

Wiesław Caban

ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

Proper development of three types of relationships i.e. relationships between the institutional environment and the state, relationships within the state and more precisely within the economic centre, and relationships between the Centre and companies is of decisive importance of execution of a deep socio-economic reform and for the regaining of sovereign control over the economy by the state.

With regard to relationships of the first type, it is important to ensure appropriate position and role for organizations protecting interests of particular social classes and groups such as trade unions, selfmanagement organizations, political parties and other organizations. Interactions between these organizations and between them and the state result or should result in determination of socially accepted goals of economic management reflecting needs and aspirations of the society.

Relationships of the second type encompass problems concerning the position and role of supreme and central state organs and relations between them. Effectiveness of relations between supreme and central organs of the state is reflected in the ability of transforming socially accepted goals of economic activity into socially accepted tasks of the economic policy finding their expression in central economic plans.

Finally, as regards relationships between the economic centre /supreme and central state organs dealing with economic affairs/ and companies they basically boil down to creation of a system of economic instruments by means of which the Centre induces autonomous companies to act in conformity with the fixed social goals and tasks as outlined in central plan in a way which does not destroy foundations and prerequisites of micro-economic effectiveness.

# 1. Mechanizm of formulation of social objectives and the economic policy tasks

Relationships of the first type, as mentioned above, are of primary importance for subordination of economic activities to social objectives. However, a slow revival of trade unions and self-management system delays the process of creating a partner for the state and especially for the economic Centre in the determining of social goals of economic activity. This activity consists mainly in determining a desirable volume and structure of the gross national product and the national income, which ensure appropriate consumption level for particular social groups and the entire society. Distribution of the national income into accumulation and consumption, as well as distribution of the consumption fund among particular social classes and groups must be correlated with it. This is a prerequisite of ensuring growth of real incomes of the population. The scale /and directions of investing/ determining the share of investments in the national income must be taken into account while elaborating long-term social goals. All these goals and propositions concerning distribution of the national income connected with them constitute an object of animated social interest. The shaping of these goals in accordance with expectations of the society is one of decisive factors in winning social support for a chosen strategy of economic development.

The choice of social goals of economic activity may be performed autonomously by the Centre, which "knows" the current and the future social needs and basing on this knowledge it elaborates an appropriate strategy of economic development. The past practice and its consequences arouse serious doubts as regards the actual knowledge of social needs as possessed by the Centre. Even if social goals of economic activity elaborated by the Centre corresponded really to social needs, they would be imposed in a way from outside without active participation of the society in their formulation. That would not guarantee the indispensable social support and involvement in their execution and identyfikation of these goals as the society's own goals. Such a mechanism of

choice, which creates these prerequisites, is inherent in the concept of socialized planning as contained in the idea of the reform that assumes compatibility of the general interest with interests of social classes and groups through their active participation in formulation and choice of the social development strategy.

There are possible two variants of the socialized formulation of social goals of economic activity based on negotiations and consultations. The negotiation variant, institutional representations of different social classes and groups are treated as a partner for the Centre, which is allowed to put forward his own proposition. Propositions of the Centre and social propositions are an object of discussions and consultations with the outcome of these consultations being binding for both sides. In the consultation variant, the Centre submits its properly prepared propositions, which are discussed and commented upon in various environments. The outcome of these discussions is not binding, however, for the Centre, but an essential prerequisite of this variant is the Centre's attitude to the outcome of consultations. Despite the fact that they are not binding the Centre is supposed to support with proper arguments the variant accepted by it as otherwise the idea of consultations will be discredited and there will not be achieved one of major goals of the socialized planning i.e. recognition of the accepted development strategy by the society as its own and the society's active involvement in its implementation.

These two variants of choice need not be treated as contradictory ones. A general observation that could be made here is that an object of negotiations and/or consultations cannot certainly be all problems accompanying formulation of the social goals of production but only the most significant problems. Among these problems there will most certainly be such which due to their weight lend themselves for negotiations. They include problems connected with distribution of the national income with trade unions being the most appropriate partner for the Centre in representing the working people. The already mentioned slow revival of trade unions should not pose

an obstacle in their involvement in such negotiations. On the contrary, involvement of trade unions in negotiations may pave the way for accelerated restoration of their authority.

