parts such as speeches, interviews or comments, all of which had their stable generic characteristic at their internal levels and occurred in a mostly set order in the entire broadcast. What is even more interesting, the collective (macro-) goal they had was quite different from the goals they normally realize in isolation and without the overarching context of elections. Following from that, Cap and Okulska (ibid.) arrive at a very interesting observation that

what endorses the recognition of a (political) genre is not the communication level or the genre's clusivity (i.e. whether it is potentially member of another genre); much rather, the stability of content-, form- and goal-related aspects. (Cap and Okulska 2013: 10)

As far as this point is concerned, I completely agree that the stability of content-, form- and goal-related aspects is one of the decisive and most productive criteria in the identification of a political genre, but I would treat genre's clusivity as a another – and essentially supportive – criterion in this endeavor. This would be done on the assumption that in some cases the ability to trace membership or derivation of a given novel generic structure from an existing (political) genre would give the analyst the much needed point of reference in the form of theoretical and analytic resources on the so far existing generic structure from which our (political) genre evolved.

There is one more analytic challenge in the research on political genres, and this one directly refers to ideas that I have presented in the preceding paragraphs. Recognition of macro- and/or hyper-genre might meet with the accusations of subjectivity and arbitrariness in the process of identifying such generic structures, but it may prove useful in the organization of analytic work. This particularly applies to studies that examine large-volume content which is heterogeneous and difficult to approach using conventional methodologies of genre analysis. Although the concepts of macro- and/or hyper-genre translate to a lesser extent to the methodological work than micro-genres do, they definitely enable to look at the material to be analyzed as one entity – as a whole. Cap and Okulska (ibid.) claim that this basically inspires the analysts to approach the data in a bottom-up manner and enables to them arrive at smaller-range results, but I believe that it also entitles to see enough regularities to draw some more global, macro-scale conclusions. This is even more promising in the light of this Cap and Okulska's observation:

Such an approach sheds light on the many micro-functions of and ways in which constellations of different pieces of the same macro-content are actually used. As a result, the micro-functions of assigning social identities specific to different micro-contexts emerge as candidate criteria in genre typology, at least at the micro-level (Cap and Okulska 2013: 11)

This, I believe, is the exactly opposite direction of analytic work to the one that I have presented before; however, as long as Cap and Okulska (*ibid.*) advocate in this respect the need for a bottom-up approach, in my opinion there is space for a top-down perspective as well, so that these two types of approaches could inform the analysis in a collective and synergetic way. In some cases the considerations of hyper-genre may lead to a redefinition or narrowing of the scope of research (e.g. from the genre of ‘political interview’ to the genre of ‘adversarial political interview’ as in Bell and van Leeuwen 1994), but even then they still turn productive and may help push the research in political communication forward.

2.2. Criteria characterizing political genres

The discussion in the preceding section together with all the ideas presented so far in this dissertation have enabled me to come up with a list of criteria that can be used to characterize political genres and, most importantly, identify and classify some discourse structures either as existing or as potentially new generic beings in political discourse. Some of these criteria stem directly from properties of communicative genres presented in Chapter 1 and their occasional inapplicability to political genres. Other criteria have originated as a result of my deliberation over the numerous writings in the domain of political discourse (cf. Cap 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013; Okulska and Cap 2010, 2013; Chilton 1985, 1987, 2003; Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Chilton and Schäffner 1997, 2002; van Dijk 1993, 1997, 2002, 2003, 2008), some of which (for example van Dijk 1997) referred to political genres in a limited way only, but by providing general characterization of political discourse, offered insights that perfectly describe what generic structures in political communication are like. Hence, below I shall enumerate and discuss nine criteria that I have worked out – and I perceive – as an essential and workable reference in the process of indentifying, analyzing and interpreting political genres.

The list has been divided into two parts. The first five (macro-)criteria follow directly from disparities between common properties of communicative genres discussed in Chapter 1

and their applicability to political genres. The next four (micro-) criteria have no explicit source in the general theory of communicative genres and arise from the specificity of political communication and political discourse, which makes them applicable to genres in this setting only. It has to be noted, though, that this list should be treated neither as a finite set of characteristics (as there are potentially more of them), nor as a set of criteria that excludes anything from political discourse that does not fulfill a given criterion (as this would contradict my perception of political genres as a constantly evolving way of communicative acting). Rather, this characterization of mine is a result of some generalizations that are a common element of any endeavors to refine the existing theory and complement it with some new observations that may prove useful in future research on this topic. Thus, this non-exclusive list of interrelated features is treated and presented here as a checklist that has served its purposes well in the research presented in the empirical part of this dissertation.

Micro-criteria characterizing political genres:

1. *Political genres are dynamic abstractions.* Political genres are clusters of conventionalized, goal-oriented discursive forms that arise from the imperatives of constantly evolving – thus dynamic – socio-political context. They operate both at the level of language and at the level of functions this language plays in the widely perceived domain of socio-political action. Because of this fact, both, by nature and over time they might undergo some reconstructions of structure and content to fulfill the changing situational requirements and remain functional for political discourse perceived as one of most evident ways of ‘doing politics’. These changes might be related to a) structure – and involve, for example, introducing something “extra” or altering the typical sequence of genres’ constitutive elements, and/or to b) content – and involve, for example, a greater focus on some elements of context over others, depending on what the speaker deems more rhetorically effective. Some political genres are more prone to these processes than others, but generally speaking it can be assumed that there is no political genre that has never undergone/will never undergo a change.

2. *Political genres may activate and realize contexts in a non-standard way.* Context-activation and context-realization should be treated as two disparate stages of the workings of the genre, and it is typically the latter that is of bigger interest for the analyst and has greater explanatory power in the research. A non-standard realization of context means that there is a change in the usual sequence and/or type of context-activating elements, which can be motivated by, for example, the speaker's urge to be different than other political speakers and – what seems to be one of the core values in politics – discriminative from them. This, in turn, entails the perception of context-realization as a stage with highly strategic and persuasive potential in the workings of particular political genre, and provides an interesting illustration of how the political actor uses this potential and what are his/her intentions with respect to the audience.

3. *Political genres are flexible macrostructures.* In the case of political genres, this flexibility may pertain to both the structural and the content-related elements which may be changed by the speaker(s). This means that a given political genre can be realized in a potentially infinite number of ways and some particularly creative and unconventional realizations of it may have to be treated as a separate – new – generic being. Nevertheless, in majority of cases what proves useful and helpful is the focus on functionality: both the standard and the novel structural and content-related elements of any political genre are function carriers that contribute to the accomplishment of the overall goal of this generic structure in the domain of politics. When they are approached as such, the analyst is able to see how they relate to each other and the genre as a whole. It also entails that political genres – as macrostructures – have both obligatory and optional elements and stages required in their realization, and it is this optionality that encourages flexibility and novelty in their content and structure to the greatest extent.

4. *Political genres are interrelated in and across social fields.* All political genres coexist and are interrelated in the broad socio-political setting that embraces mutual relations between the politicians and the people, the media and the public opinion, propaganda and its influence on education, healthcare, the economy or foreign affairs. Moreover, through such (inter)relations all political genres contribute to the 'hyper-genre' of political communication (of course, assuming that we will take it as existing) by serving the purposes of gaining and maintaining power and legitimization by means of written and spoken language. The driving

force of it is intertextuality seen as a process of strategic migration of content and form which may – either “by the way” or purposefully – modify the original message and the goals of the speaker(s), as well as create links between politics and, for example, advertising (e.g. election campaign ads) or show business (e.g. election night broadcasts).

5. *Political genres manifest hierarchies of behavioral patterns.* This criterion not only entails that political genres – just like communicative genres – assign interpersonal roles, but it also, if not primarily, stresses the importance and strategic potential of changing these roles by the speaker(s). This way, depending from situational requirements politicians play different discursive parts on the socio-political scene and they do it mostly when they deem it more rhetorically effective than sticking to the prototypical ones. Generally speaking, however, in some political genres (e.g. a political speech) these roles and the politicians’ behavior are more predictable than in others (e.g. an election debate or a political interview). This difference stems primarily from the fact that political genres realized by dialogic patterns are more interactional – and, as a consequence, entail the existence of more roles – than those realized by monologic patterns.

The above mentioned five macro-criteria characterizing political genres can be expanded by the following further observations resulting directly from what political discourse is like and how this characterization influences the communicative structures it uses. Although some ideas in points 1-4 below may partially overlap with those referred to in points 1-5 above, I do believe that they touch upon aspects that are absent from or insufficiently accentuated in the previous five criteria, and as such they deserve individual treatment as legitimate and truly helpful criteria of identification, analysis and interpretation of political genres.

Micro-criteria characterizing political genres:

1. *Political genres are defined based on, both, discursive and contextual properties.* Political genres – just as any other structures or patterns in communication – are shaped and characterized by both contextual and discursive properties. As long as the role of discursive properties as constitutive of the structure, content and functions of political genres is obvious,

this micro-criterion offers a useful concretization of, in fact, at least two dimensions of context that influence political genres. The first dimension is specified by macro-criteria no 1, 2 and 3 above, according to which the very existence of political genres arises from the imperatives of constantly evolving socio-political context and entails that any political genre features more or less specified rules of activating and realizing its context. This, however, is in my opinion productive mostly for the analysis of some well-established generic categories such as, for example, an inaugural address. This is a typical political genre used in the context of post-election reality in which a particular politician enters the leadership position and symbolically commences his/her term of office by delivering a public speech that has its rather fixed structural, content-related and functional properties. Of course, the speaker might activate and realize this context in a less standard way than their predecessors, but from the analytic standpoint, even such a non-standard realization does not necessarily mean that we could classify it under a new generic category, because, all in all, we would still be confined mostly to what I would call the “micro-context”, i.e. a rather particularized setting in which this specific post-election reality has the greatest influence on the speaker’s pragmatic choices. Of course, the wider socio-political context (henceforth “macro-context”) is also “there”, but its influence seems secondary to the one of micro-context.

This brings us to the second dimension of context – the one in which this specific micro-criterion is an essential supplement to macro-criteria no 1, 2 and 3, and that I perceive as particularly productive for the analysis of some discursive regularities arising from the imperatives of macro-scale contextual factors. These are, in essence, phenomena that range beyond the immediate (local and micro-) context and are combined with issues of global/transnational politics, for example: a global economic crisis that heavily influences the domestic economy of a particular country, the growth of terrorism perceived as global threat, global environmental issues, or a political conflict in which the conflicted parties are supported by other (sometimes even geographically distant) countries. In each of these cases, the macro-scale contextual phenomenon may potentially shape the discursive choices of the speaker to such an extent that in search for a label that would encompass all the discursive regularities the only valid idea that remains seems to be the one of a political genre – and essentially a new political genre. The clue to checking whether any conventionalized goal-oriented discursive forms **do** arise from the imperatives of this macro-context is to analyze diverse data, that is speeches with various micro-contexts (delivered during diverse events of national or international importance), delivered in front of various audiences

(local/international and homogeneous/heterogeneous audiences, as each of them shares a different amount of background knowledge with the speaker), and covering a period of time. As a result, this micro-criterion is an essential hint as to how to collect data for a study in which we want to illustrate a potentially new political genre.

2. Political genres are realized by means of linguistic strategies. Although this property might seem obvious since political discourse abounds in the use of numerous linguistic strategies that rely on communicating information either implicitly (e.g. through implicatures, presuppositions, forced construals, indirect speech acts) or explicitly (e.g. through direct speech acts and in this respect, particularly assertions), it is worth underlining that these strategies are the exact speaker's means of achieving, both, the ad hoc micro-goals and the general hyper-goal of legitimization. This seemingly obvious role of linguistic strategies in political communication gains new importance when we notice that particular strategies appear repeatedly, serve repeatable functions, and communicate repeatable messages (similar content). From the analytic standpoint, what increases the potential of these regularities in forming new generic categories even more is when they relate to a set of common ideas or a common thematic framework. In political communication this is the case with, for example, threat-presupposing discourses (e.g. discourses of terrorism, climate change, political conflict, etc.) where the linguistic strategies used:

- implicitly or explicitly communicate content that **revolve around this central theme** (e.g. the existence and influence of 'threat' resulting from terrorism, climate change or political conflict on various domains of social life) and
- perform specific pragmatic **functions related to this theme** (proximizing this 'threat' to legitimize specific actions as pre-emptive, using ideological polarization to legitimize 'us' and 'our actions' and delegitimize 'them' and 'their actions', etc.).

When such regularities in the use, function and content of linguistic strategies reappear across time and irrespective of various "occasions" for speaking or changing audiences, it is even more encouraging to label such linguistic material under a new (generic) category.

3. Political genres are strategic in form and distribution of content. This micro-criterion is an essential supplement to my so far discussion of the relationship of context and political genres and to my observations related to role of linguistic strategies in the formation of political genres in the previous point. As far as the idea of a strategic organization of the

structure and content of political genres is concerned, this property entails that whether or not something is mentioned at the beginning, in the body or in the concluding paragraphs of, for example, a political speech (as this property if, potentially, best visible in monologic patterns of communication), is a matter of a conscious choice. The motivation for this can be well-explained by the rules of primacy and recency as discussed in some classical studies in persuasion in discourse (Hovland 1957; Clark, Stevenson and Rutter 1986), according to which people tend to memorize messages that are written/said/shown at the very beginning and at the very end of what they read/listen to/watch. For this reason, if the speaker wants to highlight something, they will put this information in a prominent place – potentially at the beginning or at the end of the speech⁶. Conversely, if the speaker wants to conceal some information or present it as less meaningful, they will put it in a place of lesser importance, for example, in the body of the speech/the middle part of the statement and in the surrounding of other messages and arguments. Also, such message is likely to be communicated implicitly, as this enables the speaker to shift the responsibility for deducing it onto the addressee/the audience. All these endeavors in the strategic organization of structure and content of the utterance are also closely linked to the issue of speaker's credibility which is a necessary basis for gaining and maintaining legitimization and, thus, constitutes one of the central goals of political discourse. This, in turn, can be well explained by two prominent socio-psychological theories – the theory of *latitude of acceptance* (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Kiesler, Collins and Miller 1969; Jowett and O'Donnell 1992) and the theory *consistency in belief* (Festinger 1957). According to the first theory, the speaker has the greatest chances for success (which equals here to being persuasive and gaining legitimization), when the messages that he/she communicates are compatible with the values and beliefs cherished by the addressee. According to the second theory, in order to avoid “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger 1957) the addressee is likely to adjust the (deduced) meanings to their personal predispositions. Thus, the speaker's task is to set up what Cap (2013: 51) calls the “first connection”, i.e. to start from producing most acceptable messages and only then to move on to those more controversial ones. On a linguistic-pragmatic level this mechanism is performed, first and foremost, by assertions and sequences of assertions followed by directives, and it also heavily influences the speaker's pragmatic choices related to

⁶ In some cases, the speaker might even, either, repeat the opening message at the end of their statement, or finish it with, for example, an intertextual reference that is meant to communicate meaning complimentary to the one communicated at the beginning.

communicating messages explicitly or implicitly, as the successful deduction of implicit messages depends on the amount of “common ground” between the speaker and the addressee.

4. Political genres feature a hierarchy of goals. Just as in the case of roles and patterns of behavior described in macro-criterion 5, which are organized in relation to each other and entail specific types of interaction between genre participants, political genres also feature a specific organization of their goals. This is essentially a hierarchy, in which apart from legitimization, i.e. the hyper-goal of political communication, the speaker wants to achieve a number of *ad hoc* micro-goals, for example: to rebut criticism, to gain support for a specific cause, to forge a stronger relationship with his/her political ally, to build a positive image of his/her country on the international arena, etc. These micro-goals are inherently dynamic, as they depend on changing situational requirements and, as such, may vary over time, but notwithstanding this dynamic adjustment to context, they all involve a stable element of legitimization that the speaker wants to achieve, both, in a specific situation and, generally, as a political leader, i.e. a person in the position of power. This way, a single speech of a particular politician features a number of micro-goals, all of which contribute to the hyper-goal of legitimizing his/her leadership. Following on from that, when we take a number of speeches delivered by the same speaker across a specific time span, we are able to identify a variety of context-dependent micro-goals that he/she wanted to achieve on the way, and to see how they all worked at the service of strengthening his/her leadership position.

As a matter of summary of this section of Chapter 2, I would like to propose the following definition of political genres, which underlies my approach presented in this dissertation:

Political genres are conventional uses of more or less stable utterance groups which are strategically organized and follow recognizable patterns that suit the accomplishment of individual and global political goals in a socio-political context.

2.3. Typologies of political genres

The last, but definitely not the least important section of this chapter deals with the topic of typologies of political genres and includes a brief overview of both the problematic issues and the potential of considerations over the need for constructing them for the purposes of analyzing generic structures in political communication. Although there is a number of attempts at providing typologies of political genres, none of them can be perceived as applicable to every single study conducted in this field or as one that is able to accommodate all the types and possible sub-types of generic structures within political communication that the analyst may come across. This is motivated by at least the following four reasons. First, in most of the cases the proposed typologies revolve around the particular research interests of their authors and, thus, they highlight various – and sometimes different – aspects of political genres as candidate criteria for constructing these typologies. Second, it is difficult to decide whose recognition of genre counts the most – is it the communicator or the analyst who decides on the genre membership of a given text? Or perhaps it is the context that works as a determinative factor in ascribing genres to some classes or typologies? Third, genres in political communication in comparison to genres in, for example, film or literature have (and probably do require) much more flexible and fuzzy typologies, as they are inherently more dynamic and prone to changes than literary or film genres, so any stiff or in any other ways traditional methods of classifying them would not be able to accommodate the newly evolving and/or hybridized structures. Fourth, it is impossible to come up with a typology that would embrace **all** genres and subgenres that exist or may exist in a given social field, which applies not only to political communication, but also to all the other domains in which we come across and use genres, i.e. media, business, education, film, literature, art, etc., as the dynamically evolving everyday communicative reality driven by new technologies and rapidly changing situational requirements effectively makes it impossible. Still, however, coming back to communicating in politics, in every single analysis of political genres the need for such a typology exists, as it frames the methodological procedure and serves as a point of reference either at the initial or at the final stage of a study. This is to say that analyzing political genres, the analyst should be able to either classify their research material as realizing a given type/subtype that is present in the existing typology or as requiring a new generic name, that is, a separate place in such a typology. To further highlight this need, I am going to briefly present both the problematic issues and the potential of constructing

typologies of political genres as they are in selected approaches to genres in political communication.

Van Dijk (1997, 1998, 2002) opts for a typology which entails treating political discourse as a class of genres defined by the characteristics of their social domain, i.e. politics. Following on from that, on the one hand, he enumerates government deliberations, parliamentary debates, party programs and political speeches as selected examples of genres belonging to the domain of politics. On the other hand, however, he also stresses the importance of treating any genres that potentially intend to influence political decision-making processes as political genres as well, even if their scope ranges to other social domains such as education, science, business or law, which is the case with, for example, a bill about education policies (cf. van Dijk 2002: 6). Nevertheless, instead of providing a more comprehensive list, he focuses on illustrating properties that enable to check and systematically describe genres that belong to the domain of politics – these properties have been integrated into the section 2.2 devoted to criteria characterizing political genres. Thus, in van Dijk's approach with context as a crucial factor in identification of generic structures in politics, the overall typology of political genres that exists is very general – and, perhaps, even pushed to the background of his considerations. Various political genres are presented as discourse structures used in different types of political actions, political processes and political systems, but there is no hierarchy that organizes them – or at least van Dijk does not mention it. Such a typology entails that, for example, parliamentary debates, political speeches or party programs can be treated as some of many 'main' types of genres in the domain of politics, and that any creative or in any other way modified manifestations of them can be classified under these main categories without any further, lower level division into subtypes. This is, I believe, both an advantage and a drawback, because on the one hand, such a general one-level typology enables to classify generic structures in an easy way, but on the other hand, it has no power to deal with hybridized genres and to explain how (and in what hierarchy, assuming that it exists) they contribute to the accomplishment of their global political goals.

Another approach that is worth mentioning in this respect is the one of Myers' (2010), who highlights the use and the function of particular generic structures as factors determining the typology and description of genres, and pushes the role of content and form in this endeavor to the background. Myers put forward his ideas as a result of analyzing blogs and wikis with a larger interest in web language, but it seems that his criteria can at least partially

apply to the domain of political communication. Although in political communication the focus on content and form has important implications for the analysis of the function and the use of particular generic structures, Myers' insights provide an essential illustration of the general significance of function in the analysis and classification of both communicative genres and political genres. In the case of the latter, the most optimal approach to constructing a typology would probably be to combine "a possibly substantial number of both content/form- and function-oriented criteria" (Myers 2010: 20) which would enable us to classify generic structures into some types and subtypes, and thus form a hierarchy of genres in political communication. This is connected to some considerations of mine described in section 2.1 where I mentioned that political genres serve both their individual goals and, collectively, some macro- goals of, for example, winning the elections, etc. This implies and underlines the need for constructing a typology that would enable to classify various generic structures based on their content, form and function, and thus see how they work individually and collectively for/within the domain of political communication. Cap (2012) this way arrives as one candidate group of criteria – content, setting, medium and function – that could be used to determine the genre's prototypicality, membership in the hierarchy and its status in this hierarchy. This could be done by checking how many of these criteria consistently appear in the discourse of a particular socio-political field and across the timeframe of the analyzed genre's operation. He illustrates it with the following example from his research:

Discourse of the War-on-Terror (Cap 2012) would claim a genre label though its default content (terrorist themes), typical function (legitimization), and a relative predictability of major communicative channels and venues. Inability to reach a "threshold number" of the criteria, or matching them partly, or differently at different stages of genre's development, would disqualify the genre as a genre, would brush aside a vast number of "ad hoc genres" arising in highly particularized contexts hindering their further development. (Cap and Okulska 2013: 20)

The potential of such an approach to providing typologies of political genres is inevitably connected with the danger mentioned in the citation above: how can we ensure that the right number of criteria has been reached at every single stage of genre's development? A list of five macro- and four micro-criteria characterizing political genres that I presented in section 2.2 is, I believe, the minimum requirement that has to be met to facilitate classification of particular research material as either an existing or a new generic being. As for their "threshold number", I assume all the nine of them should be present in the texts analyzed to ensure that the resulting classification is not an "ad hoc" one. This, of course, has to be

supported by proper amount of research material (i.e. not, for example, one speech by a particular politician), which covers a specific time span (i.e. not a one-time event, during which a speech was delivered), because the stability of these nine properties across data and time analyzed is probably the only way to verify that the genre label has been properly assigned. This briefly described design of the analytic procedure has been employed in the research conducted for the purposes of this dissertation – an expanded presentation of it is included in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 provides discussion of it based on a number of examples.

With this section I have concluded my presentation and characterization of the fundamental aspects of analyzing political communication and political discourse in general and political genres in particular. This chapter was designed to serve as an overview of concepts, ideas and, most importantly, challenges that are inherently connected with political genres and the overall image of political communication as a field of research. It has to be noted, though, that all the concepts, ideas – and challenges in particular – have motivated and inspired the author of this dissertation to propose a framework that would enable to approach the discourse of conflict as political genre.

In the next chapter I will move on to the remaining essential theoretical considerations that underlie this research and I will focus on the topic of ‘conflict’. For these purposes, in Chapter 3 I will 1) present selected theoretical approaches to conflict within various disciplines of social sciences including an overview of selected, most prominent theories of conflict, 2) discuss how linguistics and, more specifically, discourse studies approach and analyze the discursive dimension of various social and socio-political phenomena that to a lesser or greater extent involve the notion of ‘conflict’, and 3) provide a brief overview of the conflict that forms the context of this research, i.e. the Middle East conflict, focusing on the background of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab struggle, describing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and presenting a brief history of Zionism and its influence on the Israeli statehood formation and politics.

CHAPTER 3. Around ‘Conflict’

Conflict has been the topic of inquiry in as diverse disciplines (and their sub-disciplines) of science as sociology, psychology, social psychology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, rhetoric, and linguistics, among others. But, what is conflict and what is **in** conflict that attracts the attention of scholars from across humanities and social sciences? In simple terms conflict can be defined as “an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles”¹ or “fighting between two or more groups of people or countries”². These two general and commonsensical definitions correspond to the most common understanding of this phenomenon in non-academic terms. Nevertheless, the actual complexity of conflict unveils itself once one has reached for various scientific approaches to this topic. Following there are definitions of this phenomenon selected *ad hoc* from psychology and sociology, respectively:

1) “Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals.” (Wilmot and Hocker 2007: 8-9)

2) “Conflict is a struggle over values and claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.” (Coser 1956: 8)

The definitions above show that there is a consensus on the fundamental properties of conflict across different disciplines of science, and that there is a range of elements involved in and influenced by this phenomenon. Conflict is, thus, both a process of struggling over tangibles and/or intangibles, engaging individuals or groups, and a setting of various actions these individuals/groups take as part of disagreement, competition and frictions. These and other aspects of conflict presented in this chapter will serve as an attempt to provide a cross-disciplinary theoretical background of a phenomenon that lies at the foundations of the empirical part of this dissertation, that is, the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab conflict as perceived in the discourse of the current Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu.

For these purposes, in Section 1 I shall concentrate on the theoretical approaches to conflict within various disciplines of social sciences and present an overview of selected, most prominent theories of conflict. In this account, I will start from the primarily

¹, ² After the Cambridge Dictionary of English.

sociological and philosophical considerations of ‘social conflict’, trying to outline the main assumptions of models put forward by Marx, Weber, Simmel, Collins, Dahrendorf, Coser, Foucault and Bourdieu. Next, I will move on to a short illustration of some ethnological considerations of conflict, where I will try to highlight the differences between ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘social conflict’, as they are presented in anthropological scholarship on this subject. Finally, I will briefly point to some general socio-psychological considerations of the phenomenon of ‘conflict’, with which I will conclude this section. The motivation behind this condensed overview of approaches to conflict coming from a range of scientific disciplines and fields is, primarily, to sketch the broad spectrum of Conflict Studies³, to which this dissertation inherently belongs on grounds of its subject matter, but there is one, more specific, underlying reason for that. Although some important scholarly contributions to this topic might be – and in fact, are – limited or excluded from this overview, which is unavoidable in the light of the constraints of this dissertation, it is my deep belief and hope that those that have been included will serve as a helpful resource for readers seeking to have a broader perspective. This is also connected with the fact that for linguists in particular the knowledge of social phenomena is crucial to interpreting linguistic data and understanding their context, which in many cases – including the topic of conflict – requires them to reach for considerations from philosophy, sociology, political science, etc. To find and decide what literature to read is a challenge, and Section 1 of this dissertation attempts to serve as a hint as to where to look for, both, the most established theories and some further readings if some aspects or ideas are underrepresented here.

Some of the theoretical considerations included in Section 1 will necessarily reappear in Section 2, where I shall direct my attention to how linguistics and, more specifically, discourse studies approach and analyze the discursive dimension of various social and socio-political phenomena that to a lesser or greater extent involve the notion of ‘conflict’. Section 2 will, thus, include an illustration of a highly diversified panorama of discourse studies, some of which have ‘conflict’ as a background, i.e. as the context of social and socio-political phenomena connected with strangeness, enmity, violence and power, and some other – although not many – that have ‘conflict’ in their foreground, i.e. as the main subject matter of

³ ‘Conflict Studies’ and ‘Peace and Conflict Studies’ is a field of social science that deals with analyzing the behaviors and mechanisms of the phenomenon of ‘conflict’. Its scope, depending on affiliation with particular academic units, deals with irenology (peace studies), polemology (war studies) or both, and implies largely interdisciplinary research that involves political science, geography, economics, psychology, sociology, international relations, history, anthropology, religious studies, gender studies, linguistics and many other disciplines.

the analysis. There, I will also point to studies that focus on the discourses of/on the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conducted within various discourse-analytic affiliations to signal how diversified the research on this topic is. Concluding Section 2, I will discuss the potential of incorporating this type of research, i.e. the analysis of the discursive aspects of conflict, into the scope of peace and conflict studies. This highly multidisciplinary field of social science investigates behaviors and mechanisms attending peace and conflict as processes and elements of social relations, drawing on insights and methodologies from disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, geography, anthropology, economics or religious studies. Nevertheless, within this panorama discourse analysis is still to a great extent an underrepresented resource which, when more readily incorporated, offers important and interesting contribution to the discussion and management of the phenomenon of conflict.

Finally, in the concluding section of this chapter I shall focus on the situation of Israel in the Middle East and, most importantly, the difficult history of the state of Israel and its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. This way, Section 3 of this chapter will serve as an account of the ongoing Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, both of which have major influence on global and regional politics, economy and relations. This way, in Section 3.1 I will outline the background of these two conflicts, discussing their main causes and key events on the timeframe of struggles between Israel, Arab countries and Palestine. Next, in Section 3.2 I will move on to the Middle East peace process, to describe selected efforts taken so far to solve these conflicts and reconcile claims of all parties concerned. Finally, in Section 3.3 I will briefly describe Zionism – the political movement and doctrine that led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and which still serves the purposes of maintaining national unity within the country and across the Jewish people living in Diaspora.

1. ‘Conflict’ in social sciences

The long scientific tradition of investigating conflict can be attributed to the equally long history of consideration over how social order is construed and maintained. As Śliz and Szczepański (2011) argue, the visions of it are located on two different poles: one of them, as described by Teilhard de Chardin, is based on love and brotherhood, while the other one perceives social order as a result of social conflicts. Thus, in de Chardin’s reflections the

world is heading towards the state of an idyllic community where there is mutual respect and peaceful coexistence of various races, ethnicities and cultures, while within contrasting approaches, various type of struggle and competition are seen as an indispensable and essential element of social order (cf. Coser 1975, Simmel 1980, Marx 1992). Nevertheless, ages of conquests, riots, wars and revolutions, the consequences of which have had a decisive influence on the formation and reformulation of states, nations, political systems, social divisions and the distribution of power, have undoubtedly led to a greater development and popularity of the latter approach. Scholars sought the reasons of the existence and emergence of the phenomenon of conflict to find and explain its role in groups, communities and societies.

One of the most prominent conflict theorists, Marx (1992), attributed the emergence of conflicts to the unequal distribution of resources within systems, which led to a dichotomous division of the society into the dominating and the subordinate ones. In this view, the moment the subordinate group becomes aware of their situation, they start to challenge the legitimation of the system. The two decisive factors that trigger this awareness are, first, the extent to which the subordinate group is alienated and, second, their communication which is facilitated by living side-by-side in a concentrated group of people sharing negative experiences. The access to education works then as a factor that increases both the awareness of the situation and the speed of forming common ideologies. This, in turn, leads to the appointment of ideological leaders and the decrease of the approval for the laws and rules imposed by the dominant group. What follows from it is a formation of an opposition which aims to challenge the status quo to change the distribution of resources. If the subordinates notice any signs of disintegration within the dominant group, there is a greater chance that they will gather their forces, as in such a setting the interests of these two sides are more polarized and increase the pressure in their mutual relations. This way, according to Marx, violent conflicts that emerge change not only the distribution of resources, but also the entire organization of the society.

A voice that has critically reinterpreted Marx's theory of conflict came from Weber (1930, 1968), who claimed that, to develop, societies do not need revolutions, but particular empirical conditions. On his view, there is no space for a dichotomous division of the society and the economic criterion as the trigger of conflicts. Rather, for Weber it is the division of power, wealth and prestige that is to blame for the emergence of frictions between the groups. Nevertheless, similar to Marx, he also stresses the importance of ideological leaders whose role was to mobilize the members of the subordinate group under a common goal. Weber's

ideas were rooted in a transition from traditional authority to a rational-legal model, which disempowers elites who possess most of the existing authority, wealth and prestige. The more privileges the elites have, the greater the frustration of the subordinate majority is. In such settings, charismatic leaders form new political organizations that function either within the traditional authority or on the basis of an equal distribution of laws and rules within the rational-legal model. Weber has also distinguished between internal and external conflicts, the former of which are concerned with models of authority, while the latter with threats to the territory or sovereignty of a particular group.

Considerations of Marx and Weber have served as an important vantage point for Collins (2006) and his conflict theory of social differentiation and stratification, which is also a development of Durkheim's (1912) discussion of the role of emotions and religion in social interactions, and Goffman's (1967) interaction rituals, which – through emotions – enable to achieve dominance over individuals and increase group solidarity. According to Collins, people are prone to triggering or becoming involved in conflicts, because they inherently reject any types of coercion and dominance. Any instances of these two types of power-rooted behavior cause the objections of the ones who are expected to submit, but on the other hand, the need to gain power over others is so strong that it cannot be compromised. The essential aspect of it is that the authority distributes the economic and emotional resources in an uneven way, which directly leads to conflicts that involve the entire community or society. This is motivated by the fact that every individual builds their own social status by means of accessible resources and interaction with other people. What follows from it is a range of different stratifications, which derive from a number of elements, e.g. ethnic origin, age, sex, profession, education and relations with others. Nevertheless, according to Collins it is profession that has the greatest impact on the social status, as the way we earn money conditions our rank within the group. Thus, those who have a better profession are more powerful and potentially more motivated to control those with lower social status, although not every type of power equals dominance. As a result, class cultures emerge, the relations of which are grounded in their experience with power, coercion and dominance. In such a setting it is the upper class that usually holds power, the lower class is expected to fully submit, while the middle class combines these two orientations and thus comes as the most diversified group out of these three, which in Collins' view contributes to the emergence of numerous frictions across level of social differentiation and social strata.

Another influential approach to social conflict comes from Simmel (1955), who to a greater extent than other conflict theorists focused on the positive aspects of this

phenomenon, that is, the idea that conflict enables to maintain integrity, solidarity and unification of groups involved in this process. In his view, not all the conflicts that emerge are violent, but their violence increases when the parties engaged are emotionally committed to the situation and have clearly defined goals in the conflict. Apart from increasing integration, conflicts also enable to set the boundaries between the groups involved and to centralize authority, but if the level of mutual enmity is low, it is possible that various groups engaged in the conflict may form coalitions that transgress these divisions. Simmel perceived conflict as a common element of culture, which he defines as “the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course of history” (Levine 1971: 6, cit. in. Babaei and Taadolkhah 2013: 10). For him, the most important and autonomous domain of culture is “cognition”, which he perceives as crucial to questioning the established concepts and introducing the new ones. According to him, every culture has its central idea that inspires the creative spirit, and that leads to changes and reformulations adjusted to new needs and requirements. This, however, entails that conflict is an inherent and permanent element of social relations, but it may emerge in different forms, i.e. as struggle (*Kampf*), dispute (*Streit*) or rivalry (*Konkurrenz*). For Simmel, rivalry is of prime importance, because the aim of it is to prove one’s superiority rather than to defeat the opponent, but he also argues that the attitude to conflicts depends on the group that a given individual is affiliated with.

Dahrendorf’s (1973) conflict theory came as a critique of the ideological backings of functionalism, when he outlines two traditions in social sciences: focusing on values that govern the differences in viewpoints and interests, and perceiving coercion and force as factors determining the dominance of one group over another. This dualism is accepted in sociology and societies are analyzed considering both of these approaches. Dahrendorf’s conflict theory is, however, mostly concerned with social change, transformation of class conflict and methods of regulating these processes in capitalist societies. In this view social conflict emerges as a result of formation of conflicted groups that are bound by relations of authority. In each social organization there is coercion and control of one group over others, and the distribution of power and supremacy between them is unequal. What follows from it is that one side of the conflict struggles to maintain the status quo, while the other one wants to challenge it, which Dahrendorf sees as a core element of social conflict. He also draws attention to the contradiction between poverty and development, which entails that some people are more concerned with innovation, while others with social justice – this results from the economic growth that is driven by the technological development and that makes many employees redundant. Nevertheless, the modern conflict does not imply a struggle over goods,

but over social barriers that result from unequal distribution of rights. These rights together with resources constitute the foundations of contemporary conflicts which can be illustrated by the Martinez Paradox – as Dahrendorf (1988) argues, “the revolution has transformed a world of plenty for the few into one of little for all” (p. 8). Therefore, the central question in this theory is as follows: how the increase in resources influences the rights and how the increase in rights influences the access to resources? Civil societies provide both rights and resources, but prospects are never equal. The idea behind it is that only these inequalities can drive progress and without them this progress is impossible. This is also the basis of social stratification, as it entails the existence of a hierarchy of values, according to which there are super ordinate and subordinate groups. According to Dahrendorf, this inherently involves hegemony or power, since those who are empowered govern the law-making processes, which translates into greater access to rights and resources that lead to better life prospects. Thus, the emerging antagonisms work as factors driving change and shaping progress of groups, communities, societies and entire nations.

Yet another prominent voice comes from Coser (1956, 1975), who developed a stable model of conflict, according to which this phenomenon may contribute to increased integrity and unity of a group that struggles with internal antagonisms and enmity. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that not every conflict may have equally positive effects, as these depend on the importance of the issue at stake and the structure of the groups. Coser also distinguishes between internal and external conflicts, which he perceives as having quite opposite qualitative impacts on the situation. As for the former type, i.e. internal conflicts, he defines them as conflicts over goals, values and interests, which are functionally positive and do not influence the systems that underlie social relations. The role of such conflicts is to solve the problems with the axionormative system or the system of authority, but if it reaches to values that are fundamental to the identity of a particular group, specific institutionalized mechanisms have to be introduced in order to prevent its disintegration. Due to the fact that in each social structure there are conflict-prone situations, the challenge lies in the level of tolerance for otherness and antagonisms, since these two are directly correlated with the group integrity. Hence, the greater the tolerance for the emergence of conflicting viewpoints, the lesser the risk of the group’s disintegration. Coser also notices that the extent to which groups are integrated influences the level of violence when the conflict emerges, i.e. well-integrated groups are more likely to experience violent internal conflict. As for the latter type of conflicts, i.e. the external conflicts, Coser sees them as situations that require the group members to fully commit themselves to the issue at stake, which in turn suppresses the

internal tensions and the internal conflict. This way, external conflicts may lead to a flare-up of the struggle within this group, which may cause its disintegration and division into smaller conflicted subgroups. Thus, an external conflict works as a tester of the group's flexibility, because in flexible structures the combination of internal and external conflict factors contributes to their overall stabilization. If the group is able to immediately define the sources of conflict, it is also able to proactively react to them and thus eliminate the risk of disintegration. On balance, various types of conflict result in the emergence of diverse coalitions and associations, all of which locate themselves in the wider social environment.

Coser has also drawn attention to the ways in which groups aim to maintain internal unity, that is, through permanent sought for "an enemy" and "a threat", both of which have to appear as real in order to appeal to the group members. Allport (1937) called this process "the functional autonomy of motives", according to which motives that underlie the initial goal of the group's activities still apply once this goal has been achieved. Another case in point here is Merton's (1968) "ritualism", which describes the mechanism of seeking a scapegoat⁴ when the group experiences failure or increased external threat, and which entails that the existence of such a scapegoat enables to clear the group's fault – which directly translates into its increased unity. The third mechanism that applies here is what Thomas & Thomas (1928) express in the formulation: "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (p. 572). Hence, even if the enemy is imaginary, it serves its purposes and works as a factor integrating social structures.

Coser also draws attention to ethnic conflicts, in which minorities struggle to gain and/or maintain their separate positions in societies. His conflict theory is often applied in the analyses of tensions and antagonisms in ethnically and culturally diverse communities, in which minority groups experience discrimination and persecution. Nevertheless, in some contexts these minorities also use the mechanism of seeking an enemy or a scapegoat, and attribute the fault or the threat to the majority group to more effectively defend their interests and values. Also, another minority group may be treated as an opponent if in the background of such a conflict there are some shared historical experiences and issues that have not been resolved.

In this overview of theories of social conflict I would also like to briefly refer to poststructuralist considerations of Foucault (1982) and Bourdieu (1991). In the Foucauldian approach, there are three key terms: discourse, knowledge and power. Discourse is seen as

⁴ This mechanism is responsible for various types of discrimination, including anti-Semitism.

ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern. (Weedon 1987: 108)

Thus, through language and practices, power relations are expressed, because discourses are systems of power that impose particular framings of what is true and false, good and bad, acceptable and not, which means that “power” is interrelated with “knowledge”. According to Foucault, knowledge rests within the political field, which is the field of power, while power implies the hegemony of meanings, that is, it becomes knowledge. What follows from it is that knowledge is prone to political influence, as it serves the purposes of justifying – thus legitimizing – meanings and norms used by power. This way, power shapes knowledge in particular ways to more effectively control individuals that remain unaware of this impact. The power/knowledge nexus becomes a tool that stabilizes the system of dominance and the system of meanings by constructing its own “regimes of truth”, morality, etc. This approach entails that individuals are shaped by knowledge which is an instrument of power and provides people with basic interpretations of their deeds, thoughts and emotions. These, in turn, shape the individual perception of the self and the surrounding reality, which simultaneously implies social control and non-existence of objective knowledge. In the light of rapid development of societies and increasing complexity of social relations, knowledge becomes the fundamental element of power, which facilitates the process of rationalizing violence and oppression. Hence, conflicts are created and realized in everyday communication (discourses) and culture is the arena of conflict between the individuals and the power that aims to maintain its dominance.

Bourdieu (1984) in his approach to social order and distribution of power relied on the notions of class, capital and habitus. Class is bound to the environment that conditions lifestyle, taste, consumption, family relations, fashion and other elements of individual's habitus, i.e. the system that allows us to react and adjust to the life environment. The same applies to capital which involves – contrary to Marx – not only economic resources, but also the social, political and cultural ones, all of which constitute the basis of dominance of those with greater capital over those with less resources. Bourdieu's concept of cultural dominance of classes is closely connected to the workings of the education and “pedagogic authority” which imposes on us “cultural arbitrary” standards through symbolic violence defined as “the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu and

Wacquant 2002: 167). This subtle type of power implies imposing particular norms and images of social reality and presenting them as universal and unquestionable. In this setting language becomes the mechanism of power, as it designates one's position within the entire social structure and, most importantly, the field or social space. Thus, it is language that determines who speaks, listens, asks questions, interrupts, etc. and that leads to oppression and discrimination, since the dominated ones are expected to accept the imposed rules and meanings even if they do not agree with them. Bourdieu's notion of 'field' refers to a network of objectified relations between individuals holding different positions, where people constantly compete and struggle for meanings. This way, fields are arenas of everlasting conflicts about politics, art, economy, education, religion and any other elements and aspects of social life, and "linguistic markets" (Bourdieu 1991) serve there, in Ruiz's (2009) words, as "mechanisms that establish and maintain the unequal value of different social discourses" (para. 44). This way, the existence of such diverse discourses is a reflection of social inequality – and a cultural mechanism of domination that preserves these inequalities.

Although among all these approaches to social conflict, only several explicitly referred to notions such as culture, ethnicity, identity, values, it is anthropology and ethnology that shed more life on these topics, also through the analysis of 'ethnic conflicts'. Surprisingly, however, the very term of 'ethnic conflict' does not derive from ethnology, even though it seems obvious that it falls within the scope of interests of this discipline. Szykiewicz (1996) attributes this situation to the fact that ethnologists tend to treat ethnicity as one of natural elements of social structure – just like class, profession or creed. This perception implies that 'ethnos' undergoes the same social processes as other elements of the structure, which means that it may also become the subject of conflict. Nevertheless, it would also mean that ethnic conflicts range far beyond the scope of ethnology and overlap with the scope covered by theories of 'social conflict', which would be a huge oversimplification. By this, Szykiewicz has drawn attention to the fact that some scholars eagerly reduce culturally-grounded conflict to the issues with economic or political backing (cf. Kwaśniewski 1994), which in turn undermines the ethnological tradition of focusing on less palpable, yet immensely important aspects of conflict between groups, such as their identities and values. Nevertheless, simultaneously it has to be noted that although in some cases only one of the conflicted party is a nation, a state, a political or economic interest group, the idea of 'ethnicity' in conflict is only partly applicable. In such settings the ethnic issues are only of instrumental importance and serve as one of many arguments used to stimulate positive endorsement of the majority,

i.e. large groups, potential electorate or influential social actors. Ethnic groups may be involved in political or economic conflicts only as a pretext, while the real issue at stake may remain hidden and visible only to those who observe the situation from the outside, which has served as yet another reason for analyzing ethnic conflicts using theories not grounded in ethnology.

Thus, the term 'ethnic conflict' has its roots in political science and sociology, and has deserved considerable attention following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. In these socio-historical contexts many conflicts involved not only the material (political and economic) interests of ethnic groups, but also their efforts to defend their ethnic identities in the new setting⁵. The need to focus on ethnicity has come as an unexpected challenge to the postmodernist belief that nationalisms and ethnic solidarity are a relic of the past. It is postmodernism, progressive globalization and unification of lifestyles that gave the impression that ethnic origins are of minor importance. According to Szynekiewicz (ibid.) the roots of such an approach can be traced in liberalism where the focus on individuality undermined importance of social groups created based on membership resulting from common origin and cultural heritage. Also Marxism has had its share in this respect, as it proclaimed the disappearance of ethnicity and nationalisms in favor of class solidarity. This all has contributed to the formation of a myth, according to which unified nations on post-WW I Europe will guarantee peace both on the national and international levels. Nevertheless, Holocaust and other instances of ethnic cleansing, together with a growing number of ethnically-motivated struggles in the Middle East, Europe or post-colonial Africa and Asia have proved the faultiness of this reasoning. 'Ethnic conflict' deserved more ethnological attention, as it offered new ways of understanding why notions of identity, culture or values are that powerful in triggering struggles and leading to the deaths of thousands of human beings. As it has occurred, ethnic tensions across the continent are typologically the same and manifest similar dynamics, while their only distinguishing elements are only some formal features (Szynekiewicz 1996: 17).

In this setting, two major trends of analyzing ethnic conflict have emerged, that is, instrumentalism and historicism. The instrumental approach sees ethnicity as a phenomenon shaped by circumstances rather than history (cf. Brass 1985, Steinberg 1981), while the

⁵ Szynekiewicz (ibid.) criticizes the very broad application of the term 'ethnic conflict' in the American scholarship, where it is understood as a complex idea housing ethnic minorities within state societies, which implies the transposition of cultural phenomena on the political ones. This leads to the interpretation of nation-forming or nationalistic phenomena as 'ethnic conflicts' as well, which Szynekiewicz sees as a too far-fetched incorporation.

historical approach perceives it as a permanent result of social evolution that is resistant to opportunism (cf. Smith 1986). Ethnologists conform mostly to the latter of these two, as within this view ethnic culture is the distinguishing element of groups, and the basis of ethnicity in general. Although scholars disagree as to whether there are any subjective determinants of ethnic culture or whether it is a group- or individual-oriented phenomenon, it is without doubt the source of something that lies at the foundations of any type of expressed and/or experienced belonging, i.e. identity. Further differences between these two approaches involve disparate ways of interpreting goals of ethnic conflict. The instrumental approach sees it as a politically-motivated process targeted at challenging the dominance of one group over another or the situation in which a particular group experiences discrimination from the state. The counter-activity, i.e. reactions to imposed dominance or discrimination, ranges from declarations of belonging to terrorism, depending on the goal it is aimed to achieve. These might be: political hegemony (in extreme cases leading to complete autonomy), group privileges (political, economic, territory-related) or individual privileges of groups leaders. From the point of view of governments, in most of instances the process of negotiating conflict is oriented at the last one of these three categories of goals, as it perceived as posing the smallest threat to the state's integrity. Such interpretations of ethnic conflict lead to the phenomenon of progressive politicization of issues related to ethnicity, but this in fact seems to be the actual dimension of many of them. This, however, does not exclude more spontaneous and less politicized struggles from the category of 'ethnic conflict', as in all cases they involve the notion of 'identity' used as a real or alleged issue at stake.

In this respect, identity is a true keyword for both social scientists and discourse analysts dealing with social phenomena, as it implies that its construction (through language, among others) is the source of all the necessary information of how individuals and groups see themselves in the surrounding reality. The common idea shared by scholars across disciplines is the perception of the 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy as a source of identity formation, which I have already mentioned in Chapter 2 where I referred to ideological polarization. Us-them dichotomy is the very roots of cultural self-identification that we build in reference to the others and the surrounding reality. Within ethnology, it is seen as the source of our ethnos, i.e. ethnicity that distinguishes our group from other groups. As in any other contexts of application, this dichotomy implies a very specific and detailed conceptualization of 'the other', which serves as a point of reference to the ethnic 'self'. This also means that without 'them' there would be no 'us', as this mechanism works only on condition that there are at least two parties. As Szykiewicz (1996: 19) argues, Obrębski (1936) was the first one to

notice this regularity, but due to the fact that his works have not been popularized in international ethnology, authors might attribute it to other scholars. ‘Us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy is not an opposition of two identities, but the opposition of our identity – their otherness. What is important, ‘our identity’ might not have a clear or unified definition, because group members rarely can share exactly the same reflection of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’: we have different individual experiences and cognition and we more readily think about the others than about ourselves. Nevertheless, we tend to share the definition of this ‘otherness’, especially if we are in the context of conflict or rivalry with an identified ‘enemy’. What results from it is the exact idea behind ideological polarization and the ideological square, i.e. positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation that in context of conflict are usually supplemented with elements legitimizing conflict situation. Hence, the scope of self- and other-defining arguments is extended to accommodate those events, ideas or opinions that are (subjectively) presented as direct causes of the conflict.

