

Sophia van de BOEL*

THE CHALLENGE TO DEVELOP A BORDER REGION: GERMAN-POLISH COOPERATION

Abstract: Changes in Central and Eastern Europe have an impact on regional development in border areas and on cross-national cooperation in favour of these areas. The German-Polish border area illustrates the complexity of regional (re)development, which is related to the interplay between endogenous regional forces and external influences.

This paper discusses the German-Polish border area with regard to its adaptability to post-revolutionary socio-economic processes. At the same time it pays attention to the influence of local, regional and national authorities. Finally, it discusses some development opportunities on the basis of the 'Oderlandplan'. We may conclude that the context for regional development in the Polish-German border region is not unfavourable.

Key words: regional development, European economic cooperation, European integration.

1. INTRODUCTION

After the 'soft revolution', regional-economic development in former eastern block countries has become a new perspective, or, as KUKLIŃSKI (1992b) suggests, the pattern of regional inequality in the nineties will be different from that in the eighties.

This paper starts with a description of the influence of external changes on regional development in general. The third section discusses the influence of these external changes on border areas. In the next sections the issue of regional development is directed to the German-Polish border area.

In addition to capital cities, border areas were most heavily affected by the post-revolutionary changes. Particularly those located in the western part of the former Eastern Bloc countries, were positively affected. In the discussion about

* Geographical Institute, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

changes in the German-Polish border area it is pointed out that the opportunities for economic development will be determined not only by the external forces, but also by the endogenous regional properties, and by local, regional and national administrations and development plans. Although these contexts may be conflicting, there are ample opportunities for economic development in the German-Polish border area.

2. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Regional development is determined by the adaptability of a region to unexpected exogenous stimuli (FISHER, 1974). The more diverse regions are with regard to their characteristic elements and their mutual and external interaction processes, the greater their ability is to deal with unexpected stimuli from the outside (REIF, 1973)¹. For the Central and East European regions in general and for border areas in particular, the economic and political changes in both the national and the international context can be considered as unexpected exogenous stimuli.

Regional adaptability often has to do with the region's internal differentiation leading to a specific social structure. The internal differentiation can be reduced to a combination of regional properties in the scope of historical heritage, culture, physical geography and relative location (PAUL, 1992). On the other hand, it depends on the state authorities and their regional-economic policy to determine if regions with a small economic diversity are predestined to permanent backwardness.

All over the world, economic prosperity and welfare are unequally distributed among various regions. In most West European countries unequal regional development was reduced by the smooth interplay between state authorities, representatives of the free-market system, and regional properties. In the Bloc countries, regional development was generally determined by the central government, often at the cost of regions with unfavourable properties. There was no room for equity-producing processes. National economic growth prevailed over regional equality. Free market forces were almost absent and regional authorities were forced to follow a rigid planning strategy, whether it was natural or not. In most cases it was not. Decision makers at the regional and local level were strangled by the inconsistencies of the whole system. In order not to lose face either with respect to the central leaders or with respect to their rank and file, the regional decision makers often made arbitrary decisions, or they falsi-

¹ Reif's idea is based on systems in general. Since regions can normally be considered as open systems, the word region is used by analogy with the word system.

fied important data which became the cornerstone for new central plans (HAMILTON, 1970).

In border areas 'relative location' was an important determinant for regional development. During communism borders were considered by the governments as absolute boundaries. As a result, areas close to the border generally had low economic growth and activity rates (except for some areas in the neighbourhood of main axes of transport) in comparison with the capital cities and their surroundings, cities and towns in the old industrial triangle, and last but not least, around the prestigious socialist economic growth projects. The latter were, for strategic reasons, often located in the eastern parts of the Bloc countries.

Hence, most border areas have a small socio-economic diversity. They are located far from centres of activity, and their character is mainly rural. Therefore, one might expect their chances for economic development to be low, unless comprehensive regional plans are implemented.

