The Conceptual Metaphor as an Ethical Kaleidoscope in Field Research

Maria Flis  
Jagiellonian University, Poland

Karol Piotrowski  
Jagiellonian University, Poland

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Abstract: Attention to metaphor as a tool for cognition and action has already been called by the classic work by Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson—Metaphors We Live By (1980). However, some four decades after this publication’s first edition, the role of metaphor as a useful instrument in empirical research seems to have been forgotten. Therefore, the first step taken in the text at hand is to highlight that codes of ethics neither resolve nor befit the dynamically shifting circumstances of research conducted in the field. Ethical codes are often insufficient. Hence, an objective here will be to critically assess the broad application of such codes in general. The second step will be to turn to metaphor as a tool in developing the sociological imagination as understood by C. Wright Mills. The metaphor can also assist in finding oneself when confronted with difficult, ambiguous circumstances that may arise during fieldwork. Metaphor as a tool, as an ethical kaleidoscope coherently links the field research experience precisely with the sociological imagination.

Keywords: Metaphor; Ethical Kaleidoscope; Researcher Identity; Researcher Sensitivity; Ethical Code

Maria Flis is a professor of sociology and Head of the Section of Social Anthropology at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow. Her areas of research interest encompass philosophy, the sociology of culture, social anthropology, the history of ideas, cognitive science, and the cultural mechanisms by which knowledge is developed. Her most significant books (in Polish) include Leszek Kołakowski—A Theoretician of European Culture (Leszek Kołakowski – Teoretyk kultury europejskiej, 1994) and The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown (Antropologia społeczna Radcliffe’a-Browna, 2001). She also edited and contributed to a collaborative volume, The Ethical Dimension of Cultural Identity (Etyczny wymiar tożsamości kulturowej, 2004). Among her other chapters and articles are “Patriotism in Light of Ethics Discourse: Is a Patriotic Education Possible?” (“Patriotyzm w świetle etyki dyskursu: czy możliwe jest patriotyczne wychowanie?”) (in Ethics and Patriotism [Etyka a patriotyzm], 2019); “Kołakowski’s Discourse on Man” (“Kołakowskiego dyskurs o człowieku”) (Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, 2010); “Utopian Thinking: A Discourse on the Culture of Leszek Kołakowski and Zygmunt Bauman” (Orbis Idearum, 2/2019); and “The Identity of Human Nature and the Dominant Identity Strategy in European Culture” (“Tożsamość natury ludzkiej i dominująca w kulturze europejskiej strategia tożsamościowa”) (Kultura i Społeczeństwo, 2/2020).

email address: maria.flis@uj.edu.pl
The objective herein is to endeavor an escape from the impasse presented by the interminable creation of codes of ethics within the social sciences—codes, however, which do not live up to the challenges and dynamics of fieldwork. It is certainly not our claim that such codes are unnecessary and superfluous in the social sciences, but it is vital that an ethical code be supplemented by a tool sufficiently adaptable and tractable to afford quick responses to the unexpected, problematic situations that arise in the course of research. An apparatus of this kind would—for scholars drifting untethered on the open, unfamiliar waters of new fieldwork—instantly provide something of a rescue pontoon.

This tool would also constitute a response to Karl Popper’s call, postulated in his classic *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (2002) released in 1959—scholars should break away from the safe havens of academic hypotheses, confronting instead the novel, perilous challenges of the world of science and learning. Facing up to those challenges could result in a more abundant harvest of knowledge. “Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science” (Popper 2002:32). With this in mind, the rule we propose here in social sciences research is the implementation of metaphors as a kind of ethical kaleidoscope guiding the experience of the anthropologist in the field and their ethical reflection.

