Infinity in Language

Infinity in Language: Conceptualization of the Experience of the Sublime

By

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INTRODUCTION

A SHORT GUIDE TO THE THEORY OF THE SUBLIME

The main aim of this book is to integrate the concept of the sublime into the established concepts of cognitive semantics. In order to do this, we first want to make a reconnaissance into the very broad area of the theory of the sublime.

*

Among the most stimulating contemporary pronouncements on the subject of the sublime, one can discover an interpretation of the phenomenon of violence in mass culture which refers to the notion of "the aesthetics of the sublime" (Crowther *Critical Aesthetics* 129–130). This can help to realise how much the meaning of that technical term (the sublime) used nowadays by philosophers, aestheticians and literary theorists differs from the meaning usually associated with the sublime and sublime phenomena in the ordinary use of language. Listening to people, we can observe that the sublime frequently means noble and morally positive.

In the theoretical reflection a totally different notion is **fashionable**. In 1984, Jean–Luc Nancy opened his article devoted to the subject as follows: "The sublime is in fashion" (25, see also Crowther *The Kantian Sublime* 3). But he added immediately that the fashion is very old. Indeed, if we look at the bibliography of the sublime in English we can even observe a kind of renaissance: there has been an abundance of theoretical and critical, aesthetic and general philosophical texts dealing with the sublime since the end of the 70s. (The most important texts are written mainly by Lyotard, but there are other sources relevant here: Rachwał and Sławek, the reader *Of the Sublime* ed. by Courtine, monographic issues of *New Literary History* and *Studies in Romanticism*; one of the earliest and the most important texts in literary studies is Weiskel's work) This real "eruption" of academic interest in the English speaking world is

accompanied by a revival in other countries. Special issues of literary journals are devoted to the sublime in France, Sweden and Poland. Anthologies dealing with the subject are published in France, the Netherlands and Denmark. There is a growing interest in the sublime in Germany and Italy.

In the contemporary reflection on the subject, the sublime has many dimensions, not only aesthetic but also ethical (Crowther *Critical Aesthetics*, passim, *The Kantian Sublime*, passim, Ferguson *The Nuclear Sublime*, passim), general philosophical, psychological (Sussman, Morris, Weiskel), political (Crowther *Critical Aesthetics*, Ramazani, Shapiro, Ferguson *The Nuclear Sublime*), linguistic and rhetorical (Holmqvist and Pluciennik) or sociological (Balfe) ones. Speaking about the sublime may induce people to think about political motives of action (Kwiek).

However, a similar explosion of interest in the sublime can be found in eighteenth century pre–romantic Britain (see the reader ed. by Ashfield and de Bolla, Hipple, Monk). It is impossible here to decide whether 'the sublime' and 'sublimity' used in the eighteenth century have similar meanings as used today. (For an overview of the complex history of the term, see: Wood, Cohn and Miles.) That is why initially we treat the sublime as a kind of literary motif. It is certain that the renaissance of the motif in the 80s of the twentieth century does not make easy to use the sublime as a term ascribed from the beginning to rhetoric or, generally, to reflection on language. In the eighteenth–century the aesthetic reflection on the sublime by Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant contain astoundingly different accounts of the subject. It may be said that all three theoretic "arche–texts of the sublime" by Pseudo–Longinos, Burke and Kant constitute incomparable paradigms of talking about it. (see Crowther *Critical Aesthetics* 115) For instance, in Pseudo–Longinos' theory the sublime has distinct moral implications because it is strongly associated with a kind of normative psychology. On the other hand, Burke's theory is, broadly speaking, directed toward the aesthetics of such situations in which some elements are felt either as painful or threatening. Still, Kant elaborates his theory in such a way that in his aesthetics the most substantial part is a response of reason to the overwhelming excess either of greatness or power. Kant focuses on limitations of imagination when confronted with ideas of reason. (cf. Crowther *Critical Aesthetics* 115) However, there is something Burke and Kant have in common: they both built their aesthetic theories on the dualism of the beautiful and the sublime. This motif would reappear in the further reflection on the sublime many times.

Contemporary theoreticians usually comment on the three mentioned arche-texts: by Pseudo–Longinos, Burke and Kant, often ignoring the fact that the texts are theoretically very complex. For instance, when commenting on Burke, they fail to see his associationism and physiologism. While discussing Kant, they frequently happen not to notice all his metaphysics. The history of the sublime, as the history of many crucial notions for the humanities, may be seen and understood as a history of misreadings of the past. (cf. Nycz 3)

There is something ironic and perverse in the contemporary - post-modern - renaissance of the sublime. Its sources are in the **lost** treatise by Caecilius of Calakte and **a defective** response to it by an author **unidentified** untill now, a response which was accompanied through ages by **silence**. From the first century AD, i. e. from the time when the Pseudo–Longinian treatise called *Peri hypsous* came into existence, till the sixteenth century, when the treatise was published in Basel (in 1554), European intellectuals were not interested in the sublime[1]. It became popular thanks to Nicholas Boileau's translation (published in 1674), who developed the main thoughts of the treatise, often altering the general ideological meaning of the original. He also published commentaries on Pseudo–Longinos entitled *Réflexions Critiques sur Quelques Passages du Rhéteur Longin* (published in 1694 and 1713). The next milestone in the history of the sublime is *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* by Edmund Burke (1756/57). That book grew on very fertile soil - the British reflection on the sublime was significantly rich at that time and it deserves a wider description (Ashfield and de Bolla, Hipple, Monk). The next great event in the history was Kant's Third Critique *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790) which contains a crucial part, *The Analytic of the Sublime*. (Earlier in 1764 Kant published a less influential work devoted to the beautiful and the sublime, *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*. Cf. Kant *Observations*, Crowther *The Kantian Sublime*, Klinger.) In Germany Kantian ideas were developed by Friedrich Schiller in *Über das Erhabene* (first published in 1801) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in *Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik* (1820), while Burke's viewpoint was elaborated in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1819) by Artur Schopenhauer. Romantics from all over Europe developed, theoretically and practically, the ideas of the sublime found in works of their predecessors. On the surface, there was little interest in the sublime in the second half of the nineteenth century. (There is an interpretation of the theories of the French Symbolists, mainly Mallarmé's theory, which shows their dependence on the aesthetics of the sublime. Cf. Lokke 427–

428.) It seems that in the twentieth century the sublime was incompatible with the spirit of the age, and until the pronouncements of Theodor Adorno (1970) and Jean–François Lyotard (1979), who claimed the opposite, there had been no bold and systemic attempts to revive it. Harold Bloom sees the last considerable interpretation of the sublime in Freud's *Das Unheimliche* (first published in 1919). (Macksey 931)

The almost two thousand year old world history of the sublime is hence full of insinuations, ambiguities and sudden pauses.

Moreover, one of the most crucial problems in the theoretical thought on the sublime is a linguistic problem. It is common in English, Polish and Swedish to substitute qualities such as pathos, nobility, dignity and gravity for the sublime. This gives the notion of the sublime a special moral dimension, present also in non-colloquial speech, which is theoretically justifiable only to a certain extent by some elements of Pseudo–Longinos' and Kant's theories.

Theoretical problems with the sublime as a research category in linguistics are complicated by the fact that we have only one archetypical text of the sublime – Pseudo–Longinos' treatise - containing examples taken mainly from literature (broadly understood). But in Burke, who even sketches a very interesting theory of language, there are few literary examples. The third grand work of the sublime, Kant's Third Critique, deals mainly with the sublime in nature and, additionally, in architecture - literature is a marginal reference there.

Similarly, the father of the twentieth–century renaissance of the sublime, Lyotard, employs this category as a tool to describe abstract painting, and literature is a secondary reference in his work.

We can have more theoretical and terminological troubles if we consider the quite common tradition to give the sublime many epithets by which some scholars categorise it in a peculiar way. (Vijay Mishra mentions this tradition and quotes several qualifications cf. *The Gothic Sublime* 21) Beside the theoretical varieties of the sublime of Pseudo–Longinos, Burke, Kant and some author sub–varieties such as William Wordsworth's sublime or Emily Dickinson's sublime, there are also geographical and national classifications: 'arctic', 'American', 'European', 'Indian' and 'Nordic'. We can also find qualifications referring to epochs and cultural currents: 'medieval', 'of the Enlightenment', 'Sentimental', 'Romantic', 'modern' and 'post-modern'. We have broader categorisations of the sublime: 'natural', 'artificial' as well as 'supernatural', 'oceanic', 'technological', 'urban', 'industrial' and 'religious' (it is even possible to find 'the Calvinist sublime'), 'non–Idealist' and 'Marxist', 'moral' and 'poetic' as well as 'material'. Different kinds of sublime attributed to some

genres seem worth mentioning: the 'gothic sublime', the 'comic sublime', the 'avant-garde sublime', the 'apocalyptic sublime', the 'wondertale sublime' and the 'saga sublime'. Besides Kant's 'mathematical' and 'dynamic' sublime, we have qualifications such as: 'negative', 'positive', 'metaphoric' and 'metonymic', 'rhetoric' and 'theological'. It should not be surprising to find attributes of the sublime such as 'trivial', 'ironic', 'existential', 'nihilistic', 'erotic', 'feminine' and 'masculine', 'androgynous', 'egotistical', 'hysteric', 'impersonal', 'nuclear', 'textual', 'performative', 'botanical', 'angelic' and 'satanic', or even 'excremental'.

Moreover, there are special neologisms which are very hard to translate into other languages: sublimicism and sublimicist (see Crowther *The Critical Aesthetics*: passim).

If we ponder a little bit longer on the phenomenon, we should not be astounded by the terminological inventiveness because the sublime is a category which by aestheticians is put next to the beautiful, so it must be, as the beautiful, ubiquitous. One can legitimately ask, however, if such a capacious theoretical category is still workable and if it can be proved correct in application. In our opinion situation is not so hopeless as it seems to be.

The picture of the situation can be convoluted by the fact that it is quite widespread to put together with the sublime, or even identify with it, other aesthetic qualities such as *the picturesque* (Labbe, Ashfield and de Bolla, Brennan, Hipple), *the tragic* and *pathos* (e.g. Schiller, Albrecht), or even *the ugly* and *the grotesque* (Nesbitt, Guerlac *The Impersonal Sublime*). Theoreticians mention such aesthetic and philosophical notions as Benjamin's *aura* (Lyotard *Lessons*, Erjavec), the Freudian *uncanny* (Bloom *Freud*, Morris, Mishra *The Gothic Sublime*) or Witkacy's *pure form* (Zajac). Since Lyotard, the sublime has also been associated with a notion of *nostalgia* and *allusiveness*. In the context of the sublime, other notions also appear: *shock* (Crowther *The Critical Aesthetics)*, *suddenness* (Bohrer) and *the Holy* (Otto).

Because of the universality of the phenomenon in question, its multifariousness and weirdness, different approaches to the sublime can nowadays be distinguished, although they are not always exclusive. There are approaches which can be called theo–anthropological (Otto), intertextual (Bloom), psychoanalytic (Dainotto, Morris, Hertz, Bloom, Weiskel), deconstructionist (Courtine, Silverman and Aylesworth, Derrida, de Man; cf. characteristic features of this approach in Ferguson *Solitude and the Sublime*), postmodernist (all texts by Lyotard, Rachwał, critical evaluation in Crowther *The Critical Aesthetics*). There is a discussion of the sublime in new pragmatism (Knapp), new aestheticism (Ferguson

Solitude and the Sublime, Terada), feminism (Klinger, Freeman, Williams, Yeager, Edelman), Marxism (Jameson, Eagleton), "black theory" (Armstrong). The sublime is also attractive to cognitivists (Tsur) and suggestion theory (Cieślikowscy). It seems significant that structuralism was not interested in the sublime (except Weiskel, who combines the structuralist approach with psychoanalysis). The renaissance of the sublime is strictly tied to the revival of the research interest in the problem of emotions in language and literature (Oxenhandler).

The motives of this renaissance are quite a different problem. Conjecturally, pre–Romantics in the eighteenth century saw irrationality in the sublime, which gave them an opportunity to fight the predominant rationalism of the epoch. In a similar manner, postmodernist thinkers of the twentieth century looked for the sublime as a great tool in fighting the mimetic theory of language and the positivist ideas of total knowledge treated as the only proper way of mirroring reality (cf. Rorty, Altieri). On the other hand, we can hypothesise that the suggestion theory has found in the sublime an interesting model of personal relationships in literature, a model which is totally different from the structuralist one.

Miscellaneous approaches to the sublime are accompanied by different theoretical texts - the fact is not so evident as it seems to be. But the three pratexts by Pseudo–Longinos, Burke and Kant are predominant. In the critical discourse, one can rarely encounter other historically significant pronouncements by Blake, Wordsworth, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Freud and Benjamin that refer to the sublime, though not always directly. The picture is clouded because the sublime can be found, according to some scholars, in theological and religious conceptions of different cultures and epochs. The theme of the sublime might be discovered for instance in Tao te Ching, in the tradition of Zen Buddism or in the Revelations of St. Teresa (cf. Sircello). Some philosophers are thought to have been engaged in the theme of presenting the unpresentable (e.g. Wittgenstein).

A starting point for research is not easy for various theoreticians and historians of literature - this is also because of the heterogeneity of the literary texts referred to by researchers in the context of the sublime. Romanticism is very popular with scholars, but there are also ancient texts of various cultures such as the *Bible*, *Mahabharata* or the *Iliad*. One can notice the presence of medieval works by Dante or William Langland. Among 'sublime' authors one can find William Shakespeare, Christopher Marlowe and Tulsidas. In the seventeenth century John Milton and Thomas Burnet were popular. In the eighteenth century many authors were regarded as sublime: William Collins, William Cowper, Daniel Defoe,

Philip Freneau, William Gilpin, Oliver Goldsmith, Thomas Gray, Aaron Hill, Matthew Gregory Lewis, James Macpherson, Ann Radcliffe, Christopher Smart, James Thomson, Horace Walpole, William Warburton, Edward Young. The most popular is, however, the nineteenth century: Jane Austen, Charles Baudelaire, Wiliam Blake, Charles Brockden Brown, William Cullen Bryant, George Byron, Enrique Gil y Carrasco, Thomas Cole, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, J. Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane, Charles Darwin, Charles Dickens, Emily Dickinson, George Eliot, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Gustave Flaubert, Margaret Fuller, Wolfgang Goethe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Hazlitt, Victor Hugo, Washington Irving, Anna Jameson, John Keats, Zygmunt Krasiński, de Lautramont, Giacomo Leopardi, Stphane Mallarmé, Charles Robert Maturin, Herman Melville, Tadeusz Miciński, Adam Mickiewicz, Francis Parkman, Edgar Allan Poe, Stanisław Przybyszewski, Aleksander Puszkin, Thomas De Quincey, Artur Rimbaud, John Ruskin, Friedrich Schiller, Walter Scott, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, Juliusz Słowacki, Stendhal, Henry David Thoreau, William Wordsworth. Twentiethcentury authors are sublime too: Conrad Aiken, Samuel Beckett, Saul Bellow, Miron Białoszewski, William Bradford, André Breton, Elizabeth Browning, William Seward Burroughs, Józef Conrad, Hart Crane, Thomas Stearns Eliot, Francis Scott Fitzgerald, Edward Morgan Forster, William Gibson, William Golding, Henry James, James Joyce, David Herbert Lawrence, Robert Lowell, Toni Morrison, Alice Munro, Frank O'Connor, Ezra Pound, Thomas Pynchon, John Crowe Ransom, Salman Rushdie, Bruno Schulz, Wallace Stevens, Andre Suares, Allen Tate, Aleksander Wat, William Butler Yeats.

Although the catalogue of names of authors listed above is also based on data found in unpublished doctoral dissertations, it is far from being complete[2]. The list, however, seems to illustrate quite well the statement that the category of the sublime is very popular and ubiquitous. It also indicates that we can talk about the sublime in given literary works of art regardless of their intentionality.

In the history of the sublime as a tool term in literary studies, we can observe that it enjoyed special popularity among scholars researching the eighteenth century and Romanticism. At that time the sublime was mostly intentional - Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Mickiewicz, Słowacki, Schiller, Poe, to mention but a few, were artists who used the sublime being aware of its implications (cf. for instance Voller about Poe). It can be argued that as a cultural current Romanticism implies a positive valorisation of the sublime. Enthusiasm, ecstasy, imagination, *páthos* - values and qualities inseparably tied with the sublime - are also irresistibly

associated with Romanticism. A similar affinity existed between gothicism and Burke's aesthetics. Taking into consideration all terminological doubts regarding gothicism, we cannot determine what was first: the Gothic elements in literature or Burke's theory. In this context, some propositions offered by Lyotard are slightly puzzling. He claims that by the time romantic art liberated itself from classical and baroque modes of presentation, the arts had begun to resemble abstract art and *Minimal Art*. And it follows that avantgardism has its seed in the Kantian aesthetics of the sublime. So the elaboration of the aesthetics of the sublime by Burke and later by Kant in the dawn of Romanticism makes artistic experiences possible, which will be carried out by the Avant-garde (Lyotard). Indeed, Crowther notices that also comprising Romanticism in the one word 'avant-garde' is not fully arbitrary, because this word, as referring to the arts, was used for the first time in the 30's of the nineteenth century (Crowther *Critical Aesthetics* 155), nevertheless such bold formulas are bound to raise questions. In other words, while it is easy to agree that the sublime is to be found in the literary works by Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth or Mickiewicz, Słowacki and Krasiński, and even if we agree that the sublime is the main aesthetic feature of the Gothic (on troubles with defining the Gothic in relation to the sublime cf. Williams 12-24 and the introduction to Mishra *The Gothic Sublime*) in such works as Lewis' *Monk*, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* or Poe's *The Fall of the House of Usher*, it is difficult to discern the sublime in the literary works of the twentieth-century avant-garde.

Lyotard might be right if we look closer at Edmund Burke's theory of language which is really surprising and demands rethinking of the reader's natural expectations.

> In painting we may represent any fine figure we please; but we never can give it those enlivening touches which it may receive from words. To represent an angel in a picture, you can only draw a beautiful young man winged; but what painting can furnish out any thing so grand as the addition of one word, the angel of the *Lord*"? It is true, I have here no clear idea, but these words affect the mind more than the sensible image did, which is all I contend for (174).

So the idea of a mysterious affinity between abstraction and the sublime is already present in Burke. Lyotard likes Burke's idea that words have some advantages: they bear emotional associations, they can evoke what is spiritual without referring to what is visible, and we can, by using words, create combinations impossible to make in another way. Lyotard adds that the arts inspired by the aesthetics of the sublime and looking for

powerful effects can and must neglect any imitation of beautiful models and devote themselves to combinations which are astonishing, unusual and shocking (Lyotard).

If we believe Kant, the principal effect of the sublime might be rendered as a negative sign of inadequacy of imaginative power in relation to the idea of reason (Kant *The Critique* 26). A subject wishes to present something that is ultimately unpresentable, though conceptually understood. Lyotard is spellbound by the formula "presenting the unpresentable" and by the idea of negative presentation. He repeats several times that the artistic procedures of presenting the fact that there is something unpresentable is very modernist. In modernist painting, he argues, artists want to make clear that there is something conceivable that is absolutely not to be seen and not to be made visible. He ponders how it is possible to make visible that which is impossible to see, and answers the question by referring to Kant, who talked about formlessness "as a possible indication of the unpresentable. According to Lyotard, Kant discussed abstraction when describing imagination experiencing infinity. Infinity is a negative presentation. (cf. Lyotard *Lessons* 150-153)".

Lyotard's reflection can also be applied to literature. James Joyce's writing serves in Lyotard *The Avan-garde and the Sublime* as a good sample and illustration of the modernist means of presenting the unpresentable. In Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* grammar and lexicon are not treated as a gift of heaven. They are regarded rather as academisms and rituals which come from that kind of piety which makes allusions to the unpresentable impossible. If we agree with Lyotard on that point, abstraction in literature could be made real by the stylisation of gabbling. Roman Jakobson and Linda Waugh have already talked about parallelism of abstract painting and experimental futurist poetry (transsense language) (Jakobson and Waugh). So all literary gabbling can be regarded as a way of achieving the sublime. (Pluciennik *The Avant-garde Sublime*)

In this context, it might be helpful to follow Guy Sircello in differentiating experiences of the sublime, sublime discourse and talk about the sublime (541). Aestheticians and philosophers are usually concerned with descriptions of experiences of the sublime. In contrast, Pseudo–Longinos was mainly preoccupied with a description of sublime discourse and, on this basis, with the formulation of a rhetoric of the sublime, i.e. a collection of more or less formal rhetorical devices used in the sublime discourse. Following Burke, Lyotard would add abstraction and allusiveness, devices unforeseen by Pseudo–Longinos. If the problem is expressed in this way, it must be a challenge for all scholars interested in language and literature. It might be the case that Lyotard broadens the

scope of some words and embraces too many domains, but his proposal could give us a new tool for portraying the rhetorical category of the sublime.

Assuming with Kant that experience of the sublime is a result of a subjective encounter with something which is absolutely great or absolutely menacing (we treat it here provisionally without getting into the deep thoughts of Kant), one can theoretically reflect on linguistic means which can be used by a subject who wants either to express the sublime or to evoke the sublime in the recepient. (This dialectic of expression and persuasion is very complex and it deserves a closer investigation.) The subject is confronted with something absolutely great or absolutely menacing and expresses an overwhelming feeling: Aa!!! (an example from Mickiewicz's poetry used by Skwarczyńska in a Polish course-book in literary studies from 1954)

The most basic way of representing the sublime consists in representing sublime objects. Theoreticians and philosophers of the eighteenth and twentieeth century often catalogued those objects: great rivers, oceans, the sun, the moon, stars, active volcanos, gods, demons, hell, spirits, human souls, wonders, incantations, thunders, storms, floods, rivers, earthquakes, beasts, snakes, lions, tigers, fire, war, deserts and abysses, winds, sounds of canons, bells, piraminds and churches, steel and concrete constructions such as the Eiffel tower or sky-scrapers, great bridges. We could certainly add the Internet, the power grid, airplanes, rockets, driving a fast car and nuclear bombs.

But there is also a linguistic way of representing the sublime – for instance: "Aa!", which conventionally clearly signalises a desire to represent something and an avowal of a failure of language.

If we consistently apply Lyotard's reasoning to language all negation of presenting will appeal to the sublime. We can locate such negative linguistic figures of the sublime, in our opinion, on all levels of language: morphological, lexical, syntactic and generic.

First, we should mention all kinds of formulas of the sublime: presenting the unpresentable, speaking the unspeakable, expressing the unexpressable. We try to persuade our readers in this book that all these formulas can be properly substitiuted by a formula of re-presenting the unimaginable, which means a mimetic presentation of the unimaginable.

Such negation of presenting we can also find in many morphological constructions with interior negative affixes. There are hyperbolic negative constructions which are predestined, in our view, to code experiences of the sublime linguistically (e. g. unbound, infinite, boundless, limitless etc.). On the lexical level, we can also point at vulgarisms, which are not

often used in literature in this function - to present the unpresentable - but theoretically they can occur in regular language usage. All kinds of mysterious words, glossolalia, and stylisation drawing on a strange unfamiliar language can be regarded as the perfect medium to present the unpresentable (cf. Jakobson and Waugh; for a presentation of the difference between onomatopoeic language and sound symbolism see Cruse 34-35, 46). Of course, the main figures of the sublime are traditional rhetorical figures the semantic mechanism of which implies negation of presenting, such as oxymoron and paradox (Otto wrote on the connection between paradox and the sublime in 1923, see also Cieślikowscy) or just hyperbole (the mechanism here is complex). All preteritions, aposiopesis, and silence must be regarded as figures of signalising unpresentability. Personification can be viewed as a kind of hyperbole. As regards the syntactic level, we must mention ellipse and running of thoughts. Rhetorical rhythmisation also deserves our attention - the power encountered by the subject is so great and overwhelming that the subject is subordinated to the rhythm. (Skwarczyńska) We can list some genres apt to evoke the sublime: ode , hymns, psalms, benedictions, maledictions, epitaphs, invocations, swearing, puzzles etc. (cf. Deguy) All the above-mentioned linguistic means presuppose an encounter of the subject with something beyond his/her imagination. All the figures of the sublime are more or less conventional and they can occur in literature and outside of it.

The sublime allows us to correlate miscellaneous linguistic phenomena and perceive them in a new light. But the most tempting aspect of the sublime is the fact that it seems to embody a very particular theory of language and a whole model of relationships between participants in the process of communication. In this model of language, notions such as identification, imagination, emotions and communication play the main role.

The figures just mentioned are rhetorical if we understand rhetoric as an utterance which is to persuade (Cicero) and if we take persuasion to apply to actions which change attitudes (Kenneth Burke 49-83). Jahan Ramazani wrote the best passage stating an interdisciplinary character of the theory of the sublime:

> The sublime is not a genre, and its theorists are happy to emphasize its fluid movement across generic boundaries. Nevertheless, the sublime has an affective structure and a rhetoric - among the qualities that define genre - and so it might be thought of as an extended mode, related in turn to other modes, such as the apocalyptic and the curse (175).

It can be argued that nowadays we can encounter such conventional sublime accessories more often in films and TV. It is a particular paradox if we think about the sublime in Lyotard's manner. But it is obvious that such film genres as horror (stemming from gothicism), desaster films or science fiction images of spaceships in immeasurable space all refer to the aesthetics of the sublime (cf. Crowther *The Kantian Sublime* 165). Also politicians would refer to the experience of the sublime when organising military parades with shows of the latest war technology (Crowther *The Kantian Sublime* 165). The rhetoric of the sublime may be very useful in advertising; compare for instance the presence of the sublime American landscape in Marlboro advertisements. TV shows broadcasted during the Gulf War were so fascinating for people around the world because of the technological sublime present in them. The seductiveness of the Internet might also be explained when we take into account the peculiar unpresentablity of Cyberspace. However, in our book we would like to focus on linguistic means of expressing experiences of the sublime and on a model of language and communication presupposed by this stylistic sublime.

But what is experience of the sublime? This is a tricky question. We may base our claims on different descriptions of experiences which have something in common. There are plenty of interpretations in which something similar to the basic Kantian experience of the sublime might occur. First, the experience of the sublime seems to be evoked by different domains: by nature, transcendence, "self", and by culture. Pseudo–Longinos already spoke about nature as a source of sublime feelings. Nature, which means cosmos in this context, is so great in order to prove our greateness. We are to worship the great nature and, in this manner, to prove our greateness. We love everything which is greater than us (Pseudo–Longinos, chapter 35). Here we can also find an interpretation of nature as a kind of communication: we have to decipher a special language of natural phenomena – which exist in order to speak to us. This kind of interpretation would be recurrent in many places of Western culture, it can be found for instance in St. Paul's letter to Romanians (1.20). However, since the beginning of the discussion about nature in this context we can also find voices pointing out ourselves as the main source of the experiences. St Augustine makes this point clear in his confessions: people do worship great mountains and oceans and do not have respect for infinite possibilities of ourselves. "Self" is a wonderful phenomenon, worthy of worship and infinite in its potential.

This reflection seems to be very universal and present in different cultures. One of the main pronouncements of the sublime in Indian

thought one can find in *Astavakrasamhita*: "You are Infinite Ocean". (see Mishra 1998, 27) This experience, the experience of the sublime, is strictly tied to a feeling of auto-amplification and sometimes bumptiuos inflation. And here too, Pseudo–Longinos was very pertinent, when he writes that our soul has such a characteristic that it accedes to transport of the sublime, and, joyfully speeding up, it fills up ourselves with not only joy and enthusiasm but also with pride. Experiencing the sublime while reading, we behave in such a way as we did not know that we had not been a creator of the wonderful phrase, just metaphor and wonderful incantation. We think and feel as we had created ourselves what we just were listening to. There is something which gives an echo of the other's speech.

We could preliminarly define the Kantian experience of the sublime using a transposed definition by Crowther (*The Kantian Sublime* 162). Sublime stimuli are all stimuli which overwhelm perceptually, imaginatively or emotionally. They cause us to feel overwhelmed and, at the same time, it multiplies our feeling of being.

Emotions of the sublime are strictly tied to such stimuli. They allow us, according to Schopenhauer, to raise above ourselves and to feel a unity with the world. The relevant emotions are above all: ecstasy and enthusiasm, but also terror and horror if experienced in a safe position. Traditionally, ecstasy meant transport above ourselves and enthusiasm meant to be filled with god, or inspired.

Such experiences of the sublime can be interpreted in many different ways. It seems that there are nine main ones:

The first physiological interpretation according to which we need a strong stimulation from our senses or imagination in order to feel alive, and not bored, and hence our inclination to extreme sports, mountain climbing, or fast driving. We humans love to watch horror and desaster movies or war reports. Some neurobiologist scholars, like Irving Biedermann, confirm this view.

The second physiological interpretation says that we need to be drunk in some way. In the experience of the sublime we lose ourselves, we vanish into an undefined state of the sublime feeling.

A psychiatric interpretation: since antiquity people have been speaking about madness. For instance, Plato spoke on love as a basic experience of madness which can be a model for other kinds of madness: the poetic, mystic and prophetic ones. According to this interpretation, the experiences of the sublime is equal to an invasion of the irrationality in our life.

The psychoanalytic interpretations: a) experience of the sublime is the

experience of the uncanny, it is a meeting of that which was pushed out (see Freud) b) the experiences of the sublime prove our masochistic nature, because we love to experience the power of others over us (see Lyotard).

The Marxist-materialistic interpretation: the sublime is an illusion of the presence of certain qualities, phantasmagorias often used for ideological reasons by religious institutions.

A rhetorical and political interpretation claims that the rulers of states often use the sublime in order to keep themselves in power. Hence, they organize military parades and build huge official buildings (see Edmund Burke's conception of the sublime). But at the same time, the sublime is also connceted to all kinds of revolutions. (Lyotard)

An educational interpretation: experiences of the sublime can widen the sense of self. An image of infinity in ourselves can cause us, for instance, to go and fight wars, as we do not believe we are finite. In the same manner we can jump much higher distance when we believe we are able to do it.

A mystic interpretation claims that we are really infinite, that we can find, for instance, a sparkle at the bottom of our soul (Master Eckhart) or that our Brahman is equal to cosmic Atman (Hindusim)

A cognitive interpretation according to which the sublime experience is above all the phenomenological experience of the human mind, when we experience the limits to our imagination (Kant and his followers).

In our consideration of the stylistic sublime we would like to focus on the last possible and more impartial interpretation. It is likely that most of the interpretations are not exclusive, and can be treated as peculiar points of view, they could refer to experiences which are similar to some degree. We have to emphasize that the experience of the sublime displays a prototype effect: there are more prototypical examples of it and less prototypical ones. That is why the most important examples of linguistic representations of the experience we can find in religious contexts. On the other hand, linguistic representation of infinity can be used in order to suggest irritation or irony, instead of ecstasy or enthusiasm.

In the next chapters we will show various ways how the infinite can enter into our linguistic experience. First, we interpret the two main theoretical components of the representations involved in the experiences of the sublime: *mimesis* of emotions and anti-mimetic representation of the unimaginable. In the second chapter, we will try to analyse a special type of rhetorical figure: the hyperbole. In the third and fourth chapters, the reader can find an extension of this research to a domain of other rhetorical figures such as amplification, gradation and antonomasia. In the

following chapter we will move our attention to the main linguistic mechanism explaining how it is possible to experience the sublime in language: empathy. We do this by analysing the concept of appearance markers. These markers, paradoxically, are the representations of de-empathized language, they form a basic obstacle for linguisic empathy. The next chapter serves as a kind of historical contribution both to the concept of presupposing (on a lexixal level) or to the concept of Kantian adjectives. This chapter explains why we started our research into infinity in language. The following two chapters provide readers with two main exemplifications of the sublime, as it functions in literature and in contemporary popular culture. The last part is kind of closure which explains which model of semantics we endorse in this book and which kind of linguistic model is presupposed by the fact of the experience of the sublime in language.

Notes

[1] There has been found some parallels between Pseudo–Longinian treatise and a Chinese *Wen Fu* (302 r.) by Lu Chi (Lu Ji). Cf. Macksey 923–924.

[2] We used here data also from *Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature*, Chadwyck–Healey Ltd., as in March 1998.

CHAPTER ONE

IMAGE AND IMAGINATION IN THE THEORY OF THE SUBLIME

This chapter is based on a historical survey of rhetorical and aesthetic theories of the sublime proposed by Pseudo-Longinus, Boileau, Burke, Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Lyotard, and others. First, we try to sketch out a model of a rhetoric of the sublime. This model consists of three elements: antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable, a mimesis of emotions and figures of the discourse of the sublime. In other words, we try to show, as we have announced at the beginning of this book, that the classical Lyotardian formula of the sublime as "presenting the unpresentable" should be reformulated as "re-presenting the unimaginable" and supplemented by other elements, such as a mimesis of emotions (the term is ours, but the concept can be found as early as in Plato) based on a process of identification. Secondly, we use the model to analyze and interpret samples of the discourse of the sublime in literature and film (figures of the discourse of the sublime). We try to point out that the sublime provides us with images that are similar in many respects across all media of human communication. We describe the images focusing on their relationship with imagination and imitation. We reflect on the problem of the cognitive mechanism that underlies the similarity of images evoked by samples of art forms as different as literature and film.

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Nowadays the fashionable concept of the sublime seems to belong mainly to the aesthetic discourse, but, as a matter of fact, it stems from rhetoric. It is impossible here to trace the long history of the concept. We have done this in a book titled *Retoryka wzniosłości w dziele literackim* (Płuciennik). Our historical survey deals with the theories of the sublime by Pseudo-Longinus, Boileau, Burke, Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Vischer, Nietzsche, Freud, Lyotard, and others. From the very origins of

the discussion about the sublime (we refer here to a distinction used in Sircello (541), where the author distinguishes between experiences of the sublime, sublime discourse and talk about the sublime), rhetorical figures were the focus of the theoretical attention. The problem of the rhetorical figures, images and imagination is, in the Pseudo-Longinian treatise, tied up with a theory of language and communication; hence we shall describe these two items together.

