Denaturalisation of Collective Identities within pro-Euromaidan Discourse (on field of Facebook Representation)

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Abstract:

The spreading violence beyond Euromaidan space in Kyiv have become one of the main issues of Ukrainian society in winter 2013–2014. For Euromaidan supporters their relatively safe space of every-day interaction came under pressure of discourse which divided the whole world into "friends and enemies". The naturalisation of collective identities of Euromaidan supporters and their opponents served the purpose of symbolic struggle and provided the simplified social worldview. The last one is, on the one hand, a useful tool of social mobilisation but, on the other hand, this kind of worldview (simplified, "Black and white") provokes violence. The topic of this article is a denaturalisation as an opposite strategy which creates the complicated worldview. The research issues of this article are the following: does denaturalisation exist within pro-Euromaidan discourse; in what kind of discursive strategies and modes does it appear? Online social networks, Facebook in particular, were chosen as a field of study. The research method is traditional analysis of text. The implication of this research is revealing of internal dynamic of pro-Euromaidan discourse.

Keywords:
denaturalisation, Euromaidan, pro-Euromaidan discourse, symbolic struggle, nominations, online social networks, internal dynamic of pro-Euromaidan discourse.

Introduction

Among many questions of the current situation in Ukraine let me focus on the following one: why did peaceful protest on Euromaidan turn into violence (Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2014; Kulyk, 2014)? This question is mostly answered from either ideological or psychological perspective: some groups or categories of people are recognised as aggressive, warlike or dangerous (in case of Euromaidan these are "berkut"[1] and "Pravyi sector"[2] for instance). Another common explanation appeals to geopolitics or money. According to sociological view, action (and violence as such) is influenced by networks of meanings and is supported by cultural symbols. Therefore I propose to study the processes in Ukrainian symbolic space, i.e. naturalisation and denaturalisation, which influenced the escalation of violence.

Researchers of Euromaidan symbolic space usually define only two competing discourses: pro-Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan. This view corresponds to the binary vision of mass protest movements, which are supposed to have two opposite camps, standpoints and languages. On the contrary the pro-Euromaidan discourse seems to have greater diversity and dynamics, which are reflected in naturalisation and denaturalisation.

Naturalisation is a discursive tool of mass mobilisation via *producing an enemy* with the help of a simplified worldview (Barthes, 1972 (1953); Foucault, 1980). *Berkut, titushky*[3], *Pravyi*

sector, colorady[4], etc. are the examples of naturalised group (and collective identities) nominations. These group nominations usually fall into two binary oppositions, i.e. people–power and Ukrainian–Russian. Naturalisation helps to legitimise violence, to spread it beyond the immediate place of conflict and to destroy the relatively safe space of every-day interaction. Denaturalisation (Batler, 1990) is an opposite process which returns complexity to social world and safe space of every-day interaction. It is important to emphasize that denaturalisation is becoming a part of the pro-Euromaidan discourse, helping to develop and reinforce the correspondent values and ideas.

Naturalisation as communicative strategy claims to be dominant in public representation, in pro-Euromaidan discourse in particular. Denaturalisation can be considered as a kind of resistant against naturalisation. The naturalisation–denaturalisation interaction produces a specific context of symbolic struggle and internal dynamics of the discourse itself. My research helps to explain the mechanisms of exclusion as a discursive and practical strategy of mass protests movement, which is recognised by researchers (Baysha, 2015) as one of the most important causes of its failure.

The blogosphere of Euromaidan is considering in this article as a space of naturalisation and denaturalisation processes, taking OSN (online social networks), Facebook in particular, as a specific field of my research. As a rule OSNs in mass protests movements (Occupy (US), Tahrir (Turkey), Bolotnaya (RF), Euromaidan, etc.) are considered to be the tools of spreading information, mobilising supporters and organising logistics (Barbero, Mezger 2014; Beriro 2014; Cao, Cheong, Li 2014; Onuch 2014; Szostek 2014). The role of

OSNs in discursive dimension is reduced to the circulation of solidarity-building materials and means for sharing interpretation of actions frame, actors, identities (Dickinson, 2014). I propose to study Facebook in the context of internal dynamics within the pro-Euromaidan discourse and as a space of deployment of power relationship in the protests movement.