After the 'soft revolution' the influence of national governments on regional development has declined (GORZELAK, 1992a). New capitalist pressure groups emanating from local communities and from the changing (inter)national society, have gained importance. As a consequence, regional properties and opportunities for regional development are placed in a new context. Therefore, the pattern of regional inequality in the eighties is unlikely to be the same in the nineties (KUKLIŃSKI, 1992b). Unfortunately however, national governments lost their control over these processes, which has often resulted in chaos.

In the meantime, politicians, scientists and administrators are working on plans for new regional policy and administrative power relations. Administrative responsibility has to be earmarked for local governments (KUKLIŃSKI, 1992b), while, at the same time, meso-organizations in the scope of regional development plans have to be called into being (KROSZEL, 1992). Regional features and signals from the new capitalist society have to be included within the decision making process. Then, the task of the national governments will be no longer initiating, but steering. Moreover, this new organizational structure will be comparable to that in Western Europe and it might enlarge the chances for successful cooperation in both the international and the cross-national field. This however, takes time.

3. POST-COMMUNIST SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON BORDER AREAS

The main socio-economic contextual changes that affect border areas seem to be: foreign investment, unemployment, and transnational commuting. Depending on the combination of specific regional properties and regional-economic

policies, border areas have different perspectives for further economic development. The underlying forces will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2 and can be subsumed under regional properties and regional-economic policy.

3.1. New socio-economic dynamics

Foreign investments. In most Central and East European countries, foreign investors were admitted for the first time in the seventies. Their location criteria were mainly based on proximity to markets, technical and institutional infrastructure, and the availability of skilled labour. After the revolution these location criteria did not change considerably (MYNC, 1992, MURPHEY, 1992). In more concrete terms, investors are attracted by capital cities and by axes of transport (the axis Berlin/Poznań/Warsaw and the axis Vienna/Budapest). As a consequence, some regions in the western parts of Poland and Hungary were, and still are, attractive for foreign investors. At present, also wage rates play an important role in location decisions of foreign investors. On the macro-scale, wage rates are declining from west to east/south-east. Therefore, one might expect new (foreign) investments or branch plants in the western border areas of countries further eastward, provided that for these enterprises highly skilled labour is of small importance.

In some Central and East European countries, signs of economic progress can be detected. This progress is due to a tolerant economic climate and to increasing rates of foreign investment. In Poland foreign investment was a considerable factor in 1992.

Unemployment. Before the revolution, real unemployment did not exist in Central and Eastern Europe. At present there is unemployment and, in most countries, it is still growing. It is difficult to give a general overview of the spatial distribution of unemployment and its growth on the macro-scale, because unemployment rates depend on the countries' nature and speed of transition and on different definitions of unemployment (van de BOEL and PAUL, 1993).

The highest unemployment rates are found in most old industrial areas, in industrial areas with a monostructure, and in underdeveloped rural areas in a peripheral location (FASSMANN, 1992, p. 55). Since most border areas have a highly rural character and find themselves far away from main centres of activity, it is assumed that unemployment rates in border areas are high.

Cross-national commuting. On a lower level of analysis (the community level), frontier areas are vital for the improvement of individual income. Russians, Poles and Romanians cross their western borders to sell their products in the neighbouring countries where incomes and prices are higher. This phenomenon however, cannot be considered as a propelling one, since the money obtained is mainly spent on housing construction and luxury goods.

Besides, this process might change abruptly as a result of the implementation of new laws.

3.2. Structuring forces

Centres of economic activity. New (foreign) enterprises are often attracted by technically skilled workers and high income groups. Both can be found in and around capital cities and other economically well developed towns (MURPHEY, 1992, van HASTENBERG, 1993).

Because of the relatively high income rates in the vicinity of large towns, the inhabitants are able to invest in small-scale enterprises. During the last years, one can watch an explosive growth of huge wholesale/retail houses and workshops in these areas. The improvement of recreational facilities is under way. In border regions economically well developed centres of activity are scarce.