Formulation of social goals of economic activity represents a precondition for undertaking actions oriented at elaboration of socio-economic plan. Such a plan translates social goals into long- and medium-term tasks of the economic policy.

Planning should correspond to system's assumptions in two ways. The first requirement concerns methodology of planning, and the second one - relationship between planning and functioning of the national economy, which includes the questions of the position and role of companies.

Without looking here any deeper into the question of methodological requirements of central planning,<sup>1</sup> we should stress here, first of all, the requirement of comprehensiveness. Failure to satisfy this requirement accounts for lack of coherence between particular elements of the plan and hampers or even excludes a possibility of performing comparative analyses and evaluating different variants. The possibility of performing comparative analyses is dependent upon integration of material, income-financial prerequisites and those measured in terms of value. Description of elements of the plan in terms of value, its correctness depends on "authenticity" of economic categories applied by the planner, that is, on the degree to which they reflect relationships between input of labour and scarcity of goods. Proper integration of different elements of the plan creates conditions for modelling and analyzing alternative variants. Conclusions ensuing from such analyses must be treated as binding. Otherwise, it will lead to instrumental treatment of economic categories and replacement of a plan based on the economic calculus by arbitrary choices prompted allegedly by superior social interests.

Basing of the central planning on the indirect calculus is also of great importance for this reason that it makes it possible to conduct the calculus at macro and micro levels in the same categories. Otherwise, it will lead to contradictions, the removal of which by the Centre carries a threat of its

fragmentary manipulation of chosen elements in companies' mechanism of functioning instead of its comprehensive influence.

The postulated character of the above remarks is conditioned by the fact that the central planning is far from fulfilling methodological requirements being indispensable in the new economic system.

The relationship between the central planning and the mechanism of functioning consists primarily in the fact that indispensable changes in the planning /their more important elements are mentioned above/ are possible only when the mechanism of functioning changes in accordance with the initial concept of the reform. Incomplete systems solutions, their fragmentary character generate a climate in which it is suggested that systems solutions should be subordinated to implementation of the plan, which would allow for direct interference in these fields of activity that are considered to be socially important.

Autonomy of companies is one of the pillars of the economic reform, and it involves the concept of two-tier planning creating appropriate field of adaptation for companies.

Stochastic character of economic processes causes that they are not fully steerable. A possibility of preserving a general equilibrium and partial equilibrium in the economy is dependent upon adaptability of companies in response to changing conditions of their operation. Absence of such adaptability, appearance of disturbances in partial equilibriums, and especially in more important areas, leads to the undertaking of correcting activities by the Centre. Consequently, the Centre carries the burden of problems, which by their very nature should not lie within its decision-making area.

Adaptability of companies depends, generally speaking, on the character of the central plan and of the instruments by means of which companies are steered.

As regards the central plan, apart from its internal balancing it is important from the point of view of companies' adaptability whether it creates conditions for their balanced growth. Moreover, the scope of its obligatory action is very



important as well. The concept of the economic reform envisages that the central plan is a binding plan only for the Centre, and there should not result from it any obligatory tasks for companies. The plan tasks are to be executed, first of all, by means of economic instruments. They should be characterized among others with their systems character, which imposes a requirement of their internal logic, and lack of inconsistency among particular instruments. If economic instruments fulfil this condition then introduction of direct instruments by the Centre deforms a company's economic calculus and diminishes its adaptation abilities. Absence of solutions of systems character in the field of plan implementation instruments of their fragmentary character must bring identical consequences as they pave the way for the Centre's intervention in a company's internal affairs. And conversely - it also affords possibilities for stronger companies and industrial branches to exert their pressure on the Centre to push their own private interests.

