Hermeneutyczna charakterystyka pojęcia „Lebenswelt” w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla

dc.contributor.author	Furman, Marcin
dc.date.accessioned	2017-04-28T11:26:10Z
dc.date.available	2017-04-28T11:26:10Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.issn	1689-4286
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11089/21500
dc.description.abstract	The subject of this are the considerations concerning the “late” period of Edmund Husserl’s output and the notion of Lebenswelt. Husserl believes that any scientific knowledge, unlike analyses of common experience, requires new formal specification. Ipso facto cognitive absoluteness and its objectivity in a form of the “thing-in-itself” is moved to the background. A man cannot reach definitive cognition in this manner. Therefore cognition of life is the matter of principle.	pl_PL
dc.language.iso	pl	pl_PL
dc.publisher	Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego	pl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;18
dc.subject	Edmund Husserl	pl_PL
dc.subject	Lebenswelt	pl_PL
dc.subject	phenomenology	pl_PL
dc.subject	“thing-in-itself”	pl_PL
dc.title	Hermeneutyczna charakterystyka pojęcia „Lebenswelt” w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla	pl_PL
dc.title.alternative	Hermeneutical characteristics of the notion of Lebenswelt in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology	pl_PL
dc.type	Article	pl_PL
dc.rights.holder	© Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS 2012	pl_PL
dc.page.number	26-34	pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation	Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku	pl_PL