An identification of the metaphor with the kaleidoscope is substantiated by the Greek etymology of the latter. Indeed, the very word embodies three lexemes: that is, *kalós* (beautiful), *eîdos* (shape or form), and *skopós* (aim or look at). Metaphor understood literally as a kaleidoscope manifests as a tool that facilitates the perception of beauty in all its shapes and forms—in other words, a tool drawing us closer to the world of ideas embodied in ethical codes. These, in turn, are an expression of cultural values universally appreciated in a society, and thus, by the same token, taken under careful consideration in the course of scholarly research. This is so because of metaphor’s communicative function—making use of conceptual systems that go hand in glove with daily feats of cognition inherent in our activities, thoughts, and deeds. These elements allow us to transcend the limitations of individual experiences consisting of words and images that do not necessarily correspond with one another.

When used in this context, the creative power of language also permits discernment of intrinsic ambiguities in the word “kaleidoscope.” With every rotation and realignment of the pieces inside, this optical tool provides us with a different image and a different view of the same elements. Here, too, the power of metaphor allows us to recognize a diver-
sity of discourses; it aids in hearing a community’s polyphony, especially the voices of subordinated groups or individuals. The kaleidoscope shifts and rearranges the rather ossified frames of reference—including the researcher’s persona—that are used in perceiving the world.

Looking back at the perambulations of social scientists in the field, we come across the metaphor-as-tool among the innovations of sociology. From precursors like Émile Durkheim and on, the metaphor is universally found in the instrument set sociologists use in the research process. Moreover, it has reappeared time and time again as a cornerstone in various, new sociological paradigms, such as engaged (public) sociology or feminist sociology, in which the researcher becomes the voice of the less powerful (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

It is impossible not to notice the power relations generally arising in any research situation between the researcher (e.g., physician, sociologist, or even the quasi-enquiring society as a whole) and the researched (e.g., the patient, interlocutor, or minority groups respectively). We argue, however, that the vector of symbolic power runs from the researched group or individual toward the researcher and not vice versa. This is particularly the case in the course of (quasi-) social research in which participants decide how much of their biography, thinking, or experiences to reveal and how that will be presented—something that swiftly brings Michel Foucault’s power-knowledge concept to mind. Directing the situation is thus the person under study, whereas the researcher must seek out a procedural manual to wisely and carefully negotiate that strange land.

In this case and for our purposes, the conceptual metaphor of the guest is also of assistance. The guest appears a perfect fit within the environs of contemporary social science research in which increasingly more space has been devoted to ethical standards and the psychological comfort of the groups and individuals who are the focus of inquiry. The use of metaphor in the research context renders it possible to adapt the standardized principles included in a sociological code of ethics to a given situation.

The Researcher’s Responsibility vis-à-vis Ethical Codes

As Mirosława Marody (2021:77 [trans. MF and KP]) observes, “Responsibility is, in many ways, a peculiarity as it conjoins seemingly contradictory properties. This is already evident in its lexical definition: according to the Dictionary of the Polish Language [Słownik 2022], responsibility is 1) a moral or legal obligation to be accountable for one’s own or someone else’s actions and 2) taking upon oneself the duty to care for someone or something.” Plainly clear in this definition is that the first meaning refers to responsibility understood in categories of agency appraised by the broader community. Yet the second is decidedly individualistic with positive connotations. According to Marody, the internal fissure contained within the concept of responsibility is a consequence of the historical evolution of the term’s meanings and senses.

Still, in the eyes of Zygmunt Bauman, the development of morality had been effectively blocked in the formation of modernity. One reason for this was a desire to frame a universal, unequivocal, and all-encompassing code of ethics (Bauman 1993). Three decades earlier, Leszek Kołakowski had accomplished this in his Ethics without a Moral Code (1971) released in 1962. Bauman, however, argued that normative tendencies inevitably lead to a blunting of individual sensitivi-
ty and to obscuring the fact that there is an extraordinary complexity intrinsic to moral dilemmas (Flis 1994). Among other things, he pointed out that the driving forces of modernity were reflected in disciplinary practices aimed at shaping obedient and simultaneously captive individuals (Foucault 2006). In Bauman’s opinion, it has been the postmodern condition that has compelled the Western world to undergo an axiological transformation. “The denizens of the postmodern era are, so to speak, forced to stand face-to-face with their moral autonomy, and so also with their moral responsibility” (Bauman 1995:43). Bauman discerned responsibility as a cornerstone of contemporary public life. Postmodernity’s retreat away from moral codes has resulted in a shift toward the emotive sphere. In this context, Richard Rorty (2002) wrote about the ethics of sensitivity, whereas Bauman (1993) indicated a need for the development of the moral self.

