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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica 2007, nr 81</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13729</link>
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<dc:date>2026-04-06T02:01:27Z</dc:date>
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<title>Stanowisko rządu Johna F. Kennedy’ego wobec kryzysu kongijskiego na forum ONZ (1961-1963)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13781</link>
<description>Stanowisko rządu Johna F. Kennedy’ego wobec kryzysu kongijskiego na forum ONZ (1961-1963)
Porczyńska, Anna
The Congo Crisis was one of the conflicts which involved economical and military power&#13;
of the United Nations under presidency of John F. Kennedy. The United Stales had already&#13;
aided Belgium but they weren’t able to solve that problem by using the US Army in Secessionist&#13;
Katanga because it would lead to the direct confrontation with the USSR and its satellite&#13;
countries.&#13;
The second reason was connected with involvement of American private business in&#13;
Katangian industry and the attempts of its exclusion made by Belgians or Patrice Lumumba’s&#13;
forces.&#13;
The John F. Kennedy Government attitude was determined by his predecessors policy of&#13;
the containment, which should be successful in the decolonized areas. The John F. Kennedy&#13;
Government attitude towards the United Nations during the Congo Crisis was determined by&#13;
the majority in General Assembly created by newly independent African countries which&#13;
supported the Soviet Union and his allies. That was the main cause why previously adopted&#13;
“majority voting” in General Assembly was impossible for the John F. Kennedy Government.
</description>
<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13769">
<title>Franjo Tudjman jako twórca chorwackiej niepodległości</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13769</link>
<description>Franjo Tudjman jako twórca chorwackiej niepodległości
Wawrzeńczak, Anna
The author of this paper discusses role of Franjo Tudjman during the Yugoslav transformations&#13;
and building of an independent of Croatia (between 1989 and 1992).&#13;
The Croat’s growing preoccupation with the “national question” in ihe wake of&#13;
the 1971-72 purge accompanied a steady growth of anti - Yugoslavia and pro - independence&#13;
sentiment. It found delayed expression in Croatia’s first multiparty election&#13;
in April-May 1990.&#13;
The election won overwhemingly by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). It’s leader,&#13;
Franjo Tudjman, a historian and former general in the Yugoslav Army. He was Josip Broz&#13;
Tito’s favourite untill there was conflict beetwen them. Tudjman started talking about Croatian’s&#13;
bad situation and discrimination in Yugoslav. He was sacked in 1967 from the post of head&#13;
of the party history institute in Zagreb. His attempts to correct what he saw as anti-Croat&#13;
bias in official communist pronouncements concering World War two caused this. Tudjman&#13;
was later twice arrested in 1972 and 1982 for “counter-revolutinary” nationalism, activity in&#13;
“Croatian Spring” and for giving “hostile” interviews to the Western media about the situation&#13;
in Croatia.&#13;
Tudjman based his election campaign squarely on the “national question” and anti-Serbs and anti-semitism rhetoric. He paid little attention to the economy. He demanded&#13;
sovereignty and independent of Croatia. He tackled the sucject of Ante Pavelic’s state&#13;
without much apology to its victims. He said that NDH was “not only a quisling organization&#13;
and Fascist crime, but was also an expresion of the Croatian nation’s historic&#13;
desire for an independent homeland” . In Tudjman’s state, there were not place for Croatian&#13;
Serbs. Tudjman said about discrimination of Croatians in Yugoslav’s administration, army&#13;
and culture. The main reason of bad condition of Yugoslav and enemy of Croatia were&#13;
Serbs. The war with Serbs from Slavonia and Krajina, who were helped by Belgrad and&#13;
JNA was unavoidable. Tudjman was saying a lot about “democracy” and “building democratic Croatia” but his&#13;
style of rule was more similar to communistic regime. For example, the new goverment was&#13;
soon determined to control the media almost as much the old Communists. Instead of building&#13;
independent and democratic Croatia, Tudjman aimed to strenghten nationalism, monoparty&#13;
and strong dictatorship.&#13;
After two years of rule Tudjman had a trouble. Croatia was in deep economic crisis&#13;
Rising inflation and unemployment were the cause of an improverish society. At the and of&#13;
war in early 1992, nearly one-third of Croatia’s territory remained under Serb control. It&#13;
included the important east, which was some of the most fertile agricultural land. Before the second election in 1992 Tudjman regained the trust of Croatian people.&#13;
However there was a lot of insoluble problems and then came something new. A new war&#13;
came with the Serbs and a conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Tudjman said at the time&#13;
that Bosnia and Hercegovina should be given to Croatia. Just like Vojvodina was given to&#13;
Serbia in 1945.&#13;
The second election in 1992 Tudjman and his party won again. This time Tudjman openly&#13;
aimed to war, threw any negotiations out. Again the main enemies were Serbs and Slobodan&#13;
Milosevic. Tudjman built fear and terror in Croatia. He was too convinced of his great&#13;
mission in Croatian history.