Infrastructure. The availability of a well developed technical infrastructure is of great importance for further economic development. A well developed technical infrastructure is found in the vicinity of capital cities and in the old industrial areas. Although the economic growth and development in most of the old industrial areas are declining because of outdated production processes and heavy pollution, the classical axes of transport connecting these areas with the west are unlikely to lose much of their importance. The axis Vienna/Budapest keeps linking a rather diverse and still prosperous old industrial area with the west. The axis Berlin/Poznań/Warsaw which connected the capital city Warsaw and the old industrial city of Łódź with the west, remains important, predominantly for Warsaw. The maintenance of the importance of these axes is the result of an interplay between national governments and foreign entrepreneurs. Western entrepreneurs choose the easiest way to penetrate new markets. This results in settlement in the vicinity of transport axes. The national governments react by (re)developing main centres along these axes (Frankfurt am Oder/Ślubiце, Poznań, Győr).

Local and national responsibilities. With regard to all the changes mentioned before, a strong totalitarian centralization of administration is not desirable anymore. Particularly the less favourable areas need more room for local and regional initiatives to improve their situation. In most countries, the division of responsibilities between state government and local governments is still unclear. There is a great deal of uncertainty about finance and about the legitimacy and accuracy in decision-making. Therefore, local authorities prefer either not to take any decisions at all or they misuse the loopholes in the law. Also in border areas, local authorities still miss the power to optimize the opportunities for new (foreign) investment and cross-national cooperation. Nevertheless some of them succeeded in small-scale cross-boundary cooperation.

Moreover, there are hardly any meso-organisations working on regional-economic development plans. Without these meso-organizations, it will be quite difficult to attune the interests of the local and national levels to one another and to consider the broader socio-economic context of local entities. With regard to cross-national cooperation, the role of meso-organisations may be of vital importance. A cross-national context makes things even more complicated. Even in the EC which has long experience with cross-national cooperation, the issue of juridical authority still remains controversial (CEC, 1991). However, being in transition, the former Bloc countries might get an edge on EC countries in this respect.

Summarizing the effects of the new regional economic processes and their underlying forces, we learn that particularly capital cities and dynamic centres in the western territories of the Bloc countries are attracting new economic activities. Already during communism these western territories, particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were the most developed, despite the ideology of equal spread of economic growth and development. More particularly, the two main international axes of transport are attractive. They bring prosperity to the western parts of Poland and Hungary. Besides, municipalities along the border are positively affected.

Hence, the western border areas have relatively good prospects for economic growth. However, centres of economic activity are quite rare in these areas.

In the near future, processes favouring the western territories of countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, might result in an increase of regional inequality at the cost of the territories further eastward. Moreover, as long as the interplay between local and national responsibilities, controlled by (cross-national) meso-organisations, is lacking, the economic growth and development will remain unevenly spread not only in a national, but also in a regional context.

4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDER REGION

In this section, the wider border area as demarcated in the Bundesforschungsanstalt für Ländeskunde und Raumordnung (BfLR, 1992) is considered as German-Polish border area (figure 1). The area consists of territories which, during six centuries up till the Second World War, all belonged to Germany. In the 20th century the area underwent two fundamental changes. The first one immediately after the Second World War, when the area was split by a borderline, and the other one after the "soft revolution", when the relative location changed together with the political, economic and social contexts. These changes bring about new opportunities for regional development. In addition,

regional properties of the type “historical heritage” might further stimulate new development processes.

4.1. Regional properties and regional adaptability

Until the Second World War the German-Polish border area was characterized by agriculture and by a tradition of large land ownership. Although the area made up the periphery of the German Empire, agriculture and technical infrastructure were fairly well developed, especially when compared with Poland.




Fig. 1. Demarcation of German-Polish border area

— coast; — border;
 [diagonal hatching] wider B/LR (border) area; [horizontal hatching] smaller B/LR (border) area;

The population consisted mainly of Germans, mixed with Slavs further eastward. The south was part of the old industrial triangle with mining industries. Industries, other than ship building in Stettin (Szczecin) and foodprocessing industries, were not well developed. But again, compared with Polish peripheral areas at that time, the situation was not bad.