The sublime in Pseudo–Longinus might be an effect of an encounter of a solitary subject with something very great or terrifying, such as an ocean or an active volcano (Pseudo–Longinus ch. 35). It is important to emphasize that the encounter may be purely imaginative or mental. A subject of the experience of the sublime must be mentally engaged in it, which means that she/he is emotionally involved in the experience. Relevant emotions, according to Pseudo–Longinus, are very intensive, to the highest degree of *ekstasis* and enthusiasm. The subject experiencing the sublime is transported. Other emotions bound up with the sublime are admiration and shock. Sometimes we can also find horror there. This is one reason why Michel Deguy could reinterpret Pseudo–Longinus in the light of Burke's *Enquiry* and say: "The mortal condition and the moment of perishing are always at stake when the sublime appears. The sublime is the concentration, the start of the startling that weighs in speech against death " (9). At any rate, in the debate on the sublime since Addison, there is a topos of using of oxymoronic expressions like "pleasing kind of horror" or "pleasing astonishment" (Rachwał 18).

The kind of passion involved in the subject encountering sublime objects we can call quasi-emotions, because in Pseudo–Longinus there is no need to encounter an elevating object in nature (on quasi-emotions see Currie 182–216). It can be fictional or mental, as one prefers (on fictionality in language and grammar we refer here to ongoing research presented in a chapter on virtuality in: Langacker). Most important to us is the mental engagement of the subject.

The next problem is an expression of this engagement. How is it possible to talk about the rhetoric of the sublime? How is it possible to express and communicate the experience of the sublime? Resolving these questions demands a proper theory of language and communication.

A rhetoric of the sublime in this essay is understood as the art of using some code (e.g. language) in order to persuade emotionally. The emotional persuasion consists in the evocation of the emotions bound up with the sublime, experienced by the listener. The rhetoric also has a set of means to achieve the evocation. A model of communication implied by the sublime is an element of rhetoric designed to bring about that effect.

1. Antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable

The relationship between an object and an affect in the experience of the sublime is quite easy to understand, since it can be conceptualised simply in terms of reaction. The problem arises when we consider the transition from emotions to language. If Kant and Lyotard are right and an object of the experience of the sublime can be described as unpresentable (Kant; Lyotard 1994: 150–53; Lyotard 1982: 64–9), then how is it possible to present it? It seems that we have a paradoxical and aporetic formula here: "presenting the unpresentable." The problem will remain unresolved unless we distinguish between mental and physical representations and, following Sperber (1990: 25), between mental representations (such as memories) and public representations (such as utterances). When Kant is discussing the inability to present (negative presentation) (chap. 29), he refers to mental representations, to imagination. Éliane Escoubas is right: in the moment of the experience of the sublime our imagination is no longer the place of imitation (Nachahmung) (67). The sublime is another name for imagination itself: the unimaginable as such (69). Therefore the problem of "presenting the unpresentable" should be reformulated as the problem of "presenting the unimaginable." In Kant there is no problem with other kinds of mental representation. People can think about infinity, but they cannot actually imagine it. So, how can we make a transition from a mental to a public representation, from imagination to discourse, and from image to metaphor?

The problem of "presenting the unpresentable" is often stated in terms of "expression of the unspeakable." As Nycz has noted, the problem is impossible to solve by using monistic theories of language according to which language and thought are in some way parallel. Neither is it possible to solve the problem through "dualistic" theories of language which deny the very possibility of expressing thoughts and experiences (84). These remarks apply to the problem of "presenting the unimaginable." So, what kind of theory of language is necessary in order to present the unimaginable?

We cannot speak here about mimesis in the sense of imitation, reproducing (Tatarkiewicz 1988: 312; Baldick 137), copying (Gołaszewska 248; Mitosek 15-31) or repeating (Melberg 5; Tatarkiewicz 1988: 312). Neither can it be formulated in terms of conformity to stereotypes, texts, and clichés interpreting reality (Riffaterre).

Indeed, if we look at the history of reflection on the sublime, we see many traces of an antimimetic theory of the sublime. This antimimetic tendency is already present in Pseudo–Longinus' treatise. In chapter 36, he

develops an account of nature and the function of language. In works of art (craft) we look for likeness, but in language, as in nature, we look for something transcending the human. Language is creative as is nature and it has to reveal what transcends the human being. Poetry of the sublime is evocation of the supernatural.

Lacoue-Labarthe says the following about a concept of mimesis, which is different from the traditional one. "Great art has nothing to do with the *eidos* because it has nothing to do, essentially, with the *déjà vu*, the already present" (103). Richard McKeon writes about Longinus' replacement of mimesis by *ekstasis* (171–2). The antimimetic aspects of the theory of the sublime are apparent in Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* from 1756/57, when he explicitly says:

> […] poetry, taken in its most general sense, cannot with strict propriety be called an art of imitation…Nothing is an imitation further than as it resembles some other things and words undoubtedly have no sort of resemblance to the ideas for which they stand. (172–3)

But this does not mean that words lack other properties, which can turn out to be very useful from the point of view of the theory of the sublime. Language has the ability to present the unimaginable by virtue of combining simple elements. It can create unnatural ideas, which cannot be found in nature, that is to say, ideas that are regarded as unnatural by culture. Language can evoke emotions as music can and it can bring about unimaginable ideas by combining simple ideas. These blends create a new reality or, simply, a different one. Thus language has iconoclastic properties, if we understand image (icon) as a mental image, which is in some way similar to the images of nature. In that sense, language is unnatural and iconoclastic. This aspect of Burke's theory of language is apparent in its contemporary reception by Lyotard. According to him, words have the ability to refer to what belongs to the mind without referring to what is visible.

The antimimetic aspects of the imagination itself are stated best in Kant's theory. He speaks about negative presentation and he means above all negative ideas, negative imaginings. The iconoclastic tendency is absolutely original here. Kant cites a fragment of the First Commandment (i. e. the Second in some churches) from the Bible: "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; you shall not bow down to them or serve them; for I the Lord your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to

the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me, but showing steadfast love to thousands of those who love me and keep my commandments." He comments on it this way:

> This commandment can alone explain the enthusiasm which the Jewish people, in their moral period, felt for their religion when comparing themselves with others, or the pride inspired by Mohammedanism. The very same holds true for our representation of the moral law and of our native capacity for morality. The fear that, if we divest this representation of everything that can commend it to the senses, it will thereupon be attended only with a cold and lifeless approbation and not with any moving force or emotion, is wholly unwarranted. The very reverse is the truth. For when nothing any longer meets the eye of sense, and the unmistakable and ineffaceable idea of morality is left in possession of the field, there would be the need of tempering the ardour of an unbounded imagination to prevent it from rising to enthusiasm, rather than of seeking to lend these ideas the aid of images and childish devices for fear of their being wanting in potency. *For this reason, governments have gladly let religion be fully equipped with these accessories, seeking in this way to relieve their subjects of the exertion, but to deprive them, at the same time, of the ability, required for expanding their spiritual powers beyond the limits arbitrarily laid down for them, and which facilitate their being treated as though they were merely passive*" (our emphasis, ch. 29).

In this passage, Kant confronts what may be called "a rhetoric of images" and "a rhetoric of the sublime." Kant also refers to the inscription upon the Temple of Isis (Mother Nature): "I am all that is, and that was, and that shall be, and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my face" (ch. 48). Thus, what should be revealed in the experience of the sublime has nothing to do with objective visual characteristics. Imagination, which has mainly visual properties, cannot represent what can be thought and experienced in other ways:

> We have no reason to fear that the feeling of the sublime will suffer from an abstract mode of presentation like this, which is altogether negative as to what is sensuous. For though the imagination, no doubt, finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can lay hold, still this thrusting aside of the sensible barriers gives it a feeling of being unbounded; and that removal is thus a presentation of the infinite. As such it can never be anything more than a negative presentation—but still it expands the soul.

But in Kant's *Analytic* it is apparent that poetry is antimimetic, when he ascribes to the imagination a special ability to operate on aesthetic ideas: "…by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination

which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible" (ch. 49). It follows from this passage that poetry is iconoclastic and that it has the ability to evoke what is not created.

> The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc. Or, again, as to things of which examples occur in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all vices, as also love, fame, and the like, transgressing the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination which emulates the display of reason in its attainment of a maximum, to body them forth to sense with a completeness. Of which nature affords no parallel; and it is in fact precisely in the poetic art that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself to full advantage. This faculty, however, regarded solely on its own account, is properly no more than a talent [of the imagination]. (ch. 49)

We can also find this iconoclastic character of the imagination itself and poetry, especially some of its genres (such as psalms), in the theory of the sublime by Hegel, but the best elaboration it has is in Lyotard's thought. It is not only imagination that is iconoclastic but art in general. This is so because it aims at producing shock. A destruction of images and forms in art (especially in the avant-garde art) has to evoke something that is radically new, "not-created," unnatural, even monstrous.

2. A mimesis of emotions

If we understand mimesis in the most common Platonic sense as a copy of reality's appearance, it should be clear that in the case of the theory of language, which is presupposed by the theory of the sublime, we have to point out its radical antimimetic character. However, when talking about linguistic evocation, Burke also refers to music and this might cause us to go in a different direction. If we compare poetry and music, we can say that both express emotions. But, as long as we describe the phenomenon in terms of emotional expression, we cannot notice possibilities of other kinds.

In ancient Greece, the most original meaning of mimesis was not a copy but imitation by music, dance, and singing (Tatarkiewicz 1985: 29). The role of an artist, according to this view, is not the role of a copyist but rather of an actor-*mimos* (Sörbom 27–32), who reproduces emotions and characters. There is such a concept of mimesis in the Pythagoreans, who explained with this term the psychotherapeutic character of music and

dance. Music and dance can affect souls because there is an affinity between body movements, sounds and emotions. Here Tatarkiewicz uses the image of resonance. Two souls are like two lyres; when we hit the strings of the first, the second responds to the sound (1985: 90). This mimesis of emotions was believed to have the ability to cause catharsis. We can also find this basic conception of mimesis in Plato, when he speaks about imitation of better or worse human attitudes by all music works of art (*Laws*: 798 D), or when he says that dance imitates manners and characters (*Laws*: 655 D). It is apparent that he meant this kind of mimesis when explaining his reluctance to admit poetry and poets into the *Republic* (606 D). Aristotle knows this kind of mimesis very well when in the *Poetics* he speaks about the imitation of characters and actions by a dancer (50).

We can also find such a primary understanding of mimesis and the affecting of the human soul by poetry and eloquence in Pseudo–Longinus, when he discusses figures. All figures work because they express emotions (cf. Macksey 921). The basic determination of all figures is an audience's tendency to infer from the external effects: an audience infers from the signs used what the emotional state of the speaker is. The inferences must not be a conscious action. Such operations are automatic processes. As is stated by Tom Givón, such automatic processes, which can be compared to presuppositions, are very often unconscious; they allow non interfering, multichannel and parallel actions; they are much faster than the conscious actions of the mind; they are foreseeable, because the processes are independent on context and they arise when some causes are conventionally repeated (256–7).

We can present the inferences just described in a very simple and schematic way as follows: (A coexists with B) → (B represents A) where A is emotion and B is linguistic behaviour. Metaphorically speaking, a B is a symptom of an A, when it is often the case that a B occurs with an A. By the same rule, we usually infer fire from the presence of smoke.

Absolutely crucial to the mechanism in question is a notion of identification or empathy. Empathy makes resonance possible: when we see some symptoms of emotions, the linguistic effects of being moved, we can repeat the emotions in ourselves. What we have here is a repetition, which is another name for imitation. The repetition is not a strict identity. "What human communication achieves in general is merely some degree of resemblance between the communicator's and the audience's thoughts. Strict replication, if it exists at all, should be viewed as just a limiting case of maximal resemblance, rather than as the norm of communication. … A process of communication is basically one of transformation. The degree

of transformation may vary between two extremes: duplication and total loss of information. Only those representations that are repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the process will end up belonging to the culture" (Sperber 1996: 83). Such a vision of communication is presented in Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson's *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. The process of emotional communication meant by us can be compared with the process of "becoming infected." The process corresponds to anthropology as outlined in Sperber (1996), where culture depends on the epidemiology of representations. In this process mimesis, the basic human instinct to imitate, plays the crucial role. (It is Dan Sperber's opinion expressed in a personal communication in Lund, Sweden, November 1995)

The doctrine of empathy is expressed explicitly in Edmund Burke's *Enquiry*.

> For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected..It is by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to another, and are often capable of grafting a delight on wretchedness, misery, and death itself" (44).

In Burke sympathy and mimesis form an opposition, but this "sort of substitution" must be considered a kind of mimesis. This idea of sympathy as mimesis has a strong correspondence with quite recent theories of mimesis based on the concept of empathy (Walton).

The substitution is apparently present in Pseudo-Longinus when he discusses the identification and imitation of great predecessors. Paul H. Fry confirms that transport (*exstasis*) in the theory of Longinus causes identification with some other voice. "Persuasion is a democratic, tolerant discourse that leaves the hearer free to choose whether to be persuaded … 'Transport,' on the other hand, as we have seen, whether it drives the hearer across the sky or drives him mad, casts him into slavery, robbing him even of his proper self" (60 and 79).

Pseudo–Longinus describes the psychology of the sublime and refers to the experience of that special pride when we are proud of what we have created from what we have heard (ch. 7). The true sublime is contagious and can be communicated together with an associated feeling of being creative. The sublime repeated in the hearer's soul does not lose the property of originality and novelty.

In chapter 32 Pseudo–Longinus defends multiplication and bold profusion of metaphors in discourse. He says that, in the discourse of

passion, profusion of metaphors is necessary. In the margin, he refers to linguistic expressions of mitigating metaphorical conceptualisation. In Holmqvist and Płuciennik (see next chapters), we label such linguistic devices as "appearance markers": seemingly, virtually, as though, like, etc. Pseudo–Longinus emphasizes the main goal of discourse, which is to cause an audience to feel sympathy with a speaker, or to transport an audience together with a speaker. An audience is not supposed to be conscious of the number of metaphors used by a speaker. Here Pseudo–Longinus introduces tension between the apparent distance of the speaker from the metaphoric conceptualisation of the world and participation in the enthusiastic transport of the metaphoric conceptualisation. The emotional participation is a mutual view and a conceptualisation of the world. Here the difference between nature and art, between belief and make-believe, between a face and a mask, is nullified. The dualism of face and mask is used by Pseudo–Longinus in a slightly different context when he introduces metaphors. Hence the dualism is a metaphor for metaphor (chap. 30). On the one hand, we could speak here about intentional deceiving and pretending but, on the other hand, it seems that a speaker him/herself must participate emotionally in the conceptualised world. This cancels the difference between a face and a mask. A speaker seems to identify with something transcendent, which is not his/her creation.

3. A rhetoric of the sublime in horror films

Above, we have sketched a model of the rhetoric of the sublime that applies mainly to language and literature. But the crucial elements of the rhetoric: antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable and a mimesis of emotion could also be identified in other art forms such as film. In this model, literary and filmic images of alien bodies and violated bodies, which we have chosen to illustrate a rhetoric of the sublime, are comparable to images of ghosts because all such images are created in order to evoke the feeling of the sublime in an audience. We are not the only ones who identify the aesthetic value of horror films with the sublime (see Coates, passim). The best exemplification of the rhetoric can be found in the *Blair Witch Project* (1999) but also in a classic *Alien* (1979) and its sequels: *Aliens* (1986), *Alien* 3 (1987), *Alien. Resurrection* (1997).

It is obvious that a mimesis of emotions can easily be found in all horror films. While in literature this mimetic element could be realised by using a whole range of rhetorical figures (such as hyperbolas or apostrophes), in films and the "literature of terror" the main figure is the

exclamation and all that is naturally tied to it: ellipsis, asyndeton and hyperbolic body expressions. When something alien appears, a monster, a ghost or a violated body, normal bodies and persons cry. This mimetic element is strictly tied to the antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable. A reader may note, for instance, a scene in *Alien. Resurrection* where a man, chosen to be a host for another monster, starts to cry when he sees something emerging from a gigantic egg. There is no image of a monster on the screen. In order to evoke the unimaginable, it is sometimes enough to show the results of its appearance. In all films with aliens, they are presented as ghosts, that is to say, in a very short moment or from distance (compare for example the ghost film *The Haunting of Helen Walker* 1995) or from a strange perspective: see for example *Alien 3* when, in one of the final scenes, the Alien is being hunted by people in the colony. Actually, it is the strange perspective of the alien: it is seeing its environment as a frog or even upside down. But the unimaginable is also suggested by the exclamations of the characters: compare the reactions of the characters in *Alien* when Alien is "being born" the first time. The most effective way of creating an antimimetic suggestion is through obscurity, which Burke has already identified as the sublime. Obscurity prevails in all films with aliens. Moreover, there is sometimes a twinkling or other unnatural light (e.g. red, blue) in order to increase the antimimetic effect of the objects: compare for instance a scene in *Alien. Resurrection* when we see the hanging bodies of the dead hosts.

However, it is important to realise that the antimimetic element in the presention of violated bodies, ghosts and alien bodies has to be "reasonable": the unnatural bodies must recall real bodies in order to scare them. If a body does not, it does not scare, as the body of an anthropoid that lacks real blood. In particular, blood must be very mimetic. Blood can represent exclusively the whole human body, as in the scene from *Alien 3* when the body of a worker is sliced by a kind of windmill. There are no other parts of the body on the screen, only blood and some unidentified tatters. On the other hand, it is a real horror to see in *Alien. Resurrection* mutated bodies in a laboratory because they are so antimimetic and because they are human after all. But if it is to scare an audience, the alien body has to recall the human body in an altered proportion. It is striking that the alien must be lacking a human face. When the alien has something that recalls a human face, it can bring about sympathy, not fear (compare the final alien "baby" in *Alien. Resurrection*).

4. Conclusion to this chapter

Paul Coates argues that it is dubious to say that the production of images of death panders to a pornography of horror (109). We would argue that horror is the opposite of pornography and this is especially striking when we consider images of violated and alien bodies. They form the opposite of pornographic bodies because the reaction to traditional mimesis in pornography is attraction. Artur Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,* from 1819, treats still lives and naked bodies in painting as the opposite of the sublime because they attract an audience and excite desire. Similarly, he excludes waxworks from the arts because they do not excite the imagination, that is to say, they are too mimetic. So pornography, as mimetic as possible, is the opposite of horror, which does not simply attract an audience. Two bodies are confronted in *Alien* when Ripley tries to escape in a pressure suit from the alien: an almost naked woman's body and the scary body of the alien. The two bodies form an opposition because one is very human, while the second is monstrous. Pornography, if we understand it in terms of the formal devices it uses in order to represent naked bodies, does not have much to do with representing the unimaginable or, in another formula, with ghosts. So, we have, on the one hand, a mimetic, clear image and, on the other hand, an antimimetic, blurred image of ghosts. Imagination is a marvellous place where both can be found.

It is common in the literature on metaphor to emphasise that cognition in the metaphorical process is based on imagination and feeling (Ricoeur). In the cognitive theory of metaphor it is obvious that image-schematic visualisation in language plays a crucial role in cognition (see for instance Lakoff). On the other hand, if the theory of the sublime is right at the point that there is an antimimetic and iconoclastic component in metaphor, we should consider taking into account something else, something that transcends our imagination and emotion, which is against imagination and against ourselves. Both the imagination and emotion are principally mimetic and based on icons. Here, we can talk not only about the relationship between language and affect (Talmy), between language and spatial imagination, but also between affect and imagination. However, the most inspiring element in the theory of the sublime is the iconoclastic imagination, which is not necessarily spatial. This part of imagination obviously has something to do with authentic creation, cognition and understanding. The model sketched out above depends on a holistic view of the mind, in which cognition, emotion and language act together.

Otherwise, we should suppose that images and metaphors are devices with no function in cognition, that they just express emotions.

Another question could be raised here. If we are able to say that linguistic representations can represent what is impossible to represent in imagination, then we can ask if it is possible to discriminate between such imaginings as, for example, "infinity" and such "absurd" imaginings that an object is simultaneously red all over and blue all over (although we can express this thought in words). In the first case we have the strong impression that we understand what "infinity" is, but in the second case it is not only impossible to imagine the object but also impossible to understand the very possibility that the object exists. It is likely that, without proper anthropological and psychological theories, this question cannot be answered.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALISED INFINITY

In this chapter we will try to apply some concepts of Cognitive Semantics to the analysis of a rhetorical figure, called hyperbole. Recently, hyperbolas are perceived as figures, which violates conversational maxims (Gibbs 1993: 266-268). We would like to provide an alternative interpretation of the figure using a Langackerian concept of scanning and virtuality. The main analysed examples consist of negative adjectives such as *boundless*, *endless*, *unbounded*, *infinite* etc. which we have coined "Kantian adjectives" for reasons that will become apparent. Since the beginning of in 1994, we have studied 4152 literary and other contexts in which a Kantian adjective was applied to an object. Finally, in our hypothesis, the Kantian adjectives code that state of mind when our attention is absorbed into one small scope, excluding the boundaries outside of it from perceptual access, making what remains inside the scope appear infinite and endless. Virtual scanning is a concept crucial for understanding this semantic mechanism. In this article we would like to ponder on the nature of hyperbolas. A typical hyperbole functions on the basis of some extension on a relevant scale of relevant values. For instance, when we say: "This bag weighs tons" (Patnoe 1996: 335), we ask our interlocutor to evoke in his mind a value on a scale of values which is improbable as far as a bag is concerned. This hyperbole cannot be true in this world. Langackerian concepts of scanning and virtuality make the pragmatic terms unnecessary in the analysis of hyperbolas.

*

Motto: *The carpenter was standing erect in front of Alice's chair, and pointing his finger towards the maiden with an expression of triumphant power, the limits of which could not be defined, as, indeed, its scope stretched vaguely towards the unseen and the infinite.* (Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The House of the Seven Gables*)

*

Here in the literary example above, the unseen seems to be a completely different region in space equal to the infinite. At first glance, such adjectives as: ageless, bottomless, boundless, ceaseless, countless,

dateless, endless, exhaustless, fathomless, formless, illimited, immeasurable, incalculable, incessant, indefinite, inexhaustible, infinite, innumerable, interminable, limitless, measureless, numberless, shapeless, shoreless, spaceless, structureless, quenchless, timeless, unbounded, unending, unfathomable, unlimited, unmeasured, unnumbered, unstoppable, unquenchable are infallible hyperbolas: in the phenomenal world all things have ends and are bounded and finite. But according to our analysis, to interpret them using conversational maxims is to distort the nature of communication, which is always not only about the exchange of information (as suggested by many definitions in the classical theory of communication, cf. O'Sullivan et al. 1990: 42). Kantian adjectives suggest something, which amounts to something different from information about the world. They represent subjectivity, a true subjective state of mind of the speaker, which, in turn, evokes similar states in the mind of the receiver.

1. Corpus analysis

In order to thoroughly investigate the effect of these adjectives when applied to different objects, we have studied 4152 contexts in which such an adjective or similar construction was applied to an object. Of these, 3498 were pure adjectival forms. We have obtained our context material from five Internet sources as of spring 1996:

1. *Columbia*: http://www.columbia.edu/acis/bartleby/ (Project Bartleby at Columbia University, mainly British nineteenth century poetry but also Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the USA and eighteenth centuries Vindication of the Rights of Woman by M. Wollstonecraft and The Elements of Style by W. Strunk, Jr.)
2. *Virginia*: http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/english.html (The Electronic Text Centre at University of Virginia, certainly a not homogenous, because very wide, source containing mainly British and American fiction from nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries, but also the modern translation of Plato's Republic, for instance, and some anonymous extracts from different nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries journals, E. A. Poe's short-stories and some J. Verne's novels, studies of G. Le Bon and translation of Robin Redbreast by S. Lagerlöf, The Wild Duck by H. Ibsen and essay by T.S. Eliot and novels by A.C. Doyle)
3. *Time*:
http://pathfinder.com/@@j0ZUYaNh4AMAQNi1/time/universe.html
(Time Universe /the source is certainly one of the most homogenous in our query but not easy to use, the archive is changing all the time, contains many non-sentential samples of American English, texts differ in style:

you can find there serious political comments, daily news, sport news as well as some interviews with rock-stars).
4. *LISTS*: http://www.dataflight.com/cgitest.html (Medical Data Exchange; Resumes; Litigation Support; Network News which are to obtain at Concordance Information Retrieval System: quite homogenous source which can provide you in texts from rational discourse, mainly from Usenet discussions)
5. *Shakespeare*: http://the-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/works.html (The Complete Works of William Shakespeare provided by The Tech.)
We also used one corpus only for getting distribution data, but not for retrieving contexts.
Collins: http://titania.cobuild.collins.co.uk/direct_demo.html
(CobuildDirect Free Trial Demo).

These sources are different in quality but the material included in them is quite large; in the archive ETC at University of Virginia there are several hundred titles accessible. Some sources are changing all the time, if not all: What you get depends on when you visit the site. Especially TIME magazine cannot be regarded as a stabile source.

The Shakespeare works are used in our analysis as a helpful historical and stylistic comparison. We do not base any general assumptions crucial to our view on the material from this source, especially regarding the style of Shakespeare or a stylistic characterization of the particular stage in the evolution of English.

Our five context sources provided in total 4152 constructions in contexts, including appearances as adverbs (*endlessly*) or nouns (*endlessness*) or adjectival form *infinitesimal*. They were distributed as in table 2-1.

Table 2-1: Number and proportion of Kantian adjectives from the five different sources.

Virginia	61.92 % (2571)	adj 59.38% (2077)
Columbia	17.94 % (745)	adj 18.55% (649)
Time	14.38 % (597)	adj 15.44% (540)
Shakespeare	2.41 % (100)	adj 2.72% (95)
LISTS	3.35 % (139)	adj 3.92% (137)

The most common adjective was *infinite*, with a total of 591 instances (16.94 %). Then follow *endless*, *innumerable* etc, as in table 2-2.

Table 2-2: Proportions of Kantian adjectives in the total material, and for comparison, occurrences per million words in Collins.

	Proportion in the five context sources	Occurrences per million words in Collins
infinite	16.94 % (591)	9.61
endless	12.76 % (445)	22.24
innumerable	9.95 % (347)	1.76
incessant	5.45 % (190)	1.56
countless	6.97 % (243)	7.66
indefinite	4.13 % (144)	1.85
unlimited	5.39 % (188)	6.20
boundless	4.96 % (173)	1.32
interminable	4.50 % (157)	1.95
ceaseless	3.21 % (112)	0.49
numberless	2.55 % (89)	0.20
inexhaustible	2.41 % (84)	1.02
limitless	2.29 % (80)	1.22
unbounded	2.26 % (79)	0.44
incalculable	1.83 % (64)	0.68
unfathomable	1.78 % (62)	0.29
timeless	1.72 % (60)	3.37
immeasurable	1.61 % (56)	0.34
bottomless	1.78 % (62)	1.32
measureless	1.49 % (52)	0
unending	1.23 % (43)	0.98
formless	1.15 % (40)	0.59
unquenchable	0.83 % (29)	0.29
unmeasured	0.75 % (26)	0
fathomless	0.72 % (25)	0.15
unnumbered	0.6 % (21)	0.10
quenchless	0.4 % (14)	0
dateless	0.29 % (10)	0.05
exhaustless	0.32 % (11)	0.05
illimited	0.03 % (1)	0

Table 2-2 also shows the occurrences per million words (opm) of Kantian adjectives in the Collins corpus, only adjectival forms. There is a clear correlation (0.77) between the proportions in the five corpora and the

opm in Collins, meaning that although there is a variation between genres in the use of Kantian adjectives, our context sources roughly reflect the frequency in usage. The high frequency of *infinite* in our context sources can be explained by the high degree of British literature in those corpora (cf. Table 2-4).

The Collins data is divided into eight genre corpora. Kantian adjectives occurred with a frequency of 134.8 and 118 opm in British and American Books, while the frequency was 12.2 opm in Spoken, 32.2 in Broadcasts and 48.4 in Newspapers. Magazines and Ephemera have an opm between 71 and 95. Kantian adjectives obviously belong more to written than to spoken language.

Table 2-3: Over- and underrepresented Kantian adjectives in the five different context sources.

	Strongly over	Weakly over	Weakly under	Strongly under
Virginia	*infinite, innumerable*	*incessant, numberless*	*boundless, immeasurable, limitless, unmeasured*	*dateless, quenchless, timeless*
Columbia	*ceaseless, measureless, quenchless, unmeasured*	*boundless, exhaustless, fathomless, formless, limitless, unbounded*	*bottomless, incessant, interminable*	*unlimited*
Time Time (cnd)	*bottomless, limitless, timeless, unquenchable*	*dateless, immeasurable, incalculable, interminable, unending*	*infinite*	*measureless, numberless*
Shakespeare	*boundless, quenchless, timeless*			
LISTS	*unlimited, unnumbered*		*incessant*	

In the Collins data, see table 2-4, there was also a clear overrepresentation of certain Kantian adjectives. For instance, in Spoken, the *endless* instances provided 48.7 % of all Kantian adjectives, while in Ephemera, the *endless* instances were only 21.6 % of the adjectives. 29 %

of all Kantian adjectives in the British books were *infinite*, but in American Books it was 11.8 % and in Newspapers 2.4 %.

Table 2-4: Opm and over- and underrepresented Kantian adjectives in the eight genre of the Collins corpus

Genre	opm of Kantian adjectives	Overrepresented	Underrepresented
Spoken	12.2	*endless, immortal, unlimited*	*countless*
Broadcasts	32.2	*countless*	
Newspapers	48.4	*countless, interminable, unstoppable*	*infinite, timeless*
Times magazine	71.0	*incalculable, indefinite, unstoppable*	*immortal, timeless*
Other magazines	86.7	-	-
Ephemera	94.6	*timeless, unlimited*	*endless, immortal, infinite*
American books	118	*boundless, incessant, innumerable*	*unstoppable*
British books	134.8	*endless, infinite*	*countless, immortal, unlimited*

2. Image schemata as a cognitive tool in understanding Kantian adjectives

The crucial term for our analysis is *kinaesthetic image schema*. In particular, we make use of the CONTAINER image schema, RADIATION and STREAM image schemata. Image schemata are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE and various orientations and relations: UP—DOWN, FRONT—BACK, PART—WHOLE, CENTER—PERIPHERY, etc." (Lakoff 1987:267)

As already noted in the previouis chapter: schemata are generalizations over the basic perceptual and imaginative images. In other words: "Schemata are schemata because they schematize" the images of both

perception and reason (Holmqvist 1993:107). Kantian adjectives schematize boundary removal, and the objects from which the Kantian Adjectives remove boundaries are of six basic types, as summarized in table 25.

Table 2-5: Six types of objects, from which the Kantian adjectives remove boundaries.

General container	Cylindrical container	Time container	General process	Counting process	Measuring process
boundless *unbounded* *formless* *illimited* *indefinite* *limitless* *unlimited*	*bottomless* *exhaustless* *inexhaustible* *fathomless* *unfathomable*	*dateless* *timeless*	*ceaseless* *incessant* *endless* *unending* *interminable* *infinite* *quenchless* *unquenchable*	*countless* *incalculable* *innumerable* *numberless* *unnumbered*	*immeasurable* *measureless* *unmeasured*

As an example of the objects in these groups, we will now provide a short analysis of the different image schemata in which *bottomless*, *ceaseless* and *endless* appear. Two image schemata with a number of variations govern the usage of these three Kantian adjectives. All examples used below are authentic use from our five sources.

2.1 Radiation schemata

Radiation assumes a source, something which is radiated and an observer. One concrete example is that of heat radiation from a fire. The radiation flows from the source, sometimes outward in all directions like from a campfire, more often just in one single direction like from an oven. The observer stands in the vicinity of the radiating source and perceives the flow, like the flow of heat onto the bare face. The observer has very little or only indirect influence on the intensity and longevity of the radiation. As with a fire, the conditions inside the source decide how intense the radiation is and for how long it will continue. Our default expectation is that radiation always ends. The fire always burns out. It is this expectation that makes it meaningful to use Kantian adjectives on radiation schemata.

Some sources are obvious from the object, especially those that have to do with people. *Endless folly* obviously streams from people. The word *folly* provides the source, just like *chorus*. In these cases, the source is often a container. The container schema can be checked by testing the construction *people are full of folly*. In other cases, the source has to be

provided from context, such as with the cadence radiated by the sea rolling against the beach. You cannot then say that **the water is full of cadence*. The water only radiates, but does not contain cadence. (Which means we should only speak of source containers in those cases where they are containers). Sometimes the radiated substance is the object, and you must guess the source (*endless bliss*). At other times, the source is the object (*endless fountain*), and you must guess the flow. The variation on the radiation schemata involves the nature of the source and the perspective of the observer/consumer.

Radiation from the mental container

One of the most common sources for radiation is the human mind. Some of the things radiating from the human mind are emotions, such as: *endless agitation, bliss*, *care*, *concern*, *folly*, *grief*, *insecurity*, *joy, love*, *pleasure*, *pride*, *sanctity*, *sorrow*, *woe*. The *endless memory* is radiated again and again, seemingly without end. A flow of *endless ingenuity* never ends. The internal event of a recollection was conceived of as a container and radiated *endless conjectures*. The observer in these cases is as often the radiating person him/herself as an external individual.

Endless is more appropriate when the focus is on the observer position in the flow: *they kept snarling their endless hatred into each other's faces*. Ceaseless instead focuses on the generation of the flow: *the ceaseless worry and mental distraction resultant from his Herculean efforts*, *the ceaseful distrustfulness of their neighbour*, *all these hours of ceaseless anguish, the ceaseless and aimless activity from the consciousness that they are themselves*. Bottomless does not at all involve radiation of emotions; *bottomless despair* is rather applicable when you are travelling down into a container filled with despair.

There is much evidence that we often conceptualise the mind as a container for emotions, thoughts etc (Holmqvist/Pluciennik 1995). For instance, there is no problem saying that a person is *blissful* or *full of ravings upon politics*. It is therefore close at hand to identify the radiating source with this mental container.

The container can be construed as closed, and there is then no radiation: *Does he too harbor his friendship silent and endless*? The affections radiated from him are not perceivable by the observer, and s/he can only speculate about the contents of his container.

