Umiarkowana obrona sceptycyzmu
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The artićle is an attempt to present a ćredibility of the philosophićal skeptićism and its intrinsić ćonnećtion to wisdom. In the paper I explain basić presupposition of the tradition and then revise them within the framework a few modern skeptićal ćlues (rhetorićal nature of all argumentation, L. Wittgenstein's language games, hermeneutić ćonćept of knowledge). Taking into ćonsiderations widespread aććusations against the philosophićal skeptićism, I reveal their limitations, doing it in a referenće to Sextus Empirićus' original remarks. In the last sećtion of the paper I present the skeptićal tradition as a ćertain way of being, whićh has some signifićant moral qualities.