After the War the area was split up by a borderline dividing two different peoples, the Germans and the Poles. At the beginning, the new Polish territories were devastated and demolished. Then, new settlers from the former Polish eastern territories came in.

The former feudal settlement structure, which was most prominent in the north, was very helpful in realizing one of the communist principles, the socialization of agriculture. The large estates were transformed into state farms, both in Germany and in Poland, although in Poland the Roman Catholic Church was a hindrance to the extensive socialization of agriculture. During the communist era over 90% of the agricultural areas were socialized in Germany. In the Polish western territories this was only 40–70% (GUS). In the other parts of Poland this share was even considerably lower than 40%, because the feudal settlement structure was less prominent and, as a result, less adaptable to the socialization principle. This socialization (in the seventies megagigantism) of large estates made the structure of these rural areas rather uni-directional. As a result, the economic diversity was small.

In this new spatial context, the harbour of Szczecin received new impulses. In the pre-war period the city had been heavily neglected by the Germans, because of its peripheral location and the importance of the harbour of Hamburg, located further west. For Poland however, Szczecin is the closest connection with Scandinavia and other Western European countries.

The industrial centres of the south remained of vital importance in both countries. During communism, the main impulses were directed toward a further growth and development of heavy industry and machinery. For strategical reasons, new industrial centres emerged in the eastern part of GDR. The western part of Poland received more impulses for industrial development in the scope of the new regional planning concept of 1975. In this concept the new provincial capitals received additional incentives for further development.

As a result of the post-war regional policy in combination with regional endogenous properties, Germany and Poland can roughly be divided along two lines. In the former GDR a north/south line can be drawn east of Berlin, where the eastern part can be considered as peripheral. South of Berlin a west/east line can be drawn, where the northern part (except for the agglomeration of Berlin) is the most backward. In Poland a north/south line can be drawn along the border of the former German territories. The division between north and south is less clear for Poland. Main centres of activity are found in Silesia (Southwest), in the central part (Warsaw/Łódź) and in the north (Gdańsk agglomeration and Szczecin). The southeastern part however, can be considered as the least developed area in Poland.

Although the communist ideology was differently interpreted by the two national governments, the German and Polish part did not grow far apart from each other. Because of the old feudal settlement structure.

After the soft revolution the German-Polish border line lost its importance. Integrated German and Polish development strategies might help this rather uniform area to survive the political, economic and social transformations. However, some serious problems have arisen. In the first place, the presence of numerous and huge state-farms, especially in the northern part, can be blamed for the small economic diversity. Secondly, the area has to deal with two different peoples and their different mentalities, and finally, the international economic and political contexts of both countries are different.

4.2. Regional dynamics and structuring forces in the German-Polish border region

Before the soft revolution, regional dynamics and structural forces were predominantly determined and controlled by the Central Government. In the former GDR this tendency was even stronger than in Poland. At present, structuring forces and regional dynamics are determined more by free-market forces. The antipode of the communist situation has emerged.

In this subsection the focus will be again on the three dynamics and three structuring forces which are vital for the changes taking place in border areas; foreign investment, unemployment, cross-national commuting, and innovation, infrastructure and administrative responsibility.

Socio-economic dynamics. As it was shown in the previous section, the criteria for location are mainly based on proximity to markets, technical and institutional infrastructure, and the availability of both technically skilled labour and cheap labour.

In the case of the German-Polish border area, the technical infrastructure is most developed along the axis Berlin/Frankfurt-Słubice/Poznań/Warsaw and along the axis which connects the industrial area Leipzig-Halle in Germany with Upper Silesia in Poland. The road connecting Berlin with the Polish harbour Szczecin crosses a sparsely populated rural area, unattractive for (foreign) industrial investment.