## 2. Selected problems concerning the structure and the role of the Centre /functional and branch ministries/

The main element in the national economy's structure and in the mechanism of its functioning is the state and more precisely the economic Centre i.e. supreme and central organs whose activity is focussed on economic affairs. Organization and functioning of the Centre must be adapted to the mechanism of the economy's functioning. New economic mechanism in the form in which it is outlined in "Directions of the Economic Reform"<sup>3</sup> calls for establishment of the national centre of the economic policy, that will be primarily charged with elaboration of a strategy of socio-economic development and its implementation. This includes a task of creating instruments of the central plan implementation in their systems approach. Performance of such a role by the Centre is possible if it is released from tasks connected with direct management of companies, and if the principle of their autonomy is observed.

The present structure of the Centre, functions of its component elements have remained unchanged as a rule despite far-reaching transformations in the mechanism of companies' functioning. Lack of any major progress in changing the structure and principles of the Centre's activity carries not only a threat of actions being incompatible with principles of the new system but it is a cause also that such actions are undertaken actually. It is not only a result of the fact that the Centre has not been reformed but also of incomplete, non-systems regulation of companies' operation principles.

Reform of the Centre encompasses among others a problem of defining position and role of branch and functional ministries.

Functional ministries carrying out specific tasks in relation to the entire national economy are not representatives of interests of industrial branches, sectors, or definite territorial units. A threat on their part for the economic reform may ensue from incomprehensive form of companies' economic-financial system, lack of cohesion among various instruments, or predominance of a specific function over others as performed by a given instrument e.g. predominance of the fiscal function in assessing taxes over their economic function. One of major causes of such phenomena is absence of coordination of activities between functional and central organs.

The problem of branch ministries looks different. They have been developed as a representative of specific areas of the national economy and that is why they do not express general social interests but rather narrowly-conceived interests of particular industrial branches or sectors. As a product of the previous management system based on commands and centralized allocation of means of production, they are accustomed to application of direct instruments. Their number, right connections, and lack of explicit description of their new functions in the reformed mechanism of the national economy's functioning carry a direct threat for the economic reform.

In the above mentioned document entitled "Directions of the Economic Reform" it was postulated that the factors of

transitional character i.e. necessity of continued application of centralized allocations should not hamper the reconstruction process of the state economic administration, and especially the reconstruction of branch ministries.<sup>4</sup> This task was to have been accomplished by 1982. The changes actually performed have been of a superficial character, and in relation to branch ministries they were expressed in reduction of their number without any change of their functions. As a result of it, these ministries may exert their influence on activities and decision-making processes of the Council of Ministers, and indirectly also on other organs, as well as hamper effectively processes of formation of a national centre of economic policy promoting fundamental social interests and not narrowly-conceived interests. These hypotheses are confirmed by the performed changes, which consolidated the position held by branch ministries instead of weakening it.

We could mention here by way of example a long list of over 1,300 state companies recognized to be of basic importance for the national economy, in which the director is appointed and recalled and his salary is fixed by the ministry. There have been set up 40 compulsory associations of producers and 140 voluntary associations. These associations, in the prevailing conditions of acute shortages in industrial supplies and subordination of industrial supply centres to branch ministries, act as middlemen between companies and ministries in solving companies procurement problems and in their efforts to secure tax reliefs and subsidies. In this way, the present associations of producers gradually take over the functions performed by industrial amalgamations in the past. This is confirmed by results of studies carried out by The Institute of Political Economy in the University of Lodz, and by other research centres.<sup>5</sup>

The above solutions, quoted by way of examples, afford a possibility for branch ministries to interfere in companies' affairs, but simultaneously, they become an object of pressure exerted by big companies. Consequently, branch ministries instead of implementing the state economic policy, elaborating and executing development strategies of industry, partici-



pating actively in developing indirect instruments for regulation of companies' activity, instead of performing information and service functions in relation to these companies, continue to represent narrowly-conceived interests of industrial branches, sectors, and big companies thus undermining effectiveness of the state's regulatory function.<sup>6</sup> In definite situations, it causes that the Centre identifies itself with interests of specific economic sectors, and narrowly-conceived interests tend to predominate instead of more general social interests.