Conceptual frame of research

The situation in Ukraine in fall 2013 was characterised by rapid growth of social confrontation, aggression and hostility not only in the space of Euromaidan in Kyiv and other cities, but also in online space and social media. These processes have become a challenge for social science, which tried to use concepts of manipulation, informational war, hate speech, xenophobia, etc., for their interpretation. All of these concepts have their traditions and advantages, but they cannot give complete interpretation for the particular process and have essential restriction for using in Ukrainian academic and public context. Concept of manipulation, for example, requires a basic understanding of its potential subjects, "customers" and ability to compare distorted image of reality with its true picture. It is not achievable when the links between group of interests are not transparent, events are accelerated and alternative descriptions of reality are multiplied. These conditions also restrict using of the *informational war* concept. Explanation of violence through the growth of xenophobia requires a reliable data of dynamics and structure of the events participants. We need time to determine the causes of increasing of xenophobia, which also limits the interpretation of current events. The explanatory potential of "hate speech" concept is weak, because the representative mode of language is still common, like "objectivism" in understanding of social reality.

In other words, we need to use the approach which gives ability to interpret rapid changes in peoples' behavior, caused not by dynamics of material condition of their life, but by the shifts in common meanings. Cultural-symbolic space attracted my attention, because not only it mediates meanings and actions, but is also a place of construction of meanings, creation and reinterpretation of symbols, which "lead to" action. Symbolic space is also a place of struggle between different competing modes of interpretation of reality (see. symbolic struggle – Bourdieu, 1989) and distinct discourses. According to poststructuralist methodology, used in this research, changeability of symbolic space is correlated to a struggle for domination within society, and the concept of discursive power (or power of discourse, knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980) is crucial for it.

As we know, functionalists and structuralists in sociology considered power as a secondary element of social life, as a subject–object relation and defined it as an intention, a will, an ability to achieve some results. Poststructuralists criticise objectivistic vision of domination as an analogy of natural forces and subordinates as an obedient machines. According to them, power is a type of social relation of domination, which exercise as influence, control, governance, manipulation, supremacy, etc. Power exists everywhere, in all levels of social interaction – societal, interindividual, intergroup and intragroup. Power exercises in different strategies of establishing of hierarchy including persuasion, coercion, force, assessment, competence, credibility, charisma, etc. This interpretation of power base on M. Foucault concepts of power/knowledge or discursive power (Foucault, 1980). It operates horizontally, regulates interaction through knowledge, norms, rules and standards, which become parts of common sense. Discursive power is productive: it creates social

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1 Disbanded special police unit at the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
2 Political party.
3 Collective term for naming the young people are used secretly for political purposes as a mercenaries for the organisation of actions with the use of physical force.

4 Nomination of people who carry "George" ribbon, another naturalised nomination of anti-Ukrainian people or anti-Maidan supporters.

reality, establishing groups of people and distinction between them by categories of skin color, sex, age, class, caste, place of living, education, etc. Discursive power does not belong to someone, but to everyone who knows. The concept of discursive power gives us an ability to understand how social power operates through social networks, science, education, mass media, advertising, etc., in other words – in symbolic space.

Symbolic space is a specific dimension of social world where all of position in social space (as a set of available resources of money, power, prestige, etc.) are represented by symbols. They serve to exercise social interaction and communication, to express representation and beliefs, which are used by people, their interpretation of reality. The learning of these representation by means of learning symbols is a content of socialisation and inculturation processes. As Bourdieu writes: *Through the distribution of properties, the social world presents itself, objectively, as a symbolic system which is organised according to the logic of difference, of differential distance. Social space tends to function as a symbolic space, a space of lifestyles and status groups characterised by different lifestyles* (Bourdieu, 1989, p.20). The notion of symbolic space helps to describe specific dimension of social world, where all of objective properties exists as symbols, as signs of differences. People's ability to categorise and classify something (for example, *it looks intellectual*, *it looks patriotic*) demonstrates them as socialised in particular society where concrete practices and characteristics are related to concrete symbols. Current configuration of social positions correlate to hierarchy of symbols, and this link seems self-evident for people within the society.