</description>
<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13768">
<title>Sprawa rozmieszczenia wojsk ONZ na terenie Konga (15 lipca -12 sierpnia 1960)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13768</link>
<description>Sprawa rozmieszczenia wojsk ONZ na terenie Konga (15 lipca -12 sierpnia 1960)
Sołtysiak, Jakub
On 19 June 1960 the UN Security Council passed the resolution no 143 (1960), which&#13;
enabled the start of the UN Operation in Congo - Operation des Nations Unies Au Congo&#13;
(ONUC). The operation was to consist of two parts: civilian and military, foreseeing sending&#13;
UN Armed Forces to Congo.&#13;
The deployment of UN soldiers in Congo was subject of much controversy at the UN&#13;
forum. The first month of UN soldiers involvement in Congo’s crisis was of crucial importance&#13;
for defining the character of the military operation. Controversies arose about the powers of&#13;
UN soldiers, and the way of placement of Peace Forces in Katanga. The group of countries&#13;
put pressure to settle the conflict by force. The additional problem was the desire of world powers, competing for influence in Africa,&#13;
to use the whole conflict to achieve vested interests. There was no agreement as to the way&#13;
the UN soldiers and their powers were to be used in the face of key Congo’s problems. In&#13;
that case the character of UN Operation in Congo was brought up for an international&#13;
discussion. As a result of this discussion, and due to determination of UN Secretary - General&#13;
Dag Hammarksjold, supported by American diplomacy, the international character of UN&#13;
military operation was kept. Not using UN Forces to immediate political goals was another&#13;
success. Despite different pressures, Hammarksjold managed to deploy UN Military Forces&#13;
to Katanga by means of diplomatic and peaceful methods, exclusively.
</description>
<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13760">
<title>Traktat w Utrechcie w ocenie wybranych prac XX-wiecznej historiografii brytyjskiej</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13760</link>
<description>Traktat w Utrechcie w ocenie wybranych prac XX-wiecznej historiografii brytyjskiej
Lik, Krzysztof
The Utrecht Treaty signed on 11 IV 1713, in fact ending the war of Spanish succesion,&#13;
turned out to be one of those turning points which finally formed the XVIIl-century Europe&#13;
and secured an exeptional place in political system of that century fot the British monarchy.&#13;
No wonder that Utrecht Treaty, and events preceeding it, were the main object of interest&#13;
in the British historiography for a long time. The period of Queen Anna’s reign, and&#13;
distinguished people appearing at her court were described by many historians. Unfortunately,&#13;
those works are not well-known among Polish publicity. The issues of the war of Spanish&#13;
succesion and the Utrecht Treaty are not the most favourite topics among Polish historians&#13;
either.&#13;
For the above reasons Polish reader who want to get some knowledge on that subject&#13;
may have problems as the only sources of information can be found in textbooks accesible&#13;
in university libraries and institutes of history. However, it should be stressed that such&#13;
textbooks are totally different from those we know in our Polish conditions. They are very&#13;
detailed works presenting both historical knowledge and literary values. It is worth mentioning&#13;
that among writers who created them were such suberb names as Clark or Trevelyan and&#13;
they were edited by British best publishing companies like C.U.P., O.U.P. or Longman.&#13;
In this article one could find live historical books which in my opinion are the most&#13;
representative for the XXth century British historiography. These are:&#13;
The Cambridge History o f the British Empire, vol. I, The Old Empire from the Beginings to 1783.&#13;
G. M. Trevelyan, History of England.&#13;
The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. VII, The Old Regime.&#13;
Sir George Clark, The Later Stuarts and Frank O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century.
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<dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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