This brings us to last part of this section, in which because of the existing constraints of this dissertation I only signal the socio-psychological perspective on the phenomenon of conflict. On balance, within social psychology scholars seek to answer the following questions: 1) What psychological limitations contribute to the intensification of conflicts and hinder its resolution?, 2) How do people react in the situation of conflict?, and 3) How to effectively negotiate the conflict to lead to its resolution? (cf. Wojciszke 2002). For these purposes, apart from referring to many ideas and theories of social conflict that I have described earlier in this chapter, social psychology also focuses on how stereotypes and prejudices are constructed, and how they lead to or result from the emergence of conflicts between both individuals and groups. Furthermore, socio-psychological readings enable to approach and interpret many aspects of human behavior and mechanisms governing it from another perspective, i.e. the perspective of individual and group psyche that is influenced by the existence and activity of other people. This way, coming back to, for example, the dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and van Dijk’s ideological polarization, social psychology explains the individual motivation behind constructing the ‘otherness’ in a negative way: unambiguous and openly negative judgments about ‘them’ and conviction of moral superiority of ‘us’ enable to reassert our position and increase the chances of victory – or, at least, increase the psychological comfort in the situation of conflict. As Wojciszke (2002) argues, research based on the theory of conflict of interests clearly indicates that the number of prejudices and stereotypes increases in direct correlation with the progress of conflict. To illustrate, the lowest social classes usually manifest the strongest negative attitudes and the

greatest prejudices towards immigrants and ethnic minorities (cf. Abrams 2010). Other socio-psychological research shows that the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy lies at the foundations of many conspiracy stereotypes Poles have of Jews, Germans and Russians (cf. Kofta and Sedek 2005). This stereotype results from shared historical experiences, most of which were a direct element or a consequence of local and international conflicts, but irrespective of the passage of time, they seem to have remained in force. To illustrate, in the context of election campaigns when the topic of power and inter-group conflicts comes to the foreground, the conspiracy stereotype of Jews gains in popularity. About 1/3 of Poles manifest such attitudes towards this group, but there are also instances of attributing the explicit will to control the world, the finance or the mass media to Germans or Russians.

Social psychology also enters into those domains and aspects of human behavior (either as individuals or as groups) that are absent from theories of social conflict. For example, it seeks to understand why people are prejudiced towards groups with which they neither have conflict, nor even contact – which happens through the mechanism of transposition of aggression – or how processing of social information influences human attitudes to social phenomena (cf. Kenrick, Neuberg and Cialdini 2002). Additionally, social psychology explains what functions different types of human behavior have and how they can be strategically influenced, for example, through language.

2. ‘Conflict’ in linguistic research

Linguistic research concerned with social phenomena more and more readily reaches for their theoretical explanations from social and cognitive sciences to more comprehensively describe the relationships and mutual influences of discourse and social reality. What lies at the foundations of this inter-/transdisciplinarity and the consequent incorporation of concepts (in some cases, together with the methodologies of their analysis as well) is the inseparability of discourse we use and are surrounded by from other aspects of our individual and group/community/social activity in all domains of life. Following from it is the need – or a rather a necessity – to reach for concepts from various scientific domains that deal with social reality as it is, since this is the only way to address social phenomena as they are represented in and created by discourse from a variety of perspectives – and to see how they are perceived in, motivated by and/or linked to considerations coming from other domains of science. The analysis of political discourse is a salient illustration of it with its inherent inter-

/transdisciplinary character described in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Political science, media studies, sociology and social psychology are the main scientific disciplines, the insights of which are appropriated by the linguistic/discourse studies conducted in this field, but other references might also include philosophy, cultural anthropology and other descriptive or applied sciences.

Within linguistic research it is Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) that most readily adopt such an inter-/transdisciplinary orientation and thus have made the greatest contribution to the volume of linguistics/discourse-analytic research on ideologies, representations, identities or persuasion/legitimization in various settings, including those of different (or multiple) conflicts. As Hart and Cap (2014) point out, as an approach to critical social research (Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1993; Fairclough 1989, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Weiss and Wodak 2003; van Dijk 1999, 2003, 2006; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Wodak 2012; amongst others), CDS is an inherently multifaceted collection of studies that resort to ideas and methodologies from broadly perceived humanities, social and cognitive sciences to address various aspects of discourse understood as social practice. With ‘discourse’ being a multidimensional, multimodal and multifunctional phenomenon that always exists in context, there is a necessity to address its various dimensions, i.e. the linguistic, the cognitive, the intertextual, the historical, the social and the situational ones, as they all shape and reflect the discursive practices of people at all levels of social organization – starting from the individual one and finishing with the global. The complex dialectical relationship of discourse and social reality (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak 2011, etc.) entails the influence of situations, institutions and social structures **on** the discourse and a simultaneous influence **of** the discourse on the social status quo. Hence, CDS and other linguistic studies with critical orientation link the ‘micro’ considerations of linguistic phenomena with the ‘macro’ considerations of their social motivations and consequences, addressing them on different levels of complexity. The one occupied in this dissertation is the level of macro-considerations that, through cognitive-pragmatic critical inquiry, focus on how a specific type of discourse, i.e. the discourse of conflict, fits into the requirements of a macrostructure a (political) genre, and how it represents and creates the particular context it comes from and refers to, i.e. the long-lasting conflict in the Middle East from the perspective of the current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Further elaboration of this approach is presented in Chapter 4 devoted to methodology.

First, however, in this section I shall direct my attention to the different but complementary ways in which discourse studies in general, and Critical Discourse Studies in particular deal with analyzing the discursive dimension of various social and socio-political phenomena that – to a lesser or greater extent – involve the phenomenon of ‘conflict’. Research trends and their empirical examples presented here have been selected to depict a highly diversified panorama of discourse studies, most of which have ‘conflict’ as a background, i.e. as the context of social and socio-political phenomena connected with strangeness, enmity, violence and power. When it comes to linguistic approaches and studies that have ‘conflict’ in their foreground, i.e. as the main subject matter of the analysis, and/or that, preferably, focus on the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are relatively few of them, but I am going to provide some examples as well.

This overview will start with a brief discussion of six dominating traditions within this text-analytical approach to critical social research, as they are presented by Wodak and Meyer (2009), and continue with an account of four more approaches that have been recently identified by Hart and Cap (2014). In this presentation I shall, first, briefly outline the main assumptions and research topics of each approach and, second, give examples of studies conducted within these theoretical/methodological affiliations which either directly or indirectly focus on (socio-political) conflict or some social/socio-political phenomena that surround it. The general motivation behind it is to present the panorama of different theories, topics and methods of analysis within CDS and to account for different ways of approaching the subject matter of this dissertation, i.e. the discursive dimension of conflict. This is done to show that – as the reviewed literature suggests – so far there have been no attempts at either conceptualizing the discourse of (socio-political) conflict as genre or approaching this phenomenon as a very specific, functional-contextual determinant of discourse.

On balance, just as it is manifested in the research on political genres that I described in Chapter 2, within CDS there are two main and complementary vantage points on the studies conducted, i.e. the theory-driven approaches and the data-driven approaches. Hart and Cap (*ibid.*) argue that

the majority of attempts to date at mapping the field of CDS have been made from the perspective of particular methodological approaches, which carry out their analyses against distinct theoretical backdrops and tend to be concerned with particular dimensions or features of discourse as a linguistic, cognitive and social practice. (Hart and Cap 2014: 3).

In their attempt, Wodak and Meyer (2009) distinguished six approaches to CDS, described the way they developed over time, and pointed to their specific ‘theoretical attractors’, i.e. either the key figures or key theory names that gave grounds to the formation of a particular CDS research tradition. The list includes:

- Discourse-Historical Approach (Vienna school),
- Corpus-Linguistic Approach,
- Social Actor Model,
- Dispositive Analysis (Duisburg school),
- Socio-Cognitive Approach,
- Dialectical-Relational Approach.

As far as the Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 2009, Wodak and Reisigl 2009) is concerned, language and other semiotic practices are perceived as tools that influential social actors use to gain and maintain power over others. Although the origins of this approach are grounded in the analysis of stereotypical anti-Semitic images in the Austrian public discourse surrounding the 1986 presidential elections (Wodak et al. 1990), the more recent applications of this model include the research on sexism, racism and other types of discriminatory discourses on the level of national and inter-/transnational politics. Generally speaking, the Discourse Historical Approach is anchored at the combination of the textual and contextual levels of analysis, with historical knowledge being one of four layers of context (Wodak and Meyer 2009). The core of this approach is the list of six strategies (nomination, predication, argumentations, perspectivization, intensification and mitigation) that identify the ideological positioning of the discourse analyzed and characterize the linguistic means used to promote stereotypes and other discriminatory images. As far as the analysis of conflict and/or elements of this phenomenon are concerned, the Discourse Historical Approach has been employed in the analyses of, for example, the implicit content of media reporting conflict (Lynch 2014), ‘call to arms’ speeches by selected influential historical figures as a background of the analysis of George W. Bush’s 2001 declaration of a ‘war on terror’ (Graham, Keenan and Dowd 2004), or the Western and the Arab media coverage of Saddam Hussein’s execution (Al Ali 2011).

The Corpus-Linguistic Approach, which is probably the most recent contribution to this panorama of CDS approaches, is an important addition introduced in response to the challenge that underlies almost every single CDS research, i.e. the challenge of reducing the analyst’s bias in the selection and interpretation of data. In this respect, quantitative computer-aided methods come in handy, as they enable to both tackle this challenge and handle large

amounts of data, allowing thus for potentially more large-scale considerations. Hence, the Corpus-Linguistic Approach has introduced into CDS the analyses of collocations, keyness, semantic preference and semantic prosody, together with the consequent ability to example, trace preferred and dispreferred patterns of lexis and structures, which enables to study, for example, the ideological workings of hegemonic discourses (cf. Baker 2006). Nevertheless, such analyses can rarely be conducted based on corpus linguistic methods only, as there is very little reference to context, so to reach a potentially higher level of explanatory power, they additionally apply some qualitative methods as well. Corpus linguistic and critical discourse analytic tools have been combined to investigate conflict-related issues such as, for example, Scottish nationalism as an ideological source of Scottish independence (Prentice 2010), which also incorporates the discourse-historical approach, the discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in UN and newspaper texts (Baker and McEnery 2005), or ideological recontextualization of Wahhabi-Saudi Islam in post-9/11 discourses (Salama 2011).

The Social Actor Model (van Leeuwen 1996, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, Reisigl and Wodak 2001) draws on analyzing the representations of social actors in discourse. This approach is based on insights from systemic functional linguistics (Halliday 2004) and critical linguistics (Fowler 1991, Hodge and Kress 1993), the latter of which is a historical precursor of CDS that still receives considerable scientific attention both with respect to theories and research methods. The Social Actor Model is primarily devoted to socio-semantic considerations over the ways in which groups and individuals are referred to in discourse and how they – as social actors – are included or excluded, generalized or specified, activated or subjected in the texts analyzed (cf. Koller 2012). This is done on the assumption that such representations of social actors communicate: i) specific beliefs and knowledge about them, ii) specific attitudes and expectations that result from these beliefs and knowledge, and iii) emotions that surround them. This approach has been employed in the analysis of, for example, press representations of Marxist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries in the internal Colombian conflict (Garcia-Marrugo 2013) and refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers during the Balkan conflict (KhosraviNik 2009).

The Dispositive Analysis, also known as the Duisburg School, relies on the assumption that discourse constitutes subjects (Jäger and Meier 2009), which means that our sense of ‘self’ results directly from meanings communicated to us through some institutionalized patterns of behavior, thinking and speaking. This approach draws heavily on insights from Foucault’s discussion of power and knowledge interrelationship, constructivism (Laclau 1980) and activity theory (Leont’ev 1982), which are used here to argue that social

actors link discourse with reality, and that there is no societal reality other than the discursive one (Wodak and Meyer 2009). This approach positions human linguistic activity among, for example, architectural arrangements, legal practices, social institutions, customs, rituals and modes of moral thought, all of which are perceived as elements of a semiotic network in which we live. As far as its analytic interests are concerned, the Dispositive Analysis focuses on studying the role of metaphors, style, references, topics, argumentation strategies and symbols, among others, in the creation of racist, patriarchal or conservative discourses. When it comes to investigating conflict or phenomena that surround it, the dispositive approach has been used in the analysis of, for example, post-9/11 Bush and bin Laden cartoons (Mazid 2008), which was also largely informed by Van Dijk's ideological square and Chilton's (de)legitimation and proximization model.

The Socio-Cognitive Approach represented by van Dijk (2005, 2008, 2009) is rooted in formal text linguistics developed by insights from psychology and cognitive science. This approach is based on the interrelation of cognition, discourse and society perceived as three elements that interact in the creation and reproduction of stereotypes and ethnic prejudice, and work in the background of power abuse and resistance. Central to this approach is van Dijk's (2008) perception of the control over discourse dimensions as a means to gain power, and the idea that individual cognition is shaped by social representations⁶, i.e. values, beliefs, norms and images shared, promoted and reproduced by the members of a particular social group through discourse. The Socio-Cognitive Approach focuses on the rhetorical figures, speech acts, semantic macrostructures, local and global discourse forms and other specific linguistic realizations perceived as means of influencing individual and group cognition. When it comes to the topic of conflict, the Socio-Cognitive Approach has been applied to the analysis of, for example, enemy framing and the politics of reporting religious conflicts in the Nigerian press (Musa and Ferguson 2013).

When it comes to Dialectical-Relational Approach, as it is manifested by Fairclough (1989, 1995) and his interest in the relationships of language, ideology and power, it focuses on the semiotic aspects of social conflict and its reflection in discourse seen as an element of social processes, i.e. social structures, practices and events. Studies conducted under this label are inspired by Foucault's approach to discourse and Marx's insights on the establishment of

⁶ The Socio-Cognitive Approach incorporated insights from social representation theory (Moscovici 1984), which derives from social psychology and sociological social psychology. Some parallels can also be found in primarily sociological theories such as social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Searle 1995, Lock and Strong 2010) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1962, Plummer 1975, Stryker and Vryan 2003).

social order, which are incorporated to and address the phenomena of discursively performed dominance and resistance. Among the topics of inquiry there are phenomena such as conversationalization and technologization of public discourse and hybridization of discursive practices perceived as processes that have major impact on constructing hierarchies within social structures. As Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue, the Dialectical-Relational Approach entails identification of a specific social problem with a semiotic dimension, which is then analyzed based on “its styles (or semiotic ways of being), genres (or semiotic ways of acting and interacting) and discourses (or semiotic ways of constructing the world)” (Tenorio 2011: 8). The analysis of these parameters is targeted at the identification of those styles, genres and discourses that are dominant in a given problem, and serves as a basis for the study of the structure of the context, for example, the agents, the tense or the modality. The last stage of this approach involves the focus on interdiscursivity (or, in strictly Fairclough’s terms, the concept of “orders of discourse”), i.e. the mutual implicit or explicit relations between various discourses. This approach has been employed in the analysis of, for example, the discourse of national conflicts in American and Chinese daily newspapers (Li 2009).

Hart and Cap (ibid.) have supplemented Wodak and Meyer’s (2009) overview with four more approaches that have only recently emerged within CDS or at its borderline with other linguistic disciplines and empirical fields. As they argue,

each of these new agendas represents, like most strands in CDS, an individual yet interdisciplinary research programme. Moreover, in line with other schools in CDS, each of them constitutes a nuanced line of inquiry shining a light on otherwise unexplored features of the social-linguistic interface. (Hart and Cap 2014: 6)

Thus, these new approaches deserve separate place in the CDS landscape, as they have taken up new topics and worked out their own ways of analyzing specific phenomena and problems – in some cases, ways that were initially excluded from the CDS agenda either by their authors or by other CDS researchers⁷. These recent developments include:

- Critical Metaphor Studies,
- Cognitive-Linguistic Approach,

⁷ The case in point here is the work of Chilton (1994a/b, 1996 a/b, 2004, 2005a/b, 2011) who is primarily affiliated with cognitive linguistics and the analysis of political discourse. As Wodak and Meyer (2009) point out, much of his research “departs from CDA’s tendency to allegedly reify social structures and process and raises major questions relating to the relationship between language and social cognition in the evolution of human species” (p. 14). His references to cognitive evolutionary psychology have questioned the operation of ‘critical instinct’ in societies, which has been rejected by many CDS researchers.

- Legitimization-Proximization Model,
- Neuchatel/Fribourg School of Critical Cognitive Pragmatics.

Critical Metaphor Studies (Charteris-Black 2004, Koller 2004, Musolff 2004, 2010), more than any other field of research, have explored the mechanisms that govern the ways in which we understand and argue about socio-political issues (Hart and Cap 2014: 6). Analyses of metaphorical expressions have enabled to treat conceptual metaphors as networks of knowledge, the role of which is to introduce arrangement and integrity into human experience, and to serve as vehicles of ideology. Apart from the framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis (cf. Charteris-Black 2004, 2005), defined as the “integration of cognitive semantic and pragmatic approaches that is based on corpus evidence” (Charteris-Black 2004: 13), the ideological dimension of metaphors has also been analyzed within the broad cognitive-linguistic paradigm (Barcelona 2000, Dirven, Hawkins & Sandikcioglu 2001, Dirven, Frank & Ilie 2001, Dirven, Frank & Pütz 2003, Dirven, Polzenhagen & Wolf 2005, Leezenberg 2001). Likewise, Cap (2002) addressed the issue of metaphorization in political discourse, placing particular emphasis on its pragmatic function, and treating it as “an independent category of a global organization of political LSM” (Cap 2002: 70). Accordingly, Cap (ibid.) showed the place of metaphor in politics, its interaction with other categories present in analyses, and the diversity of metaphorization strategies applied by American presidents in their inaugural speeches. As far as the topic of conflict is concerned, Critical Metaphor Analysis and related frameworks of analyzing metaphor have been employed in the research on, for example, ‘collective memory’ as a metaphor in the Israeli political discourse (Gavriely-Nuri 2014), *The New York Times* representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2009 and 2011 (Roy 2012), and the ‘war-normalizing metaphors’ in the 2006 Second Lebanon War in the Israeli political discourse (Gavriely-Nuri 2008).

Nevertheless, due to extensive research on the ideological influence of lexicogrammatical structures on triggering particular conceptual process, the Cognitive-Linguistic Approach (Hart 2011a/b/c, 2013a/b) has deserved a separate place in the CDS landscape. As Hart and Cap (2014: 6) argue, conceptual processes such as categorization, metaphor, modality or deixis, are a part of larger non-linguistic cognitive processes that allow ideology to influence us through language. As Chilton (1998: 28) points out, “[m]etaphor is one of, if not the major, cognitive means that communicating minds have for simplifying and ‘making sense’ of highly complex phenomena”. Likewise, other conceptual processes governing our perception of basic categories such as space, time, scenes, events, entities, processes, motion, location, force and causation are structured by language (Fauconnier 2006). Still, what is

important, although here the Cognitive-Linguistic Approach is understood as one of perspectives newly introduced into CDS, Hart (2010) admits that – just like CDS – rather than a single theory, it is a paradigm in linguistic studies that houses numerous approaches and theories that deal with analyzing the ideological and manipulative potential of discourse. The integration of Cognitive-Linguistic theories into CDS has provided them with additional descriptive power and enabled – through the notion of “construal”⁸ – to account for a deeper relationship between linguistically expressed ideology (and other phenomena of this type) and the general principles of conceptual processes. The Cognitive-Linguistic Approach has been employed in the conflict-related research on, for example, the Occupy movement (Catalano and Creswell 2013) or immigration discourse (Hart 2010).

The Legitimization-Proximization Model (Cap 2006, 2008, 2013, Chilton 2004, 2011, Kopytowska 2013), in turn, concentrates on a specific, contextually-shaped conceptual operation of “proximization”, which serves the purposes of stabilizing and maintaining the effect (and goal) of legitimization in the changing political context. Proximization as a theory postulates a three-dimensional discursive realization of spatially, temporally and axiologically conceptualized ‘threat’ that works as a stimulator of the audience’s acceptance (thus, legitimization) of particular counter-measures. These three dimension can be applied at the same time, but as the analyses show, their intensity depends essentially on the changeability of state of affairs in a particular political context. Typically, however, particular proximization strategies are mutually balancing and the usual mechanism is as follows: if as a result of some external factors the temporal or the spatial dimension of proximization is downplayed (in most of the cases because of the weakening or disappearance of a physical ‘threat’ argument), the overall proximization-legitimization effect is maintained by the intensification of the references to the axiological differences, which are less dependent on the political environment. What is important, this relationship is bidirectional: axiological conflicts can be either treated as reasons for the occurrence of events proximized spatially and/or temporally, or almost completely abandoned if another pretext for spatial/temporal proximization appears. Nevertheless, the expected rhetorical effect of all of these strategies is always the same: to legitimize actions the political speaker wants to take up to neutralize the suggested threat and to delegitimize anything that is conceptualized as belonging to the outside domain of aggressors and/or may hinder the postulated counter-measures. On balance, the legitimization-proximization model can be characterized by the greatest affiliation to

⁸ Hart (2010: 56) defines ‘construal’ as the potential of conceptualizing the same situation in different ways.

linguistic pragmatics and its focus on the functional, SAT-grounded, aspect of language use. When it comes to the topic of conflict, the proximization-legitimization model in its current form has developed directly from the analysis of post-9/11 discourse, and as such it is potentially widely applicable to the discourses of other conflicts. The proximization-legitimization model has also been employed in the analysis of, for example, *The New York Times* discursive construction of the second Palestinian Intifada (Amer 2009) and the Israeli political discourse on the conflict in the Middle East (Królikowska 2012).

Finally, Neuchatel/Fribourg School of Critical Cognitive Pragmatics (Saussure and Schulz 2005; Maillat and Oswald 2009, 2011; Lewiński and Oswald 2013) focuses on the manipulative property of language, which is perceived as that can be exercised by fallacious arguments. The main assumption that underlies studies conducted within this approach is that “people are nearly-incorrigible ‘cognitive optimists’” (Sperber 1995: 11), which makes them readily and rather thoughtlessly accept what their cognitive processes suggest them. It has a particularly powerful impact on how people process and internalize ideological or in any other way manipulative content, since – especially if delivered in the form of arguments purposefully construed to avoid spotting their fallaciousness – it is in many cases simply accepted as true. Studies under this approach integrate, inter alia, the Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 1998, 2002) to investigate how human cognition, cognitive bias and consideration of relevance govern the selection of information and downplay the importance of critical questioning (cf. Oswald and Hart 2014). In the case of this approach, however, to date no studies that employ this perspective in the analysis of the phenomenon of conflict have been found.

As Hart and Cap (2014) point out, CDS traditions are often interconnected, as it rarely happens that one approach deals with a topic, a tool or a theory that other approaches do not touch upon. To illustrate this claim, they provide the following examples:

For example, the discourse-historical and socio-cognitive approaches are both related in their focus on argumentation, although the discourse-historical approach deals with argumentation in more detail. Similarly, the discourse-historical approach borrows heavily in its outline of ‘referential strategies’ from the social actor model (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 46-56). And the social actor model, although the categories within it are socio-semantic rather than purely grammatical, is presented as a grammar in the format of a Hallidayan functional network (van Leeuwen 1996). The social actor model thus owes much to other systemic functional approaches such as critical linguistics (not represented) and the dialectical-relational approach. (Hart and Cap 2014: 3)

CDS analyses manifest the move towards combining different models, methodologies and theories in a synergetic way, to accommodate for either new social phenomena or new ways of studying the familiar ones. This image of CDS – but also other discourse-analytic, pragmatic approaches – as a set of empirical and theoretical accounts integrating and intertwining various linguistic and social theories could already be seen in my so far illustration of how researchers approach the topic of conflict in discourse. As we could see, many studies on the discursive dimension of this phenomenon conducted to date have relied on more than one approach, thus combining them to meet the diverse needs of the topic under consideration.

The same can be said about linguistic research concerned with the discursive dimensions of the conflict analyzed in the empirical part of this dissertation, i.e. the Israeli-Arab conflict. Bazzi's (2009) multidisciplinary discourse analysis of media representations of the situation in the Middle East, which is in fact one of few comprehensive research projects dedicated to this subject, is an example of a combination of pragmatic and functional models of analysis used to characterize and compare the persuasive – and legitimizing – dimension of the Western and the Arab media coverage. This study revealed major differences in these representations of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the central role of modality in shaping them, but most importantly, it a detailed profile of two opposing ideological orientations of the Western and the Arab media outlets. Earlier research on the American mainstream media reporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conducted by Dunskey (2007), adopted a similarly complex approach oriented at analyzing major themes present in the American media coverage and, just like in the case of Bazzi (2009), the disparate ways in which they report the different parties engaged in this conflict. Here, however, important attention was drawn to the influence of pressure groups – pro-Israel media-watch organizations such as CAMERA (Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America) and HonestReporting.com – who force media to report the conflict in a way that is favorable to Israel.

The role of language in conflict has also deserved some attention in literature that combines insights from various disciplines of humanities and social sciences in its description of conflict. In their multidisciplinary overview of the theory and practice of conflict management, Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011), focused on various dimensions of conflict resolution, such as the peace-building process, reconciliation, reaction to terror, gender issues, ethics of intervention, dialogue, discourse and disagreement, the cultural aspect, etc. Although this is a resource grounded mostly in international politics and peace

and security studies, it understands the immense influence and role of discourse in the (re)production of conflict. The authors argue that

[i]t is the *clash f discourses* – radical disagreement – that is the chief linguistic form of intense political conflict once conflict parties have formed. For example, the Israeli security discourse, the Palestinian liberation discourse and the international (UN) peacemaking discourses (as well as others) all struggle for supremacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Each tries to impose its own language. Each wants to provide the lens through which the conflict is viewed. (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 2011: 378, original emphasis).

This citation, although it comes from a book that discusses different types of conflict (including those that are not primarily political) and different international conflicts such as those in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Cambodia, not only serves as an example of the complex workings of language in the practice of this phenomenon, but also – quite accidentally – highlights one of the core assumptions and motivations of this dissertation. This is the need to investigate and present the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab conflict as an exceptional instance of discourses on the political arena. After over sixty years of conflict following the establishment of the state of Israel, the conflict parties have developed their own, distinguishing ways in which they discursively (re)construct the situation in the Middle East. The limitations of this dissertation make it possible to focus on only one of them, the Israeli discourse, but it simultaneously triggers the need to devote equal attention to the discourses of other sides of this intractable conflict in the future. Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011), although they are not affiliated with the discipline of linguistics, not to mention the analysis of political discourse, rightfully perceive language as one of the chief means of the practice of conflict, which is an evident argument for the elevation of the status of linguistic research in conflict studies. Furthermore, their perspective leaves room for research such as the one presented in this dissertation, i.e. one that postulates the necessity to approach the discourse of conflict as a higher level category – a specific practice of conflict and a political genre.

There is yet another dimension of the linguistic research concerned with topic of conflict that – indirectly through this dissertation as well – deserves considerable attention, that is the applied potential that the analysis of the discourse of conflict has for conflict studies⁹ and the three dimensions of conflict that are of interest for this field of social

⁹ This is yet another, in this case more particular, argument supporting the application of linguistic research and discourse analysis in social sciences. More generally, as I have pointed out in section 1, Chapter 2, where I referred to van Dijk's (1997) argument for more informed

sciences, i.e. studying the causes *of conflict*, the *dynamics of conflict* and the *consequences of conflict*.

When it comes to the *causes of conflict*, Suurmond (2005) postulates the need of using discourse analytic tools in studying proactive ways of conflict prevention, i.e. conditions that may prevent or even delegitimize violence as a tool of power (p. 20). This idea draws on the assumption that particular strategies of conflict prevention or resolution are inherently discursive, so analyzing them through discourse-proper tools may enable to, for example, uncover the interests of parties representing conflicting positions while they assume and negotiate their stances. This, in turn, is connected with several most typical and powerful causes of socio-political conflict that make confrontation unavoidable.

First, it is nationalism that adds fuel to the fire through stimulating positive attitudes towards one's nation and strictly negative ones to others. Investigating the discursive representations of national identities and the evaluations they carry, the researcher is able to discern the focal points which, by referencing the discourse of national identity to some wider political discourse, promote ideologically-shaped and imbued values responsible for two sides of the same coin, i.e. patriotism and nationalism. As Finlayson (2007) argues,

conceptualizing nations and nationalism in this way enables us to see the centrality of nation in framing modern political discourse and its crucial place in the ideological 'institution' of modern society providing an appearance of 'closure' or 'unity' where there is division and contradiction. (Finlayson 2007: 99)

Data for such analyses may come not only from political leaders with a nationalistic orientation, but also from resources more commonly treated as objective, i.e. history textbooks, the content of which typically corresponds to the current mainstream socio-political situation and argumentation.

Another cause of conflict with discourse-analytic potential is what Suurmond (2005) describes as "the definition of the issue at stake by the conflict parties" (p. 21). Although she suggests frame analysis (Goffman 1974, 1981; Reisigl and Wodak 2001) as a method that enables to investigate the influence of cultural or religious themes on the perception of the issue in question, many other methods and tools may serve this purpose equally well. To

incorporation of the analysis of political discourse into political science and other social sciences. Specifically for conflict studies, linguistic research may provide information on discursive representations of all aspects of conflict understood as a social phenomenon, and their functions at all stages of conflict. This is based on the assumption that discourse (re)creates reality, thus it also (re)creates conflict perceived as a part of reality in certain contexts of local and global politics.

enumerate just a few, these are, for example, the Critical Metaphor Analysis or any other parameters grounded in cognitive linguistics.

Yet another cause of conflict is the distribution of power and knowledge. In the case of this cause, discourse analysis and linguistic studies in general promise interesting findings as to how ‘leaders’ and/or ‘experts’ are created and represented discursively and how different sides of conflict legitimize their leaders and experts, and delegitimize those of the competing party. Moreover, the interest in the distribution of power is connected with how the parties concerned legitimize their motives for entering into conflict and how they argue that there is no possibility to prevent it.

As far as the analysis of the *dynamics of conflict* is concerned, discourse analysis has the potential of illustrating an important, that is, the linguistic aspect of processes such as competition, cooperation, polarization and (de-)escalation. Suurmond (2005) sees two main applications of discourse analysis in this respect, i.e. the focus on cultural competence and the analysis of the role of ideologies. With respect to the former, Suurmond (2005) argues that cultural competence seen as “the ability to handle and allow multiple discourses within a society” (p. 21) grows weaker in the context of approaching war, which – by diachronic analyses in particular – might enable to predict the escalation of conflict. With respect to the latter, Suurmond (2005) postulates the need to investigate how ideologies change with the dynamics of conflict, i.e. how they correspond to the changes in the state of affairs or what intensity of conflict they reflect and promote. Since the volume of discourse-analytic research on ideologies is massive (cf. Saussure and Schulz 2005, Schäffner and Holmes 1996, van Dijk 1996, 1998, Verschueren 1999, among many others), much of the existing research content is already at hand for conflict researchers affiliated with, for example, political science or sociology. Unfortunately, however, the extent to which they do incorporate and refer to it is still slight and insufficient considering the general image of conflict studies as a field of social sciences, described in the opening section of this chapter.

As far as the potential of discourse analysis in analyzing the *consequences of conflict* is concerned, Suurmond (2005) suggests a number of important and interesting topics that could be shared by both conflict and discourse researchers. These are: 1) ‘war stories’ understood as a means of handling individual and collective traumas that can be analyzed as ways of conceptualizing, representing and reconstructing conflicting issues, the course of conflict, the self and the others (co-victims, allies and enemies), 2) the influence of ‘ideologies of antagonism’ (cf. Staub 1989) that lead to further mutual hostility in the post-conflict context, which in consequence makes enmity the source of identity construction for

all conflicted parties (cf. Kressel 1996), 3) rhetoric of leaders/influential social actors representing the conflicted parties with the focus on legitimization strategies and other tools of persuasion used to, for example, mitigate the blame of self and strengthen the blame of others, which could be done through the analysis of semantic/ideological polarization (e.g. ‘ideological square’ as presented by van Dijk 1997, 2006, and ‘proximization’ as perceived by Cap 2006, 2008, 2013), and 4) the analysis of the discourses of the victims in post-conflict settings which – in the case of diachronic research in particular – would enable to embrace the entire conflict, including its aftermath. The research topic mentioned in point 4, although Suurmond (2005) does not mention it, could refer not only to the discourses of the victims, but also to the discourses of other parties, including the victors of the conflict, which through, for example, comparative analysis, would enable to characterize various discourses in the post-conflict setting. Such studies could focus on the attitudes towards the (dis)proportion in the distribution of power and resources once the conflict is finished or any other post-conflict shadows that creep out for decades and reverberate through the rhetoric of conflicted parties.

Suurmond (2005) also draws attention to investigating *meta-conflicts* as a topic that remains to a great extent unexplored. Meta conflicts can be defined as “implicit assumptions of principles guiding decisions, such as ‘violence as revenge for violence suffered’ (Galtung 2000), or ‘violence [as] an unavoidable expression of human nature, even necessary’” (p. 22). Analyzing them would enable to see how the idea of ‘conflict’ underlies relations that are not openly conflictual or how it explicitly or implicitly stimulates and legitimizes decisions related to policymaking, economy or social life.

Summond’s considerations draw attention to many applications of discourse analysis to various branches of science involved in conducting conflict studies, which she encapsulates with the following exemplification of discourse-analytic research questions that each of these disciplines could pose:

In conclusion, discourse analysis can contribute to fairly all levels of conflict analysis, be it the history (how are colonial legacies perceived?), economy (how are struggles over valued resources explained/legitimated?), politics (revealing power relations, who claims to have knowledge?), sociology (how are the social forces involved constructed?), anthropology (how is ethnicity defined, cultural values defended?), or psychology (how are identities constructed?) of conflict. (Suurmond 2005: 22).

Undoubtedly, researchers from these disciplines could find many more issues for discourse analysts to investigate and thus form interdisciplinary conflict research teams or more widely join academic units conducting interdisciplinary research on conflict. Some of the possible

opportunities for it take place and to realize this still rather unexplored potential are the readiness and openness to work out common ways of approaching the complex phenomenon of conflict and/or to reach for the results of studies conducted in various disciplines interested in conflict more often.

On balance, discourse analysis with its focus on social realities takes up topics that bridge it with disciplines such as political science, anthropology, sociology or psychology, among others. ‘Conflict’ is only one of such topics and, as Suurmond (2005) argues, in recent years research on the discourse of conflict has started contributing “cultural, societal and behavioral insights to the political, economic and military perspectives on conflicts” (p. 23). Since the links between discourse and social reality are unquestionable, the mutual influence of language and social phenomena (including conflict) on the organization of social reality is immense. Through social influence theories such as the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957 and later reformulations), psychology explains that humans tend to change their attitudes to accommodate behavior in response to any contradictions and discrepancies between these two. This knowledge is used in, for example, conflict resolution techniques which rely on influencing the attitudes in specific ways to trigger the desired conduct. Considering the fact that language is one of the available means of such influence, in the context of conflict it will obviously propagate particular attitudes to the issues at stake and to the conflict itself, irrespective of whether it will be the official, mainstream voice of the political leader or some grassroots voices and the voices of the opponents. Each of these stances locates itself on different points of the scale of attitudes, on the opposite ends of which there are violence and cooperation, and it is the analysis of their discourses that, among other things, might show what specific attitudes are presented as (un)favored in a particular context and how they are explained and legitimized. Hence, the research on the discourse of conflict comes into view as a compelling and interesting, yet – through its complexity and heterogeneity – undoubtedly challenging area of discourse studies, to which the author of this dissertation commits her current and future academic endeavors.

3. The situation of Israel in the Middle East

The ongoing Middle East conflict has had major influence on global politics and the identities and interests of all conflicted parties. So far, for over sixty years, it has remained unresolved and various efforts made as part of the peace process seem to bring no long-lasting results. All these events constitute the larger context of speeches that I analyze and interpret in the empirical part of this dissertation, hence, to provide the readers with an account of selected most important aspects of the situation of Israel in the Middle East, in the concluding section of Chapter 3 I will focus on several aspects of this conflict and the background of the establishment of the state of Israel. For these purposes, in Section 3.1 I will discuss the main reasons and the so far course of the Israeli-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Next, I shall devote a separate subsection (Section 3.2) to the Middle East peace process in order to describe efforts taken so far to solve the conflicts and reconcile claims of both the Arab countries and the Palestinians with those of Israel. Finally, in Section 3.1 I will focus on Zionism – the political movement and doctrine that led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and which still serves the purposes of maintaining national unity within the country and across the Jewish people living in Diaspora.

3.1. Conflict in the Middle East

The roots of the Israeli-Arab conflict can be traced as far back as to the beginnings of the Jewish settlements in Palestine, which in the 19th century was chosen by the Zionists as the location of the future state of Israel and supported by Great Britain under the 1917 Balfour Declaration. After WW I, Principal Allied Powers obliged the British government to create favorable conditions for Jewish settlers in Palestine, which led to a significant increase in the number of settlers – starting from 1919 and for the next twenty years, the number of immigrants tripled. In 1939, when Europe experienced the outbreak of WW II, around 30% of Palestinian residents were of Jewish origin, and they formed their own self-government. Palestinian Arabs during the Palestine Arab Congress openly opposed to the influx of Jewish settlers and demanded the right to form their government and parliament – nevertheless, to no avail. These events led to many instances of armed struggles between the Palestinian and the Jewish residents, which in turn led to the formation of the Jewish self-defense movements such as Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lehi, some of which over time turned into terrorist or

paramilitary organizations fighting the Arabs and the British. At the end of 1930s the situation became so tense, that the Jewish immigration to Palestine was, first, limited and then, in 1945, suspended, although considerable numbers of Jews continued to illegally migrate to this territory.

After WW II, when the British government still could not reconcile the Arab and the Jewish residents in Palestine, the case was passed on to the United Nations, and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine decided to divide the mandate territory into the Jewish state and the Arab state, with Jerusalem as city administered by this international body. The United National General Assembly approved this course of action by voting for the Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 and on 14 May 1948 the state of Israel was proclaimed.

Arab states did not recognize this decision and sent their armies to the territory of Palestine, which has marked the beginning of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. In 1948 the First Arab-Israeli War broke out, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan fighting on the Arab side. The war ended in 1949 with a ceasefire agreement between Israel and a few Arab countries. This war, which was a military victory of Israel, consolidated its statehood and led to the increase of its territory first demarcated by the United Nations. Egypt started administering the area of Gaza Strip, the West Bank was incorporated by Transjordan (and formulated the state of Jordan), while Jerusalem was divided between the Israeli and the Jordanian authorities. Nevertheless, Arab states still did not recognize Israel as a legitimate state, so their relations were continually tense.

In 1956, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France and Israel took common military action against Egypt and the Second Arab-Israeli War broke out. Israeli army entered the territory of Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and the British and the French armies did the same a few days later, explaining it as an action targeted at maintaining safety on the territories surrounding the canal. Nevertheless, the pressures imposed by USSR and USA forced them to retreat from the area, but Israel managed to unblock the Gulf of Eilat and the port in Eilat for its sailing.

Eleven years later, in 1967, Israel and Arab countries confronted each other again. The Six-Day War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli War, broke out, but Israel claimed that it was only its defensive action provoked by threats posed by the Arab states, such as increased investments in their armies, blockade of the Israeli access to the Red Sea and the demand of Egypt to the UN to withdraw their forces from this territory. During this war, Israel managed to occupy the Gaza Strip, the entire area of the Sinai Peninsula, the Jordanian part of the West Bank, the eastern Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights, which once again enabled to

redefine its borders and significantly increase the Israeli territory. The Arab area occupied by Israel served as a pretext for “Land for peace” parley, which was rejected during the Arab League meeting in Khartoum on 29 August 1967.

Egypt and Syria tried to regain the lost territories and in 1973 the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Yom Kippur or the Ramadan war, broke out. This time Israel was supported by the USA, while the Arab Countries by the USSR. It was Egypt and Syria that initiated the offensive by surprise, which led to their initial success on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the Israeli counterattack occurred to be effective enough to pose threat to Cairo and Damascus, so the war ended with truce. One of the key actors in this armed conflict was Henry Kissinger who marginalized the participation of the Soviet Union in the struggle and, following these events, provoked peace negotiations which enabled to limit the scope of USSR’s influence in the Middle East. Ceasefire parley also led to talks between Israel and Egypt, which in turn initiated negotiations oriented at normalization of their mutual relations. On 17 September 1978 in Camp David, USA, the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat and the Prime Minister of Israel Menachem Begin signed documents stipulating the conditions for peace in the Middle East and the general conditions of a peace treaty between these two states. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979 featured mutual recognition of the states, cessation of war and gradual withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula, but this normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel led to a boycott of the former by the Arab countries.

As a consequence of the Yom Kippur war and the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Middle East conflict has undergone qualitative changes. American support for Israel and the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran strengthened the Israeli position and turned it into the main ally of the USA in the region. Weakening of Syria, neutralization of Egypt, closer relations of the USA and Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi participation in the war with Iran all led to a major change in the attitude of Arab countries to Israel, who resigned from the politics of direct confrontation. The state of war between Israel and Jordan ended in 1994 with a peace treaty, while the situation with Syria remains unresolved. Nevertheless, although the Israeli-Arab conflict has waned, the conflict with Palestine seems to have come to the foreground of the Israeli situation in the Middle East.

After WW I Palestine unavailingly demanded full independence and the Palestinian Arabs opposed to the Jewish settlements. Even though in 1948 the United Nations decided to divide the mandated territory between the Jews and the Palestinians, the latter did not have their own political authority to represent them before the UN. After the proclamation of the

state of Israel and during the First Arab-Israeli War that followed, more than 700,000 Arab residents escaped or were moved from Israel to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Only around 200,000 Arab residents decided to stay, and in 1948 the United Nations adopted resolution 194, according to which the Palestinian refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date”. Israel accepted this document, which to date has been the main legal foundation of one of the main Palestinian points in peace negotiations with Israel, i.e. the right of return. The Six-Day War triggered another wave of Palestinian refugees and around 400,000 of them escaped to Jordan and Syria, which meant that these large forced migrations became a major problem for the UN and a bargaining card for the Arab countries. The Arab League issued a document which made assimilation of the Palestinians in other Middle East countries impossible, as it prohibited granting them citizenship and forced their respective authorities to treat them as permanent refugees. Nevertheless, the 1974 summit of the League finally recognized the Palestinian right of return to their homeland, as for the previous thirty years the issue of Palestinian refugees led to many political, economic and social problems in the region.

In this context, the modern Palestinian national identity shaped itself in reference to the struggle for a legitimate state – and against Israel. Since 1960s Palestinians started forming movements calling for national independence, and the refugee camps became the base for groups attacking Israel. The 1964 initiative of the Arab League which supported the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (henceforth ‘PLO’) that concentrated ten biggest Palestinian organizations fighting against the Israeli presence in the region. The programme documents of PLO implied that Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian people and all its activities are targeted at liberating the territory from the Israelis and damaging the state of Israel. The major armed forces of PLO – the Al-Fatah organization established in 1965 – was led by Yasser Arafat, who then became the leader of PLO and who transformed it into the only legitimate representation of the Palestinian people. The 1974 UN declaration officially empowered PLO by granting them the right of self-determination, sovereignty and national independence, followed by the status of the UN observer. This way, in 1976, PLO joined the Arab League.

At the end of 1960s Al-Fatah conducted military operations against Israel mainly from Jordan, where the bases of the Fedayeen fighters were located. All these events led to the destabilization of the situation inside Jordan and fueled the anyway tense relations with Israel. As a result, the Palestinian-Jordanian conflict emerged, which in 1970 resulted in forced

migrations of Palestinian refugees from the territory of the Jordanian state. Most of them ended their journey in Lebanon, where they continued to develop groups of fighters, but when the Israeli forces entered Beirut, they were forced to head to Tunis. The leaders of PLO stayed in Tunis until early 1990s, but bases and military training camps were still kept in Lebanon.

Following the Yom Kippur war of 1973, during the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations in Camp David, the Palestinian case was discussed as well. It was Egypt that represented this side of the conflict, because Israel did not agree to negotiate with PLO directly. In the course of these talks, the solution of establishing the Palestinian National Authority to be located in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was suggested, but PLO rejected the idea, which terminated the negotiations. Since 1967 the residents of the territories occupied by Israel experienced many restrictions and limitations of their rights. These included: prohibition to freely migrate and settle, difficulties in forming self-governments, deportations, displacements, confiscation of property, curfew, imposition of collective responsibility, liquidation of schools and universities, and other types of offence and discrimination. Also in 1967, in order to take over the control of the situation, Israel started building Jewish settlements which worked as strategic units of defense. Moreover, for the same purpose, Israelis started buying land from the Palestinians, which fueled the conflict to an even greater extent.

In December 1987 Israeli soldiers started shooting to young Palestinians who were throwing stones at them, which was a direct cause for a spontaneous Palestinian Rising – the Intifada – that reached all the refugee camps and Arab cities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Acts of civil disobedience and protests that attended this rising included closing the Arab shops in specified hours, general strikes, rejection to pay taxes and a boycott of Israeli products. Cities and refugee camps built barricades and the Israeli patrols were attacked with stones, bottles filled with petrol and other types of more or less professional arms. This Intifada came as a surprise to the leaders of PLO, and was led by Muslim clerics based in Gaza. Another major player in these events was Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement – and Jihad – an organization supported by Iran – which did and still do compete with PLO over authority in the occupied territories.

3.2. The Middle East peace process

The events of Intifada drew international attention and many countries started to investigate the Palestinian issue, which was taken by PLO as an advantage. On 15 November 1988, the Palestinian National Council proclaimed the establishment of the state of Palestine, but it refrained from declaring unilateral independence. As a consequence, Jordan resigned from the West Bank for the sake of the Palestinians, and Yasser Arafat announced that to support the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the newly established state of Palestine has to encompass the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while Israel's territory will be limited to the one of 1967. This was followed by the USA's official consent to enter into diplomatic contacts with the representatives of PLO. A breakthrough came three years later, in 1991, when Israel experienced financial and social consequences of Intifada and PLO lost support of the Soviet Union due to its dissolution. In the second half of 1991 PLO, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt (as an observer) met in Madrid, and two years later Israel and PLO recognized each other. These events were followed by the so called "Oslo I Accord" signed 13 September 1993 in Washington by Bill Clinton as the agreement guarantor and Yitzchak Rabin and Yasser Arafat as representatives of the two conflicted parties. This document marked the beginning of the "Land for Peace" policy, which through another document – the agreement of 4 May 1994 – led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the areas neighboring the city of Jericho. Israeli forces had to withdraw from that territory and the Palestinian Authority formed its civil authority and jurisdiction; however, to a limited extent, as they were not permitted to have their own foreign and defense policies. This document also allowed the formation of Palestinian police and relocation of PLO leaders from Tunisia to Jericho. Yet another agreement, the "Oslo II Accord" signed 28 September 1995, extended the territory of the Palestinian Authority to the entire area of the West Bank. What is important, in 1994 Yitzchak Rabin together with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres won the Nobel Peace Prize for the preceding peace talks.

In 1996 Arafat was elected the leader of the Palestinian Authority's legislative body, the 88-seat Palestinian Council, and expressed willingness to amend the Palestinian National Covenant by cancelling articles on the liquidation of the state of Israel and the establishment of the state of Palestine in the entire territory. Nevertheless, experts disagreed as to whether these amendments were introduced or not, so following the Israeli government demand for greater clarity and precision, the Palestinian Authority expressed them in the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 in an overt way. Nevertheless, these and other events within the

Israeli-Palestinian peace process in fact deepened internal divisions between the Palestinians, among whom those who supported anti-Israeli Hamas (including Hamas itself) did not recognize any of the agreements signed. As a result, PLO gradually lost its force of impact and, most importantly, control over the situation in the region. The position of Arafat deteriorated as well, which meant that PLO was not able to stop extremist and terrorist organizations from taking their own initiatives against Israel. The factor that poured salt to the wound was the simultaneous activity of the Israelis who kept building the Israeli settlements and took revenge for any acts of terrorism and disobedience following the accords. Thus, that stage of the bilateral peace process ultimately incited the conflict rather than contributed to its resolution. As a result, after Rabin's assassination¹⁰ and a series of terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu – who then served his first term of the Prime Minister's Office – decided to reject the "Land for Peace" policy. He justified it by saying that this was aimed at ensuring safety to Israel, but the pressure of the USA and the Arab countries forced him to withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank and Hebron, and to free the Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the amendments introduced to the National Covenant. Nonetheless, these conditions were not made effective.