Radiation by means of communication

Radiation of emotions can be very saliently perceived, but it is not always a matter of communication. By using our ability to speak, write and in general communicate, we can radiate *endless claims*, *gratitude*, *insinuations*, *monologues*, *praise*, *promises*, and *vocatives*, as well as *endless ravings upon politics* and an *endless epistle*. A slave who paid *endless little attentions* to his master is conceived of as radiating them.

When ceaseless is used, the observer's position is out of focus, and the communicative function can therefore not be realised: *her ceaseless cry* has an introvert focus on the production of the cry, and it is only by accident that anyone would hear **ceaseless promises*. Paying **ceaseless little attentions* to someone is not appropriate. The verticality of bottomless makes it impossible to use it for communication: the **bottomless gratitude* has a downward introvert direction, the opposite to *endless gratitude*.

The mental container can also be used in parallel (zeugmata) with more concrete containers: *the herdsman poured forth his heart and his wine together in endless profusion*.

Radiation from the human body

The human body also radiates the (perception of) *endless sleep*. Bodies and other live things also radiate *endless youth*. A woman's forehead radiated *endless grace*. When active, the human body radiates *endless imitation*, *industry*, *effort* and *endless motion*. In times of war, bodies may radiate *endless blood*.

Groups of people may radiate *endless ballads*, *endless clamours*, *endless disputes whether or not*, and *endless speculation*. An intense dancing party radiates *endless cascades of colours, tunes, and perfumes*. A party going off to war radiated an *endless chorus of clanging weapons*.

Ceaseless generally applies to these objects, but again requires the possibility to focus on the generation of the stream: *ceaseless noise* (from the cavalry), *the now almost ceaseless notes of their bloodthirsty screams*. Bottomless only applies to those objects that allow a vertical container interpretation, such as *bottomless sleep* and *bottomless blood*

Radiation from storerooms

In storeroom radiation, the focus of the expression is on the use of the radiated substance for the observer. The *endless store of things* radiates in

the sense of providing goods for endless consumption. Storeroom radiation is different from human container radiation not only in that the source is not necessarily human, but also in that the radiated substance is seen from the perspective of an observer who wants to consume or make use of that substance. For instance, the *endless feuillage* allows for endless consumption. The *endless capabilities* are provided by a 900-pound income. An *endless excess of vigour* provides perquisites for hard work. The person who is an *endless psychological account* provides material for the doctors wanting to cast him up. Consumption of tales streaming from a source can be thus described: *All lovely tales that we have heard or read: An endless fountain of immortal drink, Pouring unto us from the heaven's brink*.

The gardens in a parish radiated *endless waste*, namely the harvest normally radiated from a garden, but which in this case none makes use of. The word *waste* indicates the observer's obligation, not only possibility, to consume from the flow.

We also find storeroom radiation in the *bottomless purse*, the *bottomless cup of coffee*, and the *bottomless bag of tricks*. In order to use bottomless for storeroom radiation, the radiating container must be possible to conceive of as vertical. The observer is also more active with bottomless than with endless: **endless purse* is not possible, because the purse does not radiate by itself. It requires the consumer to stick down his hand a pick up the goods him/herself.

When you consume the money from *bottomless purse*, the level of money sinks and sinks. Each time you pick something up, you have to go a little deeper into the purse, so in practice you are travelling down into the purse. This is what has allowed bottomless in this usage.

Ceaseless is not good for storeroom radiation, because of its focus on the radiation production, which removes focus from the consumption at the other end of the flow. **A ceaseless fountain of immortal drink* would mean a very abrupt focus change from production to consumption.

Radiation out of vertical containers

There is also a type of radiation in which the production occurs at the bottom of the bottomless container. The perspective is one of standing outside of the container and perceiving the radiation. Often, in accordance with GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN, the things radiating from below is bad, for instance a *cloud of locusts*. In a spiritualistic context, a man named Hark heard his name shouted from below: *„From Pit that's bottomless and dark -- Methinks I hear it shrieking -- Hark!"* A man just

told in cynical words that he had been sentenced to death described it as: *The breath of the bottomless pit had blown in my face.*

Radiation from nature

Both ceaseless and endless take objects referring to radiation from nature. Of course, nature not only radiates things for our consumption. It also radiates *endless charm*, *endless constancy*, *endless images*, and an *almost endless amount of organic action and reaction*. The waves of water hitting the beach radiated an *endless cadence*. A governor's dominion radiated *endless beauty*.

Ceaseless radiation from nature always involves focus on the sound production: *the ceaseless murmur of the insect life*, *Numberless torrents with ceaseless sound*.

Radiation from activities

Ceaseless has a number of objects referring to sound production: *ceaseless bleating*, *clangor*, *din*, *patter*, *rings*, *roar*. In most cases the actor (TR) of the sound-creating activity is explicit from the context: *the ceaseless note of the corncrake*, *the sea of life thundered into their ears ceaseless and unheeded*. Endless can be applied to these objects, but the obvious production activity is then less emphasized, and hence ceaseless is preferred. Bottomless is not found in the production meaning.

Endless punishment and *torture* radiate from an external, all-encompassing activity onto the body and the mind. This is also a sort of consumption. Again, the *its ceaseless torture of uncertainty* focuses on the production (*it* is the desert island on which the speaker is trapped; he therefore receives no information from the outside).

In *the established, but ceaseless, wonders of steam locomotion and electric telegraphing*, ceaseless was obviously chosen instead of endless to keep the focus on the production of wonders. The production activity is normally given as a noun to fit the *of*-construction. Sometimes, however, the production process is quite implicit as in the following case, in which the process of reading generates a flow of beauty: *I discovered my first book of travels in my father's library, and as with a magical key unlocked the gate of an enchanted realm of wondrous and ceaseless beauty*.

Radiation from relations and states

A few relations and states are also perceived as radiating: The *endlesse blessednes* is radiated from an ancient king's reign. The fact of the captain lying in state radiates *endless ramifications*. The *endless matrimony* radiates a flow of good things, the *endless war* a flow of bad things.

The united spheres in *Learned from the tuneful spheres that glide in endless union, earth and sea above* radiated not only tunes but also knowledge.

Relations and states are not activities and hence ceaseless is not appropriate. The parallel we found to the state *endless war* was the activity *ceaseless warfare*. Applying bottomless to the objects removes us completely from radiation.

2.2. Stream schemata

Streaming is a directed one-dimensional process relative to an observer. It differs from the radiation schema in that there is no known source from which the stream originates. Instead the stream seems endless in both directions. *We stand amid time, beginningless and endless*. The *endless stream of cars* appears somewhere near the horizon, streams by the observer and continues indefinitely into the other direction. The stream is directed from one horizon to the other. It should not be confused with a special two-way directed radiation, in which the source stands in the middle of a vertical tunnel/well, as in: *we catch dim glimpses of endless circles below descending into gloom and endless circles above, ascending into glory*. The variations of the stream schema are many, mainly concerning the nature of the stream motion and the dimensions along which the stream streams.

Objective motion of the stream

The *endless stream of cars* moves relative to a pedestrian who wants to get across the road. For a number of the endless cases and for all ceaseless cases, the stream moves objectively, relative to some still-standing observer: *the ghost-like clouds which amongst the Carpathians seem to wind ceaselessly through the valleys*, *the city's ceaseless crowd moves on*. The actor is often present in one-way or another: *in her wild and ceaseless hurtling*. In some cases, the actor simply has to be present to provide the activity which ceaseless requires: *wherefore all these ceaseless toilings? Speak, weaver!*

Relative motion of the stream

In many other cases, the observer is moving and the streaming object is still. For instance, the *endless road* is fixed, just like the *endless plain*, the *endless waters*, and the *endless stars*. To an observer walking along the *endless road* or *distance* or up *endless steps* or down an *endless stairway* (or looking down the *endless string*) or going an *endless river*, or wound up an *endless way*, it will seem as it the road is streaming past him/her. It is this relative motion between stream and observer that is relevant to *endless*. The same relative motion takes place along *endless flights of stairs* and into the *endless labyrinth*. The observer *sinking into a bottomless abyss* has the same, although vertical, sense that the abyss is streaming towards and past him/her.

The *endless chase*, *cruise*, *journey*, *wandering*, and *flight*, seem at first to involve objective motion. But since in these cases, the TR/actor of these processes coincides with the observer/narrator, the perspective is one of relative motion. This is clear in the comparison **an endless chase down an endless road*.

This relative motion may be only imagined, as with the observer looking out over the *endless plain,* the *endless sands*, the *endless expanse of Dead Sea*, the *endless forest crown*, the *endless panorama* or *vista* or *perspective*, or into *the endless stretch beyond the Mississippi*. This also works in the microworld, as with the *endless filament*. While travelling into the plain with her attention, she imagines actually travelling into the plain, similar to the actual walk on the *endless road*.

A number of different dominions can be travelled into by means of attentional movement, such as: *to gaze back into an endless past*, *to gaze forward into an endless future*. In one poem, Endymion was snatched *into endless heaven*. More than one was said to go into the *endless hereafter*. Religion was claimed to be capable of *endless extension*. They had an *endless range of common interest*. Someone was lost in *endless meshes* (a net of music capturing the narrators heart). A strange and very lonely man sees *endless space* extending from his body outward, not obstructed by anything, least of all people in the street.

The function of eye or attentional movement becomes especially evident when it travels sequences of objects inside the visual field: *his eye ran along the lines of mummies and the endless array of polished cases*. And: *and endless beauties tire the wand'ring eyes*. Similarly, with the *endless stars* neither stars nor the observer move. The only motion is the eye movement of the observer scanning over the stars, just as with the

endless alignment of monuments, and the *endless billows* surrounding the pilgrims lost in the forest. One person scanned over the *endless pains and sorrows* there when he had a look down into hell. Also, *they could see for themselves the endless thick-forested plains*.

Under unclear circumstances, the relative motion may be taken for objective. Although a motion of attention, it appears as if the observer were still and the stream moving, as in *they all seemed to file past her dying eyes that day in an endless, shadowy review*.

There are no restrictions to the speed of the stream. The *endless stars* were scanned in seconds, while the *endless successions* took ages (units streaming slowly, the former gone before the next arrives).

The reason that there are no ceaseless cases here is that ceaseless does not allow for relative motion. The **ceaseless road*, **heaven*, **labyrinth* can not involve their own activity to become ceaseless. **Ceaseless clouds* is acceptable, because the clouds can move themselves, but how do the **ceaseless stars* move? Ceaseless could only take the activity nouns: *chase*, *cruise*, *journey*, *wandering*, and *flight* as objects, but we found no such cases in the material.

Streams down into containers

There are two differences between endless and bottomless streams: Bottomless does not allow for absolute motion of the stream, and bottomless requires verticality, i.e. alignment with the gravitation line. Among the objects to bottomless, we find physical containers such as the *bottomless barrel*, *box*, *cup*, *glass*, *pit*, *purse*, which are used metaphorically. *Barrel* and *pit* are empty containers into which we may fall, pour things or travel in the search of something. Whatever falls into the bottomless pit is lost forever, because gravitation just draws it further and further down.

These containers are often filled with confusion, humiliation, delight, longing and other emotions that one can descend into, be down in, or sink into, as in: *he descended immediately into a bottomless pit of confusion*. This is a stream similar to that along the endless road.

The containers are metaphorically identified with the human mind, sometimes very consciously: *takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature*. The journey is implicit here, but concerns understanding the soul in terms of descending into the ocean.

Only in one case was the bottomless pit an actual physical container, viz. in a situation of a cave system. The *journey towards the bottomless pit*

was an actual one inside the cave. In all other cases, the journey into the container is only imagined, as with the ocean in: *Where, in the bottomless deeps, could he find the torn limbs of his brother?*

Very often, the container of bottomless is a bad place, or the worst of all conceivable places. This of course is an instance of the general metaphor GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN: *Will my spirit fly upward to a happy heaven? Or shall I sink into the bottomless pit?* Or: *There's only trouble comes of hunting ghosts; they lead you into bottomless pits and things like that.* Things that you want to speak ill of are therefore appropriate to connect to the pit: *bottomless wealth pit*.

In several cases, the observer did not follow the stream down into the container, but rather dropped or pushed things down: *Bernard had often spoken of his comrade's want of imagination as a bottomless pit, into which Gordon was perpetually inviting him to lower himself. "My dear fellow," Bernard said, "you must really excuse me; I cannot take these subterranean excursions. I should lose my breath down there; I should never come up alive. You know I have dropped things down -- little jokes and metaphors, little fantasies and paradoxes -- and I have never heard them touch bottom!"*

Attempts are even conceived of at filling up bottomless pits: *as if it were able to fill up a bottomless pit, and to satiate hell!* Of course, the generally acknowledged impossibility of filling up bottomless holes makes them a good tool for a negative description, for instance of an investment in a rubber company: *It was more like a bottomless pit which swallowed with avidity the funds fed to it, and demanded more with ever-increasing insistence.*

The vertical element of the bottomless stream is relative to the observer descending down into the container. Most observers have the same perception of the gravitational direction, and hence it appears like an objective direction. However, when the observer is a fly with its ability to walk on walls, gravitation can suddenly become horizontal: *A little blue fly is trying to cross the yawning keyhole. He marches briskly up to it, peers into the chasm in a surprised sort of way, and rubs his feelers reflectively; then he essays its depths, and, finding it bottomless, draws back again.*

Constancy streams

Not only are there streams with relative motion. There does not even have to be change in the stream. Objects that express mass constancy streams, with no clear generation activity or actor, are used only with endless: An *endless stay*, just like *endless constancy*, or *endless being*

rather negates change, evoking a mass stream which does not alter in appearance. The *endless night*, *evening*, *peace* and *year* stream past the observer, who does not perceive of any noteworthy change in the flow. And *endless Sabbath day*. And *endless delay* or *tarrying*. And *endlesse despeyre*. And *endless dissension in your family*. And the *endless existence in Vera Cruz*. Burning in *endlesse fire*. The noise of the *endless gale*, *endless storm*.

Constancy also involves relations: *labor will embrace misery in an endless union*. This union is sideward restricted, can never be dissolved. Nouns with a strong relational whole, such as husband may be used metonymically for that whole, as in *My sister's endless husband*.

When the object involves a clear activity that allows for an actor, ceaseless also works: *Endless work* allows no rest (sideward). *Ceaseless writing* and *endless writing*, in this case the outside observer is annoyed over the writer never leaving her writing (sideward). And the *endless feud* between the two dogs. And *endless duty of the frontier guard*. And *endless search and endeavor*. An *endless Court of Inquiry* and *endless trial*, is the same. Sometimes there is metabounderies: *Endless stagnation* means that there is change, but the change is bounded always to be to the worse.

In the constancy meanings, the object provides sideward boundaries, while endless and ceaseless remove the forward boundary. The matrimony in *endless matrimony* has a sideway boundary against dissolvation of the matrimony. *Endless misery* sets borders against happiness. You cannot get out of that misery. *Endless mystery* means that you never get sideways into clarity. *Endless pain* never allows you sideward to its opposites. *Endlesse moniment* will never get out and be anything else than a monument. *Endless rest* negates hard work/anxiety etc. Someone *buried in endless ruin* will never have their life solidly built again. *Endless shopping* stops you from doing other (more sensible) things. The *endless toil*. The one in *endless vigil* may never take a rest. *Endless waiting* never allows you to move on (sideward). *Endless wooing* never ceases (sideward). *Endlesse wynd* keeps blowing and the weather never moves sideward into stillness. The life in *my endless life* imposes its boundaries Of another kind of life. The *endless meal* goes into the maw of a mining machine. It sets borders against eating that which is not ore.

Usually there is disappointment when speaking of these unchanging time flows. Change is desired, with the exception of the poets' praise of the *endless May* and a writer's hope for an *endless day* at a mansion.

Rather, a change to too violent is important to stay within the same category. Therefore, endless restricts in the side direction just as well as it opens up in the forward direction.

Mass streams and unit streams

The endless stream may consist of masses as well as of units. The conceptualization in the context decides what is appropriate. For instance, someone who sails for many days and sees the ocean shifting appearance from day to day, interrupted by sleep, will talk of the unit stream *endless waters*, even when looking out over the ocean mass. With the plural *waters (vistas*, *woods*, *streets*, *wilds)* each individual water is limited, only the stream of all waters is endless. Someone who sees the flow of *endless water* from the fountain will speak of it as a mass, often using the of-construction.

There may be multiplex verbs for streams of action units: *the endless combining of forms of novel beauty*.

In some cases, such as the *endless history*, we have an underlying mass stream with occasional units (historical events) floating in the mass, similar to boats on a river or islands in the ocean. The mass whining in *that's the end of the endless "Win95 has networking and Warp doesn't" whining* involves occasional islands where the quote is spoken out. *Endless converse* also involves identifiable units, changes in the stream, but change that still leaves it a stream of converse. And *it would be endless to describe the different sensations* is similarly multiplex. Discussions have subjects, and the subjects may change even in an endless discussion (or an *endless dream*). Here it remains the same, however: *Just what should ultimately be done with the money was the subject of endless discussion*. And: *It were endless to dispute upon everything that is disputable*, and to *dwell upon the several variations*. Mass with mentioned islands: *their talk ran on endlessly of "strike" and "contact" and "mother lode,"*

The *endless crowds of people* probably just means endless people, partly grouped into unclear units, called crowds. Similarly *endless forests* probably just signifies one forest, partly grouped in unclear units, thereby allowing for the plural. The *endless hours* and *endless minutes* are probably just one sequence of time, but the common division of time into hours makes the speaker prefer to conceptualise this basic mass time as a unit stream. And the one who *drove endless miles* of course drove a mass line in space.

The loop and repetition schemata

Loops are circular schemata, which can be masses or which can be a sequence of unit rounds. Repetitions are unit streams in which each unit is the same as the preceding or so similar to it as to be conceived of as identical. Both ceaseless and endless applied to the loop and repetition schemata. A continuous loop is seen in *Saturn's ceaseless whirl*, and in *the great spheres of which it is composed spin and spin through the eternal void ceaselessly*, where *it* is the solar system.

The Internet newsgroups gave us *endless loop* and the *endless cycle*, while Darwin wrote of *endless cycles*. One person experienced the *endless rotation of thought*, another listened to *the ceaseless pulse of the engines*. The *cycle*, *loop*, *pulse*, *rotation* and *whirl* are all-multiplex and provide the stream elements.

Endless round is also multiplex. Pluralizing it can be made to emphasize that the rounds regard a number of units: *the endless rounds from the house to the barn, from the barn to the fields, from the fields to the barn, from the barn to the house*.

The repetition schema cannot be used on masses such as whirl, but requires there to be units, such as the rounds in: *five steps one way and five back—round after round, round after round, in ceaseless repetition*. Or like the water drops in *hollowed by ceaseless billows*.

Ferry is not multiplex, but its foremost activity is, allowing for *crossing the ceaseless ferry* by means of metonymy.

In the computer, there is a very high degree of identity between the successive units in the *endless loop* and the *ceaseless pulse*. Darwin's *endless cycles* are also very similar to one another. In other cases, such as *His talk was an endless repetition. "Reserve your fire, boys—don't shoot till I tell you—save your fire—wait till they get close up—don't be damned fools—"*, the sound difference between the units is great, but the content is judged similar by the author.

In the *endless question and answer*, an endless loop between question and answer is imagined.

The distinction between unit streams and repetitions lies in how the speaker judges the similarity between successive units. If they are judged identical, we have repetition.

If bottomless are applied to these objects, the bottomlessness will concern the vertical depth and not the longevity of the spin or repetition. Bottomless does not involve loops and repetition.

Endlessness along the multiplexity dimension

A large group of the endless objects are multiplex, i.e. although they appear as singular nouns they have an inner structure of minor units. The *endless crowd*, *chain*, *diversity*, *irregularity*, *line*, *list*, *number*, *oscillation*, *procession*, *stream*, *succession*, *troupe*, *variety*, and *retinue* all have such minor units in them. Some are linearly ordered in themselves, while others, such as the crowd, irregularity, and variety, have to be ordered by the scanning process in *endless*. In both cases, the endlessness dimension will coincide with a sorting of the minor units. It is normally mentioned in context what these stream units are; for instance the *endless list of parameters*, the *endless procession of webby wheels*, the *endless variety of eccentric costumes* and the *endless oscillation of industrial power*.

A number of other endless objects are not normally multiplex, but in the larger image which discourse evokes, they are forced to assume a multiplex structure. The *endless attempt to keep a smooth surface on the inner tumult* is not naturally (lexically) multiplex. Instead the attempt inherits its multiplexity from the tumult, because we see in the resulting image how the surface is again and again, on different locations, being disturbed from below by this inner multiplex tumult. The attempt to smoothen the surface must deal with all the individual disturbances, and hence the attempt becomes multiplex. Other words for human activities, such as the *endless work (to do ...)*, the *endless task (to do ...)*, the *endless error*, the *endless practice* and the *endless process of education* inherited their multiplexity from context in a similar way.

When endless has two objects, as with the *endless question and answer*, and one naturally follows the other, the combination forms a repetitive multiplex pattern.

Multiplexity is, just like the more general boundedness, a construed property. For example, the person who *hummed an endless tune* was certainly making individual hums, which makes the tune a stream of hums and hence multiplex. Endless appears to support and strengthen the construance of multiplexity. Wealth appears to be a mass, but in the *endless wealth of beautiful sights*, it is clearly multiplex.

3. Image-schema of unboundedness

What do all these adjectives have in common and why do we call them Kantian? In Holmqvist & Pluciennik 1996, (see the chapter 6 in this book) we first introduced the concept of Kantian adjectives for a subgroup of lexemes having the suffix *-less*, among them *ageless*, *endless* and

boundless. We observed that the meaning of these adjectives differed considerably from the majority of adjectives ending in *-less*, for instance *childless*, *homeless* and *faithless*. The other adjectives always meant that the stem was either a mental state (*faith*) or a part (*child*) expected to be present with the objects (*faithless woman*, *childless couple*).

We then turned to the question why the corresponding adjectives *ageful*, *endful* or *structureful* do not exist? This is, we argued, because hardly anything is expected to lack age. Even if there existed something expected to lack age, we would not very often need to point out that for once it does have an age, which is what *ageful* would do. Beside this we can say that to create such a word as *ageful* would be an absurdity. This is a strikingly unimaginable construction, because of the requirement of a container involved in the morpheme *-ful* (cf. Holmqvist & Pluciennik 1996 or chapter 7).

In short, the Kantian stems refer to limitations that are expected of almost all conceivable objects: Having age, form, being bounded, countable and structured. Coding these limitations in the *-less* adjectives the language community answers to Kant's a priori categories. Just like space and time are inherent in our conception of the world, so are structures, ends, bottoms and the other "phenomena" which stems in this group refer to.

The Kantian Adjective has a semantic negation inside the word. This is obviously true of all adjectives in the list, but also with a large number of other words, for instance all others taking the *in-* or *un-* prefixes or the *-less* suffix. We focus on semantic negation instead of just negation to avoid the misunderstanding that the sufix *-less* has nothing to do with negation (see review and discussion in Horn 1989).

Our work on adjectives has shown that negation inside lexical items is extremely important also from the rhetorical point of view. Sentential negation is in the central point of our awareness, and its visibility can be seen as one of its important features. Affixal negation is instead much more hidden in the background. Hence, affixal negation goes much more unnoticed than semantic negation, although their semantic functions are of the same nature.

On the other hand, we argue in Holmqvist/Pluciennik (1995) (see chapter 6), that affixal negation can also be used to suggest otherwise unthinkable attitudes, beliefs and opinions. Adjectives containing negative affixes can therefore serve as a good instrument for suggesting contents and viewpoints, and, on the other hand, as a powerful generator of social ideologies, prescriptions and desires.

In our study on Kantian adjectives it has been clear that they are overrepresented in works by, for instance, Darwin and Proudhon, as well as in the Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the USA. In these works, it appears that Kantian adjectives serve as a powerful rhetorical device when suggesting opinions, beliefs and desires that are irrational (i.e. not motivated in the accepted contexts). One can easily find Kantian Adjectives also in mystical texts, for instance in the Indian culture, in Upanishads. There, in religious contexts, the adjectives seem much more suitable. (Holmqvist and Pluciennik 2001)

We would like to argue that the power of the Kantian adjectives lies in suggesting a very special state of mind, which has something to do with the removal of boundedness and the experience of the sublime. In other words, the infinity is real, not fictional; it is a real state of mind conceptualised in language.

3.1. The mathematical sublime[3] and virtual scanning

Imagine you go to the mountains and stand in front of an abrupt slope. If you look up reaching the pick of the highest mountain you can feel something that is called *the sublime* by theorists of aesthetic experience. Or when during the starlit summer night, you go to a big forest. Suddenly, inside the forest you discover a big peaceful lake. In the mirror of the lake you can see the reflected sky with myriads of stars. Seeing this, you can start doubting the preciseness of your perceptions: What is really the sky and what is the mirror? You may feel as if you were standing in the middle of universe: stars up and stars down. In other words, you try to grasp the *infinity* of your situation. You can even try to count the stars in front of you, you can start, imaginatively and sensually to count and ... feel the mathematical sublime (Kant 1952, Burke 1958, Crowther 1989, Moore 1990, Pluciennik 2000, Pluciennik 2002).

As we stated in the Introduction to this book, the sublime is all the stimuli which have features of overwhelming perceptually, imaginatively or emotionally and causing at the same time the subject to experience sensual intensification of the perceived reality and/ or of the self. (cf. Płuciennik 2000, Płuciennik 2002;. Crowther 1989; Holmqvist and Płuciennik 2002c)

In the context of our considerations on hyperbole we would like to refer to a concept of artificial infinity described by Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century. According to his description, our eyes are not able to perceive the boundaries of many things in this world. However, our sensual apparatus and our imagination deceive us. Especially in the case

when parts of a huge object are stretched in an indefinite number: our imagination does not meet any hindrance and multiplies the parts indefinitely. (Burke 1958)

Kant describes this process of a virtual scanning and writes on the work of the mind experiencing the mathematical sublime. His phenomenological analysis is a description of a work of mind, not necessary conscious one.

"The mind, however, hearkens now to the voice of reason, which for all given magnitudes-even for those which can never be completely apprehended, though (in sensuous representation) estimated as completely given-requires totality, and consequently comprehension in one intuition, and which calls for a presentation answering to all the above members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt even the infinite (space and time past) from this requirement, but rather renders it inevitable for us to regard this infinite (in the judgement of common reason) as completely given (i.e., given in its totality)." (Kant 1952)

The paradox of *endless roads* and *bottomless despair* arises in the conflict between the mind's struggle to order perceptions in finite and rational forms on the one hand, and the infinitudes presented in the perceptual input. The mind appears to believe at first in its own ability to measure the object (or an image of the object) and then, after this first probe of grasping, abdicates the privileged place of reason and involuntarily submits to the overwhelming feelings of the sublime. Notice, there is time involved in the process: First, the mind seems to have a representation of the object that can be grasped and, then, the mind forms a representation of a completely different kind. As Kant emphasizes, the experience of the sublime arises from the nature of the mind itself, not from the nature of objects. So, we can talk about the phenomenological experience of the sublime. In this experience, we could try to grasp a real mental process of scanning which in a moment becomes a virtual scanning, scanning "as if". In other words, it would be a Langackerian sequential scanning, which could not reach a state of cumulative scanning (cf. Holmqvist 1993: 22 and 88), The virtual scanning takes place, when our mind is forced to make perceptual judgments of some scale with a limited, bounded perspective and limited viewpoint. In other words, perceptual action associated with scanning of some domain is replaced by virtual simulation of a perceptual domain. This simulation would be a crucial mechanism in cognitive semantics.

A rhetorical figure of hyperbole in the light of cognitive concepts, above all, virtual scanning, would be a trace of much wider mental

mechanisms. Hyperbole, on the one hand, represents such attempts of the mind which are the results of realistic judgments; on the other hand, it indicates unboundedness and the dynamics of a the human imagination. Human subjectivity and human imagination seem to be much wider in the capacity than the reality of measurement and concepts. We have in ourselves a faculty enabling us to simulate reality, which is, as a matter of fact, a continuation of the given and known reality, but which is a world in our minds and which is subjectively experienced. Due to the wonderful ability of language we can empathize with impossible points of view and impossible perspectives. In this context, a special relevance should be ascribed to literature, in which the described Kantian adjectives are very common feature. Literature is based on the linguistic and literary phenomenon of meeting others by empathic simulation of being in "someone else's shoes". (cf. a concept of empathy in aesthetics in Walton 2002, cf. on empathy in linguistics Holmqvist and Płuciennik 2002a) Literature intensifies our ability of experiencing other styles of being and makes us – in a very dictatorial way – form a mental community with others. And here we could start a discussion on the need and advantages of using hyperbolas in literature. We could also start a debate on the benefits and hazards of reading *Don Kichote* or *Madame Bovary*.

4. Negation, virtuality and empathy

According to Mark Turner, a crucial human ability is detachment from the reality, or, in other words – as it can be interpreted – the possibility to negate the world (on cognitive theory of negation see Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996). Turner calls this ability plucking forbidden fruit. (Turner 2002, cf. Gärdenfors 2000). Besides to all the stories of the world, we can always present an alternative story coming from daydreaming, memory or imagination. During this process we can blend different stories. In our view, a model of such a blended reality we can easily find in empathy. In a classical situation of perspective taking we have two perspectives involved: the present one and the simulated one, the perspective of the Other. (On empathy and current issues tied to it see Płuciennik 2002, Holmqvist and Płuciennik 2002a and 2002b). A similar mechanism we can find in virtual scanning in a hyperbole: one perspective is clearly defining the limits of values, which can be reached through given objects or phenomenon in a given domain. For instance, a book can weigh maximally a few kilos (it is impossible to define the value in other than a fuzzy way, but this value is an important component of the meaning). The other perspective commands us to believe that the book

weighs tons. As a result, our scanning in the scale of weights theoretically breaks the impassable barrier of the expected "some kilos" and runs away with terrific speed which causes a vehement emotional reaction. From a different perspective of the speaker, it can be the result of the emotional reaction. We can find a similar hyperbolised reaction in gradation (cf. Holmqvist and Płuciennik 2002b and the next chapter). We would like to refer here to the short poem *Rozmowa* (1825) by a romantic Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, who wrote:

> And I want to speak to you with a heartbeat
> And with sighs, and with kisses
> And to keep such talking for hours, for days, and for years
> Until Doomsday, and a day after.

The scale of values in the domain of time is passed due to the impetus of the gradated mental jumps: *hours*, *days*, and *years*. This scanning has been done still in a time-scale. However, the poetic exaltation of the speaking subject compels us to transgress all the boundaries. In that way, the scanning in a scale becomes a transgressive mental action, that is to say: it becomes a virtual scanning. Here we are reaching here the limits of the human imagination. In spite of this, we still comprehend the other perspective. The boundaries of imagination are the limits of those phenomena, which can be repeatable, and the other phenomena, the unrepeatable and the new. The scanning in a value-domain, as it is a mental transgression, causes a vehement emotional reaction. This can be a confirmation of cognitive theories of emotion, which clam that there are cognitive elements in all emotional reactions. The aesthetic emotions are not different in this respect. (On a cognitive overview of emotions, cf Nussbaum 2001, however, it is not a point of view coming necessary from cognitive science)

Our claim is that the whole process of the virtual scanning would be impossible if a schema of imaginative unboundedness did not exist. This unboundedness displayed in virtual scanning, in the simulated world of hyperbole is strictly tied to the features of the subject. In other words, the human subject has "formless form". It is meaningful that Immanuel Kant, when defining the sublime, used the metaphor of abyss. The sublime according to Kant is an abyss for our imagination. But the abyss is in us. It depends on philosophical interpretations, where the schema of unboundedness come from. We wish to stop our investigation of the philosophical issue at this point.

Hyperbole, in the light of cognitive concepts such as Langackerian virtual scanning or Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual spaces, emerges as

not merely one of the rhetorical figures but as a trace of a wider mental mechanism, which cannot be confined to "pure linguistic mechanisms", as it was defined in Chomskyan linguistics. In this respect, hyperbole in those constructions, which we call Kantian, would relate to conceptual metaphors and metonymy. Indeed, hyperbole is closer to metonymy because mental operations involved in it relate to one semantic domain, only the values on scales change. (On metonymy, a lot of people wrote in cognitive semantics, and a recent overview can be found in Barcelona 2002.) In metaphors, we have a projection of the quality from one semantic domain to another one. Hyperbole is a mental operation in a framework of one object; it operates on its values, it does not cause us to put different objects in one mental space. But hyperbole relates also to at least two elements – two scales: an expected one and the experienced. Hyperbole, like conceptual metaphor and metonymy, is a mental phenomenon, and secondary, a linguistic one. It represents, on the one hand, mental movements, which are the product of an attempt to evaluate reality, and on the other, it is a sign of the unlimited and dynamic human imagination. The human subjectivity and, particularly, human imagination, seem to be much more capable than reality and all the scales and concepts. We have in ourselves the ability to simulate a reality which could be a continuation of the familiar world ("hours, days, and years"), however, it is the reality merely thought of, and if it is experienced, it is subjective. Due to the wonders of language, we can empathize with seemingly impossible viewpoints. In this context, literature would be especially essential for understanding this phenomenon. In literature, conceptualisation of the mathematical sublime might suggest the aesthetical sublime. But in other contexts, it can represent irritation ("I have waited for years!!!") or boredom ("They talk, and talk, and talk and nothing more..." "This is endless talking") and other emotions. In literature, hyperbole, due to described mechanism, can represent irony.

In our view, it is possible to apply our model of analysis of the Kantian adjectives to the less obvious hyperbolas. In Polish, we can for instance "*pękać ze śmiechu*", "burst with laughter" "split one's sides with laughter" (see Okopień-Sławińska 1998). We think that analysis with virtual scanning on scales could be helpful in such cases. In this instance, we have to take for granted the existence of a fuzzy scale of possible body reactions framed in a long-lasting laughter. For instance, it could be 1) tickle 2) occasional pains 3) a sharp stomach pain 4).... in the frame of this scale we would have to put the "pękać ze śmiechu" reaction on the outermost point. We do not need to be afraid of the fuzziness of the scales, because the way we think is far from the ideal structures of different kinds of formalisms.