Codes, as Kołakowski pointed out, have been created to shift the burden of personal responsibility onto a set of rules and regulations of conduct via the introduction of set behavioral patterns. The implicit assumption upon which the codification of conduct for fieldwork was built was a belief in “the repetitive nature of moral situations and, consequently, in the possibility of the re-applicability of solutions worked out once and for all. Thanks to this, the ethical life of each person is conferred in the primed form of a series of normative schemes” (Flis 1994:63 [trans. MF and KP]). Ethical codes thus infer a cause-and-effect relationship. They point toward the existence of ready-made, remedial means to counter specific effects—the provision of a norm or commandment. The codified world of scholarly research manifests itself as one that is invariable, stable, and fossilized—a world that does not take into account the context in which studies are conducted.

Yet, here, a question arises: Is ethics possible without its code? This issue is articulated by Magdalena Środa (2020:427 [trans. MF and KP]), who writes that this would be ethics “devoid of the illusions of universalism, but with the hopes of crossing cultural and genre boundaries, cosmopolitan, and unlike deontology—emotive.” This scholar underscores that we cannot press for such a solution as yet, as the humanities have not thus far developed an ethics without a core anchored in autotelic cultural values. The essence of such values is general and abstract in nature, and their endorsements lie in “truths revealed” found in religious scriptures. Those scriptures, in turn, function based on listed, internalized sanctions with the intent of navigating a human being’s conscience. Hence, ethics without a code takes the shape of a utopia—and thus a mission, a project for sociological and humanistic thought in the 21st century.

Social sciences research ethics constitute a particular and distinct branch of normative ethics. The task before this category of ethics is to problematize the academic research process in terms of compliance with rules according to which the researcher should proceed. For this, among other reasons, attempts have been made to codify good ethical practices; an outcome in our field in Poland is the Code of Ethics of a Sociologist created and ratified by the Polish Sociological Association in 2012 (Kodeks Etyki Socjologa 2012). Nevertheless, examples of the susceptibilities and frailties in codes of ethics can be found in articles by social anthropologists who, while conducting research, have had to cope with situations generated by “the field.” In his article on the methodological conundrums that anthropologists face today, Jacek Nowak (2010:124 [trans. MF and KP]) calls attention to the fact “that anthropology becomes an implement for the emancipation of
the communities studied. This gives rise not only to tensions of a cognitive and methodological nature but also to the surfacing of new ethical-moral dilemmas.” With reference to James Clifford (1997:189), it could be said that present-day fieldwork is “a mixture of observation, dialogue, apprenticeship, and friendship.” Researchers are increasingly employed by institutions established by ethnic groups who are the very focus of inquiry; naturally, this generates ethically problematic situations. The researcher is subject to pressure, persuasion, or even manipulation on the part of the respondents. Still relevant, too, is the problem of covert participant observation. The applicable norms and standards in this matter remain ambiguous.

Still, other problems are pointed out by Natalia Bloch (2011:210-211 [trans. MF and KP]) in her article on how the factor of power figures in fieldwork situations: “I would like to place particular emphasis on the dynamics of power relations in the field—in other words, to consider who, in all these years, has actually reigned in our mutual relations: they or I?” Delving deeper, she draws attention to the fact that: “the bottom-upness and the personal touch in the acquisition of material, as well as shared experiencing seem to be our greatest asset. They are, however, also a hazard because they call into question the credibility of the knowledge we generate...Therefore, an indispensable element of field research is an anthropological reflection upon the place an anthropologist occupies in a given community” (Bloch 2011:212-213 [trans. MF and KP]).