A very striking example may be here a fact that in spite of a very urgent necessity of introducing fundamental changes to the structure of central investments, in 1983 - 90 per cent of total investment outlays were allocated for development of capital goods production.<sup>7</sup>

As it was observed above, functional ministries even though they do not represent narrowly-conceived interests may exert a negative influence on the process of executing the economic reform. This is due, first of all, to insufficient harmonization of concepts and activities of various ministries. This may result in a fragmentary formulation of companies' economic-financial system and in incoherent impact of different regulatory instruments on decision-making processes in companies.

Such a situation is confirmed by findings of our studies presented in a further part of this paper.

Thus, there are justified reasons to express a view that functional ministries failed to create so far a strong support for the reform. The weakness of the present form of companies' economic-financial system also testifies to the fact that so far there has not been formed a single central organ dealing with the economic policy and harmonizing activities of particular supreme and central organs.

### 3. Instruments of developing decision-making processes in companies.

In the concept of the reform this problem is settled quite explicitly. In conditions when companies are equipped with

their autonomy, management of their activity, stimulating them to operate in directions compatible with the central plan may be done by means of economic instruments and information ties approached in a systems way. Application of direct instruments may take place in exceptional situations and only within the scope determined by an act of law.

The solutions introduced so far, as it was generally mentioned above, are far from a desirable state both as regards their systems approach, creation of stimuli promoting higher effectiveness and application of direct instruments in only exceptional cases.

Motivational system of companies is characterized with major weaknesses. Research findings indicate that it does not induce companies to rationalization of their employment, reduction of costs, and undertaking developmental ventures. Companies' efforts are focussed, first of all, on current industrial supplies procurement and production problems and that despite the fact that aging of their fixed assets is not a threat of the future but a real fact today. Companies' aspirations largely boil down to satisfaction of their employees' consumer desires. It is interesting to observe that despite great significance of consumer goods production, wages in industries manufacturing them show a slower dynamics than wages in industries turning out capital goods and industrial materials. Motivational system of companies is additionally softened by quite extensive although smaller than in 1982 possibilities of obtaining financial reliefs and subsidies. Obtaining them depends not so much on their profitability indices but on their willingness to obtain them and on their ability to pull the right strings. The obtained reliefs did not promote any major improvement in companies' effectiveness. Companies may rely on considerable assistance extended to them by associations of producers and organs which founded them. Efforts aiming at consolidation of systems solutions, assurance of close interrelationships between dynamics of companies' revenues and expenditure were replaced by fragmentary solutions incoherent with systems solutions. We might list here the obligatory measure of sold production,

compulsory mediation of manpower agencies, or a category of substantiated costs.

Cost-based character of prices, and more precisely their non-parametric character represent one of fundamental causes of weaknesses in the motivational system. Relative ease with which companies solve their problems ensues not so much from substantial field of manoeuvre in division of profit but from ease with which all costs can be covered. Introduction of substantiated costs category is a palliative solution. Its effectiveness can be doubted considering the fact that the system of industrial standards in companies has not been ordered properly, as well as difficulties encountered by effective external control of costs.

Practically, in no major market segment are prices the prices of equilibrium. Thus, the market has been deprived of its function as a verifier of the level of costs and prices. Economic pressure in the case of prices for consumer goods has been replaced with pressure of the public opinion. The latter is, to some extent, effective as regards consumer goods but its effectiveness is much smaller in relation to industrial supplies prices where contractual prices are applied to a bigger extent. This leads to stimulation of processes of cost-based inflation. It should be also noted that companies are not really interested in lifting their prices to the equilibrium level since it involves a possibility of exceeding the profitability threshold delimited by progressive income taxation.

