http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11178 Sun, 05 Apr 2026 22:55:24 GMT 2026-04-05T22:55:24Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11336 Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec przystąpienia ZSRS do Ligi Narodów w 1934 r. Jeziorny, Dariusz First rumors about Moscow’s access to the League of Nation appeared after the whole series of speeches delivered by the Soviet leading personalities at the turn of 1933/1934. It was regarded as a revolutionary step because the USSR’s attitude towards the League has been very hostile so far. Deterioration of Soviet-German relations in 1933 after the Reichstag’s fire made the Soviet authority willing to cooperate with Geneva. London was not sure about the Soviet attitude in this question but Lord Chilston, British Ambassador in Moscow tended to state that the USSR was going at least to cooperate with the League of Nations. Diplomats employed in the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, who commented Chilston’s reports, did not doubt that Moscow moved to the “anti-revisionist camp”. However higher FO officials were more reserved. Sir John Simon, the Secretary and Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary regarded the Soviet enuntiations as tactical only. Their suspicions were strong because Moscow has never clearly declared her intentions. In Spring 1934 British Foreign Office experienced pressure from various sides to support the Soviet access to the League of Nations. It was mainly the French government which was not going to be the only Moscow’s mentor. Sir John Simon declared in the House of Commons his support for the Soviet accession to the League of Nations after Louis Barthou’s visit to London. He described the USSR as a big power with a hugh potential. Its League membership was labelled as a condition for stabilizing world political situation. The only diplomatic démarche addressed to London was taken up by the Soviet diplomacy on 3rd August 1934. The British response was very promising so Moscow did not try influence Paris and London more actively. French diplomacy assisted by strong British support brought the USSR in the League of Nations on 18th September. The Soviet conditions (particularly official invitation from Geneva powers and guarantee of a permanent seat in the League’s Council) were not too difficult to be fulfilled for the British Cabinet. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11336 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11335 Stanowisko rządu brytyjskiego wobec spłaty długu wojennego Stanom Zjednoczonym (20 czerwca 1931 r. – 15 grudnia 1932 r.) Piątek, Justyna On account of a financial collapse in Europe during the first months of 1931 and German extremely critical situation, on June 20th, 1931 President of the United States Herbert Hoover have agreed to suspend for one year (from July 1st, 1931) all international debts due to America provided that the German reparations would be postponed as well. The Hoover Moratorium seemed reasonable for British Government to hope that this was a step to lead to the end of reparations and war debts. Securing the cancellation or great reduction of those payments was the cardinal point of British policy embodied in Balfour Note of 1922. In the opinion of the British Government the Young Plan of 1929 recognized the inevitable connection between reparations and the war debts contrary to American point of view. After the Laval visit in Washington in October 1931 the debtor Powers were even more strengthened in the assumption that they could hope to obtain parallel concessions from the United States in regard to war debts in exchange for concession to Germany. Therefore it was the objective of the European Conference in Lausanne of 1932. A radical reduction of German reparations was achieved. Under the pressure of France so called gentleman’s agreement was attached which made ratification of the Lausanne Protocol dependent on a satisfactory debt settlement with the United States. The key remained in the American hands. Still Hoover and the U.S. Congress have ruled out the change of the American position toward the outstanding debt. Although the president-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt had suggested a desire to consider the war debt question with the European debtors, nothing has changed. In view of the impossibility of carrying through discussions with America before next maturity, after the cautious considerations, in London have been decided to pay installment debt to the United States with exclusion of the payments resumption under the Funding Agreement. Nevertheless in subsequent years the debt problem remained unresolved and Lausanne Protocol was never ratified. The causes of this were mainly different points of view, lack of mutual understanding between debtors and the creditor and a contradiction between the financial and political approach. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11335 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11334 Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec zabiegów Rosji o wyłączne wpływy w Mandżurii (październik 1901 r. – sierpień 1903 r.) Damski, Przemysław Piotr After the collapse of the ‘Boxer Rebellion’, Russia wanted to take an advantage of the fact that hers troops occupied Manchuria and to obtain the exclusive influence in this country. This was contrary to the Open Door policy which had been declared by the United States, Japan, Great Britain and other European Powers, including the Russian Empire, since 1899. These had made London to rethink his own policy in the Far East. British hadn’t much interests in Manchuria. However, in their point of view rise of Russian power in China would destabilize situ¬ation in the Celestial Empire and encourage other Powers to ‘curving a Chinese pie’. It would affect British interests in Qing’s State which were larger than any other Power. Russian railway businesses and her ambition in North-East China were also a danger to similar British investments. This was one of the reasons to abandon a policy of so called ‘splendid isolation’. First visible effect of this decision was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30th, 1902. The treaty was a defensive one but clearly anti-Russian. Simultaneously Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Lansdowne, raised that Russian policy was contrary to the Open Door policy. In fact Britain was concerned on defending her own interests instead of Open Door which was only a slogan for her. During February and March of 1902 London wasn’t able to develop a common policy with his ally – Japan, and also with the United States which appeal for the ‘open door’ once again (February 1st, 1902). St Petersburg took the opportunity and published with Paris the Franco-Russian Declaration of March 16th, 1902. Foreign Office was ready to deal with Russian Government, but the tenacity of the latter convinced Whitehall that Britain should act in accord with Tokyo and Washington. This made Russia to sign an agreement with China on April 8th, 1902. Between April 8th, 1902 and April 8th, 1903 British were waiting and observing the results of Russian evacuation from Manchuria. At this time they weren’t especially concerned about the situation in North-East China as far as Russians were accomplishing the terms of the agreement. They only singed a commercial treaty with the Celestial Empire of September 5th, 1902. This was changed by St Petersburg announcement about new terms of evacuation of Russian soldiers (April 8th, 1903). This time London, as well as Washington, didn’t force Russia to fulfil her treaty obligations. Only Tokyo whose interests were most endangered strongly opposed Russia’s plans. Lansdowne who was planning an agreement with France was also thinking about rapprochement with Russia. Lack of strong reaction from Washington on St Petersburg’s demands convinced Whitehall of rightness of his own policy. British abandoned the phrase of Open Door and de facto recognized Russian influences in Manchuria in the Lansdowne’s proposition of July 29th, of 1903. Russia answered with formation of the Far Eastern Viceroyalty. This had ended the first attempt of British-Russian rapprochement but didn’t stop Franco-British talks which leaded to so called Entente Cordiale of April 8th, 1904. It proves that Britain hadn’t been committed to the Open Door policy which was only an in¬strument securing her interests in Qing’s Empire. The alliance with Japan had the same task. When British politicians had realized that both instruments hadn’t brought expected results they started to search a better way to secure British interests. The only reasonable step for Whitehall, who wanted to avoid a war, was an agreement with Russia. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11334 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11333 Wielka Brytania wobec kształtowania się amerykańskiej polityki „otwartych drzwi” w Chinach (1898–1900) Pajor, Jan The intention of this paper is to present how the British idea of the Open Door in China permeated to the United States and influenced the diplomatic actions of this country. Another matter covered here is Whitehall’s reaction to the first and second series of the Open Door notes, issued by the Department of State. The Open Door doctrine, encompassing the principles of equal commercial treatment and maintenance of China’s territorial integrity, was for many years one of the pillars of the British Far Eastern policy. However, when in the aftermath of China’s severe defeat in war with Japan foreign Powers engaged in creating spheres of influence in the Middle Kingdom, Great Britain diverged from its traditional position. London, having commercial preponderance in China, was at first against the dismemberment of this country, but eventually – since its endeavours to gain support of other Powers for the Open Door policy proved abortive – decided to perpetuate its sphere of influence. The United States, approached by the British in March 1898, were unwilling to act at that time, nor did they want to align with anyone. Nevertheless, soon afterwards the concept of the Open Door started gaining popularity among American politicians mainly due to various British influences. Therefore at the turn of 1898 and 1899 London reiterated its proposition to cooperate in China, but was rejected. The United States were determined to act alone and between 1899 and 1900 issued two series of the Open Door notes. Whilst Great Britain cordially applauded these pronouncements in general, she tried to obtain some concessions, and was partially successful. Once the Open Door policy was internationally accepted, Foreign Office again made it a fundamental element of its Chinese policy. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11333 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z