The territories inhabited by the Palestinians still experienced numerous attacks, bombings and struggles, which meant that the Israel's decision to suspend the peace process led to further deterioration of the relations in the region. Hamas and Jihad – the two leading terrorist organizations – gained more and more proponents and continued to conduct mostly suicide terrorist attacks against Israel. Even Bill Clinton's visit to the Gaza Strip did not appease the tensions and the 2000 Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat ended in failure. The direct consequence of this event was another Palestinian Intifada (the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that increased the number of casualties on both sides to the conflict.

When Ariel Sharon became the Prime Minister of Israel, he opposed to the liquidation of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and insisted that Arafat – whom he treated as a supporter of terrorism – should officially prohibit terrorist attacks. Finally, in 2001 he put him under home detention and announced that from then on, as a part of post-9/11 "War on Terror", Israel would take action against the Palestinian terrorism. This way, the Israeli forces started attacking the territory of the Palestinian Authority, the buildings of the Palestinian government, Jenin and Bethlehem, but it did not put an end to the terrorist attacks of the

¹⁰ Yitzchak Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by an Israeli extremist. The wider context of this event will be provided in Chapter 5, as it has direct reference to the content of some speeches analyzed in the empirical part of this dissertation.

Palestinian extremists. Starting from March 2003 Arafat stopped being the Palestinian representative during the peace talks with Israel and was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas from Al-Fatah, who during a meeting in June 2003 with Israelis and George W. Bush officially criminated the Palestinian terrorists and declared the will to enter into peaceful coexistence with Israel in the region. Also, Sharon announced the liquidation of some Jewish settlements, which was meant to stimulate the resolution of the conflict.

Another peace-making initiative came from George W. Bush, whose “Road Map to Peace” plan worked out by the USA, the EU, Russia and the UN envisaged gradual development of the state of Palestine. Nevertheless, reality put an end to these efforts and Sharon came up with his plan for peace: to build a wall protecting Israelis from terrorists, to evacuate some Jewish settlements and, this way, to allow the Palestinians create their state within borders set by Israel. In fact, wall-building works started even earlier – in 2002 in the West Bank – which the Hague Tribunal deemed as a breach of the international law. Next, Sharon announced withdrawal from the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, but kept the settlements on the West Bank. Although the plan received support from the American government, it was rejected the Palestinians and even the Israeli government treated it coldly.

In 2006 in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem parliamentary elections were organized and it was Hamas that achieved the position of power, as it had won 72 out of 132 places in the Palestinian Authority parliament. This resulted in freezing the diplomatic relations with the USA and the EU, and it limited financial support for PA. Competition between Hamas and Al-Fatah fueled the situation, as it caused many open struggles between these two organizations, so in 2007 president Abbas decided to dissolve the parliament and the government, and to announce new elections. This, in turn, led to even more internal frictions between the Palestinians and the influence in the territory was divided between Hamas (with authority over the Gaza Strip) and Abbas (with authority in the West Bank). Also in June 2007 Egypt decided to close down the last border crossing with the Gaza Strip that was independent from Israel.

Meanwhile, Israel accused Hamas of cooperating with Iran (suspected of training and arming the Hamas fighters) and significantly limited commercial traffic and individual movement with the Gaza Strip. Next, following massive firing of southern parts of Israel, it blocked the Gaza Strip, which meant that its residents did now have products to cater for their basic needs. This blockade was met with international protests, so Israel decided to suspend it – but only for some time. In March 2008 the Gaza Strip was blocked again, which was

justified as a countermeasure to threats posed at Israel. After negotiations with Egypt, Hamas undertook to cease fire and the Israeli government relaxed the blockade.

A few months earlier, in November 2007 in Annapolis, USA, representatives of Israel and PA entered into next negotiations for conflict resolution that was expected to take place at the end of 2008. Nevertheless, the date was unrealistic considering the fact that within Palestinian Authority there were many internal frictions and Hamas did not intend to submit to the rule of PA government. Moreover, the then Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Olmert continued to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, which meant that the situation was coming back to the drawing board. Until September 2008, PA and Israeli authorities met nearly forty times, but in the background of these initiatives another conflict erupted – between Al Fatah and Hamas, each of which claimed the right to be the only legitimate representative and voice of the Palestinian people. As a consequence, the anyway internally fragmented PA experienced even more threat to its fragile integrity: the Gaza Strip was controlled by Hamas, while Al Fatah developed its influence over the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank.

2009 brought a new Israeli Prime Minister and a new set of offerings in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Benjamin Netanyahu assumed the Prime Minister's Office for the second time in his political career and announced that Israel would support the establishment of the state of Palestine. Nevertheless, he outlined several conditions for that to take place. First, he expected reciprocity from the Palestinians and, following on from that, wanted them to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. Second, as far as more tangible conditions are concerned, he demanded Palestine to demilitarize once its state is established. Simultaneously, he advocated the need for Israel to receive additional security guarantees, which he presented as necessary conditions to ensure safety to the Israelis.

At the end of 2009, President Obama announced that he intends to engage the authorities of Israel and Palestine into trilateral talks in order to push the peace process forward. All the parties concerned finally met in September 2010, following months of the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's efforts to convince the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian President to arrive to the USA and sit by one table. She managed to get the Egyptian and Jordanian support for these negotiations, which eventually induced the representatives of two conflicted sides to enter into talks assisted by President Obama. Nevertheless, because of mutual hostility the chances for success, i.e. final agreement, were slim and the White House's aim to work out a binding and effective resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within one year seemed rather unrealistic. As in the case of many previous

talks, this time as well, the expectations included forming two mutually recognizing states with no further claims to land, and forcing the two sides to officially reject violence as a means to react to any offences. The Israeli Prime Minister rejected these conditions and stated that they do not guarantee peace even if the agreement is signed, because the ongoing activity of Hamas and Hezbollah poses major threat to the effectiveness of peace between the two conflicted sides. This way, the USA decided to engage these two organizations into the peace talks, but Israel was still unconvinced as to whether it would really put a halt to violence.

Two years later, in April 2012, in a letter to Netanyahu, Abbas insisted that for the purposes of two-state solutions Israeli should accept the borders of 1967 and stop building settlements in the West Bank, which was a consequence of preceding talks over the distribution of land between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This issue resulted from negotiations over the land expected to be exchanged between future states, and Abbas' demand for 1:1 ration that was rejected by Israel. That is why in 2012 Abbas argued that for Palestine to enter the peace talks again, Israel has to propose "anything promising or positive" in exchange, therefore Prime Minister Netanyahu in his reply letter wrote for the first time that Palestinians are entitled to have their own state, but he also laid down the same conditions that were proposed in 2010, i.e. mutual recognition and demilitarization.

2013 and 2014 brought new initiatives to encourage the two sides to resolve the conflict. John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, convinced the Arab League to officially endorse economic support for the Palestinians and security assurances for Israel, but the Palestinian President Abbas rejected this solution. Irrespective of that, however, Abbas expressed readiness to re-engage into direct peace negotiations with Israel, which Kerry announced following weeks of his individual talks with Abbas and Netanyahu. This, though, was rejected by Hamas governing in the Gaza Strip, which stated that Palestinian Authority leaders have no legitimacy to represent and negotiate in the name of the Palestinians.

The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps a timeline of selected events under the peace negotiations with the Palestinians, but as of June 2014, it stops on the following note:

On July 28, 2013 the Israeli Cabinet approved the opening of diplomatic negotiations between the State of Israel and the Palestinians, with US support, with the objective of achieving a final status agreement over the course of the next nine months.¹¹

¹¹ Source (the official website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs): <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-palestinian%20negotiations.aspx> (last retrieved January 5, 2015).

3.3. Zionism

Zionism is defined as that national movement of the Jewish people that in its initial phase in the 19th and 20th century propagated the idea of establishing the state of Israel on the territory of Palestine and halting assimilation of Jews living in Diaspora. Its name derives from the word ‘Zion’, which is one of the Old Testament names for Jerusalem and the Israeli land. Nevertheless, this definition is much too narrow in the light of all the controversies that arouse around Zionism with the passage of time, and some authors (cf. Davis 2003; MacAllister 2008) openly describe it as a nationalistic and racist movement that can be compared with Apartheid. These controversies appeared mainly following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, but before I explain their causes, I would like to focus on the origins of the Zionist thought and briefly present its father figures. This will serve as a starting point for the presentation of the directions of Zionism in the 20th and 21st century and as a basis for a critical look on its influence on the Middle East conflict.

The initiative figure of Zionism – or pre-Zionism¹² – was Mordecai Manuel Noah who advocated the need to establish the state of Israel as early as in 1818, but in this case on the territory of Grand Island, NY, near the Niagara Falls. Nevertheless, around twenty years later he supported the idea to reinstate Jewish settlements in the Biblical land of Israel, which caused hostile reactions of the Palestinians to the first Jewish immigrants who arrived in these territories.

Similar ideas were put forward by rabbis representing Jewish communities in Serbia and Italy, and by Leo Pinsker’s in his book *Autoemancipation* published in 1882. In this writing, Pinsker laid grounds for the idea of political Zionism that encouraged Jews living in Diaspora to immigrate to the Palestinian land (DeLange 2000: 30). The issue of immigration came up in 1840s when wealthy Jews such as Sir Moses Montefiore and the Rotschild family of bankers intended to buy Palestine from the Egypt-based Mehemet Ali who conquered the ancient lands of Israel and governed them for almost a decade. Supported by Great Britain that perceived this immigration of Jews as a motivator of economic growth in this region, European and Russian Jews started buying land and gradually moved to the Palestinian

¹² The first person to use the term “Zionism” was Nathan Birnbaum, who used it in 1890 in a press article published in a Germany-based Jewish newspaper *Shichrur Atzmi* to describe new Jewish initiatives taken to form their own state and to distinguish them from other efforts oriented at maintaining national identity of Jews living in Diaspora (source: www.izrael.badacz.org, last retrieved July 28,2014).

territories. This secular return to the Promised Land, Erec Jisrael, was quite particular, as it contradicted the rules of Judaic religious doctrines such as Messianism, according to which the return to Erec Jisrael could take place only following the return of the Messiah. Although that did not happen, Zionism turned out to be so powerful and energizing a movement that its ideology attracted growing numbers of Jews living in Diaspora. For this reason it is often called “Secular Messianism” (ibid).

The then image of Zionism is the result of Theodor Herzl’s activity, who brought it into the international light. This was caused by his involvement into the trial of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain serving in the French army who was wrongfully accused of spying for Germans. Dreyfus was publicly humiliated and the raging crowd of people in the court attacked him with anti-Semitic slogans. Although in 1906, after 8 years of lawsuit, he was finally exonerated, the scale of anti-Semitism in France shocked Herzl. France was the first country ever to grant equal rights to Jews, so in the light of growing hostility towards Jews, Herzl decided that the only guarantee of safety is to create a state for Jewish people in another place. These ambitions almost led to an obsession when he was working on the foundations of the Zionist nation-state, which he published in a brochure titled *Jewish State*. What is interesting, although he came from a non-assimilated family himself and before the lawsuit of Dreyfus he was mostly concerned with his career as a journalist in Budapest and Vienna where he had not experienced any persecution, after these events he focused all his efforts on creating an autonomous state for the Jewish people in Diaspora. He also tried to encourage the German emperor, the Russian tsar, the Turkish sultan and Pope Pius X to support him in these endeavors, but to no avail (Gradkowska 2007). Apart from that, he convened and chaired an annual Zionist Congress, created a number of institutions supporting the formation of the state, encouraged Jews to immigrate to Palestine and believed that all these initiatives were profitable for the Arab residents as well. In his view, this mass immigration would also stimulate the economic growth in that region which – as he believed – would be a natural consequence and advantage of the creation of Jewish settlements.

In spite of the fact that Herzl’s Zionism promoted borders of the Biblical Israel, it was a secular doctrine, as it marginalized the importance of Orthodox Judaism and did not force Israelis to speak Hebrew. Moreover, Herzl’s Zionism was based on the promise of a “better tomorrow” rather than the Biblical and past-oriented idea of “The Chosen People” deprived of their land. The values in the foreground were: the unity of Jews in Diaspora, creation of new Jewish culture, development of agriculture and industry, political activism and granting equal chances to the citizens. Although Herzl was not supported by influential Jews – probably

because of the scale of secularization he promoted – the Jewish middle and lower classes were his greatest and most numerous proponents (Isseroff 2005). These Jews were led by an utopian vision of the state described in *Altneuland* and immigrated to the Palestinian territories in large groups. Although Herzl died at the age of 44, after a decade of struggle for the formation of the Jewish state he was compared to Moses (Gradkowska 2007), and in the light of more and more anti-Semitic moods in Europe, he became the symbol of struggle for safety of the Jewish people living in the Old Continent.

Later events such as the 1917 Balfour Declaration that supported Zionist activity and the creation of the nation-state in Palestine, Anti-Jewish pogrom in Odessa, Hitler's growing influence in Germany and, finally, the Nuremberg Laws introduced in 1935, led to an even greater support of Great Britain for Jewish immigrations to the Palestinian territories. Soon, it went out of control and the Arab residents expressed their growing concerns, so Great Britain decided to limit the number of Jews immigrating to these lands. The supporters of the Zionist vision of the state of Israel took it as an offence, as the outbreak of WW II together with the atrocities of Holocaust served as yet another argument for moving to the Palestinian territories. As a result, Zionists started to attack British people residing there and many of these offences could be treated as acts of terrorism – which to date is still the strongest charge against this movement. Nevertheless, Great Britain could not solve the situation on its own, therefore it asked for help from the United Nations. Following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and the following First Arab-Israel War, Zionism underwent many changes and became a very heterogeneous doctrine. Several competing trends were formed, all of which struggled to gain support of the local and global public opinion. Some postulates that there were, had little to do with the so called Liberal Zionism, to which Herzl devoted his life.

Although the World Zionist Organization created by Herzl still functioned, the term “Zionism” started to be defined as: 1) affinities and organized support for Jews in the West, with the American support for Israel in particular, 2) quite recent endeavors of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel, and 3) an ongoing promise of Israel that any Jew will find their home there (Bullock and Trombley 1999). Furthermore, the new Zionist trends such as Religious Zionism, Revisionist Zionism or Socialist Zionism further developed their own postulates and ideologies.

Religious Zionism openly rejected Herzl's concept of secularization and based its claims on the cultural and national heritage of the Jewish people, using elaborate symbolism of the Torah in a rhetoric of orthodox mysticism, according to which the return to the Biblical land of Israel was a creed-based obligation. As Rubinstein (2000) argues, Religious Zionism

evolved in 1960s into an extremist movement to be blamed for the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin and the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank.

Revisionist Zionism, which is perceived as having its roots in fascism, did not manage to gain any greater popularity inside Israel, but at the same time it had many proponents outside the country. As a doctrine, it aimed to expand the British influence in the Middle East and force the Arabs to accept the Jewish settlements in the region. Interestingly, although this particular current of Zionism also promoted secularization, it simultaneously used religious symbolism, which his leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky applied in his arguments supporting the secularized and pauperized version of Jewish Messianism.

Socialist Zionism openly rejected Judaism, and Yiddish and Hebrew languages in turns, propagating the need to create a working class that was perceived as the only driving force for the growth of the new state of Israel. Its core assumptions were congruent with Socialism, which fostered formation of many kibbutzim in the country. As a left-wing movement, it succeeded until 1970s, when the Likud party came to power. This party has its roots in the Revisionist Zionism and it is the origin of two influential Prime Ministers of Israel, Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu. Nevertheless, Zionism in the current form that is present in both internal and foreign affairs, has changed its face. According to a researcher of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict James L. Gelvin (2009), this is mostly a complement to the history of Israel and a political means of expression for the Jewish people. Surprising as it is, Gelvin claims that in its postulates, contemporary Zionism is very similar to the Palestinian nationalism, as both the Israeli and the Palestinian side to the conflict have created historical narratives that illustrate the uninterrupted origins of their nations. What follows from it is that each of these two movements, i.e. Zionism and the Palestinian nationalism, draws significant attention to the place being the cradle of the nation and the witness of its political and cultural growth. These claims together with the arguments of special relation with the land serve as central arguments that both Jews and the Palestinians use to legitimize their right to form a sovereign state on the same territory (ibid.)

This way, contemporary Zionism accentuates its nationalistic character and ranges to postulates that were rejected by Herzl and leaders of later Zionist currents, i.e. religious and cultural heritage, which might be surprising in the light of the fact that many religious, orthodox Jews and other citizens of Israel alike openly criticize it. Additional tensions are caused by a movement that developed almost simultaneously with Zionism, that is Anti-Zionism, which is wrongfully equated with anti-Semitism, because as Luty (2010) argues, in the anti-Zionist discourse there are elements from both traditional and orthodox Judaism, and

the ideology of communism (para. 6). This inevitably makes it more difficult to evaluate these doctrines in an unambiguous way, as inside Israel the representatives of New Left organizations are openly Anti-Zionist: they oppose to the activity of the Israeli government, criticize its politics with the Palestinians and use arguments of Stalin and Trotski who were fierce opponents of the Zionist doctrine. Simultaneously, the leaders of the Israeli government deem, both, any instances of internal dissent and external activity of Arab countries that is not congruent with the Israeli expectations as manifestations of anti-Semitism. That is probably the reason why, on a local scale, Anti-Zionists were given this label, and why, on the international scale, the peace process in the Middle East is a challenge to both all parties concerned and the global politics. The complex rhetoric – and discourse – of this conflict is based on elaborate arguments ranging to economy, politics, ethnicity, culture and religion, among others, which makes it an extremely demanding conflict to analyze within any scientific discipline – and, not to mention, to resolve.

Having discussed various scientific approaches to the theory of conflict and having outlined the most significant aspects of the Middle East conflict, I conclude, both, this chapter and the theoretical part of this dissertation. Ideas presented in the preceding two chapters and in Chapter 3 will serve as a background of the empirical part and the research that I shall illustrate and discuss in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 which follows my considerations around conflict, will serve as a presentation of methodology and data used in my analysis of the discourse of conflict as political genre. There – and at several points in Chapter 5, I will elaborate on my approach in this vein, that is the critical cognitive-pragmatic approach which I signaled as one of the newly evolving trends within (Critical) Discourse Studies.

CHAPTER 4. Discourse of Conflict as Political Genre: Data and Methodology

As a transition point between my so far theoretical considerations included in Chapters 1-3 of this dissertation and the presentation of my research in Chapter 5, this chapter is a place where I describe my approach in the analysis of the discourse of conflict as political genre. For these purposes, in Section 1 I discuss data that I selected for my research, focusing on the rationale for analyzing the speeches of the current Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu as an exemplification of the discourse of conflict. There, I also briefly explain the limitations that I faced in the process of data selection. Next, in Section 2 I move on to describing my general theoretical-methodological framework for the analysis, including the thesis statement that I came up with, to illustrate how the research procedure for this study was designed and what relation it has to the thesis statement and specific theory-related endeavors that I took before I started analyzing my data. There, I also elaborate on the motivator that inspired these theoretical considerations of mine and that was a direct incentive for me to conduct this research, i.e. a concern raised by Cap and Okulska (2013) over the possible ways of analyzing potentially new genres in political communication under a unified approach. Finally, in Section 3 I shortly discuss the relation of this research with potential future studies in the discourse of conflict or any other attempts at applying the model developed for the purposes of this analysis in researching other potentially new political genres. This topic, I believe, deserves a place here, because it explains the way in which I perceived my study and, most importantly, describes how I would like my discussion in Chapter 5 to be perceived by my readers.

1. Data

The material analyzed in the study comprises 21 speeches (48,179 words) in total delivered by the current Prime Minister of Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu in the years 2009-2014, this way covering his (ongoing) second term of office on this position. All speeches

have been taken from the official online resources¹ of the Briefing Room of the Prime Minister's Office.

In the period between March 2009-September 2014 Prime Minister Netanyahu delivered over 250 speeches, all of which have been downloaded in order to extract those that were eventually considered in the study. For these purposes, I have decided to employ text-external criteria for selection, delimiting three groups of speeches according to the venue of the speech. This way I extracted the following three sets of speeches:

Set 1: The Knesset speeches

10 speeches delivered by Netanyahu in the Knesset, i.e. the Israeli parliament, in the years 2009-2014, which were destined mostly for local audiences and delivered on occasions important for policy-making in Israel (e.g. Knesset Swearing In Ceremony, openings of regular Knesset sessions) or national holidays and other events of national importance (official Jerusalem Day or Herzl Day celebrations, special Knesset sessions held during visits of foreign guests, special Knesset sessions commemorating the late PM Yitzhak Rabin).

Set 2: The AIPAC Policy Conference speeches

6 speeches delivered by Netanyahu at The American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy Conference (henceforth, the AIPAC Policy Conference) in Washington, US, in the years 2009-2014, which is a venue gathering more than² 14,000 American Pro-Israeli lobbyists, two-third of American Congressmen, 2,200 students from 491 campuses, 260 Geller Student Government Presidents from all 50 states, 50 national and state leaders of the College Democrats of America and College Republican National Committee, 250 Synagogue delegations.

Set 3: The UN General Assembly speeches

5 speeches delivered by Netanyahu at the United Nations General Assemblies in New York, US, in the years 2009-2014.

¹ Official URL: <http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/default.aspx> (last retrieved December 9, 2014)

² Figures as of 2014, taken from the official AIPAC Policy Conference website and the information on the conference attendees: <http://www.aipac.org/act/attend-events/policy-conference> (last retrieved December 9, 2014)

The distribution of speeches according to their venue and dates looks as follows:

Venues and dates			
Year	Knesset (18,191 words)	AIPAC (13,564 words)	UN GA (16,424 words)
2009	31.03.09 (2623 words)	05.05.09 (860 words)	24.09.09 (2309 words)
	29.10.09 (640 words)		
2010	03.02.10 (1648 words)	22.03.10 (3091 words)	-
	11.10.10 (2684 words)		
	20.10.10 (1032 words)		
2011	16.05.11 (1921 words)	23.05.11 (2069 words)	24.09.11 (4060 words)
	01.06.11 (1050 words)		
	31.10.11 (3500 words)		
2012	-	06.03.12 (2237 words)	27.09.12 (3400 words)
2013	14.10.13 (3160 words)	04.03.13 (1451 words)	01.10.13 (3102 words)
2014	28.05.14 (936 words)	04.03.14 (3856 words)	29.09.14 (3553 words)

Table 1. Netanyahu's speeches used in the study.

The blank cells in the table indicate that in 2012 no speech delivered by Netanyahu on any of the described occasions in the Knesset has been found, while the 2010 gap in the group of UN General Assembly speeches stands for a year in which the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman addressed the General Assembly (instead of PM Netanyahu). The case of Lieberman's speech is interesting with respect to the reactions it provoked, as according to the New York Times³ "sharp differences within the Israeli government over peace negotiations

³ Taken from the New York Times article "Israeli Foreign Minister Distances Himself From Talks" published in New York Times online on September 28, 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/world/middleeast/29nations.html?_r=2&ref=world& (last retrieved December 9, 2014)

played out in the unusual setting of the United Nations General Assembly.” Prime Minister Office issued a statement in which it distanced PM Netanyahu from the address given by Lieberman, writing that “the content of the foreign minister’s speech at the United Nations was not coordinated with the prime minister” and that “Prime Minister Netanyahu is the one who is managing the political negotiations of the State of Israel.” For this reason, Lieberman’s speech has been excluded from this study.

This brings us to my rationale for approaching the 2009-2014 speeches delivered by PM Netanyahu as an exemplification of the discourse of conflict. The first argument is grounded in the fact that the State of Israel is a country that has been involved in conflict for over sixty years, this way provoking the following assumption of mine that underlies this entire research and the process of data selection in particular: long-lasting conflict is a phenomenon determining potentially all official communicative events in which political speakers representing the conflicted parties participate, irrespective of the individual time and place of these communicative events. This means that I assume that if the Middle East conflict remains unresolved, all official communicative events that take place in this context are related to it and construe its own discourse – the discourse of conflict. The second argument is grounded in the fact that the Prime Minister of Israel is the supervisor of the Israeli negotiations in the peace process with the Palestinian Authority, which entails that the content that the person holding this position communicates is to be taken as the expression of the official stance of the Israeli government – and the Israeli side – in the Middle East conflict.

What follows from this is the primarily diachronic character of my study of Netanyahu’s speeches, in which I looked for and examined specific regularities in the Israeli political discourse on the Middle East conflict in the years 2009-2014. This is intended to account for the potentially stable elements of it, and work out a set of prototypical properties of the “discourse of conflict” as political genre.

Nevertheless, there is a synchronic aspect to the analysis as well, because the texts selected for the analysis were destined for various audiences, this way enabling me to investigate how the potential generic properties of the discourse of conflict get realized on different levels of the micro-macro scale, i.e. depending on the range of message (local or global), the type of addressee/audience (homogenous or heterogeneous) and the amount of addressee’s/ audience’s contextual knowledge (potentially large contextual knowledge of local addressees/audiences and smaller amount of it in the global ones). This, in turn, entails

that the (micro) local realizations of the discourse of conflict in Netanyahu's speeches can be treated as a homogenized version of the local dialogues, where the speaker and the addressees/audience share a lot of context, enabling the speaker to rely more on directness and explicitness. As far as the (macro) international/global realizations of the discourse of conflict are concerned, just like other global monologues (e.g. those on global warming), they are likely to have large ideological input carried by indirectness and implicitness – this caused by the fact that the speaker and the addressees/audiences share less context and that, generally, there are many groups of addressees (including the home audience) of these messages. All these factors have been taken into scrutiny in the process of data selection and interpretation. Also for this reason, the research presented in this dissertation is by default qualitative, since with such a strong (in fact, determining) impact of context, i.e. the Middle East conflict, on the official communicative activity of the Israeli PM Netanyahu, a quantitative analysis would occur to a great extent insufficient in investigating this impact.

Nevertheless, the current scope of this study also features some limitations that result from rather external factors. The constraints of this dissertation forced me to narrow down the initial scope of research to the essential minimum required for the analysis of the discourse of conflict as political genre to have explanatory power for handling other macro-discourses (including discourses of other conflicts), i.e. to one – and the current – term of the Prime Minister's office. In the first run, I intended to cover a longer period of time, possibly, both Netanyahu's terms of office (1996-1999, 2009-). Unfortunately, this has occurred to be impossible, because the official online resources of the Briefing Room of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office include materials that date back to 2004 at the earliest, that is, some speeches delivered by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. This means that speeches from Netanyahu's first term as the Israeli PM in the years 1996- 1999 and speeches of any other/former Israeli Prime Ministers have not been made publicly available. Before the research, I contacted the Israeli Prime Minister's Office staff with an official request for these materials several times, but to no avail, so I have been forced to narrow down the temporal range to one Netanyahu's premiership. Nevertheless, I currently treat these limitations as the following advantage: by selecting speeches from the ongoing Netanyahu's term of office as an Israeli PM I have the opportunity to focus on the most recent image of the Middle East conflict in the Israeli political discourse and, this way, to have a solid reference point for further research (see Section 3 below).

2. Methodology

Linguistic research concerned with socially consequential phenomena such as expressed political conflict more and more readily reaches for their theoretical explanations from social and cognitive sciences to more comprehensively describe the relationships and mutual influences of discourse and social reality (Wodak and Fairclough 1997; Wodak 2011, etc.). For this reason, the study conducted in this dissertation inherently positions itself at the crossroads of several disciplines and research perspectives to investigate various, yet linked concepts shaping political communication in the context of conflict in an attempt to understand the complex workings of language in the practice of this phenomenon. This reveals the major preconception underlying this project, i.e. the dialectical relationship of discourse and social reality, which entails the influence of situations, institutions and social structures on the discourse of conflict and a simultaneous influence of the discourse of conflict on the social status quo. This way, this research project has strong foundations in Critical Discourse Studies, which entails critical perspective on the ‘micro’ considerations of the cognitive-pragmatic properties of the (political) discourse of conflict and the ‘macro’ considerations of their larger social motivations and consequences (Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 2001; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009).

The context of the study is the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab conflict (henceforth also referred to, by a common term, as the Middle East conflict), in which I investigate the Israeli political discourse as an exceptional instance of discourse on the political arena, focusing on specific regularities that it has shaped in the course of communicating in and about the Middle East conflict. After over sixty years of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab struggle following the establishment of the state of Israel, the conflict parties have developed their own, distinguishing ways in which they discursively (re)construct the situation in the Middle East and, thus, influence their local settings. The limitations of this dissertation make it possible to focus on only one of them, the Israeli discourse, but it simultaneously signals the need to devote equal attention to the discourses of other sides of this long-lasting conflict in the future.

All these aspects, again, inherently bring us to the methodology adopted in this research, i.e. the cognitive-pragmatic critical approach which is potentially most effective in identifying and explaining the structural, content-related and functional regularities of the Israeli political discourse as a manifestation of the discourse of conflict that has developed in

the context of socio-political situation in the Middle East. The cognitive-pragmatic component of this approach entails focus on pragmatic parameters and pragmalinguistic devices as tools that perform specific functions in the context of the Middle East conflict, that is, activate non-linguistic cognitive processes that allow conflict-related ideology to influence local and global addressees/audiences through language. These conceptual processes govern the addressees'/audiences' perception of basic categories such as space, time, scenes, events, entities, processes, motion, location, force and causation, and as such, enable to interpret particular construals, i.e. regularities in developing and forcing specific perceptions as dominating ideology meant to represent and (be internalized as) a particular and rather fixed Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict. Thus, regularities in linguistically expressed/enacted ideology, persuasion and legitimization are perceived as elements constitutive of the Israeli (communicative) practice in its relations with the Palestinians, Arab countries and the international community, which accentuate themselves in the following definition of the discourse of conflict:

Discourse of conflict is a set of communicative events in which speakers negotiate meanings about the conflict in order to achieve particular goals in this conflict; these meanings are developed and negotiated as a result of mutual influence of the utterances produced and the surrounding context of conflict, with a view to achieve particular goals in this conflict and to represent and discursively create the conflict in a specific speaker-chosen, goal-oriented way.

In search of a category that would methodologically supplement this definition and enable me to design my analysis of the discourse of conflict in a way that would entail, on the one hand, a controlling critical top-down perspective of these regularities and, on the other hand, a bottom-up, data-driven testing of their appearance, functionality and goal-orientedness, I have decided to adopt and adapt the latest developments in the theory and research on political genres described by Cap and Okulska (2013) in an attempt to sketch the panorama of current research on genres in political communication and to indicate the direction for studies that target newly evolving, hybridized generic categories. This theoretical-methodological background has been presented in detail in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this dissertation, where I used Cap and Okulska's considerations of the disparities between communicative and political genres to put forward specific macro- and micro-criteria characterizing the latter,

which was in my opinion a necessary opening step for the empirical part of this project. This way, I arrived at five macro-criteria that stem directly from properties of communicative genres presented in Chapter 1 and their occasional inapplicability to political genres signaled by Cap and Okulska in their discussion. Next, I supplemented it with additional four micro-criteria that originated as a result of my deliberation over the numerous writings in the domain of political discourse (cf. Cap 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2013; Okulska and Cap 2010, Cap and Okulska 2013; Chilton 1985, 1987, 1988, 1995, 2003; Chilton and Ilyin 1993; Chilton and Schäffner 1997, 2002; van Dijk 1993, 1997, 2002, 2003, 2008), some of which (for example van Dijk 1997) referred to political genres in a limited way only, but by providing general characterization of political discourse, offered insights that perfectly describe what generic structures in political communication are like. Some considerations included in these micro-criteria conceptually overlap with those covered in the macro- properties, but I believe that, as such, they offer useful concretization of some generalization made in the first set. Apart from that, they also touch upon aspects that are absent from or insufficiently accentuated in the macro-criteria, thus earning the right of individual treatment as legitimate and helpful parameters of identification, analysis and interpretation of political genres.

All these attempts enabled me to propose a working definition of political genre that was then taken as a theoretical-methodological counterpart of my definition of the discourse of conflict:

Political genres are conventional uses of more or less stable utterance groups which are strategically organized and follow recognizable patterns that suit the accomplishment of individual and global political goals in the socio-political context.

The rationale behind analyzing the discourse of conflict as political genre follows from my motivation to treat the stability of content-, structure- and goal-related aspects of text structures analyzed just as they are treated in the latest scholarship in political communication, i.e. as the decisive criteria identifying political genres. This, in turn, provoked the following thesis statement that I have come up with for the purposes of the empirical part of this dissertation:

Discourse of conflict has specific and (more or less) stable structural, content-related and functional characteristics that are typical for political genres and, thus, enable to classify, analyze and interpret it as a (potentially new) genre in political communication.

This thesis statement entails that in my study I take structural, content-related and functional regularities of the discourse of conflict as constitutive of a potentially new political genre that is oriented at achieving specific (macro-)goals in the context of conflict. This, in turn, has enabled me to use the five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria characterizing political genres described in section 2.2. in Chapter 2 of this dissertation as a theoretical-methodological framework for the analysis of my data. This has been done in the following two stages:

Stage 1: Matching the data to the following five macro-criteria of political genres:

1. Political genres are dynamic abstractions
2. Political genres may activate and realize contexts in a non-standard way
3. Political genres are flexible macrostructures
4. Political genres are interrelated in and across social fields
5. Political genres manifest hierarchies of behavioral patterns

These five criteria are treated as necessary conditions, in the formal sense, so moving on to the next stage of analysis is possible only once they all have been fulfilled.

Stage 2: Matching the data to following four additional micro-criteria of political genres:

1. Political genres are defined based on, both, discursive and contextual properties
2. Political genres are realized by means of linguistic strategies
3. Political genres are strategic in structure and distribution of content.
4. Political genres feature a hierarchy of goals.

The nine criteria described above are engaged in a bidirectional relationship with my definitions of the discourse of conflict and political genre, and my thesis statement. On the one hand, I have mapped them out in order to have a clear and, hopefully, complete perspective on the so far scholarship in political genres – a perspective that would enable me

to amalgamate all these characteristic features in my definition of political genre. This way, by inductive reasoning, I have attempted to form a definition that entails a top-down perspective, synthesizing (hopefully all) aspects of discourse of conflict that can be considered as representative of political genre – and, most importantly, productive for analyzing the discourse of conflict as potentially new genre in political communication. This brings me to another direction of relationship between these (five) macro- and (four) micro-criteria characterizing political genres and my definitions, as, on the other hand, these definitions are meant to deductively refer, both, me as a researcher and my readers to specific characteristics, to which the data is matched in a bottom-up manner in this study – and to which other data can be matched, should other researchers decide to incorporate this framework in their analyses of other potentially new political genres and the discourses of other conflicts. Furthermore, these two definitions, my thesis statement and the nine criteria characterizing political genres are an essential follow-up of my considerations in Chapter 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and as such, they are the umbrella concepts for the empirical part of this dissertation, illustrating the major inter-/transdisciplinary theoretical preconceptions that have inspired me throughout the entire process of analyzing and interpreting the speeches of the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu.

Such a perspective also entails a specific methodological relation of my thesis statement and the criteria characterizing political genres, where my thesis statement is a synthesis of the total of nine genre-constitutive properties that I have worked out based on the existing scholarship in political genres, and which makes each of these properties an *individual thesis statement* that I put forward for the discourse of conflict to fulfill. Although in Chapter 2 I have mentioned that the five macro-criteria are to be treated neither as a finite set of characteristics (as there are potentially more of them), nor as a set of criteria that excludes anything from political discourse that does not fulfill a given criterion (as this would contradict my perception of political genres as a constantly evolving way of communicative acting), in this study I take them as the core of my framework and, as such, they are treated as necessary conditions to be met. The reason for this lies in my motivation to, on the basis of this research, propose a hopefully integrated approach to the analysis of political genres that would hold water and have explanatory power for other attempts at classifying specific regularities in content, form and function of other discourses under generic labels. As a result, the (five) macro- and the (four) micro-criteria characterizing political genres are at the same

time a reflection of a methodological procedure that I designed to handle my data – and that can potentially be used in other studies.

This means that every single text structure in the corpus analyzed in this research project had to have its share in the construction of the following generic macro- and micro-characteristics of the discourse of conflict:

Macro-criterion 1. Discourse of conflict is a dynamic abstraction.

Discourse of conflict is a cluster of conventionalized, goal-oriented discursive forms that arise from the imperatives of the context of conflict. It operates both at the level of language and at the level of functions this language plays in the widely perceived domain of the practice of conflict. Because of this fact it might manifest some common, more or less stable properties of communicating in the context of conflict, but this approach does not exclude its dynamic character – it is assumed and accepted that over time these properties might undergo some reconstructions in structure and content to fulfill the changing situational requirements and to remain functional in this communicative practice of conflict. These changes might be related to a) structure – and involve, for example, introducing something “extra” or altering the typical sequence of genre-constitutive elements to adjust to the new conditions, and/or to b) content – and involve, for example, a greater focus on some elements of context (here, conflict) over others, depending on what the speaker deems more rhetorically effective at the time of speaking.

Macro-criterion 2. Discourse of conflict may activate and realize contexts in a non-standard way.

This criterion entails that the discourse of conflict, apart from being produced in and influenced by the very existence of conflict, uses the mechanisms of context-activation and context-realization to realize and develop itself in the context of conflict and in the pursuit of specific conflict-related goals. In some well established generic categories in political communication, context-activation and context-realization are typically treated as two disparate stages of the workings of the genre, and it is usually the latter stage that is of bigger interest for the analyst. In this study activation and realization of context is examined collectively as the speaker’s mechanism of positioning their communicative activity in the

practice of conflict. This entails that the speaker might (and potentially does), for some reason, decide to use a particular communicative event which might not necessarily be directly connected with the practice of conflict, to bring the conflict from the contextual background to the foreground, thus turning their communicative activity into another building block of the larger category of the discourse of conflict that exists above individual text structures, but that gets realized in them. This, in turn, entails the perception of context-activation and context-realization as highly strategic and persuasive means of (re)producing conflict through discourse, and provides an interesting illustration of how political actors use this potential and what their intentions with respect to their addressees/audiences might be. Hence, the fulfillment of this specific criterion in the discourse of conflict entails that conflict becomes the dominant and defining element of, both, the context and the content of individual conventionalized utterance groups produced by the speaker during individual communicative events, this way making them functional in the pursuit of conflict-related (macro-)goals.

Macro-criterion 3. Discourse of conflict is a flexible macrostructure.

This macro-criterion entails the perception of the discourse of conflict as a macrostructure, in which speeches delivered by the same speaker in a specific time span and related to a specific socio-political situation such as a long-lasting conflict (that inevitably influences their communicative choices which reflect and adopt to the situational requirements), are oriented towards the achievement of specific conflict-related (macro-) goals. This goal-orientedness is the governing category here, which means that the elements of this macrostructure (i.e. micro-pragmatic parameters and some larger pragmatolinguistic devices) are flexible in the pursuit of these goals. This means that the discourse of conflict can be realized in a potentially infinite number of ways, including some particularly creative and unconventional ways of communicating in and about conflict. Nevertheless, the common denominator of, both, the standard and the novel structural and content-related elements of the discourse of conflict is functionality, i.e. the pragmatic property of linguistic material, so all elements of this macrostructure are perceived as function-carriers that contribute to the accomplishment of the overall goal of this potentially new generic structure in the domain of politics. This view also entails that as a pragmatically flexible macrostructure, the discourse of conflict might have, both, obligatory and optional elements and stages required to the realization of the macro-goal(s).

Macro-criterion 4. Discourse of conflict is interrelated in and across social fields.

All political genres coexist and are interrelated in the broad socio-political setting that embraces mutual relations between the politicians and the people, the media and the public opinion, propaganda and its influence on education, healthcare, the economy or foreign affairs. Because of the fact that the phenomenon of conflict influences potentially all domains of socio-political life, it might be assumed that its discourse will also address a variety of social fields and influence their discourses – this done to discursively (re)construct the scale of the conflict. This interrelatedness also reveals itself in the use of intertextuality and recontextualization in and between the individual text structures included in the discourse of conflict, i.e. in the process where a dominant text structure assimilates, for some strategic purpose, elements of another genre. Through such (inter)relations, the discourse of conflict also contributes to the *hyper-genre* of political communication (of course, assuming that we will take it as existing), as by pursuing specific goals in the context of conflict, it serves the purposes of gaining and maintaining legitimization in the domain of politics of a party (i.e. a group or a state) involved in conflict.

Macro-criterion 5. Discourse of conflict manifests hierarchies of behavioral patterns.

This criterion not only entails that the discourse of conflict assigns interpersonal roles, but it also, if not primarily, stresses the importance and strategic potential of the process of assigning these roles by the speaker. Such roles are assigned to all social actors involved in the conflict, be that the speaker and his side, the opponents or other parties engaged in the practice of conflict, this way enabling the speaker to discursively reconstruct the extra-linguistic context (of conflict) and to further shape it in the desired way through language. Of course, the roles might also depend from situational requirements and, as such, be dynamically adjusted to them, but in each case they reflect the speaker's-construed organization of the Discourse Space⁴ and (Chilton 2004; Cap 2006, 2008, 2010; Hart 2007) its

⁴ Discourse Space is understood here as a conceptual in which entities explicitly or implicitly included in discourse are mentally processed and positioned. These entities are located in a scalar way along three axes of *space*, *time* and *modality*, which intersect in the *deictic centre* (the Self, that is, *I* or *we*). In later works of Chilton (e.g. 2010, 2011), the name “Discourse Space Theory” has been replaced by the name “Deictic Space Theory” to signal that the model operates at the sentence level rather than at the level of complex phenomena in discourse (Cap 2013).

elements. In this respect, not all roles might be equal and not all entities might be engaged in equal relations. Rather, the arrangement entails a hierarchy in which the core of the practice of conflict takes place between the explicitly expressed belligerent parties, which are supported or contested by other entities. This way, some interpersonal roles entail active participation in the conflict, while others are perceived as passive.

Each of the claims included in the descriptions of the above five macro-criteria analyzing political genres to be tested on the discourse of conflict, were reformulated into a huge number of specific research questions used in Stage 1 of my study. Stage 2 that followed featured testing the data according to the following four additional micro-criteria:

Micro-criterion 1. Discourse of conflict is defined based on, both, discursive and contextual properties.

Discourse of conflict – just as any other structures or patterns in communication – is shaped and characterized by both contextual and discursive properties. As long as the role of discursive properties as constitutive of the structure, content and functions of it being a potentially new political genre is rather obvious, this micro-criterion offers a useful concretization of at least two dimensions of context that influence the discourse of conflict. The first dimension is specified by macro-criteria no 1, 2 and 3 above, according to which the very existence of political genres arises from the imperatives of constantly evolving socio-political context and entails that any political genre features more or less specified rules of activating and realizing its context. This, as I have already mentioned, is in my opinion productive mostly for the analysis of the well-established generic categories such as, for example, an inaugural address and its “micro-context”, i.e. a rather particularized setting in which this specific post-election reality has the greatest influence on the speaker’s pragmatic choices. Of course, the wider socio-political context (henceforth “macro-context”) is also “there”, but its influence on the genre seems secondary to the one of micro-context. This brings us to the second dimension of context – the one in which this specific micro-criterion is an essential supplement to macro-criteria no 1, 2 and 3 above, and that I perceive as particularly productive for the analysis of the discourse of conflict. Conflict, just like economic crisis, environmental issues such as global warming, or the growth of terrorism are phenomena that range beyond the immediate (local and micro-) context and are combined

with issues of global/transnational politics, i.e. the macro-context. As a result, in each of these cases, the macro-scale contextual phenomenon may potentially shape the discursive choices of the speaker to such an extent that in search for a label that would encompass all the discursive regularities the only valid idea that remains seems to be the one of a political genre – and essentially a new political genre. The clue to checking whether any conventionalized goal-oriented discursive forms do arise from the imperatives of this macro-context, is to analyze diverse data, that is speeches with various micro-contexts (delivered during diverse events of national or international importance), delivered in front of various audiences (local/international and homogeneous/heterogeneous audiences, as each of them shares a different amount of background knowledge with the speaker), and covering a period of time. This is, essentially, the motivation that governed my choice of data for the analysis which I described in Section 1 of this chapter.

Micro-criterion 2. Discourse of conflict is realized by means of specific linguistic strategies.

Although this property might seem obvious since political discourse abounds in the use of numerous linguistic strategies that rely on communicating information either implicitly (e.g. through implicatures, presuppositions, forced construals, indirect speech acts) or explicitly (e.g. through direct speech acts and in this respect, particularly assertions), it is worth underlining that these strategies are the exact speaker's means of achieving, both, the ad hoc micro-goals, macro-goals and the hyper-goal of legitimization in political communication. This seemingly obvious role of linguistic strategies in political communication gains new importance when we notice that particular strategies appear repeatedly, serve repeatable functions, and communicate repeatable messages (similar content). From the analytic standpoint, what increases the potential of these regularities in forming new generic categories even more is when they relate to a set of common ideas or a common thematic framework. In political communication this is the case with, for example, threat-presupposing discourses (e.g. discourses of terrorism, climate change, political conflict, etc.) where the linguistic strategies used:

- implicitly or explicitly communicate content that revolve around this central theme (e.g. the existence and influence of 'threat' resulting from terrorism, climate change or political conflict on various domains of social life) and

- perform specific pragmatic functions related to this theme (proximizing this 'threat' to legitimize specific actions as pre-emptive, using ideological polarization to legitimize 'us' and 'our actions' and delegitimize 'them' and 'their actions', etc.).

For this reason, in the course of the analysis of the discourse of conflict I sought regularities in the function, content and use of linguistic strategies reappearing across time and changing audiences in Netanyahu's speeches, to see whether they do implicitly or explicitly communicate specific messages about the Middle East conflict and whether they are meant to perform specific pragmatic functions supporting the Israeli stance in this struggle.

Micro-criterion 3. Discourse of conflict is strategic in form and distribution of content.

This micro-criterion is an essential supplement to my discussion of the relationship of (micro- and macro-) context and the discourse of conflict and to my observations related to role of linguistic strategies in the formation of potentially new political genres in the previous point. As far as the idea of a strategic organization of the structure and content of the discourse of conflict is concerned, this property entails that whether or not something is mentioned at the beginning, in the body or in the concluding paragraphs of, for example, a political speech (as this property if, potentially, best visible in monologic patterns of communication), is a matter of a conscious choice. In the discourse of conflict, this specific micro-criterion might have the biggest impact on, first, the organization and distribution of messages about conflict across text structures and, second, their adjustment to, both, the micro-contextual requirements and the addressees'/audiences' predispositions. For this reason, analyzing the Israeli PM's speeches, special attention has been paid to how the speaker attempted to enact his credibility and how he adjusted the form and content of his messages to the various situational requirements, still remaining committed to the governing theme of conflict and to the goals that he pursued in the course of time.

Micro-criterion 4. Discourse of conflict features a hierarchy of goals.

Just as in the case of roles and patterns of behavior described in macro-criterion 5, which are organized in relation to each other and entail specific types of interaction between the participants of conflict, I assumed that the discourse of conflict features a specific organization of its goals. This is essentially a hierarchy, in which apart from legitimization,

i.e. the hyper-goal of political communication, the speaker wants to achieve a number of *ad hoc* micro-goals, for example: to rebut criticism, to gain support for a specific cause, to forge a stronger relationship with political allies, to build a positive image of his/her country on the international arena, etc., and specific macro-goals related strictly to the conditioning macro-contextual phenomenon of conflict. In this arrangement, the micro-goals are potentially most dynamic, as they to a largest extent depend on changing situational requirements and, as such, may vary over time, but notwithstanding this dynamic adjustment to context, they all involve a stable element of legitimization that the speaker wants to achieve, and a rather stable element of macro-goals pursued in the conflict. This way, a single speech might feature a number of micro-goals, all of which contribute to the macro-goal(s) of the discourse of conflict – and to the hyper-goal of political communication, i.e. legitimization of leadership. Following on from that, analyzing a number of speeches delivered by the same speaker across a specific time span, but in front of various audiences, enables to identify a variety of context-dependent micro-goals that are pursued on the way, and to see how they might potentially work at the service of some larger (macro-) motivations.

Just as in the case of Stage 1 of my research, each of the claims included in the descriptions of the above four micro-criteria analyzing political genres to be tested on the discourse of conflict, were reformulated into a huge number of specific research questions used in Stage 2 of the analysis of Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches.

The opening material for this was the inaugural speech delivered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Knesset at the Swearing In Ceremony on March 31, 2009. The motivation behind this results directly from characteristics of political genres that I described discussing the issues of genre intertextuality, prototypicality of interpersonal roles assigned and taken up in genres, and the pursuit of micro- and macro-goals. These points inspired several preconceptions of mine that I considered both analyzing the first text structure in the corpus and that kept considering in the course of the analysis of all the other Netanyahu's speeches.

The first preconception – the one related to intertextuality – implies that analyzing all texts I took extra caution looking for intertextual references between Netanyahu's inaugural speech at the Knesset and the speeches he delivered later in, both, that venue and during international events such as the AIPAC Policy Conference or the UN General Assembly. This caution and sensitivity to intertextuality was treated as an opportunity to see if the

representations of conflict in the Middle East present in his rhetoric repeat and/or change across time and audiences, but also to see what other texts are potentially most readily incorporated into the discourse of conflict by means of intertextual references.