These examples show that, from an ethical perspective, the research condition has two dimensions. At the outset, concerning cultural universals, there is the rational-universal dimension and the emotional-agentive one (Środa 2020:428). The former solves problematic situations and ethical dilemmas through formal processes. This is an expression of an initiatory act vis-à-vis the ethos of a sociologist whose task—at least on the declarative level—is to be particular about the maintenance of a high standard in any scholarly investigation. The latter, the emotional-agentive dimension, pertains to the actual conduct of the researcher in the field. First of all, this situation verifies the expediency of the code of ethics. Secondly, it lays bare the degree to which principles implied by the code have been internalized by the social scientist; it also reveals their skill and competence in designing a research project on the cornerstones of a rightly shaped conscience. Inasmuch as, on the rational-universal level, codes point to proper and fitting norms, on the emotional-agentive level, codes are incapable of effectively answering the question of what to do in a concrete, specific, dilemmatic situation in the field.

In his text on the fluidity of the pertinent knowledge with regard to fieldwork, Tarzycjusz Buliński (2014:100 [trans. MF and KP]) underlines the fact that

The process paradigm presupposes a long-range epistemology. The researcher is able to come to know the way of life of the Other by confronting it head-on with his own way of life; it is his own experiences that he interprets in an intersubjective text...A metaphor reflecting this paradigm is the image of the anthropologist as a tool. The researcher’s attention is focused on analyzing his own experience in relation to Others.

The process paradigm assumes that knowledge gathered in the field is subjective and comes to be only as a result of the personal encounter and engagement of the social scientist. That knowledge is motile, kinetic, and continuously transmuting. The researcher must be in possession of “thick” and
practical knowledge and experience—and this is facilitated by Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor.

An interest in the cognitive function of metaphor developed based on Anglo-Saxon thinking where-in a belief in the metaphorical nature of language gained in popularity and renown by way of cognitive linguistics. Understood thusly, metaphor becomes a vital instrument serving in the conceptualization of everyday life experiences. Moreover—by coalescing reason and imagination—it ceases to be a mere matter of language—it becomes a matter of thinking and cognition (Krzeszowski 2020:9). This approach stands in contradiction to the usual understanding of metaphor as a stylistic medium or rhetorical embellishment. In their groundbreaking work, *Metaphors We Live By* (published in 1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson evidence the fact that the system of concepts that we customarily use in action is, in essence, metaphorical. Indeed, “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:3). These scholars extensively substantiate their thesis, yet one of its most interesting features—from a sociological perspective—is the coupling of metaphor with experience. Here, experience is embedded in a latticework of concepts and processes that build cognitive frameworks or structures of a cultural nature.

Entering upon these assumptions, Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor is constructive in social sciences research for several reasons. Firstly, it highlights the ubiquitousness of metaphors put to use in day-to-day life, occupying a central place in any and all processes that utilize a linguistic system. A metaphor understood in this way is not only a rhetorical figure but can be considered against the broader backdrop of language usage. Secondly, the structure of metaphors—and especially cognitive metaphors—is characterized by a systematicity, so that projections taking place within its boundaries can be described in strict, formal categories. Thirdly, the mappings and projections found within the metaphorical structure can be described in categories of pattern leading to concretization. Therefore, metaphor is a schematic structure serving as the foundation for the conceptualization of various, idiosyncratic statements. Fourthly, metaphor is typical not only for the process of constructing linguistic utterances but also comprises a constitutive component of any and all human processes—mental processes that prescribe our actions and behavior.

Likewise, metaphor is a tool for conceptual reduction in the identity debate. It facilitates communication within specific conceptual systems. It is a creative tool for language. In terms of the primal and original, physical experience of humankind, conceptual metaphor constitutes a representation of the complex aspects found in the world surrounding us. In this context, metaphor can become the subject of sociological analysis because it concerns the way we understand the world.

