dc.contributor.author | Kędziora, Krzysztof | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-22T10:00:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-22T10:00:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Kędziora K., John Rawls. Uzasadnienie, sprawiedliwość i rozum publiczny, WUŁ, Łódź 2019, https://doi.org/10.18778/8142-599-5 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-83-8142-599-5 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/40697 | |
dc.description.abstract | „Teoria Rawlsa – jak zauważył jeden z recenzentów jego pierwszego dzieła – charakteryzuje się zarówno prostotą, jak i złożonością gotyckiej katedry”. Takie porównanie zachęca, rzecz jasna, do podkreślenia możliwości spojrzenia na filozofię Rawlsa z różnych perspektyw, przyjęcia odmiennych jej interpretacji, a także wskazuje na konieczność wyjścia poza ograniczone jej ujęcia i poszukiwania bardziej całościowego obrazu. Porównanie filozofii Rawlsa z gotycką katedrą wydaje mi się trafne z jeszcze jednego powodu. Zwraca bowiem naszą uwagę na architektonikę jego myśli, której rekonstrukcja jest celem niniejszej książki. Wychodzę zatem od przedstawienia samego zamysłu Rawlsa, można by powiedzieć od przedstawienia architektonicznego projektu, czyli staram się wyjaśnić, jak należy rozumieć to, czym jest teoria sprawiedliwości, jak i filozofia polityczna2. Ich celem było wypracowanie i uzasadnienie określonej koncepcji sprawiedliwości. W rozdziale następnym (drugim) wyjaśniam, jak było przez Rawlsa rozumiane uzasadnienie koncepcji sprawiedliwości i w jaki sposób powiązane jest ono z możliwością zdobycia przez nią uznania obywateli społeczeństwa demokratycznego, którzy mają odmienne filozoficzne, moralne i religijne przekonania. W rozdziale trzecim przyglądam się obranym przez Rawlsa strategiom uzasadnienia. Wyróżniam dwa sposoby uzasadnienia: kontraktualistyczny oraz konstruktywistyczny. Służą one Rawlsowi do wypracowania określonych zasad sprawiedliwości, co przedstawiam w rozdziale czwartym. Chodzi tutaj oczywiście o tak zwane dwie zasady sprawiedliwości. Pierwsza z nich (zasada równych wolności) określa podstawowe uprawnienia i wolności oraz nakazuje równą ich dystrybucję, druga z nich (zasada różnicy) rządzi dystrybucją innych dóbr niż wspomniane wcześniej uprawnienia i wolności. Książkę kończy rozdział piąty, w którym przedstawiam zastosowanie w praktyce prawno-politycznej dwóch zasad sprawiedliwości, a dokładniej mówiąc, ich instytucjonalizację pod postacią konstytucji i urzeczywistnienie w rozumowaniu obywateli w społeczeństwie pod postacią rozumu publicznego. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Międzynarodowe | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | teoria sprawiedliwości | pl_PL |
dc.subject | filozofia polityczna | pl_PL |
dc.subject | kontraktualizm | pl_PL |
dc.subject | konstruktywizm | pl_PL |
dc.subject | zasady sprawiedliwości | pl_PL |
dc.subject | John Rawls | pl_PL |
dc.title | John Rawls. Uzasadnienie, sprawiedliwość i rozum publiczny | pl_PL |
dc.type | Book | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | 196 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Filozoficzno-Historyczny, Instytut Filozofii, Katedra Etyki | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.eisbn | 978-83-8142-600-8 | |
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dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/8142-599-5 | |