Poland might benefit from the foreign investor's preferences for cheap labour markets (van HASTENBERG, 1993). Since the wage rates in the former GDR are higher than in Poland and, within a few years, will be equalized with those in the former FRG, the western part of Poland might be attractive to foreign investors. Even though Poland's western part is sparsely populated and its population in the productive age is lower than in the German border area, it can be presumed that the prospects for Poland are not necessarily negative. Moreover, the population on the Polish side is younger than on the German side and the emigration rate is still lower. Under these circumstances, the German part

might become still more peripheral. This is expected to be most severe in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in the North.

Unemployment rates are high, both in Poland and in the former GDR, i. e. 13,6% (GUS) and 15% (Grünwälder, 1993) respectively at the end of 1992. On the German side of the border area unemployment rates are highest in Vorpommern in the north (> 20%). In this rural area the huge (former) state farms suffer great losses. In the rural northern part of the Polish side these losses are partly compensated by labour opportunities in the Szczecin agglomeration. The unemployment rate in the province of Szczecin is about 11%. The other Polish border provinces face the problem of privatization of state farms with a high burden of debt. At the same time, light industries which are well represented there, have no entry to the EC-market. In these provinces the unemployment rate amounts to, at least, 17% (GUS).

As already pointed out in the previous section, the income position of people in communities close to the border improves as a result of cross-border commuting and trade. The Polish people in particular enjoy the advantage of this opportunity.

Structuring forces. In the German-Polish border area Szczecin and the mini triangle of Cottbus, Görlitz and Frankfurt/Śluby can be considered as dynamic centres.

The main axes of transport have already been described under 'foreign investment'. In this respect the German-Polish border area is quite well off. In addition, cities which are split up by the border (Frankfurt/Śluby, Guben/Gubin, Görlitz/Zgorzelec) receive new prospects for development. In her article about changes in the Central European border regions which once were a political and cultural unit, HAMMER-MORAVČÍKOVÁ (1992) points out that cultural influence of areas in a more developed country have a positive impact on more backward areas in the other country. This is probably true also in regard to economic influence, particularly on a small scale like in border cities.

In the longer term, other areas such as the areas in eastern Poland should be connected with main axes. If these connections are neglected, there is a real chance that the eastern and western parts of Poland will fall apart economically. The existence of a relatively dense road- and rail structure in the western territories (historical heritage) increases this fear.

Since the German part of the area is part of the EC, Germany and Poland do not only deal with different interests in a national context, but also in an international context. This makes cross-national cooperation more complex than in case of, for instance, Polish-Czech or Polish-Slovak cooperation.

Meso-organisations are of vital importance for cross-national cooperation. Well set up meso-organisations might represent a diverse range of interests, especially when they are well organised in respect of international legal differences they can be more easily attuned to meso-organisations on the other side of

the border. However, there is a long way to go to realize this or, as KUKLIŃSKI puts it (1992a, p. 14), "A lot of efforts of different types must be undertaken to accustom Polish scientific, political, and social opinion to think in terms of a European regional system". This is less the case for the former GDR, since it is now part of the EC context. But even in the EC this is hard to realize.

Until now, cross-national cooperation is found at the local level and represents just a narrowly defined interest without legal authority. The same is true with respect to the new Euro-regions. They function in a complementary rather than in a propulsive way.

5. GERMAN-POLISH COOPERATION IN THE BORDER AREA

In the introduction it was indicated that the opportunities for the development of the German-Polish border area and for German-Polish cooperation are not unfavourable. Some people may disagree, because at first sight there do not seem to be many possibilities for redevelopment. Nevertheless, an optimistic view can be compatible with a realistic one.

This opinion is based on the simple fact that expectations with regard to economic growth and regional development should not be too high in the short term. Therefore, national planning and plans for cross-national cooperation, with well defined administrative authority, should not be too ambitious. Referring to the second section, these plans will be most effective when endogenous regional properties, and social and economic changes in both the national and international context are considered together. Below are discussed the opportunities for economic growth and regional development in the German-Polish border area on the basis of the 'Oderlandplan', introduced by the prime minister of Brandenburg, Stolpe.