We are especially interested in the theory of conceptual metaphor. It stands as the cornerstone for a re-definition of the concept of “metaphor” itself, understood as a reflection of (cultural) knowledge and experience. Metaphors assist in the planning and designing of future activities. Thanks to awareness of which actions are more likely to be coherent and consistent with metaphor, its strength will be augmented. This, in turn, will allow us to reconcile experience: “This is connected with the performative function of metaphor—as a tool that allows the visualization of the (yet) nonexistent. Metaphor creates
reality by shifting the horizons of the imagination” (Burzyński 2012:17 [trans. MF and KP]).

It often happens that a single new metaphor opens up many different, closed systems. Metaphor is something of a pollinating energy. From the perspective taken by Lakoff and Johnson, this is possible because “metaphor” is perceived not as a “metaphorical expression” but as a “metaphorical concept.” In other words, metaphor is not merely a matter of language but a way of comprehending the world. In fact, interest in metaphor as a tool of cognition has enjoyed a long tradition in the social sciences (Lewis 1947; Cassirer 1963). As Lakoff and Johnson have shown, metaphors accompany us in our commonplace acts of cognition—in daily activities, thoughts, and deeds.

The use of metaphor thus becomes a valuable research tool in the establishing and rooting of personal responsibility for one’s conduct. Here, responsibility is understood as “the reasonable anticipation of the effects of one’s actions upon others and taking action only when those effects are good (or at least not harmful) for others” (Sztompka 2021:13 [trans. MF and KP]). Thus, metaphor is a mechanism by which we realize the instrumental value of responsibility and the set of social practices that are formed around that core. Metaphor creates a culture of concern and accountability that stems from caring for the well-being of “Others.”

**Metaphors as a Tool for Consistency in Research Situations**

In the preamble of the Code of Ethics of a Sociologist (Kodeks Etyki Socjologa 2012 [trans. MF and KP]), formulated and ratified by the Polish Sociological Association, we read:

The Code of ethics of a sociologist denotes the ethical issues and principles, as well as problems and conflicts of interest that may arise in professional practice. Making sociologists more sensitive to the ethical dimension of their professional pursuits, the Code will also help them make decisions and resolve concerns in other situations. Any deviation from the principles of the Code should be the effect of a well-conceived decision by a sociologist and not a lack of knowledge.

Scrutinizing this code of ethics, it is noticeable that the principles listed therein are general statements proposing certain standards to be applied in the practice of research. Their axiological core is derived from utilitarian ethics and points toward the happiness of another human being as an autotelic value—that is, a value in and of itself. Therefore, a quest for the truth should be ensoconced in another human being—in Others and their well-being.

This can be justified by the proposal Paul Ricoeur presented in his *Oneself as Another*, in which he proposes that the crux of morality should be responsibility—that is, simply a norm. Ethics, in turn, is the same as a teleological intention directed at others—an intention expressed by the slogan: “aiming at a good life lived with and for others” (Ricoeur 1992:172). Thus, morality manifests itself as a generalized, socially objectified set of individual and autonomous duties that is external with regard to the individual. In this case, whereas ethics constitutes the individual conscience, morality—following Florian Znaniecki’s concept (1973:37)—determines human behavior by and as a member of society (specific duties and responsibilities are assigned to a position, not to a person). Thus, morality constitutes the sphere of an individual’s external, structural determination, while ethics is the field of their inner freedom and the domain of unlimited choice.
Morality is also a realm of both incommensurate scales of values and the construction of identity. According to Ricoeur, responsibility and faithfulness appear to be the building blocks of identity and interpersonal relations—and thus create a chance for understanding.

For our purposes here, we believe that not any less important than familiarizing oneself with the research field is finding the appropriate formula or narrative by which the researcher tells themselves. As Michael Carrithers points out in *Why Humans Have Cultures* (1992), a person makes use of one’s narrative thinking skills to understand oneself and the environs in which one must function. Therefore, reaching back to the very nascence of the research process to skillfully root oneself in the field under study and to accurately discern the hidden aporias inherent in the researcher-subject relationship—all this can serve as a universal postulate underpinning the process of research design. Narrating oneself is thus an act of creation that entails the fashioning of a certain metaphorical figure. It is, by the same token, a finding of oneself, situating oneself in the research field thanks to the conceptual function of metaphor. This entails a response to the question: “Who or what is actually this speaking ‘I’—this voice that lays fingers on solely foreknown footholds in such a way that a story sounds certain and inspires trust?” (Tokarczuk 2020:151 [trans. MF and KP]). The search for the right metaphorical figure is a step toward telling oneself, as well as finding oneself in the field.

