<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica nr 188/2005</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5756" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5756</id>
<updated>2026-04-05T17:30:34Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-05T17:30:34Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Dyscyplina rynkowa – czyli czy prywatny monitoring zwiększa bezpieczeństwo systemu bankowego</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5753" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Marcinkowska, Monika</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5753</id>
<updated>2021-06-18T08:17:56Z</updated>
<published>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Dyscyplina rynkowa – czyli czy prywatny monitoring zwiększa bezpieczeństwo systemu bankowego
Marcinkowska, Monika
The article outlines the issues of market discipline - that is the private monitoring and&#13;
oversight over banks. Market discipline is considered to be an important component of the&#13;
supervisory system, which can significantly influence the stability of individual institutions, as well&#13;
as the whole banking system. The paper presents the theoretical considerations about private&#13;
monitoring and the possibilities of its widespread application. The recommendations of Basel&#13;
Committee on Banking Supervision are discussed. The discussion of conditions for the limits and&#13;
the conditions for effective market discipline is the complement for those considerations.
</summary>
<dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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