The second preconception – the one related to interpersonal roles – implies that I focused on roles that Netanyahu took up and assigned to other parties in (this) discourse of conflict, to see if they are repeatable and, if not, how they change and this way influence the generic characteristics of the data analyzed. This, in turn, was motivated by the fact that in the course of the analysis I wanted to work out a set of prototypical behavioral patterns taken up/assigned to parties involved in the conflict in order to show that the discourse of conflict – just like Lakoff’s “Fairy Tale of the Just War” (1992) or some well-established political genres – entails the existence of some prototypical roles that might be kept or, for some strategic purposes, suspended.

The third preconception – the one related to the fulfillment of goals – implies that in the course of my study I tried to define macro-goals typical for the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict to see if they also changed across time and audiences and, most importantly, to see how they related to the hyper-goal of legitimization. This is assumed in the spirit of my discussion of the macrostructural properties of the discourse of conflict, as I argue that the existence of some recognizable and stable macro-goals in this category of discourse can be treated genre-constitutive, since political genres, essentially, **are** macrostructures. Such an approach enabled me to look at some repeatable political-communicative elements of the Israeli practice of the Middle East conflict from a broader perspective – the perspective of a macrostructure that has its regularities in the content, structure and functions, all of which become its generic properties.

Additionally, this study and the framework it proposes is meant to serve as a response to a concern raised by Cap and Okulska (2013) over the possible ways of analyzing potentially new genres in political communication under a unified approach:

An alternative solution – though still intuitive and thus not meriting placement anywhere outside this note – would involve combining a possibly substantial number of both content/form- and function-oriented criteria. It seems that one candidate group reconciling the various strands of research in genres might be the four criteria of: content, setting, medium, and function (cf. Cap 2012). These could be used to determine prototypicality, status in the generic hierarchy, and the status of “genre” in the first place, based on *how many of the criteria are consistently matched in discourse throughout the socio-political field and the timeframe in which the genre has been operating*. For instance, Discourse of the War-on Terror (Cap 2013) would claim a genre label through its default content (terrorist themes),

typical function (legitimization), and a relative predictability of major communicative channels and venues. Inability to reach a “threshold number” of the criteria, or matching them partly, or differently at different stages of genre’s development, would disqualify the genre as a genre, would brush aside a vast number of “ad hoc genres” arising in highly particularized contexts hindering their further development. (Cap and Okulska 2013: 20)

The theoretical-methodological model that I developed for the purposes of my study in the generic properties of the discourse of conflict is a modest attempt at targeting these concerns, as it is based on investigating specific content-, form- and function-oriented criteria as genre-constitutive. For these purposes, the macro- and micro-criteria characterizing political genres which I worked out, revolve around the notions of content, medium, setting and functions as parameters determining the prototypicality of the genre of the discourse of conflict and positioning it in the generic hierarchy on the same level as macro-discourses, since they both involve strategic adjustment of linguistic material to pursue specific macro-goals. When it comes to the concern over the “threshold number” of criteria characterizing political genres, or the concern over matching these criteria partly or differently, it can be addressed only by testing the framework proposed here on other data and other potentially new generic categories to check whether the nine criteria proposed here are sufficient or applicable outside this specific study. Yet, irrespective of all its peculiarities, I believe that the context of the Middle East conflict cannot be treated as a “highly particularized” one, since – as my discussion in Chapter 5 will show – it manifests certain characteristics that might be taken as common to other conflicts, thus allowing to put forward a claim that the discourse of conflict is a pragmatically flexible macrostructure developing and realizing itself across different settings in which parties communicate in the context of conflict.

3. The profile of this research in relation to potential future studies

As a matter of a direct transition to the discussion of examples in Chapter 5, in this last section I would like to briefly sketch the relation of my research to the potential future studies in the discourse of conflict or any other attempts at applying the model developed for the purposes of this research in analyzing other potentially new political genres. I will come back to this commentary in Chapter 6 as well, but I believe that several observations on this topic deserve a place here, because they clarify the way in which I approached my study and, most

importantly, signal how I would like my discussion in Chapter 5 to be perceived by my readers.

Due to the fact that linguistic scholarship in political genres has to face challenges resulting from constant evolution and hybridization of political communication, from the very beginning of this project I have committed myself to conducting research that, rather than a goal in itself, will serve as an opening point for some wider discussion of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict (and other potentially new political genres) and as a solid reference for potential further studies on the discourse of the Middle East conflict or other conflicts. These might include:

- a comparative analysis of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict based on Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches covered here and the speeches that he delivered during his first term of office to confirm or deny the stability of these properties in a larger time span,
- a comparative analysis of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict based on Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches covered here and speeches delivered by other Israeli Prime Ministers (former or future) to confirm or deny the stability of these properties in rhetoric of other speakers,
- a comparative analysis of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict based on Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches covered here and speeches delivered by the Palestinian and/or Iranian political leaders in the same time span and on similar occasions (including the United Nations General Assembly) to confirm or deny the stability of these properties in the rhetoric of other parties actively involved in the Middle East conflict,
- a comparative analysis of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict based on Benjamin Netanyahu's speeches covered here and other individual political or media genres such as press/ TV interviews with him, media releases or policy documents issued by parties involved in the Middle East conflict (e.g. UN resolutions) to confirm or deny the stability of these properties across genres coming from various domains of communication and/or various participants involved in this conflict,
- an analysis of the reconciliation discourse as a potential counterpart of the discourse of conflict in an attempt to investigate whether it also manifests any generic properties; in this case, the data for the analysis could come from speeches of representatives of international bodies engaged in or committed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,
- an analysis of the generic properties of the discourses of other conflicts to confirm or deny the stability of this genre-constitutive elements in other settings of socially consequential

political struggle, e.g. the discourses of the 2014 Crimean crisis or the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

The only limitation to these potential research projects is the same as the one that the study presented in this dissertation has experienced, that is, the accessibility of data. As long as the UN General Assembly speeches of the political leaders of the Palestinian Authority or Iran are officially interpreted into English, their speeches delivered to the local audiences often have no official translations, which significantly hampers the process of data collection. Similar concern applies to the speeches of the Ukrainian and Russian political leaders, this way causing potential problems with the representativeness of data.

Yet, I believe, this is an important direction in genre studies and in the analysis of political discourse, as it reveals the potential of linguistic research in the broad interdisciplinary domain of (peace and) conflict studies, currently largely dominated by social sciences. This study of the discourse of conflict is an attempt to elevate the status of linguistic research in this domain on the assumption that it might shed light on aspects that are absent from conflict studies conducted in political science, geography, economics, psychology, sociology, international relations, history, anthropology, religious studies or gender studies. Nevertheless, this descriptive potential of the linguistic analysis of the discourse of conflict for conflict studies conducted in other disciplines and fields of science is but one of the potential applications. There is also the prescriptive potential of such research which might provide knowledge necessary to understand the dynamics of conflicts or to develop conflict resolution techniques, i.e. the practice of reconciliation discourses.

CHAPTER 5. Discourse of Conflict as Political Genre: Analysis and Discussion

This chapter is a presentation of the results of my study, illustrating five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria characterizing political genres, to which I matched my data in pursuit of generic properties of the discourse of conflict. The discussion is divided into two parts and each of these parts is organized in a different way. Part 1 devoted to macro-criteria is a more generalized account of five major characteristics of the discourse of conflict that apply to all data that I have analyzed and that, in my model, are treated as must-haves, i.e. absolutely necessary characteristics of any linguistic material to be classified as political genre. This means that since they all reappear throughout the speeches, they cater for the (more) stable characteristics of the discourse of conflict, so not to tire my readers with repeating and discussing similar examples from 21 speeches delivered across 6 years of Netanyahu's premiership, I have decided to discuss the macro-criteria based on one of his speeches, the text of which I include at the very beginning of Part 1 of this chapter. This is a speech that Netanyahu delivered at the Knesset Swearing In ceremony on 31 March, 2009. This, however, does not entail that this particular type of speech – the inaugural address – is most likely to fulfill the macro-criteria characterizing political genres due to its specificity, such as, for example, inherent requirement that the speaker of the inaugural communicates in what setting he/she and their government is taking office and what political relations their country has with other countries. Rather, in the case of Prime Minister Netanyahu the inaugural address with its structural, content-related and functional features serves as a very good reflection of his later speeches delivered in the years 2009-2014, in front of diverse audiences and on as diverse occasions as subsequent United Nations General Assemblies, AIPAC Policy Conferences or various events in the Knesset – be that regular sessions or special meetings held on visits of important guests. Some of these regularities across different settings and audiences will be presented in detail in Part 2, the content of which I am explaining below. Furthermore, Part 1 is also meant to be a model analysis that illustrates how I proceeded with matching the five macro-criteria to individual speeches, and thus how it might be done in any future studies that will apply this framework in identifying and analyzing potentially new political genres¹.

¹ This is what this framework has been primarily designed for, but at the same time it is **by no means** limited to researching new political genres only. I deeply believe that since it has been developed based on scholarship that deals with analyzing the well-established political genres,

Part 2, in contrast, will be devoted to micro-criteria characterizing the discourse of conflict as political genre, and as such it is a more particularized account that, first, supplements the general characteristics presented in Part 1 and builds up on some claims presented there, and, second, caters for some idiosyncratic and dynamic properties of the discourse of the Israel-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts such as linguistic devices that have been used by the speaker to communicate specific messages in a way that was adjusted to the diverse predispositions of his addressees/audiences. Such an arrangement enables me to add some interesting and more detailed insights to the discussion of what I included in my thesis statement, i.e. the regularities in the structure, content and function of the discourse of conflict across time, and to the illustration of how these regularities in individual speeches provoke some macro-level considerations of the discourse of conflict as political genre. Thus, to best illustrate them, in Part 2 I shall discuss four micro-criteria characterizing political genres that I offered in Chapter 2 referring to examples from all 21 speeches delivered by Benjamin Netanyahu in the years 2009-2014 that I analyzed for the purposes of this dissertation. This is also the reason why Part 2 is bigger in its volume than Part 1, as there are more examples and some of these examples are much longer, because only in this form they allow to illustrate some interesting complexities that I encountered matching my data to the four micro-characteristics.

it might also serve as a useful resource that proposes an updated – and mostly more detailed – framework for the analysis of any political genres, including those more typical and well-documented in literature such as inaugural address or election debate. My framework and, in particular, the 5 macro-criteria characterizing political genres draw heavily on characteristics of communicative genres proposed by Cap and Okulska (2013), and, most importantly, on their observations of peculiarities of political communication and political discourse in comparison to other domains of communication. Thus, as such, my framework and all the criteria characterizing political genres that it proposes might potentially be applied to any political discourse data that has a more particular context of political activity and/or political situation as its controlling parameter, i.e. a parameter that governs the structural, content-related and functional characteristics of text structures/utterance groups in political communication.

Part 1. Macro-criteria characterizing political genres

The speech² for a model analysis of five macro-criteria analyzing political genres:

Incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech
at the Knesset Swearing In Ceremony
March 31, 2009

Speaker of the Knesset, Reuven Rivlin – congratulations again, my friend,
Honorable Outgoing Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert – thank you for your words,
Members of the Outgoing Government,
Members of the Incoming Government,
Former Members of Knesset,
State Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss,
Mrs. Aviva Shalit,
Mrs. Karnit Goldwasser,
Mrs. Esther Waxman,
Members of Knesset,
Distinguished Guests,

As the poet in Psalms wrote: “Lord, my heart was not proud, and my eyes were not haughty, nor did I pursue matters too great and too wondrous for me.”
Members of Knesset,

It is not with the elation of the victorious that I stand before you today, but rather with a feeling of heavy responsibility. However, these are not ordinary days. I ask for your trust at a time of global crises, the likes of which have not been seen in years. I speak out of a feeling of concern, but also of hope and faith, and mostly in recognition of the seriousness of this challenging hour. For Israel faces two enormous challenges: the economic challenge and the security challenge. These result from dramatic international developments; huge thunderstorms are raging around us. It is not our actions or failures of the past that are the root of these crises, but our actions and decisions in the near future that will determine if we will prevail. On this day I would like to express my full confidence that the people of Israel will be able to successfully deal with the challenges we face. The State of Israel was established during its most difficult hour, an hour during which the words of the Declaration of Independence echoed in our ears: “The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it

² The file with the original text can be downloaded from the official website of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, section “Briefing Room”, subsection “Speeches”. The direct link is: <http://www.pmo.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/PMO/32communication/speeches/2009/03/knessbENGi310309.doc>

throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to its land and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.”

Members of Knesset,

There is no more wondrous a journey in history than that of the Jewish people. There is no struggle more just than its struggle to return to its homeland and build a life here as a free and sovereign nation. There is no question mark, not about the right, not about the justice and not about the existence of the people of Israel and its country. There is no question mark, and we will not allow anyone or any country to raise a question mark over our existence. The 20th century proved that the future of the Jewish people is dependent on the future of the State of Israel, and therefore it is our duty to do all that is necessary to ensure the security, strength and prosperity of our country. It is within our power to do so and overcome any obstacle or impediment as long as our will is steadfast and as long as we are united, and it was my sincere and stated aspiration to establish a government at this difficult time that would unite all the centrist forces among our people. I saw this as the order of the day and invested ongoing and consistent efforts to achieving this goal. I am pleased that the Labor Party, a movement with deep roots and of great contributions to the history of Zionism and settlement, eventually made the responsible decision for the good of the country to join hands with the Likud Movement and our other partners.

I wish to express appreciation to the members of this house who understood the enormous responsibility we are facing, and took the decision, not without hesitation, to extend a hand and provide support for the unity government.

Members of Knesset,

The security crisis we are facing originates from the rise and spread of radical Islam in our region and in other parts of the world. The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime. I wish to distinguish fundamentalist Islam from the overall Muslim and Arab world, which is also threatened by the extremists. The Islamic culture is a great, rich culture, with many connections to the history of our people as well, and we have known periods of cooperation; of Jews and Arabs living together and creating together. Today, more than ever, Israel strives to achieve full peace with all the Arab and Muslim world. Today, this ambition is also backed by a shared interest of Israel and the Arab world that are facing a wave of fanaticism which threatens us all. While we may not be the only ones threatened by radical Islam, we are first and foremost threatened by it. It is true that it strives to eradicate all the Arab regimes and bring all Muslims in the world under an autocratic, narrow-minded, reactionary regime. It is also true that it threatens governments in the West and in the East with terrorism and deadly missiles. However, all its different manifestations share one common objective – to wipe the State of Israel off the face of the earth.

It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the State of Israel is weak,

there is no firm condemnation and decisive measures – almost as if dismissed as routine. However, the Jewish people have learnt their lesson. We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us. Contrary to the terrible trauma we experienced during the last century when we stood helpless and stateless, today we are not defenseless. We have a state, and we know how to defend it. It was the concern for our national security that was the first and main reason that my friends and I strove to achieve national unity at this time. Terrorists from radical Islam now threaten us from both the North and the South. We are determined to curb terrorism from all directions and fight against it with all our might. Those who want peace must fight terror. However, in order for there to be peace, the Palestinian partner must also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Over the past two decades, six Israeli prime ministers failed to achieve peace, and through no fault of their own. To the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, I say: if you truly want peace, peace can be obtained.

My Government will act vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority to achieve peace on three parallel tracks: economic, security and political. We strive to assist with the accelerated development of the Palestinian economy and in developing its economic ties with Israel. We will support a Palestinian security mechanism that will fight terror, and we will conduct ongoing peace negotiations with the PA, with the aim of reaching a final status arrangement. We have no desire to control another people; we have no wish to rule over the Palestinians. In the final status arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authority needed to govern themselves, except those which threaten the existence and security of the State of Israel. This track – combining the economic, security and political – is the right way to achieve peace. All previous attempts to make shortcuts have achieved the opposite outcome and resulted in increased terror and greater bloodshed. We choose a realistic path, positive in approach and with a genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict between us and our neighbors.

With regard to the global economic crisis, it is indeed of an unprecedented scope. It affects each and every one of us and it threatens the livelihood of thousands of Israelis. We do not yet know how and when it will end, but I am convinced of one thing: the Israeli economy has clear advantages that enable it to confront the crisis better than other economies. Our primary advantages are entrepreneurship and innovation, coupled with the ability to adjust rapidly. In this case, the fact that we are a small state is an advantage that will enable us to extricate ourselves quickly from the crisis. It is the reverse of having a quantitative advantage. The Israeli economy can be likened to a small racing boat sailing among large ships. It is easier to change the direction of a quick racing boat than that of a large ship. I intend to personally lead this change of direction. I will be the one to navigate Israel's economic strategy. My Government assumes the responsibility of protecting – to the best of our ability – employment, solving the credit crisis and maintaining a responsible macro-economic policy. These are not three contradictory objectives, although there is some measure of friction between them. The three of them can be obtained through cooperation and dialogue between all the central economic forces – the Government, the Labor Federation, the employers and social organizations – the driving force behind all of us being the good of the country. Now, more than ever, we will open our hearts to the

unemployed, the elderly and the weak. We must see before us the worker who was laid off on the eve of Passover, whose livelihood is destroyed, and the thought of how he will support his family torments him. The need to address the economic and social crisis is the second reason that prompted me and my friends to strive to achieve national unity.

There are additional challenges that our government will place at the top of its list of priorities. It is time to carry out a real revolution in education. We are the People of the Book. From the “Heder” students to Nobel Prize laureates, no nation has contributed more, relative to its size, to human knowledge and civilization. We cannot accept that our children will not be amongst the world’s leading students. Therefore, the goal we are setting today is to bring the children of Israel back to the world’s ten leading countries in international tests, within a decade.

Alongside with excellence, we will also bring Zionism back. We will teach our children the eternal values of the people of Israel, and forge values of Jewish and Israeli culture in our country’s spiritual kaleidoscope.

We will also generate a fundamental change in public safety. It was the Jewish people who bequeathed to the world the Commandments: thou shalt not steal, and thou shalt not kill. Even when we were scattered in exile, we maintained a high level of morality between man and man and between an individual and the community. It is therefore inconceivable that when we returned to being a free, sovereign nation in our homeland, crime organizations and criminal syndicates are emerging among us, dealing in theft, murder and trafficking in women, and fighting against each other with guns in the streets of our cities. It is intolerable that parents in Israel should be afraid to send their children to school or to the beach. We must put a stop to this. We will stiffen the penalties against criminals, advance important reforms in the police force and strengthen the Israel Police in its battle against crime.

At the beginning of my speech, I mentioned the opening section of the Declaration of Independence. I am committed to the Declaration as a whole, including the promise for complete equality between all the citizens of the State, regardless of religion, race or gender. Our concern will be for all the citizens of Israel: Jews, Arabs, Druze, Muslims, Christians and Circassians.

To the Arab citizens of Israel I wish to say: you will find in me a loyal partner to your integration into Israel's society and economy. I believe in this aim, and I will act in this direction.

This is a time of crisis. Our government system is unsuitable to meet the challenges of today. The large size of the Government presented to you today reflects the necessity for national unity at this time, but it also reflects a certain deficiency in the existing government system – a deficiency that can be corrected, and will be corrected.

At the same time, the Government that will be leading Israel in the years to come, is expecting neither pleasures nor luxury. On our shoulders rests an enormous,

overwhelming responsibility, and a duty to make decisions, with clarity of mind and purpose, on those issues that will determine the fate of Israel.

I would like to thank the outgoing Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, for his service to the nation. When you were only just elected, Ehud, I told you that very soon you would discover what difficulties and responsibilities were placed on your shoulders. Indeed, you discovered them. At numerous important crossroads of which the public are still not fully aware, you worked to strengthen Israel's security and made brave decisions. Ehud: thank you.

Members of Knesset,

We are on the eve of the Passover holiday and the Seder. At our national table, there is an empty chair: that of Gilad Shalit. I will do everything in my power to quickly return him healthy to the bosom of his family, and will act to return all our missing soldiers.

Citizens of Israel, I asked myself how best to express the depth of my feelings at this event, on the eve of Passover 2009. I chose to read an excerpt from one of the final letters written by my late brother, Yoni, approximately one year before he fell during the operation to rescue the hostages in Entebbe: "Tomorrow is Passover," wrote Yoni. "I always saw it as our most wonderful holiday; it is an age-old holiday celebrating freedom. As I sail backwards on the wings of history, I travel through long years of suffering, of oppression, of slaughter, of ghettos, of ostracism, of humiliation; many years that, from an historic perspective, do not contain one ray of light; but that is not the case because of the fact that the core remained, hope existed, the idea of freedom continued to burn through the fulfillment of the tradition of the ancient holiday. This, in my opinion, is a testament to the eternalness of the aspiration for freedom in Israel, the continuity of the idea of freedom. The Passover holiday," he wrote, "awakens in me an emotional affinity, also because of the Seder which, like it does for all of us, reminds me of forgotten moments from our personal pasts, my past. I clearly remember the Seder we held in Talpiot, Jerusalem when I was six. Among the participants were a number of elders like Rabbi Binyamin and Professor Klausner, and my father was also there. There was a large table and there was light. I find myself in my past, but I do not only mean my own personal past, but also the way I see myself as an inseparable link in the chain of our existence and independence in Israel."

Citizens of Israel, at this difficult time, let us all see ourselves as an inseparable link in the chain of our existence and independence in Israel. From this podium in Jerusalem, our eternal capital, I pray to G-d Almighty that our work will be blessed, and that the unity with which we begin our journey will be a good omen and the promise for our future.

Happy holiday of freedom.

1. Discourse of conflict is a dynamic abstraction

When it comes to this macro-criterion, in order to understand how Netanyahu's inaugural speech at the 2009 Knesset Swearing In Ceremony can be classified as a dynamic abstraction and thus, as a genre, one has to, first and foremost, focus on its external, political context and the way it is presented by speaker. The speech marks the beginning of Netanyahu's second term of office as the Israeli Prime Minister and, quite obviously, can be treated as steering the general direction of his work on this position in the upcoming years. 2009 was the year of international economic crisis and this topic is mentioned in the speech several times:

- (1) However, these are not ordinary days. I ask for your trust at a time of global crises, the likes of which have not been seen in years. I speak out of a feeling of concern, but also of hope and faith, and mostly in recognition of the seriousness of this challenging hour. For Israel faces two enormous challenges: the economic challenge and the security challenge.
- (2) With regard to the global economic crisis, it is indeed of an unprecedented scope. It affects each and every one of us and it threatens the livelihood of thousands of Israelis.
- (3) The Israeli economy can be likened to a small racing boat sailing among large ships.

All these three examples are preceded or followed by Netanyahu's declarations of what will be done to react to the worsening of the Israeli economic situation in order to ensure prosperity. Obviously, this relates to the then global economic context, but – surprising as it is – it is not economic crisis that dominates this speech. Rather than unstable economy, it is the Middle East conflict that reigns here and can be treated both as i) a context and as ii) a content of Netanyahu's address. This way, this text could as well be classified as a 'conflict speech', but I use this term here only as a helpful label for the huge number of references to the antagonistic relations between Israel and other groups and countries in the region. Consider the following:

- (4) The security crisis we are facing originates from the rise and spread of radical Islam in our region and in other parts of the world. The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime.

- (5) Today, this ambition is also backed by a shared interest of Israel and the Arab world that are facing a wave of fanaticism which threatens us all. While we may not be the only ones threatened by radical Islam, we are first and foremost threatened by it. It is true that it strives to eradicate all the Arab regimes and bring all Muslims in the world under an autocratic, narrow-minded, reactionary regime. It is also true that it threatens governments in the West and in the East with terrorism and deadly missiles. However, all its different manifestations share one common objective – to wipe the State of Israel off the face of the earth.
- (6) It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the State of Israel is weak, there is no firm condemnation and decisive measures – almost as if dismissed as routine.
- (7) Terrorists from radical Islam now threaten us from both the North and the South. We are determined to curb terrorism from all directions and fight against it with all our might. Those who want peace must fight terror. However, in order for there to be peace, the Palestinian partner must also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

Examples (4)-(7) are only a few selected references to the Middle East conflict that Netanyahu makes in his speech to indicate in what setting he becomes the Israeli Prime Minister. Interestingly, when it comes to the Israeli-Arab conflict, it is mostly Iran that Netanyahu focuses on, as examples (4)-(5) including references to threats posed to Israel by terrorism, fanaticism and nuclear weapons are taken from a paragraph that is directly followed by an explicit attribution of these dangers to the activity of Iran (6).

When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is example (7) that well illustrates how it is represented in the Israeli discourse: the relations with the Palestinians are undoubtedly less tense than with Iran, but “the Palestinian partner” is implicitly referred to here as co-responsible for the threats to Israel, as by a phrase “the Palestinian partner must also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people” Netanyahu implies that Palestinians do not take the initiatives presented as necessary to ensure peace in the Middle East and, through this passivity or unawareness, they further jeopardize Israel.

What is interesting in these two context-related aspects, i.e. references to the global economic crisis and to the Middle East conflict, is their rather disproportionate importance for the speaker, which is visible if we compare both the quantity and the quality of references to these two elements of context. Although Netanyahu does not express it explicitly, it can be assumed that since he pays more attention to the conflict in the region than to the economic

crisis (even though the latter might be more pressing and perceptible for the Israeli citizens at the time of the speech), it seems that it is more the conflict rather than the economic crisis that will shape his Prime Ministerial decisions and activity. This way, conflict is brought from the contextual background to the foreground, and encompasses both the context and the content of his performance, which intensifies the impression that Israel continuously experiences direct danger and is involved, voluntarily or not, in a conflict with those that do not recognize it as a state and cherish different values. As a result, based on the core assumption of this macro-criterion, according to which political genres are goal-oriented discursive forms that arise from imperatives of constantly evolving – thus dynamic – political context, there are two fundamental properties of the discourse of conflict that fit it in well with the label of political genre:

1. Discourse of conflict is targeted at presenting the conflict as happening **here** and **now**, even if the conflict itself has started in the past and has had its dynamics from intensive phases (such as a war, an open struggle or any other types of armed confrontation or explicitly expressed threat) to more neutralized phases (such as peace negotiations, attempts at working out peace agreements or seeking any non-violent ways of solving the conflict). Any conflict, including the Middle East conflict has its dynamics, but the key function of the discourse of conflict seems to be to emphasize the intensive and, potentially, most threatening and negative side of it as enduring and most current – or to discursively construe it as such using a wide range of tools. And this “imminence” of conflict becomes, both, a goal of the discourse of conflict in itself, and a means to achieve higher level goals.

2. Discourse of conflict is targeted at presenting the conflict as concerning **everyone**, that is, both the local audience (in the case of the Knesset Swearing In ceremony speech and other speeches with primarily national range) and the global audience (speeches ranging to the international community consisting of supporters, opponents and, potentially, people with no opinion on the subject; this is the case with the United Nation General Assembly speeches, AIPAC Policy Conference speeches and some Knesset speeches broadcast internationally). This, I believe, is also a goal of the discourse of conflict in itself, and a means to achieve higher level goals.

What is the rationale behind my claims that both these properties are goals of the discourse of conflict in itself and means to achieve higher level goals? To understand it, we should come

back to how the very phenomenon of conflict is defined. At the beginning of Chapter 3 I outlined that in different disciplines of science there is a general consensus on the fundamental properties of conflict, so at this point, I believe, we could take any of the existing definitions of this phenomenon in the humanities or social sciences, but I will take the one of Coser (1956), according to which conflict is “a struggle over values and claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals” (p. 8). The reason why I particularly like this definition is that it also well illustrates the essence of politics and, most specifically, political discourse as the discourse of gaining and maintaining power, and the discourse of legitimizing “the self” and delegitimizing “the other”. Conflict – and in this case of so multidimensional a conflict such as the one in the Middle East – can be thus perceived as a more expressed and more physical embodiment of the what lies at the foundations of doing politics, so when the conflict becomes political, i.e. it engages political leaders, political bodies and organizations (either local or international), it becomes a tool in the hand of politicians.

Hence, what type of tool is the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the hands of Prime Minister Netanyahu? First, in his rhetoric, the various, yet incredibly³ numerous references to the Middle East conflict as happening **here** and **now**, i.e. not losing any of its intensity or featuring mostly escalations, are meant to serve as a source of creating ubiquitous threat to the functioning of the state of Israel. This way, in all his speeches analyzed the conflict is conceptualized as a peril to the Israeli national security, education, sovereignty, economy, social policy, territorial integrity and national identity. Of course, one could argue that any conflict poses such a multidimensional threat to those who are engaged in it, but when we look at it at the level of discourse, this strategic use of conflict as a source of ubiquitous threat immediately brings us to the extensive scholarship on persuasion in political communication and, most importantly, to the recent scholarship on proximization⁴ (Cap 2005,

³ Following several years of researching the Israeli political discourse and, more recently, Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric, I can venture a claim that in virtually any situation (and in virtually any speech that he gives – again, irrespective of the occasion and the audience), he either openly talks about the Middle East conflict or refers to it through various types of inferences (presuppositions, implicatures or forced construals; to be discussed in more detail in Part 2 of this chapter).

⁴ In Part 2 of this chapter I am also going to illustrate how Netanyahu’s conceptualization of conflict can be illustrated by means of several elements of the STA proximization model proposed by Cap (cf. 2008, 2013). Unfortunately, this is going to be a brief account, since due to the limitations of this dissertation and the need to focus on generic characteristics of the

2006, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2014; Chilton 2005, 2010; Dunmire 2011; Filardo Llamas 2010; Hart 2010). This brings us to potential higher-level goals of bringing the conflict to the foreground of rhetoric and presenting it as imminent, that is legitimization. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, legitimization can be treated as high-level (hyper-) goal of political communication, so for the discourse of conflict, such a strategic use of conflict and its presence, both, in the context and in the content of it is a source of legitimizing “the self”, i.e. the Israeli side to it and its supporters, and delegitimizing “the other”, i.e. the Arab and/or the Palestinian side to the conflict and their supporters.

This same mechanism applies to the property that I described in point 2 above, where I wrote that the discourse of conflict is targeted at presenting the conflict as concerning **everyone**, that is, both the local audience and the global audience. In Netanyahu’s rhetoric, on the one hand, it serves the goal of keeping the attention of the audience by presenting the conflict as harmful and dangerous to all and, on the other hand, works for him as a source of legitimization of, first, some controversial decisions (such as the 2008-2009 so-called “Operation Cast Lead”/Gaza War, when the IDF – the Israeli armed forces – bombarded the Gaza Strip, and the 2014 Israeli bombings of the same territory) and, second, seeking political, financial or military support from other countries or the international community in general. The issue of the hierarchy of goals will also be explored in Part 2, as there I am going to provide examples illustrating what goals the discourse of conflict has and what hierarchy these goals have (see Part 2, micro-criterion no 4).

2. Discourse of conflict may activate and realize contexts in a non-standard way

Due to the fact that, for the time being, it is the first and the only study that attempts to label the discourse of conflict as political genre, it is impossible to clearly define what aspects of context-activation and context-realization could be treated as standard or non-standard for such a generic category. Netanyahu’s Knesset speech from March 31, 2009, undoubtedly activated and realized the rather standard context for the genre of inaugural address with its elements of thanking the predecessor and specifying the direction of his Prime Ministerial activity, but if we were to focus on how context was activated and realized in this text treated

discourse of conflict primarily, I had to confine myself to presenting the deictic arrangement construed by PM Netanyahu in his speeches. At the same time, this is one of the directions into which I would like to expand the following study in the future.

as an example of the genre of the discourse of conflict, there are several conclusions that can be drawn.

Since explicit or implicit references to various aspects of conflict are present across the entire text, it can be assumed that, with respect to standard context-activation, high frequency of allusions to instability, insecurity, struggle, etc. across the entire utterance will enable the speaker to instantly signal that conflict is the dominant and defining element of both the context and the content. When it comes to context realization, the powerful strategic-persuasive potential of non-standard context-realizing elements lies primarily within highly creative or in any other way non-typical ways of talking about conflict. This macro-criterion would be best visible in, for example, a comparative study of the rhetoric of two Israeli Prime Ministers or leaders of two opposing and conflicted parties (for example, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Iranian President), but it also becomes visible when the image of conflict and the tools used to (either explicitly or implicitly) build this image present in this Knesset speech from March 31, 2009, are compared to those in Netanyahu's speeches delivered later or in another setting such as, for example, during the the AIPAC Policy Conference or the UN General Assembly, when Netanyahu has different audiences. This idea will be developed and illustrated in more detail in Part 2, where I present how, for example, deixis, implicatures, presuppositions and speech acts are strategically used by the speaker to communicate ideological messages, be persuasive and achieve the effect of legitimization.

Nevertheless, the Knesset Swearing In speech well illustrates a particular 3-stage pattern of context-activation/context-realization in the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, which can also be identified in other Netanyahu's speeches analyzed:

Stage 1: The speaker focuses on the axiological dimension of the conflict (values, beliefs that are threatened and fought for, emotions that assist this 'struggle', expression of the speaker's attitude to the conflict – usually presented as the expression of the attitude of the community that the speaker represents, etc.).

This means that the opening section of a text structure is essentially "tone-setting"; here, the speaker is most likely to start from references to values and beliefs that are cherished by him and/or the community that he represents, to sketch the axiological background of the current situation. This is what Netanyahu does at the very beginning of the 2009 Knesset Swearing In Speech – and in the first paragraphs of his UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference Speeches:

- (8) It is **not with the elation of the victorious** that I stand before you today, but rather **with a feeling of heavy responsibility**.

This very first line immediately signals that since he has “a feeling of heavy responsibility”, there must be some difficulty or threat with which he will have to deal as the Prime Minister of Israel. This way, he activates and realizes the context of instability and danger, which is further built up by, first, a reference to the economic crisis and, second, a reference to the problems with the security of Israel – which is, obviously, an implied reference to the ongoing Middle East conflict:

- (9) However, these are not ordinary days. I ask for your trust at a time of global crises, the likes of which have not been seen in years. I speak out of a feeling of concern, but also of hope and faith, and mostly in recognition of the seriousness of this challenging hour. For Israel faces two enormous challenges: the economic challenge and the security challenge. These result from dramatic international developments; huge thunderstorms are raging around us.

Another remarkable and common element of this stage of context-activation/context-realization pattern are the references to national values that Netanyahu makes using various quotes. In the case of the Knesset Swearing In speech, it is a quote⁵ from the Israeli Declaration of Independence:

- (10) The State of Israel was established during its most difficult hour, an hour during which the words of the Declaration of Independence echoed in our ears: “The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to its land and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.”

In this quote we have a reference to values such as nationhood, statehood, religious tradition, cultural tradition, independence, etc., which are at stake for the Israeli side to the conflict in

⁵ Apart from the Israeli Declaration of Independence, the opening parts of other Netanyahu’s speeches, activated and realized the context of insecurity and conflict through references to axiology based on quotes from: the founder of Zionism Theodore Herzl or Zionist authority figures such as Moshe Hess, authority figures such as David Ben Gurion, Yitzhk Rabin, Uri Zvi Greenberg or Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Israeli legal acts such as 1992 Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty, Biblical prophets, among others. In any of these cases, such a quote was meant to illustrate values and beliefs that were then presented as threatened by the conflict.

the Middle East. As will be shown in Part 2, the threat to these and other values will be presented as resulting from antagonistic attitudes towards Israel manifested by its opponents⁶. In this speech it is primarily the activity of Iran that is presented as openly hostile to Israel and dangerous to its founding values, but the threat is also indirectly attributed to the Palestinians presented in this speech as passive, and to “the world”, as in (11) where Netanyahu states that the reaction of the international community to this threat is insufficient:

- (11) It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world’s response to the calls by Iran’s leader to destroy the State of Israel is weak, there is no firm condemnation and decisive measures – almost as if dismissed as routine.

Stage 2: Based on the axiological background, the speaker stresses the physical dimension of the conflict (accounts of physical attacks and use/development of weapons, negotiations with the opponents, legislation introduced in reaction to the conflict; often supported by ‘facts and figures’).

This means that following axiology-based references, the speaker moves on to some more ‘facts-like’ and/or specific context-activating and context-realizing references, in which they provide more details as to the physical threat that assists or results from the conflict, and as to the specific countermeasures and/or solutions to the conflict situation. Consider the following two examples taken from the middle part of Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech:

- (12) The security crisis we are facing originates from the rise and spread of radical Islam in our region and in other parts of the world. The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime.

⁶ This aspect is also crucial in terms of patterns of behavior ascribed by the speaker within the discourse of conflict, which will be explored in Part 1, Macro-criterion 5 below. This topic we also reappear in Part 2, where I will illustrate how Netanyahu expands the group of these opponents, the activity of whom threatens the Israeli values and beliefs, in other speeches. Just as a matter of an interesting detail here, following a highly critical 2009 Gaza report issued by the United Nations Human Rights Council and several other incidents concerning the UN activity directly or indirectly related to the Middle East and Israel, Netanyahu started conceptualizing some bodies of the United Nations Human Rights Council as offenders of the ‘Western values’, who – controversial as it is – take initiatives are supportive of terrorists.

(13) Terrorists from radical Islam now threaten us from both the North and the South. We are determined to curb terrorism from all directions and fight against it with all our might. Those who want peace must fight terror. However, in order for there to be peace, the Palestinian partner must also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

“The rise and spread of radical Islam” in (12) is an axiological back-up to the statement that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, which is a part of the shared knowledge of Netanyahu and his addresses. A similar case is in (13), where Netanyahu, again, refers to radical Islam and, next, comments on the then stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, implying that the Palestinian side is ineffective in fighting terror, which for him is but one of several reasons why there is no peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Also in (13) Netanyahu provides more specific conditions for the Palestinians to fulfill in order for this conflict to end, i.e. taking active anti-terrorism initiatives, educating the Palestinian children about peace and recognizing the statehood of Israel, by which he refers to the background knowledge that he shares with the audience, i.e. that none of these three conditions has been met so far. Thus, for him the conflict exists – and will exist until the Palestinian Authority meets the Israeli requirements.

In Part 2 I will illustrate how stage 2 of this pattern is followed in other speeches and how it develops over time⁷, showing some interesting examples of a strategic use of deixis, implicatures, presuppositions and speech acts.

Stage 3: The speaker joins the axiological and the physical dimension of the conflict in order for these two to work as sources of mutually legitimizing arguments; however, there is a visible renewed focus on axiology.

This means that the speaker mixes values and facts, mostly in statements oriented at the future, in order to legitimize the decisions to be made and actions to be taken. In the case of Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech we have such a blend in (14), the aim of which

⁷ Again, for the sake of a short illustration of how this macro-criterion is met in other speeches, I would like to point out that other more physical, ‘facts-like’ references that activated and realized the context of conflict in 2009-2014 Netanyahu’s speeches included accounts of: past battles and wars with all the sides to both of the conflicts, (terrorist) attacks on the Israeli politicians and civilians, successful and unsuccessful peace negotiations, etc. Most of these events took place not long before the time of speaking and/or are events that Netanyahu’s audience is likely to remember from their own experience, which might be perceived as another regularity connected with Stage 2 of the pattern of context-activation and context-realization.

is to activate and realize the (unreal) context of (future) peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority:

- (14) We have no desire to control another people; we have no wish to rule over the Palestinians. In the final status arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authority needed to govern themselves, except those which threaten the existence and security of the State of Israel. This track – combining the economic, security and political – is the right way to achieve peace.

This, however, is also meant to maintain the already activated context of the current phase of conflict, as it simultaneously implies that in **this reality** in which there is no such thing as a final status arrangement, several things will have to be done to achieve it. Netanyahu commits himself to taking “economic, security and political” initiatives, and he implies the expectation towards the Palestinians to fulfill their conditions. Similarly, example (14) illustrates how references to axiology (the idea behind celebrating the Passover holiday) and physical aspects of the conflict (reference to Gilad Shalit, the IDF soldier held captive by Hamas) are blended at the end of the speech:

- (15) We are on the eve of the Passover holiday and the Seder. At our national table, there is an empty chair: that of Gilad Shalit. I will do everything in my power to quickly return him healthy to the bosom of his family, and will act to return all our missing soldiers.

Quite visibly, however, the ending of 2009 Netanyahu’s’ Swearing In speech marks a come back to the major focus on axiology. The entire two last paragraphs, in which Netanyahu refers to his brother Yoni (Yonatan Netanyahu) and quotes one of his letters, serves as a great blend of historical facts and axiological arguments, by means of which Netanyahu aims to stress his commitment to values and traditions that lie at the foundations of the Israeli statehood, and thus legitimize his uncompromising stance in conflicts with all parties that undermine the right of the Jews/the Israelis to have their state. Simultaneously, this is yet another instance of activation and realization of the context of conflict, and essentially an illustration that various context-activating and context-realizing elements are present across all component parts of this speech as a macrostructure.

These three stages illustrated based on examples from Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech come one by one and reappear in this form throughout all speeches analyzed. The only difference identified is in the means that Netanyahu employs to realize each of the stages of this pattern, i.e. in the number and content of presuppositions,

implicatures and speech acts that differ depending on the range of the message, heterogeneity of his audience or the amount of background knowledge that his addressees share with him. In Part 2 of this chapter I will try to briefly illustrate these differences.

3. Discourse of conflict is a (flexible) macrostructure

This macro-criterion has already been partly fulfilled in the previous point, where I described three general stages of (re)contextualizing conflict in Netanyahu's inaugural address at the Knesset. Nonetheless, there are several other observations about the discourse of conflict that make it congruent with the properties of this macro-criterion.

Based on the assumption that in any genre both the standard and the novel structural and content-related elements are function carriers, all of which contribute to the accomplishment of the overall goal of this generic structure, in the discourse of conflict we can ascribe at least two (groups of) goals to the structural and content-related regularities of the text structures analyzed. The first group includes the goals that the speaker wants to achieve in the context of discursively (re)construed conflict, while the second group includes the goals that the speaker ascribes to the other side to this conflict⁸. In a nutshell, these two groups can be described as featuring contradictory goals of either **solving** or **maintaining** the conflict, i.e. in other words, neutralizing or intensifying it. Consider the following examples:

(16) Today, more than ever, Israel strives to achieve full peace with all the Arab and Muslim world.

(17) However, all its [radical Islam] different manifestations share one common objective – to wipe the State of Israel off the face of the earth.

(18) Those who want peace must fight terror. However, in order for there to be peace, the Palestinian partner must also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Over the past two decades, six Israeli prime ministers failed to achieve peace, and through no fault of their own. To the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, I say: if you truly want peace, peace can be obtained.

⁸ Obviously, these ascribed goals might not reflect the “real” goals of the other side to the conflict.

(19) My Government will act vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority to achieve peace on three parallel tracks: economic, security and political. We strive to assist with the accelerated development of the Palestinian economy and in developing its economic ties with Israel. We will support a Palestinian security mechanism that will fight terror, and we will conduct ongoing peace negotiations with the PA, with the aim of reaching a final status arrangement. We have no desire to control another people; we have no wish to rule over the Palestinians. In the final status arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authority needed to govern themselves, except those which threaten the existence and security of the State of Israel. This track – combining the economic, security and political – is the right way to achieve peace. All previous attempts to make shortcuts have achieved the opposite outcome and resulted in increased terror and greater bloodshed. We choose a realistic path, positive in approach and with a genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict between us and our neighbors.

As examples (16) and (17) illustrate, Netanyahu presents the Israeli side to the Israeli-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts as the one (and probably the only one) that explicitly declares the will to achieve peace. But does it really mean that the Israeli goal is to solve the conflict? To some extent yes, as on the one hand references to the Israeli dedication to achieve ‘peace’ (“genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict”) and to the initiatives planned by the Israeli government to foster it are quite frequent, but on the other hand it seems that this is peace on the Israeli terms only – and with no room for any major compromise⁹. Examples (16) and (17) well illustrate this discursively construed disparity of goals, as following a declaration of the Israeli commitment to peace, Netanyahu implicitly refers to Iran and its alleged will to “wipe the State of Israel off the face of the earth” as an implied reason for the lack of peace in the region. This, consequently, entails that the Israeli opponents – in this case Iran and other “radical regimes”– put much more effort into fighting and designing new

⁹ The idea that there is no room for compromise in the Israeli conditions for peace is triggered by a historical analogy that Netanyahu makes in example (19) by saying that “All previous attempts to make shortcuts have achieved the opposite outcome and resulted in increased terror and greater bloodshed”. The phrase “previous attempts to make shortcuts” presupposes the events of 2005, when Israel unilaterally withdrew from the south of the Gaza Strip and dismantled Gush Katif – a bloc of 21 settlements inhabited by over 8,000 Israelis. In 2006 Hamas won parliamentary elections on these territories and in the West Bank, and in 2007 two large synagogue buildings that remained there were transformed into a military base, where the Palestinian groups kept rockets to fire at Israeli cities and trained their members in conducting anti-Israeli attacks. In his 2009 United Nations General Assembly speech, Netanyahu directly referred to these events in the following words: “In 2005, hoping to advance peace, Israel unilaterally withdrew from every inch of Gaza. It dismantled 21 settlements and uprooted over 8,000 Israelis. We didn't get peace. Instead we got an Iranian backed terror base fifty miles from Tel Aviv. Life in Israeli towns and cities next to Gaza became a nightmare. You see, the Hamas rocket attacks not only continued, they increased tenfold.” (United Nations General Assembly, 24.09.2009).

weapons than into entering into peace negotiations. In examples (18) and (19), in turn, Netanyahu refers to the other conflict in which his country is engaged, the Israeli-Palestinian one, where the relations between the parties concerned are not that openly aggressive as in the previous examples, but again, it is the Israeli side that is presented as the one (and potentially the only one) that openly expresses the will to achieve peace and works as an active peace-initiator.

On balance, in all these four examples Israel presents its goals as oriented towards peace, and the goals of the other sides to the conflict as either actively (Iran) or passively (the Palestinians) opposing peace, what also illustrates my discussion in macro-criterion no. 1 above, where I claimed that the discourse of conflict (re)creates the dynamics of relations between the conflicted parties. Thus, as a regularity, it may be assumed that in the discourse of conflict the speaker will locate the (past, present or future) events taking place and the attitudes of the ‘us’ and the opposing parties on a conflict neutralization-conflict intensification scale and – as long as in such an arrangement the speaker’s side to the conflict is most likely to be presented as conflict-neutralizing – the other side(s) are most likely to be presented as conflict-intensifying. This, obviously, brings us again to the idea behind ideological polarization and the ideological square, i.e. the positive self-presentation and the negative other-presentation, both of which in the context of conflict lie at the foundations of presenting ‘us’ as those who suffer and are threatened by the situation, but, nonetheless, try to solve it, and ‘them’ as the aggressors who either actively intensify or passively maintain the conflict. This way, the speaker in the discourse of conflict accentuates the contradiction between the ‘us’ goals and the ‘them’ goals.

As far as the tools for creating this dichotomy of goals are concerned, my analysis revealed that the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict is realized by speech events/macro speech acts featuring the content and context of conflict – which in the case of Prime Minister Netanyahu include virtually any¹⁰ of the 250+ speeches delivered in the years of 2009-2014, including 21 speeches selected to illustrate my framework in this study. This, in turn, means that any of the 21 speech events/macro speech acts analyzed were oriented at the i) macro-goals postulated for the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, i.e. the ‘us’

¹⁰ This generalization is made based on what I mentioned in footnote 3 to macro-criterion 1, where I stated that following several years of researching the Israeli political discourse and, more recently, Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric, I can venture a claim that in virtually any situation (and in virtually any speech that he makes – again, irrespective of the occasion and the audience), he either openly talks about the Middle East conflict or refers to it through various types of inferences.

goal of **solving/neutralizing** the conflict and the ‘them’ goal of **maintaining/intensifying** the conflict, and at the ii) hyper-goal of the domain of political communication, i.e. legitimization of the speaker’s leadership and decisions – including those controversial ones¹¹. The components that worked for these goals on the level of individual speech events/macro speech acts, were essentially the well-known micropragmatic parameters such as deixis, speech acts, implicatures and presuppositions. Thus, as a matter of illustration of how these micropragmatic parameters build the speech event/macro speech act of Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech, and this way contribute to the formation of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, I would like to briefly discuss selected examples of deictic operation, implicatures, presuppositions and speech acts from this text structure:

Deictic operation

- (20) a. (...)We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants **who threaten to annihilate us**.
- b. (...)Terrorists from radical Islam **now threaten us from both the North and the South**. We are determined **to curb terrorism from all directions** and fight against it with all our might.
- c. (...)We choose a realistic path, positive in approach and with a genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict **between us and our neighbors**.