Studying culture is akin to dancing flamenco—it requires an iron discipline that is the keystone for improvisation. Without scholarly discipline, researching and learning become garrulousness; without improvisation, they become a reiteration of codified figures. Just as the essence of flamenco is the *duende*—a state difficult to describe or put in words whose prerequisite is a receptiveness to subtle shades of living as a human—so the deepest sense of research into culture is a reconstruction of the hidden mechanisms of its operation. The accomplishment of this requires plunging into as many of its levels as possible and reproducing the relations between them. Dancing flamenco is not merely the mastery of rhythmic beats, and studying human cultures is more than the correct application of rote methods. Of great necessity in both flamenco and cultural studies are bravado and intuition. The end product of the creative undertaking—again, in both flamenco and cultural studies—is difficult to separate from the dancer, from the anthropologist. The masterwork will be marked (for better or worse) by the scope of the “artist’s” imagination.

And what, in fact, does this imagination entail? This question has been answered for social scientists by C. Wright Mills (2000:7), who wrote that the sociological imagination,

> For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world…from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self—and to see the relations between the two.

The essence of the sociological imagination is, therefore, the realization of one’s position in society as a fieldwork researcher and, consequently, a conscious entry into that field. This situation is possible when the researcher sets oneself up as a subject of
reflection, too—entering into an internal dialogue and striving to find a metaphorical figure suitable for the telling of oneself. The process of becoming aware of oneself and one’s agency in the field carries with it a burden of responsibility not only for oneself and one’s behavior but also for the relationships that will take shape between the researcher and the respondent. Inherent in the sociological imagination is a demand for accountability for one’s conduct. The researcher is not absolved of responsibility via reference to preexisting codes of ethics.

Looking further, Anna Horolets describes in an article the ethical and cognitive consequences of situating the researcher in the position of a guest. This can lead to excessive influence and/or control of the respondents over the researcher. Horolets aims to propose a more pragmatic vision of ethnographic research. She draws attention to those structural determinants arising in the researcher-respondent relationship that are not the effect of ethical choices made by individuals and, therefore, cannot be addressed by ethical codes. If hospitality is a certain cultural code, then it can be identified with a conceptual metaphor that could be the basis for the redefining of the concept of metaphor understood as a reflection of cultural knowledge and experience. Horolets signals to the reader that “the fundamental ethical dilemma for the anthropologist is the necessity to combine that which is personal with that which is professional. Cultural differences and status differences magnify the difficulties for the anthropologist-guest in ethically navigating the field” (Horolets 2016:63 [trans. MF and KP]).

Problems of this sort are expunged by the theory of conceptual metaphor that we have adopted herein. Metaphor creates reality by shifting the horizons of the imagination. The new metaphor opens up closed systems of thinking that have been constrained or limited by barriers in cognition and information processing associated with the limitations of memory. It is often the case that when a single new metaphor unlocks several different, closed systems, a kind of nourishing, pollinating energy is released—that is, metaphor acts precisely as an ethical kaleidoscope for social scientists conducting fieldwork. Metaphor assuages a critical feature of ethnographic practice—a structural vulnerability when faced with refusal by respondents in the field. As Horolets notes, “The hospitality of the respondents should be seen more as metaphor rather than the definition of a situation since genuine human relationships of a researcher with respondents do occur, but are not the rule” (Horolets 2016:67 [trans. MF and KP]).