(See Fauconnier and Turner 2002 and Lakoff on fuzzy sets 1987). It does not cause us to postulate a resignation from a logical culture in the scientific discourse.

So, the analysis provided for all prototypical examples such as Kantian constructions, might help to elucidate mechanisms involved in all hyperbolas. The pragmatic terms are not necessary, neither are conversational maxims. Instead of that, we have to remember about mental rules, such as "keep the human scale" and social framing of the human conceptualization.

Notes

[3] Among cognitive-science-inspired scholars, Reuven Tsur uses a notion of the sublime. (1992)

CHAPTER THREE

"MANY, MANY", ACCUMULATION AND A MODEL OF MIND

In our paper, we present a new interpretation of the rhetorical figure of accumulatio. We analyse and interpret many instances of the figure from poetry and prose. We supplement a model of semantics in which we are able to describe the holistic work of our mind in the experience of the sublime. According to the holistic view of the mind, cognition, emotion and language act together. We ponder on the question why accumulatio very often turns into gradatio. In order to answer this question we use our term mimesis of emotions introduced in the first chapter of our book. In our interpretation, accumulatio can be compared to the main rhetorical device present either in Indian mantras or ecstatic music. The reason lies in the spatial structure of our imagination.

1. Instances of "many, many"

It is necessary to use here only some of the most representative examples from our collection.

(1) [*] Collin POWELL: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Foreign Minister Vedrine and I had a very, very useful meeting, which we continued through lunch. We met when I was in Brussels last month, but this was our first opportunity to really get acquainted and discuss the issues in some depth. The foreign minister shared with me his valuable insights on many issues that are important to our two nations. Let me say that I appreciated the opportunity to talk so openly with him and so candidly, and we look forward to many, many more such meetings in the future.

(2) Monsieur Vigo took the money, and was all his life many, many thousand dollars the poorer.

(3) And the opera men: Bettini, Badiali, Marini, Mario, Brignoli, Amodio, Beneventano, and many, many others whose names I do not at this moment recall.

(4) The woman did not even lift her head, but answered at once, readily, as though she had expected the question for a long time. "While you were asleep under the tree, before the strange canoe came, she went out of the house. I saw her look at you and pass on with a great light in her eyes. A great light. And she went towards the place where our master Lakamba had his fruit trees. When we were many here. Many, many. Men with arms by their side. Many . . . men. And talk . . .and songs . . . "

(5) many, many, many examples (from a presentation at the conference in St. Catharines, Canada)

Similar constructions:

(6) Japan's Ministry of Trade occupies a 17-story granite tower in the heart of Tokyo's political district. The building looks as sturdy as ever. The bureaucrats inside are still recording trade surpluses with the rest of the world, month after month after month.

(7) President Bush: "I don't like to sit around in meetings for hours and hours and hours," he told TIME during the campaign.

(8) The expansion, the expansion of NATO has fulfilled NATO's promise, and that promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward. (a speech by President Bush on June the 15th at the Warsaw University Library in Poland, as recorded by The New York Times)

2. Figure

"Many, many". It must be a figure. It is not an idiomatic expression because, as in (5), we can also find "many, many, many". So, there must be a semantic mechanism, which underlies this construction. But what kind of figure can we refer to? The similar device can be found in a case of amplification and gradation much discussed in a connection with the sublime. The figure of accumulation is a kind of amplification, which by Kenneth Burke is called the most thoroughgoing of all rhetorical devices.

> It seems to cover a wide range of meanings, since one can amplify by extension, by intensification, and by dignification. […] But as extension, expatiation, the saying of something in various ways until it increases in persuasiveness by the sheer accumulation, amplification can come to name

> a purely poetic process of development, such systematic exploitation of a theme as we find in lyrics built about a refrain. (Burke 1969: 69)

It can be argued that the power of amplification results from the fact that it denies the basic rule of linguistic relevance (as understood in Sperber and Wilson 1986, however we do not share with them a propositional approach). Repetition, the main means of amplification, is a sign that the speaking subject has no adequate instrumentality of representation. But the mere fact that, in spite of the difficulties, the subject continues the act of communication is a proof for the audience that he/she has something to say, something transcending the applied linguistic signs. The extreme example of such a mechanism is apparent in *glossollalia* and all poetic experiments with imitating it. (Pluciennik 1999) The other good example we can find also in Indian mantras[4]. The most typical passage here we can find in (4).

Traditionally such a figure can be regarded as a means of emotional expression. We would, however, like to call it a mimetic representation. The metaphoric basis of the term "expression" gives us a strange view according to which some substance is ex-pressed from a container (emotions from a human being). Imagine an actor on stage, who represents the ecstasy of love. He can be calm. There is no substance he could ex-press. But there is a representation of ecstasy on the stage and in the minds of the audience. We would not like to deny, however, a phenomenon called expressiveness of language. We would roughly say that talking about expression nowadays to us seems similar to talking about "phlogiston" in the past. ("In early chemical theory, hypothetical principle of fire, of which every combustible substance was in part composed".) It is folk imagery. If we understand emotions in language (so called "expressions") they have to have representational nature. Otherwise it would be impossible to communicate emotions, deceive others that we have them and so on.

So, how can we account for the many, many examples of amplification in order to describe its semantic mechanism?

- The second element in "many, many" is not the same element as the first one. But it seems the same.
- It also is not a regular emphasis by which we can stress appropriateness and relevance of a chosen word.
- In all the instances of "many" there is an expected scale of value involved. This scale is in the case of "many, many" transcended, the relevant value is much more than expected "many".
- This transcendence of the default scale evokes the mathematical sublime, using Kant's term and concept. The subject is overwhelmed

perceptually, imaginatively or emotionally (Kant 1952; Crowther 1989; Płuciennik 2000; Holmqvist and Płuciennik) and, at the same time, re-vitalised.

- We cannot talk here on a regular communication understood as a neutral exchange of messages. Instead, we have a form of experience, to repeat.
- The similar semantic device can be found in gradation where there is also a repetition, but the repeated element is a close synonym or a lexical element referring to an object placed higher or lower in a certain semantic domain.
- In gradation we can observe an emotional acceleration better than in "many, many".

Generally speaking, accumulation is a negative presentation in the Kantian sense because it does violence to imagination. (Kant 1952) Accumulation is a semantic device, but the nature of it is quite complex, because in many cases accumulation turns into gradation. Gradation is an emotional phenomenon. Simply speaking, when we accumulate phenomena, the next phenomenon in a series can have a much higher emotional value. And the suggestion arises that we can reach an infinite emotional peak. This is the case of ecstasy, which is in the core of the experience of the sublime. This experience, in our view, depends heavily on the spatial structure of our imagination but we will address this issue later. Accumulation and gradation help to transcend the boundaries of our imagination because of the suggestion of the infinite, a monotonous movement from a grade to a next grade.

The figure of gradation, rarely discussed nowadays, is a kind of accumulation and amplification. It is acknowledged that amplification is a key figure. It is not an accident that the most typical and advanced forms of amplification and gradation can be found in Romantic poetry. We already referred to one poem by the Polish Romantic prophet Adam Mickiewicz. The next of his works we would like to refer to is called "To Spin Love". In the first stanza, Mickiewicz accumulates images of centrifugal move: spinning love is similar to spinning spider web, to water from spring, to wind blowing in the sky etc. (This is comparable to our example 8.) In the second stanza, we can find an incantation where rhythmic structure induces power in the audience as in Platonic magnetic rings from *Ion*.

First, your might will be as the might of nature,
Then, your might will be as the might of elements,
And then, your might will be as the might of spreading,

And then, as the might of humans, and then as the might of angels,
Finally, your might will be as the might of the God, the Creator.

We found another good example of accumulation in a poem by Bolesław Leśmian ("Topielec") where a demon of nature decoys a man, then allures him, then charms him and seduces him. From the "pure semantic" point of view, we are here dealing with synonyms and, actually, the repetition of these synonyms is redundant as far as communication is concerned. Let us call it a "Cartesian semantics". This semantics sees communication as an exchange of messages. No images, no emotions.

Gradation is a semantic phenomenon which seems to be easy to understand and even obvious. But on closer scrutiny, its nature becomes much more complicated. In the poem "To Spin Love", an elaborated gradation consists of sex elements, which are on the scale of the Great Chain of Beings. (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 160) To add a successive element is to move from a grade to the next grade on the scale. This move, somehow mysteriously, evokes emotions.

The spatial domain is the basic and main domain in the reference of all gradation. Sometimes it is combined with other domains. In Zbigniew Herbert's poem "Trzcina" we can read:

Give us death
up to shoulders
up to mouths
up to brows
not higher

Here the spatial domain is combined with the domain of the human body.

In the other case there is a secondary domain of time combined with the domain of cultural conceptualisation of human life. (*Pan Cogito a poeta w pewnym wieku*)

An old, to some degree, poet
remembers warm childhood
exuberant youth
not glorious manhood

Besides those typical examples of gradation, in poetry it is not always a mechanism that is so easy to understand. It often occurs that abstract elements belong to various different domains. And we have only a slight suggestion of emotional gradation. Generally speaking, all accumulation has the tendency to turn into gradation. But it is impossible when we have

got accumulation that consists of elements from the same semantic domain and the objects do not differ either in size or in other respects. For example, when we accumulate names of natural kinds of trees accumulation cannot turn into gradation unless we start to enumerate more than is expected in a given context. Merely three names of trees, for instance, do not form gradation.

Accumulation that turns into gradation is in a way smilar to hyperbole. A hyperbole, as it has been presented in the previous chapter of this book, is always to suggest violation to some numerical scale. For example, when we say "This bag weighs a ton" (Enos 1996) we suggest that the audience should choose the most remote point on the scale of bag weight. In the case of such adjectives as endless, unbounded and infinite etc. we can always say that they are infallible hyperbolas: in the phenomenal world all things have ends and are bounded and finite (see the previous chapter). But in situations of stress, high cognitive load, high gravitational forces, tiredness and with increasing age, the size of the visual field decreases in a way similar to tunnel vision (Williams 1986). When attentive resources are scarce, foveal perception is emphasised, and less information can be perceived in the periphery. Boundaries located in the periphery are therefore lost under the cognitive load. Foveally perceived objects will appear endless, boundless, and unlimited, since they fill up the entire attentional scope.

How does it work that we have the impression of infinity here? The answer can partially be found in the ancient reflection on poetry. We would like to call the described phenomenon: a mimesis of emotions. (See chapter 1)

Absolutely crucial for the mechanism in question is a notion of identification or empathy. The empathy makes a resonance possible: when we see some symptoms of emotions, linguistic effects of being moved, we can repeat the emotions in ourselves. What we have here is a repetition, which is another name for imitation. The repetition is not a strict identity. (Sperber 1990; Sperber 1996) It should be emphasised that we do not have to empathise consciously, as in the case of sympathy. (Walton 2002; Barnes and Thagard 1997)

Pseudo–Longinos describes the psychology of the sublime and refers to the experience of special pride when "we are proud as if we had ourselves created what we heard". (Chap. 7) The true sublime is contagious and can be communicated together with an associated feeling of being creative. The sublime repeated in the hearer's soul does not loose a property of originality and novelty. That is why the sentence ''You are

an infinite ocean" from *Astavakrasamhita* (we cite this following Mishra 1998: 27) can be regarded as an essence of the theory of the sublime.

It should also be added that empathy was used the first time (by a translator of Lipps) to refer to identification with objects of nature, not with human beings. It is not identical with sympathy. Kenneth Burke wrote about identification with rhetoric, linguistic form when discussing *climax*, gradation. Mark Turner, following Burke, comments on it when discussing iconicity. (Turner 1998: 51) He treats it as a tool of persuasion. He says that cooperation with the image schema of the iconic form disposes us to yield to its meaning. What does "cooperation" mean? It is another name for formal empathy.

If it is true that emotions always arise in connection with some goals, then we are forced to assume that all numbers have an associated semantic expectation of unboundedness. But there is also a semantic expectation in a semantic domain to which a number is applied (for instance, a handbag has some kilos as a possible default value in the domain of weight). Those two expectations could explain why, when we add the second element as in "many, many" or the third as in "many, many, many", we actually find a value radically different from the normal use of "many" and not, for instance, doubled value. Moreover, in spite of a certain universal ability of many phenomena to being gradual, in some cases we are not able to apply gradation.

3. Mental apparatus

What kind of mental apparatus can handle such semantic phenomena as "many, many" and gradation? We would like to propose that is must have the following features.

- Spatiality. Our perceptual apparatus is modelled on spatial relations. This is particularly clear in 2)
- Boundedness. Delimitation of an object is delimitation of the apparatus.
- Inertia. Without stimuli in input there is inertia in the apparatus, the apparatus likes constancy.
- Dynamics and Empathy. The apparatus is expanding itself when moved by perceptual and imaginative stimulus. Empathy can apply to objects and abstract forms. The expanding is not physical.
- Acceleration. Subsequent elements in a series do not sum up. MORE is UP in an emotional domain and the accumulation is not mathematical. But there must be also an arbitrary pick of accumulation.

- Indefiniteness. In a state of constancy the apparatus is indefinite regarding "size"
- Inattentional blindness. The apparatus is absorbed by stimuli, and when absorbed, blind to stimuli outside the fuzzy boundaries of the attentional scope.

We should emphasise in the final word that the model of semantics presented here is a model of the holistic work of mind. It has nothing to do with a "Cartesian semantics", which treats language as a mere source of information because it separates mind and body, mind and image, intellect and emotions, language (logos) and emotions (pathos).

Notes

[4] We would like to thank Robert A. Yelle for his opinion expressed in a discussion in Calcutta in August 2000.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRINCESS ANTONOMASIA, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE QUIXOTISM OF CULTURE: A CASE OF *TRISTRAM SHANDY* BY LAURENCE STERNE

1. Introduction

This chapter is an essay of literary theory and of cognitive semantics about the relationship between antonomasia, metonymy and literature. All these phenomena are connected, in our opinion, by motives of individualism and empiricism. These motives, from a historical point of view, appeared in the history of ideas, in 18th century Western Europe. This connection may be proved by describing for instance the literary theory of Shaftesbury, the hymns of Isaac Watts or the theology and aesthetics of Jonathan Edwards: all were inspired by the empiricism by John Locke and all very powerfully represent individualism. This is our main focus in one of our books (Płuciennik 2006). In all these theories empiricism's inspiration was observable in highlighting the role of individual and personal experience in achieving moral autonomy or the role of personal experience in the religious experience. Shaftesbury, Watts and Edwards are engaged in a discussion lasting many, many decades that was on enthusiasm, which is very much connected with the sublime in language. In poetics this problem is strictly tied to the problems of inspiration from ancient times and the Renaissance. The motive of enthusiasm makes the association of Locke with the just mentioned authors stronger. Locke used particular literary similes in order to mark enthusiasm negatively, to present it as related to madness and tyranny. (Motooka 1998: 41) Wendy Motooka clearly shows that Locke was not isolated in the practice of blaming many different political and ideological opponents by ascribing Quixotism to them. The theme of Quixotism was also very popular in the 18th century and, at the same time; it was a leading

motive of individualism. In this book we would like to analyze the relationship between antonomasia (a kind of metonymy), empiricism and the literature of individualism by interpreting the philosophical novel by Rev. Laurence Sterne *Tristram Shandy*. This novel is philosophical and meta-theoretical, and, at the same time, it is very modern and literary. *Don Quixote* by Cervantes remains in the background of our interpretation.

2. Metonymy and antonomasia in *Tristram Shandy* by Sterne

First, we would like to substantiate the thesis about relation between individualism and metonymy. We cannot be surprised when finding metonymy in *Tristram Shandy* by Sterne: metonymy is everywhere. But this presence of metonymy and antonomasia in this particular novel is something more than the omnipresence of metonymy as a phenomenon associated with processes of inferring and creating text[5]. In order to show the importance of metonymy for Sterne's novel we must reach its crucial scene of conception, namely the scene of conception of the main character and narrator:

> It was attended but with one misfortune, which, in a great measure, fell upon myself, and the effects of which I fear I shall carry with me to my grave; namely, that from an unhappy association of ideas, which have no connection in nature, it so fell out at length, that my poor mother could never hear the said clock wound up, -- but the thoughts of some other things unavoidably popped into her head -- & vice versa: -- Which strange combination of ideas, the sagacious Locke, who certainly understood the nature of these things better than most men, affirms to have produced more wry actions than all other sources of prejudice whatsoever (Sterne, 1.IV).

Subjective association of ideas in this episode is responsible for particular behaviour of the characters in the scene: individual and idiosyncratic association of the sound of wounding up a clock with sexual behaviours of the married couple is responsible for formation of a particular communicative convention which has a physiological power over a female character. If we agree with 18th century rhetoricians claiming that metonymy is a result of the association of ideas coming from conventional usage, in the life of Shandys couple wounding up a clock might be regarded as announcement of particular sexual behaviours. This is a communicative convention by metonymy. Therefore, we may properly say that Tristram Shandy as a child is a result or a victim of metonymy.

Such a view might be confirmed by a point of view of the narrator of the novel in *My Father's Lamentation*:

> Unhappy Tristram! child of wrath! child of decrepitude! interruption! mistake! and discontent! (Sterne, 2.LIV)

If we agree with Walter Shandy that Tristram is a victim of interruption, child of wrath, discontent and a mistake we can also say that Tristram is a child of subjective and individual metonymy. The conception of Tristram would be unsuccessful if Walter had not forgotten to wind up the clock as usually and if his wife had not interrupted his sexual behaviour by her surprise: this surprise caused wrath in Walter's mind. By the way, this example of metonymy is an interesting confirmation of the thesis that metonymy can often be used as an allusion, especially as an obscene one.

It is worthy to evoke in such ambivalent context the name of John Locke and his theory of empiricism. This problem has already been raised in Sterne studies: usually, many people dealing with *Tristram Shandy* have emphasized analogies between Locke's theory and this novel. Sterne himself seems to point out the importance of such analogies when writing:

> Pray, Sir, in all the reading which you have ever read, did you ever read such a book as Locke's Essay upon the Human Understanding?—Don't answer me rashly—because many, I know, quote the book, who have not read it—and many have read it who understand it not:—If either of these is your case, as I write to instruct, I will tell you in three words what the book is.—It is a history.—A history! Of who? What? Where? When? Don't hurry yourself—It is a history-book, Sir, (which may possibly recommend it to the world) of what passes in a man's own mind; and if you will say so much of the book, and no more, believe me, you will cut no contemptible figure in a metaphysic circle.
> But this by the way. (Sterne, 1.XXVII)

In the long history of interpreting *Tristram Shandy* such hypothesis were raised: that Sterne's book should be treated as Locke's *Essay*, as a historical treatise about what happens in the human mind. This novel would be a treatise also in respect to ideological significance: the novel would be empirical too. Such comparison, of course, should be treated with due criticism; in the mouth of the narrator, this analogy sounds like teasing. Sterne was not a philosopher and he wrote, above all, to please his readers. But complexity of his literary creativity and of the literary form of his novel seem to point out the recursive motive of his writing, which is also present in *Essay* by Locke: this is a theme of human madness. This

motive would additionally strengthen all possible analogies between philosophical and literary empiricism.

> In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme: for they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. (Locke, II, XI, §13)

In this context, it is interesting to refer to the main characters of Sterne's novel: indeed, Walter Shandy for instance, is not an idiot, for sure, he does not lose his power to reason, he argues very properly "from wrong principles". His two hobbyhorses however, NOSES and NAMES, must be treated as thematic obsessions concentrating his madness.

> Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance, respect and obedience; others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass that a man, who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly: the disorderly jumbling ideas together, is in some more, some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all. (Locke, II, XI, §13)

Madness is defined as an erroneous association of ideas based on coincidence or a custom. (Locke, II, XXXIII, § 1-19)

Walter Shandy is characterized as a man who used to build his own amateur philosophy. He is even dubbed a philosopher and he has got his own philosophical system that is ironically compared to the Copernican system. However, there are some traces in the text that suggest that Walter associates ideas in a mad way:

> 'Certainly,' he would say to himself, over and over again, 'the woman could not be deceived herself—if she could,—what weakness!'—tormenting word!—which led his imagination a thorny dance, and, before all was over, play'd the duce and all with him;—for sure as ever the word weakness was

> uttered, and struck full upon his brain—so sure it set him upon running divisions upon how many kinds of weaknesses there were;—that there was such a thing as weakness of the body,—as well as weakness of the mind,—and then he would do nothing but syllogize within himself for a stage or two together, How far the cause of all these vexations might, or might not, have arisen out of himself.(Sterne, 1.XVI)

This passage can be seen as a glorious illustration of the mental move of associations, which might lead imagination astray and cause confusion to a pondering mind of a character. Here, the move of associations is not controlled by metonymies but by categorical similarity: one type of weakness evokes other types, but the associative area is focused around a common folk category of "weakness". Mad associations, according to Locke, are very often context-independent and very fluently processed: and it applies to either metonymical or metaphorical associations. Locke writes even about clearing a way by ideas and their connections in the brain and he likens all these processes to a musician who recalls the beginning of melody and, then, the whole melody without any hindrance (Sterne, 1. XXXVI).

If we agree on such a characterization of the mad way of associating ideas, Walter Shandy is then not the only hero of Sterne's novel, whose way of functioning in his world is mad. It is very visible well in the case of uncle Toby and his hobby-horse:

> When a man gives himself up to the government of a ruling passion,—or, in other words, when his Hobby-Horse grows headstrong,—farewell cool reason and fair discretion! (Sterne, 1.XXX)

A "Hobby-horse" is a children's toy, which might here function here as a metonymy representing mental control ruled by a particular passion. This individual passion is to blame for all communicative interferences between people, making communication a pathetic exchange of disassociated sentences, because association of ideas which is dominating in such a communication is an interiorized one and without any natural discursive context. It is such a case as in the scene, when uncle Toby is listening to Walter Shandy's lecture on noses and he hears "siege", which causes a chain of associations in his mind, as melody.

> Now it happened then, as indeed it had often done before, that my uncle Toby's fancy, during the time of my father's explanation of Prignitz to him—having nothing to stay it there, had taken a short flight to the bowling-green;—his body might as well have taken a turn there too—so that with all the semblance of a deep school-man intent upon the medius

> terminus—my uncle Toby was in fact as ignorant of the whole lecture, and all its pros and cons, as if my father had been translating Hafen Slawkenbergius from the Latin tongue into the Cherokee. But the word siege, like a talismanic power, in my father's metaphor, wafting back my uncle Toby's fancy, quick as a note could follow the touch—he open'd his ears—and my father observing that he took his pipe out of his mouth, and shuffled his chair nearer the table, as with a desire to profit—my father with great pleasure began his sentence again—changing only the plan, and dropping the metaphor of the siege of it, to keep clear of some dangers my father apprehended from it. (Sterne, 2.XXXIV)

It is worthy to notice that this "melody" rules either the process of speech perception or its comprehension and it is not an effect of just one element: the impossibility of communication between people is a result of filtration of perceived phenomena by the „hobby-horse". Subjectivity is here projected on a linguistic context and altered arbitrarily according to the rule obligatory in the space of a given "hobby-horse". Of course, such a way of linguistic relationship with others is not merely characteristic of uncle Toby, other figures of the novel behave similarly, but the narrator focuses his attention just on him. "Hobby-horse" as a dominating thematic passion (or enthusiasm) displays directly, in Sterne's narration, its metonymic nature in a human being: contact dominates over similarity and analogy:

> A man and his Hobby-Horse, tho' I cannot say that they act and re-act exactly after the same manner in which the soul and body do upon each other: Yet doubtless there is a communication between them of some kind; and my opinion rather is, that there is something in it more of the manner of electrified bodies, -- and that, by means of the heated parts of the rider, which come immediately into contact with the back of the Hobby-Horse,—by long journies and much friction, it so happens, that the body of the rider is at length fill'd as full of Hobby-Horsical matter as it can hold;—so that if you are able to give but a clear description of the nature of the one, you may form a pretty exact notion of the genius and character of the other. (Sterne, 1.XXIV)

This contact in the cited passage is a real bond likened to a physical tie of electrified bodies. We might infer that thematic tangency makes changes in physical states of a body. At the same time, Sterne apparently tries to avoid saying that "hobby-horse" is the "soul of the body" but it is an apparent suggestion of the text in this fragment. "Hobby-horse" is – as a soul – ruling the body, it is dominating it and pervading IT through and through by the smallest degree of contact in space and time. "Hobby-horse" is the enthusiasm of the body.

Even if we first learn all the concept of „hobby-horse" in Sterne's novel through uncle Toby's „hobby-horse of a siege", the most interesting "hobby-horse" in this novel is Walter Shandy's "hobby-horse". It is he, who is characterized as a philosopher having his own philosophical system and this system is a theoretical conception related to christening and communication between people. It is this system which makes most opportunities to characterize the concepts of antonomasia and metonymy according to Sterne's novel:

> His opinion, in this matter, was, That there was a strange kind of magick bias, which good or bad names, as he called them, irresistibly impressed upon our characters and conduct.
> The hero of Cervantes argued not the point with more seriousness,—nor had he more faith,—or more to say on the powers of necromancy in dishonouring his deeds,—or on Dulcinea's name, in shedding lustre upon them, than my father had on those of Trismegistus or Archimedes, on the one hand—or of Nyky and Simkin on the other. How many Caesars and Pompeys, he would say, by mere inspiration of the names, have been rendered worthy of them? And how many, he would add, are there, who might have done exceeding well in the world, had not their characters and spirits been totally depressed and Nicodemus'd into nothing? (Sterne, 1.XIX)

Walter's cult of particular names and contempt for other names is the result, it seems, of several factors: on the one hand, it might be sound symbolism, on the other hand, mechanisms associated with antonomasia may play a huge role. Trismegistos who is so important to Walter is certainly not associated with sound symbolism; instead it is substantial for Walter that he was "the greatest king, the greatest lawgiver, the greatest philosopher, the greatest priest and engineer". Beside this, Sterne uses other antonomasia, relating on the one hand to *Don Quixote* by Cervantes (Don Quixote, Rosinante, Dulcinea) and, on the other hand, to *Hamlet* by Shakespeare (Yorick). Problems associated with the figure of antonomasia are undoubtedly strictly tied to the problems of figurative language and madness of association of ideas. According to Walter, there are some neutral names (Sterne, 1.XIX); opinions about Christian names build something similar to the anthroponymic philosophical system.

> —My father, as I told you was a philosopher in grain,—speculative, systematical;—and my aunt Dinah's affair was a matter of as much consequence to him, as the retrogradation of the planets to Copernicus:—The backslidings of Venus in her orbit fortified the Copernican system, called so after his name; and the backslidings of my aunt Dinah in her orbit, did the same service in establishing my father's system, which, I

> trust, will for ever hereafter be called the Shandean System, after his. (Sterne, 1.XXI)

The anthroponymic philosophical system by Walter Shandy is quite systematic in his son's opinion and this is significant. Though there are some suggestions here that some pagan cult of names, comparable to the astrological system of beliefs, might be important too, it seems to me that in the context of the whole novel, Sterne, ascribed to it major role. Walter uses other rhetorical figures too, though he is not an educated man. Walter Shandy is eloquent in spite of his lack of education, which may suggest that it is possible to fluently use some tools (for instance, figures) without awareness of their professional names. (Sterne, 1.XIX) It is worthy to notice that for Locke the employment of figures was a symptom of madness: simile and imaginative speech are defined as abuse and error that should be avoided. (Locke, III, IV). Sterne seems to say that it is unavoidable to use figures in human communication. Walter Shandy has the tendency to talk figuratively, he uses hyperbole, for instance, and it is this trait of character that is noticeable from the point of view of the narrator.

> He was very sensible that all political writers upon the subject had unanimously agreed and lamented, from the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign down to his own time, that the current of men and money towards the metropolis, upon one frivolous errand or another,—set in so strong,—as to become dangerous to our civil rights,—though, by the bye,—a current was not the image he took most delight in,—a distemper was here his favourite metaphor, and he would run it down into a perfect allegory, by maintaining it was identically the same in the body national as in the body natural, where the blood and spirits were driven up into the head faster than they could find their ways down;—a stoppage of circulation must ensue, which was death in both cases. (Sterne, 1.XVIII)

The building of the allegory in itself is in this passage treated as an exaggerated act. Moreover, the allegory is based on hyperbolic imagery: the death of state must have had the meaning of an apocalyptic catastrophe, which could be a motivated image in a political argument, still it is a hyperbole anyway.

What is most characteristic, however, for the anthroponomical system of Walter, is its relation to his second "hobby-horse", namely, noses. Our hero denies the opinion that the length of a nose is accidental and random, dependent on God's will. It is similar to the fate of a human being, which is not dependent on God's will, but on antonomastic power of a given

name. A good antonomasia is able to amend all harms done by evil power or bad luck.

> Now, my dear brother, said my father, replacing his fore-finger, as he was coming closer to the point—had my child arrived safe into the world, unmartyr'd in that precious part of him—fanciful and extravagant as I may appear to the world in my opinion of Christian names, and of that magic bias which good or bad names irresistibly impress upon our characters and conducts—Heaven is witness! That in the warmest transports of my wishes for the prosperity of my child, I never once wished to crown his head with more glory and honour than what George or Edward would have spread around it.
> But alas! Continued my father, as the greatest evil has befallen him—I must counteract and undo it with the greatest good.
> He shall be christened Trismegistus, brother. (Sterne, 2.XLIII)

Trismegistus is a good name not merely because Hermes Trismegistos was the greatest king, priest etc., and that he is a patron saint of written word and exoteric knowledge, but also because this name is a double antonomasia. It is a metaphoric antonomasia since human being has to remind us a character and fate of the first bearer of the name. It is also a metonymic antonomasia (see following paragraphs) because the name is meaningful: Trismegistos like Zeus "the Thunderer" is a transparent name for those who know Greek: "triple great" is a meaningful name in the context of a flat nose and a cult of great noses. It is meaningful since it is compensation and a comic element:

> We shall bring all things to rights, said my father, setting his foot upon the first step from the landing.—This Trismegistus, continued my father, drawing his leg back and turning to my uncle Toby—was the greatest (Toby)of all earthly beings—he was the greatest king—the greatest lawgiver—the greatest philosopher—and the greatest priest—and engineer—said my uncle Toby.
> —In course, said my father. (Sterne, 2.XLVI)

The compensative function of the name for Tristram is worthy to notice for several reasons, above all, because in Walter's philosophical system rhetorical figures would have an anti-mimetic aspect (see Holmqvist and Płuciennik 2002b). We will return to this problem. This anti-mimetic aspect is however visible merely for the educated, therefore stupid Susannah, not knowing the meaningful essence of the antonomasia and treating the name Trismegistus as nontransparent, generates a catastrophe, causing by accident the christening of Walter's son by the hated name of Tristram.

> Susannah ran with all speed along the gallery.
> My father made all possible speed to find his breeches.
> Susannah got the start, and kept it—'Tis Tris—something, cried Susannah—There is no christian name in the world, said the curate, beginning with Tris—but Tristram. Then 'tis Tristram-gistus, quoth Susannah.
> —There is no gistus to it, noodle!—'tis my own name, replied the curate, dipping his hand, as he spoke, into the bason—Tristram! said he, &c. &c. &c. &c.—so Tristram was I called, and Tristram shall I be to the day of my death. (Sterne, 2.XLIX)

Why it is so important for us to know the etymology of the name according to the philosophical system of Walter Shandy? Why is antonomasia so important? Antonomasia is generally regarded as a minor figure of speech and therefore not treated as a princess among the figures of speech. However, in this chapter, we would like to give antonomasia a different place in the tropical ranks and elevate her to the status of princess, following the advice of Cervantes who wrote a chapter on Princess Antonomasia in his well-known novel *Don Quixote* (Cervantes 1981, vol. 2, chap. 38). We must also follow Walter Shandy who in *Tristram Shandy* makes antonomasia a crucial point in his philosophy of communication. We will try to show that antonomasia might be rhetorically more important than has hitherto been assumed. It might by worthy to ponder a little bit on this problem and to try to understand the decisions of both authors. It seems to us that the literary games of Cervantes and Sterne are not a naïve game. They result in proposing some fundamental questions and decisions. They are also relevant for the problem of communicative individualism.

In many literary and rhetorical dictionaries antonomasia is regarded as a rhetorical figure in some respects similar to metonymy. It is based on the substitution of regular names by proper names and vice versa, as indicated by its etymology: in Greek *anti* means "instead" and *onomazein* means "to name"; in Latin, antonomasia is called *pronominatio*. It is therefore based on two different kinds of semantic mechanisms. One mechanism is involved when we use a regular noun instead of a proper name, e.g. "the Thunderer" instead of "Zeus". This can really explain why antonomasia is regarded as a kind of metonymy. However, the second mechanism is involved when a proper name replaces a regular noun, e.g. "Don Quixote" instead of "an idealist". This mechanism is quite different from metonymical relations. Of course, this kind of antonomasia does not stop to be a metonymy, but there is a chain of elements involved here.

Most definitions of antonomasia are based on the old substitution theory that also pervaded the definitions of metaphors for a long time.

According to this theory there is always a proper meaning of a word and an improper meaning of a word, or, rather in the case of antonomasia, there is always a proper name for a phenomenon and a less proper name for it. Tzvetan Todorov (Todorov 1967) regards antonomasia as an anomaly just like hyperbole, irony, metaphor and metonymy. According to Todorov, we can talk about anomaly in these figures and the semantic mechanism refers to the relationship between a sign and a reference. Why do people use a less proper name for a more proper name? What kind of goals do we have when we use either kind of antonomasia?

In the first kind of antonomasia (antonomasia-1), which is similar also to periphrasis, a proper name is substituted by an epithet. This kind of antonomasia was often used in ancient times, when talking about mythical and epical characters. For instance, Zeus and Achilles were often described by using the epithets "the Thunderer" and "the swift-footed" respectively. This usage of antonomasia can be explained if we take into account the formulaic character of the oral culture (Parry 1971). In every oral culture a bard must have prefabricated material in order to remember particular elements in his stories. Using prefabricated material is a much wider cultural phenomenon, however. It is found in many religions, where different variations of a particular god are presented in a social imagery function. For instance, in Polish Catholicism, "Gromniczna" is a name for one Madonna used for her function as protection from thunders.