Example (20a) presents the way in which Netanyahu conceptualizes the closeness (expressed through the use of the Present Tense in verb phrases) of the ideological (i.e. axiological) threat caused to Israel from the outside – in this respect, Iran. A similar effect is triggered in (20b), where by saying that “terrorists from radical Islam now threaten us from both the North and the South” and that Israel is determined “to curb terrorism from all directions” Netanyahu refers to the spatial and temporal closeness of the territories of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon (the actual North to Israel) which are under the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah, and to the spatial and temporal closeness (again, expressed through the use of the Present Tense in verb phrases) of the (both ideological and physical) threats resulting from the fact that these two

¹¹ By controversial decisions I mean those Israeli initiatives that had triggered widespread criticism of the international community and that Netanyahu later attempted to legitimize in his speeches during subsequent United Nations General Assemblies. In the years 2009-2014 Israel received such widespread criticism for IDF attacks on the Gaza Strip conducted: 1) in 2009 as part of the 2008-2009 Gaza War under “Operation Cast Lead”, 2) in 2012 under “Operation Pillar of Defense”, and 3) in 2014 under “Operation Protective Edge”.

organization, just like Iran, openly disregard Israel as a state and are said to cooperate with each other in their fight against the Israeli statehood. Example (20c) is an illustration of the deictic closeness of the Palestinians who are referred to here as “neighbors” engaged in the ongoing conflict with Israel. This, in turn, implies that this conflict is also close in time and space, just as in the case of conflict with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, but its phase is different – since Netanyahu commits himself to taking a specific ‘path’ for peace, we may assume that he implies that there are prospects for ending the conflict with the Palestinians. On a larger scale, however, examples (20a), (20b), (20c) briefly illustrate that within the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict the belligerent parties have contradictory goals – Israel is conceptualized as oriented at achieving peace, while its opponents are conceptualized as contributing to the continuation of the struggle.

Implicatures

- (21)a. Those who want peace **must** fight terror.
- b. However, in order for there to be peace, the Palestinian partner **must** also fight terror, educate its children towards peace and prepare its people for recognizing Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.
- c. Over the past two decades, six Israeli prime ministers failed to achieve peace, **and through no fault of their own.**

In examples (21a) and (21b) implicatures are coded in the modal verb “must” and function as arguments supporting the general Netanyahu’s claim that the Palestinian side acts against the solution to the conflict, as it does not fight terror, does not educate about the necessity for peace in the region, and does not recognize Israel as a state. In example (21c), in turn, Netanyahu implies that it is not Israel that is to blame for (the continuation of) the Middle East conflict – and since it is not Israel, then it is probably the activity of the Palestinian Authority, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah that maintains/intensifies the antagonistic relations in the region. This way, these implicatures also function as a manifestation of the contradictory goals of Israel and its opponents construed in this discourse of conflict.

Presuppositions

- (22)a. The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime.

b. It is true that it [radical Islam] strives to eradicate all the Arab regimes and bring all Muslims in the world under an autocratic, narrow-minded, reactionary regime. It is also true that it threatens governments in the West and in the East with terrorism and deadly missiles.

In example (22a) and (22b) alike, Netanyahu presupposes that nuclear weapons are produced in the region and that they are designed and destined to be used by the Israeli opponents to target not only Israel, but also the entire Western world (here, referred to as “humanity”, “governments in the West and in the East”). This way, in both of these examples Netanyahu presupposes the existence of threat and strengthens this construal by a presupposition of impact, in which the development of the nuclear weapons and the ideological motivations of “radical Islam” are meant to evoke to effect of a forthcoming catastrophe that will take place not only on a local scale (i.e. in the “State of Israel”), but also on the global scene (anywhere where there is “humanity” or where there are “governments” and not “regimes”). In this respect, presuppositions discussed here effectively intensify the impression of antagonisms between the conflicted parties and, as such, they equally effectively reflect and build up their discursively (re)construed contradictory goals.

Assertion-directive link

(23) There is no more wondrous a journey in history than that of the Jewish people. There is no struggle more just than its struggle to return to its homeland and build a life here as a free and sovereign nation. There is no question mark, not about the right, not about the justice and not about the existence of the people of Israel and its country. There is no question mark, and [Directive segment] we will not allow anyone or any country to raise a question mark over our existence.

Example (23) illustrates a frequent pattern of speech acts within political discourse in general, i.e. the mechanism of “assertion-directive link” (Cap 2002). In this example we have a sequence of Netanyahu’s assertions about the legitimacy of the Jewish nation to have its state (and to have it on the territories of contemporary Israel), followed by a(n indirect) directive “we will not allow anyone or any country to raise a question mark over our existence”, in which Netanyahu sanctions the more controversial future act of rejecting any instances of questioning and attacking the Israeli state- or nationhood. This way, by referring to undeniable and historically accepted ideas, he establishes his credibility which is the key to the legitimization of his action and policies. The (indirect) directive in the very last sentence of example (23) also carries a presupposition that there are entities (most probably, Iran,

Hamas and Hezbollah) that currently question the Israeli right of “existence” – which, by the way, well illustrates that micropragmatic parameters may functionally overlap within one linguistic material.

On balance, drawing on the assumption that the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict features at least two contradictory (macro-)goals of either solving/neutralizing or maintaining/intensifying the conflict, it may be argued that starting from micropragmatic parameters, through the level of speech events/macro speech acts, all components of the macrostructure contribute to the accomplishment of these goals – and the hyper-goal of legitimization. Moreover, it may be assumed that this alleged (or actual?) disparity between the goals of the conflicted parties becomes another ground, based on which the speaker is able to further strengthen the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This, in turn, creates more context for the conflict itself and allows the speaker to effectively manage the positive self- image and the negative other- image.

As far as the idea of flexibility of this macrostructure is concerned, just as in the case of macro-criterion 2, this is a largely prototypical account of the discourse of conflict, so it is impossible to clearly define which structural and content- related elements of it are optional, since more studies in this and other discourses of conflict will have to be carried out to specify whether there are any novel elements introduced to this macrostructure in other settings, by other speakers or in other contexts of conflict. Irrespective of that, however, the category of goal(s) can be perceived as an obligatory element, because all micropragmatic parameters that appear in text structures are function carriers that contribute to the accomplishment of the macrostructure’s overall goal(s). This applies even if, as I have already mentioned in macro-criterion 2, the number and content of speech acts, presuppositions or implicatures in individual speech events/macro speech acts differs, as it may be different depending on the range of the message, heterogeneity of the audience or the background knowledge of the addressees.

4. Discourse of conflict is interrelated in and across social fields

As I have already illustrated in macro-criteria no. 1 and 2, where I discussed the role of context and the mechanisms of context-activation and context-realization, in the process of building the discourse of conflict the speaker is likely to draw on a number of contextual cues in order to trigger the impression of ubiquity and intrusiveness of conflict not only in the

domain of political life, but also in and across other social fields. Following on from that, in the texts structures we can find references to the physical and tangible dimension of conflict (e.g. accounts of armed confrontations or overt expressions of hostility), to other social fields that are directly or indirectly influenced by the ‘conflict’ (e.g. economy, education, social policy, etc.), and to social phenomena that are likely to trigger similar emotions in the addresses to those that the ‘conflict’ does (e.g. fear and insecurity associated with economic crisis, unemployment, problems with national or public security, etc.). Examples (1)-(3) presented in my discussion of macro-criterion no. 1 illustrated that in the 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech, alongside references to the Middle East conflict, Netanyahu discussed the issues of economic crisis in Israel, presenting it as (yet another) threat to the country’s stability, safety and integrity. Apart from that, this speech also includes references to the social fields of Israeli education (24) and public security (25):

(24) **It is time to carry out a real revolution in education.** We are the People of the Book. From the “Heder” students to Nobel Prize laureates, no nation has contributed more, relative to its size, to human knowledge and civilization. We cannot accept that our children will not be amongst the world’s leading students. Therefore, the goal we are setting today is to bring the children of Israel back to the world’s ten leading countries in international tests, within a decade.

(25) **We will also generate a fundamental change in public safety.** It was the Jewish people who bequeathed to the world the Commandments: thou shalt not steal, and thou shalt not kill. Even when we were scattered in exile, we maintained a high level of morality between man and man and between an individual and the community. It is therefore inconceivable that when we returned to being a free, sovereign nation in our homeland, crime organizations and criminal syndicates are emerging among us, dealing in theft, murder and trafficking in women, and fighting against each other with guns in the streets of our cities.

If both of these examples were treated in isolation from the remainder of the content, it would be impossible to find any links between them and the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, the clue to finding such a link are their opening sentences (in bold), both of which are direct calls to action that are to bring a state-strengthening “revolution” and “fundamental change” – something extremely important in terms of Israel’s survival and development, both, as a (geo)political entity and as a nation state of the Jewish people. As long as in examples (24) and (25) there are rather overt declarations, in the same speech – but several paragraphs earlier – Netanyahu resorts to the following, more indirect, call to action (in bold):

(26) It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust **the world's response to the calls by Iran's leader to destroy the State of Israel is weak, there is no firm condemnation and decisive measures – almost as if dismissed as routine.**

Here, the focus is on the Middle East conflict and this way – by means of yet another, but this time a less direct call to action – Netanyahu joins in his rhetoric all the domains of social life that are affected by the unstable situation in Israel, be that caused by the economic crisis, the Middle East conflict or the generally young age of the state of Israel that, in order to develop, has to reform its system. The idea behind these two different types of calls to action is that as long as Netanyahu sees the **internal** threats as under his control, in the case of the **external** threats he calls for – or, rather, demands – support from the outside, i.e. the international community. This way, he presents, both, the domestic and the external situation of Israel as unstable and puts forward an implied argument that the Middle East conflict poses the greatest threat, because it is an independent impact factor: it comes from the outside and cannot be resolved by Israel on its own.

Some might argue that the focus on domestic and foreign affairs, and the presence of 'calls to action' (including the speaker's commitment to take particular action) are typical properties of the genre of an inaugural address – yes, and this account by no means undermines this feature. Nevertheless, as of the analysis of 21 Netanyahu's speeches has shown, in his rhetoric – and in this discourse of conflict – treating this feature as common to the genre of an inaugural address *only* would be a major oversimplification. This is so, because virtually any of Netanyahu's UN General Assembly, AIPAC Policy Conference or Knesset speeches – none of which was an inaugural address – also includes: ample references to Israeli domestic and foreign affairs, a number of his commitments to do something to change the situation of the state and its position in the Middle East, and various 'calls to action' addressed to the international community, the leaders of the Palestinian Authority or the Presidents of Iran, among others. This brings us to a very important property¹² of the discourse of conflict: when we examine Netanyahu's speeches delivered in the course of six years of his premiership (2009-2014), we can see that a common feature of his public performances is presenting local (Israeli-internal and regional) events as events of global

¹² This property is visible not only in the discourse of this conflict, but also in the American war-on-terror discourse, where G.W. Bush frequently evoked the globality of the terrorist threat to legitimize the military anti-terrorist operations conducted in Afghanistan and Pakistan following the 9/11 attacks (cf. Cap 2013)

range of influence – and the other way round, that is, global events as directly related to what is going on inside Israel and in its Middle East neighborhood. This way, for six years of premiership, Benjamin Netanyahu has created a peculiar way of talking about Israel: his international audiences in the UN headquarters or mainly American audiences at the AIPAC Policy Conferences are discursively transferred to Israel, to experience the same hardships and threat that the Israeli citizens do. Similarly, his Israeli audiences are referred to as citizens of the Western world, i.e. the world of democratic standards and values, who are engaged into the Middle East conflict and surrounded by “barbarism” and “fanaticism” against their will and might.

Another aspect of the interconnectedness of discourse of conflict in and across social fields is related to the use of intertextuality and the resulting persuasive potential behind recontextualization of intertextual references. In Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech there are several such references: one of them has already been present in example (22), where Netanyahu recontextualized the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s statement as an overt call to destroy Israel. Other examples of intertextuality in this speech include, for example, quotes from the Israeli Declaration of Independence¹³:

(27) “The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to its land and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.”

And quotes from a letter that Netanyahu received from his brother, Yonatan, who was killed during a military operation in Entebbe, Uganda:

(28) “I always saw it as our most wonderful holiday; it is an age-old holiday celebrating freedom. As I sail backwards on the wings of history, I travel through long years of suffering, of oppression, of slaughter, of ghettos, of ostracism, of humiliation; many years that, from an historic perspective, do not contain one ray of light; but that is not the case because of the fact that the core remained, hope existed, the idea of freedom continued to burn through the fulfillment of the tradition of the ancient holiday. This, in my opinion, is

¹³ This quote from the Israeli Declaration of Independence was already presented in example (10), but due to the fact that in this point I am illustrating the realization of another macro-criterion characterizing political genres in the discourse of conflict, I decided to present it here once again and as a separate example in (27).

a testament to the eternalness of the aspiration for freedom in Israel, the continuity of the idea of freedom.”

These intertextual references are strategically intertwined into the speech in order to support arguments given by the speaker: excerpt in (27) serves as a justification of the Israel's right to have its state in the same territory as described in the Bible, while the excerpt in (28) is meant to illustrate that Netanyahu's deceased brother, a commander of the elite Israeli army unit Sayeret Matkal who fought in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, was one of many Israelis who actively supported (i.e. fought for) the Israeli independence and never stopped to believe in the right of Israel to be a sovereign state.

This way, Netanyahu's speech assimilated elements of other genres¹⁴ – a declaration of independence and a private letter – to strategically strengthen the power of his message. This power lies at the intersection of the content of these two intertextual references and the discursively construed reality of the Middle East conflict in which the Iranian President openly calls for the destruction of Israel, while the Palestinian Authority openly rejects to recognize it as a state in general and the nation state of the Jewish people in particular.

The role intertextuality plays in political discourse and, consequently, in the discourse of conflict is closely linked to ideology and the issue of political myths. Intertextual references are very productive in carrying non-rational messages, the function of which is to promote particular ideology. What is ideological, is inherently cognitive, i.e. connected with representing and acting in the world in a particular manner: individuals decide on beliefs, ideas and values that form their ideology, while politicians define their leadership and political activity based on these ideological frameworks. This, in turn, is related to the role of political myths that politicians construct and/or adopt to legitimize themselves. Geiss (1987: 29) describes a political myth as “an empirical, but usually not verifiable, explanatory thesis that presupposes a simple causal theory of political events and enjoys wide public support”. Because of this ‘wide public support’, political myths easily integrate with public opinion and are rarely immediately questioned.

¹⁴ In other speeches Netanyahu makes a number of intertextual references. Apart from those that I have mentioned in macro-criterion no. 2, i.e. the founder of Zionism Theodore Herzl or Zionist authority figures such as Moshe Hess, authority figures such as David Ben Gurion, Yitzhak Rabin, Uri Zvi Greenberg or Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Israeli legal acts such as 1992 Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty, Biblical prophets, etc. there are numerous references to Holocaust, World War II, quotes from Winston Churchill or Ronald Reagan, words or proverbs in Hebrew, etc. In Part 2 I shall provide a more detailed illustration of how they were intertwined into the 21 speeches analyzed.

On every political scene there exist particular political myths that are frequently used and have become common to its participants and audiences. Some of these myths are popular not only in one particular country, but also internationally, because they function universally – beyond national and cultural borders. Edelman (cit. in Geiss 1987: 54) distinguished three such political myths:

1. The myth of the Conspirational Enemy,
2. The Valiant Leader myth,
3. The United We Stand myth.

These three originated from the American political discourse, but the Israeli political discourse – including the discourse of conflict analyzed in this dissertation – appropriates their elements under the myth of the Chosen People which is deeply rooted in the national consciousness of the Jews and readily used by Israeli politicians, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Although considerations of this myth go beyond the main scope of this study, in Part 2 I will briefly point to how Netanyahu recalls the idea of the Jewish chosenness in the speeches analyzed.

5. Discourse of conflict manifests hierarchies of behavioral patterns

In the discourse of conflict, just as in the case of some well-established political genres, there are some more or less stable interpersonal roles assigned to the conflicted parties. These roles feature some patterns of behavior that in the case of Netanyahu's 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech, are rather fixed¹⁵. Consider the following examples:

(29) It is not with the elation of the victorious that I stand before you today, but rather with a feeling of heavy responsibility.

(30) I speak out of a feeling of concern, but also of hope and faith, and mostly in recognition of the seriousness of this challenging hour.

¹⁵ As long as in the analyzed text structure, the roles and patterns of behavior are fixed, and they essentially remained fixed across 21 speeches of Benjamin Netanyahu covering six years of his premiership, it is possible that they might change in the future. This was the case with another discourse of conflict, that is, the Iraq War, where following the execution of Saddam Hussein Iraq became the “ally”, and the discourse of conflict was focused on terrorist groups operating in Iraq (Cap 2006, 2008, 2010).

(31) I intend to personally lead this change of direction. I will be the one to navigate Israel's economic strategy.

(32) To the Arab citizens of Israel I wish to say: you will find in me a loyal partner to your integration into Israel's society and economy.

Examples (29)-(32) are all related to the role Netanyahu takes up as the Israeli Prime Minister: he sees himself as a humble representative of the Jewish people, who is required to lead the state of Israel through many changes and difficult challenges caused by the political and economical situation in the region. There is no mention of violence, force or coercion on his part in these endeavors.

When it comes to other roles in the conflict, example (28) also shows what roles and patterns of behavior Netanyahu assigns to the Arabs living in Israel – he refers to them as “partners”, but probably only with respect to those who are willing to integrate into the Israeli society and economy to an extent that is expected from them. A similar case applies to the Palestinians, who are also referred to as “partner” (see examples (18) and (19) in macro-criterion no. 3), but it seems that below this surface Netanyahu sees them as passive opponents who either do not want or do not know how to behave in order to put an end to the conflict. This impression is further strengthened by the following statement:

(33) Over the past two decades, **six Israeli prime ministers failed to achieve peace, and through no fault of their own.** To the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, I say: if you truly want peace, peace can be obtained.

The phrase in bold in example (33) additionally underlines the Israeli and the Palestinian roles in the conflict: again, Israel is presented as the most active and productive initiator of peace in the region, whose efforts are wasted by the implied unrealistic or harmful expectations of the Palestinian side to the conflict and by their passivity in the peace process that I described earlier.

When it comes to Iran and the previously mentioned “radical regimes”, Netanyahu refers to them in the following words:

(34) The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime.

(35) We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us.

(36) It is true that it strives to eradicate all the Arab regimes and bring all Muslims in the world under an autocratic, narrow-minded, reactionary regime.

Examples (34)-(36) illustrate that this side to the Middle East conflict is presented as being motivated by hatred and unrealistic visions that incite it to attack and damage Israel both ideologically and physically. This way, it seems that, as of 2009, Iran and other “radical regimes” are presented as most dangerous actors in the conflict between Israel and other countries in the region, since they are presented as having the same intentions and premises as the Nazis (implied by the use of the verb “to annihilate” in example (35)), so they pose a threat comparable to the one of Holocaust.

As a result, based on this particular speech it may be assumed that the discourse of this conflict entails the existence of the following prototypical roles of all parties involved:

The role of an **active victim**: Israel

The role of an **active offender**: Iran, other “radical regimes”, terrorist organizations

The role of a **passive offender**: the Palestinians outside Israel

The role of an **arbiter/a supporter**: the international community (e.g. the USA, the United Nations¹⁶, the European Union; although in this particular example neither of these two is explicitly referred to)

The role of a **passive participant**: the Palestinians inside Israel

The role of an **active victim**: the Israeli citizens

Obviously, this division of roles (and patterns of behavior they feature) does not entail that all parties to the conflict have equal influence on how the conflict itself is discursively (re)construed. Quite the contrary: it is only the speaker that has this power, so in the case of the materials analyzed in this study, it will always be the Israeli side only – and only the speaker of this side¹⁷, the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – actively realizes and

¹⁶ The role ascribed to the United Nations is probably the only one that underwent partial reconstruction in the years 2009-2014. As I have mentioned in one of my footnotes to macro-criterion no 2, following a highly critical Gaza report issued in 2009 by the United Nations Human Rights Council, Netanyahu started presenting this particular body of the UN as an active or passive offender of Israel and the “Western values”. This conceptualization later also ranged to those UN bodies and representatives that, for example, did not leave the room during the 2009 General Assembly speech of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or chose Lebanon to preside over the UN Security Council in 2011. I shall briefly illustrate that in Part 2 of this chapter.

¹⁷ A thought-provoking supplement to the panorama of the discourse of the Middle East conflict would come from an analysis of the speeches of the Palestinian or Iranian leaders

develops this discourse of conflict. Notwithstanding this fact, I believe that the following general rule would still apply: the discourse of conflict assigns interpersonal roles (and patterns of behavior), but it is solely the person of the speaker that deals the cards, i.e. these roles. Other parties to the conflict are quasi-present: although they are in this or another way involved in the extra-linguistic dimension of conflict, in its discursive dimension they either have no voice at all, or have it only to the extent chosen by the speaker and for the sake of goals that this speaker wants to achieve.

These considerations inevitably lead us to the strategy of “The Fairy Tale of the Just War” that Lakoff (1991) developed on the basis of the analysis of metaphors employed in the rhetoric of the Gulf War – which is another example of the discourse of conflict:

Cast of characters: A villain, a victim, and a hero. The victim and the hero may be the same person.

The scenario: A crime is committed by the villain against an innocent victim (typically an assault, theft, or kidnapping). The offence occurs due to an imbalance of power and creates a moral imbalance. The hero either gathers helpers or decides to go it alone. The hero makes sacrifices; he undergoes difficulties, typically making an arduous heroic journey, sometimes across the sea to a treacherous terrain. The villain is inherently evil, perhaps even a monster, and thus reasoning with him is out of the question. The hero is left with no choice but to engage the villain in battle. The hero defeats the villain and rescues the victim. The moral balance is restored. Victory is achieved. The hero, who always acts honorably, has proved his manhood and achieved glory. The sacrifice was worthwhile. The hero receives acclaim, along with the gratitude of the victim and the community. (Lakoff 1991 cit. in Nerlich et al. 2002)

Although the roles and patterns of behavior specified under “The Fairy Tale of the Just War” scenario bear only some resemblance to those specified by Prime Minister Netanyahu, they well illustrate the mechanism of ideological polarization which seems to be a necessary element of any war-/conflict- related rhetoric. The setting in which the participants interact, i.e. a military-political conflict, is conceived of and conceptualized as a fairy tale narrative about the struggle between good and evil. Consequently, people involved in it adopt the roles typical of fairy tale characters engaged in such a struggle, that is, roles which clearly marked as positive (a hero) and negative (a villain); active (a hero, a villain) and passive (a victim). Such a conceptualization allows for a glorification of a political leader who is ‘a hero’ forced by circumstances to take action to save a particular social group – ‘a victim’ – from the danger caused by ‘a villain’. In this arrangement, all negative qualities are ascribed to

delivered in the years 2009-2014 or, to narrow the scope down, their speeches surrounding some key events on the timeline of this conflict, such as 2008-2009 Gaza War or the imposition of USA, UN or EU sanctions against Iran. Then we could see whether these roles are reversed or – perhaps – simply different?

'a villain' exclusively, letting the audience evaluate the morality or ethics of all characters in relation to the villain.

The arsenal of roles and patterns of behavior in Netanyahu's rhetoric is, of course, more developed than the one in "The Fairy Tale of the Just War", but both of these arrangements share two important properties: first, the persuasive potential of conceptualizing a political conflict in black and white ideological terms (as a conflict of polarized interests and values) and, second, the legitimization of the leader's words, decision and actions in the course of this (ideological) battle.

Part 2. 5 micro-criteria characterizing political genres

1. Discourse of conflict is defined based on, both, discursive and contextual properties

To test the validity of this micro-criterion to my data, in the course of the analysis of all 21 speeches of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu I paid special attention to the micro-context of each of the speeches and, most importantly, to **whether** – and if so, **how** – the speaker uses it to activate and realize the macro-context of the Middle East conflict. This has been done with the following motivation: if the instances of this mechanism appear repeatedly in other speeches (possibly, across the entire corpus), it might be assumed that, as a whole, they contribute to the formation a larger abstraction that exists above and beyond individual text structures (and individual micro-contexts). This larger abstraction is, essentially, the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, which gets realized in specific structural regularities (in this case, individual text structures) and content-related regularities (in this case, references to various aspects of the Middle East conflict). In this vein, I incorporated a bottom-up approach of looking for the content-related regularities in speeches delivered over a period of time, in different settings and in front of different audiences, which I controlled top-down, having assumed that whenever such regularities appear, they contribute to the formation of the macrostructure that exists in the macro-context of the Middle-East conflict – and, potentially, might have some explanatory power for the discourses of other conflicts as well.

The analysis of data has revealed a number of such content-related regularities that appeared repeatedly in different micro-contexts, over a period of time (2009-2014) and in front of various (types of) audiences inside and outside Israel, and in each case, specific elements of particular micro-contexts were used by PM Benjamin Netanyahu as ‘anchorage points’ that enabled him to activate and realize the larger context of a particular idea or an aspect related to the Middle East conflict. Additionally, I can venture a claim that this common property of all the text structures in the corpus could be best described by the same observation that I made with respect to Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech analyzed in Part 1: just as in this particular text structure, in the remaining 20 Netanyahu’s speeches, the Middle East conflict was effectively brought by the speaker from the contextual

background to the foreground, and, as a result, it encompassed both the context and the content of all text structures analyzed.

When it comes to the exact content-related regularities shared by all Netanyahu's speeches, they are all organized around two governing ideas of this discourse of conflict, which – as we will see – develop over time and across different audiences, that is: the recognition of the Israeli statehood and the security of Israel. This way, all the content-related regularities that were identified are either explicitly or implicitly linked to these two ideas, making them two main legitimization premises in Netanyahu's 2009-2014 rhetoric. This, in turn, revealed itself in a massive number of examples illustrating the speaker's commitment to these recurrent themes, some of which occupy as much as several paragraphs of a particular speech in a row, and recur in this form in other speeches. Regrettably, it is impossible to discuss such a large number (and volume) of examples here, so in an attempt to provide a more synthesized account, I have decided to organize my discussion in this section in the following way: first, in subsection 1.1, I will describe all the regularities that appeared in different micro-contexts, pointing to those that were developed by the speaker over time. This descriptive account will enable me to gather observations resulting from the analysis of all speeches in the corpus in one place, catering for, both, their common properties and idiosyncrasies – the latter of which, I believe, well-illustrate that the existence of some differences does not disqualify (this) discourse of conflict from being a potentially new political genre. Second, in subsection 1.2, I will present some of the regularities described in 1.1 based on several speeches, which I considered as particularly interesting manifestations of the mechanism described in this micro-criterion and, thus, deserving a more detailed presentation than just a mere description. These are speeches that Netanyahu delivered on various occasions in Israel, because, as the analysis has shown, this is where he had the most diverse micro-contexts with the most diverse 'anchorage points' to activate and realize the macro-context of the Middle East conflict – and to do it in a way that remained congruent with the general trend manifested by the remainder of the corpus.

Before I move on to these two ways of presenting the results, I would like to make one general remark about the mechanism of activating and realizing the macro-context of the Middle East conflict in each of the micro-contexts analyzed: in every single speech and in the case of every single content-regularity identified, this mechanism has been performed through, essentially (and obviously), discursive means. This entails that the large number and volume of examples illustrating particular content-related regularities translates into a large number of specific linguistic tools such as implicatures, presuppositions, patterns of speech

acts, etc. that Netanyahu used in this vein. These tools, however, will only be signaled here, since in this particular section I focus more on the specific aspects of the macro-context that these and other devices activated and realized in Netanyahu's speeches. A detailed account of them will be provided immediately after this section, in my discussion of micro-criterion no 2 below, because this is where I explore the micropragmatic constituents of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict and comment on the use and function of forced construals, intertextual references and historical analogy in communicating messages under the recurrent themes identified.

1.1.Content-related regularities in the entire corpus

Netanyahu's speeches analyzed manifested content-related regularities entailing repeatable activation and realization of the following aspects of the Middle East conflicts:

1. premises legitimizing the existence of the state of Israel, its territorial area and the capital in Jerusalem,
2. mutual recognition of statehood of Israel and the Palestinians as the proposed solution to the Middle East conflict,
3. non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by Israeli opponents (the Palestinians, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, ISIS) as the root of the Middle East conflict, the reason of deadlock in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, the motivation behind the Palestinian hostility towards Israel (e.g. manifested through Bil'in demonstrations¹⁸); also, non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,

¹⁸ Bil'in is a Palestinian village located in the central West Bank, around 12 kilometers from Ramallah, the administrative capital of the State of Palestine. Since February 2005 Bil'in is the venue of weekly protests against the ongoing construction of the Israeli West Bank separation barrier that restricts the movement of the Palestinians in this territory and is said to annex some of the Palestinian land. Bil'in weekly protests take the form of mass marches from the village to the fence, with crowds of people attempting to stop the construction and dismantle the existing parts of the barrier. In each case, the protesters are halted by the Israel security forces, which leads to the eruption of mutual physical violence and the use of various weapons (rubber bullets, tear gas, stones, etc.). In the course of nine years, Bil'in demonstrations have attracted large media attention and support from various international organization. In 2013, the then Palestinian Authority PM Salam Fayyad said that these protests have become "a shining example of popular resistance against the occupation, the settlements and the fence" (quote from an article on Fayyad's visit to the Bil'in demonstration

4. threats to the existence and security of the state of Israel as a result of: terrorist activity of Hamas, Hezbollah and ISIS, development of nuclear weapons in Iran, the Arab Spring and post-Arab Spring destabilization of the Middle East,
5. post-factum legitimization of military actions taken by Israel (e.g. Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, Operation Protective Edge) as self-defense,
6. accounts of attempts of international forces to externally stimulate the resolution of the Middle East conflict (featuring mostly unsuccessful ones and those that included criticism of Israel, e.g. UN Security Council report on Gaza War; successful accounts were limited mostly to the American or Italian initiatives supporting Israel),
7. accounts of peace-oriented initiatives taken by Israel (e.g. calls to the Palestinians to begin direct negotiations, liquidation of checkpoints and roadblock, territorial withdrawals, plans for or execution of settlement construction moratorium, investments into increasing life standards of the Arab citizens of Israel, building Israeli field hospitals, etc.)

The points on this list relate to various content-related regularities that appeared across all speeches analyzed that Netanyahu delivered the years 2009-2014, inside and outside Israel, and in front of diverse audiences. What is important, as far as individual speeches are concerned, on the one hand there were cases in which the speaker covered all seven points from the list above, but on the other hand, there were also speeches, in which only selected aspects were explored. To illustrate, on balance, the greatest and the most multidimensional group of content-related regularities was identified in Netanyahu's 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech and in his 2010, 2011 and 2013 Knesset Winter Session Opening speeches. This might be motivated by two reasons. First, by the fact that all these addresses have had major press coverage inside and outside Israel, this way enabling the speaker to communicate messages covering all the topics that he deems important and representative of the Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict. Second, the specific micro-context of these two types of speeches delivered in Israel was potentially most flexible in providing the speaker with 'anchorage points' for all the seven content-related regularities from the list, as the Knesset Swearing In speech and the Knesset Session Opening speeches were (sub)types of the genre of an inaugural address, where the speaker can cover a range of topics.

published in The Times of Israel on March 1, 2013; article available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-soldier-lightly-wounded-in-west-bank/>, last retrieved November 22, 2014).

Other speeches delivered by Netanyahu in the Knesset, for example, during the Knesset Session in Honor of the PM of Italy Silvio Berlusconi, the Knesset Herzl Day or Jerusalem Day celebrations were less diversified in terms of content-related regularities listed above, but this seems to result from the limitations imposed by their micro-contexts which provided the speaker with less ‘anchorage points’ to elaborate to in relation to the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, these ‘anchorage points’ still were there – even if only a few; to illustrate, such an anchorage point for Netanyahu in his speech to Silvio Berlusconi visiting the Knesset were the Italian-Jewish historical relations and mutual ideological inspirations, having discussed which Netanyahu established common ground between Israel and Italy that he used to outline the importance of Zionism and the Jewish national revival in the pursuit of Israeli statehood. Following this, he mentioned Berlusconi’s long-lasting support for Israel, expressing his gratitude for Berlusconi’s initiative to include Hamas on the European Union’s list of terror organizations, his criticism of the Goldstone Report and boycott of the Second Durban Conference¹⁹, and, finally, his calls to the international community to target the threat of a nuclear Iran – this way briefly recontextualizing points 3-6 from the list above. As we will see in section 1.2 below, also the rather limited micro-context of occasions such as official celebrations of national holidays in Israel, still provided Netanyahu with enough ‘anchorage points’ to skillfully bring some major aspects of the Middle East conflict to the foreground of his speeches.

Coming back to the general discussion of the workings of these 7 content-related regularities in the speeches analyzed, there is one particularly interesting observation that I would like to make. It is related to the issue of Iran’s non-recognition of the Israeli statehood and, most importantly, to the issue of the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. Although these specific aspects of the Middle East conflict (covered by points 3 and 4 above) were frequently recontextualized by Netanyahu in his speeches delivered in the Knesset, the analysis of his 2009-2014 UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference speeches revealed major domination of this topic – especially from 2012²⁰ on. This peculiarity is even

¹⁹ The “Second Durban Conference”, i.e. the United Nations World Conference against Racism organized in 2009 in Switzerland, was boycotted by the USA and seven other countries including Italy based on their concerns that Arab countries would again (like 8 years before) demand denunciation of Israel and insist that all criticism of Islam be banned. During the 2001 edition of this event organized in Durban, South Africa, Canada, the USA and Israel walked out of the rooms when Arab states submitted a draft resolution criticizing Israel and equating Zionism with racism.

²⁰ In this respect, year 2012 can be treated as a particularly interesting point of Netanyahu’s discourse of conflict and the issues of activation and realization of the “threat of nuclear Iran”

more remarkable when we consider that, for example, the time span between Netanyahu's speech at the Knesset and his speech at the UN General Assembly was only 2-4 weeks long. There are at least two potential explanations for this difference: first, Netanyahu's speeches during events with large press coverage and international audiences/addressees (UN representatives or – in the case of AIPAC Policy Conference – American Pro-Israeli lobbyists, American Congressmen and, as in 2012, even the American President Barack Obama) were dominated by the Iranian issue to proximize the nuclear threat as one with global range and to persuade the international community to set an ultimatum for the Iranian nuclear program – notwithstanding President Obama's disagreement to do it. The second explanation relates specifically to the micro-context of the UN General Assembly and the fact that Netanyahu delivered his speeches after the speeches of the Iranian Presidents: in 2009 and 2011²¹ one day after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speeches, in 2013 and 2014 several days after President Hassan Rouhani's speeches to the UN. Probably for this reason, in each of these cases, Netanyahu devoted the majority of his address to commenting on the content of the Iranian Presidents speeches, recontextualising their words in order to delegitimize²² them almost immediately in front of the same audiences. At the same time, these specific references to their speeches also served as 'anchorage points' that Netanyahu used to activate and realize other aspects of the Middle East conflict manifested by the content-related regularities listed above, repeatedly referring to the topic of, for example, non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by the Palestinians and the considerable Israel's vulnerability to attacks of various terrorist organizations operating, both, regionally and globally.

theme in front of the 2012 UN General Assembly audiences. It was this particular speech, in which Netanyahu called for setting an ultimatum ("a clear red line") for the Iranian nuclear program and equated Iran (as "the world's most dangerous terrorist regime") with al-Qaeda (as "the world's most dangerous terrorist organization"). The trend represented by this specific speech (domination of the topic of "the threat of nuclear Iran" over other content-related regularities) was then very much followed by Netanyahu's 2013 and 2014 UN speeches, as each of these speeches features all the 7 points listed above, but with major prevalence of the topic of Iranian nuclear program and potential consequences of the use of its weapons.

²¹ The 2011 and 2012 UN speeches also included a number of quotes from the Palestinian President Abbas' UN speech (delivered the day before), which Netanyahu recontextualized in order to invoke larger accounts of the Israeli peace-oriented initiatives that the Palestinian side did not – in the Israeli PM's opinion – seize or to discuss non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by the Palestinians as the core reason of the conflict since 1948.

²² I will illustrate this in more detail my discussion of micro-criteria 2, 3 and 4, as this topic essentially relates to the specific linguistic devices that Netanyahu strategically used to delegitimize Iranian leaders and explicitly or implicitly activate and realize this specific aspect of the Middle East conflict, and to the goals of (this) discourse of conflict.

Interestingly, Netanyahu's AIPAC Policy Conference speeches delivered in the same years as the UN General Assembly speeches followed similar patterns, but with only one exception – a speech that Netanyahu delivered during AIPAC on March, 6, 2012, six months before his “red line” speech to the UN. Surprising as it is, this is the only speech in the entire corpus, in which Netanyahu does not refer to the Palestinians. Instead, he focuses on the “nuclear Iran” and uses very much the same linguistic devices to activate and realize this specific aspect of the Middle East conflict that he used half a year later during the UN General Assembly – this we will see based on selected examples in section 3 below. Still, however, the remaining points from the list of content-related regularities are covered, i.e. Netanyahu talks about premises legitimizing the existence of the state of Israel, local and global dimensions of threat to Israeli security, issues of Israeli self-defense and the crucial role of the Israeli-American alliance. But why does Netanyahu devote virtually entire speech to the “nuclear armed Iran”? The answer is simple: two days before, on March 4, 2012, President Barack Obama delivered a speech at the AIPAC Policy Conference, during which he stressed the importance of diplomacy, sanctions and time in solving the Iranian nuclear issue, which Netanyahu received with rather mixed feelings, as he expected a firmer and more supportive stance of the American President. The exact thing that he expected was probably a clear American declaration to take (or to join Israel in taking) military action against Iran if it exceeds the set limits of enriching uranium, so in the absence of such a declaration, Netanyahu might have decided to elaborate on the potential consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by Iran to signal that solutions proposed by Obama might be ineffective – which he skillfully did in several points of the speech. Additionally, this is probably the reason why six month later in the UN, Netanyahu called for an ultimatum for Iran to relinquish its nuclear program.

Another link between this speech and the speeches that I commented on earlier lies in its specific micro-context. Just as in the case of Netanyahu's 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014 UN speeches, in the case of his 2012 AIPAC speech the content-related regularities concerning Iran had their ‘anchorage points’ in speeches delivered by key actors in the conflict short time before particular Netanyahu's addresses. The 2012 AIPAC speech, however, is in this respect different from the UN speeches in terms of the intensity of impact of Netanyahu's recontextualization of Obama's words, as obviously the Israeli PM expressed his criticism much more diplomatically than in the case of the Presidents of Iran, which he did this way in order not to imperil the Israeli-American relations – and, most importantly, the general

political and financial American support which is undeniably important for Israel in the Middle East conflict.

Notwithstanding this one exceptional Netanyahu's address, all the remaining 2009-2014 UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference speeches in the corpus of my analysis featured all the 7 content-related regularities which I listed at the beginning of this section. In search for their 'anchorage points', apart from those that I have already mentioned in my discussion of four UN Netanyahu's speeches (2009, 2011, 2013, 2014) and his 2012 AIPAC Policy Conference address, there were also several other interesting elements of the micro-contexts of these events that Netanyahu strategically made use of to bring the Middle East conflict to the foreground of his speeches by activating and realizing particular aspects of its macro-context. To illustrate, in the case of the UN, he would refer to its mission as an organization that was founded after WWII to prevent similar atrocities from happening in the future, based on which he would make elaborated historical analogies between the threats to Israel that started – and continue – since 1948 and those that had materialized earlier, as a result of the Nazi ideology. Alternatively, in times of harsh UN criticism of Israel, he would pick instances when the Israeli opponents and/or representatives of countries associated with terrorism and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law headed various UN bodies²³, based on which he would elaborate on the past and current instances of hostility of these countries towards Israel. On balance, however, in each case also the general idea behind the micro-context of a General Assembly as a meeting of a body concerned with international peace and security immediately provided Netanyahu with an 'anchorage point' which has been grounded in the lack of stable peace and security in the Middle East, including the post-Arab Spring further destabilization of this region.

The same applies to the micro-context of each AIPAC Policy Conference, as the 'anchorage points' for Netanyahu's major coverage of the Middle East conflict in his speeches delivered there are also "right there" in the very mission and scope of this event. As we read at the official AIPAC website, the committee of this conference openly declares itself as Pro-Israeli activists concerned with "impact for Israel's future"²⁴ – this way, the micro-

²³ These include, for example, 2003 when Libya chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights and Iraq headed the UN Committee on Disarmament (with Iran as the co-chair of the UN Conference of the UN Disarmament in Geneva) or 2011 when Lebanon presided over the UN Security Council.

²⁴ Quoted directly from the official website of the AIPAC Conference registration for the 2015 edition of this event available at: <http://www.aipac.org/act/attend-events/policy-conference> (last retrieved November 21, 2014).

context of each of the AIPAC Policy Conferences together with the general fact that the Middle East conflict has remained unresolved for over sixty years also, as if automatically, provided Netanyahu with numerous opportunities to communicate content that followed all the seven patterns listed at the beginning of this section.

1.2. Illustration of the mechanism of using the micro-contexts of the speeches to activate and realize the macro-context of the Middle East conflict

As I have mentioned in the short introduction to this section, several speeches that Netanyahu delivered on various occasions in Israel have turned out to have particularly interesting ‘anchorage points’ of their micro-contexts that the Israeli PM used to activate and realize the macro-context of the Middle East conflict. Although, as we will see, these speeches might not necessarily include all seven content-related regularities listed in section 1.1., they well-illustrate how Netanyahu could skillfully (and strategically) use various bits and pieces of micro-context to direct the attention of his addressees/audiences there where he exactly wanted.

My discussion starts with two speeches, the micro-context of which were 2009 and 2010 Special Knesset Sessions Commemorating Late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The first of these two speeches – the one delivered on October 29, 2009 – possesses some typical properties of a ‘commemoration’ genre: Netanyahu vastly comments on the positive traits of the late former Israeli PM and presents his activity as a major contribution to the Israeli independence in events that are perceived as the Israeli highlights in the Middle East conflict. Example (37), which is in fact the very opening paragraph of the 2009 speech, well-illustrates these micro-contextual properties:

(37) Yitzhak Rabin was the quintessential “sacra” – idolized commander of the Hare Brigade during the War of Independence, victorious IDF commander of the Six-Day War, highly regarded ambassador to the United States, the first native-born Israeli to serve as prime minister, a leader who strove for peace – and achieved it with Jordan, “Mr. Security”. (B. Netanyahu, October 29, 2009)

These get intensified at the point, at which Netanyahu refers to Rabin’s assassination that took place 14 years before:

(38) On that night that none of us will ever forget – and that will always be part of our nation’s history – on the night of November 4th, a despicable murderer aimed his gun at the Prime Minister’s exposed back. **On that night, an Israeli patriot was vanquished by a murderer who fired a bullet at the heart of the nation.** (B. Netanyahu, October 29, 2009)

In the context of these events, Rabin’s activity as a military and a politician is presented as exemplary patriotism that gets culminated in his assassination, but to grasp the connection between these events and the Middle East conflict, a bit more background knowledge is required. Yitzhak Rabin was shot by an Israeli ultra national activist Yiga Amir who opposed to the signing of the Oslo Accords and several other peace initiatives taken by the then Israeli government, because he perceived the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank as a denial of the biblical heritage that Jews reclaimed by building their settlements there. Although all these events are related to the past – and to the past phases of the conflict and the peace process – Netanyahu recontextualizes them in probably the most important paragraph of this speech, where he relates Rabin’s death to the current reality inside Israel – and, most importantly, the current (2009) phase of the conflict:

(39) **Fourteen years have passed since then** and I believe that the vast majority of the public has internalized the lessons of tolerance and restraint. Our conduct in difficult situations over the past few years proves this true. **But** there are still a few among us who are unwilling to accept democratic decisions and the primacy of law. They do not represent the majority of Israelis. They are a small, insignificant minority. **But** we have already witnessed the power of a single murderer and the damage he can cause. (B. Netanyahu, October 29, 2009)

The first two sentences of the excerpt in example (39) are Netanyahu’s post-factum legitimization of the internationally criticized “Operation Cast Lead”/Gaza War that I already commented on in Part 1 of this chapter, which was officially legitimized as an act of Israeli self-defense in response to rockets targeting Israeli civilians that were fired from the Gaza Strip. By the use of implicatures (both triggered by “but” marked in bold above), Netanyahu extends this context and, through a historical analogy, compares²⁵ those who (now) dissent over the rationale for the Gaza War to Rabin’s assassin (fourteen years earlier). The implied

²⁵ The comparison of his/Likud’s critics to the Rabin’s assassin in this speech implies another comparison – one in which Netanyahu compares himself to Yitzhak Rabin; nevertheless, this is quite a peculiar link, as initially, the Likud party (led in the years 1993-1999 by Netanyahu) also widely criticized Rabin’s stance in the Middle East conflict and rejected the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank as a removal from the Jewish tradition.

addressees of the message are, potentially, some Members of Knesset from the Kadima party, which in Netanyahu's opinion "failed during the Second Lebanon War and in the current conflict with Gaza militants."²⁶

The same pattern is followed by a speech delivered by Netanyahu in the same place and on the same occasion, but a year later, on October 20, 2010. This time, however, Netanyahu relies on a different type of intertextual references in his 'commemoration': instead of listing Rabin's merits, for the majority of the speech he quotes excerpts from the last pre-assassination speech that Rabin delivered in the Knesset in 1995. The most important feature of these quotes is that they are all related to the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian/the Israeli-Arab conflict through: providing arguments legitimizing the right of the Jews to have their state on the current territory of Israel (as in example (40) below), recalling past events that involved aggression of the Israeli opponents targeted at the Israeli citizens (as in example (41) below), or discussing issues connected with the peace process and, most importantly, the Israeli conditions to be met by the Palestinian Authority (as in example (42) below):

(40) In that speech, Yitzhak Rabin said: "The land of the prophets, which bequeathed to the world the values of morality, law and justice, was, after two thousand years, restored to its lawful owners -- the members of the Jewish people. On its land, we have built an exceptional national home and state." (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

(41) "However, we did not return to an empty land. There were Palestinians here who struggled against us for a hundred wild and bloody years. Many thousands, on both sides," he said, "were killed in the battle over the same land, over the same strip of territory, and were joined by the armies of the Arab states." (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

(42) "We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines." (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

The central point of this speech that links these past events with the current (2010) phase of the Middle East conflict is the following excerpt:

²⁶ Taken from an article on the Likud's 2008 election campaign published on Hareetz.com. Article available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-s-election-slogan-likud-because-the-state-needs-to-be-run-1.259913> (retrieved November 13, 2014)

(43) **These things were said 15 years ago, and naturally I have a great deal to add to them after so many years.** But on this special day, I ask that the words and voice of Yitzhak Rabin echo and be heard without any additions and without interruption, **other than two short remarks.** (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

In (43) Netanyahu presupposes that the most fundamental for the Israelis issues have not been resolved by the Palestinian side and its Arab supporters, this being an implicit reference to the fact that they still have not recognized the Israeli statehood. Additionally, using an almost identical construction (“these things were said 15 years ago”) as in (39) (where he said “fourteen years have passed since then”) he presupposes that for over a decade after Rabin’s speech, again, little has changed and that there have been, possibly, many further instances of aggression targeted at Israel. Netanyahu immediately uses this presupposition of the intractability of the Middle East conflict to outline that his Prime Ministerial stance as to this issue is a continuation of Rabin’s stance, aided by “two short remarks” – something that is, possibly, meant to be interpreted as two minor comments. Nevertheless, as we will see in the discussion below, these seemingly minor additions are, in fact, two skilful implicatures that relate to one of the most seminal dimension of the struggle with the Palestinian neighbors, i.e. the (mutual) recognition of statehood. Example (44) features the first of these “two short remarks”:

(44)The first brief remark is an obvious one regarding construction and the moratorium: I already said that **the temporary construction moratorium was a gesture made by no other previous government,** and I believe that Yitzhak Rabin’s words in this regard are an additional confirmation of this observation. In addition, construction in existing communities in Judea and Samaria **does not contradict the aspiration for peace and an agreement.** (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

The excerpt in example (44) includes a presupposition that the 10-month moratorium on the construction of new Israeli settlements in the West Bank that Netanyahu introduced in early 2010 was an exceptional concession (“a gesture”) towards the Palestinian Authority, which implies the positive (self-) presentation of the Israeli side as one that wants to achieve peace. This message is immediately juxtaposed with a completely opposite, negative (other-) presentation of the Palestinian side, which is carried by an implicature that the current resumed building works in Judea and Samaria are treated by the Palestinians as a pretext for not entering into peace negotiations. This particular implicature has already been made by Netanyahu in a speech that he delivered 9 days earlier, at the Opening of the Knesset Winter

Session on October 11, 2010. In that address, Netanyahu said that the Palestinians “wasted those ten months” and that he hopes “they are not doing so [demanding the extension of moratorium] to avoid making the real decisions necessary for a peace agreement”.