The metaphor of the researcher as a guest turns out to be tremendously accurate in the research situation especially. To speak in the language of Michel Foucault (2006), the relationship initiated between the guest and the host is one of power asymmetry. The researcher, as a guest, is a privileged individual because they have been invited into the world of the respondent, who is the host in this situation. However, the former must demonstrate high sensitivity in interactions so as not to commit a blunder; they must also be careful to avoid a door being closed (literally or figuratively) by the host. The latter, in turn—by the very act of opening the door to a visitor—allows the guest to cross a certain boundary that is (primarily) that of intimacy, that is, opening the world of feelings, emotions, secrets, or memories of the respondent-host. It is at this point that the asymmetry of power begins to change its vector as the guest begins to gain insight into areas of the subject’s memories and cognitive processes that are not accessible to all. The host “gifts” their guest...
a part of the host’s identity. It is only here that material is provided based on which sociological ethics can be shaped (as typified in the processes by which nearly all ethical codes have been formed).

There is a reason why it can be said among sociologists that the best interviews are generally those accompanied by strong emotions (from sadness through anger to laughter, etc.). A high degree of sensitivity and imagination is needed before such moments in which the respondent opens up before the researcher—it is too easy to behave tactlessly or in such a manner as to offend the host. Środa notes (as did Derrida earlier) that the category of hospitality is of a pre-ethical nature. A state of affairs full of emotional tension cannot be restrained or otherwise held back by rigid norms that are part and parcel of ethical codes. Otherwise, a research situation would become reified, the dynamics of the interview would fade, and the interactional vitality would be extinguished. Abstract ideas—such as empathy and sensitivity—find their concrete form in the conceptual metaphor that the figure of the guest becomes—a role quite natural, quite near and dear to all because it is woven into our everyday lives.

**Concluding Remarks**

In light of the considerations and deliberations above, prudent is a return to the issue of ethical codes to reflect upon their role in the designing of research, as well as in the very process of doing research itself. As we have already substantiated, the Code of Ethics of a Sociologist points to certain standards and norms that are values in and of themselves. Those intrinsic values constitute the axiological core of appropriate and correct conduct. It is worth recalling and examining one of the points contained in this Code by the Polish Sociological Association, found under the heading of “Relations with Research Participants”: “8) In relationships with respondents, sociologists should act honestly, in a manner that is impartial, responsible, and trustworthy” (Kodeks Etyki Socjologa 2012 [trans. MF and KP]). This code of ethics stands, therefore, as an ontology of ethical conduct by social scientists. It speaks of the duties and obligations of the researcher in the field, yet it neither speaks of the precise manner in which they should be executed nor does it detail the acts to be performed to meet the standards declared. Its nature is such to constitute a program or rather a framework within which each fieldwork researcher must find a suitable formula or procedure. The anthropologist, sociologist, or other social scientist must learn to negotiate within this *a priori* matrix for the shaping of a culture of research responsibility.

From our perspective and in our opinion, such a universal and pragmatic formula is a metaphor acting as an ethical kaleidoscope, navigating the researcher toward morally correct, professional conduct. Due to its stimulation of the imagination and conscience, metaphor can thus alleviate the moral aporias that come to the researcher’s mind in the course of doing fieldwork. The mechanism of its functioning is based on the appropriate shaping of sensitivity and working with that to “stay on the lookout for marginalized people—people whom we still instinctively think of as ‘they’ rather than ‘us’” (Rorty 1989:196). Therefore, the conceptual metaphor surfaces as a fundamental element in a culture of responsibility, including a social scientist’s responsibility for the physical environment and human culture in which they conduct research and create relationships. Ultimately, metaphor can bridge the boundary between “us” and “them”; it can also contribute to more fac-
ile entry into the field for the researcher, anchoring interpersonal relations in the field in sincerity, trust, and mutual respect. Hence, we can say that codes of ethics constitute, at best, a broad framework within which room is left for the imagination and sensitivity of a sociologist. The social scientist is thus given the opportunity and space in which to design their “I in the field.” The conceptual function of metaphor allows us to answer the questions: “Who am I in the field?” and “How should I proceed?”

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