So, the main function of antonomasia-1 could be, on the one hand, mnemonistic. Antonomasia-1 could thus be used in order to better remember the subject of a story and the main function of a character in that story. A metonymic relationship is involved here: the property of an individual (see Barcelona 2002) that should define an individual instead describes the main role in a story. It may also work the other way around, as is the case in many religions, where a defining property can create an individual and one god multiplies in many avatars. Attributing a particular property to an individual stabilises both meaning and ontology of that individual.

One can argue that the same metonymic function explains the stabilizing social character of the prefabricated material. The formulas used in artistic performances stabilise social thinking about characters from mythology or religion. It is striking that, when for instance one god has several different names, an antonomastic epithet immobilises also the perspective from which that particular god is viewed. Changing the perspective can cause a further process of idolizing the particular property of an individual.

The idolizing feature of antonomasia-1 is apparent when we think about an example from *Don Quixote* by Cervantes: the main character calls his horse Rosinante. This is a meaningful name: "rocin" means "jade", and "antes" means "before". So Rosinante is a horse in much better condition now than before, and therefore now it is "the first steed in the world". This example of antonomasia-1 is a very interesting case because it can be used as antonomasia-2: a car in Graham Green's novel *Monsignor Quixote* is called just Rosinante. It is not a horse, but the condition of the car is very similar to that of its prototype from *Don Quixote*. A similar phenomenon may be found in Sterne's novel in which the jade of Yorick is called Rosinante and without the etymological meaning it is seen as a realistic jade, as thin as a rake.

> Be it known then, that, for about five years before the date of the midwife's licence, of which you have had so circumstantial an account,—the parson we have to do with had made himself a country-talk by a breach of all decorum, which he had committed against himself, his station, and his office;—and that was in never appearing better, or otherwise mounted, than upon a lean, sorry, jackass of a horse, value about one pound fifteen shillings; who, to shorten all description of him, was full brother to Rosinante, as far as similitude congenial could make him; for he answered his description to a hair-breadth in every thing,—except that I do not remember 'tis any where said, that Rosinante was broken-winded; and that, moreover, Rosinante, as is the happiness of most Spanish horses, fat or lean, -- was undoubtedly a horse at all points.(Sterne, 1.X)

So Rosinante of Yoricks is worse than a prototype.

Antonomasia-1 can also be described when taking into account its relationship to reference. Usually, antonomasia-1 gives us a name that has the same reference as the proper name. If a Duke is called "the most mighty lord", it is his periphrasis and it underlines his one hyperbolised feature, but the referent of this name is the same as using the title Duke or using this person's proper name. It is the same in Sterne's novel, in which instead of Yorick we may find HUMILITY:

> Let that be as it may, as my purpose is to do exact justice to every creature brought upon the stage of this dramatic work,—I could not stifle this distinction in favour of Don Quixote's horse;—in all other points, the parson's horse, I say, was just such another, for he was as lean, and as lank, and as sorry a jade, as Humility herself could have bestrided. (Sterne, 1.X)

In antonomasia-2 we find a different mechanism. Now we use a proper name in order to describe a very different kind of reference. The reason for

this is that antonomasia-2 exhibits analogical features that are common in both the paragon and in the instance of the type.

In a chapter on Idealised Cognitive Models (1987: 87-88) antonomasia-2 was described by Lakoff as paragons (together with social stereotypes, typical examples, ideals and generators): "we also comprehend categories in terms of individual members who represent either an ideal or its opposite." As a kind of metonymic semantic mechanism, antonomasia-2 (or paragons?) is mentioned in Barcelona (2002). Paragons have a very important role in society: they mark an area of ambition and imitation (cf. Girard 1965). In an antonomasia-2 such as "Don Quixote", we can observe a mechanism common in all antonomasias-2: namely, their "quixotism". It is striking that we can say that Madame Bovary is a quixote of the 19th century, or a female quixote. What is common to both these literary characters is their fascination with culture and their being very fond of imitating paragons.

3. Quixotism of culture[6]

Imitating paragons is based on the process of cultic identification. In ancient times, objects of identification were usually cultic or ritual. H. R. Jauss writes about cultic identification in literature (Jauss 1965, cf. also the chapter on imitation in *Don Quixote*: Melberg 1992). It is very apparent that in many different historical epochs this cultic identification plays an important role in popular culture. Superman and characters in computer games as well as various religious heroes provide good examples. Imitation and identification make use of human mimetic skills in order to disseminate cultural representations. The result is repetition, which is merely another name for imitation (cf. Melberg 1992). The repetition is not a strict identity.

> What human communication achieves in general is merely some degree of resemblance between the communicator's and the audience's thoughts. Strict replication, if it exists at all, should be viewed as just a limiting case of maximal resemblance, rather than as the norm of communication… A process of communication is basically one of transformation. The degree of transformation may vary between two extremes: duplication and total loss of information. Only those representations that are repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the process will end up belonging to the culture (Sperber 1996: 83).

The process of communication identified in Sperber and Wilson (1986) can be compared with the process of "becoming infected". The infection

process corresponds to anthropology as outlined in Sperber (1996), where culture depends on the epidemic spread of representations. In this spreading process, mimesis, the basic human instinct to imitate, plays the crucial role. In the individualistic communication the spreading is limited and distorted as it is usually in Don Quixote's head.

Don Quixote and Madame Bovary are the best examples of fictional characters that are infected by books and literary imaginative worlds. Joseph Conrad once said that Don Quixote's name builds an allusion to the book-born madness of the knight (Conrad 1919: 186). The personal identity of both characters is based on fiction. This is a part of the entire process of enculturation.

Culture, according to Stephen Turner, one of the proponents of the simulation theory, is not inherited or innate, but gained in experience. Culture is a set of symbolic roles and ritualised actions. Games of make-believe form a part of enculturation by taking attitudes of others that refer to stereotyped roles and symbols. (Turner 2000: 112). Culture nowadays does not only consist of literature, however. In addition to the very literary antonomasias-2, such as bovarism and quixotism, we therefore find a comparison with paragons from another sphere of culture: "Lyotard is a pope of postmodernism" (Płuciennik 2000: 133), "Bush is no Demosthenes" (Enos 1996: 445); and we can buy "the Cadillac of vacuum cleaners" (Lakoff 1987: 87).

Antonomasia-2 is the product of the imitative nature of human beings. We simply do need paragons and prototypes. It is possible that they are a means for us to identify with something more sublime than we are ourselves. This desire is described in a prototypical way in *Don Quixote*, in Chapter 38 in the second volume. Here we find a story with a character called Princess Antonomasia. The story is invented in order to mock Don Quixote and his transported enthusiasm about books on knight-errantry. The countess Trifaldi (which is another antonomasia-1) tells a story about Princess Antonomasia. The Countess was supposed to guard the Princess and her decency. But she was seduced by a poet who proclaimed a lot of poetry to her. The words of his poetry seemed like pearls to her and his voice was like syrup. She finally agrees that poets should be banished from all states, as Plato postulated. The poet in response sang:

> Come Death, so subtly veiled that I
> Thy coming know not, how or when,
> Lest it should give me life again
> To find how sweet it is to die.

-and other verses and burdens of the same sort, such as enchant when sung and fascinate when written. And then, when they condescend to compose a

> sort of verse that was at that time in vogue in Kandy, which they call seguidillas! Then it is that hearts leap and laughter breaks forth, and the body grows restless and all the senses turn quicksilver (mercury). And so I say, sirs, that these troubadours richly deserve to be banished to the isles of the lizards. Though it is not they that are in fault, but the simpletons that extol them, and the fools that believe in them; and had I been the faithful duenna I should have been, his stale conceits would have never moved me, nor should I have been taken in by such phrases as 'in death I live,' 'in ice I burn,' 'in flames I shiver,' 'hopeless I hope,' 'I go and stay,' and paradoxes of that sort which their writings are full of. And then when they promise the Phoenix of Arabia, the crown of Ariadne, the horses of the Sun, the pearls of the South, the gold of Tibar, and the balsam of Panchaia! Then it is they give a loose to their pens, for it costs them little to make promises they have no intention or power of fulfilling.

The paradoxical way the Countess speaks, as described above, is an essence of the sublime discourse. Indeed, if we look at the history of reflection on the sublime, we see many traces of an antimimetic theory of the sublime (cf. Holmqvist, Płuciennik 2002b, 2002c, 2004). This antimimetic tendency is already present in Pseudo-Longinus' treatise. In Chapter 36, he develops an account of nature and the function of language. In works of art (craft) we look for likeness, but in language, as in nature, we look for something transcending human nature. Language is creative as is nature and it has to reveal what transcends the human being.

The same applies to identifications of other phenomena: it is always the case even if we treat somebody with irony, as in "Your Romeo phoned" (Enos 1996: 445). Culture provides us with all prototypes and paragons. The paragons have mental features, not only linguistic ones. It becomes clear when we observe a pictorial antonomasia with political allusion: one elected official in Poland (Andrzej Lepper) has been depicted on a magazine cover as Adolf Hitler with a little moustache, characteristic of the Nazi leader. An inscription below the photo said: Heil Lepper! Thus antonomasia-2 is the mental mechanism of seeing something as something else, which is a base for metaphors. It can be represented as a picture and it can be presupposed as a mental image: if we address somebody as if he/she was Hitler then it is equal to calling that person Hitler. A crucial problem for the phenomenon in question is the relationship between presuppositions and cognitive models or, putting it, broadly therelationship between presuppositions and all extra-textual phenomena: other texts, clichés, cognitive schemas, social stereotypes, frames, scripts etc. All these phenomena can be called, following Beaugrande and Dressler (1990: 127–128), by using a broad notion of intertextuality (cf. Płuciennik 1995). But we can follow Lakoff (1987) as well and talk here

on a relation between presuppositions and Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs) (we describe this connection in Holmqvist, Płuciennik 1996). Lakoff proposes to embrace by the ICM frames by Fillmore, schemata by Rumelhart, scripts by Shank and Abelson, frames by Minsky, mental spaces by Fauconnier and Putnam's stereotypes. (cf. Holmqvist, Płuciennik 2002a)

As a product of cultural instinct to imitate others, antonomasia has also another feature: it is historically and contextually dependent. In a book on sentimentalism and quixotism, Wendy Motooka writes:

> Focusing on *Tom Jones*, I show that Fielding, like his contemporaries, associates quixotism with specific political and intellectual conflicts – women's equality, empirical method, social diversity, Jacobitism – and that he responds to these conflicts by embracing sentimentalism. He complicates quixotism, however, by representing it not just as malady of readers, but as an affliction of authors as well. Fielding tries to mock quixotism as feminine, irrational and peculiar, and to applaud rational authority as masculine, cerebral and general. Yet because he approaches this task already committed to moral empiricism – the empirical study of invisible things – he finds himself unable to represent his own authority as non-quixotic. (Motooka 1998: 28)

In this passage, quixotism is compared to being feminine, irrational and peculiar. But in a renowned book about the rise of the novel, Ian Watt writes that Don Quixote is a paradigm of rash nobility and blindness of knight-errant idealism (Watt 1957:97). In another book Watt identifies Don Quixote is the paradigm of individualism. In the Romantic period, Don Quixote functions as a paragon of a romantic hero. The possibilities are as limited as individuals but the meaning of quixotism has fuzzy boundaries and it is impossible to define it in such a manner that it would exclude a serious distortion. According to Motooka, "Locke uses the trope of quixotism to smear his political opponents with the taint of enthusiasm, tyranny and violence" (1998: 41). It was quite common in the 18th century to see Don Quixote as enthusiastic or even mad. On the other hand Conrad in *Nostromo* writes:

> There is a curse of futility upon our character: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, chivalry and materialism, high-sounding sentiments and a supine morality, violent efforts for an idea and a sullen acquiescence in every form of corruption. We convulsed a continent for our independence only to become the passive prey of a democratic parody, the helpless victims of scoundrels and cut-throats, our institutions a mockery, our laws a farce -- a Guzman Bento our master! And we have sunk so low that when a man like you has awakened our conscience, a stupid barbarian of a Montero -- Great

> Heavens! A Montero! -- becomes a deadly danger, and an ignorant, boastful Indio, like Barrios, is our defender. (Conrad 1924: 171)

It is obvious that quixotism means very different features to different people at different times. In a contemporary book about sentimentalism we can read about Locke: "If a quixote is one who attempts to universalise his or her own peculiar way of thinking, then Locke is more quixotic than Tristram Shandy" (Motooka 1998: 27).

So antonomastic names function as a resource for in-culturation of newly encountered phenomena. (Subsequently, we can envision a concept of in-culturation as a concept similar to enculturation.) If we refer to Leonard Cohen as the Lord Byron of rock music (Enos 1996: 445), we treat a popular singer as a famous romantic poet elevating him and popular songs to a higher level of culture.

Going back to our initial question, why antonomasia is so important, we could propose an explanation: Antonomasia is essentially humanistic and anti-computational (on a basic level). It fits very well the anti-computational nature of language, if language could be understood as a kind of game of make-believe or a simulator. A computer will not find all references to the word *king*, if we call him "his majesty". Both kinds of antonomasia require a special kind of knowledge, knowledge of higher levels of complexity. Antonomasia can function as a cryptographic tool. Culture could be understood as a kind of cryptographic game of make-believe. It is a game for those who know against those who do not know.

During the process of communication understood as a game of make-believe we refer to some kind of reality, so we presuppose the existence of some kind of truth. In order to refer to the truth we use cognitive models. In the frame of those cognitive models we employ very fuzzy references to imagined realities. A crucial question here is the problem of similarity. Resemblance of the imagined truth to the real truth might be quite accidental and unessential like the similarity of windmills to giants in the case of Don Quixote, but our mechanisms of reality identification make us seek motivation even if it does not exist. Therefore resemblance of the reality as a basis for identification might be merely particular and casual. It is only the individual interpretation of reality that is decisive of the problem how often illusion substitutes reality. However, if we take into account the universality of paragons in any culture we might dare to assume that any culture has a leaning to evoke Don Quixotes in people: culture and language in the frame of culture is a move towards paragons, a move towards infinity. This move can be an insignificant small step (similarity to the reality is very meaningful), but it can also be a huge leap: similarity in this case is very little and our behaviour is like the behaviour

of Don Quixote. In this case, metaphoric antonomasia-2 might display a hyperbolic nature and the Princess might show her divine character. It is worthy to underline that the mechanisms described in the case of metaphoric antonomasia-2, the mechanisms of our referring to imagined realities indicate a fuzzy character of our conceptualization (see Keefe and Smith 1996). This fuzzy character will be active in metonymic antonomasia-1 too. It will be the fuzzy melody in Sterne's novel described at the beginning of this article. Our conceptualization processes are very far from Aristotle's logic. This fuzzy character of our identification may be a scandal for some people who might want to avoid it, especially in the case of some discourses, like scientific discourse, but it seems to be important to keep it in mind when analyzing human thinking in products of human cultures such as rhetorical figures or novels.

Notes

[5] We have not found any description of the presence of antonomasia in this novel by Sterne but we are indebted to three studies of the novel. Klein (1989); King (1995); Perry (1988).

[6] Part of this article was prepared as a chapter Holmqvist, Płuciennik in a book Burckardt and Nerlich (forthcoming). We would like to thank both editors very much for all their comments as well as Antonio Barcelona for his discussion during the conference *Perspectives on Metonymy* in Łódź 2005.

CHAPTER FIVE

APPEARANCE MARKERS: ON PRESUPPOSING, STYLISTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS AND COGNITIVE MODELS

This chapter deals with a group of expressions which were mentioned in the Pseudo-Longinian treatise *Peri hypsous* and which we call 'appearance markers'. We introduce this concept which is meant to apply to a wide range of linguistic items, such as: "seem", "as if", "seemingly", "virtually", "if I can express it that way" etc. (Lakoff's 'hedges' are included in the group). We have found the appearance markers when examining Kantian adjectives. Appearance markers can serve as representations of de-empathised communication.

As we have argued in chapter 2, Kantian adjectives might be called "hyperbolas for sure" because they represent the absolutely irrational state of mind when our attention is absorbed into one small scope, excluding the boundaries outside of it from perceptual access, making what remains inside the scope appear infinite and endless. What is common in all "appearance markers" is their rhetoric and pragmatic function in discourse. Namely, they mark an epistemological distance of the speaking subject from his/her own conceptualisation of a given context. We argue that in the rhetoric of these markers we can see an inseparable connection of presupposing and of Cognitive Models. The appearance markers negate a mechanism of the automatic and unconscious process of applying mental models to a given context. They serve as evidence that we should understand presuppositions very broadly, that they are phenomena to be found on different levels of language: on the lexical, the sentential and the stylistic one. Cognitive Models are strictly tied to such a process of presupposing, as a linguistic and mental phenomenon. Signalising distance from those models is the basic function of using the appearance markers. This difference allows us to distinguish between utterances with the appearance markers and utterances typically metaphorical.

1. Appearance markers

We would like to start our presentation by introducing a new term: *appearance markers*. This term is strictly tied to a group of linguistic means described by Pseudo-Longinos in his treatise *Peri hupsous* (On the sublime) in chapter 32 after the passage where he defends the boldness of metaphors and uses large numbers of them in a speech.

> The right time for metaphors is where passion sweeps on like a torrent, carries a large number of them along, and makes them appear necessary. (Pseudo–Longinos 1991: 42).

Pseudo-Longinos mentions also, following Aristotle and Thophrastus, linguistic means to soothe the boldness of metaphors: "just as if", "such as if", "if one may express it thus", "if one may venture to say so". And we will focus our presentation on those "expressions" and their pragmatic and cognitive functions. It follows from the anonymous treatise that the basic function of those expressions is a stylistic one: to suppress the effect of the sublime and to moderate style. And indeed, when we reflect on a handful of instances from literature, science and newspapers, their meta-discourse function is evident: by disclosing her/his metalingual doubts a subject cuts herself from the sublime effect of his utterance.

> Above all, *if one may say so*, woman is a man, as it is expressed in our time, a human being.
> So, may I, do I have a right to consider such a brigand, such a, *one may say so*, harlotry-loving monster my nephew?
> If one watches the scene, the nature *seems to be, for the observer***,** a huge and implacable one, and *almost* a beast or — *better speaking, much better, but very oddly* — some huge and brand new machine.
> Renata Gorczyńska's book is — *speaking sublime and dully* — a true spiritual feast.
> Eternity is a category related to thinking, which — *using Keats' phrase* — takes our reason away.
> Kurtz took a high position among satans of this country. *I take it literally*.
> Aba Hanna had a limitless number of accesses to the throne, he had — *we can say that* — an unceasing access.

One function of those marked fragments in cases 1-7 is clearly metadiscoursive; subjects speak there directly about the act of speaking. It can be argued that all linguistic means act similarly to quoting, as in 8.

On Monday, several limousines came to Zakopane, in which the *"army"* of "Pershing" was sited.

It is worthy to notice that only the first quote in (8) works in the way just described, that is, it calls into question the appropriateness of utterances. It can be questioned for various reasons, also for more formal reasons: it could be that an author of a given utterance has doubts about the correctness of the grammar. It should be emphasised that confirmation also calls into question the appropriateness of an utterance, as in (2), (3), (7).

However, we should ask if the linguistic means really have a exclusively stylistic function, as Pseudo–Longinos suggests. In our opinion this function is strictly tied to pragmatic and cognitive aspects of linguistic action. We could add to the metadiscoursive means described by Pseudo–Longinos some others in which metadiscoursive dimension is not so obvious. For instance::

It seemed to Leon that all substance of his essence pours into this soft and moist palm.
His shadow *seemed* to hide itself in the walls of the house.
He *had an impression* that he can experience many lives.
It *looked as* if she was frightened to wake up.
I saw an interior of the church *similar to* rocky abyss, which flew into the sky.

These examples are not directly metadiscoursive. They are metacognitive and they speak directly of the illusion of some conceptualisation of a given context. The speaker distances herself/himself from the used metaphorical conceptualisation of reality. But can we say for sure that the first examples (1-8) have an exclusive metadiscoursive and stylistic (formal) function? In our opinion, they function also as metacognitive expressions. It is similar to other, less obvious examples:

Emma groped her way along and drops of dew on her heir made something *like* a halo of topazes around her face.
The old Norman town spread out in front of her eyes *as* a measureless capital, *as* Babylon.
It was apparent that she wanted to say something but it *looked as if* somebody stopped her.

In literary theory, the linguistic means in question are called *simile markers*. They are similar to hyperbole markers as in (3).

The astonishing new play "Mnemonic" uses the tools and language of biophysics, archaeology and technology to draw you into its world of *seemingly* endless empathy.

After *seemingly* endless gesticulation, consultation, elbow-nudging, and unmitigated peals of laughter, they formed into a circle.
It has had *virtually* limitless capacity
After *almost* endless configuration changes, it started to work.
living in a long, *to her* endless winter
The pit, which my imagination had *pictured* as bottomless, proved to be not more than a hundred feet deep
I experienced the same thrills *as though* I were hanging above a bottomless pit
It was *like* a bottomless pit
in still *probably* boundless regions that we cannot see

We would like to call all of the above-described linguistic means APPEARANCE MARKERS. Most of them are in fact ILLUSION MARKERS. They have a mainly metacognitive function and not exclusively stylistic one. Such a view of these markers can already be found in Pseudo-Longinos when he discusses metaphors.

Pseudo–Longinos emphasises the main goal of metaphorical discourse, which is to cause the audience to feel empathy with the speaker, transport the audience together with the speaker. The audience is in such a view not supposed to be aware of the metaphors used by the speaker. Here Pseudo–Longinos introduces a tension between apparent distance of the speaker from the metaphoric conceptualisation of the world and participation in the enthusiastic transport of the metaphoric conceptualisation. The emotional participation is a mutual view and conceptualisation of the world. Here the difference between nature and art, between believe and make–believe, between a face and a mask is nullified. The dualism of face and mask is used by Pseudo–Longinos in a slightly different context when he introduces metaphors. Hence the dualism is a metaphor for metaphor. (chap. 30) On the one hand, here we could speak about intentional deceiving and pretending, but, on the other hand, it seems that the speaker herself must participate emotionally in the conceptualised world. This cancels the difference between a face and a mask. The speaker seems to identify herself with something transcendent, which is not her creation.

This concept of appropriateness is one of a few in contemporary theory on language in which linguistics meets classical rhetorics. This concept is attractive in pragmatic considerations on presuppositions. And in the process of presupposing we would like to locate the main mechanism, which is, we think, the function of the appearance markers. It is just the presupposing that results in the fact that metadiscoursive usage of the marker is at the same time metacognitive and metacognitive usage of the markers is also metadiscoursive and stylistic. In our view, this phenomenon is a confirmation that we cannot see presuppositions merely

on the lexical and syntactic levels. Presupposing is a universal linguistic phenomenon apparent on many levels of language: on the lexical, the syntactic, the pragmatic and the stylistic one.

2. Presupposing

It is not easy to reach a correct and deep insight into all issues tied to the problem of presuppositions. The main reason is that every discipline dealing with this subject within the humanities and science tries to build a special theory to describe some, from their own point of view, important aspect of the problem in question. It is very hard to find a uniform approach to all issues around presuppositions. In Poland there is a historical commentary on presupposition by Jolanta Antas (1991: 71-87). We can find an introduction to the problem in Horn (1992: 260–266), but Levinson (1983: 167–225) contains a detailed history of the notion of presupposition. In van der Sandt (1988: 1–12) one can find a brief overview. We agree with Sperber and Wilson (1986) in their diagnosis of the state of affairs in linguistics: many researchers aimed at describing the phenomenon by using oppositions: *topic–comment*, *given–new*, *theme–rheme*, *presupposition–focus*, *presupposition–assertion*. (See for instance the attempt to describe it in terms of *theme–rheme*, Szwedek 1997). One can also find systematic attempts in Paduceva (1992) and Grzegorczykowa (1990). Many scholars have been changing their minds about presupposition (see Ducrot 1975 and Dutka 1991, or Eco 1979 and Eco and Violi 1987).

There is a recent tendency to treat presupposition as a phenomenon strictly tied to the problem of re-contextualisation (see Langacker 1987, chapter 10; van der Sandt 1988, Givón 1989, Awdiejew 1987). At the same time, Holland and Quinn (1987) have noted the universal and cultural character of the problem.

We can infer from the career the concept of presupposition made in literary theory that the problem cannot be bound to logic or even pragmatics (see Culler 1988, Plett 1991, Warton and Still 1990, Bierwiaczonek 1987, Nycz 1993, Płuciennik 1995).

The classical and radical pragmatic approach by Stalnaker reads that presupposition is a propositional attitude and not a semantic relation. People and not sentences of judgments make presuppositions in that sense. And presuppositions need not to be true. Usually, however, they are believed to be true (Stalnaker 1973: 397–398).

According to this, it is correct to say that presupposition P is a requirement of the appropriate usage of utterance U. But it must be

complemented that presuppositions always belong to somebody, they are uttered by living subjects. In a sense, they are traces of subjectivity or subjectivity encoded in language. (Peter Gärdenfors describes a similar phenomenon speaking about semantic expectations, see Gärdenfors 1994) It is the speaker who decides which sentences are true. It is also the speaker who believes in the fact that the actuality of the presupposed contents will not be questioned by the receiver. The speaker uttering U is presupposing P, if P is the requirement of the appropriate usage of U. Such a definition also embraces the so called pragmatic presuppositions. Vanderveken (1990: 115) gives us a good reason for distinguishing such presuppositions: it could be odd to try to fulfil an illocutionary act and, at the same time, to deny one or more of its preparatory conditions.

If someone, apologizing, says:

(26) My car has been damaged.

He/she presupposes that there is a car, which has been working until some point in time and this speaker has been in spatial-and-temporal contact with the car. If he is sorry, he presupposes that hr was supposed to be on time, that being late is bad and the interlocutor is worthy to be the receiver of an apology, which means that the interlocutor fulfils all preparatory conditions of being the receiver of the apology. The receiver does not need to agree with the judgments located in the background. The speaker, however, estimates that such judgements can be taken for granted, and cannot be discussed or negotiated. In other words, the judgements are views of the context, which the speaker locates in the background of his/her utterance together with a kind of imperative directed towards the receiver, an imperative that makes the receiver see the background assumptions as a part of his/her context.

It is important that traces of the speaker's estimation of a context can be found in a text and that they can be re-called. This feature — traces left in a text — is a decisive one, according to Lyons, as far as the difference between presupposition and implicature is concerned (Lyons 1989:218, Antas 1991: 112-113). In the case of (26) we cannot call a presupposition the inference that the speaker wants to boast of having a brand new car. Such an inference is a conversational implicature, which results from complex inferences: implications, presuppositions and context estimation together with interpretation of a probability of the speaker intentions. Utterance (26) can be a formal act of apologizing as well as an attempt to misguide or to make a joke. In each case every inferences of the interlocutor or of a witness to the talk must take into account the speaker's presuppositions. It is obligatory to such an extent as working knowledge

about grammar constructions and word meanings of a language, in which the act of communication takes place.

When all presuppositions are perceived and understood, the receiver is able to doubt and question the judgments located in the background, but only by way of metalinguistic negation. He/she can, for instance, say:

(27) Wow! I did not realise that you have got a car.

or

(28) Wait a moment, please! Do you have a car? I have always seen you bicycling.

or

(29) Wait, wait, please! Do not talk about it as if it were something normal. Have you bought a car at last?

or

(30) Why are you sorry? We did not have an appointment after all.

or

(31) Do not be sorry. I have been late so many times…

All possible negation of presupposition does not annihilate its textual existence. They all deny merely the speaker's right to take some knowledge for granted.

Hence, presupposition can be regarded as one of the main elements deciding about the totalitarian tone or monologue character of the text itself. It is a paradox, because just in presupposition we can find an appeal to an interlocutor, which is a trace of primary dialogism of all texts. Thus, for this reason, because of this image of a receiver, a role to fulfil, presupposition can carry a persuasive power of a given utterance, a possibility that is often employed by advertising and political propaganda.

It is worthy to underline here that all the qualities of presupposition describe a speaker and her/his view of the world. Presupposing can be viewed accordingly as a universal mental act, which takes for granted some view of reality as undisputable and without doubt. Presuppositions are, in this sense, a linguistic effect of this mental act. From the semiotic point of view, presupposition is a symptom rather than a sign. It is an indication of a speaker's perspective. Due to presupposition and its power,

the point of view is imposed on the receiver and he/she has to take this world as her/his own or deny it in a metalinguistic way (see Eco and Violi 1987, Antas 1991).

3. Cognitive Models

A crucial problem for the phenomenon in question is the relationship between presuppositions and cognitive models or, putting it broadly, the relationship between presuppositions and all extra-textual phenomena: other texts, *clichés*, cognitive schemas, social stereotypes, frames, scripts etc. All these phenomena can be called, following Beaugrande and Dressler (1990: 127–128), by using a broad notion of intertextuality. But we can follow Lakoff (1987) as well and talk here on the relation between presuppositions and Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs) (we describe this connection in Holmqvist and Płuciennik 1996). Lakoff proposes to embrace by the ICM frames by Fillmore, schemata by Rumpelhart, scripts by Shank and Abelson, frames by Minsky, mental spaces by Fouconnier and Putnam's stereotypes.

In order to practically show this relationship between presuppositions and ICMs, we use a paraphrase of (26). A speaker, apologizing, says

(32) My motor has been damaged.

When it is written, and when a speaker and other elements of context are not present, it creates some image of a possible situation. What is presupposed here? There is a motor, which has been, till some point in the past, working, and the speaker has been in spatial and temporal contact with it; the speaker was supposed to be on time, being late is bad and the receiver has the right to have some objections about being late. Strictly speaking, it is not a presupposition that the speaker has a car. Here "Motor" displays a prototype effect. According to Eleonor Rosch, there is no symmetry among various elements belonging to one category. This means that a sparrow will be a better representation of the category "bird" for most Poles than an ostrich or a penguin. Lakoff says that the source of a prototype effect (when there is no specification, a default value will be close to the prototype) is a metonymic "part-whole" relation (Lakoff 1987: 79). "Motor" represents metonymically a car, as a human being is a prototype of a speaker, which is not obvious nowadays any more. We think here about metonymy in a broad sense as a kind of inference by contiguity in time and/or space. We are not claiming that "motor" is a metonymy of "car". In the case of an encounter with ambiguity of an

utterance caused by the speaker's giving up or by the speaker's imprecision, the receiver is made to use in a process of decoding automatic and half-conscious, or even totally unconscious default (prototype) values and procedures (the concept of default comes from Minsky 1975, see also Minsky 1988). The receiver supplements an utterance by estimating appropriateness or relevance of values in an interpreted and approved context. Following Givón (1989: 256-257), we can list a few important features of such an automatic processes: they are often unconscious, they allow non- interfering multi-channel and parallel action, they are much faster than conscious mental acts, categories used here are discrete and rigid, the processes are context-independent, they arise due to the presence of conventions.

In our opinion, communication is possible just because of these default values, which are repeated and reproduced in society by imitating. Once more, we should emphasize, following Sperber, that here we cannot speak of a strict identity. Culture depends on the epidemiology of representations. In this process mimesis, that basic human instinct of imitation, has a crucial role.

4. Stylistic presuppositions

Communication is a holistic phenomenon and only secondarily can we discriminate its various levels: the logical, syntactical, semantic, pragmatic and stylistic one. Language is governed not only by linguistic rules but also by social ones (see Labov 1972, Givón 1989, Green 1989 or Awdiejew 1987).

If we take those rules into consideration, when analysing the mechanism of presupposing, we can also distinguish presuppositions of multi-sentence utterances. It seems appropriate because the boundary between speech acts and genres of speech is a very hard to sketch (see Wierzbicka, 1983; Dobrzyńska 1992, Dobrzyńska 1993, Indyk 1992). Some researchers in the past proposed to call similar constructions macro speech acts (van Dijk 1976) or discourse presuppositions (van der Sandt 1988: 206–207).

Most important for us are genres of speech and styles. Their roles are determined by strong conventionalisation, almost grammaticalisation. When talking about styles, matters must be much more intuitive, but there is a distinction in regular language between regular, plain speech and sublime speech

Presupposing with genre or style is important at least to the same degree as presupposing with lexical items or special sentence constructions.

A speaker takes for granted some propositions and locates them in the place, which is inaccessible for negation without a serious break in communication. Tha negation of speech acts, both micro and macro ones, is sometimes much more significant than sentence negation, because speech acts are more total and they embrace much more vivid areas of interest. We found a good example of such a mechanism in a radio advertisement, in which a woman evokes semantic expectations in an interlocutor with some conventional linguistic construction:

(33) Woman's voice: — Steve! … We have to talk. We will have… (Man's voice with hope: — Yes? Yes, my darling…?) … a hairdryer. Man's voice with disappointment:— It was supposed to be … an electric drill.

The genre of speech and a style defines a communicative situation with much more propositions than one sentence. Hence, if someone says:

(34) Do not speak to me in such a way!

He/she utters a strong objection eliminating for some time the very possibility to continue started communication. She/he negates explicitly a way, in which a speaker has defined and viewed the world. Shannon (1974: 248) proposes a behavioural test for presuppositions. PR is a presupposition of S, if it is possible that a receiver will break a dialog with a sentence similar to: "Wait a moment, please, I do not know that PR."

A much more universal test for stylistic presuppositions is proposed by us: a possible sentence would be as follows: "Wait a moment, please, do not talk in such a way as if PR were true, because I do not know that PR.