Even in foreign trade, where it was relatively easiest to ensure a parametric character for prices, there were not created necessary conditions promoting it. Predominance of contractual prices in relations between producers and foreign trade organizations, exchange rate equalization grants, discretionary character of hard currency deductions represent the most important factors undermining the foreign trade mechanism. It fails to induce companies to seek higher effectiveness.

Taxes levied on a company should, by their very assumption, play dual functions i.e. fiscal and economic /motivational/.

Obligatory solutions in the field of motivational system and prices account for the fact that fiscal function has become a predominant one. Cost-based character of prices, which ensures growth of taxation burden calculated among costs /wage tax and property tax/, causes that taxes cannot induce companies to lower other elements of costs or taxation base. From companies' point of view such activities are not justified.

In the case of income tax, its progressive character and the way in which profitability is determined /profit from manufacturing or processing costs/ blunt its economic functions. Progressive character of taxation diminishes the company's interest taken in increasing its profitability since higher profitability involves higher tax rate. Such tax produces antieffectiveness barrier as it discourages companies from lowering their manufacturing costs, what is more - it encourages them to raise these costs. Higher costs of manufacturing with a given profit volume decrease profitability. The structure of costs, share of costs of manufacturing in total costs are not uniform in different industries, which should be accompanied by differentiation of tax burden quite independently of companies. Meanwhile, research findings point at reduction of differences in profitability of companies belonging to different industrial branches. A conclusion which ensues from these remarks is that companies managed to master the art of minimizing their tax burden in order to be able to satisfy consumer aspirations of their employees to a bigger degree.

As it was indicated above, the analyzed companies tend to be more interested in their current problems at the cost of developmental problems. Apart from restricted possibilities of self-financing, the cause of such situation lies in difficulties connected with obtaining bank credits for investment purposes. The consequences of such situation are quite apparent - it poses an unsurmountable obstacle on the way of investments with a short pay-back period, accelerates aging of fixed assets and their gradual decapitalization. Our studies indicate also that in centrally-sponsored investments there participate a bigger number of companies producing capital

goods than those producing consumer goods. This reflects a wider problem of the state's investment policy and namely, with the state being entangled in investment "heritage" bequeathed by the seventies, it gives its preference to capital goods industries failing to contribute to restructuralization of the national economy and creation of material prerequisites allowing to fight inflation.

Deep market disequilibrium, lack of cohesion in the economic-financial system, as well as habits developed at the time the management system was based on commands and centralized allocations all cause that direct instruments are applied on a much wider scale than it is actually necessary. By direct instruments I mean activities undertaken by the Centre in various forms and concerning directly the real sphere i.e. structure of production, industrial procurement, location of plants etc. These instruments have one extremely dangerous feature. Namely, they prove to be seemingly effective and easy to be applied. Instead of elaborating tediously more or less refined methods of indirect manipulation of companies' decision-making processes there are always available direct instruments whose effects can be easily foreseen. Nonetheless, their application on any wider scale undermines the economic calculus in companies excluding a possibility of achieving microeconomic effectiveness by them.

Deep market and production disequilibrium led to the launching of many operational programmes in 1982. Critique of their negative consequences, which appeared in 1982, caused that the number of these programmes was reduced in 1983. Operational programmes, being a reaction to absence of equilibrium, were at the same time an expression of confidence that it would be possible to eliminate or at least mitigate the consequences of structural disproportions in the economy by means of direct instruments. Despite reduction of their number in 1983, participation of companies in these programmes, as it was revealed by our studies, not always guaranteed better industrial supplies. Continued considerable dependence of companies on the organs which founded them creates favourable conditions for appearance of substitutes of direct



instruments, among others, in the form of pressure exerted on companies e.g. in the case of government orders where companies did not always have freedom of choice. As a result of it, all the above mentioned factors lead to restriction of their freedom of choice and to further undermining of their already incoherent economic-financial systems.

The last group of instruments aiding the state's regulatory role in the economy includes organizational instruments. They encompass, first of all, performance of founding-organ functions by state organs /mainly ministries/. Expansion of this function are the rights with which these organs have been equipped as concerns establishment or liquidation of companies, prohibiting their mergers and/or associations of producers. These rights aim, among others, at counteracting appearance of monopolistic situations.