This, in turn, brings us to another important element of the macro-context which Netanyahu activates and realizes across these speeches, and which is strictly connected with the idea of intractability of the Middle East conflict, i.e. mutual recognition of statehood perceived as a solution to this conflict. This brings us to the second Netanyahu’s “short remark” in example (45):

- (45) The second remark has to do with his reference to the Palestinian entity that would be established. Yitzhak Rabin spoke of, and I quote: **“less than a state”**. I do not know what he intended at the time. Today, we say **“a demilitarized state that recognizes the state of the Jewish people”**. **We do not want to deny the Palestinians their right of self-definition. We do not want to rule them.** (B. Netanyahu, October 20, 2010)

In example (45), Netanyahu focuses on the taxonomy of statehood that is – or should be – applied by the conflicted parties as part of mutual recognition. Although he rejects Rabin’s way of addressing “the Palestinian entity” as “less than a state”, it is difficult to escape the impression that the label of “a demilitarized state that recognizes the state of the Jewish people” that Netanyahu offers instead is anything more than just a euphemistic reformulation of Rabin’s idea. This interpretation becomes even more salient when we try to answer a question that arises when we critically approach Netanyahu’s proposal and ask ourselves whether a state without its own military forces can indeed be perceived as a truly sovereign state. This, in turn, directs the attention of Netanyahu’s audience to, first, the ongoing non-recognition of Israel by the Palestinians as the core reason of the conflict and, second, to the accusations of the Palestinian Authority and the international community who claim that Israel wants to gain permanent control over the Palestinian population. In (45) Netanyahu tries to refute this criticism by saying that Israel does not deny the Palestinian right of “self-definition” and self-governance and implicitly communicates that it is rather the Palestinians who continuously and persistently deny the Israelis such rights.

This way, both of these speeches delivered by Netanyahu during special Knesset sessions commemorating late PM Rabin turn out to serve as pretexts to draw their audiences’ attention to those aspects of the Middle East conflict that lie at the foundations of the rather fixed Israeli stance at any of so far stages of the peace process. As the analysis of Netanyahu’s 2009-2014 speeches has shown, the idea that irrespective of the passage of time and the

initiatives taken (by Israel or by international community), little²⁷ has changed in the Israeli-Palestinian relations, and that the Palestinians are to be blamed²⁸ for that, are one of the most prominent ideological messages that Netanyahu communicates in this discourse of conflict. The potential impact of this content increases even more once we notice that Netanyahu produces such messages in a very similar way, including reuse of the phrase “the demilitarized (Palestinian) state that recognizes the state of the Jewish people” with this specific wording in a number of speeches delivered in front of as diverse audiences as he had in the corpus analyzed. This way, we may assume that since he consequently repeats this message, he wants all the potential recipients to internalize it as an overarching motivation that Israel has, and to, most importantly, increase the chances of this conflict to be solved in favor of Israel. By this I mean that, should an end to this conflict finally come, irrespective of the specific territorial or political arrangements made, the thing at stake will be the publicity, i.e. the opinion that the contemporary and future generations will have. As the history has shown, once finished, virtually any conflict has had its ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and from the point of view of a political leader – and political communication – becoming the ‘winner’ equals back-legitimization of nearly all that the ‘winning side’ has ever said or done.

Coming back to data, another interesting manifestation of the mechanism of pushing the macro-context of the Middle East conflict to the foreground comes with speeches that Netanyahu delivered in the micro-context of the official Jerusalem Day celebrations. Nevertheless, in this case as well, the illustration of a surprisingly uniform pattern of activating and realizing the context of conflict in these speeches requires a short introduction to the ideological background of this national Israeli holiday, because this is the key to understanding its role – and the role of Jerusalem – in the Middle East conflict. Jerusalem Day is, officially, a national holiday in Israel since 1998²⁹, although it was first proclaimed in the aftermath of the Six Day War, when in 1967 Israel gained control over East Jerusalem (previously controlled by Jordan). Following these events, Israel joined East Jerusalem with

²⁷ This also recalls my discussion of macro-criterion 1 in Part 1 above, where I stated that the discourse of conflict is targeted at presenting the conflict as happening **here** and **now**, and not losing any of its intensity with the passage of time.

²⁸ This also recalls my discussion of macro-criterion 3 in Part 1 above, where I stated that in the discourse of conflict the speakers tend to locate the (past, present or future) events taking place and the attitudes of the ‘us’ and the opposing parties on a conflict neutralization-conflict intensification scale and – as long as in such an arrangement the speaker’s side to the conflict is most likely to be presented as conflict-neutralizing – the other side(s) are most likely to be presented as conflict-intensifying.

²⁹ In 1998 the Knesset passed the Jerusalem Day Law, thus making it a national holiday in Israel.

West Jerusalem – the then capital of the state and the headquarters of the Israeli government and the Knesset since 1948 – making the “unified” city its capital, which until now remains an internationally disputed and criticized³⁰ issue, also with respect to religious matters, as the city is an important religious site for believers of Judaism, Islam and Christianity. What is interesting, also the very idea of celebrating Jerusalem Day raises concerns among some Israelis in the country and some Jews worldwide, as it is mostly observed by Religious Zionists and openly rejected by some Orthodox communities.

Irrespective of all these controversies, Benjamin Netanyahu, both as a Zionist and as the Israeli Prime Minister, forces the perception of the “unified” city as the only legitimate capital of the State of Israel and eagerly uses occasions such as the official celebrations of Jerusalem Day as a setting for various arguments supporting the claim that under the Israeli control the “unified” city has flourished. Consider the following examples:

(46) That was the reality of a city which was shriveled and suffocated; a city that did not develop; a city that simply froze. All this changed at once, within a period of six days in 1967. And since the end of the Six Day War, when Jerusalem was united under Israel's sovereignty, Jerusalem has breathed, thrived and developed, and the city is whole again. Jerusalem's unification was the catalyst to its progress. (B. Netanyahu, June 1, 2011)

(47) I believe the most appropriate words were actually written in modern times by Uri Zvi Greenberg: "*and I say: there is one truth and not two. As there is one sun and as there are not two Jerusalems.*" We know it, and you said it, that the Eternal City belongs to the Eternal People and we want to preserve Jerusalem's unity and integrity in words and actions, because it is not only a spiritual, celestial city, but also an earthly city, and it is not only a city of yesterday, but also a city of tomorrow. (B. Netanyahu, June 1, 2011)

³⁰ The actual legal and diplomatic status of Jerusalem outside Israel raises many concerns. The UN Partition Plan introduced in 1947 made it an international city, and the UN and many international organizations still adhere to this status. For these reasons, many countries have their Israeli-based diplomatic representations in Tel Aviv and not in Jerusalem. In 1980 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 478 in which it demanded that Israel rescinds declaration of Jerusalem as its unified capital, but Israel rejected to do it. The same reaction on the part of Israel followed the opinion of the International Court of Justice issued in 2004, in which East Jerusalem was named "Occupied Palestinian Territory". Full texts of Resolution 478 can be accessed here:

<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/DDE590C6FF232007852560DF0065FDDB>

(last retrieved November 15, 2014).

Full text of the 2004 opinion of the International Court of Justice can be accessed here:

<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6>

(last retrieved November 15, 2014).

Example (46) manifests a generally frequent pattern of comparison-making that Netanyahu uses in this and other speeches to presuppose that the Israeli control over Jerusalem is the decisive factor stimulating its development. The same idea reverberates in example (47), where the main message is that Jerusalem (“Eternal City”) is currently in the hands of its rightful owners (“Eternal People”), and that these rightful owners not only preserve their (eternal) heritage, but also contribute to development of the city to an unparalleled extent. This, in turn, also enables Netanyahu to politically realize the myth of the Chosen People, under which he communicates that any other parties that ever controlled (any of the parts of) Jerusalem, neither had the right to do it, nor preserved or developed the city to the extent that is required considering the city’s importance – this being, both Jerusalem’s objective religious importance and its strategic political-symbolic importance in the Middle East.

An exactly the same pattern is followed by Netanyahu in his 2014 Jerusalem Day speech. Consider the following examples:

(48) Jerusalem has developed remarkably. Jerusalem after the Six Day War was not a small village, but it was not exactly a big metropolis either. Today, Jerusalem is a big metropolis. It stands out in all its glory. (B. Netanyahu, May 27, 2014)

(49) We preserve our heart, the heart of our nation. We will never divide our heart – never. As we believe that our capital is the heart of our nation, it must be united, as the Rabbi just said, it must be connected to the great soul of Eternal Israel, to the Torah and to the intellectual assets created by our Sages throughout the generations. (B. Netanyahu, May 27, 2014)

In example (48), just like in example (46) from his address delivered three years earlier, Netanyahu uses a comparison (although this time implied) of the life conditions in Jerusalem under the Israeli control with those from the period surrounding the Six Day War. Again, this way he presupposes that the Israeli influence on Jerusalem is solely positive and that no other entities governing any of the city’s parts managed to do as much for it.

Example (49), in turn, is much of a build-up of the content of example (47). Once again, Netanyahu presupposes that the “united” Jerusalem is the preservation of the eternal right of Jews to this city and, as a consequence, the right of Israelis to have their capital there. Again, this is a salient allusion to the politically realized myth of the Jewish chosenness, and an implicit response to the international pressures put on the Israeli government to give East Jerusalem (and, in fact, also West Bank) back to the Palestinians. This demand has particularly gained in force in 2014 surrounding the United Nations General Assembly, because as part of their initiatives oriented at independence and full UN recognition, the

Palestinians started pushing a draft of a resolution forcing Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, i.e. West Bank and East Jerusalem, by November 2016. Although Netanyahu's 2014 Jerusalem Day speech precedes these specific events, Netanyahu's words "We will never divide our heart – never" well-illustrate the general Israeli stance on this subject, which has remained fairly unchanged³¹ for nearly 20 years. Another suggestive illustration of the general Israeli position comes in example (50):

(50) There is also a great deal of **hatred, anti-Semitism and slander** directed at us, but there is also great **admiration** because many among the nations of the world know that there is something special **here**, a spiritual spark, an eternal spark, a people that survived for thousands of years against all odds, **returned to their homeland, rebuilt their homeland**, established their state and built an unprecedented military force. There is a unique spirit **here**, and it all concentrated in one place – **Jerusalem**. (B. Netanyahu, May 27, 2014)

Example (50), which is an excerpt from Netanyahu's 2014 Jerusalem Day speech, essentializes two frequent ideological messages reproduced by the speaker in different settings and in front of various audiences. The first message relates to the (regional and international) attitudes towards Israel in relation to the Middle East conflict: "hatred, anti-Semitism and slander" are the properties typically ascribed to the Israeli direct opponents (but, also, potentially those who are the Israeli non-supporters), while "admiration" is the quality ascribed to those countries that, potentially, act in favor Israel and openly support it in the conflict in the region. This way, Netanyahu also reproduces the general arrangement of conflict-related roles and patterns of behavior that I described in macro-criterion 5 in Part 1.

The second recurrent ideological message lies in the presuppositions triggered by verbs "return" and "rebuild" in the phrases marked in bold: on the one hand, due to the micro-context of the Jerusalem Day celebrations, Netanyahu, again, presupposes the eternal Jewish – and the consequent current Israeli – right to this city, but on the other hand, when we look at how this message is reproduced in other Netanyahu's speech, it occurs that this is a systematically used metonymic representation of the entire State of Israel. This metonymy is particularly productive for the persuasive potential of interpreting the deictic marker of space "here", which in example (50) is used twice and rather ambiguously, as it can be understood as either "in Jerusalem (only)" or "(generally) in Israel (including Jerusalem)". Nonetheless,

³¹ Apart from Netanyahu (during his both terms of office), other Israeli Prime Ministers who categorically rejected the idea of withdrawing from East Jerusalem and dividing the city were Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon. This view was not fully shared by Ehud Barak and Ehud Elmert.

this ambiguity disappears when more material is analyzed: as the analysis of all speeches (including those delivered during the UN General Assembly and the AIPAC Policy Conference) has shown, Jerusalem was used in this metonymic fashion across different micro-contexts and audiences, each time with the function of legitimizing the Jewish right to, both, this specific city as the Jewish capital (of course, in its “unified” form), and the State of Israel with the specific territories that it covers (of course, including the “unified capital of Jerusalem” and other places referred to by the UN as “occupied territories”). Simultaneously, what is particularly important for this micro-criterion characterizing the discourse of conflict as political genre, each of these cases enabled Netanyahu to activate and realize one of the major aspects of the macro-context of the Middle East conflict described under content-related regularity no 1 in Section 1.2, i.e. the territorial disputes between Israel and its opponents in the region and the international community, some of which have remained unresolved for as much as several decades.

2. Discourse of conflict is realized by means of specific linguistic strategies

The fulfillment of this micro-criterion is an inherent consequence of the existence of specific content-related regularities in Netanyahu’s 2009-2014 speeches analyzed that I described in the previous section, because these in every single speech and in the case of every single content-regularity identified, the mechanism of activating and realizing the macro-context of the Middle East conflict has been performed by the speaker through discursive means. The study revealed a huge number of micropragmatic parameters such as deixis, implicatures, presuppositions and speech acts as constituent elements of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, with a considerable popularity of strategies such as forced construals, intetextual references and historical analogy in Netanyahu’s speeches analyzed. All these micropragmatic parameters and strategies were functional in communicating messages under the recurrent themes identified, which I will present based on selected examples in subsections dedicated to each of them. Nevertheless, before I move on to this, I would like to clarify two things related to such an organization of my discussion. The first clarification applies to the first subsection, which will be a rather generalized illustration of deictic operation, i.e. the arrangement of the discourse space made by Netanyahu in this discourse of conflict, with a focus on “home” (“inside-the-deictic-centre”, henceforth “IDC”) elements, the “foreign/antagonistic” (“outside-the-deictic-centre”, henceforth “ODC”)

elements, and the movement between them. This way, I will illustrate the realization of the principles of the theory of proximization in the discourse of the Middle East conflict to signal that although I do not account for the dynamics of proximization in this specific study, this is one of the directions that deserve detailed exploration in the future. This is motivated by the fact that, as threat-presupposing discourse and a potentially new generic category of communication in the context of conflict, the discourse of conflict seems to be a particularly good practical realization of the theory of proximization. Nonetheless, due to the fact that this research focuses, first and foremost, on the generic characteristics of the discourse of conflict, several aspects had to remain underrepresented – which I plan to make up for in the future.

The second clarification is related to the rationale for devoting a separate subsection to historical analogy which, as a means of persuasion (and proximization), can be created by, both, implicatures and presuppositions. Although in this respect it is a conceptual overlap, in my discussion of examples I decided to treat examples of historical analogy individually to highlight how the historical experiences of Jews are engaged by PM Netanyahu in the discursive dimension of the Middle East conflict and, most importantly, in the service of legitimizing the Israeli statehood.

2.1. Deictic operation

The arrangement of the discourse space made by Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 rhetoric illustrates that, quite obviously, the major IDC element of the discourse of the Middle East conflict is Israel, but what is particularly interesting, the deictic center seems to have its rather specific location covering the territory of the State of Israel. To understand how the physical and the symbolic space are layered by Netanyahu, let us look at several examples illustrating how he situates Israel in the Middle East:

(51) **There is no country in our region** that protects the individual rights of its citizens and the rights of their minorities **like Israel's democracy** does. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 11, 2010)

(52) We live **in a small country** – very small. **Our small dimensions** pose existential security problems – problems that are unique. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 11, 2010)

- (53)The citizens of Israel and their safety is constantly before my eyes, and it is my responsibility to ensure that they can continue their routine lives of calm and prosperity **in this stormy region**. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 14, 2013)
- (54)It [fanaticism] hates Israel because of the West – because it sees **Israel as an outpost of freedom and democracy** that prevents them from overrunning the Middle East. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)
- (55)**Israel is the cradle of our common civilization**. It's **the crucible of our common values**. And the **modern state of Israel** was founded precisely on these eternal values. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, May 23, 2011)
- (56)Israel's fate is to continue to be **the forward position of freedom in the Middle East**. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 6, 2012)
- (57)Israel that has become a **technological marvel**. It's teeming with innovation. Israel, that **each day pushes the boundaries of medicine and science to the ends of human imagination**. Israel that has **one of the world's most vibrant cultures and one of the world's most dynamic peoples**. Israel, **the modern Jewish state living in the ancient Jewish homeland -- an oasis of liberty and progress in the heart of the Middle East where these ideas have yet to take root**. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2013)

Examples (50)-(57), through various noun phrases, create a complex – and essentially positive – image of Israel as a “modern” (in this respect, meaning both “contemporary” and “advanced”) state that is the “outpost of freedom and democracy” in the “stormy region” of the Middle East, where these values are unknown. As we learn, although the country is “very small”, it promotes new standards through its “fate” to be “the forward position of freedom in the Middle East”, which results from the fact that it is the “cradle of our civilization” and the “crucible of our common values”. All these NPs combine the symbolic and physical dimension of Israel’s image, the layering and overlap of which is best visible in the description made by Netanyahu in example (57), where we learn that “the modern Jewish state living in the ancient Jewish homeland” is an “oasis of liberty and progress in the heart of the Middle East where these ideas have yet to take root”. This way, we receive, both, the description of the deictic center and its main IDC element, which are – as we will see below – conceptualized as, first, suffering as a result of non-recognition of the Israeli statehood and, second, fighting for the consolidation of the Israeli sovereignty and its security with hostile ODC elements that continuously pose new threats.

This image of the State of Israel bears significant resemblance to the image of (“unified”) Jerusalem that Netanyahu creates in his speeches in front of diverse audiences. Consider the following examples:

(58)Our generation **liberated Jerusalem** and now it **is building Jerusalem**. The next generation **will undoubtedly build it further** and I believe that **Jerusalem will quickly become a universal city that we can all be proud of** – in terms of its perception of tomorrow, and adjustment to the future. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, June 1, 2011)

(59)Three thousand years ago, **King David reigned over the Jewish state in our eternal capital, Jerusalem**. I say that to all those who proclaim that **the Jewish state has no roots in our region** and that **it will soon disappear**. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)

(60)**The connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel cannot be denied. The connection between the Jewish people and Jerusalem cannot be denied.** The Jewish people **were building Jerusalem** 3,000 years ago and the Jewish people **are building Jerusalem** today. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

By the use of verb phrase-construals marked in bold in examples (58)-(60), Netanyahu legitimizes the right of the Israelis to have the capital of their state in (“unified”) Jerusalem presupposing that they have always had an undeniable connection with, both, this city and “the Land of Israel”. For these reasons, as we may infer, first, the State of Israel has been established in 1948 and, second, in 1967 Jerusalem was “liberated”. What I would like to draw attention to here is the similarity between the way Netanyahu conceptualizes (the state of) Israel and (the capital in) Jerusalem: both entities are seen as eternal belongings of the Jewish nation that have been recovered and now, as the deictic center, Israelis “are building” them as part of restoring their long-lost statehood.

A particularly interesting example of layering this symbolic and physical space in the arrangement of the discourse space came in Netanyahu’s 2014 AIPAC Policy Conference speech, in which he established an accurate borderline between the deictic center and the foreign and antagonistic area:

(61)My friends, I’ve come here **to draw a clear line**. You know that I like to draw lines -- especially red ones. But the line I want to draw today is the **line between life and death, between right and wrong, between the blessings of a brilliant future and the curses of a dark past**. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

(62)**That border**, that runs a hundred yards east of that field hospital, is **the dividing line between decency and depravity, between compassion and cruelty. On the one side stands Israel**, animated by the values we cherish, values that move us to treat sick Palestinians, thousands of them, from Gaza. They come to our hospitals. We treat them despite the fact that **terrorists from Gaza hurl thousands of rockets at our cities**. Now, **on the other side of that moral divide**, steeped in **blood and savagery**, stand the **forces of terror -- Iran**,

Assad, Hezbollah, al- Qaida and many others. Did you ever hear about Syria sending a field hospital anywhere? Did you ever hear about Iran sending a humanitarian delegation overseas? No? You missed that memo? You know why? You know why you haven't heard anything about that? Because the only thing that **Iran sends abroad are rockets, terrorists and missiles to murder, maim and menace the innocent.** (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

In example (61) the speaker provides a description of an ideological dimension of this borderline based on a stark contrast of IDC and ODC elements' values dividing the discourse space, where "life" is juxtaposed with "death", "right" with "wrong", and "blessings of a brilliant future" with "curses of a dark past". In the same speech, several paragraphs later, he supplements it – as in example (62) – with a concretization of the specific geographic and geopolitical location of this borderline which, as it turns out, goes along the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip. Yet, this physical boundary is, again, conceptualized by the speaker in the symbolic, highly ideological terms as a "moral divide", on the one side of which there is Israel and on the other side its enemies. This also brings us to a more detailed speaker-construed characterization of the ODC elements that is made here by nouns and noun phrases such as "depravity", "cruelty", "terrorists from Gaza", "blood and savagery", "forces of terror", "Iran, Assad, Hezbollah, al- Qaida and many others"³². Example (62) also well-illustrates the activity of these ODC elements and their movement towards the deictic center, where they "hurl thousands of rockets at our [Israeli] cities", supported by "Iran" that sends them "rockets, terrorists and missiles to murder, maim and menace the innocent". This way, we receive an image of the discourse space of the Middle East conflict, which is almost complete, as there is no clear mention of the key and direct Israeli opponent, the Palestinian Authority.

Surprising as it is, in the entire corpus analyzed there has been no single instance of conceptualizing the Palestinians in the same way as other ODC elements. Rather, as we could see in my model analysis of Netanyahu's 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech in Part 1 on this chapter, they were referred to as "Palestinian partner" or, in other speeches, as "Palestinian neighbors", "Palestinian people" or simply "the Palestinians". This might be caused by the considerable international focus and pressure on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process which, when we combine it with the ongoing and, especially, the most current initiatives of the

³² "Many others", i.e. the group of ODC elements, was expanded several months later by Netanyahu in his 2014 UN General Assembly speech, where he described ISIS as a "branch of the same poisonous tree" as Hamas, sharing a "fanatical creed" with it and seeking "to impose [it] well beyond the territory under their control", this way directly threatening the existence of the State of Israel (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014).

Palestinians and the international community to foster the recognition of the Palestinian statehood by Israel, forces Netanyahu to be more moderate and careful in lexical choices made to label the Palestinians. Yet, the Israeli PM finds another way to categorize the Palestinians as a foreign and antagonistic element of the discourse space, which he does through, first, communicating in an implied way, as in example (62), that the Palestinian territories are controlled by terrorist organizations, leaving the audiences with the task to infer that the Palestinians are unable (or unwilling?) to counter this influence, and, second, by using verb phrase-based construals, presenting the negative and hostile activity of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians. Consider the following examples:

(63) **The Palestinians regard this day**, the foundation of the State of Israel, **their *nakba*, their catastrophe**. But their catastrophe was that **they did not have a leadership that was willing to reach a true historic compromise** between the Palestinian people and the Jewish people. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 20, 2010)

(64) **Those who wish to obliterate us** are no partners for peace. **A Palestinian government with half its members declaring daily that they plan to annihilate the Jewish state** is not a partner for peace. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 16, 2011)

(65) Unfortunately, while we support the foundation of a Palestinian state as part of a peace agreement, **the Palestinians are trying to reach a Palestinian state without a peace agreement**. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 31, 2011)

(66) **They [the Palestinians] have placed preconditions on peace talks, waged a relentless international campaign to undermine Israel's legitimacy, and promoted the notorious Goldstone report** that falsely accuses Israel of war crimes. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

(67) **Palestinian officials made clear the other day** -- in fact, I think they made it right here in New York -- **they said the Palestinian state won't allow any Jews in it. They'll be Jew-free** -- *Judenrein*. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2011)

(68) It's time **the Palestinians stopped denying history**. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

Each of the examples in this collection illustrates quite complex verb phrase-construals that Netanyahu uses to more or less explicitly negatively characterize the Palestinians as another ODC element. This way, although in other speeches they are referred to as “neighbors”, “partner” or “people”, which seems to entail that their presence inside (as the “Palestinian

people” living in Israel) or at the border of the deictic centre (in the Gaza Strip) is neutral, Netanyahu in fact implies – and, again, leaves it to the audience to infer – that they are hostile and unwilling to solve the Middle East conflict.

2.2. Implicatures

In this subsection I would like to discuss selected examples of implicatures which Netanyahu used to communicate messages covering the content-related regularities that I described in section 1.1, discussing those that I found particularly interesting, and focusing particularly on examples that I have not explored anywhere earlier in this chapter. On balance, the analysis revealed a huge concentration of implicatures in text structures, many of which were made by the speaker based on information encoded in presuppositions preceding or following them. As such, implicatures in (this) discourse of conflict to a significant extent facilitated the continuous update of specific elements of the macro-context of the Middle East conflict activated and realized by Netanyahu, which makes them directly functional to the achievement of goals that the Israeli PM pursued in his speeches. The examples that I have selected for discussion here cover implicit messages which Netanyahu communicated in relation to two key actors, with whom Israel is in conflict, i.e. the Palestinian Authority and Iran, which by the way also enabled him to communicate implicit messages about other parties directly or indirectly engaged into the situation in the Middle East. This way, implicature appears as a multi-functional linguistic tool which provides the speaker with means to pursue different goals at the same time. For a start, let us consider the following excerpt:

(69) We also build inside neighborhoods, and not only Jewish ones, but also the Arab ones. They deserve it. They do not have enough schools. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, June 1, 2011)

In (69) Netanyahu, by commenting on the investments into increasing the life standard of the Arab residents living in Israel, implies that the Palestinian Authority is unable to cater for their basic needs such as housing and schooling. This also enables Netanyahu to implicitly present Israel as an active and fair entity which, rather than being hostile to its opponents, works for their well-being. This empathy towards the Palestinians and in this respect, most specifically, towards the *ordinary (Palestinian) people* that Netanyahu frequently expresses,

is justified in a variety of ways, with a considerable popularity of ideological arguments, as in example (70), where the Israeli PM implies that Israel acts (and has always acted) according to the Biblical truths – which might also imply that, through the struggle for statehood recognition, Israel continuously fulfills the Biblical prophecies on the Jewish chosenness:

(70) The amount of strength we draw from the Bible is tremendous. Never have I read it without discovering how relevant it is to our situation today, both spiritually and practically. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 28, 2014)

The theme of recognition of the Israeli statehood is also explored by Netanyahu through implicatures as in (71) where, by referring to authority organizations that recognized Israel, he implies that no one – and, specifically, all the entities in the Middle East that are hostile towards Israel – should question it:

(71) Nearly 62 years ago, the United Nations recognized the right of the Jews, an ancient people 3,500 years-old, to a state of their own in their ancestral homeland. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)

This way, Netanyahu explores the recurrent theme of non-recognition of the Israeli statehood, which he usually develops in the course of his speeches by presenting it as the core reason of the conflict with the Palestinian Authority. In most of the cases this is done through conventional implicatures such as the one triggered by “but” in example (72) below:

(72) The settlements have to be -- it's an issue that has to be addressed and resolved in the course of negotiations. **But** the core of the conflict has always been and unfortunately remains the refusal of the Palestinians to recognize a Jewish state in any border. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2011)

By the way, in (72) Netanyahu also implies that the topic of Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem, which I mentioned earlier in this chapter, is works for the Palestinians solely as a pretext for not entering into peace negotiations. In the same speech, Netanyahu strengthens this implicit message in the following way:

(73) The day I came into office, I called for direct negotiations without preconditions. President Abbas didn't respond. I outlined a vision of peace of two states for two peoples. He still didn't respond. I removed hundreds of roadblocks and checkpoints, to ease freedom of movement in the Palestinian areas; this facilitated a fantastic growth in the Palestinian economy. But again -- no response. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2011)

Here, in example (73), through quite a long contrast pattern, Netanyahu implies that as the Prime Minister of Israel he is active in peace initiatives and making peace-oriented concessions, while the Palestinian President Abbas is passive and thus unwilling to achieve peace. This examples also well-illustrates the mechanism that I presented in subsection 2.1 on deictic operation, where I showed verb-phrase construals as major tools that Netanyahu used to negatively characterize the Palestinians as ODC elements.

Such implicit attribution of fault to the Palestinian side of the Middle East conflict is usually followed by Netanyahu's declarations of the general commitment of Israel to peace in the region, which are potentially meant to further strengthen the speaker-construed positive image of Israel. For these purposes, Netanyahu often uses ideological arguments, as in (75) where he, again, relies on the idea of Jewish chosenness as a source of standards of peace and tolerance:

(74) Israel wants to see a Middle East of progress and peace. We want to see the three great religions that sprang forth from our region - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - coexist in peace and in mutual respect. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)

In this respect, example (74) also serves as another good illustration of how, by the way, Netanyahu implies that other parties to the conflict have a different idea of the arrangement of life in the Middle East and that, essentially, the Israeli attitude should be regarded as one and the only one that is motivated by "peace" and "mutual respect". This particular premise was often used by Netanyahu in times of legitimization crisis, i.e. in settings where he tried to refute international community's criticism of Israel. The direct scene for this were his UN General Assembly speeches, where he would usually resort to large sequences of various types inferences, all of which ultimately led to the construction of one major implicature, as in (75) below:

(75) By investigating Israel rather than Hamas for war crimes, the UN Human Rights Council has betrayed its noble mission to protect the innocent. In fact, what it's doing is to turn the laws of war upside-down. Israel, which took unprecedented steps to minimize civilian casualties, Israel is condemned. Hamas, which both targeted and hid behind civilians – that a double war crime - Hamas is given a pass. The Human Rights Council is thus sending a clear message to terrorists everywhere: Use civilians as human shields. Use them again and again and again. You know why? Because sadly, it works. By granting international legitimacy to the use of human shields, the UN's Human Rights Council has thus become a Terrorist Rights Council, and it will have repercussions.

It probably already has, about the use of civilians as human shields. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)

In example (75), Netanyahu wants the audience to infer that Israel has been unjustly criticized, and that the real offender is Hamas (possibly, together with the Palestinian Authority, as Hamas acts on its territories), which in turn is meant to create the overarching implicature that the UN Human Rights Council openly supports terrorists and, thus, is to be blamed for all the casualties of summer 2014 military conflict in the Gaza Strip. Interestingly, this is the same mechanism that Netanyahu used to counter the criticism of the UN Human Rights Council in the previous years, reacting to the earlier instances when reports issued by this body accused Israel of committing war crimes in its military standoffs in the region or when the UN HRC issued resolutions obliging Israel to make up for the losses and/or withdraw from specific territories. Consider the following example:

(76) We live in a world steeped in tyranny and terror, where gays are hanged from cranes in Tehran, political prisoners are executed in Gaza, young girls are abducted en masse in Nigeria and hundreds of thousands are butchered in Syria, Libya and Iraq. Yet nearly half, nearly half of the UN Human Rights Council's resolutions focusing on a single country have been directed against Israel, the one true democracy in the Middle East – Israel, where issues are openly debated in a boisterous parliament, where human rights are protected by independent courts and where women, gays and minorities live in a genuinely free society. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)

In (76), just like in (75), Netanyahu uses an elaborate contrast pattern to ultimately imply that the UN Human Rights Council is unjust – or even prejudiced – towards Israel, which he illustrates through saying that “nearly half of the UN Human Rights Council's resolutions focusing on a single country have been directed against Israel”. This way, in another consequent attempt, Netanyahu tries to delegitimize this body and conceptualizes it as another ODC element of the discourse space, at the same time trying to convince the audience of the positive image and attitude of Israel, both, in the Middle East conflict and on the international political arena. This theme is interestingly reproduced in front of audiences and in micro-contexts where rather than criticism, Netanyahu expects (presupposes?) support and acclaim for Israel, i.e. the AIPAC Policy Conference, as in (77):

(77) But Israel should be judged by the same standards applied to all nations and to other democracies. Sometimes I think there's a triple standard: one standard for the dictatorships, a second standard for the democracies and a third standard is the standard for Israel. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

Example (77), although it comes from a speech delivered a few years earlier, is Netanyahu's implied reference to the 2009 Goldstone report issued by the UN HRC after the Gaza War, which he uses to, again, delegitimize this body and the report itself and to imply that Israel is judged by exclusionary, unjust and undemocratic standards. This, considering the fact that in AIPAC Netanyahu's audience consists of pro-Israeli Americans, many of which are of Jewish ancestry, potentially increases his chances of further consolidating the image of Israel as *a double victim*: the victim of violence in the Middle East and the victim of discriminatory treatment of the UN HRC. This, in turn, is a particularly fertile ground, on which Netanyahu is able to explore the topic of Israeli security, in relation to the peace-process with the Palestinians, as in (78) and (79) below:

(78) Now, my friends, it may take years, it may take decades for this formal acceptance of Israel to filter down through all layers of Palestinian society. So **if this peace is to be more than a brief interlude between wars, Israel needs long-term security arrangements on the ground to protect the peace** and to protect Israel if the peace unravels. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

Excerpt in (78) comes from Netanyahu's 2014 AIPAC speech and well-illustrates specifically the same implicature that he made four years earlier, in his Knesset speech in 2010:

(79) Peace and security are interwoven, and they are the principles which guide me. I firmly insist on the need for both of them, and I see that an understanding of our security needs has finally begun to penetrate international debate, beyond general statements. I speak of our specific needs. I believe, Members of Knesset, that **if we stand together on this front, united around these principles, I am convinced it will help us achieve a peace agreement**. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 11, 2010)

In both of the above, the phrases marked in bold presuppose the failure of the previous stages of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as manifested by (a presupposition of) anti-Israeli attacks that followed them, making this peace only "a brief interlude between wars". This premise provides Netanyahu with room to imply that without an increase in the Israeli security, lasting peace cannot be obtained, which, in turn, leaves him the opportunity to legitimize the Israeli investments into military and calls for further American financial

support for the Israeli defense system as necessary to “achieve peace agreement” and “to protect the peace”, presenting the so far investments as proofs for the “understanding of our [Israeli] security needs” in the “international debate”.

As we will below, these security-related implicatures were also used in Netanyahu’s discussion of the “Iranian nuclear threat”; nevertheless, first, I would like to focus on the very ways of conceptualizing this threat. As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, the analysis of Netanyahu’s UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference speeches revealed major domination of this topic (especially from 2012 on) in comparison to what he talked about in his speeches in Israel. Yet, as early as 2009 he already signaled the danger in, essentially, axiological terms:

(80) The primitivism of the 9th century **ought to** be no match for the progress of the 21st century. The allure of freedom, the power of technology, the reach of communications should surely win the day. Ultimately, the past **cannot** triumph over the future. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)

In this excerpt Netanyahu implicitly refers to the Iranian nuclear program, which he combines with the expressed hostility of the Iranian (political and religious) leaders as a potentially new type of threat towards Israel in the Middle East conflict. As such, he conceptualizes it as an irrational struggle between civilizations, where Iran, referred to here as “the primitivism of the 9th century” is attacking Israel (and, possibly, other Western countries as well) referred to as “the progress of the 21 century. Weak modal verbs such as “ought to” and “cannot” that carry the conventional implicature of probability here, facilitate the conveyance of this message without having to fully commit to its truth. Nonetheless, as the analysis of speeches delivered later has shown, the external context of post-Arab Spring destabilization in the Middle East and the use of chemical weapons in Syria, provided Netanyahu with more opportunities to explore the physical dimension of this nuclear threat, which he did simultaneously delegitimizing the Iranian attempts at calming down the international community’s concerns with the Iranian nuclear program as oriented only at easing the sanctions (imposed on Iran by the UN in 2010 and then extended). Consider examples (81) and (82):

(81)Rouhani condemned the “violent scourge of terrorism.” **Yet** in the last three years alone Iran has ordered, planned or perpetrated terrorist attacks in 25 cities on five continents. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013)

(82) Due to this pressure, Iran's economy is currently very close to its breaking point. **But** we must admit that despite the pressure, the regime in Tehran has not relinquished its goal to develop nuclear weapons. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 14, 2013)

The excerpt in (81), which comes from Netanyahu's 2013 UN General Assembly speech, includes a conventional implicature carried by "yet", where he implies that the Iranian President Rouhani is only trying to deceive the international community into thinking that Iran indeed condemns terrorism, as its implied *real* activity in the last three years of sanctions counters this declaration. This way, Netanyahu attributes the fault for all the terrorist attacks that he mentioned to Iran and implies that sanctions did not bring the expected results, i.e. a decrease in terrorist threat in the world. The same implicature is in (82), where Netanyahu implies that despite the impact on the Iranian economy, the sanctions did not discourage "the regime in Teheran" from developing nuclear weapons.

Based on these propositions, a year later, Netanyahu could develop the theme of the "Iranian nuclear threat" in even more detail and present it as even more imminent, implying that Iran threatens, both, Israel – which is already taken for granted on the premises that Iran does not recognize the Israeli statehood – and the entire world, as it is building intercontinental ballistic missiles (83):

(83) And the important point to make is this: Iran's missiles can already reach Israel, so those ICBMs that they're building, they're not intended for us. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

To strengthen the impression of threat, Netanyahu again implied that Iran is lying to the international community (as in example (84)), based on which in the 2014 rhetoric he intensively called for military intervention in Iran (as in example (85)) and, again, legitimized the American investments into the Israeli defense systems (as in example (86)):

(84) I said it here once, I'll say it here again: If it looks like a duck, if it walks like a duck, if it quacks like a duck, then what is it? Well, it ain't a chicken --- and it's certainly not a dove. It's still a nuclear duck. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

(85) But this threat -- this threat will not be eliminated by just any agreement, only by an agreement which requires Iran to fully dismantle its military nuclear capability. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

(86) My friends, yesterday I met with President Obama, with Vice President Biden, with Secretary Kerry and with the leaders of the U.S. Congress. We had very good meetings. I thanked them for their strong support for Israel -- for our security, including in the vital area of missile defense. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

2.3. Presuppositions

Presuppositions, along with implicatures and forced construals, were the most popular types of inferences in the discourse of conflict analyzed. As a consequence, just as in the case of implicatures, the study revealed a massive number of examples and a large concentration of presuppositions in the text structures, but it also enabled me to identify several differences between presuppositions that were typically made in front of local audiences and those that were designed for international addressees. For this reason, in my discussion of examples in this section I will cover selected, yet most remarkable, types of presuppositions found in Netanyahu's speeches delivered in front of local audiences (i.e. in Israel) and international audiences (i.e. at the UN General Assembly and the AIPAC Policy Conference).

Starting from Netanyahu's speeches delivered in the Knesset, I should first note that the presuppositions found there relied on a large amount of background knowledge that the speaker shared with the audience. This way, on the assumption that his addressees (i.e. the Members of Knesset and the Israeli nation) are perfectly familiar with the history of the Jews and the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Netanyahu could – and would – often presuppose that the Middle East conflict is a struggle resulting from the non-recognition of the Israeli statehood in the region, as in (87), which is but one out of many similar constructions identified in his 2009-2014 Knesset speeches:

(87) My friends, the root of this conflict **never** was a Palestinian state, or lack thereof. The root of the conflict is, and **always** has been, their **refusal to recognize the Jewish state**. It is not a conflict over **1967**, but **over 1948**, over the very existence of the State of Israel. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 16, 2011)

The excerpt in (87) includes several such presuppositions, each triggered by time expressions, dates or, simply, a verb phrase “refusal to recognize the Jewish state” marked in bold. This way, Netanyahu also presupposed that, first, there is an ongoing conflict and, second, that the Jewish state has been recognized, on the basis of which he could easily further presuppose the reasons of the Israeli struggle in the region. Interestingly, as I have illustrated in example (72)

in the section on implicatures above, in front of international audiences Netanyahu would rather imply than presuppose this idea, which was probably caused by the fact that these audiences shared less background knowledge with him and, consequently, there was less common ground, on the basis of which Netanyahu could assert the credibility of this message.

The same applies to topic of Israeli security: in Israel Netanyahu could take it for granted that his audience is aware of the national security needs and concerns caused by the Middle East conflict, and that it has some expectations as to the sense of security of the Israeli citizens, as in examples (88) below:

(88) I assure you that in the negotiations for peace, we will **continue** to insist on our national interests, first and foremost, security. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 31, 2011)

This idea could be further illustrated by several other security-related presuppositions in example (89) below, where Netanyahu relied on the background assumption that, for Israelis, peace with the Palestinians must be accompanied by specific security arrangements – as it was in the case of Jordan and Egypt, which he presupposed by the second sentence in bold:

(89) **Fostering the strength and responsibility required to fortify Israel's security is also paramount in our quest for peace. In the Middle East, peace is made with the strong, not with the weak.** The stronger Israel is, the closer peace will be. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 31, 2011)

Interestingly, in front of international audiences Netanyahu would also rather imply (recall the example (78) above) than presuppose on the issue of the Israeli security, necessarily strengthening such messages with implicatures of threat (as in examples (81) or (83) above). In this respect, only the analysis of his speeches delivered in the micro-context of the AIPAC Policy Conference did not reveal such a contrast in the use of implicatures and presupposition, which might be motivated by the fact that, as I have already mentioned, his audiences there consisted of, primarily, pro-Israeli activists who either had the necessary background knowledge of the exact reasons for the Israeli security concerns or, at least, shared more ideological common ground with the speaker.

Other typical presupposition made by Netanyahu in his Knesset speeches also relied on the, specifically, nationally-accepted ideas, such as the recognition of (“unified”) Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. Consider the following example:

(90) 47 years ago, Jerusalem – the unified city – was joined together **again**. This is the way it has **always** been, and this is the way it **always** will be. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 28, 2014)

The excerpt in (90) includes several such presuppositions triggered by time expressions and the adverb of repetition “again”, which carry the same message as other tools that Netanyahu used to legitimize the Israeli right to this city (briefly described in section 1.2 above). Again, in front of local audiences, he could assume that virtually no one would question this right, so this is probably the reason why, when speaking publicly in Israel about this topic, he would rather use presuppositions than implicatures.

As far as Netanyahu’s 2009-2014 United Nations General Assembly speeches are concerned, there were essentially two types of presuppositions that he would repeatedly make in these micro-contexts. The first type includes instances when Netanyahu refuted the criticism of Israel as lies, in each case relying on the presupposed assumption that from the point of view of the audience, *lying is bad and harmful*. Consider the following examples:

(91) Yesterday the President of Iran stood at this very podium, **spewing his latest anti-Semitic rants**. Just a few days earlier, he **again claimed that the Holocaust is a lie**. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)

(92) I’ve come here to **expose the brazen lies** spoken from this very podium against my country and against the brave soldiers who defend it. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)

In example (91) Netanyahu recalls the audience’s background knowledge of the history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, based on which he delegitimizes the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s UN speech as an instance of an overtly anti-Semitic attitude expressed by his denial of the Holocaust. Example (92), in turn, includes a bit different application of lying as a background concept underlying Netanyahu’s presupposition: here, he explores the ideas that *defending one’s country is good* and that *courage is a positive feature*, which he combined with the idea that *lying is bad and harmful* to presuppose that, rather than committing war crimes, the Israeli soldiers bravely defend their country.

Another typical presuppositions found in Netanyahu’s UN speeches were based on comparison-making. Consider the following two examples:

(93) To understand what the world **would be like** with a nuclear-armed Iran, just imagine the world with a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)

(94) The distance between the 1967 lines and the suburbs of Tel Aviv **is like** the distance between the UN building here and Times Square. Israel's a tiny country. That's why in any peace agreement, which will obviously necessitate a territorial compromise, I will always insist that Israel be able to defend itself by itself against any threat. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)

Both examples include presuppositions triggered by comparisons which are meant to facilitate the audience's understanding of the messages that Netanyahu later implies – this, basically, reveals comparison as a helpful tool in triggering presuppositions which are meant to serve as a basis for implicatures that follow them, especially in the settings where the speaker and the audience share less background knowledge or common ground. In such cases, the speaker is forced to somehow make up for the potential lack of knowledge or understanding of a given topic on the part of the audience, since without it this audience might not properly infer the implicit message produced. For these purposes, Netanyahu compares specific aspects of the Israeli situation in the Middle East to something that the UN audience is familiar with. This way, in example (93) we have “nuclear-armed Iran” compared to “nuclear-armed al-Qaeda”, and in example (94), the “distance between the 1967 lines and the suburbs of Tel Aviv” to the “distance between the UN building here and Times Square”. Based on these comparisons, Netanyahu presupposes the unpredictability of the use of the Iranian nuclear weapons and the indefensibility of the state of Israel if, though the “territorial compromise” in the peace process, it returned to its 1967 borders. This, in turn, immediately provides Netanyahu with grounds to imply that Iran and its nuclear weapons are deadly dangerous (in (93)), and that large operational capabilities of the Israeli armed forces together with limited territorial withdrawals are a necessary condition for, both, peace in the Middle East and the Israeli sovereignty (in (94)).

The topic of the Iranian nuclear threat is also connected with another type of presuppositions that frequently appeared in the data analyzed, i.e. the temporally unspecific presuppositions of impact as in examples (95)-(101):

(95)The international community must stop Iran **before it's too late**. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2011)

(96)I think the relevant question is this: it's not whether this fanaticism will be defeated. It's how many lives will be lost **before it's defeated**. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)

- (97) From there, it's only a few months, possibly a few weeks **before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.** (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)
- (98) The red line should be drawn right here... **Before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment necessary to make a bomb. Before Iran gets to a point where it's a few months away or a few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon.** (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)
- (99) Iran wants to be in a position to rush forward to build nuclear bombs **before the international community can detect it, much less prevent it.** (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013)
- (100) We have to stop its nuclear enrichment program **before it's too late.** (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2013)

In all these examples, Netanyahu evokes the impression of unpredictable, yet tangible threat posed by the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, based on constructions that presuppose the existence of (nuclear) “bombs”/“weapons” and the potential catastrophic results of its use. Interestingly, this types of presuppositions was used only in reference to ODC entities such as “Iran” or terrorist organizations affiliated with it, and only in speeches that Netanyahu delivered in front of international audiences. The analysis of Netanyahu’s 2009-2014 Knesset speeches, surprising as it is, revealed no instances of the use of this specific type of inference. This might be caused by the fact that, in the course of these six years, the Israeli PM consequently used the occasions such as the UN General Assembly or the AIPAC Policy Conference to convince the international community of the need to set an ultimatum for the Iranian nuclear program, legitimizing the possibility of a military intervention in Iran as a necessary pre-emptive action, forcing Iran to dismantle its nuclear capabilities. This inherently makes this specific element of the discourse of the Middle East conflict a topic of interest for a future study in proximization, as Netanyahu’s construals of the “Iranian nuclear threat” bear significant resemblance to those made by the US President George W. Bush in the post 9/11 discourse of the alleged “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq.

2.4. Forced construals

Forced construals, as the very name suggests, are constructions in which the speaker forces their audience/addressees to interpret the implicit message communicated in a specific way. Thus, potentially all implicatures and presuppositions could be classified as such, yet following my research I would like to single out one group of these constructions, which I found discriminative from any other types of inference discussed here. These are forced construals carried by rhetorical questions.

On the level of micropragmatic parameters that were functional in (and constitutive of) the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, this specific type of forced construals turned out to appear frequently enough to be classified as a characteristic property the text structures analyzed – especially, the Israeli PM's speeches delivered in the Knesset and at the UN General Assembly. In each of these two cases, forced construals carried by rhetorical questions reflected Netanyahu's judgment as to what specific aspects of the Middle East conflict (i.e. which of the content-related regularities described in section 1.1 above) and, consequently, what specific interpretations of these aspects, should be forced onto his audiences/addressees in a given micro-context. This, in turn, reveals the pragmatic function of forced construals carried by rhetorical questions in the discourse of conflict, which – as we will see in the examples below – were intended to maximize the effect of legitimization of Netanyahu's claims through an interesting mechanism based on the same element as presuppositions, i.e. the common ground. This was done in the following way: Netanyahu would make an assertion, usually about something that either he or, both, he and his audience accepted as true, which he would immediately follow by at least one rhetorical question featuring an explicit point about this topic, as it is seen by those who (actually or potentially) disagree with the proposition in the assertion. As a result, he would imply – and force the audience to infer – that to disagree with the proposition in the assertion means *to contradict the truth*. What is important, these rhetorical questions would obviously carry Netanyahu's preferred perception of this *contradiction with the truth* (being, essentially, the contrasting viewpoints of Israeli and its opponents in the conflict or any other parties engaged in it), subtly forcing the audience to take it as the obvious response to this question. Let us focus on the following two examples of this device from Netanyahu's speech in the Knesset:

(101) And mutual recognition – how can it be that while the Palestinians demand that Israel recognize the Palestinian nation state, they refuse to recognize the Jewish nation state? (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 14, 2013, my underline)

(102) The Jewish people has been around for almost 4,000 years. And why should a people like ours not deserve to have the right to our own nation state in our historic homeland recognized? Why is it so difficult to accept this simple historical fact? (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 14, 2013, my underline)

The text underlined in examples (101) and (102) is Netanyahu's assertion (or, as in (101), the assertion-like verbless phrase) explicitly or implicitly related to the topic of statehood recognition. In (101) we have "mutual recognition", the lack of which, as we already know, is presented by him as one of the reasons for the continuation of the conflict with the Palestinians. The rhetorical question that follows this assertion forces the response that 'it is absurd that the Palestinians demand Israel to recognize their state when they do not recognize the Israeli statehood'. In (102), in turn, we have an assertion about the long-lasting presence of the Jews in the world, based on which, through rhetorical questions that follow, Netanyahu forces the audience to infer that 'the Jews deserve to have the right to their nation state in their historical homeland recognized' and that 'by non-recognition the Palestinians refuse to accept a simple historical fact'. This way, legitimizing the Israeli statehood, Netanyahu positively presents Israel and its claims in the conflict simultaneously delegitimizing the Palestinian claims and attributing the fault for the situation to them only.