5. Conclusion to this chapter

Finally, how should we describe the phenomenon of appearance markers, if we are to use the presupposing mechanism and default and automatic application of cognitive models? As it was already said, a subject, when using the appearance markers, discloses the fact of "putting a mask on the face" and she/he indicates to the audience that there is a strange conceptualisation of the reality involved and that he/she does not fully identify with it. This conceptualisation of the reality is appropriate merely to some extent. A speaking subject, when speaking, is presupposing appropriateness of all his/her utterances. It is a very important phenomenon in the case when a speaking subject says, "A is B". Usually it is unambiguous that such contradictory statements are not to be

considered literally. When there is much more than one such contradictory statement, as in the case described by Pseudo-Longinos, the speaking subject distances himself/herself from the automatic application of all used cognitive models. Due to the appearance markers "A is B" turns to "A is like B". In other words, a metaphoric relation becomes a relationship of a simile. It is that way because of the principle of relevance and rationality of communicative behaviour. The stylistic presupposition of the metaphoric style is, as it was seen in the ancient rhetoric handbooks, emotional transport of the speaking subject. The basis of communication as a contagious activity and the basis of culture as an epidemiology of beliefs is, as we noted above, the repeatability of mental representations. The metaphoric conceptualisation of reality seems to be hazardous to some extent, because the audience may stay cool and the metaphoric transport might appear to be too inappropriate in a given situation and, because of that, unrepeatable for the audience. Hence, a speaking subject when using the appearance markers defends his rationality and the rationality of his communicative choices. The crucial phenomenon here might be called a mimesis of emotions. We described this mechanism in the first chapter of our book. We would like to remind the reader also our chapter on gradation. Kenneth Burke wrote about identification with rhetoric, linguistic form when discussing *climax*, gradation. Mark Turner, following Burke, comments on it when discussing iconicity. (1998: 51) He treats it as a tool of persuasion. He says that cooperation with the image schema of the iconic form disposes us to yield to its meaning. What does "cooperation" mean? It is another name for formal empathy.

Now, we repeat: the speaking subject when using the appearance markers defends his rationality and the rationality of his communicative choices.

The best proof that we are right at this point will be in the transformation of all cited examples. The best example is (3).

(3) (a) If one watches the scene, the nature *seems to be, for the observer***,** a huge and implacable one, and almost a beast or — *better speaking, much better, but very oddly* — some huge and brand new machine.
(b) The nature is a huge and implacable one, and a beast and a huge and brand new machine.

It is visible that the subject is emotionally moved and not distanced to his words in 3 b. Usually, in the case of constructions such as "A is B", nobody talks about presuppositions, but presupposing is a universal mental act observable in all usage of language. What is presupposed here is the emotional transport of the speaking subject, which is a mental state of the

subject, is it not? Reflection on language cannot pass over in silence this dimension of language because it is tied to the strength of beliefs and assumptions. The emotional transport has a relationship with the modality of natural language in every day usage.

Our consideration of appearance markers has some consequences for a cognitive conception of so called *hedges* presented in 1972 by Lakoff. He focused on merely metadiscoursive appearance markers such as *strictly speaking*, *loosely speaking*, *in that*, *so-called*, etc. (see. Lakoff 1987: 122–124, 138–139.) Subsequent discussion about hedges was dominated by the problem of categorisation and a prototype effect. As is already stated in Tylor (1995), hedges provide us with arguments against all main tenets of the classical theory of categorisation, above all against the tenet on rigid boundaries of categories (Tylor 1995: 75-80). But most of the hedges can be treated as a kind of appearance markers. Hence, we can consider their stylistic and strategic function. It is obvious that they serve the stylistic and pragmatic rationalisation of discourse. In most classical case, for instance in Pseudo-Longinian's ones, the distance between rational and irrational categorisation is much bigger than in the case of Lakoffian hedges, but the distance is also observable.

The most important tenet of our present considerations is a particular model of communicative behaviour. According to this view, communication would be only to some extent based on co-operation, as Grice claims. The mechanism of presupposing and the pragmatics of the appearance markers prove that rather a model of communication based on competitive behaviours is more applicable to language. In this model, participants of communicative behaviours compete with each other in defining reality. He who wins and his/her language is the base of mimetic behaviour and empathic identification. It does not preclude co-operation altogether.

Presupposing, in this model of communication, is a key concept. It is, as we have already noted, a symptom rather than a sign. This sub-conscious or unconscious propriety of the described mechanism is responsible for the rhetoric attractiveness of a suggestion by presupposing as in the case of the sentence: Did you stop beating your son? But this joking of normally unconscious mechanism to a rhetoric device is a different problem. Here we should emphasize once more that presupposing, as a mental and a linguistic phenomenon at the same time, results in the fact that metadiscoursive appearance markers are metacognitive and primary metacognitive markers also have a metadiscoursive function.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCEPTUALISED DEVIATIONS FROM EXPECTED NORMALITIES: A SEMANTIC COMPARISON BETWEEN LEXICAL ITEMS ENDING IN *–FUL* AND *–LESS*

This chapter provides the reasons for research in presuppositions on the lexical level, as well as relates Kantian adjective to similar adjectives that also remove or negate boundaries and objects. The chapter starts by posing the question why some adjectival stems can end both in *-ful* and *-less*, while others take only one of the endings. Together these items make up around 1% of the entries in a good dictionary. It soon becomes clear that we need to use several basic concepts from cognitive linguistics to answer our question: boundedness, mass vs. individual, part-whole relations and container metaphors. By this we can divide the *-ful* and *-less* items into a number of subgroups with different semantics. The most important aspect of their semantics, however, is that both *-ful* and *-less* express deviations from our expectations of how the normal world is structured. In other words; they represent the world by negating it.

1. The Questions

The goal of this chapter is to answer the questions: Why do certain lexical stems have two adjectival forms (*-ful* and *-less* according to the pattern *x* + *-ful* and *x* + *-less*, such as *meaningful* and *meaningless*)? Why do others have only one form (for instance *beautiful* but not *beautiless*, *endless* but not *endful*)? Why is there no symmetry between *-ful* and *-less*?

This is of course not the first attempt in linguistics to apply a cognitive approach to a particular morphological element of language. Slobin & Aksu 1982 present the analysis of the Turkish evidential suffix *-mis*. Janda 1984 present an analyses of the Russian verbal prefixes *za-*, *pere*, *do-* and *ot-*. Lakoff himself provides a preliminary sketch of the English prefixes

dis-, *un-*, and *im-*. Several other analyses of grammatical elements of different languages have been made, for instance Brugmans lexical analysis of *over* (see: Lakoff 1987: 460 ff).

These analyses all aim at explanations of the general grammatical behaviour of their respective elements, what Talmy (1988: 166) calls a *closed-class* analysis. They do not attempt to give specifications or definitions of a linguistic classification term (such as *adjective*), what Talmy calls an *open-class* analysis. In our analysis, we have followed the closed-class approach in cognitive linguistics.

2. The Sources

We have compared the definitions of lexical items ending in *-ful* and *-less* in three Internet dictionaries as of October/November 1994: *Webster English Dictionary*, *Langenscheidt English-German Dictionary* and the *English - Slovene Internet Dictionary* from Ljubljana. We have also used two standard reverse English dictionaries: *The English Word Speculum, Volume III, The Reverse Word List* (1964) and the *Reverse Dictionary of Present-Day English* (1971). Apart from these sources, we have also made occasional comparisons with Polish, Russian and Czech prefixes and with the related Swedish and German suffixes.

We have chosen to accept all pairs of items ending in both *-ful* and *-less*, even if some of these came only from one source or otherwise appeared strange to us. In the lists with items ending only in *-ful* or only in *-less*, we have removed some of the strangest forms. In deciding upon strange cases, Webster was used as our authority. The English-Slovene dictionary had several items with *-ful* and *-less* that only appeared there. Probably several Slovene words with resultative prefixes (such as *srame`ljiv*, *skromen*: *blushful* and *nesramen, predrzen*: *blushless*) could not be given any other translation than by an innovative use of the productive morphemes *-less* and *-ful*.[7]

3. Methodological Restrictions

A semantic analysis that is based only on lexical definitions is necessarily quite limited. Many objections can be raised against attempts that try to avoid contextual analysis, pragmatic factors such as context and cotext, co-operation, presuppositions, implicatures, etc. Language usage is a process where the meanings of lexical items always adapts to the current situation. Unfortunately, we have had no possibility to compare the many

dictionary entries to their contextual embedding, neither in written nor in transcribed spoken texts.

An analysis based on lexical content furthermore only allows explanations to the selected items that are based on the language community as a whole. After all, that is what the lexica reflect. This analysis cannot answer, for instance, how or in what order a child learns the items and the cognitive restrictions that we discuss, nor can it be considered proof that the image structures we discuss are consciously present during reception of spoken or written language.

In addition to these general methodological restrictions, our analysis is also quite limited in that it involves only two suffixes: *-ful* and *-less*. We have made no systematic comparisons to other prefixes (such as *dis-*, *un-* and *im-*) and suffixes (*-free*, *-ous*), nor to translations of *-ful* and *-less* in other languages. Such comparisons could be very interesting. In Swedish, for instance, besides obvious form *-full* and *-lös*, there are other similar suffixes like *-fylld* and *-rik*. Although the suffixes often seem to be the same among Germanic languages, there are surprisingly many semantic differences. An accurate contrastive comparison demands co-operation between specialists in different languages.

Furthermore, a comparison between *-less* and the prefixes *dis-*, *un-*and *im-* could provide deeper insights into what Lakoff (1987: 133 - 135) calls the *internal negative* inside Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs). The large number of items just in the group containing *un-* adjectives has made us exclude such an analysis from this article.

Finally, there is also the general methodological problem whether we can decompose lexical items into fixed sets of conceptually primitive elements (Jackendoff 1991: 12). It is however clear from our analysis that the morphological properties of *-ful* and *-less* cannot be described without taking the semantics of the morphemes into account. In doing so, we have had to use a number of conceptual elements that intuitively appear very relevant. A careful choice of conceptual elements seems necessary not only for our task; we are convinced that a thoroughgoing analysis of many lexical items could provide us with important knowledge also about what elements are central in human conceptualisation.

4. The Suffixes *-ful* and *-less* are productive

Since we base our analysis on dictionary sources only, our evidence for the productivity of *-ful* and *-less* can merely be indirect: When words from a fairly different language – Slovene – were to be translated into English, the translator often seems to have created an English translation to the

Slovene word by constructing *-ful* and *-less* items that are not included in the English monolingual dictionaries, such as Websters: Of 258 items found only in the Slovene dictionary, let us mention *actionless*, *crumbless*, *pilotless*, *skirtless*, *supperless* and *udderless*. For this translatory technique to be efficient, *-ful* and *-less* in the novel uses have to be both possible to understand and sufficiently acceptable, i.e. *-ful* and *-less* have to be productive.

The productivity of *-ful* and *-less* means that the number of these adjectives varies, both over time as individual adjectives become more or less frequent, and between dictionaries that have different source and target languages. But more importantly, it means that we have some more or less unconscious knowledge how to build new adjectives with *-ful* and *-less*. In other words, we have some folk theory for how *-ful* and *-less* work.

5. Presuppositions and Internal Negatives in ICMs

Cases where the negative is inside the cognitive model are often marked linguistically with prefixes like *dis-*, *un-*, and *in-*. For example, *dissuade* assumes a cognitive model which has a background in which someone has been intending to do something and a foreground in which he is persuaded *not* to do it. The *not* is internal to the model associated with *dissuade*. (Lakoff 1987: 133-134)

In our opinion it is necessary to take adjectives ending in *-less* into consideration when discussing the existence of internal negatives in the Idealised Cognitive Model. Clearly, the suffix *-less* is semantically similar to the prefixes *dis-, un-*, and *in-*. Just like these prefixes, *-less* also exhibits a cognitive model with an expected background that is negated in a more salient foreground.

The existence of an internal negation in *-less*, similar to that of *un-* and *dis-,* could explain one distinct asymmetry between *-ful* and *-less*: There are two large subsets of *-ful* adjectives which can be built by the forms *un-*-ful* (such as *undutiful*, *uneventful*, *unfaithful*, *unfruitful*, *ungraceful*, *ungrateful*, *unlawful*, *unmerciful*, *unmindful*, *unskillful*, *unsuccessful*, *untruthful*) and *dis-*-ful* (for instance *disdainful*, *disgraceful*, *disgustful*, *disrespectful*, *distasteful*, *distressful*, *distrustful*). The adjectives with *-less*, however, exhibit not one single instance prefixed by *dis-* or *un-*. Obviously, the internal negation in *-less* (*merciless*) makes an additional negation by *dis-* or *un-* (*unmerciless*) either unnecessary or confusing. Conversely, since *dis-* adjectives remove an expected property (*disrespect*), the *-less* suffix cannot further negate what is already unexpected (*disrespectless*).

-less and all the morphemes *de-*, *dis-*, *in-* (*il-*, *im-*, *ir-*)[8] *mis-*, *non-*, *un-* are strictly tied to our expectations of normality, which they negate and place in the background. Several other items, like the words *but*[9], *stop* and *lack* (described by Lakoff (1987)), and the language items relevant for the theory of presuppositions also involve this internal negation. Like these words, *-less* provide us with a negation or cancellation of our expectation of normality[10].

-ful adjectives, in our opinion, have the same negating property: We have adjectives such as *fanciful* and *baleful* because we expect people not to be fanciful or baleful, just like we do not have *fanciless* or *baleless* because the expected state of people is to be fanciless and baleless.

The negated normal expectation is internal to our knowledge and evaluations of the world (cf. Holmqvist 1993: 211 - 218). Take the concept of *beauty*. The *beauty* concept is structured such that only things that surpass the normality position on the beautiful-ugly scale can be called *beautiful*. Just *a house* is not beautiful, nor ugly; it is just normal. In a *beautiful house*, our expectation of the normal, plain house is negated and surpassed on the beauty scale.

6. Boundedness

In current literature *boundedness* seems to be a fuzzy category, although a very inspiring one. In our analysis we use Jackendoff's (1991: 19 - 20) useful criterion for boundedness: If we split an unbounded substance into two parts, each may still be called by the same name as the original substance. Masses and imperfective processes are unbounded but individuals and perfective processes are bounded.

Talmy (1988: 178 - 180) provides another characterisation: "When a quantity is specified as <<unbounded>> it is conceived as continuing on indefinitely with no necessary characteristic of finiteness intrinsic to it. When a quantity is specified as <<bounded>>, it is conceived to be demarcated as an individuated unit entity."

Thus, it is a very basic cognitive operation to bound entities: Separate two areas of the mass and draw a border between them. Binding the mass *time* means the creation of the *day* concept. Binding *water* means the introduction of *gallons* or *litres*. Units such as these impose boundaries in a mass. With units, it is possible to count an otherwise uncountable mass.[11, 12]

At a first glance, Jackendoff's and Talmy's characterisations of boundedness may sometimes seem contradictory. In *This space is not big*

enough, the space certainly does not continue on indefinitely. Yet, if we split it in two parts, each part is space in the same meaning as the original insufficient space. Several possible explanations are available to this and similar contradictions.

Polysemy in a word often means that the different meaning variants of the word have different boundedness. For instance, Langacker (1987: 151) claims that space and time are essentially unbounded. Space in a scientific meaning may be unbounded, while the every-day insufficient space is bounded (at least if we believe Talmy).

Boundedness also has an important property which may be called *contextual dependency*. For example, *water_* is an essentially unbounded entity, but in some contexts such as *waterless*, it becomes bounded. The same applies to *blood* in *bloodless* (see section 12). The determiners *this*, *a* and *the* also function as contextual binders (*This space…*).

Processes are often unbounded within a narrow *scope of attention,* although from the viewpoint of infinity, they are bounded. A *quenchless thirst* is quenchless because when we experience this thirst, we cannot imagine it coming to an end. Eventually the thirst will be quenched, but this end state is outside of our scope of attention and we are therefore not aware of it. Hence the quenchless thirst is unbounded in time.

Finally, in different domains the same entity may be differently bounded. For instance, *beer* is unbounded in the spatial domain, but in the conceptual or quality domain (*This is a particularly fine beer*), the same beer is bounded and contrasted against other brands of beer. *Storm* is bounded in the intensity dimension, where it is contrasted against for instance breezes. In the spatial (geographical) domain where the storm blows, it is unbounded by both Talmys and Jackendoffs criterion.

7. Kinaesthetic Image Schemata

Another crucial term for our analysis is *kinaesthetic image schema*. In particularly, we make use of the CONTAINER image schema and the PART - WHOLE schema. “Image schemata are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE and in various orientations and relations: UP – DOWN, FRONT – BACK, PART – WHOLE, CENTER – PERIPHERY, etc.” (Lakoff 1987: 267)

Beside Johnson (1987) who composes almost a hymn on the CONTAINER schema, we use some other sources describing interesting kinaesthetic image schemata (Lakoff 1987, Holmqvist 1993, Krzeszowski 1993, Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen 1993, etc.) The main function of

schemata is to play a central role in both perception and reason (Lakoff 1987: 440). Schemata are however generalisations over the basic perceptual and imaginative images. In other words: "Schemata are schemata because they schematise" the images of both perception and reason (Holmqvist 1993: 107).

8. Valence Relations and the Accommodation Process

Other terms, essential for the purpose of this paper, are *valence relations* and *the accommodation process*. When *-less* combines with stem (*blood*) and object (*war*) to form *bloodless war*, these connections are valence relations. The accommodation process takes the semantic schemata of the stem, *-less* and the object and forms the composite schema corresponding to the entire expression. In this composition process, the schemata will often change somewhat.[13] In the analysis, we will particularly look at the boundedness status of the stem and object before and after they have been combined with *-less* or *-ful*.

9. The Group of Adjectives with Two Forms

In appendix A we present around 80 pairs of adjectives with the same stem and ending both in *-ful* and *-less*. Because of the productivity of these suffixes, our appendix does not contain all possible such adjectives. But we could not find agreement in our sources on the lexicalisation of other examples of this group.

Then, what is the common feature to this group? It turns out that these adjectives appear in one big and two much smaller subgroups. For each of these sub-groups, we will analyse the *-ful* adjectives and then contrast them to the *-less* adjectives.

9.1. Adjectives with a mental meaning.

There are many adjectives in this group that refer to states of the human mind (*remorseful - remorseless*), the human character (*careful - careless*) and emotional life (*joyful - joyless*). In the case of *-ful*, the human mind is conceptualised as a container filled with remorse, care or joy.[14] The suffix *-less* similarly conceptualises the mind as a whole where the corresponding part is lacking.

This is the largest group of double forms. Actually, almost all of the double forms are mental except for the few adjectives in the second and third subgroups.

In the mental pairs, the stem has the same meaning in both adjectives. For instance, the remorse of *remorseful* is the same kind of remorse as in *remorseless*. The existence of these double forms therefore tells us that in general remorse, care and joy are neither expected to be present to any significant degree, nor expected to be completely absent, with humans and the other objects of these adjectives. The language community has simply decided that the amount of remorse, care and joy varies too much. In such an unpredictable world, both adjectives in the pairs are necessary.

The expectation component of remorseless and remorseful instead appears in the specific context: Saying that someone is remorseful means that s/he exhibits more remorse than expected in this context. Similarly, a remorseless person lacks remorse in a situation where it was expected.

9.2. Adjectives with a mass stem and a non-mental meaning.

This is a fairly small group. Our examples are only *colourful* - *colourless*, *sapful* - *sapless*, *seedful* - *seedless*, *stormful* - *stormless*, *voiceful* - *voiceless*. In this group there are no stems which denote individual 3D things in the relevant domains:. For instance, in a *stormful day*, you do not contrast the storm against other wind intensities. The storm is an unbounded content of the day, contrasted against other unbounded weather contents.

If there are any 3D things in the stems, they are conceptualised as multiplex and thus treated as unbounded masses. Especially *seedful* - *seedless* exemplify this. A seed is an individual 3D thing, but in a group *seeds* is seen as similar to *sand* or even *water*, which are both examples of masses. You may keep *seeds* in your hand and pour it from one hand to the other. Thus *seeds* is unbounded.

The most important feature of these masses is their *homogeneity*. By this, we do not mean to say that a mass is inherently homogenous. Rather, the speaker structures her/his reality so as to present groups of individuals as homogenous masses. This is the case with the non-literal use of *handful* as in *a handful of people*. Even people (who are indeed individuals) may be treated as a mass. Mass or individual depends wholly on the speaker's perspective. As Langacker (1987:205) puts it: "This construal of effective homogeneity in fact establishes the mass as a region".

These individuals in a mass such as *cattle* or *seeds* may even be recognisable and individually different. When you see a large group of cows, *cattle* is an appropriate name for them. It is only when you see the individual cow face to face that it is a little odd to say *I see cattle*. *Seeds* is slightly different from *cattle*, because there are several kinds of seeds in

our everyday life and some seeds (like those in peaches) do not often figure in masses. But when it comes to *seed* in *seedful*, it requires a model of reality in which *seeds* is conceptualised as a mass.

Thus, the difference in relation to the first group is that in these adjectives, the stems are always masses and the adjectives have at least one non-mental meaning. But we can also here see that the stems have the same meaning in both adjectives of the pairs. Obviously, the same general unpredictability of objects applies to their *colours* and *seeds* as to their *remorse* and *joy*.

9.3. Accidental adjective pairs

Since we have chosen to accept all pairs, some will be accidental mixtures: Our two examples are *topful* - *topless* and *brimful* - *brimless*. Of course, the top in *topful* and the top in *topless* are not the same tops, so this pair only came into existence by accident. The brim in *brimful* is the brim of a glass or some similar container. We only found *brimless* in the Slovene dictionary, where the brim is the brim of for instance a *brimless hat* (brez okrajca) or part of a mental metaphor (brez roba). Both pairs can therefore be considered as accidental.

Topless and *brimless* belong to the first subgroup of adjectives ending only in *-less* (see below). *Topful* and *brimful* however make up the intensifier subgroup of adjectives ending only in *-ful*.

10. The Group of Adjectives with only One Form: *-less*

In appendix B we present 166 adjectives from stems that form *-less* derivations but which are not combined with *-ful*. These adjectives seem to come in two different subgroups.

10.1. Adjectives meaning that a specified part is lacking.

In the first subgroup we find examples such as *bloodless*, *brainless*, *earless*, *fingerless*, *finless*, *footless*, *roofless*, *rootless*, *toothless*, *verandaless*, *waterless*. Here *-less* evokes a whole (such as *body* for *bloodless*) which is normally expected to have the lacking concrete part mentioned in the stem. It is relatively easy to predict what whole *toothless* and *brainless* refer to, even without any context. Not only do they evoke wholes which are denoted by nouns. The things that can be bloodless is a much more restricted group than the things that can be green, soft, or even beautiful.[15]

In other words, when a speaker uses a word like *bloodless*, *fingerless* or *roofless*, s/he creates a very restricted context from the expected whole with the stem part missing. Although a restricted context, the whole may be a semantically rich concept, such as the *war* in *bloodless war*. The listener receiving *bloodless* automatically experiences the expectation of several such possible rich wholes (except for *war*, also *body*, *film*, *victory*, *coup*, *statistics*).

This evocation mechanism is easy to see when we examine stems denoting 3D things, such as *hand*, *roof*, *tree*. But it is even more interesting from a semantic perspective to show how the evocation mechanism works when we consider things that are not primarily 3D objects, as in *godless*, *homeless* and *childless*. We will return to these cases in section 14.

The reason that there are no *-ful* adjectives corresponding to this group of *-less* adjectives should be obvious: There are not many things normally without fingers that we would want to say are *fingerful*, so *fingerful* can almost only express either what is already expected and nothing special (*fingerful hand*; a hand with fingers) or what is a weird anomaly (*fingerful house*). Using *fingerful* is therefore pointless. Had *-ful* expressed a process leading to the state (as does *-filled*), the anomalies could have been resolved: Compare *bloodful barrel* to *blood-filled barrel*. But *-ful* only refers to the state itself.

Also, as we will see, *-ful* requires there to be a container involved, and normally these adjectival stems are not placed in containers. It is difficult to conceptualise the hand as a container that is possible to fill with fingers.

Building amount-specifying *-ful* nouns from these stems is sometimes possible but often strange: *an earful (of scolding)*, *a brainful of thoughts*. They do not belong in this group, however.

There exist a few metaphorical *-ful* adjectives with these stems, at least in Swedish: *blodfull* (English *full-blooded*). However, since the blood in the metaphorical adjective is not the same blood as in *bloodless* (but instead a "mental" blood as in section 7), *blodfull* does not couple with *bloodless*.

10.2. Adjectives that remove boundaries.

The second subset of *-less* adjectives is the most metaphysical group in our collection: *ageless*, *bottomless*, *boundless*, *ceaseless*, *countless*, *dateless*, *endless*, *fathomless*, *formless*, *limitless*, *measureless*, *numberless*, *placeless*, *quenchless*, *spaceless*, *structureless* and *timeless*.

Of course, some of these adjectives are similar to the first subgroup. For instance, an *endless journey* lacks the end which is normally a part of a journey. But are forms parts of things? Or places? Or ages?

Instead we propose that all stems in this subgroup more or less indirectly denote *boundaries*. The end of a journey is the boundary between the journey and whatever follows. The bottom of a lake is the boundary between the lake and whatever is beneath it.[16] In these cases *-less* removes these boundaries from the journey and the lake. In *limitless* a general limit, present with many objects, can be removed.

Similarly, in a *quenchless thirst* the normal boundary is removed between the thirst and the satisfied state after having drunk one's fill. The object (*thirst*) has a process tied to it (*quench*), and *-less* removes the end of the process (at least within the current scope of attention). *Ceaseless* is a more general adjective with the same end-boundary removal function.

A number of adjectives remove the form and structure of objects: *formless*, *shapeless*, *structureless*. When we imagine a *formless creature*, it is not possible to point out the boundary between the creature itself and the external environment, i.e. the object to *formless* is not configured as an entity, but rather as a mass. *Structureless* similarly refers to the lack of internal organisation of parts: Because the parts of a structureless entity can move about freely (just like grains of sand), we conceived of it as a plural mass.

The timeless beauty of Venice has no boundaries in time: Venice will never (within our scope of attention) cross any of the boundaries from beautiful to common or to ugly. *Spaceless* and *timeless* remove the basic boundaries with all objects between what they are here and now and what they will be elsewhere and afterwards.

Countless and *numberless* show the significance of boundaries for practical reasons: If you want to count something, you first need to bound what you want to count. When you cannot structure something in the form of countable entities, you represent it as a homogenous mass.[17]

Why then does not *ageful*, *endful* or *structureful* exist? It is because hardly anything is expected to lack age. Even if there were such a thing, we would not very often need to point out that for once it does have an age. In short, the stems in subgroup 2 refer to limitations that are expected of almost all conceivable objects. Coding these limitations in the *-less* adjectives may be the language community answer to Kant's a priori categories: Just like space and time are inherent in our conception of the world, so are structures, ends, bottoms and the other stems in this group.

10.3. Valence relation requirements of *–less*

In this first analysis of the *-less* adjectives, we presented two subgroups[18]. Let us now look at how the binding requirements of the *-less* adjectives appear before and after the valence relations have been accommodated.

	stem		*object*
adj.	[± **b**] +	[**less**] +	[± **b**]

The formula means that *-less* has no special requirements concerning boundedness, neither on the stem nor on the object of the adjective.

10.4 Results of the accommodation process, subgroup 1

After accommodation however, both the stem and the object in subgroup 1 adjectives will be conceived of as bounded, irrelevant of their previous boundedness status. Take as an example *bloodless victory*. The stem *blood* refers to something which is unbounded when it is out of context. Here, in this context, *blood* is bounded, because this blood is a part of the bounded whole *victory* (or more precisely the blood is part of the people that are part of that war and victory). The blood is properly contained and consequently bounded.

	stem		*object*
adj.	[+ **b**] +	[**less**] +	[+ **b**]

If the object was unbounded, as in *waterless ground*, that object will also be bounded, at least in the quality domain: The waterless ground is contrasted against ground with water on the other side of the boundary.

10.5 Results of the accommodation process, subgroup 2

Of course, in the second subgroup (*limitless*, *spaceless* etc.) the object is instead conceived of as unbounded after accommodation. The stem is a boundary and it does not change its boundedness status.

	stem		*object*
adj.	[boundary] +	[**less**] +	[**- b**]

If we combine an object that is bounded, say *speech*, with, for example, *endless* we get an unbounded *speech*. If we instead say *endless speaking* nothing special occurs - *speaking* is as unbounded after its encounter with *endless* as it was before.

Yet it makes sense to say *endless speaking*, why? It seems that we expect a result from all processes, bounded or not: From the unbounded *sleep*, we expect as a result that the agent is less tired afterwards. This expectation is so common that it seems not to require a special marker. But if this expectation becomes actually fulfilled, or if it is clear that it cannot become fulfilled, an overt marker may be required. The adjectives discussed here function as such markers of unfulfilable results. Prefixes marking the resultative Aktionsart in Polish and Russian provide an example of fulfilled result.

11. The Group of Items Ending only with in *-ful*

There is also a group of items whose stems may combine with *-ful*, but not with *-less*. Among these items, there are no stems that involve boundaries which are part of the object (*endless journey*), for reasons explained above. Instead there is one subgroup of amount-specifying nouns and one subgroup of adjectives with a mental meaning.

11.1. Nouns meaning the amount in the container of the stem

There is in this group a collection of nouns (or rather lexemes traditionally characterised as nouns) ending in *-ful*: *handful*, *glassful*, *spoonful*, etc. Appendix C provides a longer list. In these nouns, the stems are what Langacker calls *open containers*: *box*, *jar*, *pot*. It is notable that open containers "are often construed as designating the entire enclosed area, and not simply the physical object per se", Langacker (1987: 195). Langacker uses open containers as good examples to show what a *virtual boundary* is.

To our analysis it may be more important that such lexical elements (*open containers*) trigger a cognitive operation of *bounding* or *portion-excerpting*. "By this operation, a portion of the specified unbounded quantity is demarcated and placed in the foreground of attention." (Talmy 1988: 179-180).

11.2. Adjectives with a mental or social meaning.

In appendix D we have collected around 125 adjectives for this group. Except for a handful of uncertain cases (*fitful*, *interfruitful*), all of them have a mental or social meaning, such as: *blissful*, *deceitful*, *disrespectful*, *unfaithful*, *watchful*. Most of these adjectives have a negative meaning: *Boastful*, *forgetful*, *ghastful*, *hateful*, *scornful*, *unfruitful*, *unskilful*, *wrongful*. Even adjectives which are positive from a social perspective – *respectful*, *remorseful* – might be seen as negative for the individual because of the social restrictions on behaviour involved in them.

The objects to these adjectives are seldom prototypical open containers: *Boastful people*, *lustful evening*, *beautiful song*. Instead the objects are conceptualised as *closed containers*. These containers are filled with boasting, lust or beauty, but we cannot physically open and look into them, as we can with the open containers.

There are two large subgroups of adjectives prefixed with *un-* and *dis-*. As we noted above, these adjectives are probably close in meaning to the *-less* adjectives.

There seem to exist no adjectives ending only in *-ful* similar to *seedful*, i.e. with the meaning: Full of the non-mental mass denoted in the stem. Somehow, such adjectives are always coupled with an opposite adjective with *-less*. The only non-mental examples of *-ful* adjectives were *brimful* and *topful*, which accidentally couple with *-less* adjectives.

11.3 Adjectives with an intensifier meaning

On the surface level, *topful* and *brimful* are coupled with *-less* adjectives, but as we saw above, this is a mere accident. The meaning of the stems differ enough for the couples to be considered as different.

These adjectives also differ in meaning from the other *-ful* adjectives in the double forms. While seeds and tears can be treated as masses, certainly it is not the case with brims and tops. As is hinted by their alternative spelling *brimfull* and *topfull*, *brimful* and *topful* instead function as intensifiers, just like *chock-full*. They say of something that it is more than full, more precisely that the container is full to the "virtual boundary" (Langacker 1987: 191) part of the container that is placed in the stem (brims and tops being boundary parts of containers).

However, *brimful* does not say what the container is full of. Contrast its meaning to that of *seedful*, which says that the container is full of seeds, but not necessarily full to the brim. Or contrast *brimful* to the noun *handful*. A hand is a 3D container, so *handful* means only (an amount so

big) that the hand is full, but *handful* says neither full of what nor that the hand is full to the brim or any other boundary that is part of the hand.

11.4 Valence relation requirements of *–ful*

In her *Classifying Adjectives*, Warren (1984: 110) presents the hypothesis that the *-ful* suffix is "without lexical content" and "with discernible stem preference" of an abstract concept, i.e. that *-ful* only wants stems that are abstract (as opposed to *hand* in *handful*). It seems reasonable to reject Warrens hypothesis. From our analysis, *-ful* adjectives require stems with a mass meaning (with the exceptions of subgroup 3 in section 7). Strictly speaking, when the grammatical element *-ful* forms an adjective, it requires a stem denoting a *thing* that is *unbounded in its perceptual spatial domain*.

When the stem is not a mass, as a result of the accommodation process, *-ful* forms nouns with special grammatical requirements (as being followed by the *of*-something; cf. Jackendoff (1991: 23-24) on the function of COMPosition which takes "a substance as its argument and maps it into an individual"). The requirements on valence relation formation for *-ful* may thus be described as follows.

	Stem		*object*
n. (1)	[+ **b** in perceptual spatial domain] +	[**ful**] + of	[- **b**]
adj. (2)	[- **b** in perceptual spatial domain] +	[**ful**] +	[± **b**]
adj. (3)	[+ **b** in perceptual spatial domain] +	[**ful**] +	[+ **b**]

We can say *a handful of people*, but *a handful of man* seems to be anomalous (unless, of course, we interpret it with Jackendoffs (1991:25) grisly *universal grinder* – the opposite to the COMP function – which maps an individual entity into a mass substance).

The objects to the second group adjectives can be either bounded or unbounded: *beautiful song* and *beautiful singing*. The third group of adjectives seem to take only bounded objects (*brimful glass* is in order, but *brimful water* is anomalous as long as *water* is not allowed to have a part which is a virtual boundary).