Rationing of raw materials, fuels and energy necessitated by acute restrictions in their supply, discretionary character of tax reliefs, subsidies, hard currency deductions, as well as other formal and informal factors led to big consolidation /against assumptions of the reform/ of the controlling position and role of founding organs in relation to companies as regards possibilities of their intervention in their internal affairs. The latter, anyway, strive themselves to secure the assistance of founding organs in such matters as industrial procurement, reliefs, subsidies, and hard currency deductions. Creation of 40 obligatory and 140 voluntary associations of producers, which from the point of view of their branch structure duplicated former amalgamations, consolidates the monopolistic position held by bigger companies and branches. Theoretically founding organs should counteract such tendency. However, the fact that their functions remained basically unchanged favoured creation of such associations as a substitute of indirect management level. A threat inherent in this solution lies not only in a possibility of utilizing associations by ministries as an instrument of selective pressure on companies but also in a possibility of rebirth of a channel through which the pressure of narrowly-conceived interests of big companies, branches and sectors on the

Centre may be cumulated. This will hamper formation of a central organ of the economic policy, which should constitute an instrument of sovereign state control over the economy. The necessity of verifying usefulness of associations in their present form can hardly be questioned. It seems to be a direction taken by one of regulations in the government act concerning adjustments in some acts introducing the economic reform. It stipulates that all costs incurred by companies due to their supporting of associations are to be covered from their distributable profit with this reservation, however, that it is to refer to voluntary associations only.<sup>8</sup>

5. Basic causes of shortcomings in solutions in the field of the state's economic function.

It was pointed out above that in all there areas i.e. of relationships between the institutional environment and the state, those with-in the state, and those between the Centre and companies, the accepted solutions or their absence arouse many questions as regards their compatibility with the reform concept. Thus, there have not been created as yet conditions allowing the state to perform its sovereign control over the economy. It seems advisable to look at the main causes of such situation now. There could be distinguished three such causes. The first is a conflict between the necessity of introducing solutions bearing fruit over longer period of time and the necessity of solving immediate problems resulting from a deep market disequilibrium, inflation, speculation etc. The second cause of a social character may be a conflict of socio-professional interests and views of the people. The third cause is of a cognitive character.

Lack of market equilibrium, being among others a consequence of acute shortages in supply of industry with means of production and deep disproportions in production structure, may be eliminated by means of economic instruments bringing effects in a longer period of time /restructurization of industry, growth of import through earlier growth of export/. The actions which must be undertaken here may encounter a social barrier /resistance of the society to

the raising of prices to the equilibrium level/. Pressure of unsatisfied social needs gives rise to a trend of searching for make-shift solutions, immediate solutions and, what is more, on a scale exceeding justified needs. In 1982, it assumed a form of several operational programmes, which imposed rigid restrictions on the flow of capital goods instead of rationalizing them as they tended to eliminate or curb the rationalizing impact of economic mechanisms. Reduction in the number of operational programmes in 1983 did not always ensure appropriate supplies for companies participating in them either. In as much as the system of rationing assumed excessive proportions the moves made in the field of prices were characterized with excessive restraint. Such restraint can be understood as regards prices for primary consumer goods but it is hard to understand why prices of durable consumer goods were not brought up to the level of equilibrium /as a result of this situation, we can observe intensified speculation in this market segment, which can hardly be controlled by administrative measures/. Pressure of immediate needs led to changes in the applied instruments, which were quite surprising for companies or to introduction of new instruments in the course of a business year. This happened in 1982 when a one-stage stabilization tax was introduced and when the value of charges for the so-called State Fund of Professional Activation was changed

Solution of the conflict between introduction of new solutions in economic mechanisms and a desire to reduce tensions caused by appearing problems through intervention, and in a fragmentary way without a comprehensive evaluation of consequences of such activity generates a whole range of undesirable consequences. They result in undermining an indispensable stability of instruments, diminishing certainty of the economic calculus and companies' plans, and ultimately they undermine confidence in the state.

