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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica 18/2006</title>
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<dc:date>2026-04-08T13:45:18Z</dc:date>
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<title>Eksternalizm illokucyjny a uwyraźnienie mocy illokucyjnej</title>
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<description>Eksternalizm illokucyjny a uwyraźnienie mocy illokucyjnej
Blanco Salgueiro, Antonio
I call illocutionary externalism (IE) the approach to the study of illocutionary force that I favor. IE is inspired by Austin's seminal ideas on performatives and speech acts. According to IE, in the analysis of a paradigmatic illocutionary force we must essentially mention some aspects of the social and natural environment that cannot be reduced to the (de dicto) speakers' mental states, no matter how these are individuated. A difficult problem for IE derives from the possibility of making explicit the force of an utterance. This fact invites us to focus our attention on the utterer (the person who makes the force explicit) and  his mental states (illocutionary intentions), and to support a mentalist approach in the study of forces. In this article I shall argue for the compatibility of IE with the phenomenon of the explicitability of illocutionary force.
Przełożył Janusz Maciaszek.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4795">
<title>Odrzucanie: przeczenie a dylematy</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4795</link>
<description>Odrzucanie: przeczenie a dylematy
Priest, Graham
The paper is about the notion of rejection, and its linguistic expression, denial. Following Frege, it is often supposed that to deny something is simply to assert its negation. This connection is contested, and some consequences of rejecting it are discussed, especially in connection with a dialetheic solution to the paradoxes of self-reference. The paper then goes on to discuss the connection between rejection and truth (more specifically, untruth). This raises the possibility that there are rational dilemmas, and the paper ends by discussing some examples of these.
Przełożyli Piotr Łukowski i Dorota Rybarkiewicz.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Poznanie zmysłowe w ujęciu Fryderyka Jacobiego</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4794</link>
<description>Poznanie zmysłowe w ujęciu Fryderyka Jacobiego
Piórczyński, Józef
In relation to material reality only direct perception as sensual perception gives unbiased, reliable cognisance. Therefore, this cognisance is irremovably receptive. A subject does not add anything of himself to the object. Thinking does not play any role in such a cognisance, because object is before any thinking. According to Jacobi sensual cognisance consists of this what is given, a certain perceived content, and of a feeling assuring the existence of what is given, e.g. a belief. These two elements are inseparable.&#13;
	A foundation of this approach has been prepared for Jacobi by Thomas Reid, however, it was finalised thanks to critical reference to David Hume concerning that second, not perceptive element of cognisance.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Natura człowieka w twórczości Dostojewskiego</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4793</link>
<description>Natura człowieka w twórczości Dostojewskiego
Perkowska, Iwona Magdalena
This article is a presentation of the problem of human nature in Dostoevsky's writings. Its author does not agree that the great Russian thinker would give his assent to any of the two opposing ideas: neither that man is good by nature nor that his fate from the moment of birth is tragic. Dostoevsky has proved that freedom constitutes the core of human being. When this freedom is used in a wrong way man becomes bad, and if it is used according to Jesus Christ teachings, he may attain righteousness due to His Grace. In such circumstances, there is no space for any predetermination. Man is free, if he wants to be free. He has got free will. He is always responsible for everything he has done.&#13;
	Dostoevsky uses the term  n a t u r e  in two different meanings. The first one is essential and refers to the notion of freedom. Consequently, Dostoevsky claims, human nature is beyond full cognition. The second meaning of the term nature refers to the attributes of a particular nation. The differences between nations are further evidence of freedom, which manifests in an infinity of ways. Nature understood as such can be changed and comprehended. The change requires much effort over a long period of time but can by achieved. To capture the full picture of the problem of human nature in Dostoevsky's ultimately it works, both meanings of the above notion should be the taken into consideration.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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