11.5 Results of the accommodation process

As a result of the accommodation process of the valence relations, the adjectival stems will be bounded, like the objects to both the *-ful* adjectives and the *-ful* nouns:

stem		*object*	
n. (1)	[+ **b** in perceptual spatial domain] +	[**ful**] + of	[- **b**]
adj. (2)	[+ **b** in perceptual spatial or conceptual domain] +	[**ful**] +	[± **b**]
adj. (3)	[+ **b** in perceptual spatial domain] +	[**ful**] +	[+ **b**]

For the group 2 adjectives discussed here, the containers are not literal 3D spatial containers: The smile in *rueful smile* does not physically contain 'rue', i.e. regret. The nouns, however, denote amounts of things that are spatially contained as masses, and in this context as bounded masses: *a teaspoonful of coffee.*

12. The *-ful* and *-less* groups

Above, we presented two sets of formulae describing the boundedness behaviour of the *-ful* and *-less* morphemes in the accommodation process. The seven subgroups that we have described can be summarised as in table 6.

We will now discuss the semantic mechanism of *-ful* and *-less* and point out the underlying cognitive domains, which can explain why there is so little symmetry between *-ful* and *-less*.

At a first glance, adjectives ending in *-ful* and *-less* seem to involve the plexity concept. However, in our opinion, plexity is not the main component in their semantic behaviour. Instead, the *-ful* and *-less* morphemes evoke two different *kinaesthetic image schemata*.

Table 6-1: Summary of the groups of –ful and –less adjectives. The accidental double 3 group is not included.

Group	*Stem*	*Object*	*Item meaning*	*Normal state expectation*
Double 1, adjectives	Mental or social (*remorseful*, *joyless*)	Conceived of as closed container	Object is full of or lacks the stem	Generally neither nor. In context: Not normally full of stem or stem is expected.
Double 2, adjectives	Mass (*sapful*, *seedless*)	Physical closed container	Object is full of or lacks the stem	-"-
-less 1 adjectives	Part (*fingerless*, *verandaless*)	Whole	The object lacks the part	That the whole includes the part expressed in the stem
-less 2, adjectives	Basic (Kantian) boundary (*ageless*, *formless*)	Varying	The object lacks the stem type of boundary	That the object is bounded in the stem aspect
-ful 1, nouns	Open container (*handful*, *glassful*)	*of* mass	The amount of the object that fills the stem container	The amount meets the expected fullness level of the stem container
-ful 2, adjectives	Mental or social (*boastful*, *unfaithful*)	Conceived of as closed container	The object is full of the stem	That the object has little of the stem in it
-ful 3, adjectives	Virtual boundary (*brimfull*, *topful(l)*) which is part of container	Open container	Container is full to this boundary.	The normal fullness level is not this high

13. The Full-Empty Domain and the Container Image Schema

-ful has very strong semantic requirements on its stem and object because *-ful* involves the *full-empty* domain[19].

In Rusiecki (1985: 9), the full-empty domain is called a "binary, antonymic, symmetric, bounded scale". Moreover, Rusiecki excludes it

from all numerical adjectives: "Firstly, in the case of all numerical adjectives except the bounded-scale ones (full : empty etc.), the numbers are always number *of something*: namely numbers of *units of measure*, such as feet, years, kilograms, etc., appropriate to a *dimension*, such as height, age, weight, etc."

Rusieckis exclusion seems very reasonable. The main difference between numerical adjectives and *full-empty* lies in the fact that the *full-empty domain involves the relation between two different cognitive entities: container and contents*. Numerical adjectives, on the other hand, involve only one entity.

In other words: The domain full-empty has two landmarks (container and contents). When you say *something is full* it means: *It is a container* and *it contains something else* and *the content has reached the maximum level of the container*. The meaning of *something is empty* is very similar: *It is a container* and *the container contains nothing*.

Therefore the full-empty domain has only two values, 1 and 0, that apply to the relation between container and contents. Of course, the numerical adjectives instead make use of a full numerical scale (0, 1, 2, 3...n).[20]

Significantly, if we put *full* in the predicative position we can add *of X*: *The river is full of water*. If instead we say *Y is empty* we cannot add *of X*: *The river is empty of water*. We only have an expectation what there should be within the empty container (such as wine in the empty wine bottle). The *full-empty* scale is therefore not as symmetric between full and empty as one may initially think.

13.1 Full is not always full

Moreover, the state of *full*-ness in a container is dependent on the kind of container. *Open(able)* containers such as *glass*, *jar*, *vase*, and so on all have an *absolute maximum*: The state when the entire container is filled. This state is lexicalised in *brimful* and *topful*. There is also for many open containers an *expected fullness level*: In *a full bottle of beer*, we expect there to be a little air left at the top. The expected fullness level is therefore lower than brimful, i.e. lower than the absolute maximum.

But when the content is not a mass but a collection such as pears, the open containers do not any longer have such a well-defined absolute maximum. Herskovits' 1984 example *the pear is in the bowl* clearly indicates that in a full bowl of pears, we can add or remove many of the pears, and the bowl would still be full.

Closed containers, such as a *fruit* or the *body*, are quite different. A *sapful apple* is not completely filled with sap (there are also seeds, for instance). For closed containers, *full* rather seems to mean that we expected a high level of sap, but there was even more sap than we expected. The same applies to *beautiful song*: We expect songs to have beauty in them, but a beautiful song has more beauty than expected. In closed containers, the contents (sap and beauty) seem to be uniformly spread out inside the container, in contrast to the content in the full bottle of beer.

There are also cases such as *rueful smile* and *watchful child*. Here we expect a low level of 'rue' in the smile and not much watchfulness in the child, yet *-ful* tells us that there was much of both. We are therefore more surprised (or given more information) in these cases than in *beautiful song*.

In short, there are many different 'fullnesses', and *full* is definitely not always *maximum*.[21] Instead *-ful* in adjectives means just fuller than expected. Even the absolute level adjective *brimful* has the meaning: full to the brim, when we only expected the normal fullness level.

13.2 Resultative fulfilment

If we translate adjectives with *-ful* into inflectional languages (such as Polish or Russian), we often have to use the aspectually marked resultative participle: *delightful* - ***za**chwycający*, *remorseful* - ***s**kruszony*. In these cases *-ful* therefore seems to mark the fulfilment of the script connected to the stem. The *-ful* adjective very often has a stem with a script, which it applies to an active object: *harmful germs*, *merciful soldier*, *watchful eye*.

Other evidence for the *resultative* or *active* character of objects determined by these adjectives is found in their dictionary definitions. They usually include words such as: *having*, *containing*, *showing*, *expressing*, *causing*, *full of*, *giving*, *keeping*, *producing*, *feeling*. We could not check the frequency of these expressions, but they definitely give the image of resultative fulfilment.

Despite this strong processual character of the *-ful* adjectives, their connection to the CONTAINER image schema makes the stems appear as nouns rather than as verbs: Things make better contents than processes.

13.3 Container creation

It is interesting that when we apply a *-ful* adjective to an object, that object appears to be automatically conceptualised as a container: *scornful*

sight, *dreadful news*. The container creation follows the pattern: Unbounded stem + *-ful* + object -> the object is a bounded container.

[- **b** in the perceptual spatial domain] + [**ful**] + noun ———>
stem = conceptual CONTENT [+ **b**]
noun = CONTAINER [+ **b**]

These containers then become instantly full of the stem content, *scorn* and *dread*. Containers in the mental domain are non-3D and non-literal. Instead, the containers created by *-ful* express very fundamental human experiences, like in *rueful smile*. *Smile* can be conceived of as a container, because it has a temporal domain and it is temporally bounded. This temporal extension together with the spatial extension of the smile forms a perceptually salient container, which can be filled with 'rue' (i.e. regret).

As we showed in section 7, the vast majority of *-ful* adjectives are mental. Is it an accident that experiences from the interaction between people and the conceptualisation of humans as mental individuals is made by container constructions? Hardly, but this interesting question unfortunately lies outside the scope of this chapter.

13.4 Verticality: *-ful* is not up, *-less* is not down

Some of the confusion about *-ful* versus *-less* may stem from the VERTICALITY component of the full-empty domain: In a full bottle, the level is *higher* than in an empty bottle. Via VERTICALITY, the full-empty domain partially corresponds to the *more-less* domain: Since full is max and empty is nothing, full is *more* than empty and empty is *less* than full.

If the VERTICALITY component in full-empty were strong, one would expect that the full - empty domain connects to the metaphor MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN to generate the pattern FULL IS UP, EMPTY IS DOWN. If this connection existed, *full* would come close to being an opposite too *less*.

One indication of the weakness of the VERTICALITY in the full-empty domain is that it does not connect to the very well known metaphor UP IS GOOD, DOWN IS BAD to generate FULL IS GOOD, EMPTY IS BAD. The following examples clearly indicate the lack of such a connection: *artful*, *blameful*, *deathful*, *forgetful*, *frightful*, *harmful*, *hateful*, *mournful*, *painful*, *plaintful*, *resentful*, *revengeful*, *ruthful*, *scornful*, *sinful*, *slothful*, *sorrowful*, *spiteful*, *spleenful*, *stenchful*, *stressful*, *tearful*, *toilful*, *vauntful*, *vengeful*, *wailful*, *wasteful*, *weariful*, *woeful*, *wrongful*.

It should be fairly obvious that VERTICALITY in the full-empty domain is very marginal. The reason is that VERTICALITY is gradable and continuous, while the full-empty domain is binary and discontinuous. Such domains do not connect. Therefore the *full* in *-ful* does not mean *more*, and *-less* does not mean *less*.

14. The Minus Domain and the Part-Whole Image Schema

What domain does *-less* involve? At a first glance it may seem that *-less* invokes the more-(equal)-less domain. So, according to Rusiecki (1985: 34) the relations *equals*, *is more than* and *is less than* are primitive semantic concepts, just as primitive as *many* and *few*, which Bartsch and Vennemann call "the most primitive relative adjectives" (Rusiecki 1985: 34).

To us the most important feature of the relations *more* and *less* is that they apply to two continuous portions of the same kind of mass. You compare these portions, seeing their sizes at one and the same time, and estimate whether they are equal. If they are not equal, you have to decide where there is more, and where less. Your predication refers to two portions of one substance placed on two places at one time. This comparison is made within the *more-(equal)-less* domain.



Figure 6-1: When comparisons are made within the *more-(equal)-less* domain, the two substance portions differ either in space or in time. Here we show an example of less where the time of comparison is the same, but where the spatial locations of the two portions differ.

You can however also compare the same portion of *the same substance* but at different time points. You then make use of the *minus* domain.



Figure 6-2: In the *minus* domain, comparisons are instead made between two time instances (the previous LM2 and the current LM) of the same substance portion. Space is now irrelevant, because over time, the substance may have moved. The lacking part of the LM is marked as TR. Again, the amount minimum is 1, because 0 is a bad base for comparisons: *We have more children now than we had before* sounds like a joke when coming from a couple with only one child.

The *more-(equal)-less* domain does not seem to matter at all for the *-less* adjectives. Waterless is not a comparison between two simultaneously accessible objects, a TR that lacks the expected water and an LM that has the water. The two compared objects are not simultaneous. In other words, *-less* rather refers to the *minus* domain. It is the main reason why you can find *not having* and *lacking* in dictionaries definitions of the different lexical entries: Some of the substance has been removed.

Applying the *minus* domain is a mental decrementation process. You have to compare two states at different time points. This comparison does however not only work with substances and numerals. When applied to non-numerical objects; i.e. to individual things possibly with an internal structure, what we saw in section 10 will reappear: The TR of figure 2 is the missing part, i.e. the difference between the current whole (LM) and the whole in a previous time (LM2). The LM, i.e. WHOLE *minus* PART, is the profile of the entire nominal expression.

Unfortunately, this explanation of the semantics of *-less* adjectives is still not satisfactory. The time dimension of the minus domain is not present in the *-less* adjectives: When you say *legless table* you ascertain

only a present state of the table, but nothing is said of an actual process leading to this state.[22]



Figure 6-3: The *-less* adjectives have a dimension of different realities: One actual and one expected or imagined. In the expression *childless couple*, the LM is the couple, the TR is the lacking child, and the LM2 is the couple in the expected or imagined comparison state, i.e. with a child. Now, neither space nor time is relevant in the comparison, but the generic amount scale is the same for both realities.

Take as an example *childless couple*. This couple probably did not previously have a child, which they then lost and so became childless. Time is not the crucial difference between their current childless state and the expected but negated state of having children. Instead of having a time dimension, the domain which *-less* invokes has a dimension of different *realities*[23]. In the actual reality, we have the LM that in our case is the childless couple. In another reality, which is *expected* (and perhaps also imagined, possible or prescribed), the LM2 is the same couple but now with the expected child(-ren). The difference between the LM2 and the LM is the TR, i.e. the child(-ren).

The relative status of the other reality to our own is very important for the evaluative meaning of *childless couple*. If the other reality is the world of unfulfilled wishes of the couple, having (that much) less than what they hope for makes us feel sorry for the childless couple. If however the other reality expresses the world as it would be if the prescribed moral were followed, then having less than what is prescribed is rather seen as immoral and causing indignation[124].

1

That the time dimension of the minus domain has been substituted for a dimension of realities in the *-less* domain is not so strange. Futures and pasts are easily conceptualised as other realities. Consider a piece of *stainless steel.* In the future, it will have no or few stains. A normal piece of steel will corrode over time. So although the normal and the stainless steel look alike when you choose between them today, your choice is also between two different futures; the normal future with rust and the stainless future. By buying stainless steel, you sign up for the version of future where the steel is not stained, as opposed to the normal future where steel is always stained.

Taking the step from conceptualising different version of the future to conceptualising other variants of reality is not at all difficult.

Probably, the generations living towards the end of the 20th century have little experience with steel always rusting over time. To them, the commercial persuasiveness of *stainless steel* is therefore not very strong. Today, stainless steel is the norm. But even if the current generation lacks experience with stained steel, when they consider buying stainless steel, the comparison mechanism in *-less* is not gone. *-less* makes it clear to them that there is something like stained steel, even if it is outside of their own experience and expectations.

How the current day consumers imagine stained steel is another matter: To previous generations, *stainless* did not imply that the expected normality is *stainful* or *full of stains*. Their standard was rather steel with *some* stains.

A *stainless reputation* is also compared to an expected reputation with only some stains. Stains are always part of a surface whole, so *stainless* will expect a surface. Steel can provide such a surface, and obviously something in the concept of reputation is also a surface. Or, equally possible, the expected surface from *stainless* is simply installed in the *reputation* concept, similar to how humans were made into mental containers by *-ful*.

Applying *stains* and its surface to the *reputation* concept has to be metaphorically motivated (since *stainless* does not apply to everything). In this case the motivation probably comes from the opposition *clean - dirty* with its metaphorical pattern CLEAN IS GOOD, DIRTY IS BAD. This metaphor pattern is involved in some other relations as well (***im****maculate*, *spot****less***, ***un****impeachable*).

Stainless just like *childless* hints at how we think the world is organised: Steel and people's reputations have some stains. Couples have children. *Ageless* tells us that all things have an age. *Brainless* that people have brains. *Breathless* that we breathe. *Emotionless* that we have feelings.

Jobless that we normally have jobs. The *-less* adjectives present a picture of the normal world, to which we can compare and contrast the current situation.

But the *-less* adjectives are not just an objective mirror of the world as we know it. Objectively, *godless* should only indicate that we normally have gods, but in the dictionaries its primary meaning is *wicked* (i.e. we have *partial compositionality* only). There is a clear normative element in this meaning of *godless*. *Stainless* connects to CLEAN IS GOOD. We could feel pity for or indignation over the *childless couple*. Is *mannerless* good or bad? What about *spineless*, *spiritless* and *resistless*. In our analysis of the *-less* adjectives, we have often had the feeling that large areas of life are being evaluated, as if these adjectives were a road into whole ideologies and social mythology. With this conceptual content, it is not strange that the *-less* adjectives are so often used to *evaluate* deviations from expected and prescribed behaviour.

Summary of this chapter

It is now easy to answer our initial questions: The reason that *-ful* and *-less* sometimes appear in pairs and sometimes do not is that they make a different use of our expectations. *-ful* refers to the expected amount in containers, *-less* to lacking parts that should have been present in an expected whole. Only sometimes are these meanings compatible, as in the mental and social world, where we humans can be conceptualised either as closed containers (*-ful*) or as wholes (*-less*) and where the contents (*-ful*) or lacking parts (*-less*) are neither expected to be absent nor to be plentiful. More often, we have such a strong conceptualisation of what the world is like (all things have an age etc.) that only one of the two suffixes will ever have a communicative use. Finally, *-ful* and *-less* refer to different domains, which make them specialised for different purposes. *-ful* can be used not only to indicate deviation from the expected fullness level in physical and mental containers as well as in processes. *-ful* also specifies units by binding a mass with a container size. *-less* not only negates expected concrete parts such as fingers, verandas and children but also negates basic boundaries like age, space and structure.

The *-less* and *-ful* adjectives make up around 1 % of the words in dictionaries of 60000 - 100000 words, which is an indication that they have been found useful in many areas of life. Their usefulness consists in their broad flexibility in contrasting all sorts of things to how they *should be* in the normal, expected, prescribed, desired,… world.

Notes

[7] A similar example was provided by a Czech immigrant in Sweden, who productively formed the Swedish adjective *alkoholfull* (*alcoholful*) to express the Czech *alkoholicky*.
[8] Prefixes *in-*, *il-*, *im-*, *ir-* are phonetic variants of one prefix.
[9] Compare Blakemore (1989:34) who analysed how *but* can be used for signalling that the interpretation should contrast to the prototype expectation in a concept. Gärdenfors (1993) also connects *but* to expectations.
[10] Similar perhaps to what Winter and Gärdenfors (1994: 6) call an *epistemic revision*.
[11] A further speculation is that the bounding operation is involved when the very youngest infants learn that different areas of its original mass of sensory input are different objects.
[12] The difference between *boundedness* and *dividedness* (Talmy) or *boundedness* and *internal structure* (Jackendoff) has actually not been defined clearly enough. Ikegami (1993) presents the persuasive thought that Talmys and Jackendoffs concepts are two aspects of the same difference.
[13] "Valence *relations* are relations between parts within image schemata. *The accommodation process* takes these parts and tries to weld them into one entity by means of image superimposition." "The purpose of the accommodation process is to knit schemata together in valence relations as tight as reasonable and to protest when it finds them too different from each other." (Holmqvist 1993: 115 - 119; italics ours). The accommodation process is half-conscious or even unconscious (Holmqvist 1993:118).
[14] Mental processes are obviously seen as essentially unbounded. This might be evidence for the domination of vision in our conceptualisation: Since we count with our eyes, we also impose boundaries with our eyes. Since we cannot look inside ourselves, we therefore have no alternative other than to think of our inside content as a mass. Cf Lakoffs (1987) and Johnsons (1987) metaphors for our feelings as masses - liquid, air, steam, pressure.
[15] Since the object to *bloodless* is also expected just after *bloodless* itself (as the *war* in *bloodless war*), this is a very clear example of the coinciding grammatical and semantic expectations that Holmqvist 1993 describes.
[16] The bottom in *bottomless* is not, of course, an abstract and geometrically precise boundary. Jackendoff therefore claims that we have to add to its description a certain very fuzzy factor.
[17] This shows very clearly the role of our subjectivity in the process of conceptualisation: "something is bounded because a conceptualiser imposes a boundary in structuring a conceived situation, irrespective of how the requisite cognitive events are prompted" (Langacker 1987: 196).
[18] Sigurd (1972:55-56) claims that in Swedish, four main groups of nouns take the *-lös* suffix: (1) Admirable human qualities such as in *talanglös* (talentless), *mållös*

(speechless) and *orkeslös* (powerless). (2) Effect and importance, as in *poänglös* (pointless), *verkningslös* (ineffective) and *värdelös* (worthless). (3) Selfevident, close and useful things, such as *roderlös* (rudderless), *hemlös* (homeless) and *huvudlös* (thoughtless). (4) Desired benefits, such as *hjälplös* (helpless) and *värnlös* (defenceless). Without conducting any deeper analyses of the Swedish material, it seems clear that most of the examples in groups (1), (2) and (4) can be placed in our subgroup 2, because in these cases *-lös* removes the resultative boundaries on perfective processes underlying the nouns: The help given to the helpless person never can reach the positive end of the helping process. Sigurds group (3) mainly has to do with part-whole relations and therefore corresponds to our subgroup 1.

[19] In Langackers (1987) terminology, the full-empty domain is an *abstract* domain, not a basic domain such as time, space and temperature.

[20] Cases such as *something is half full* or *something is 70% empty* are very special. We treat them as no primary use of *full* and *empty*, as opposed to Rusiecki (1985: 76 - 77)

[21] This difference between full and maximum might be similar to the length of the end of a rope, for which Jackendoff (1991) would use the category.

[22] Here we can apparently see why adjectives in English are "a fuzzy category" (Rusiecki, 1985:1). "Semantically, the adjective seems to stand between the noun and the verb. This applies particularly to adjectives in predicative function. Occasionally one and the same sense can be expressed, within the same language, by a verb or an adjective." (Rusiecki 1985: 2)

[23] We prefer the naive term *reality* to *possible world*, which is used in modal semantics. An other reality is an imagined, presupposed, desired, believed or expected version of our actual reality, much like Fauconniers (1985) *mental spaces*. Holmqvist 1993:182 pp discuss how so-called *hedges* also invoke different realities.

[24] According to Sigurd (1972:54), the corresponding Swedish suffix *-lös* has the evaluation built into it: Only positive or neutral stems are used. Negative stems are instead used with the suffix *-fri* (*-free*). Therefore *painless* is translated into *smärtfri*, not *smärtlös*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ECHOES OF THE INFINITE I: SUBLIMICISM. THE HISTORY OF THE SUBLIME IN THE POLISH LYRIC FROM A THUNDERING PROPHET TO THE BLACK ROSE

This chapter is based on an analytical survey of the selected literary works of 11 major figures of the Polish lyric such as J. Kochanowski, A. Mickiewicz, J. Słowacki, C. K. Norwid, B. Leśmian, A. Wat, J. Przyboś, T. Różewicz, M. Białoszewski, Z. Herbert, and Cz. Miłosz. (Pluciennik 2002) Those authors were chosen for analysis and interpretation because their works are deeply rooted in a "sublimicist" sensitivity and discourse of the sublime or opposed to this discourse. We characterise basic rhetoric devices found in the literary works of art as representations of the experience of the sublime. In the frame of the history of the sublime there has always been a particular kind of dynamics that stems from the tension between the antimimetic element of the sublime and *mimesis*, mainly the *mimesis* of emotion. In our view, there is a strong relationship between the increasingly antimimetic bias in modernist lyric and more universal tendencies in modernist art, namely dehumanisation, intellectualisation and abstraction. (Pluciennik 2000) We would like to claim that the rhetoric of the sublime in Polish lyric has persisted because of the resistance to the radical dehumanisation and intellectualisation (as in Ortega y Gasset and Hugo Friedrich), because of the opposition to its own antimimetic forces. This resistance follows from the social nature of language as the main substance of the literary work of art as well as from the generic feature of lyric that has always been tied to the mimesis of emotions. However, the latest representations of the experience of the sublime in Polish poetry are, in a way, indirect. The main devices used there to make the representations not direct are intertextuality and quoting.

Is it possible to imagine and trace *the first appearance of the unimaginable* in the history of humankind? Adam Smith, in *Essays on*

philosophical subjects from 1758, printed in 1795, wrote that lack of simple account for phenomena of nature, that is to say, lack of imagination, shaped the beginning of philosophy. The marvellous and the enchantment are caused by natural wonders. Lack of imagination to conceive of a mechanism causing natural phenomena such as wind, moving of the sun, moon, stars and birth, and death. (Smith 1996: 233-243) But it is not this unimaginable which is at stake here.

There are people who would like to look at the inconceivability of the Old Testament's God as an absolutely unique paradigm of imagination, which stands as a distinguishing mark not only for the people of Israel but also for Christianity, and, last but not least, for Islam. Such an imagination was the main reference and assistance of many authentic religious lives. This imagination makes the soul wider, as Immanuel Kant puts it, (Kant 1958: § 29) and it makes vivid and stronger a sense of being, it awakes people to life. In the name of this imagination, through ages, one negates and condemns pagan cultures that are dedicated to that, which is visible and sensual and which is depicted on incalculable woodland altars. In the name of this imagination as well, after the Reformation, many statues and paintings were thrown out from temples in Europe. In the name of just this imagination the Taliban in Afghanistan destroyed huge statues of Buddah in March 2001. And then followed a terrorist attack on a contemporary statue of Western Civilisation: Twin Towers. Osama ben Laden was talking about this in an iconoclastic manner before the attacks on America in September. This imagination is based on enthusiasm, it evokes enthusiasm, it, one would like to say, is enthusiasm. As Eliane Escobas puts it, this imagination is a faculty of creation of the unimaginable. (Escoubas 1993: 67) However, from time to time, the enthusiasm turns into intolerance. It is significant that Edmund Burke, one of the three main figures in the theory of the sublime, in his early writings on the sublime from 1759 (Burke 1958), seems to accept enthusiastic and violent facets of the sublime, but, in later reflections on the revolution in France from 1790, (Burke: 1996) revolution, which is regarded as the peak of the political sublime, (Ashfield and de Bolla 1996: 267) he observes with terror the actual escalation of violence during the "advances" of the French revolution, which culminated in insulting and decapitating the king, the archetypical figure of the sublime. Excess of such imagery in the arts and literature becomes much more easily accepted in the long 18th century in Europe (1688-1815). Then, there was a significant change in accounting of genius, for example. "Genius" began to mean a person with natural talents, which made extraordinary achievements possible, which earlier were only possible with the assistance of supernatural and trans-human spirits. So

genius bears connotations of transgression (Mason 1993). Representations of the sublime experience in literature at this time also bear this factor evoking political and moral transgression.

Many theorists of the sublime, above all Kant and Hegel, (Modiano 1987) emphasise the role of the Decalogue in the building of foundations such an iconoclastic type of imagination. According to Kant, (§ 29) *the Commandment*, we are here talking about, *forbidding making a material resemblance or image*, is the most sublime passage of the Torah. There are two traditions in numbering this Commandment: the Catholic and Lutheran churches make it a part of the First Commandment but the Orthodox and Reformed churches treat it as a separated second Commandment. Kant assigns to this Commandment a huge role in evoking enthusiasm of Jews for their own religion, when they compare themselves with pagan nations. He also writes about the pride of Muslims in this context. However, Kant accounts for the opposition to the sublime as well. And it is not a plain style. The opposite of the sublime phenomenon consists of image worshipping. He also considers rhetorical and political dimension of this cult of paintings and statues: governments employ the cult in order to constrain imagination of their serfs, to codify their imagery, and to make impossible the expansion of the individual soul. A serf becomes passive and it is easy to lead her/him. One of the recent slogans in Polish advertising was the sentence: "Imagination is dynamite". But the true dynamite is the unimaginable, that is to say, the sublime. That is why the prophet and pope of postmodernism, Jean-François Lyotard, following Adorno, views the sublime as the main device of the iconoclastic avant-garde techniques. (Lyotard 1982, 1982, 1984, 1993, 1994)

The result of our historical survey of 11 Polish poets is the hypothesis that we should be aware of the strong literary tradition in Polish literature, which employs an iconoclastic imagery, in an etymological sense. We here use here the term **"***sublimicism***"** invented by Paul Crowther in his book on aesthetics of postmodernism from 1993. According to him, sublimicism is a movement in the contemporary arts, which is very close to abstract expressionism. But we use this term in a wider sense. We would like to talk here on sublimicist imagination. Due to this, we can here describe many phenomena from different times and different literary movements. Literary works included in this tradition represent similar cultural and imaginative experience using iconoclastic devices. There were theorists of the sublime who underlined the trans-generic character of the sublime. (cf. Ramazani 1989) We cannot constrain ourselves to epochs, to media, styles, to literary genres. Pseudo-Longinos already puts this problem in a

different way.

In the 18th century in Britain, we can find the enthusiast and theorist of the sublimicist literature Robert Lowth who wrote his lectures *Praelectiones de Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum* published in 1753 translated into English as *Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews* 1787. (Lowth 1996) They were famous in Poland at that time, as we can infer from praising the Bible and psalms by Leon Borowski in his notions on rhetoric and poetry from 1820. (Borowski 1972: 47, 49, 69). But Lowth's ideas were already in the cultural air of that time.

It is not easy to define the sublimicist imagination. In order to do so, we catalogued the gathered exemplification of sublimicist lyric images in 4 series. Then, we tried to account an ideal model of lyric as an evoker of the experience of the sublime. This model can be described using an act of Annunciation. God, using a word of an Angel, incarnates himself. Word becomes flesh. Word becomes enthusiasm.

In the first series, we describe *images tied to the representations of the infinite and supernatural*. In these images, antimimetic evocation prevails as well as iconoclastic attitude towards the virtual reader's imagination. The central representation here is limitless God, and the Hidden God, the unpresentable and unconceivable. It is characteristic that motives of mental transgression are strictly tied to those representations. This mental transgression means very often transcendence of this world in catastrophic and apocalyptic imagery or imagery connected to a before–death perspective. Representations of the contact with the Transcendent God are included here as well as representations of human dignity coming from his/her spirituality (universal priesthood of man or even God in man). In the West such an imagination had a religious outlet. In Poland, significantly, such motives were an important part of the Polish Church of Literature (This is idea present in the Polish Romanticism in an era of a nation without independent state.)

In the second series, we consider *representations of the natural order and architectural representations* in lyric poetry. They are sometimes tied to the social and political architecture. We describe inspirational and inspiring huge open spaces of Polish lyric: images of the Far North in Russia, representations of invaders' space, particularly, the gothic imagery connected with an image of Germans. Also the open space of Ukraine was a most inspiring for Polish nationalism. We also account images of the Mediterranean Sea and images of artificial infinity in Leśmian's poetry where two mirrors confront each other. In avant-garde lyric, we find an urban space connected with the experience of the technological sublime. Recently, one can discover open spaces of the World War II destruction,

spaces of the Holocaust and empty axiological space of the communist ruling. They all function as angelic, inspiring spaces used to announce to the reader the sacred word.

In the third series, we deal with *motives connected to experience of the aura of the past*: "song" as a church of national memories, literary encounters with spirits of the past, openness to resonance with the past and a pietistic relationship towards archetypical images of the past. Here we can also find an idea of a National Sacred Book and a model of literature as an eerie house of spiritualistic encounters.

The fourth series is devoted to *the representations of transport associated with struggle with adversity and hardship*. With those images we can combine the representations of absolute solitude and negligence, national martyrdom. But here we can also find the imperial sublime and the sublime connected with political opposition in a totalitarian regime. Czesław Miłosz, in a recent work, creates an image of opposition and estrangement in ourselves.

With all those mentioned images *a model of the lyric as Annunciation* is strictly tied. First, in the lyric of all times there are formulas of the sublime such as presenting the unpresentable, expressing the inexpressible, saying the unsayable. They all signal a wish to represent and, at the same time, the impossibility to represent.

A model of lyric as annunciation is present in contexts of such formulas of the sublime. The poem announces a word which becomes flesh inside the reader. A virtual reader must have a particular attitude towards the sacred word of the lyric. This attitude is perfectly described in Song of Songs and the attitude of the beloved. It is necessary to humiliate oneself in order to be transported by the sublime lyric word. This model is using a model of the erotic relationship between lover and beloved, God and the soul of the reader. This might also take a form of particular ecstatic devices such as gradation and accumulation. (Holmqvist, Pluciennik) It is significant that the most typical and advanced forms of amplification and gradation can be found in the Romantic poetry. We already referred to the poem by the Polish Romantic prophet Adam Mickiewicz called "To Spin Love". This is an ecstatic, mystic and, at the same time, paradoxically enough, magic ladder to heaven. It is possible, however, to find gradation and accumulation even in 20th century Polish poetry after World War II, particularly in Zbigniew Herbert's works. But there, the gradation functions as an allusion and a remainder of the past possibilities for the lyric transport.

In our survey of Polish lyric poetry, obviously, philosophical and religious works prevail. But there are also political agitations, erotic

verses, meta-poetic works and parodies of glossolalia and revelation. (see Pluciennik 1999)

In the futurist era *Pug Iron Stove* by Aleksander Wat was written. It was a kind of parody of the poetics of Polish neoromanticism. One of the most famous fragments of the work: "THE ABSOLUTE. A sexless whore with a bronze forehead, motionless throughout the vibrations of years and universes." (translation by Venclova 1996:66) was commented by Bolecki: "This is a futurist end of the Young Poland" (Bolecki 1991: 154). This fragment can be viewed as such since it mocks at the neoromantic language of revelation and epiphany. (On characteristics of the epiphanic style of the Polish neoromanticism see Nycz 1996: 25).

The history of the sublime in the Polish lyric, which a superficial overview we tried to present here, *starts with Jan Kochanowski* from the 16th century because his psalms were trans-denominational inspired by Buchanan's version. This tradition of basic sensibility, directed towards inconceivability of God and the huge world, was continued by the great romantic poets such as Mickiewicz, Słowacki, Krasiński and Norwid. The major break comes with Leśmian, whose poetry, on one hand, hyperbolises the traditional images of infinity, on the other hand, one may find there nihilistic cracks. He is fascinated with images, which might be compared to an image of black rose: a plant impossible to exist at this time, but a romantic figure fascinating for poetic imagination. This is the first step towards nihilistic blasphemies of the futurists and intellectual lyric of the poets of the avant-garde in general.

The opposition towards this tradition is particularly well visible in the works of Tadeusz Różewicz and Zbigniew Herbert. It is a paradoxical situation because both poets, at the same time, function in contemporary Poland as emblems of ethical poetry. It is apparent that the sublime experience has a morally neutral meaning. The sublime may be used in a good and a bad manner and for good and bad goals. Both poets would think that to experience the sublime transport is to put oneself in a dangerous position. Beside this, Różewicz views the sublime with suspicion because he associates it with a dominant western patriarchal culture of the Spirit, which discredited itself during the World War II. What was left in representational politics after the war disaster was body and feminine values. Moreover, not young feminine values were important but old women values were.

From this perspective, Miron Białoszewski, Czesław Miłosz and Julian Przyboś seem to be completely different. Białoszewski transports and elevates ordinary phenomena such as colander and stove. But Miłosz, the best incarnation of the sublime, finds in this incantations and rhythm of his

poetry. Another poetic device used by him is intertextuality. He sometimes cites discourses of angels and prophets. At other times, he identifies with dead people. The main device, however, is a peculiar cult of objectivity. He wants us to see particular things in an objective, particular and, at the same time, general way.