Other interesting examples of forced construals carried by rhetorical questions were found in Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speeches. There, in comparison to other groups of speeches, Netanyahu used this device most often. Consider the following selected examples from his 2009 UN General Assembly speech:

(103) This June, President Obama visited the Buchenwald concentration camp. Did President Obama pay tribute to a lie? And what of the Auschwitz survivors whose arms still bear the tattooed numbers branded on them by the Nazis? Are those tattoos a lie? One-third of all Jews perished in the conflagration. Nearly every Jewish family was affected, including my own. My wife's grandparents, her father's two sisters and three brothers, and all the aunts, uncles and cousins were all murdered by the Nazis. Is that also a lie? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009, my underline)

(104) The most urgent challenge facing this body is to prevent the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Are the member states of the United Nations up to that challenge? Will the international community confront a despotism that terrorizes its own people as they bravely stand up for freedom? Will it take action against the dictators who stole an election in broad daylight and gunned

down Iranian protesters who died in the streets choking in their own blood? Will the international community thwart the world's most pernicious sponsors and practitioners of terrorism? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009, my underline)

(105) Israel justly defended itself against terror. This biased and unjust report is a clear-cut test for all governments. Will you stand with Israel or will you stand with the terrorists? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009, my underline)

Example (103) includes a complex illustration of this pattern; here, Netanyahu makes several assertions (all underlined), which he follows by a number of rhetorical questions obviously, yet implicitly, delegitimizing the President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his denial of the Holocaust in front of the 2009 UN General Assembly audience. This way, Netanyahu implies that Ahmadinejad is a liar, based on which in the upcoming paragraphs he further intensifies the vision of the “Iranian nuclear threat” as imminent and unpredictable. In example (104), Netanyahu implies that if the UN does not take any action against the danger, atrocity and immorality of “the tyrants of Teheran”, this will mean that they approve of the activity of Iran and this way support what “the world's most pernicious sponsors and practitioners of terrorism”. Example (105), in turn, is his attempt at delegitimizing the Goldstone Report – here, he implies that to accept its contents means to support the terrorists, which is meant to force the audience to infer that the Israeli participation in the Gaza War was an instance of self-defense rather than a military assault.

Years 2010-2014 in Netanyahu’s UN General Assembly speeches brought even more examples of this device and in some cases, the pattern assertion-rhetorical question(s) was so long that it occupied as much as an entire paragraph and was used repeatedly even within one text structure. Consider the following examples:

(106) Our major international airport is a few kilometers away from the West Bank. Without peace, will our planes become targets for anti-aircraft missiles placed in the adjacent Palestinian state? And how will we stop the smuggling into the West Bank? (...) How could we prevent the smuggling into these mountains of those missiles that could be fired on our cities? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2011, my underline)

(107) For over two years, our intelligence agencies didn't know that Iran was building a huge nuclear enrichment plant under a mountain. Do we want to risk the security of the world on the assumption that we would find in time a small workshop in a country half the size of Europe? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012, my underline)

- (108) So I ask you, given this record of Iranian aggression without nuclear weapons, just imagine Iranian aggression with nuclear weapons. Imagine their long range missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, their terror networks armed with atomic bombs. Who among you would feel safe in the Middle East? Who would be safe in Europe? Who would be safe in America? Who would be safe anywhere? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012, my underline)
- (109) Rouhani tells us not to worry; he assures us that all this is not intended for nuclear weapons. Do any of you believe that? If you believe that, here's a few questions that you might want to ask: Why would a country that claims to only want peaceful nuclear energy, why would such a country build hidden underground enrichment facilities? Why would a country with vast natural energy reserves invest billions in developing nuclear energy? Why would a country intent on merely civilian nuclear programs continue to defy multiple Security Council resolutions and incur the costs of crippling sanctions on its economy? And why would a country with a peaceful nuclear program develop intercontinental ballistic missiles whose sole purpose is to deliver nuclear warheads? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013, my underline)
- (110) Imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic State, ISIS, would be if it possessed chemical weapons. Now imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic state of Iran would be if it possessed nuclear weapons. Ladies and Gentlemen, Would you let ISIS enrich uranium? Would you let ISIS build a heavy water reactor? Would you let ISIS develop intercontinental ballistic missiles? Of course you wouldn't. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014, my underline)
- (111) Today, the Jewish state is demonized with the apartheid libel and charges of genocide. Genocide? In what moral universe does genocide include warning the enemy's civilian population to get out of harm's way? Or ensuring that they receive tons, tons of humanitarian aid each day, even as thousands of rockets are being fired at us? Or setting up a field hospital to aid for their wounded? (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014, my underline)

Although examples (106)-(111) come from four different speeches, there is particular prevalence of the issue of “Iranian nuclear weapons” in them, which well-illustrates Netanyahu’s consequent choice of this device to strengthen the impact of the construed threat; in this collection only examples (106) and (111) relate to different topics, i.e. the idea that the Palestinian territories are controlled by terrorist organizations (as in example (106)), and the UN HRC’s criticism of Israel, this time following the summer 2014 events in the Gaza Strip (as in example (111)). Yet, each of these examples follows exactly the same pattern: the Israeli PM starts from a more or less easily acceptable assertion, which he immediately supports or counters with rhetorical questions to force a specific message. The overarching function of all these forced construals also remains the same: to build a maximally positive

image of Israel as a country that is concerned not only with the well-being of its citizens, but also the well-being of the entire population of the world, including the Palestinian civilians, as in example (111).

This brings us to several explanations why the forced construals carried by rhetorical questions were so frequent in Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speeches. First, this might be caused by the fact that, as a type of inference, they provided a rather narrow spectrum of possible interpretations in comparison to, for example, implicatures. As a result, to ensure that the audience properly infers the implicitly communicated content, Netanyahu might have decided to use forced construals carried by rhetorical questions to strengthen the messages already communicated elsewhere in the speeches by means of implicatures. Simultaneously, this exposed him to potentially lesser criticism, as – just like in the case of implicatures – it was the audience's task to interpret the message. Second, due to the fact that such forced construals often relied on some basic pre-expectations, wants and needs of the audience (e.g. safety, peace, telling the truth/not telling lies), they increased Netanyahu's chances of maintaining the aura of credibility even in times of harsh criticism of Israel for its military standoffs in the Gaza Strip. Third, the UN is possibly the most powerful international body that Israel has to reckon with – and to the criticism of which it has to react. On the one hand, it is caused by the fact that at the General Assemblies and other UN-held events all the parties to the Middle East conflict meet and their speeches are closely followed by, both, the audience and the international media. On the other hand, as a transgovernmental body concerned with peacekeeping, the UN is a key player in the global politics, which in the light of the fact that the state of Israel was established under the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, makes it inherently engaged into the situation in the Middle East. Considering the fact that the public of the UN General Assembly consists of, both, Israeli supporters and critics, to be successful as the speaker and the key Israeli politician, the Israeli PM has to adjust his speeches to a highly diversified – yet very important – audience and this is probably why these speeches are so long, complex and rich in a variety of linguistic devices.

2.5. Assertion-directive pattern

In this short section I would like to illustrate another device that heavily relies on the inferences made by the audience and features the use of assertions – probably the most powerful type of speech acts responsible for enacting the speaker’s credibility. As in the case of some examples presented in the previous subsection, not always and not all the assertions that Netanyahu made were equally easily acceptable. Rather, across every individual text structures they were distributed in a scalar way – from the most acceptable to the least acceptable assertions, which enabled the speaker to validate some more controversial claims or directives on the basis of the audience’s acceptance of those made earlier. In this arrangement, the directive force of assertions grows with the imposition of novel message, which could be illustrated only based on rather long sequences of examples taken from a number of Netanyahu’s speeches. Therefore, instead I would like to focus on one specific element of this mechanism, i.e. the point at which the assertion meets with the directive, to show how – even in such a short illustration – more controversial claims (usually including implicatures) were validated by some more easily acceptable assertions that preceded them.

On balance, much of Netanyahu’s rhetoric on the Israeli situation in the Middle East involved strong assertions of the past events in the conflict with the Palestinians, Hamas and Hezbollah, and other signs of hostility towards Israel following the establishment of the state in 1948. Additionally, there was a number of strong assertions on the activity of Iran as oriented at “wiping the State of Israel off the face of earth”, which Netanyahu validated based on the truthfulness of assertions on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism that preceded them. These, however, will be presented in subsection 2.7 below, which is dedicated to most interesting examples of historical analogy found in this discourse of conflict, as they primarily illustrate this specific device. The examples that I have chosen for my discussion here are also related to the Israeli relations with the Palestinians and with Iran, but it is caused by the fact that the assertion-directive pattern found in Netanyahu’s speeches was most frequently employed to communicate messages about these two parties to the Middle East conflict, and, interestingly, just as in the case of forced construals carried by rhetorical questions, it was generally most typical for speeches that Netanyahu delivered in front of international audiences.

Thus, first, let us consider two excerpts from Netanyahu’s AIPAC Policy Conference speeches:

(112) Six successive prime ministers of Israel and two American presidents have not succeeded in achieving this final peace settlement. [*Directive segment*] I believe it is possible to achieve it, but I think it requires a fresh approach, and the fresh approach that I suggest is pursuing a triple track towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians – a political track, a security track, an economic track. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, May 5, 2009, my underline)

(113) There are many issues linked to this conflict that must be resolved between Israelis and Palestinians. [*Directive segment*] We can, we must, resolve them. But I repeat: We can only make peace with the Palestinians if they're prepared to make peace with the Jewish State. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, May 23, 2011, my underline)

Both of these examples above illustrate how, based on a commonly accepted assertion (in both cases underlines) on the peace process with the Palestinians, Netanyahu tries to develop the perception of credibility of new content that he introduces in the directive segment: in example (112) this is his proposition of a “fresh approach” to the peace negotiations, i.e. one that would help to end the cycle of failures in achieving the “final peace settlement”, while in example (113) it is his implicature that the major “issue linked to this conflict” is the Palestinian recognition of Israel as the Jewish State, without which for Netanyahu there can be no peace in the region. In both cases, Netanyahu uses the directive segment to communicate messages that we are already familiar with from other types of inference, which means that the assertion-directive pattern in might be used here to simply strengthen the impact of the messages already communicated by the speaker elsewhere (i.e. through a different device, in a different place in the text structure or even in another speech). As long as in this respect the order is not that important, there are two other observations that matter here: first, that Netanyahu used multiple devices to communicate repeatable messages under each of the 7 content-related regularities which I identified and, second, that these various devices were complementary in the functions they played and the goals they served in this discourse of conflict.

To further illustrate this property, let us go through examples of the assertion-directive pattern employed to legitimize the need to threaten Iran with military action should it enrich enough uranium to produce a nuclear bomb, as in example (114), and to legitimize the need to fully dismantle Iran's nuclear program, thus preventing it from having one in the future, as in example (115):

(114) According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, during the last year alone, Iran has doubled the number of centrifuges in its underground nuclear facility in Qom. [*Directive segment*] At this late hour, there is only one way to peacefully prevent Iran from getting atomic bombs. That's by placing a clear red line on Iran's nuclear weapons program. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012, my underline)

(115) Three decades ago, President Ronald Reagan famously advised: Trust but verify. [*Directive segment*] When it comes to Iran's nuclear weapons program, here's my advice: Distrust, Dismantle, and Verify. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013, my underline)

Again, in both of the above I have underlined the segment with the easily acceptable assertions which precede the directive segments carrying implicatures with the more controversial content that Netanyahu wants to validate based on the authority – and the resulting audience's perception of truthfulness – of the sources that he recalls and recontextualizes to enact the credibility of the directives that follow. In example (114) it is the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while in example (115) it is the famous signature phrase of Ronald Reagan who used it to describe the US-Soviet Union relations in the last years of the Cold War, and which Netanyahu reformulates to imply that Iran with its “nuclear weapons program” poses even graver threat to the Western world than USSR did. This way, both these examples also reveal the potential of intertextuality (which I shall discuss separately in the next subsection) in the process of the enactment of the speaker's credibility, thus illustrating that intertextual references can be effectively used with the same purpose in multiple and complementary linguistic devices and strategies.

Interestingly, however, there were also instances of the assertion-directive pattern in Netanyahu's speeches, where the assertoric component or sequence itself could be treated by some audiences/addressees as controversial enough not to validate them. Yet, such potentially less easily acceptable assertions were used in settings where the Israeli PM could have taken it for granted that the audience accepts such content as true, i.e. at the AIPAC Policy Conferences. Consider the following two examples:

(116) Iran enriches more and more uranium; It installs faster and faster centrifuges; It's still not crossed the red line I drew at the United Nations last September. But Iran is getting closer to that line, and it's putting itself in a position to cross that line very quickly once it decides to do so. [*Directive segment*] Sanctions must be coupled with a clear and credible military threat if diplomacy and sanctions fail. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2013, my underline)

(117) And here's my point. Iran continues to stand unabashedly on the wrong side of the moral divide. [*Directive segment*] And that's why we must continue to stand unequivocally on the right side of that divide. We must oppose Iran and stand up for what is right. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014, my underline)

Assertions preceding the directive segments in both of the excerpts above, in comparison to those grounded in the authority of figures or external sources that were discussed in earlier examples taken from the UN speeches, are more grounded in the exceptionally large – and quite peculiar – ideological “common ground” that Netanyahu shares with his AIPAC Policy Conference audiences, i.e. the Pro-Israeli American activists. This inherently makes such assertions potentially less easily acceptable in (micro-)contexts such as the UN General Assembly, where instead of a more uniform group of Israeli supporters, Netanyahu had to face a largely heterogeneous audience with various viewpoints, expectations, knowledge and beliefs. This reveals another essential property of this specific linguistic device and the very idea behind the enactment of the speaker’s credibility: the speaker has to continuously and cautiously adjust the form in which he/she delivers the desired content to meet the addressee’s predispositions, which supports one of the fundamental characteristics of the discourse of conflict, i.e. its strategicality in communicating in the (macro-)context of conflict. Various pragmatic choices of Netanyahu reflect the necessary and unavoidable idiosyncrasies of micro-contexts in which he spoke about the Middle East conflict in the course of the six years analyzed, yet they simultaneously show that he remained consequent and uniform in the general range of topics covered and goals pursued in all these speeches. This will be further illustrated in the remaining two subsections, where I will show that although there some audience-dependent differences in the use of intertextual references and historical analogy in Netanyahu’s speeches, they all carry content and pursue goals that are in line with the major content regularities identified in subsection 1.1 above and that, as such, they are also legitimate constituents of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict.

2.6. Intertextuality

The analysis revealed a huge share of intertextuality in this discourse of conflict, which each of Netanyahu’s speeches – just like his 2009 Knesset Swearing In Ceremony address analyzed in Part 1 of this chapter – having at least a few different intertextual references strategically intertwined into the content. On balance, the entire resource included:

quotes from the founder of Zionism Theodore Herzl and other Zionist authority figures such as Moshe Hess or Uri Zvi Greenberg; quotes from political authority figures such as David Ben Gurion, Yitzhk Rabin, Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, Thomas Jefferson or Ronald Reagan; quotes from religious authority figures such as Rabbi Ovadia Yosef; quotes from Israeli legal acts such as the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty and other legal documents of major importance to the establishment and practice of the Israeli statehood; quotes from religious sources; numerous references to the Holocaust, World War II; words or proverbs in Hebrew; speaker's narratives of personal experiences; quotes from sources or persons representing the opposing parties to the Middle East conflict.

In majority of cases, this huge resource was used to support the speaker's viewpoints and/or to enact his credibility for the purposes of validating future more controversial messages, but the analysis revealed a specific speaker's logic in the choice of particular intertextual references in individual speeches and, more specifically, in the functions they played in these speeches. Generally, apart from statehood-constitutive Israeli legal documents, the text structures designed for local audiences in Israel included the greatest number of quotes from or references to Zionist or religious authority figures and sources. This is directly linked to the predispositions of Netanyahu's audiences in the Knesset and in Israel as being familiar with these resources and accepting them as unquestionably truthful and credible. For this reason, they were used to extend their aura of credibility and legitimization onto ideas and messages that were somehow controversial – even if not for the Israelis themselves, but for the international community, as the issue of (the “united”) Jerusalem as the Israeli capital:

(118) Uri Zvi Greenberg [wrote]: *"and I say: there is one truth and not two. As there is one sun and as there are not two Jerusalems."* (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, June 1, 2011)

(119) "Be glad with Jerusalem and rejoice in her", said the Prophet Isaiah (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 28, 2014)

Both of the examples above are meant to legitimize the Israeli right to have (the “united”) Jerusalem as its capital, but their function is to primarily strengthen the local audience's belief that the international community unjustifiably questions and criticizes this state of affairs.

Netanyahu's UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference speeches were, in turn, the scene for intertextual references legitimizing, both, the Jerusalem case and the Israeli statehood, as a matter of an implied refutation of the criticism mentioned above and as an

implied response to non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by the Palestinians, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, as in the examples (120) and (121) below:

(120) As the prophet Amos said: *They shall rebuild ruined cities and inhabit them, they shall plant vineyards and drink their wine, they shall till gardens and eat their fruit. And I will plant them upon their soil, never to be uprooted again.* (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013)

(121) Isaiah, our great prophet of peace, taught us nearly 3,000 years ago in Jerusalem to speak truth to power. *For the sake of Zion, I will not be silent. For the sake of Jerusalem, I will not be still. Until her justice shines bright, And her salvation glows like a flaming torch.* (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)

Another significant group of intertextual references designed for these audiences included quotes from the Israeli opponents to the Middle East conflict, some of whom either spoke to the UN General Assembly in temporal proximity to Netanyahu's speeches or were somehow affiliated with them – even if only through Netanyahu's forced construals. Such intertextual references were meant to immediately delegitimize these parties and to strengthen the impact of other messages communicated by Netanyahu in the speeches, for example, the issue of the "Iranian nuclear threat". Consider the following examples:

(122) Just listen to Ayatollah Rafsanjani who said, I quote: "The use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything, however it would only harm the Islamic world." Rafsanjani said: "It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality." (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)

(123) Iran's rulers say "Israel is a one bomb country." The head of Hezbollah says: "If all the Jews gather in Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide." (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

These two are particularly interesting, as they illustrate the general recontextualization pattern that Netanyahu used to discredit the Israeli opponents in front of the UN General Assembly and AIPAC Policy Conference audiences, in each case choosing quotes – or rather fragments of quotes (sometimes from various speakers as in example (123)) – that he combined to create the effect of controversy of the quoted persons' intentions. This way, he could provoke emotive reactions in the audiences, forcing them to infer that specific Israel-belligerent parties to the Middle East conflict are, either individually or collectively, anti-Semitic and driven by the will to liquidate the state of Israel. This, in turn, enabled him to force a construal of Israel as an object of unjustified persecution and hatred, which was further developed by means of

elaborate historical analogies established between the current situation of Israel and the WW II events (see subsection 2.7 below). All these efforts were obviously oriented at enacting his credibility for the purposes of legitimizing his simultaneous calls for an international support in targeting the “Iranian nuclear threat”.

Alternatively, especially in speeches designed for potentially most Israel-favorable audiences such as those of the AIPAC Policy Conference, Netanyahu would often resort to quotes from authority figures that the American addressee was perfectly familiar with. What is even more important, in this respect he would choose those fragments that could be interpreted as communicating explicit support for Israel or that, generally, were in line with the ideological principles presented as underlying the Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict. Consider the following examples:

(124) President Harry Truman, the first leader to recognize Israel, has this to say, “*I have faith in Israel and I believe that it has a glorious future – not just as another sovereign nation, but as an embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization.*” (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)

(125) I read Jefferson's timeless words, "*We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.*" I read Lincoln's immortal address, "*government of the people, for the people, by the people.*" Now, let me tell you why these words resonate so powerfully with me and with all Israelis - because they're rooted in ideas first championed by our people, the Jewish people, the idea that all men are created in God's image, that no ruler is above the law, that everyone is entitled to justice. These are revolutionary Jewish ideas, and they were spoken thousands of years ago - when vast empires ruled the earth, vast slave empires ruled the world. And the Jews spoke these truths. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, May 23, 2011)

(126) The rebirth of Israel is one of the greatest events in history. I think Churchill said it transcends generations, it transcends centuries. He said it is significant in the perspective of thousands of years. We never lose sight of that perspective. We shall always defend the one and only Jewish state. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2013)

In each of the three cases above, the intertextual references are meant to strengthen the positive image of Israel, even to the extent of implicitly signaling that the state of Israel realizes the myth of the Jewish chosenness as “an embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization”, including democracy presented by Netanyahu as “rooted in ideas first championed by (...) the Jewish people”. This, in turn, is meant to legitimize the establishment of the state of Israel as an event that “is significant in the perspective of thousands of years” which is meant to automatically discredit all the parties that do not recognize the Israeli

statehood. Altogether, such intertextual references are primarily oriented at reinforcing ideology and consolidating it with the ideological background of the audiences, which is an essential element of the process of enacting the speaker's credibility.

Another interesting group of examples illustrating the strategic use and adjustment of intertextual references to the audience's predisposition includes the following two examples:

(127) You remember that beer commercial, "*this Bud's for you*"? Well, when you see Iran building ICBMs, just remember, America, that Scud's for you. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

(128) And guess what tune they're singing in Tehran? It's not "*God Bless America*," it's "*death to America*." And they chant this as brazenly as ever. Some charm offensive. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

The excerpts in examples (127) and (128) come from the same speech, i.e. Netanyahu's 2014 AIPAC Policy Conference address and rely on the same mechanism as example (113), where Netanyahu recontextualized (and reformulated) the famous Ronald Reagan's saying. In example (127) Netanyahu does essentially the same, but with a slogan taken from a popular American beer commercial, which he reformulates and, thus, recontextualizes to assert that the Iranian "Scuds" are developed and destined to target the US, by which he once again implies that the threat posed by the "Iranian nuclear weapons program" has a global range. Interestingly, also the very use of the word "Scud" has considerable intertextual potential here: Scud is the name of a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed and widely exported by the USSR during the Cold War, commonly used by countries such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and Syria in their armed conflicts. This way, by referring to "Scud", Netanyahu draws an implied historical analogy between the Cold War and the contemporary tensions between Iran and the international community, instilling in his American audiences the aura of threat. The same function has the "*death to America*" phrase in example (128), but in this specific case Netanyahu recontextualizes the popular anti-American slogan first introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This slogan has been widely used during various protests in Iran since then and appears on state-sponsored murals in major Iranian cities, including Teheran. Here, Netanyahu follows it with an assertion "they chant this as brazenly as ever" to intensify the impression of the ideological clash between the Western world and Iran, which in turn is done to imply that currently, the anti-American hatred has increased and might materialize in the Iranian ICBM attack on the US.

The last example that I would like present here is an even more complex blend of intertextuality and historical analogy:

(129) Some commentators would have you believe that stopping Iran from getting the bomb is more dangerous than letting Iran have the bomb. They say that a military confrontation with Iran would undermine the efforts already underway; that it would be ineffective; and that it would provoke an even more vindictive response by Iran. I've heard these arguments before. In fact, I've read them before -- In my desk, I have copies of an exchange of letters between the World Jewish Congress and the United States War Department. Here are the letters: The year was 1944. The World Jewish Congress implored the American government to bomb Auschwitz. The reply came five days later. I want to read it to you. "*Such an operation could be executed only by diverting considerable air support essential to the success of our forces elsewhere...and in any case, it would be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not warrant the use of our resources...*" And, my friends, here's the most remarkable sentence of all, and I quote: "*Such an effort might provoke even more vindictive action by the Germans.*" Think about that -- "even more vindictive action" -- than the Holocaust. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 6, 2012)

The entire excerpt in (129) is an elaborate illustration of the mechanism that I have briefly described in example (122) and (123) above. Again, Netanyahu uses quotes from Israel's critics (although in this case without an explicit attribution of authorship), that he freely combines and, thus, recontextualizes to create the background for a historical analogy, in which he discredits them and compares the current Israel-Iran relations to the situation of Jews during the WWII. This is done by an intertextual reference that he makes through quoting a response of the American government to a letter written by the World Jewish Congress, in which it refused to bomb the Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz -- and which is an implied comparison to the current American government's refusal to take military action in Iran. Moreover, the entire excerpt also well illustrates the pattern of moving from most acceptable assertions to the more controversial ones, validating them based on the credibility of preceding content. The culmination of controversy also comes at very end, but again, it is hidden by the speaker under a forced construal to be inferred by the audience, in which Netanyahu implies that the American government and, more specifically, the US President Barrack Obama ignores the threat to the Jews just as it was ignored during the WWII. This way, example (129) illustrates how within one paragraph of a text structure various linguistic strategies and devices intertwine and complement each other, carrying repeatable implicit messages, pursuing repeatable goals, and forming continuum of content and functions of this discourse of conflict.

2.7. Historical analogy

In this subsection I would like discuss selected examples of historical analogy used by Netanyahu in his speeches, focusing on the audience-dependent differences in the use of this strategy. Just as in the case of intertextuality, in speeches delivered in the Knesset, where the audience/addressees shared more knowledge and ideological background with the speaker, Netanyahu would most often draw historical analogies between the contemporary situation of Israel and the history of Zionism, as in example (130), or the history of the Jewish nation, as in example (131):

(130) Today we know that Herzl's most remarkable ability was his awareness to the changing reality and to come up with a solution, even if this solution was not accepted among the Jewish leaders of the time. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 16, 2011)

(131) Our policy is guided by two main principles: the first is "if someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first," and the second is "if anyone harms us, his blood is on his own hands."For two thousand years our people could not realize these two basic principles of self defense. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 31, 2011)

In each case, these historical analogies were used by the Israeli PM either as a source of inspiration for him as the Israeli leader (as in example (130)) or as “a lesson” that has been learnt by the Jewish nation (as in example (131)). This, in turn, enabled him to validate the messages implied: in example (130) , based on the authority of Herzl, he legitimized his potential “unpopular decisions” as right, while in example (131) he legitimized the Israeli increased investments into defense facilities.

Nevertheless, when Netanyahu faced international audiences, there was specifically one major type of historical analogies that he would use most often and in almost every such speech, i.e. historical analogies based on references to WWI. Consider the following examples:

(132) Perhaps some of you think that this man and his odious regime threaten only the Jews. You're wrong. History has shown us time and again that what starts with attacks on the Jews eventually ends up engulfing many others. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)

- (133) I speak here today in the hope that Churchill's assessment of the "unteachability of mankind" is for once proven wrong. I speak here today in the hope that we can learn from history -- that we can prevent danger in time. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)
- (134) And like the belated victory over the Nazis, the forces of progress and freedom will prevail only after an horrific toll of blood and fortune has been exacted from mankind. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)
- (135) We've seen that happen before too. Some 70 years ago, the world saw another fanatic ideology bent on world conquest. It went down in flames. But not before it took millions of people with it. Those who opposed that fanaticism waited too long to act. In the end they triumphed, but at an horrific cost. My friends, we cannot let that happen again. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)
- (136) If the Western powers had drawn clear red lines during the 1930s, I believe they would have stopped Nazi aggression and World War II might have been avoided. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)
- (137) The last century has taught us that when a radical regime with global ambitions gets awesome power, sooner or later, its appetite for aggression knows no bounds. That's the central lesson of the 20th century. Now, we cannot forget it. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, October 1, 2013)
- (138) Militant Islam's ambition to dominate the world seems mad. But so too did the global ambitions of another fanatic ideology that swept to power eight decades ago. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)
- (139) Seventy-five years ago, many leaders around the world put their heads in the sand. Untold millions died in the war that followed. Ultimately, two of history's greatest leaders helped turn the tide. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill helped save the world. Indeed they deserve every applause. They helped save the world, but they were too late to save six million of my own people, the Jewish people. The future of the Jewish state can never depend on the goodwill of even the greatest of men. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)
- (140) Throughout our history, the slanders against the Jewish people always preceded physical attacks against us. In fact they were used to justify these attacks. The Jews were called the well-poisoners of mankind; the fomenters of instability; the source of all evil under the sun. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)
- (141) The Jewish people know the cost of being defenseless against those who would exterminate us. We will never let that happen again. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2013)
- (142) 70 years ago, our people, the Jewish people, were left for dead. We came back to life. We will never be brought to the brink of extinction again. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

Examples (132)-(142) are only selected illustrations of a large group of similar patterns repeatedly used by Netanyahu, both, within one single speech and across many speeches delivered to the UN General Assembly and the AIPAC Policy Conference audiences. The differences between them are minor and they could as well appear within one text structure. Major popularity of such references to WW II in this rhetoric and, generally, in the Israeli political discourse, stems from at least two complementary reasons. First, WWII has had an unprecedented and unquestionable impact on the history of the Jewish nation and its national consciousness, and as such, it has become one of sources for building the Israeli identity – and the identity of the Israeli statehood established three years after the end of the Holocaust. For this reason, it has occupied a permanent place in the Israeli political discourse and serves as an objectified premise legitimizing the existence of the state of Israel as an entity protecting its citizens from similar atrocities and preserving the Jewish religious and cultural heritage severely affected by anti-Semitism and the largest genocide of the 20th century. Second, the events of WWII engaged and directly affected many countries and nations, this way forming a specific common ground in the international politics that political leaders often use for their individual purposes, as it is simply immediately appealing to their audiences. Thus, it is not surprising that Netanyahu also uses this resource for drawing numerous historical analogies in the discourse of the Middle East conflict, although in his case it is hard to interpret references to WWII as motivated solely by his desire to be persuasive and to quickly claim common ground with the audience.

Nonetheless, what can be said about this specific linguistic device is that in the speeches analyzed it was most often used to carry implicit messages about the Israel-Iran relations and to delegitimize the moderate reactions of the international community to the threat of nuclear weapons to be produced and used by Iran. As we can see in the examples above, Netanyahu would often compare the Iranian leaders to the Nazis or construe the vision of the Israeli nation as the first target of the Iranian weapons to legitimize various Israeli security initiatives as oriented at self-defense, or to persuade the addressees to take more decisive measures against Iran than sanctions and diplomacy. In each case, such a historical analogy carried a sort of inference to be made by the audience, this being an implicature, a presupposition or a forced construal, the content of which was validated based on the truthfulness of the historical fact referred to. Some historical analogies also included elements of intertextuality further supporting the process of enacting the speaker's credibility.

The fact that in the text structures analyzed this device was used together with other tools of persuasion and legitimization to communicate messages under the 7 content-related

regularities that I identified in section 1.2, provokes several observations as to the general status of linguistic tools in political genres and, specifically, in the (potentially new) genre of the discourse of conflict. First, the linguistic devices described here – and potentially a number of other tools that might appear in other examples of the discourse of conflict – were the exact speaker's means of achieving, both, the ad hoc micro-goals and the general hyper-goal of legitimization in the macro-context of conflict. Second, by overlapping, they in fact complemented each other in communicating repeatable messages and serving repeatable functions. Third, and as a result of the second observation, they were the exact bits and pieces that enabled me to work out a list of major recurrent themes in the rhetoric analyzed, thus providing me with the much needed opportunity to test my top-down assumption that the discourse of conflict is a macrostructure in a bottom-up, data-driven manner. This, in turn, links my discussion here with the remaining two micro-criteria characterizing political genres, i.e. the strategicality of form and content and the hierarchy of goals in the discourse of conflict, which I am going to account for using insights directly resulting from the analysis of linguistic devices presented in this section.

3. Discourse of conflict is strategic in form and distribution of content

This micro-criterion is an **essential follow-up to the macro-criterion no 2**, which I described in Part 1 of this chapter pointing to a specific three-stage coverage of the topic of the Middle East conflict in Netanyahu's 2009 Knesset Swearing In Ceremony speech, and at the same time, a **governing property organizing the pragmatic choices** of Netanyahu manifested by the exact linguistic tool that he used and adjusted to the predispositions of his audiences to talk about the Middle East conflict in his speeches delivered in the Knesset, at the UN General Assemblies and at the AIPAC Policy Conferences. In this section I would like to include more insights as to how the three-stage pattern was followed in the entire corpus and how Netanyahu's pragmatic choices in the speeches could be generally explained by theories that have their roots in social psychology and some classical approaches to persuasion in discourse.

The strategicality of form and content of the discourse of content reveals itself in a particular three-stage organization of individual text structures analyzed, all of which followed the same sequence described below:

Stage 1: The speaker focuses on the axiological dimension of the conflict (values, beliefs that are threatened and fought for, emotions that assist this ‘struggle’) and expresses his attitude to the conflict – usually presented as the expression of the attitude of the community that he represents. This means that the opening section of each of the text structures analyzed was, essentially, setting the tone for the discussion of various aspects of the Middle East conflict that appeared in the remainder of the speech by means of the 7 content-related regularities described in section 1.1 of Part 2. Here, Netanyahu focused on presenting values and beliefs that are cherished by him and the Israelis, which he did to sketch the axiological background of the Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict, and which he then used to mark contrast between Israel and its opponents. Most typically, at this stage he would use a number of intertextual references, implicatures, presuppositions and most easily acceptable assertions to:

- highlight the positive image of the state of Israel as an “outpost of democracy” in the Middle East,
- to stress the “eternal right” of the Jews to the land of Israel and
- to create the image of Israel as ready and willing to make peace with the Palestinianians.

Thus, at this stage he would also construe the characterization of Israel as a discourse space of the conflict – and as its major IDC element. For these purposes, he would predicate facts and/or focus on the undeniable or historically accepted ideological groundworks, which his audiences would most easily accept. As a result, Stage 1 was where Netanyahu first expressed the common ground uniting him and his addressees, and first enacted his credibility through content that was potentially least controversial – as the audiences were generally familiar with what he was talking about. As far as his speeches in the Knesset are concerned, in this place he would most often talk about Zionism, Israeli influential political and religious authorities and key events in the history of Israel, focusing on their importance to the establishment and maintenance of the Israeli statehood **in relation to** and **irrespective of** the Middle East conflict. When it comes to speeches that he delivered to the international audiences, at this stage he would focus on, for example, accounts of historical events in which a specific body (the UN or the AIPAC) supported Israel and its statehood, references to the history of the Jewish nation (starting from the Biblical times to WWII), and explicit expression of mutual sympathies and gratitude – which was specifically the case of his AIPAC Policy Conference speeches. In sum, all these endeavours provided him with the necessary basis for introducing more (and most) controversial content in the next stage.

Stage 2: Based on the axiological background, the speaker stresses the physical dimension of the conflict (accounts of physical attacks and use/development of weapons, negotiations with the opponents, legislation introduced in reaction to the conflict; often supported by ‘facts and figures’). This means that following axiology-based references, Netanyahu moved on to some more ‘facts-like’ and/or specific context-activating and context-realizing references, in which he provide more details as to the physical threat that assists or results from the Middle East conflict, and as to the specific countermeasures and/or solutions to the conflict situation. Other more physical, ‘facts-like’ references that activated and realized the context of conflict in 2009-2014 Netanyahu’s speeches included accounts of: past battles and wars with all the sides to the Middle East conflict, reactions of the international community to these events, the terrorist attacks on the Israeli politicians and civilians, successful and unsuccessful peace negotiations, etc. Most of these events took place not long before the time of speaking and/or are events that Netanyahu’s audience is likely to remember from their own experience. If he referred to events that took place much earlier, for example, several years or decades ago, he did it to make a historical analogy between them and the current situation. This brings us to the seminal property of this stage: although Netanyahu focused here on the physical and tangible dimension of the Middle East conflict, this is the stage at which the input of ideology in his speeches was the biggest. This is caused by the fact that this is where he most often used complex patterns of presuppositions and implicatures, presuppositions triggered by comparisons (in which he used and developed the positive image of Israel construed in Stage 1, contrasting it with negatively conceptualized Palestinian Authority, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and other parties presented as hostile towards Israel, such as the UN Human Rights Council), forced construals (including those followed by rhetorical questions), and reached the key point of the assertion-directive pattern, where he would finally introduce the directive component. All these devices, as we could see in the previous section, communicated the key messages related to the current Israeli stance in the conflict: blaming the Palestinian Authority for deadlock in the peace negotiations and accusing it of cooperation with terrorist organizations, proximizing the “Iranian nuclear threat” to convince the international community to take military action in Iran, rejecting the UN resolutions and reports of the UN Human Rights Council criticizing Israel, and – most importantly – legitimizing the activity of Israel in the Middle East conflict as peace-oriented self-defense. Interestingly, Stage 2 in all the speeches analyzed has also had its individual “dynamics of controversy”. Here, Netanyahu would gradually go from the least controversial to the most controversial assertions that he would support and validate by various linguistic tools to finally introduce the potentially most

controversial content, i.e. the directive component. Also, the message carried by the directive component would be typically followed by numerous implicatures, presuppositions and forced construals, the aim of which was to add something to this message in order to legitimize it in front of the audiences/addressees and further enact the speaker's credibility. This way, Stage 2 can be interpreted as one in which controversy culminates, which in turn means that in Stage 3 Netanyahu primarily tried to decrease the controversial effect of his messages and further validate his claims by supplementary content and pragmalinguistic devices.

Stage 3: The speaker joins the axiological and the physical dimension of the conflict in order for these two to work as sources of mutually legitimizing arguments; however, there is a visible renewed focus on axiology towards the end of the text structures. This means that the speaker mixes values and facts, mostly in statements oriented at the future, in order to further legitimize the decisions, solutions or counter-measures that have been proposed so far. This stage in Netanyahu's speeches would usually entail a follow-up of what has been communicated in Stage 2, but essentially supplemented with more content and more linguistic devices that added something to the controversial messages introduced earlier. Typically, this would involve his focus on projecting the positive consequences of decisions or solutions that he offered – or negative consequences should these decisions or solutions be not introduced. These Netanyahu's counstruals would be followed by a gradual come back to what he did in Stage 1, i.e. expressing the common ground uniting him and his addressees, predicating facts and/or focusing on the undeniable or historically accepted ideological groundworks, which he would do to neutralize these controversies and, thus, to validate and legitimize the suggested solutions as positive and right. For these purposes, he would, again, use a number of intertextual references, implicatures, presuppositions and easily acceptable assertions highlighting the positive image of the state of Israel as democratic, peace-oriented state promoting the Western values and standards in the Middle East, in order to extend the aura of their credibility onto preceding controversial messages. Still, however, in this combination he would always finish his speech with an explicit or implicit expression of the ideological common ground between him and his audiences. Examples (143)-(151), which are the very ending paragraphs of selected Netanyahu's speeches, well illustrate this finishing strategic comeback to axiology:

- (143) I pray in my heart that we – Israel’s leaders and elected officials – can follow the principle that guided Yitzhak Rabin: to do what's best for our people. I pray that we always remember to respect each other and the laws of the country when faced with the fateful decisions. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, February 3, 2010)
- (144) I call upon you, Zionist members of the opposition, rise above party considerations, set aside your personal interests. Join us based on the principles that I have outlined, and let us present a united front for security, for peace, for the State. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, May 16, 2011)
- (145) Facing the tremendous tumults in our world, I tell you, Members of Knesset, that the State of Israel continues to be a great success story. More than ever, I am convinced that we will overcome all of the challenges that I mentioned: we will strengthen our national resilience, we will build our country, we will develop our economy and bring success, security and peace to the people in Zion. (B. Netanyahu, Knesset, October 14, 2013)
- (146) In the spirit of the timeless words spoken to Joshua over 3,000 years ago, let us be strong and of good courage. Let us confront this peril, secure our future and, God willing, forge an enduring peace for generations to come. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 24, 2009)
- (147) We champion these principles not despite of our traditions but because of them. We heed the words of the Jewish prophets Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah to treat all with dignity and compassion, to pursue justice and cherish life and to pray and strive for peace. These are the timeless values of my people and these are the Jewish people's greatest gift to mankind. Let us commit ourselves today to defend these values so that we can defend our freedom and protect our common civilization. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 27, 2012)
- (148) Let's light a torch of truth and justice to safeguard our common future. (B. Netanyahu, UNGA, September 29, 2014)
- (149) We are gathered here today because we believe in these common ideals of our great civilization. And because of these ideals, I am certain that Israel and America will always stand together. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 22, 2010)
- (150) In this generation, we are blessed to live in an age when there is a Jewish state capable of defending the Jewish people. And we are doubly blessed to have so many friends like you, Jews and non-Jews alike, who love the State of Israel and support its right to defend itself. So as I leave you tonight I thank you for your friendship. Thank you for your courage. Thank you for standing up for the one and only Jewish state. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 6, 2012)
- (151) Ladies and gentlemen, my friends, never forget -- America and Israel stand for life. We stand together on the right side of the moral divide. We stand together on the right side of history. So stand tall, stand strong, stand proud. (B. Netanyahu, AIPAC, March 4, 2014)

These three stages described above reappear in this form throughout all the 21 Netanyahu's speeches that I have analyzed. The only differences identified are in the means that Netanyahu employed to realize each of the stages of this pattern, i.e. in the exact linguistic devices that he used to activate and realize the 7 content-related regularities connected with the macro-context of the Middle East conflict which I described in section 1.1 of this chapter. As we already know from my presentation of examples in section 2, these tools and the functions they played in communicating messages organized around recurrent themes differed depending on heterogeneity of Netanyahu's audiences and the amount of background knowledge that he shared with them. Nevertheless, these idiosyncrasies were noticeable only at the micro-level of analysis, since at the macrostructural level of considerations, they still formed recognizable, goal-oriented patterns of communication in the context of conflict. Thus, again, they fulfilled the major criteria characterizing political genres and enabled me to support my thesis statement with some validating evidence.

What might add more to these considerations is the relation between these pragmlinguistic patterns illustrated in the data and the general socio-psychological explanations of the rationale for their distribution in the text structures analyzed in this specific way, aided by some classical approaches to persuasion in discourse. The first hint comes from the rules of primacy and recency (Hovland 1957; Clark, Stevenson and Rutter 1986), according to which people tend to memorize messages that are written/said/shown at the very beginning and at the very end of what they read/listen to/watch. For this reason, if the speaker wants to highlight something, they will put this information in a prominent place – potentially at the beginning or at the end of the speech. Conversely, if the speaker wants to conceal some information or present it as less meaningful, they will put it in a place of lesser importance, for example, in the body of the speech/the middle part of the statement and in the surrounding of other messages and arguments. Also, such message is likely to be communicated implicitly, as this enables the speaker to shift the responsibility for deducing it onto the addressee/the audience. When we relate these rules to the properties of Netanyahu's 2009-2014 speeches delivered in the Knesset, at the United Nations General Assemblies and at the AIPAC Policy Conferences, it occurs that this might be the exact motivation why Stage 1 and Stage 3 in the text structures abound in pragmlinguistic devices and content oriented at positive presentation of Israel as, generally, a state, and as an entity engaged in conflict. Such construals are aimed at presenting the Middle East conflict as a struggle in which Israel has been caught up involuntarily, but with which it has to deal, since this is a struggle over its sovereignty and preservation of the good “Western values” and standards of democracy in the

region “in turmoil”. This, in turn, once validated and internalized by the audiences, provides Netanyahu with grounds to legitimize Israeli military standoffs against the Palestinians as necessary self- defense against offenders. Moreover, his focus on and elaborate coverage of peace initiatives taken by the Israeli government and presented as ruthlessly rejected by the Palestinian side to the conflict, enable him to consequently force this positive perception of Israel as tirelessly working for peace. The same applies to the Israel-Iran relations, where Israel is presented as the victim and target of a vindictive and dehumanized regime driven by “fanatic creed”. Most probably, the existence and prevalence of such messages in the opening and closing parts of the text structures entails that this is what Netanyahu wants his audiences to remember and immediately associate with Israel in relation to the Middle East Conflict. In this respect, as far as the pragmalinguistic patterns and content of Stage 2 of text structures are concerned, its focus on the physical and tangible dimensions of the struggle with the Palestinians, Hamas or Iran might mean that Netanyahu attempts to conceal the potential offensive role of Israel (and, thus, rebut criticism and accusations of genocide), and replace it with an image of state that “justly defends itself and its citizens” against a range of threats.

Another helpful hint in explaining the strategicity of structure and content of the discourse of conflict comes from the theory of *latitude of acceptance* (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Kiesler, Collins and Miller 1969; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992) and the theory of *consistency in belief* (Festinger 1957). At the cognitive level, both of these underlie the process of enacting the speaker’s credibility in front of their audiences and, as such, explain the speaker-stimulated mechanisms taking place in the minds of the audiences. In political communication – and in discourse of conflict – the speaker’s chances for success (i.e. being persuasive and gaining legitimization) depend from the ability to adjust content to the values and beliefs cherished by the addressee. This is a difficult task, yet the audiences themselves facilitate it by the mechanism of avoiding “cognitive dissonance” through adjusting the messages to their predispositions and interpreting novel content introduced by the speaker in relation to what they have already accepted and validated as credible. Also in this respect, Netanyahu’s speeches analyzed are particularly illustrative, as they reveal the strategic distribution of content and various linguistic devices, first, into specific parts of the text structures and, second, depending on the diverse audiences that he faced in the course of these six years analyzed. Simultaneously, as we could see in section 2 of this chapter, this job was mostly done by various types and patterns of inference, this way enabling to argue that the discourse of conflict is to a significant degree governed by implicitness, because the existence

of a range of potential interpretations (which the speaker may enforce or cancel accordingly) increases his rhetorical safety and the audience's chances of avoiding cognitive dissonance.

4. Discourse of conflict features a hierarchy of goals

Just as in the case of roles and patterns of behavior in the discourse of conflict described in macro-criterion 5 in Part 1 to this chapter, there is also a specific organization of goals that the speaker discursively pursues in the macro-context of conflict. This is essentially a hierarchy, in which apart from legitimization, i.e. the hyper-goal of political communication, the speaker wants to achieve some specific larger (i.e. macro-) goals related to the conflict itself, and a number of *ad hoc* micro-goals, such as those that I have mentioned as functions of linguistic devices used by Netanyahu, that is, for example, to rebut criticism, to gain support for a specific cause, to discredit political opponents, to build a positive image of his country on the international arena, etc. As long as these goals are, generally, typical for the domain of political discourse, it is important to note that they are dynamically dependent from the changing situational requirements (i.e. micro-contexts) and, as such, may vary over time and audiences, thus illustrating what (at a given moment and with given addressees) the speaker tries to achieve. In the macro-context such as a conflict – and more specifically, the Middle East conflict – this dynamics has depended from, both, rather objective factors such as exacerbation of relations between the conflicted parties resulting from/leading to military standoffs (including other situations entailing mutual violence) or increased pressures or criticism of the international community, and some more subjective factors such as Netanyahu's own judgment of what he, as a political leader deemed important 'here' and 'now' – irrespective of the objective elements of context.

The goals recognized in Netanyahu's 2009-2014 speeches that I analyzed well-illustrate this dichotomy. On the one hand, over these six years of the Israeli participation in the Middle East conflict that my corpus covers, there were several hundred instances of mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians or terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah, ranging from incidents to longer military conflicts. Major Israeli standoffs in this period of time include 2008-2009 Gaza War, that is, the "Operation Cast Lead", 2012 "Operation Pillar of Defense" and 2014 "Operation Protective Edge". Additionally, as a direct consequence of all these instances of violence, over these six years Israel had to struggle with large pressures of the international community, including the USA

insisting on Israel to support a two-state solution and cease settlement construction, and the United Nations' criticism expressed in the 2009 Goldstone Report that classified some Israeli military actions during the Gaza War as war-crimes, and in the following years – when the UN voted for upgrading the Palestinian Authority's status to the one of a 'non-member state', which Israel reacted to by not transferring about \$100 million in tax revenue owed to the Palestinian Authority, and by resuming its plans to build further settlements in the West Bank. On the other hand, however, as the analysis has shown, in the course of these six years Netanyahu in his speeches also pursued goals that were not directly related to the circumstances described above. Rather, these were motivations that he had and expressed as part of the general and quite fixed Israeli stance and Israeli interests in the Middle East conflict, and that, interestingly, sometimes seemed to completely detract from what, at a given moment in time, Israel was faced with from the side of the international community or its opponents in the conflict.

In this section of my discussion I would like to present what goals were pursued by Netanyahu in his speeches and what speaker-established hierarchy in the discourse of conflict they have formed in the period between 2009 and 2014. In the course of identifying and listing these goals the idea of legitimization as a hyper-goal of political communication was used as a top-level category, but with a special focus on how the macro-context of the Middle East conflict conditions this and the lower-level goals. Additionally, I remained sensitive to all potential differences between the goals pursued by Netanyahu in speeches delivered in a given year but in front of various audiences, which was done to – should such differences arise – compare what he sought to achieve with his local audiences and the international ones, be that the pro-Israeli audiences of the AIPAC Policy Conference or more impartial and diversified audiences of the United Nations General Assembly.