The 'Oderlandplan'; strengths and shortcomings. The 'Oderlandplan', introduced in 1991, is demarcated by 34 German counties (Kreise) east of Berlin and 5 Polish counties (województwa). The area amounts to 53, 000 km². The Polish area is about 1,5 times bigger than the German area, but the population is about the same (both about 2,5 million people). The plan aims at an economic frontier, on both sides of the German-Polish border, to avoid a further desintegration of the eastern part of the former GDR. Besides, it provides an easy way for Germany to penetrate the Polish market (labour and products). Originally, the plan foresees on the German side the maintenance of industrial activities and the stimulation of high-tech industries in the south. At the same time attention will be directed toward the improvement of the natural environment. The agglomerations Dresden and Berlin will stimulate the industrial development. The border city of Frankfurt is considered as an important international

transport node and as an economic and cultural meeting point. The agricultural areas in the north will receive new impulses, but the infertile or partly forested agricultural areas should be taken out of production and transferred into national parks and tourist areas. Besides, high standard foodprocessing industries will be developed.

The Polish side is considered as an important agricultural area. For the rural areas with poor soils its concerns are the same as for those in Germany. The policy with regard to industrial development builds on that of the communist era. Everything is directed to the provincial capitals. The already present light industries will get new impulses. Finally, a new north-south axis of transport from Szczecin to the Central European 'hinterland' is urged.

The harbour area Szczecin/Świnoujście is mentioned as a possible international trust territory.

The plan is still being discussed. It is based too much on the spatial and economic structure of the eighties, but, as we will see later in this section, the nineties offer different prospects. In Poland the plan has encountered resistance which is partly fed by the profound distrust of Germans, originating from the manifold inimical events in German-Polish history. The plan is considered more beneficial for Germany than for Poland, since the largest financial contribution, and thereby impact, is German. Besides, the Poles doubt if the regional potentials are fairly considered in the plan.

Nevertheless, German-Polish cooperation in one form or another is recommendable, because Germany has experience with free-market mechanisms and Western European legislation. To prevent Germany from dominating the development processes, exchange of experience and knowledge about the problems of former Bloc countries is indispensable. Poland has to present itself as an equal partner and Germany has to listen. In the next paragraphs some adjustments on the 'Oderlandplan' will be suggested.

The planning area should be much smaller. In this form it is too extended, which makes the plan rather a concern of two nations than of regions. In the EC, for instance, trans-border regions are much smaller. Initiatives, originating either from counties (top-down) or from local authorities (bottom-up), are coordinated fairly well. Nevertheless, an administrative framework seems hard to establish.

In some cases problem solving discussions in the German-Polish border area are already directed to subregions, whether or not in the context of the 'Oderlandplan' (Szczecin, Euro-Region Germany/Slovakia/Poland).

The area is demarcated according to county- and provincial borders. Especially for Poland this demarcation criterion is quite arbitrary, because the counties are artificial and, in comparison to the German counties, large. It might be better to demarcate planning areas on the basis of regional potentials.

On the basis of regional potentials the border area can be demarcated as follows (cf. figure 2).

In the north, the harbour area of Szczecin/Świnoujście can be extended around the Oderhaf on the other side of the border. The agricultural activities of Vorpommern should not be considered in the plan, since this area is confronted with the same problems as Mecklenburg, further west. Hence, development of Vorpommern in another context will make more sense.

In regard to the development of Frankfurt(Oder)/Ślubiце, further development of the axis Berlin/Poznań/Warsaw can be considered. For Germany this will enlighten the eastward economic penetration and for Poland it will be of great help, because now some savings will be left to stimulate the eastern territories. If a north-south axis, starting in Szczecin, is considered of importance, it might be split up into two smaller axes, one Szczecin/Poznań/Katowice/ Ostrawa/Prague and Vienna, and the other Szczecin/Berlin/Dresden/Frankfurt (Main) and Prague. However, I do not foresee impulses for economic development along the northern parts of these axes, since other potentials for economic development are almost absent in those areas.