The second cause, as mentioned above, is of a social character. People perform different roles in the social process of production according to the way they are involved

in specific socio-professional systems. The degree to which the existing systems of socio-professional relations correspond to their views and interests and their past experience determine their attitude to changes of the existing relations and to concrete solutions.<sup>9</sup> This refers both to the sphere where theoretical concepts of methods of the state economic regulation and their application are worked out and to the sphere of application of these methods. As a result, there may appear situations in which theoretically and practically correct solutions do not always bring the expected results as well as situation with not quite correct theoretical concepts and their application form.

The last cause of shortcomings in the state economic regulation is of a cognitive character. The socio-economic reality has an extremely complex character. Determination of these mutual relationships and codeterminants, which are of essential significance among a magnitude of others is, as a rule, an outcome of a long process. The hypotheses formulated in this cognitive process must be an object of discussions while applicable solutions produced by them will pass through a test of their rationality in practice. It appears then that theoretical analyses not always conduct to fully rational practical solutions. At such a time, it becomes necessary to correct them through further studies.

It is extremely difficult to determine the exact significance of the above causes, which is among others due to the fact that they operate simultaneously. However, the order in which they have been presented is not accidental.

## References

This paper has been based on results of studies carried out by the Institute of Political Economy in the University of Lodz within the following research projects: "Evaluation of logic of the economic reform introduction - economic and social aspects" ordered by the Institute of National Economy in Warsaw in 1982; "Analysis of introduction of the economic reform in light, heavy, and engineering industries" ordered by the Institute of National Economy in Warsaw in 1982; "Analysis of introduction of the economic reform in industrial companies" ordered by the Institute of Finance and National Economy in the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw in 1983.

1. For more information on this subject see: K. Porwit, Central Planning in Reform Conditions /in Polish/, "Życie Gospodarcze", No. 40 and 41 from 1983.
2. Ibid.
3. Directions of Economic Reform /in Polish/, KiW, Warsaw, 1981.
4. Ibid., thesis 117, p. 60.
5. See: St. Kuziński, Reform and Functioning of State Economic Organs /in Polish/, "Gospodarka Planowa", Nos. 7-8, 1983, pp. 322-324.
6. See: Opinion No. 16 of the Socio-Economic Council attached to the Polish Parliament from 24th May 1983, "Rzeczpospolita", 16th June 1983.
7. See: T. Górnicka, Inertia /in Polish/, "Życie Gospodarcze", No. 48 from 1983.
8. "On changes in some acts introducing the economic reform" /in Polish/, Dziennik Ustaw No. 71, Art. 33 item 1.
9. An illustration of this thesis may be propositions of the Chief Technical Organization critically discussed by T. Jezirański in his article "By front door", "Życie Gospodarcze", No. 16, 15th April 1984.



Wiesław Caban

## Rola Państwa w procesie reformy gospodarczej

Autor podejmuje w opracowaniu kwestię roli ekonomicznej państwa socjalistycznego i dowodzi, że państwo winno sprawować suwerenną władzę nad gospodarką. W przekonaniu Autora dla sprawowania przez państwo takiej roli decydujące znaczenie ma prawidłowe ukształtowanie trojakiego typu relacji: relacji między instytucjonalnym otoczeniem a państwem, relacji w obrębie państwa a ściślej w obrębie centrum gospodarczego oraz relacji między centrum gospodarczym a przedsiębiorstwami. W treści opracowania wyjaśnione jest pojęcie suwerennej władzy państwa nad gospodarką, jak i treść i uwarunkowania wymienionych wyżej trzech typów relacji. Autor, odwołując się do wyników badań dowodzi, że kształt tych relacji jest daleki od pożądanego. W końcowej części opracowania podjęta jest próba wyjaśnienia głównych przyczyn takiego stanu rzeczy.