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dc.contributor.authorDziało, Joanna
dc.contributor.authorAlberciak, Paweł
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-01T12:31:32Z
dc.date.available2024-03-01T12:31:32Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn1508-2008
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/50500
dc.description.abstractThe paper focuses on the efficiency of a capital market in the process of corporate governance. The efficiency is concerned in a context of the company 's structure of ownership. It is stated that dispersed ownership is most favorable for takeovers than in of concentrated ownership. The paper provides a model of a takeover that analyses relationship between the company 's ownership structure and the motives behind takeovers. A specific case of a toehold as a factor exerting a discipline on managers' activities is investigated. The paper ends up with same concluding remarks on the discussed issues.pl_PL
dc.language.isoenpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesComparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe;1-2
dc.titleThe capital market in the process of corporate governancepl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number115-126pl_PL
dc.identifier.eissn2082-6737
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dc.relation.volume6pl_PL
dc.disciplineekonomia i finansepl_PL


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