Fig. 2. Variation on the 'Oderlandplan'

- 'Oderland Plan' area;
 agriculture area not to be considered in the plan;
- border;
 primary axis;
 harbour area;
- secondary axis;
 tertiary axis;
 coast;

The industrial centres Cottbus/Görlitz/Eisenhüttenstadt might be considered together with the two Polish provincial capitals Legnica and Jelenia Góra. The stimulation of machinery and light industry in the latter, as proposed in the 'Oderlandplan' is rather perspectiveless, since the EC-market is closed for most products from these sectors. On the other hand, the development of high-tech industry may be too ambitious, given the required highly qualified labour force which is hardly present in this area. Enterprises and branch-plants of another kind might be considered on both sides of the border. However, since the labour force in Poland is (still) cheaper, the Polish side of the border is probably more attractive than the German part.

The development of the Polish agricultural areas will not be easy, because agricultural products may enter the EC only in limited amounts. Moreover, the privatization of state farms with high debts, mostly on bad soils, is a serious problem. Therefore the development of tourist areas, as proposed in the 'Oderlandplan' can be considered, as a good alternative, all the more because the infrastructure in the western part of Poland is relatively well developed. The good soils can remain intact to serve the home market. On the other hand, the large farms on good soils may focus on improved agriculture and serve both the home market and the external market. These farms might be more sustainable than the smaller-size farms in the EC. Cooperation with Germany can be very fruitful in this respect, since Germany has more specialized knowledge. Moreover, the settlement structure on both sides of the border is more or less the same. The demarcation of agricultural cooperation areas can be attuned to the new Polish regional/administrative structure which is planned in the near future. The smaller German planning areas can easily be added, be it that a new regional structure is planned in about three years time.

Being the periphery of the EC, the eastern part of Germany cannot do without cross-national economic and political cooperation with Poland. Poland on the other hand needs the German experience with respect to the economic and administrative restructuring of the western territories. Both Germany and Poland may benefit from the changes in the relative location of their eastern and western territories respectively. With the help of a well thought out but not overly ambitious regional policy which takes into consideration the endogenous regional properties, the German eastern- and the Polish western territories are not necessarily in a bad position. The development of the tertiary sector (tourism), and of some economic centres (Szczecin, Frankfurt/Słubice) can play an important role. Besides, development of agriculture might become an important issue. Economic centres along secondary and tertiary axes of transport might function as pulling factors, to attract more economic activities, and as growth centres. These growth centres do not necessarily have to be spread evenly if agriculture and tourism in this area are doing well. In the longer term, economic growth may spread further eastward.

An EC development fund for border areas (2 million ECUs) stimulates the internal border areas. The outer boundary however, is not included in this fund, although it should be.

REFERENCES

- BOEL, F. van de (1992), *Oderlandplan moet Oder-Neissegebiet stimuleren*, "Geografie", 1, jaargang, april: 9–11.
- BOEL, S. van de and PAUL, L. (1993), *Changing regional inequalities in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union*, Congress paper: *New tendencies in urban and regional development in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Durham University, UK.
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (1991), *Europe 2000. Outlook for the development of the community's territory*, Brussels, Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Regional Policy.
- FASSMANN, H. (1992), *Phänomene der Transformation – Ökonomische Restrukturierung und Arbeitslosigkeit in Ost-Mitteleuropa*, "Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen", 1: 49–59.
- FISHER, G. (1973), *Praxisorientierte Theorie der Regionalforschung*, Tübingen.
- Główny Urząd Statystyczny (GUS), (1992), *Rocznik Statystyczny*, Warsaw.
- GORZELAK, G. (1992a), *Dilemmas of Polish regional policies during transition*, [in:] GORZELAK, G. and KUKLIŃSKI, A. (eds), *Dilemmas of regional policies in Eastern and Central Europe*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, European Institute for Regional and Local Development.
- GORZELAK, G. (1992b), *Polish regionalism and regionalisation*, [in:] GORZELAK, G. and KUKLIŃSKI, A. (eds), *Dilemmas of regional policies in Eastern and Central Europe*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, European Institute for Regional and Local Development.
- GROCHOWSKI, M. (1992), *Local economy as an incentive for regional economic restructuring; The case of Poland*, [in:] GORZELAK, G. and KUKLIŃSKI, A. (eds), *Dilemmas of regional policies in Eastern and Central Europe*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, European Institute for Regional and Local Development.
- GRÜNEWÄLDER, K. W. (1993), *Mecklenburg-Vorpommern im Spiegel der Statistik*, "Praxis Geographie", 6 Juni.
- HAMILTON, I. F. E. (1970), *Aspects of spatial behaviour in planned economies*, TSGV, 25: 83–105.
- HAMMER-MORAVČÍKOVÁ, H. (1992), *Einfluss der gegenwertigen Änderungen auf die regionalen kulturellen Zusammenhänge der Zentraleuropäischen Grenzregionen. Materialien zur Raumentwicklung*, Strukturwandel in Osteuropa, 49, Bonn: Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung.
- HASTENBERG, H. van (1993), *Nederlandse directe investeringen in Hongarije, Polen en Tsjecho-Slowakije*, Verslagen van leeronderzoek G and P, Utrecht: Faculteit der Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen, Rijks Universiteit.
- KROSZEL, J. (1992), *Auswirkungen des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wandels im Bereich der Raumwirtschaft in Polen. Materialien zur Raumentwicklung*, Strukturwandel in Osteuropa, 49, Bonn: Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung.

