Etyczny pluralizm a wartości uniwersalne: katalogi normatywne Johna Finnisa i Marthy C. Nussbaum
Streszczenie
Is it possible that Nussbaum’s capability approach and Finnis’s natural
law theory have anything in common? We usually do not think ethical
pluralism and an account of objective good to be members of one family
of theories. Nevertheless there is a set of ideas that Nussbaum and
Finnis apparently, and surprisingly, share. Both authors elaborate a list
of values which plays a central role in their theory. Careful examination
of these lists provides us with many similarities in terms of concepts,
terminology and interpretation. Finnis and Nussbaum both employ the
ideas of practical reason and intuition, or self-evidence, to reject the
academic requirement for theoretical proof of normative approach in
morality, philosophy of law and political theory. In this way, they both
seek to secure their claims to universality.
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