Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica 34/2019
http://hdl.handle.net/11089/31956
2024-03-28T09:09:10ZThe Normativity of Habermas’s Public Sphere from the Vantage Point of Its Evolution
http://hdl.handle.net/11089/37821
The Normativity of Habermas’s Public Sphere from the Vantage Point of Its Evolution
Hułas, Maciej
The paper argues that the original normativity that provides the basis for Habermas’s model of the public sphere remains untouched at its core, despite having undergone some corrective alterations since the time of its first unveiling in the 1960s. This normative core is derived from two individual claims, historically articulated in the eighteenth-century’s “golden age” of reason and liberty as both sacred and self-evident: (1) the individual right to an unrestrained disposal of one’s private property; and (2) the individual right to formulate one’s opinion in the course of public debate. Habermas perceives the public sphere anchored to these two fundamental freedoms/rights as an arena of interactive opinion exchange with the capacity to solidly and reliably generate sound reason and public rationality. Despite its historical and cultural attachments to the bourgeois culture as its classical setting, Habermas’s model of the public sphere, due to its universal normativity, maintains its unique character, even if it has been thoroughly reformulated by social theories that run contrary to his original vision of the lifeworld, organized and ruled by autonomous rational individuals.
2019-12-30T00:00:00ZNie będzie pluralizmu form i sposobów życia bez uniwersalizmu zasad. Wywiad z Karlem-Otto Aplem
http://hdl.handle.net/11089/37823
Nie będzie pluralizmu form i sposobów życia bez uniwersalizmu zasad. Wywiad z Karlem-Otto Aplem
Apel, Karl-Otto; Rötzer, Florian
In an interview with Karl-Otto Apel, conducted and published by Florian Rötzer in 1987, a number of issues of Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic philosophy were discussed. The interview presents what was the subject of the main debates conducted at the time by this defender of reason and rationalist tradition in philosophy, who spoke out against all radical scepticism and was known above all as a philosopher defending the thesis of the need and the possibility of providing ultimate justification. Karl-Otto Apel explains how this thesis should be understood and what the transcendental-pragmatic ultimate justification consists of. The interview also expounds what is the argument of performative self-contradiction that is used in the final justification procedure. Apel refers to the critics directed at discourse ethics, its “formalism” of Kantian provenance (critics that accuse this current of ethics that it leads to the elimination of diversity and pluralism); his critical remarks are directed at the advocates of postmodernity and postmodernism. Karl-Otto Apel defends a universalistic model of ethics and a Kantian, purely formal image of man as an image which at the same time creates conditions for cultural pluralism and free articulation of dissent, as well as for the search for consensus.; W wywiadzie z Karlem-Otto Aplem, jaki przeprowadził i w roku 1987 opublikował Florian Rötzer, omówionych zostało szereg wątków rozwijanej przez Apla filozofii transcendentalno-pragmatycznej. Wywiad ukazuje, co było przedmiotem głównych sporów i dyskusji prowadzonych w owym czasie przez tego obrońcę rozumu i racjonalistycznej tradycji w filozofii, który występował przeciwko wszelkiemu radykalnemu sceptycyzmowi i znany był przede wszystkim jako filozof broniący tezy o potrzebie i o możliwości dostarczenia uzasadnienia ostatecznego. Karl-Otto Apel wyjaśnia w tym wywiadzie, jak należy tę tezę rozumieć oraz na czym polega ostateczne uzasadnienie transcendentalno-pragmatyczne. W wywiadzie wyjaśnione też zostaje, czym jest argument z performatywnej samozaprzeczalności, który wykorzystywany jest w procedurze ostatecznego uzasadniania. W swych odpowiedziach Apel odnosi się do krytyk kierowanych pod adresem etyki dyskursowej, jej „formalizmu” o kantowskiej proweniencji (krytyk zarzucających temu nurtowi etyki, iż prowadzi do likwidacji różnorodności i pluralizmu); krytyczne uwagi kieruje pod adresem rzeczników postnowoczesności i postmodernizmu. W swych wywodach Apel broni uniwersalistycznej etyki oraz Kantowskiego, czysto formalnego obrazu człowieka jako obrazu, który zarazem stwarza warunki dla kulturowego pluralizmu oraz swobodnego artykułowania niezgody, a także dla poszukiwania konsensu.
2019-12-30T00:00:00ZCritical Theory in Regressive Times: Liberalism, Global Populism and the “White Left” in the Twenty-First Century
http://hdl.handle.net/11089/37822
Critical Theory in Regressive Times: Liberalism, Global Populism and the “White Left” in the Twenty-First Century
Xingfu, Wang
In this paper, I consider not only the crisis in conservative neoliberalism and free market economics, but a crisis of representation and plausibility in progressive new liberalism; a situation which leads to deadlock for progressivism in which things cannot progress. In order to address this state of crisis in the global perception of the “white left,” Critical Theory, as a mode of Western liberal thought, needs to rethink the direction of its own criticism. Additionally, Critical Theory needs to adjust its focus to respond to the deadlock presented by the rise of right-wing populism and the derogation of liberal values in these regressive times (I refer antonymically, here, to Jürgen Habermas’s use of the term “progressive”). The radical democratic ideal advocated by Habermas, comprising universal equality and emancipation, should still be the goal for liberalism, and for Critical Theory, but first of all, the achievements and advances liberal progressivism has already made need to be secured to prevent society from regressing. This does not mean making a choice between neoliberalism and authoritarianism, but that a new paradigm of thinking is due. I argue that universality is anterior to cultural pluralism, as are social topics to cultural issues, and justice of distribution to justice of identity. In the complex world of modernity, good things do not come together if there is conflict between desirable values, so choices need to be made: a ranking of real, material conditions is necessary, to ensure cohesion and progression.
2019-12-30T00:00:00ZHabermas and Rawls on an Epistemic Status of the Principles of Justice
http://hdl.handle.net/11089/37820
Habermas and Rawls on an Epistemic Status of the Principles of Justice
Kędziora, Krzysztof
The so-called debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concentrated mainly on the latter’s political liberalism. It dealt with the many aspects of Rawls’s philosophical project. In this article, I focus only on one of them, namely the epistemic or cognitivistic nature of principles of justice. The first part provides an overview of the debate, while the second part aims to show that Habermas has not misinterpreted Rawls’s position. I argue that Habermas rightly considers Rawls’s conception of justice as a moral one. In the last part, I discuss two key questions raised by Habermas. The first concerns the relation between justification and acceptance of the principles of justice. The second concerns the relation between two validity terms: truth and reasonableness.
2019-12-30T00:00:00Z