Year 2009 in this discourse of conflict was the time when Netanyahu again assumed the office of the Prime Minister of Israel. For this reason, his speeches delivered in this year featured possibly the widest array of explicitly expressed and implied goals (as manifested by his pragmatic choices) and in this respect, his Knesset inaugural address was particularly illustrative of the hierarchy of goals pursued by Israel in the Middle East conflict. Individual motivations presented in this speech, such as to convince international community of the need to take decisive measures against the growing threat of “nuclear armed Iran”, to avoid further terror and bloodshed in the Israeli-Palestinian relations or to increase public safety in Israel were linked by the speaker to some higher-level motivations. These were, essentially, to force recognition of the Israeli statehood in the region as a solution to the conflict with the

Palestinians, and to stress that in the course of the upcoming years Israel will seek international support in taking these “decisive measures” against Iran. Interestingly, at this point it could only be assumed that this is, specifically, international military intervention, as in this speech Netanyahu has not clarified what these “decisive measures” against Iran are.

Also in this speech, the Israeli PM initiated the trend of presenting the motivations of the conflicted parties as opposing, which he then significantly developed in other (micro)-contexts.

Nevertheless, in comparison to speeches that followed (both in front of international audiences and in the later years), I would claim that Netanyahu’s 2009 Knesset Swearing In speech is most moderate in terms of explicit negative-presentation of the Palestinians. In this respect, his 2009 AIPAC Policy Conference and UN General Assembly speeches marked a significant difference, as there Netanyahu seemed to have two major goals: to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority in front of the international audiences by blaming them for the continuity of the conflict, and to draw larger attention to the “Iranian nuclear threat” as one that has global range – this done to persuade the international community of the need to force Iran to dismantle its nuclear facilities. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s 2009 UN speech was the first in the corpus to present the goal of legitimizing the “demilitarization” of the Palestinian state as part of potential peace agreement, which was supported by Netanyahu’s intensive attempts to delegitimize the post-Gaza War Goldstone Report as a document undermining the Israeli right of self-defense and favoring the “offenders”, i.e. Hamas controlling the Palestinian territory.

Goals pursued in 2010 and 2011 Netanyahu’s speeches to a large extent continued in this direction. Both in his 2010 Knesset and AIPAC Policy Conference speeches, the Israeli PM tried to discredit the Goldstone Report, which he supplemented by attempts to discredit any international community-driven initiatives for introducing peace in the Middle East. In this respect, only Netanyahu’s 2011 AIPAC speech was somehow different, as there he highlighted the positive impact of the American (implied political and financial) support for Israel, legitimizing the need for continued Israel-US cooperation by the Arab Spring destabilization in the region and the growing threat of the “nuclear armed Iran”. Simultaneously, this implied proximization of this “nuclear threat”, significantly aided by arguments that the Arab Spring has created grounds for terrorist organizations to claim power and introduce its “fanatic” rule. This background has been used by Netanyahu to, again, blame the Palestinian Authority for the continuity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and legitimize its demilitarization as a necessary condition for peace with Israel. This, in turn, was

accompanied by Netanyahu's elaborate positive presentation of Israel and negative presentation of the Palestinian Authority in front of all audiences of his speeches, which further strengthened the construed polarization of goals of the conflicted parties, with Israel being presented as oriented at solving/neutralizing the conflict and the Palestinian side being presented as oriented at maintaining/intensifying it.

Year 2012, in turn, brought a significant narrowing of goals pursued by Netanyahu in his speeches. As I have mentioned earlier, his AIPAC Policy Conference and UN General Assembly addresses were primarily oriented at calls to target the "Iranian nuclear program" with the threat of international military intervention in Iran (this time expressed explicitly), with a major decrease in Netanyahu's interest in the Israeli-Palestinian relations in comparison to speeches he delivered earlier. His 2012 AIPAC speech had no references to the Palestinians at all, while his 2012 UN speech was significantly dominated by the topic of Iran; as long as the goal of presenting the Palestinian Authority as unwilling to achieve peace was still there, it was secondary to the general Netanyahu's motivation to present the "Iranian nuclear threat" as global and requiring immediate action.

Interestingly, years 2013 and 2014 only partly continued in this vein. Despite US President Barack Obama's refusal to set an ultimatum for Iran to relinquish its nuclear program, Netanyahu still intensively proximized the "Iranian nuclear threat", which in the case of his 2014 UN General Assembly speech was further intensified and, thus, legitimized by the growing activity of ISIS in the Middle East. Nevertheless, these two years also marked a major Netanyahu's come back to the topic of the Palestinians and to specific goals that he wanted to achieve in front of his audiences discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This way, again, he would intensively present Israel as peace-oriented, legitimizing all Israeli military operations as necessary self-defense, while the Palestinian side would be intensively delegitimized as an uncooperative offender influenced by Hamas that Israel had to target during the "Operation Protective Edge" in summer 2014. Simultaneously, in his 2014 UN General Assembly speech Netanyahu again tried to discredit the United Nations Human Rights Council, because following the summer 2014 events, the body launched another inquiry into violations that might have been committed by Israel in Gaza.

Nonetheless, irrespective of the varied distribution of this repeatable set of goals pursued by Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 speeches there was one stable motivation that transpired from all his pragmatic choices in this discourse of conflict. It was the goal of legitimizing the existence of the state of Israel (with its territorial area and the capital in Jerusalem), which appeared throughout all text structure analyzed. This specific goal brings

us to the goal explicitly expressed by the Israeli PM as the main motivation of the Israeli government, that is, peace and security in the Middle East. This declaration has reappeared in a number of speeches in the corpus, in each case being highlighted by Netanyahu as the ultimate aspiration and the main premise legitimizing the Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict, including the stance towards the “Iranian nuclear threat”. Obviously, the most salient topic for communicating this goal was non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by the Palestinian Authority, but it also entailed his discussion and delegitimization of all parties that share this viewpoint, i.e. Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS. This way, each of the recurrent goals that I described in the previous paragraphs has featured an element of (presupposed or implied) peace-orientation or security-orientation, skillfully combined and intertwined by the Israeli PM as two necessary conditions for peace in the Middle East conflict. As a result, all his attempts to legitimize Israeli military operations, investments into Israeli self-defense or calls for the support of international community could be legitimized as resulting from, first, lack of peace with all the parties that do not recognize the Israeli statehood and, second, threats to the Israeli security resulting from the hostility of these Israel-belligerent parties. This, in turn, enables to reproduce the following hierarchy of the goals pursued by Netanyahu in this discourse of conflict:




Figure 1. Hierarchy of ‘us’ goals construed by Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 speeches.

Figure 1 above illustrates the major component elements of the ‘us’ **macro-goal of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, i.e. the goal of solving/neutralizing the conflict** that I described in macro-criterion 5 in Part 1 to this chapter. Netanyahu uses peace and security in the Middle East as the effect of this macro-goal, which is to be realized by several lower-level goals, all of which are dependent from each other and essential for the

fulfillment of the governing motivation. Hence, legitimization of the existence of the State of Israel, its territorial area and capital in Jerusalem is perceived as a must for peace and security, but it has to be supported by strong Israeli military defense capacities (against all aggressors, i.e. Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, ISIS and Palestinian individuals hostile to Israel) and demilitarization of the Palestinian state. This must be followed by mutual statehood recognition of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which at the same time becomes the basis ensuring lasting peace and security in the Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This hierarchy construed by Netanyahu also entails the opposing one, i.e. the hierarchy of goals pursued by the Israel-belligerent parties:




Figure 2. Hierarchy of ‘them’ goals construed by Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 speeches.

Figure 2 above illustrates the major component elements of the ‘them’ **macro-goal of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict, i.e. the goal of maintaining/intensifying the conflict** that I described in macro-criterion 5 in Part 1 to this chapter. Just as in the case of the ‘us’ goals presented in Figure 2, the goals ascribed by Netanyahu to the Israeli opponents in the Middle East conflict (be that active or passive opponents; see macro-criterion 5 in Part 1) are organized hierarchically. Thus, conflict and threat in the Middle East are used by Netanyahu as their main legitimization premises (and the main Israeli opponent-delegitimization premises) and as the consequence of the ‘them’ macro-goal of maintaining/intensifying the conflict. This macro-goal is, in turn, realized by several lower-level goals, all of which are dependent from each other and influential to the governing motivation. This way, refusal to recognize the Israeli statehood in the Middle East is presented by the Israeli PM as the ongoing motivation of all Israel-belligerent parties, which

is expressed and accompanied by their activity oriented at “wiping Israel off the face of the earth” (i.e. terrorist attacks, control of the Palestinian territories and production of new deadly weapons), and the deadlock in the direct Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations with the guilt of the Palestinian Authority. All these are followed by the generally Israel-unsupportive stance of the international community, which refuses to take “decisive measures”, condemns Israel in its reports and resolutions, and acts in favor of the Israel-belligerent parties (most of these allegations are related to the activity of UN bodies that Netanyahu criticized in his speeches). As a result, apart from receiving a hierarchy of constituent elements of the ‘them’ macro-goal of the discourse conflict, we also receive a hierarchy of reasons of the Middle East conflict as they are seen by the Israeli side to this struggle.

Goals presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 interestingly overlap with all seven content-related regularities that I described in subsection 1.1 of Part 2 to this chapter, this way illustrating that recurrent activation and realization of specific aspects of the Middle East conflict by Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 speeches was a matter of his conscious choice driven by precise motivations and performed through consciously selected pragmalinguistic devices. In consequence, we finally reach the point at which the last criterion characterizing political genres, i.e. their specific and hierarchical goal-orientedness, fulfills itself in the discourse of conflict and , in fact, summarizes all my considerations included in both parts of this chapter. Starting from the macro-considerations of discourse of conflict being a flexible and dynamic cluster of conventionalized and goal-oriented ways of communicating in the macro-context of conflict, I moved on to discussing it as a macrostructure that is shaped by specific functional, structural and content-related regularities. These, in turn, are realized by particular functional and goal-oriented micropragmatic parameters and linguistic devices, all of which – although dependent from particular micro-contexts and strategically adjusted to them – are forming patterns that exist above the level of individual text structures, this way further contributing to the formation of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict. This constant micro-macro and macro-micro relationship entails hierarchical organization and mutual influence of all genre-constitutive elements: micro/macropragmatic parameters, micro/macro-context and, finally, micro/macro-goals. In the political genre of the discourse of conflict, these micro-goals – just like the pragmalinguistic devices used by the speaker – form larger conventionalized patterns of more or less stable utterance groups which are strategically organized to suit the accomplishment of specific larger goals in the (macro-) context of conflict.

CHAPTER 6. Outlook

In the final chapter of this dissertation I would like to comment on several topics that reverberated through my theoretical considerations on genres in communication in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and, partly, in Chapter 3, and which underlay my critical cognitive-pragmatic approach towards analyzing the discourse of conflict as political genre presented in Chapter 4. This way, the study of 2009-2014 speeches of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that illustrates this approach in Chapter 5 will serve for me as a basis for some insights that I would like to add to the ongoing academic discussion on researching genres in various domains of communication and to the scholarship on the Middle East conflict (and other conflicts) in linguistics.

The first topic that I would like to address is the heterogeneity of political genres and the consequent difficulty of proposing a typology or a hierarchy of genres that would enable to design methodological procedures that could be followed in other studies. As I tried to illustrate in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, communicative genres in general and political genres in particular escape easy classification and lack a point of theoretical-methodological reference, that is, a canonical, commonly accepted characterization of their features. In this respect, Cap and Okulska's (2013) volume makes an important contribution, as the authors propose five candidate characteristics of communicative genres representing some general consensus as to how researchers from various fields and perspectives of linguistics approach generic structures in communication. This characterization also signals some peculiarities of political genres, which I have taken under scrutiny to propose, as far as the existing constraints allow, a set of finite criteria characterizing genres in political communication specifically. All these efforts were aimed at targeting the central problem of genre heterogeneity and complexity that essentializes itself in political discourse, and at designing a methodology that would enable me to analyze some conventionalized goal-oriented communicative activity within the discourse of conflict as political genre. The governing element of this characterization, which is at the same time a continuation of ideas put forward by scholars such as Paltridge (1995, 1997), van Dijk (1997), Cap and Okulska (2013), is the notion of context and its defining role in the process of, on the one hand, genre development and, on the other hand, genre detection, reception and classification. In this study, as we could see in the methodology described in Chapter 4 and in my discussion of examples in Chapter 5, the context of the Middle East conflict is taken as the main element of my top-down perspective on how potentially new

political genre can be identified, because I assume that it conditions the entire communicative activity of PM Netanyahu as an official representative of one of the parties engaged in this conflict, that is, Israel. Yet, the necessary supplement comes with my bottom-up investigation of Netanyahu's 2009-2014 speeches, which enabled me to confirm this preconception and, as a result, my thesis statement that this discourse manifests specific regularities that can be perceived as conventionalized and goal-oriented ways of communicating in the (macro-)context of conflict. This way, such a synergetic approach has enabled me to work out the following prototypical description of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict:

Discourse of conflict is a political genre used for the purposes of communicating in the context of conflict and, this way, achieving particular goals in this context. As such, it is a macrostructure construed by specific functional, structural and content-related regularities realized by specific functional, goal-oriented micropragmatic parameters and linguistic devices, all of which – although dependent from particular (micro-)contextual requirements and strategically adjusted to them by the speaker – form patterns that exist above the level of individual text structures and suit the accomplishment of specific larger goals in the (macro-) context of conflict. This way, all genre-constitutive elements of the discourse of conflict are mutually dependent and hierarchically organized: micropragmatic parameters flexibly develop the macrostructure, the micro-context of individual communicative events further builds and is influenced by the macro-context of conflict, while the micro-goals pursued by the speaker(s) are the constituents of their macro-goals, i.e. some larger motivations behind negotiating specific meanings about the conflict.

This brings us to what Paltridge (1995, 1997) described as felicity conditions of political genre, i.e. pragmatic criteria for the development and identification of the discourse of conflict as a specific code to produce and recognize action through communication. If I were to list such felicity conditions, I would propose three general observations. First, there must be a political conflict, that is, a struggle over values and claims to status, power, and scarce resources, which is taking place in a specific socio-political field and has some specific timeframe, and in which the conflicting parties represent some entities that want to, both, gain the desired values and eliminate their rivals. Second, the discourse they use has to be saturated with themes related to the conflict, for example, the issues at stake, and presuppose a threat

posed by the rivals in the pursuit of these values. Third, this discourse has to have its function and, as such, its performative aspect in the conflict itself, i.e. it has to legitimize one side/delegitimize the other side to the conflict and facilitate the achievement of the desired ends.

These felicity conditions bring us to the issue of the prototypicality of the genre of the discourse of conflict, which is the second theory-related topic that I would like to comment on here based on my study. Although the discourse of conflict that I analyzed revealed some strong regularities (i.e. fixed roles, repeatable ways of activating and realizing the context of conflict, recurrent themes, etc.), I take it into account that as a political genre it can be realized in a virtually infinite number of ways, some of which will be closer to what I described in Chapter 5, and other being highly creative. Nevertheless, I assume that the general felicity conditions listed here and, most importantly, the more detailed description of the generic properties of the discourse of conflict resulting from the five macro- and four micro-criteria illustrated in Chapter 5 form the necessary prototype which, I hope, will be a reference point for other researchers interested in the functions of language in the practice of conflicts., Therefore, I hope that this prototype will be tested on the discourse(s) of other conflicts or in other socio-political fields featuring struggle and presupposing threat, as it will enable to see how flexible this framework of mine is in categorizing goal-oriented conventions of communicative activity in settings different than the Middle East conflict or accommodating new elements. These can be unconventional ways of activating/realizing the context of conflict, different or dynamically changing roles, different timeframes, various speakers or more heterogeneous data (e.g. not only speeches, but also other individual political or media genres such as press/TV interviews, media releases or policy documents analyzed collectively or comparatively), as I assume that these might provoke some revision or extension of my list of macro- and micro- criteria characterizing the discourse of conflict as political genre.

The points in preceding paragraphs are also strongly connected with the topic of genre typology/ hierarchy. As I argued in Chapter 2 and tried to illustrate in the empirical part of this dissertation, some political genres – including the discourse of conflict – may contribute to the realization of specific macro-goals in political communication, which would mean that there is space for something that we could call a “hyper-genre” (cf. Cap and Okulska 2013). This results from the fact that each genre has its own more or less typical structure and features specific constituent function carriers that suit the accomplishment of not only its individual (micro-)goals, but, possibly, also some larger (macro-)goals and the overarching goal of the domain of political communication, i.e. the (hyper)-goal of legitimization.

Although not all political genres may contribute to this arrangement to an equal extent, the understanding of such potential complex workings of generic structures at least tentatively authorizes the following hierarchy of political genres:

I: hyper-genre: political communication

II: macrostructures/macro-genres: discourse of conflict, discourse of international economic crisis, discourse of global warming, etc.

III. micro-genres: speech, policy document, debate, etc.

In this arrangement there is only one hyper-genre – that of political communication. This top-level category comprises macrostructures/macro-genres, i.e. discourses surrounding phenomena that range beyond the immediate (local and micro-) contexts and are combined with issues of global/transnational politics (macro-contexts). Of course, in this middle level of the hierarchy my study directly illustrates the potential validity of the discourse of conflict only, but at the same time it signals that other macro-scale contextual phenomena may shape the discursive choices of the speaker(s) to such an extent that they will form their own conventionalized (macro-)goal-oriented discursive forms that exist above the level of individual text structures and, thus, claim this place in the hierarchy. The lowest level of this tentative organization is occupied by micro-, i.e. individual political genres, most of which are the well-established ones such as political speeches, debates, policy documents, etc., and which either form some macrostructures or simply belong to the hyper-genre of political communication – if it is impossible to trace any macro- scale regularities in them. At the same time, however, these individual genres might have their subtypes such as, for example, “inaugural address” as a subtype of “political speech” or “adversarial political interview” as a subtype of “political interview” (cf. Bell and van Leeuwen 1994). Also, these might micro-categories might form genre “chains” or “networks”, i.e. sequences of supplementing generic structures, which communicate the same message in a different way – and potentially for a different purpose (Cap and Okulska 2013). This way, apart from being engaged in a vertical relationship with the higher levels of this tentative hierarchy, they might also interact horizontally.

Nonetheless, this hierarchy that I have proposed here is far from a ready-made solution to the challenge of typologies in genre theory, as it is very general and, possibly, too general

to provide explanation of some more complex processes influencing genres, such as, for example the process of mediatization (see Chapter 2, section 2.1). Rather, the aim of this tentative classification of mine is to highlight where my study of the discourse of conflict as political genre locates itself and to, hopefully, stimulate further discussion about the applicability of genre typologies/hierarchies to studies like this one, i.e. focused on regularities in goal-oriented discursive forms surrounding and shaped by macro-scale contextual phenomena.

I would like to devote the remainder of this chapter to a commentary on the empirical part of this dissertation and its potential interesting links with selected linguistic scholarship on the Middle East conflict and, generally, research conducted within peace and conflict studies. For these purposes, as a starting point, I would like to encapsulate the most striking regularities identified in the 2009-2014 PM Netanyahu's speeches as the generic properties of the discourse of conflict.

First, as we could see in Part 1 of Chapter 5, in the data analyzed the Middle East conflict is brought by the speaker from the contextual background to the foreground, and encompasses both the context and the content of his performance, which intensifies the impression that Israel continuously experiences direct danger and is involved, voluntarily or not, in a conflict with those that do not recognize it as a state and cherish different values. This entails presenting the conflict as happening here and now and involving everyone, even if the conflict itself has started in the past and has had its dynamics from intensive phases (such as a war, an open struggle or any other types of armed confrontation or explicitly expressed threat) to more neutralized phases (such as peace negotiations, attempts at working out peace agreements or seeking any non-violent ways of solving the conflict). As a result, the conflict is strategically construed as a constant peril to the Israeli national security, education, sovereignty, economy, social policy, territorial integrity and national identity, posed by the presence and activity of rivals, i.e. all parties implicitly or explicitly presented as belligerent to Israel, which serves as a source of arguments legitimizing "the self" and delegitimizing "the other".

As far as the exact pattern of activating and realizing the context of the Middle East conflict in 2009-2014 PM Netanyahu's speeches is concerned, the analysis revealed that in this study these two typically disparate phases of the workings of genre have to be considered collectively, as they form a common 3-stage pattern. First, the speaker focuses on the axiological dimension of conflict. Second, based on the axiological background, the speaker

stresses the physical dimension of conflict. Third, the speaker joins the axiological and the physical dimensions of the conflict in order for these two to work as sources of mutually legitimizing arguments; however, there is a visible renewed focus on axiology. This, in turn, entails that each of these stages manifests itself in a range of context-activating and context-realizing elements present across individual text structures analyzed.

Furthermore, this discourse of conflict, as construed from the point of view of one of the parties, i.e. the Israeli side, features construals of two opposing goals, one of which is positive (solving/neutralizing the conflict) and ascribed to the “us” group, while the other one is negative (maintaining/intensifying the conflict) and ascribed to the “them” group. The construal of this stark contrast provides the speaker with grounds for legitimizing even the most controversial decisions as peace-oriented, and creates more context for the conflict itself, which is discursively managed based on binary evaluative oppositions. Additionally, the text structures revealed substantial speaker’s reliance on references to physical and tangible dimensions of the Middle East conflict (e.g. accounts of armed confrontations or overt expressions of hostility), social fields construed as influenced by it (e.g. economy, education, social policy in Israel), and social phenomena that are likely to trigger similar emotions in the addressees to those that the ‘conflict’ does (e.g. fear and insecurity associated with economic crisis, unemployment, problems with national or public security, etc.). Nevertheless, in this setting PM Netanyahu also introduces a specific division: internal threats are conceptualized as under the control of the Israeli government, while the external ones – those most directly resulting from the situation in the Middle East – as demanding support from the international community.

Another recurrent feature of Netanyahu’s 2009-2014 speeches is blurring the border between locality and globality. This entails presenting local (Israeli-internal and regional) events and threats as those of global range of influence – and the other way round, that is, global events and threats as directly consequential to what is going on inside Israel and in its Middle Eastern neighborhood. This way, (at least) for six years of premiership, Benjamin Netanyahu has created a peculiar way of talking about Israel: his international audiences in the UN headquarters or mainly American audiences at the AIPAC Policy Conferences are discursively transferred to Israel, to experience the same hardships and threats that the Israeli citizens do. Similarly, his Israeli audiences are referred to as citizens of the Western world, i.e. the world of democratic standards and values, who experience exceptionally strong violence and are engaged into the Middle East conflict against their will and might.

Also, the parties directly or indirectly engaged in this conflict are conceptualized in a specific and repeatable way, manifesting some rather fixed behavioral patterns ascribed to them by the speaker. Nevertheless, at the same time these rather stable roles are construed as having varied impact on the situation in the Middle East and as such, are as if positioned on different points of the activity-passivity scale. The central role is the one of Israel, which is discursively construed as the most active and productive initiator of peace in the region, and whose efforts are wasted by the implied unrealistic or harmful expectations of the Palestinian side to the conflict and by their passivity in the peace process. On balance, the distribution of roles to some extent resembles the one described by Lakoff's (1991) "The Fairy Tale of the Just War" scenario, but it is more developed.

When it comes to content-related regularities in all text structures analyzed, the analysis revealed that the recognition of the Israeli statehood and the security of Israel are used by PM Netanyahu as two main legitimization premises in his 2009-2014 rhetoric, and that all recurrent themes are either explicitly or implicitly linked to these two ideas. The entire list of content-related regularities features the following seven topics:

1. premises legitimizing the existence of the state of Israel, its territorial area and the capital in Jerusalem,
2. mutual recognition of statehood of Israel and the Palestinians as the proposed solution to the Middle East conflict,
3. non-recognition of the Israeli statehood by Israeli opponents (the Palestinians, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, ISIS) as the root of the Middle East conflict, the reason of deadlock in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, the motivation behind the Palestinian hostility towards Israel (e.g. manifested through Bil'in demonstrations); also, non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,
4. threats to the existence and security of the state of Israel as a result of: terrorist activity of Hamas, Hezbollah and ISIS, development of nuclear weapons in Iran, the Arab Spring and post-Arab Spring destabilization of the Middle East,
5. post-factum legitimization of military actions taken by Israel (e.g. Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, Operation Protective Edge) as self-defense,
6. accounts of attempts of international forces to externally stimulate the resolution of the Middle East conflict (featuring mostly unsuccessful ones and those that included criticism of Israel, e.g. UN Security Council report on Gaza War; successful accounts were limited mostly to the American or Italian initiatives supporting Israel).

7. accounts of peace-oriented initiatives taken by Israel (e.g. calls to the Palestinians to begin direct negotiations, liquidation of checkpoints and roadblock, territorial withdrawals, plans for or execution of settlement construction moratorium, investments into increasing life standards of the Arab citizens of Israel, building Israeli field hospitals, etc.)

In each case, to communicate meanings connected with these content-related regularities, PM Netanyahu uses specific ‘anchorage points’ from the micro-contexts of his individual public performances, which means that he strategically uses the specific occasions for speaking publicly to intertwine the desired messages related to the seven recurrent themes of the Middle East conflict listed above into his speeches – irrespective of whether he has local or global audiences/addressees. In this respect, however, the analysis revealed some differences in specific linguistic devices and strategies that he uses for this purpose, since deictic operation, implicatures, presuppositions, particular forced construals, speech acts (primarily assertions and assertion-directive patterns), intertextuality/recontextualization, and historical analogies were strategically adjusted to the predispositions of his audiences/addressees. This was done to manage and maximize the aura of the speaker’s credibility and to ensure its successful enactment in more controversial content such as legitimization of Israeli calls for international military intervention in Iran as threat-preventive – this threat being the development of nuclear weapons and the construction of nuclear facilities in Iran as targeted, both, at Israel and the entire “Western world”. Generally, however, (this) discourse of conflict is to a significant degree governed by implicitness, because the existence of a range of potential interpretations (which the speaker may enforce or cancel accordingly) increases his rhetorical safety and the audience’s chances of avoiding cognitive dissonance.

What is important, in this discourse of conflict, Netanyahu attempts to conceal the potential offensive role of Israel (and, thus, rebut criticism and accusations of genocide made by the United Nations Human Rights Council following Israel military standoffs against the Palestinians), and replace it with an image of a peace-oriented state that “justly defends itself and its citizens” against a range of threats. For these purposes, all goals that he expresses in individual speeches feature an element of (presupposed or implied) peace-orientation or security-orientation, skillfully combined and intertwined by the Israeli PM as two necessary conditions for peace in the Middle East conflict. As a result, all his attempts to legitimize Israeli military operations, investments into Israeli self-defense facilities and equipment, or calls for the financial, military or political support of international community are legitimized as resulting from, first, lack of peace with all the parties that do not recognize the Israeli

statehood and, second, as resulting from threats to the Israeli security caused by the hostility of Israel-belligerent parties.

This image of Israel discursively construed in PM Netanyahu's 2009-2014 discourse of conflict brings us to the research conducted by Gavriely-Nuri (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2015) who investigates some cultural misconceptions of peace in the Israeli political discourse. Her study of metaphors repeatedly used by Israeli politicians (2010) revealed very much the same pattern of self- and other- presentation in the Israeli rhetoric to the one formed by other pragmalinguistic devices that I illustrated in the empirical part of this dissertation: images of the Arab opponent are the Israeli "self" image are juxtaposed and there is visible disparity in the construed willingness to achieve peace. These are taken as the main obstacles to the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but Gavriely-Nuri argues that this by no means contradicts the sincere will of Israel to make peace. In her opinion, the root of this problem lies in moral superiority, feelings of deprivation and latent threat carried by metaphors used in the Israeli peace discourse, and the consequent fact that Israeli political leaders are heavily occupied with construing a maximally positive image of Israel on the international arena, which is done at the expense of the Arab side to the Middle East conflict.

In her forthcoming book *Israeli Peace Discourse* (2015), Gavriely-Nuri promises to more closely investigate these issues and advocates the need for a change in the "peace language" in order to create more favorable setting for conflict resolution. She argues that Israeli political discourse features "peace-estrangement" which she explains as "a set of linguistic, discursive and cultural devices intended for creating doubt regarding the positive meaning associated with the concept of peace" (2015: book abstract), and which in her opinion is the reason for the continuous failure of the peace process. These insights are particularly interesting for me, as Gavriely-Nuri analyzes the Israeli peace discourse based on various genres (e.g. Knesset records, school textbooks, etc.), which might offer insights that will enable me to compare my analysis of the "discourse of conflict" (as political genre) with her analysis of the "peace discourse", both of which are some larger entities existing above the level of individual text structures. The most striking part of this potential comparison comes with the very the topics of our inquiry and the following question that arises: can my discourse of conflict and Gavriely-Nuri's peace discourse be regarded as two sides of the same coin? Indeed, it is intriguing to think that these two studies might provide similar or complementary characterization of the discourses in Israel and – indirectly – provide further explanations of the reasons for the continuity of the Middle East conflict.

The final remark that I would like to make here is also related to Gavriely-Nuri's research and, additionally, to the scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of peace and conflict studies. Studies in behaviors and mechanisms attending peace and conflict as processes and elements of social relations draw on theories and frameworks from disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, geography, anthropology, economics or religious studies, but as I have already pointed out, within this diverse panorama discourse analysis is still to a great extent an underrepresented resource. Although Gavriely-Nuri employs a different discourse-analytic framework than mine, i.e. the Cultural Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, she explores the discursive dimension of Israeli (cultural) identity shaped in – and in relation to – the Middle East conflict.

This further supports my general motivation behind advocating the need to conduct more linguistic research within peace and conflict studies, and positioning this dissertation as a yet another linguistic contribution to this multidisciplinary field and the scholarship on the Middle East conflict. Discourse analysis presupposes the links between discourse and social reality and researching them, it bridges linguistics with disciplines such as political science, anthropology, sociology or psychology. This done to investigate socially-consequential phenomena such as, for example, political/social conflict, entails the perception of language as one – if not major – of the available means of influencing people. This way, the discourse of conflict becomes a significant tool in the practice of conflict and, as such, it propagates specific attitudes to the issues at stake and provides interesting characterization of the conflict itself, irrespective of whether we analyze the official, mainstream voice of political leaders, some grassroots voices or the voices of “the opponents”. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3, each of these stances locates itself at different points of the scale of attitudes, on the opposite ends of which there are violence and cooperation, and it is the analysis of their discourses that might shed the much needed additional light on the relations of conflicting parties and support efforts oriented at conflict resolution. In this respect, investigation of discourse(s) of conflict – and peace discourses – may also play an important role in understanding identity-construction processes, because some post-conflict shadows might creep out for decades in the rhetoric of all engaged parties even if the conflict itself has been officially resolved.

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SUMMARY

Although the approach to discourse as an essential (constituted and constitutive) element of social practices – and the practice of conflicts – is common, the very label of “discourse of conflict” is still to a large extent unpopular in the wide panorama of multidisciplinary research on various types and aspects of the phenomenon of conflict. For this reason, this dissertation comes as an attempt to increase the academic applicability and visibility of this label by offering a framework enabling to approach it in linguistic terms, i.e. as political genre.

Such a perspective implies that a long-lasting political/social conflict is taken as a phenomenon determining potentially all communicative events in which political speakers representing the conflicted parties participate, irrespective of the individual time and place of these communicative events. These preconceptions are illustrated here in reference to the rhetoric of Middle East conflict and, more specifically, the official Israeli stance in the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab struggle, as represented by the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu in his 2009-2014 speeches. This is done on the assumption that, after over sixty years of conflict following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the parties engaged have developed their own, distinguishing ways in which they discursively (re)construct the situation in the Middle East, and that investigating their official voices might help trace the major regularities that these discursive representations feature. Although the limitations of this dissertation make it possible to focus on the discourse of the Israeli side only, this research simultaneously signals the need to devote equal attention to the discourses of other sides directly or indirectly engaged in this struggle.

This dissertation approaches the discourse of conflict as a cluster of conventionalized goal-oriented discursive forms, which inherently links it theoretically with the linguistic scholarship on genres in communication and, in particular, with the most recent theoretical developments in this domain that advocate the need to seek perspectives capable of grasping novel and/or constantly evolving structures of political communication (cf. Cap and Okulska 2013). For these purposes, in this research I list and analyze specific and (more or less) stable structural, content-related and functional characteristics of the discourse of the Middle East conflict as typical for political genres and, thus, as features that enable to classify, analyze and interpret this discourse as a (potentially new) genre in political communication. Also, this entails that in my study I take these regularities as constitutive of a potentially new generic

category in political communication, which is oriented at achieving specific goals in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian/Israeli-Arab struggle.

In consequence, this research project has strong foundations in Critical Discourse Studies, which entails a critical perspective on the ‘micro’ considerations of the cognitive-pragmatic properties of the (Israeli political) discourse of conflict, and the ‘macro’ considerations of the larger social motivations and consequences (cf. Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 2001; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009) behind producing and negotiating specific conflict-related meanings in various settings. The essential cognitive-pragmatic component of this perspective entails that I focus on particular pragmatic parameters and pragmalinguistic devices as tools that perform recognizable functions in favor of the Israeli stance in the context of the Middle East conflict, i.e. that activate non-linguistic cognitive processes which allow conflict-related ideology to influence local and global addressees/audiences through language.

In order to approach the discourse of conflict this way, in this dissertation I propose a model for analyzing potentially new genres in political communication, which is based on nine properties (five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria) highlighting these aspects of discourses surrounding and influenced by macro-scale contextual phenomena such as a long-lasting conflict that might be treated as (new) genre-constitutive. These properties result from my discussion of a range of theories related to genres in communication in general and in political communication in particular, which is supplemented by an overview of theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of conflict within various disciplines of social sciences, and which have implications for my perception and interpretation of the discourse of conflict in the empirical part of this dissertation. In this theoretical account, I also highlight the importance and the descriptive and prescriptive potential of the analysis of the discourse of conflict in the multidisciplinary field of peace and conflict studies and the domain of conflict management.

The empirical part of this dissertation illustrates the specific research procedure for the study of the discourse of conflict as political genre based on the analysis of the speeches of the current Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu taken as an exemplification of the discourse of conflict. There, I present and discuss five macro-criteria and four micro-criteria characterizing political genres based on speeches delivered by the Israeli PM in front of diverse addressees and audiences of the Knesset, the United Nations General Assemblies and the AIPAC Policy Conferences in the years 2009-2014. This way, I account for, both, the absolutely necessary stable characteristics of this linguistic material to be classified as

a generic structure, and some more idiosyncratic and dynamic properties of the discourse of the Israeli stance in the Israel-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts – which are still productive for the overall development of this potentially new political genre.

Following on from that, the empirical part of this dissertation illustrates some striking goal-oriented regularities in communicating in and about the Middle East conflict, where the official Israeli voice, Prime Minister Netanyahu, strategically brings ‘conflict’ from the contextual background to the foreground of his public performances, this way creating the impression of its ubiquity. As the analysis revealed, this strategic role of conflict is seminal to the workings of this potentially new political genre, as it is the parameter governing essentially **all** its macro- and micro- elements, and – thus – the general and particular goal-orientation of communicating in and about conflict.

This reveals the discourse of conflict as a flexible and dynamic cluster of conventionalized and goal-oriented structures forming a macrostructure, which is further developed by specific functional, structural and content-related regularities. These, in turn, are realized by particular functional and goal-oriented micropragmatic parameters and linguistic devices, all of which – although dependent from particular micro-contexts and strategically adjusted to them – are forming patterns that exist above the level of individual text structures, this way further contributing to the formation of the macrostructure of the discourse of conflict. This constant micro-macro and macro-micro relationship entails hierarchical organization and mutual influence of all genre-constitutive elements: micro/macropragmatic parameters, micro/macro-context and, finally, micro/macro-goals. In the political genre of the discourse of conflict, these micro-goals – just like the pragmalinguistic devices used by the speaker – form larger conventionalized patterns of more or less stable utterance groups which are strategically organized to suit the accomplishment of specific larger goals in the (macro-) context of conflict.

STRESZCZENIE

Choć dyskurs traktowany jest jako podstawowy element praktyk społecznych, w tym praktyki konfliktów, to sam termin „dyskurs konfliktu” jest nadal mało popularny w szerokiej panoramie prowadzonych w wielu dziedzinach badań różnych typów i aspektów zjawiska konfliktu. Dlatego też niniejsza rozprawa doktorska jest próbą zwiększenia naukowej stosowności i widoczności tego pojęcia w ramach modelu umożliwiającego jego analizę językoznawczą jako gatunku politycznego.

Takie podejście oznacza, że długotrwały konflikt polityczny/społeczny jest traktowany jako zjawisko determinujące potencjalnie wszystkie zdarzenia komunikacyjne, w których uczestniczą reprezentanci skonfliktowanych stron, bez względu na ich indywidualny czas i miejsce. Ujęcie to jest ilustrowane na przykładzie retoryki konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie, a dokładniej oficjalnego izraelskiego stanowiska w konflikcie izraelsko-arabskim i izraelsko-palestyńskim, reprezentowanego przez premiera Izraela Binjamina Netanjahu w jego przemówieniach wygłoszonych w latach 2009-2014. U podstaw wyboru takich danych do analizy leży założenie, że po ponad sześćdziesięciu latach konfliktu toczącego się od chwili ustanowienia państwa Izrael w 1948 roku, strony zaangażowane w ten konflikt wykształciły własne i wyróżniające się sposoby dyskursywnego (re)konstruowania sytuacji na Bliskim Wschodzie, a badanie ich może pomóc prześledzić prawidłowości, którymi się cechują. Choć ograniczenia niniejszej rozprawy doktorskiej pozwalają skupić się jedynie na dyskursie strony izraelskiej, to analiza ta jednocześnie sygnalizuje konieczność poświęcenia jednakowej uwagi dyskursom innych stron bezpośrednio lub pośrednio zaangażowanych w ten konflikt.

W niniejszej rozprawie dyskurs konfliktu jest postrzegany jako kombinacja skonwencjonalizowanych i zorientowanych na cel form dyskursywnych, co nieodzownie łączy go z teoretycznymi rozważaniami na temat gatunków komunikacyjnych oraz gatunków politycznych, a także z najnowszymi osiągnięciami teoretycznymi w tym zakresie, które kładą nacisk na potrzebę poszukiwania perspektyw zdolnych do ujmowania nowych i/lub stale rozwijających się struktur komunikacji politycznej (por. Cap i Okulska 2013). Dlatego też w niniejszej rozprawie doktorskiej wyszczególnione i zanalizowane zostały konkretne i (mniej lub bardziej) stabilne strukturalne, treściowe i funkcjonalne cechy dyskursu konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie, które są typowe dla gatunków politycznych i, tym samym, pozwalają klasyfikować, analizować i interpretować dyskurs konfliktu jako (potencjalnie nowy) gatunek w komunikacji politycznej. Oznacza to także, że wszelkie tego typu prawidłowości są

postrzegane jako konstytutywne dla potencjalnie nowego gatunku w komunikacji politycznej, który jest zorientowany na osiągnięcie konkretnych celów w kontekście konfliktu bliskowschodniego.

Z tego względu ten projekt badawczy ma mocne fundamenty w krytycznych studiach nad dyskursem, które pociągają za sobą krytyczną perspektywę rozważań w skali „mikro”, dotyczących kognitywno-pragmatycznych właściwości (izraelskiego) dyskursu konfliktu politycznego, a także rozważań „makro”, czyli większych motywacji i konsekwencji (por. Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 2001; Wodak i Chilton 2005; Wodak i Meyer 2009) produkowania i negocjowania konkretnych znaczeń związanych z konfliktem w różnych miejscach, czasie – i względem różnych odbiorców lub adresatów. Istotny kognitywno-pragmatyczny komponent tej perspektywy oznacza, że analiza struktur tekstowych koncentruje się na określonych parametrach pragmatycznych i narzędziach pragmatyczno-językowych, które mają za zadanie działać na korzyść izraelskiego stanowiska w kontekście konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie, a które aktywują pozajęzykowe procesy poznawcze, dzięki którym ideologia związana z konfliktem może wpływać na lokalnych i globalnych adresatów/odbiorców poprzez język.

W tym celu niniejsza rozprawa doktorska proponuje model analizy potencjalnie nowych gatunków w komunikacji politycznej, opierający się o dziewięć właściwości (pięć makro-kryteriów i cztery mikro-kryteria) akcentujących te aspekty dyskursów towarzyszących zjawiskom o skali makro, takim jak długotrwałe konflikty, które można traktować jako konstytutywne dla nowych gatunków. Właściwości te wynikają bezpośrednio z omówienia teorii związanych z gatunkami komunikacyjnymi i komunikacją polityczną, uzupełnionego o przegląd teoretycznych podejść do zjawiska konfliktu w różnych dyscyplinach nauk społecznych, które mają wpływ na postrzeganie i interpretację dyskursu konfliktu w empirycznej części niniejszej rozprawy doktorskiej. Ten przegląd teoretyczny ma również na celu podkreślenie znaczenia oraz deskryptywnego i preskryptywnego potencjału analizy dyskursu konfliktu w interdyscyplinarnej dziedzinie konfliktologii oraz w zakresie zarządzania konfliktami.

Empiryczna część niniejszej rozprawy doktorskiej ilustruje konkretną procedurę badawczą dla analizy dyskursu konfliktu politycznego jako gatunku na podstawie analizy wypowiedzi obecnego premiera Izraela Benjamina Netanjahu ujętych jako przykład dyskursu konfliktu. Przedstawione i omówione w niej makro-kryteria i mikro-kryteria charakteryzujące gatunki polityczne są opatrzone przykładami z przemówień premiera Netanjahu wygłoszonych w Knesecie, na Zgromadzeniach Ogólnych Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych i podczas konferencji AIPAC w latach 2009-2014. Pozwala to na

przedstawienie zarówno absolutnie niezbędnych, stabilnych cech tego materiału językowego, bez których nie mógłby on być sklasyfikowany jako ilustrujący gatunek polityczny, a także bardziej zróżnicowanych i dynamicznych właściwości oficjalnego dyskursu izraelskiej strony konfliktu bliskowschodniego, które pomimo mniejszej stabilności nadal produktywnie przyczyniają się do rozwoju tego potencjalnie nowego gatunku komunikacji politycznej.

W tym celu, empiryczna część niniejszej rozprawy doktorskiej ilustruje pewne, częstokroć uderzające prawidłowości w komunikowaniu się w i na temat konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie, w których oficjalny głos strony izraelskiej, premier Netanjahu, strategicznie wysuwa konflikt z kontekstowego tła na pierwszy plan swoich wypowiedzi, tworząc w ten sposób wrażenie wszechobecności konfliktu. Analiza wykazała, że ta strategiczna rola konfliktu jest kluczowa dla funkcjonowania tego potencjalnie nowego gatunku w komunikacji politycznej, ponieważ jest to parametr zasadniczo regulujący wszystkie gatunkowe mikro- i makro- elementy, a co za tym idzie, zarówno ogólne, jak i bardziej spartykularyzowane cele komunikacji w kontekście konfliktu – i na jego temat.

W rezultacie dyskurs konfliktu jawi się jako elastyczna i dynamiczna kombinacja skonwencjonalizowanych i zorientowanych na cel struktur tworzących makrostruktury, które są dalej rozwijane przez określone prawidłowości funkcjonalne, strukturalne i treściowe. Te, z kolei, są realizowane przez określone funkcjonalne i zorientowane na cel parametry mikro-pragmatyczne oraz narzędzia językowe, które – choć są zależne od poszczególnych mikro-kontekstów i strategicznie dostosowują się do nich – tworzą pewne wzorce, istniejące ponad indywidualnymi strukturami tekstowymi i (w ten sposób) przyczyniające się do dalszego rozwoju makrostruktury dyskursu konfliktu. Ten stały, obustronnie zależny związek mikro i makro (oraz makro i mikro) pociąga za sobą organizację hierarchiczną, w której wszystkie konstytutywne dla tego gatunku elementy (czyli parametry mikro- i makro-pragmatyczne, mikro- i makro- kontekst oraz mikro- i makro- cele) wzajemnego na siebie oddziałują. W dyskursie konfliktu jako gatunku politycznymi te mikro- cele, na takiej samej zasadzie, jak narzędzia pragmatyczno-językowe używane w wypowiedziach, tworzą większe, skonwencjonalizowane wzorce mniej lub bardziej stabilnych grup wypowiedzi, które są strategicznie zorganizowane – tak, aby służyć osiągnięciu konkretnych większych (makro-) celów w kontekście konfliktu.

APPENDIX 1. Key terms in the analysis of political discourse

(Appropriated from van Dijk 1997)

Social domain or field

The domain of Politics is the highest, most inclusive category comprising the various aspects of politics specified below. Such a domain label, like that of e.g. Education, Health, Law, Business, the Arts, etc., plays an important role in the commonsense definition of political actions and discourse. It may also be negatively used in judging illegitimate practices in other domains, e.g., when research is prohibited or problematized because it is no longer in the domain of Science but in the domain of Politics. It is assumed that social actors generally know in which 'field' they are currently acting. Such categorizations may even be more general than the domains mentioned above, viz., those of the Private vs. the Public Sphere, or Business vs. Pleasure, or the Personal vs. the Social.

Political systems

These systems are among the most obvious commonsense categories of the domain of politics: Communism, dictatorship, democracy, fascism, or the social democracy, among others, are generally seen as typically 'political', e.g., in the description of countries, nation-states, political parties, politicians or political acts. These systems are usually understood as referring to the organization and distribution of power and the principles of decision making.

Political values

At the most general and abstract level, shared cultural values may be declared typical for political systems. Thus, Freedom is not only a political relationship (see below), but also a basic political value organizing more specific political ideologies and attitudes. The same is true for the values of Solidarity, Equality and Tolerance. Ideological groups and categories will especially also define themselves (and their goals) in terms of their most cherished (preferential) values. Thus, for dominated groups, political Freedom, Justice, Equality or Independence may be more prominent values than for instance the social values of Harmony, Submission, or Sympathy.

Political ideologies

What political systems are at the level of the social and economic organization of power, political ideologies define the socio-cognitive counterpart of such systems. They are the basic belief systems that underlie and organize the shared social representations of groups and their members. In that respect, communism or democracy may be seen both as a system and as a complex set of basic social representations, involving relevant values and sustaining specific attitudes about properties (like power, equality, etc.) that characterize the system.

Political institutions

The domain of politics is typically analyzed as consisting of a number of political institutions, which, top down, organize the political field, actors and actions, such as the State, Governments, Parliament or Congress (the Legislature), city councils, state agencies, and so on.

Political groups

Independently of their organization in political organizations, collections of political actors may form more or less formal, cohesive or permanent groups, such as opponents, dissidents, demonstrators, coalitions, crowds, and in general socio-political movements.

Political organizations

Less (legally, constitutionally) official are the large number of political organizations that structure political action, such as political parties, political clubs, NGOs, and so on.

Political actors

Besides paid, elected representatives ('politicians') the class of political actors is commonsensically defined by all those who are 'engaged in politics', by accomplishing political action, including demonstrators, lobbyists and strikers.

Political relations

The various structural units identified above are connected by multiple relations, some of which are typical for the field of politics: Power, power abuse, hegemony, oppression, tolerance, equality and inequality, among many others, especially define how the State relates to its citizens, or how certain political groups are positioned relative to others. Probably the most pervasive of these political relation terms is that of Freedom.

Political process

Passing from the 'structural' analysis of political systems, organizations and relations to a more 'dynamic' conceptualization of the domain of policies, the political process is the overall term that categorizes complex, long-term, sequences of political actions. Governing, legislation, opposition, solidarity, agenda-setting, and policies are among the prototypical aspects of such political processes.

Political actions

At the meso and micro level of the political domain, we finally deal with concrete acts and interactions that are typical for the political domain, such as sessions and meetings of political institutions, organizations and groups, passing laws, voting, demonstrations, campaigning, revolutions, and so on. It is at this level of everyday interaction that 'engaging in politics' is most directly visible and experienced. Such actions are also defined in terms of their intentions, purposes, goals and functions within the more complex political process. Thus a session of parliament is functional within the process of legislation, and a meeting of a group of dissidents part of the process of opposition or resistance.

Political discourse

Obviously a specific example of political action and interaction, political discourse (and its many genres) may here be singled out as a prominent way of 'doing politics'. Indeed, most political actions (such as passing laws, decision making, meeting, campaigning, etc.) are largely discursive. Thus, besides parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government or ministerial regulations, and other institutional forms of text and talk, we find such political discourse genres as propaganda, political advertising, political speeches, media interviews, political talk shows on TV, party programs, ballots, and so on.

Political cognition

In the same way as ideologies are the cognitive counterpart of systems, organizations or groups at the broader, societal and political macro-levels, political actors, actions and discourse are locally guided and interpreted and evaluated by various forms of political cognition, such as shared social knowledge and political attitudes, as well as more specific knowledge (models) of concrete political events. The most pervasive common-sense notion of this category is probably that of 'public opinion'.