- KUIPER, W. G. (1991), *Investeringsen in Oost-Europa*, Fiscale en juridische documentatie voor internationaal zakendoen, 27.
- KUKLIŃSKI, A. (1992a), *Restructuring of Polish regions as a problem of European cooperation*, [in:] GORZELAK, G. and KUKLIŃSKI, A. (eds), *Dilemmas of regional policies in Eastern and Central Europe*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, European Institute for Regional and Local Development.
- KUKLIŃSKI, A. (1992b), *Regional dynamics of structural change in Central and Eastern Europe*, "Geo Journal", 26.3: 418–419.
- MINGHI, J. V. (1991), *From conflict to harmony in border landscapes*, [in:] RUMLEY, D. and MINGHI, J. V. *The geography of border landscapes*, London: Routledge.
- MURPHEY, A. B. (1992), *Western Investments in East-Central Europe. Emerging patterns and implications for state stability*, "The Professional Geography", 3: 249–259.
- MYNC, A. (1992), *Foreign capital in Poland*, [in:] GORZELAK, G. and KUKLIŃSKI, A. (eds), *Dilemmas of regional policies in Eastern and Central Europe*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw, European Institute for Regional and Local Development.
- OSTERLAND, M. (1993), *The reestablishment of local government in the former GDR*, Congress paper: *New tendencies in urban and regional development in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Durham University, UK.
- PAUL, L. (1992), *Developments in rural areas in eastern Europe since the second world war: an overview*, [in:] HUIGEN P., PAUL L. and VOLKERS K. (eds), *The changing function and position of rural areas in Europe*, Utrecht: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, Utrecht University.
- REIF, B. (1973), *Models in urban and regional planning*, Aylesbury: Leonard Hill Books.
- REPORT (1992), *Perspektywy rozwoju Meklemburgii; Główny wniosek dla polityki regionalnej w Polsce Północnej*, Sopot: Makroregion Północno-Zachodni, Biuro Planowania Regionalnego.
- ROBINSON, A. (1993), *Interregional collaboration: Myths or market maker?* Congress paper: *New tendencies in urban and regional development in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Durham University, UK.
- SCHULTE-DOINGHAUS, U. (1993), *Industrie im Osten. Ein gesunder Kern*, "Focus Magazine", 7.
- STASIAK, A. (1992), *Ausgewählte Entwicklungsprobleme der westlichen Grenzgebiete Polens*, "Raumforschung und Raumordnung", 1–2: 56–59.
- ZSCHIEDRICH, H. (1992), *Die Wirtschaften Mittel- und Osteuropas auf dem Weg in die EG*, "Osteuropa Wirtschaft", 3: 201–214.