Julian Przyboś is simply fascinated by the open space of rural man and, at the same time, by the technological sublime of huge buildings such as gothic cathedrals and urban architecture.

We can summarise our survey and say, that *the history of the sublime in the Polish lyric confirms a modernist turning point***:** something came to an end then, high emotionality of the lyric was not obvious anymore, let alone the highest ecstasy of the sublime. And the model of literary reception changed, empathy with an author was not an obligation any more and the humiliated feminine attitude towards sacred words of the literary work went out of fashion.

But some examples of Miłosz's and Herbert's poetry show that *the modernist turning point was not so radical as it seemed to be* for Ortega y Gasset, Hugo Friedrich, and Wilhelm Worringer. Abstraction or intellectualisation of poetry has its limits. Readers still read poetry in order to transcend themselves, ("be ecstatic" meant "be outside") and readers still read poetry in order to fill themselves with other identity, strange but very close identity, different, but almost the same identity. But this does not mean that today we can find lyric elements in Polish poetry similar to the speeches of ancient prophets of Israel. Today poets evoke the sublime using negation and subtle images such as black rose.

From a thundering prophet to the black rose. The history of Polish lyric shows that the lyric in general fits romantic sensibility well. If this is true, is it right to define modernity by the dominance of intellectual values, then? Is it true that Enlightenment shaped modernity much more than 19th century revolutions? Readers still empathise with authors of poems. Modernism protested against empathy but lyric poetry has strong bias to be dramatic (in a Brechtian sense). People communicate with subjects in poetry and authors want to communicate with people, want to persuade them emotionally, that is to say they want to fill them up with their-like emotions and attitudes. Annunciation as a model of lyric poetry is still in force today but the Angel does not impregnate by a thundering prophet, he rather skims impersonally and goes away. He even denies his existence. But this negation can evoke the past experiences because culture is based on memory.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECHOES OF THE INFINITE II: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RHETORIC OF THE SUBLIME IN CONTEMPORARY POPULAR CULTURE (ESPECIALLY AFTER SEPT. 11)

In this chapter we will argue that there is a wide range of phenomena in contemporary popular culture that might be properly described and defined using a model of communication included in our theory of the sublime. In the past, the sublime was often used in order to describe encounters with the Other or the Absolute. Nowadays, we can find the sublime very often in unexpected phenomena of popular culture such as advertising, horror films or sport events.

*

The sublime in Pseudo–Longinos might be an effect of an encounter with something very great or terrifying such as ocean or an active volcano. The prototypical example of the sublime phenomenon in further history of the concept is "infinity". That is why it is important to emphasize that the encounter may be purely imaginative and mental. A subject of the experience of the sublime must be mentally engaged in it, which means that she/he is emotionally involved in the experience. Relevant emotions are very intensive, to the highest degree of *ekstasis* and enthusiasm. The subject experiencing the sublime is transported. Other emotions bound with the sublime are admiration and shock. Sometimes in the theory of the sublime you can find also horror. From the beginning of the talk about the sublime, it was associated with the experience of *numinosum* or the sacred.

The rhetoric of the sublime is understood in this chapter as the art of using language and other communicative activities in order to persuade emotionally. The emotional persuasion consists in evocation of the

emotions bound with the sublime. The rhetoric has also a set of communicative means of the evocation. We have tried to sketch out a model of the rhetoric of the sublime that consists of three elements: antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable, a *mimesis* of emotions and figures of the discourse of the sublime.

At first glance, there is no such thing as the sublime in contemporary popular culture, which mainly contains images and which is often defined as image-based culture.

In *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* from 1819 Artur Schopenhauer treats still lives and naked bodies in painting as the opposite to the sublime because they attract an audience and excite desire. Similarly, waxworks have been excluded by him from the arts because they do not excite imagination, that is to say, they are too mimetic. So pornography, as mimetic as possible, is the opposite of the sublime, which does not simply attract an audience. Pornography, if we understand it in terms of its formal devices used in order to represent naked bodies, has not much to do with representing the unimaginable. We live in a time of pornographic culture, when TV shows such as Big Brother dominate the scene of popular life.

No wonder that the most typical examples of sublimicist imagination (a term by Paul Crowther 1993, which we use in a broader sense) cannot be found on TV in the main realistic stream. Instead, we can find them in science-fiction movies and in cult TV shows such as *Twin Peaks*. For Kant, the most important ideas here would be: the representation of infinity and the idea of the Hidden God. We can associate with those ideas other representations to find in literature: apocalyptic imagery, images of a before-death perspective, encounters with transcendence, spirituality and universal priesthood of man. In this imagery we can trace a dominance of the antimimetic evocation of the unimaginable and iconoclastic attitude towards imagery of the audience.

We would also claim that the next circle of sublimicist imagination tied to images of the past and their aura also is not too often to be found on TV. Pietistic attitude towards literature, scripture and special spiritual encounters with the ghosts of ancestors are too literary and too connected with inner life to be presented on the TV screen.

However, one of the most inspiring sources of sublimicist imagery is nature. Huge mountains, big rivers, vast plains and oceans have always been regarded as causing the sensation of the sublime. No wonder we can find representations of such phenomena even in advertisements; for instance, in Poland there is an ad for washing-powder called Persil Ocean Fresh, where the action of the ocean serves as a comparison of the action of the washing-powder. A speaker says: “be enraptured with freshness and

cleanness!"

One of the most advertised brands of cigarettes uses the slogan "Come to Marlboro Country" where the country is represented by vast plateaus and huge mountains. In literary studies, this is called the American sublime.

Many airlines and producers of aircraft, such as Airbus or Boeing are using representations of huge space in their commercials, but this is also connected with the so called technological sublime, which we would like to discuss later.

Even the concept of infinity can be used in commercials. We tried to describe the group of Kantian adjectives connected with the experience of the sublime. (See chapter 2) Some of them are very often in ads. For instance, Ace is described by a slogan: whiteness without limits. The slogan is accompanied by an image of a monotonic series of white clothes hanging on strings. Edmund Burke would call it an artificial infinity. There is also an ad of a car branch that uses the literal image of infinity to suggest infinite possibilities.

Kant would use the term mathematical sublime. But he also used the term dynamical sublime in order to describe a disturbing and threatening element in the sublime experiences. Since Pseudo-Longinos and especially Burke, the sublime was also tied to terror, which can be regarded as a harbinger of death. At first glance, there cannot be such representations using the dynamical sublime in commercials. It was once said that the sublime in social thought was an idea of revolution. Indeed, the authors of commercials are far away from wanting to cause any revolutions. It is rather a typical image used by one Polish supermarket chain to lure the audience with a calm and childish atmosphere. They use the image of a ladybird as their logo. But there was an ad in Poland, which used the slogan: "Imagination is Dynamite". Also fighting nature was used in commercials advertising insurance companies. They employ, for instance, the image of a lonesome man in a lighthouse during a storm.

It is rather typical that the dynamical sublime is encountered rather in social ads and in the everyday news. Paul Crowther claimed that we actually experience the dynamical sublime watching images of natural disasters, for instance. (1989) It is also a significant fact that the dynamical, disturbing element of the sublime in news services is neutralised by ending the news programme with something funny and calm. And then comes sports news and a very rationalised and calming weather forecast map. (A map can be regarded as an emblem of organized reality).

With the dynamical sublime we would like to refer a second element in our model of the rhetoric of the sublime, the so called mimesis of emotions. The unimaginable may be represented not only by using huge space or other huge phenomena, but also by showing an emotional effect on human beings. The reader may like to compare our description of horror movies in chapter 2

Similar devices might be described in all enthusiastic phenomena on TV. A clapping audience in a studio, which is showing enthusiasm every time a star is saying something interesting, is a model for identification. An enthusiastic speaker during sport events is also a model for empathic identification. In one ad in Poland such a speaker was used in order to imitate a football match. Actually it was an introduction of a new mobile phone model.

Other attitudes might also be presented in order to suggest the proper attitude towards a product. A cartoon figure is worshipping a mobile phone, for instance. Or Japanese monks are saying mantras "Tau, Tau, Tau", in order to increase the quality of the picture on their TV-set screens. So, even a mystical ecstasy can be used in commercials in order to consecrate a product. In a pub, we have seen a bottle of Whiskey in a hall in the wall, which reminded us of a catholic tabernaculum. The most typical figure of mystical transport, gradation, is also used for increasing the dynamics of TV shows. Prizes in competitions are usually increased by doubling their numbers. This is a typical gradation. Also quick editing of video-clips could be interpreted as realising the rhetoric of the sublime: it was obvious in the past that the sublime must strike as a thunderbolt.

After September 11th

We live in the ecstatic time of hip-hop music and mass narcotic transport caused by the rhythm of techno music. Some call it a hyperreality. On the other hand, MOVE in a discussion on Internet we were told that New York children once they are outside the City react by crying when they see the sky with stars. It is a significant fact that they must be driven out of the city in order to experience natural sublimity. Instead of the starry heaven and the natural Niagara Falls (natural and not surrounded by civilization), people nowadays are confronted with the technological sublime: planes, spacecraft, giant bridges, towers, sky-scrapers, huge city-like airport terminals, power networks, the Internet. They serve as unbounded and wonderful nature. They are contemporary gothic cathedrals, pyramids, and starry heavens. But in the past wonders were treated as wonders, today in the European and American cultures

they are of a everyday nature. The result is that society and technology become the unpresentable God of contemporary human being. Societies can therefore have much more pressure on individuals.

One of the most important uses of the many-faced sublime took place on September 11. This was a very interesting example of the so-called 'media events', or better, 'coercive media events'. (Dayan and Katz 1992; Weimann and Winn 1994: 92)

We can call the first kind of the sublime used in the event the technological sublime combined with the second kind: the apocalyptic sublime. The famous buildings of the World Trade Center were one of the most sublime symbols of Western, global civilisation. As one poet reacting to September 11 expressed:

Twin towers of the west
illusions of a kingdom now fallen.
(David Cale, *The Blinding*) (Gordon 2001: 11)

Another poet, Richard M. Grove, the project director of a global book of poets reacting to the events of September 11, said:

September 11th, 2001
Finds two American icons crushed.
(Richard M. Grove, *The New Landscape*) (Gordon 2001: 29)

The horrible events of September 11 were planned in such a way that they could become a very interesting TV show. Already Pseudo-Longinos in his treatise on sublimity noted that we, as human beings, like very much to watch disasters and catastrophes. This is the reason why apocalyptic imagery sometimes becomes popular. George Lakoff, in his very global letter on September 11 on the Cogling discussion list, ten days after the events, tried to suggest empathic identification with the falling buildings of the WTC. (Lakoff 2001) But this empathic identification could also explain why so many people became fascinated with the image of the falling towers. (Walton) We have even seen this image on the wall of one popular pub in Poland. Apocalyptic imagery is based on identification with destroying power. The power is horrifying but attractive. (This is a very common trait in the experience of the sublime.) One of the main pieces evidence for this attraction is one very popular genre of novels in the US: the apocalyptic novel. The most popular authors of these novels are Tim F. LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins. They have recently published ten books based on some motives from the Apocalypse in the Bible. They sold about 36 000 000 copies of all the titles: *Left Behind*, *Tribulation Force*,

Nicolae, *Soul Harvest*, *Apollyon*, *Assassins*, *The Indwelling*, *The Mark*, *Desecration*, *The Remnant*. According to a poll made by *Time* (August 19, 2002: 43), 59% of Americans believe that the prophecies in the *Book of Revelation* will come true. Fighting with a demonised evil is one of the main motives in all described phenomena. As stated by Andrew McKenna:

The religious motivation of the terrorist is transparent and, on its own terms, irrefutable, since by definition its sacred inspiration and goal are exempt from all forms of human inquiry; its sanctions transcend all worldly jurisdiction, descending from a hieratic point of reference beyond the pale of human tribunals. (McKenna 2002)

The recent terrorist attacks belong to the fourth or "Religious Wave" of terrorism that began in 1979. In the three earlier waves of terrorism, religion was always important, but the main goals were to create secular sovereign states.

Religion has a vastly different significance in the fourth wave, supplying justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established. Islam is the most important religion in this wave […]. But we should remember that other religious communities produced terrorists too. […] Christian terrorism, based on racial interpretations of the Bible, emerged mostly in the amorphous American Christian Identity movement. In true millenarian fashion, armed rural communes composed of families would withdraw from the state to wait for the Second Coming and the great racial war that event would initiate. So far the level of Christian violence has been minimal, although some observers have associated the Identity movement with the Oklahoma City bombing (1995). (Rapoport 2002)

It is significant that Osama ben Laden was pointing to the iconoclastic motives of his actions. As we already mentioned, many theorists of the sublime, above all Kant and Hegel, (Modiano 1987) emphasise the role of the Decalogue in the building of foundations such an iconoclastic type of imagination. According to Kant, (§ 29) the Commandment, we are here talking about, *forbidding to make a material resemblance or image*, is the most sublime passage of the Torah. There are two traditions in numbering this Commandment: the Catholic and Lutheran churches make it a part of the First Commandment but the Orthodox and Reformed churches treat it as a separated second Commandment. Kant assigns to this Commandment a huge role in evoking enthusiasm of Jews for their own religion, when they compare themselves with pagan nations. He also writes about the pride of Muslims in this context. However, Kant accounts for an opposition to the sublime as well. And this is not a plain style. The opposite of the sublime phenomenon consists of image worshiping. He

also considers the rhetorical and political dimension of this cult of paintings and statues: governments employ the cult in order to constrain the imagination of their serfs, codify their imagery, and make impossible the expansion of the individual soul. A serf becomes passive and it is easy to lead her/him. One of the recent slogans in Polish advertising was the sentence: "Imagination is dynamite". But the true dynamite is the unimaginable, that is to say, the sublime. That is why the prophet and pope of postmodernism, Jean-François Lyotard, following Adorno, views the sublime as the main device of the iconoclastic avant-garde techniques. (Lyotard 1982, 1982, 1984, 1993, 1994)

The last problem, this attraction of the violent sublime, this common fascination with iconoclastic and apocalyptic imagery is the most important issue relating to the sublime in the media and in popular culture. How many terrorists will dream about using this imaginary power without caring about people suffering because of these evil shows? In the famous, really global, international anthology of poetry *A Time of Trial. Beyond the Terror of 9/11* a recursive motive in many works of this global literature is human brotherhood and solidarity. In this motive, one can see a very sublime element of hope that the talk about global issues and events will be dominated by "landscape of unity". Hopefully it is not merely a sentimental slogan. This motive of "unity" also belongs to the rhetoric of the sublime. The most sublime phenomena are strictly tied to a kind of empathic behaviour, namely, prosocial behaviour (they are tied to a broad concept of empathy as in Preston and de Waal). Such behaviour could be interpreted as sublime, because an individual is making a sacrifice for the sake of society. The individual is annihilating himself/herself as a drop in an ocean (as Schopenhauer says). This is a very common tread in Western civilisation. In the roots of our culture the cross is placed which is a representation of a sublime sacrifice. (Crockett 2001) On the other hand, it is a very common motive in many popular nationalisms that an individual makes a sacrifice and becomes a hero in a society. It is obvious in many works of contemporary popular culture. For instance, in the movie titled *Independence Day* (1996), directed by Roland Emmerich, one of the most decisive moments in the struggle with aliens attacking the Earth is a sacrifice made by a pilot who strikes the huge alien spaceship with his plane with him onboard. He is worshiped as a hero afterwards. This motive can easily explain why so many Palestinians decide to sacrifice themselves in an empathic prosocial behaviour. And this can also explain one of the main motivations of the terrorists attacking the World Trade Center and America generally. They believe that they are on the right side of the battle. The sublime experiences and the sublime rhetoric together

with religious motives are responsible for escalating all the conflicts underlying the global terrorism. We would like to finish with an appeal by Andrew McKenna:

> The question prompted by nihilist terrorism, then, is: What do we in the West, or the US, have in common with the suicide bomber as the token of a type of behavior that we can see around us and imagine of ourselves, or in ourselves? What can we recall from our own experience that enables us to understand him and consequently to affiliate his seemingly outlandish impulses with those we can recognize as intimately our own? How, in this context, can we respond anthropo-logically, dispassionately and scientifically, to the cognitive imperative implied by the Roman adage *homo sum et nihil humani alienum puto,"* which remains axiomatic for all interhuman inquiry? How, to borrow from Nietzsche's own phrasing, can we understand what is all-too-human about this exercise of apocalyptic violence in its appeal to hieratic and unanswerable transcendence?

This kind of understanding is equal to humanistic self-doubt which can make the world perhaps greyer and less “black and white”. We think that the way out of the mechanisms of demonising “enemies” is a humanistic alternalive to seemingly more persuasive and violent devices in our popular culture.

INSTEAD OF A FINAL CONCLUSION

NON-CARTESIAN SEMANTICS AND EMPATHY

1. Non-Cartesian and Dynamical Semantics

Now we would like to express some obvious observations on our theory presented in this book. This theory is a theory of semantics, which can be properly described as a cognitive semantics. As such, the theory itself is a continuation of the second turn in cognitive approaches to language, which is directed against the Cartesian semantics, if such semantics existed (as Cartesian linguistics by Chomsky). This hypothetical semantics would have to deny the huge role of conventionalised subjectivity in language. Our semantics is anti-Cartesian, because we claim, after Lakoff and Johnson, Turner and Gärdenfors, and many, many others that objectivist semantics cannot be true. The main reason why our semantics cannot be a Cartesian semantics, is, of course, that we believe that our concepts do not have an Aristotelian structure; instead, our concepts display a radial structure and a prototypical effect. Any simple concept such as *mother* or *house* can be a good example of a prototypical effect and radial structure. In every semantic case, we have always one word and a complex semantic radial structure in our minds. This does not mean the total methodological impressionism in semantics. Instead, we have a postulate of empirical methods.

The next significant feature of our approach to meaning is the dynamical nature of meaning. Meaning is not, as it was claimed in the structuralist time, evolving from a complex structure. Meaning is not a message transported from a sender to the receiver by a conduit. (Cf. Reddy *The Conduit Metaphor*) A concept, accordingly, is not a container with stable and concrete content. Instead, meaning according to Turner (2002 *Double-scoped stories*) is dynamic and it is built in our minds in the process of inference by projection from one domain to another, from one conceptual space to another. This dynamics stems from the architecture of our brains. Turner writes: “The visual perceptions of colour, texture, movement, form, topological attributes, part-whole structure, and so on

occur in a fragmentary fashion throughout the brain and are not assembled in any one place." (Turner 1996: 110) So, our concepts in our minds seem to be unitary but they are located at different places. In semantics, therefore, we should, according to Turner and Foucounnier, talk about different mental spaces and projection from one space to another.

Turner summarises: "Meaning is not a deposit in a concept-container. It is alive and active, dynamic and distributed, constructed for local purposes of knowing and acting. Meanings are not mental objects bounded in conceptual places but rather complex operations of projection, binding, linking, blending, and integration over multiple spaces. Meaning is parabolic and literary." (2002, *Double-scoped stories*)

One of the most striking characteristics of the cognitive semantics is a claim about unconscious processes involved in those mentioned cognitive phenomena. Most processes are undetectable except on analysis.

2. Blends

The other important tenet of Turner's theory which we use here in order to explain our approach is a claim about blending and the basic human ability which makes human beings human. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner in *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (2002), consider the special human ability to blend different mental spaces. Blending is a basic human mental operation, with constitutive and governing principles and a crucial role in the ascent of our species. The mental operation of blending according to Turner and Fauconnier is a basic part of human nature, and that ability to blend highly incompatible conceptual spaces distinguishes us from other species.

"Blended spaces do cognitive work in the strongest sense. They provide inferences, emotions, and novel actions, and consequently leave their mark upon the real world." (Turner 1996: 74) Blending is fundamental at the most basic level of perception, of understanding, and of memory. (1996: 110*)*

Blends are to find, according to Turner, at different levels of language. A very typical blend from everyday usage is a character of Mickey Mouse or any speaking animal in fables or cartoons, but one of the most interesting examples one can find in newspapers: Turner cites a news story about a race between the catamaran *Great America II* and the clipper *Northern Light*.

„As we went to press, Rich Wilson and Bill Biewenga (the crew of the catamaran) were barely maintaining a 4.5 day lead over the ghost of the clipper *Northern Light*, whose record run from San Francisco to Boston

they're trying to beat. In 1853, the clipper made the passage in 76 days, 8 hours." (Turner 1996: 67).

An impossible space in which we can find a race between two ships distant in time is comparable to a speaking animal and many, many more examples of blending. In *The Way We Think* Fauconnier and Turner claim that a typical blend can be found in a drama's character on a scene. (2002: 266–267) The reader of a novel (and in a novel) is also a blend. (2002, *Double-scoped stories*) The Authors of *The Way We Think* relate to a very well known fact that in the history of theatre: there were incidents of intervention of a spectator in the drama on the real stage. This can lead us to another concept necessary to understand Turner's theory of stories and our approach: a concept of empathy.

3. Personification, Blending and Empathy

Turner's way to the crucial concept of blending led him to his strong interest in personification as a crucial rhetorical figure. Indeed, Turner must have supported the known thesis in the history of rhetoric that personification is not a metaphor. (Ziomek 231)

A particular personification can be described as an image-schema EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. Because of this image-schema we can talk about a specific human ability to make stories about the world. Turner says that narrative imagining, often thought of as extraordinary, literary and optional, is inseparable from our personal experience and our history as a mankind. It is, according to Turner, a specific of the human mind.

In personification one can describe handily a process of projection of some semantic traits from one conceptual space to other conceptual space. And in personification one can easily see a strong connection between a rhetorical figure and empathy as a basic psychological process. We understand empathy as it is understood by Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal, who, on the one hand, discern many phenomena associated with empathy such as *identification, emotional contagion, true empathy, cognitive empathy, perspective taking, theory of mind, sympathy, prosocial behaviours*, and, on the other hand, treat all those phenomena as having a common psychological and neurological basis. In this context, the most important mechanism seems to be identification. We can find a suggestion of this in *The Literary Mind*, where Turner says about the "part–whole" relation:

"Anytime we perceive something that we take to be part of a larger whole (part of a figure, part of an event, part of a small story, part of a melody, and so on), we are blending perceptual experience with the recall

of that whole. Whenever we categorize new information, we are blending the new information and the established category." (1996: 112)

A crucial problem for the phenomenon in question is the relationship between blends and cognitive models or, putting it broadly, the relationship between language and all extra-textual phenomena: other texts, clichés, cognitive schemas, social stereotypes, frames, scripts etc. In other words, we must use paragons in order to identify reality we live in. And we must identify ouselves with paragons. Imitating paragons is based on the process of cultic identification. In ancient times, objects of identification were usually cultic or ritual. (Jauss 1965, cf. also chapter on imitation in *Don Quixot*: Melberg 1992) Imitation and identification make use of human mimetic skills in order to disseminate cultural representations. The result is repetition, which is merely another name for imitation (cf. Melberg 1992). Repetition is not a strict identity. Turner would certainly agree with the view expressed by D. Sperber about communication that can be compared with the process of "becoming infected". The infection process corresponds to anthropology as outlined in Sperber (1996), where culture depends on the epidemic spread of representations. In this spreading process, mimesis, the basic human instinct to imitate, plays a crucial role. Imitation in this case results in blends such as a reader or narrator. A very interesting, from a narrative point of view, passage one can find about the narrator and blends in *The Literary Mind:*

> The more interesting blends, however, are covert, and they are nearly ubiquitous in literature: whenever a narrator moves in and out of a character's mind, shifts point of view from character to character, or provides an inside view of any sort, she is doing something impossible for the space of the story narrated, and she is doing it to a world that is not real inside the space of narration." (1996: 75)

It could be argued that language has the nature of virtual reality: it is a simulator. As actual users of the simulator we have to wear special gloves, overalls, and goggles. This theory of language, using a simulator as a model (we could call it *the simulator theory of language*), can be described using figures as devices making possible a very old phenomenon of imitation. Blending could be, through a concept of empathy, described as a way of imitating the world and creating new worlds.

4. Stories and Empathy

Blends very often form stories about reality. Blends are the place for human creativity. This creativity is motivated by our skill of memorizing and of using our memory. It is the result of the anti-mimetic skills of human beings. Stories we operate on are either present in our direct environment or imaginary. Stories are everywhere in the world, the world speaks to us through stories. Every physical object can communicate to us something of its history. We often have souvenirs, which are regarded as a minimal personification blend: one mental space has a person, another has a physical object that is present and which we have memories or make inferences. A thing communicates even if the physical object does not have the ability to speak. So physical objects and people encapsulate stories.

Another attribute of stories in Turner's theory is that we inhabit stories we actually run. In other words, we are inside a dynamic cognitive model with roles, participants, a plot and goals. So we cannot easily operate on our stories, we are inside stories and the stories make us infer, feel and perceive the world in such and such a manner. In cognitive science, the cognitive work done by a story is called the process of framing.

> If we see one person running and then a second person running, we can view these events as separate, but we can also see them as having a certain relation of intentionality, and chunk them mentally into one framed unit: a *chase*. If one person is engaged in one event and another person is engaged in quite a different event, and they seem to interfere with each other, we can perceive these events as separate, but we might alternatively chunk them into one framed unit of *competition*." (Turner 2002, *Double-scoped stories*)

The crucial skill of human nature is, however, to detach oneself from reality. Turner calls this skill, this possibility of detachment from the present, the plucking forbidden mental fruit. Besides stories of the present, we can have alternative stories through daydreaming, memory and imagining. During this process of detachment from reality with an alternative story we can blend two or even more stories and create a double-scoped story.

In our view, empathy is a model of double-scoped stories. In the classical situation of perspective taking we have two perspectives, one of the present (our perspective) and an imaginary one (the perspective of the other). If we act according to the needs of the other perspective we are running an alternative story and we are not ourselves, we are a blend,

which, paradoxically, can be regarded, according to some ethics, as a true nature. One of our main theses in this book is that empathy is a literary and linguistic mechanism securing basic understanding of language and a literary work of art. Language makes us cope with unfamiliar ways of being and forces us to form a community with others. This can form a solid basis for differentiation in many interpretations of a literary work of art. This differentiation is necessary and unavoidable because our mimetic skills are not perfect. This could be a basis for actual creativity in culture. Turner sees blending as the main mechanism of creativity. And it could be true that it is a crucial mechanism. But without mimetic skills of empathy it could not be possible to have a double scoped story. Empathy is based on mimetic representations that strive to be minimally creative, or not creative at all. On the other hand sublime phenomena and their anti-mimetic elements can be regarded as the most creative representations on earth: they strive to be in opposition to what is already present.

APPENDIX A

Double forms.

1. artful artless
2. blushful blushless
3. brimful brimless
4. changeful changeless
5. careful careless
6. cheerful cheerless
7. colourful colourless
8. designful designless
9. doubtful doubtless
10. dreadful dreadless
11. easeful easeless
12. faithful faithless
13. fearful fearless
14. flavorful flavorless
15. forceful forceless
16. fruitful fruitless
17. gainful gainless
18. graceful graceless
19. guileful guileless
20. harmful harmless
21. heedful heedless
22. helpful helpless
23. hopeful hopeless
24. hurtful hurtless
25. joyful joyless
26. lawful lawless
27. lifeful lifeless
28. manful manless
29. masterful masterless
30. meaningful meaningless
31. merciful merciless
32. mindful mindless
33. mirthful mirthless
34. mistrustful mistrustless
35. needful needless
36. painful painless
37. peaceful peaceless
38. pitiful pitiless
39. powerful powerless
40. prayerful prayerless
41. prideful prideless
42. purposeful purposeless
43. regardful regardless
44. regretful regretless
45. remorseful remorseless
46. reproachful reproachless
47. resourceful resourceless
48. restful restless
49. rightful rightless
50. riskful riskless
51. ruthful ruthless
52. sapful sapless
53. scentful scentless
54. seedful seedless
55. senseful senseless
56. shameful shameless
57. sinful sinless
58. skilless skilful
59. songful songless
60. soulful soulless
61. sportful sportless
62. stormful stormless
63. stressful stressless
64. successful successless
65. tactful tactless
66. tasteful tasteless

67. tearful tearless
68. thankful thankless
69. thoughtful thoughtless
70. toilful toilless
71. topful topless
72. trustful trustless
73. truthful truthless
74. tuneful tuneless
75. useful useless
76. voiceful voiceless
77. worthful worthless
78. zestful zestless

APPENDIX B

Forms whose stems only appear with *-less*.

1. ageless
2. backless
3. baseless
4. beardless
5. bloodless
6. boneless
7. bottomless
8. boundless
9. brainless
10. breathless
11. causeless
12. ceaseless
13. cheerless
14. childless
15. classless
16. countless
17. dateless
18. earless
19. effortless
20. emotionless
21. endless
22. expressionless
23. faceless
24. fadeless
25. fatherless
26. fathomless
27. faultless
28. fearless
29. fingerless
30. finless
31. flavourless (flavorless)
32. flowerless
33. footless
34. formless
35. fortless
36. frictionless
37. friendless
38. godless
39. groundless
40. husbandless
41. jobless
42. keyless
43. lidless
44. limitless
45. loveless
46. luckless
47. mannerless
48. matchless
49. measureless
50. motherless
51. nameless
52. nerveless
53. noiseless
54. numberless
55. odorless
56. parentless
57. partnerless
58. pathless
59. peerless
60. penniless
61. placeless
62. planeless
63. pleasureless
64. pointless
65. poleless
66. portionless
67. pretensionless
68. priceless
69. printless

70. professionless
71. profitless
72. proofless
73. propertyless
74. quenchless
75. questionless
76. rayless
77. reasonless
78. reckless
79. reinless
80. relentless
81. remediless
82. resistless
83. rewardless
84. riderless
85. roofless
86. rootless
87. saintless
88. scentless
89. seamless
90. selfless
91. sexless
92. shapeless
93. shiftless
94. sightless
95. sinless
96. sleepless
97. sleeveless
98. smileless
99. smokeless
100. soilless
101. soulless
102. soundless
103. spaceless
104. speechless
105. spineless
106. spiritless
107. spotless
108. stateless
109. stemless
110. stingless
111. strapless
112. strengthless
113. strifless
114. strikeless
115. stringless
116. stripeless
117. structureless
118. stuffless
119. styleless
120. sunless
121. symptomless
122. systemless
123. tameless
124. tenantless
125. tensionless
126. tentless
127. termless
128. terrorless
129. threadless
130. thriftless
131. tideless
132. timeless
133. tintless
134. tireless
135. toeless
136. tombless
137. toneless
138. tongueless
139. toothless
140. traceless
141. trackless
142. traditionless
143. treeless
144. tubeless
145. valueless
146. valveless
147. verandless
148. veteless
149. viewless
150. virtueless
151. visionless

152. wageless
153. warless
154. waterless
155. waveless
156. wayless
157. weaponless
158. weedless
159. weightless
160. wifeless
161. wireless
162. witless
163. wordless
164. workless
165. worthless
166. woundless

APPENDIX C

Nouns ending in *-ful*.

1. armful
2. bagful
3. basketful
4. bellyful
5. boatful
6. bowlful
7. bushelful
8. canful
9. capful
10. cartful
11. crateful
12. cupful
13. dishful
14. earful
15. eyeful
16. glassful
17. handful
18. hatful
19. hornful
20. houseful
21. jarful
22. jugful
23. kettleful
24. ladleful
25. lapful
26. mouthful
27. nestful
28. netful
29. pailful
30. palmful
31. pipeful
32. plateful
33. pocketful
34. potful
35. purseful
36. roomful
37. sackful
38. shelfful
39. shovelful
40. skinful
41. spoonful
42. tablespoonful
43. teacupful
44. teaspoonful
45. thimbleful
46. tubful
47. tumblerful
48. urnful
49. vatful
50. vesselful
51. wineglassful

APPENDIX D

Adjectives ending only in *-ful*.

1. baleful
2. baneful
3. beautiful
4. blissful
5. boastful
6. bodeful
7. bountiful
8. chanceful
9. cropful
10. dareful
11. deceitful
12. delightful
13. despiteful
14. direful
15. disdainful
16. disgraceful
17. disgustful
18. disregardful
19. disrespectful
20. distasteful
21. distressful
22. distrustful
23. doleful
24. dutiful
25. eventful
26. fanciful
27. fateful
28. feastful
29. fitful
30. forethoughtful
31. forgetful
32. fretful
33. frightful
34. gameful
35. ghastful
36. gleeful
37. grateful
38. hateful
39. healthful
40. interfruitful
41. ireful
42. lustful
43. mistful
44. moanful
45. mournful
46. museful
47. neglectful
48. plaintful
49. playful
50. plentiful
51. praiseful
52. prankful
53. prayerful
54. presageful
55. prideful
56. proudful
57. pushful
58. rageful
59. rebukeful
60. remindful
61. reposeful
62. resentful
63. respectful
64. revengeful
65. rueful
66. scornful
67. slothful
68. sorrowful

69. spiteful
70. spleenful
71. sprightful
72. stenchful
73. tristful
74. unartful
75. unblissful
76. unboastful
77. uncareful
78. uncheerful
79. undutiful
80. uneventful
81. unfaithful
82. unfruitful
83. ungraceful
84. ungrateful
85. unharmful
86. unhealthful
87. unheedful
88. unhelpful
89. unhopeful
90. unhurtful
91. unlawful
92. unmerciful
93. unmindful
94. unmirthful
95. unneedful
96. unpainful
97. unpeaceful
98. unpitiful
99. unregardful
100. unremorseful
101. unrespectful
102. unrestful
103. unrightful
104. unskillful
105. unsuccessful
106. untactful
107. unthankful
108. unthoughtful
109. untruthful
110. unwatchful
111. unyouthful
112. vauntful
113. vengeful
114. wailful
115. wasteful
116. watchful
117. wilful
118. wishful
119. wistful
120. woeful
121. wonderful
122. wrathful
123. wreakful
124. wrongful
125. yearnful
126. youthful

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