Some symbolic systems (like language) are rather stable, but symbolic space of the society is permanently changing. This change is caused by symbolic struggle as a specific form of social interaction, which aim is to legitimate such vision (or interpretation) of world and establish it as a social order. All of us are engaged in this struggle, for example, as an audience of commercial and political advertisement, which manipulate by well-known symbols and creates its new meaning. Mass-media is another actor and space of symbolic struggle, which implements there through nomination of people, groups, events, situations, etc.

Using naturalised nomination is one of power strategies which is deployed in symbolic space for mobilisation of supporters and followers. Nomination (Bourdieu, 1989) is naming or defining of social objects, phenomena, groups, etc. Each social agent nominates social world around themselves but legitimacy of these nominations is limited by each social position. For example, parents make legitimate nomination of their children, teachers – of their pupils, commander – of their subordinates, etc. The right of legitimate nomination within society at all belongs to the state. Each kind of IDs, certificates or licenses (official nomination), produced by state, not only give person certain rights but also confirm a symbolic power of state. Nominations are not neutral, because they are produced in such social position, operate with binaries based cultural categories and correspond with symbolic interests of dominant groups. One of the main functions of nominations is to reproduce a groups border, symbolic relationships between *us* and *them*, including construction of enemy. The last one is a kind of naturalised nomination.

R. Barthes considered naturalisation as a function of myth as a secondary semiotic system: *Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion* (Barthes, 1972, p. 128). Myth naturalises the concept, transforms history to nature: *Everything happens as if the picture naturally conjured up the concept, as if* *the signifier gave a foundation to the signified: the myth exists from the precise moment when French imperiality achieves the natural state* (Barthes, 1972, p. 129). According to this, naturalisation forces to perceive some meanings as natural ones and to "forget" its socio-historical genesis. Naturalisation is a dominative group's tool for converting their dispositions to common sense for all society. The norms of social recourses division (as many other important social division) are naturalised which helps to reproduce current format of social inequality and hierarchy.

Euromaidan, as a centre of symbolic resistance against state power, has become an alternative subject of legitimate nomination and has produced naturalised nominations of collective identities. Such nomination as *maidan, titushky, colorady, vatniki*[5], *banderas*[6] were emerged for naming the participants of confrontation, designation of the border of groups, communication of this groups and others. Nominations, which emerged at that time, have become an object of researches in linguistic and sociolinguistic (Zhabotinskaya 2014, Trach 2015). These nominations were indicating some groups as aggressive, warlike, dangerous or as enemies to each other. This disposition becomes a sustained meaning of these nomination. As a result of naturalisation, using this nomination in description of such situation predetermines its finalisation (conflict, clash, violence, etc.). Choosing such naturalised nomination for identification or self-identification becomes attribution of some person as motivated to violence against opposite group.

Mass-media (printed, electronic, social, etc.), which use naturalised nominations in their messages, become a space of naturalisation. For example, huge number of people were shocked by the video where fighters of *berkut* humiliate cossack Mykhailo Gavryliuk in January 2014 in Kyiv, *separatists* abused patriot Iryna Dovgan in August 2014 in Donetsk. Messages like this do not allow the identification of executors of tortures, but spread these meanings (readiness to violence) to all people named by this nomination. Therefore the rest of situations with *separatists*, *berkut* and so on with high probability will be interpreted by this generalised definition. Numerous facts of attacked people with ribbon (yellow-blue) or attacking people with ribbon (Georgs'), like, for example, attack on the entrance of *University* metro station in Kharkiv in April 13, 2014.

There are some conditions which foster perception and adoption of naturalised nominations. These are accelerated stream of events, infringement of social order routine (in our case – mass protests on Independence Square in Kyiv), feeling of uncertainty and unpredictability among people, suppressed reflexivity and critical thinking. People who do not have direct contact to the event area (by themselves or their friends, contact, etc.) but are included to information flow, are insecure. They lose their safe everyday space. Indeed, neighbors, colleagues, random passersby, fellow citizens in your town become a potential source of danger. This danger and simplified world, where all of social categories are reduced to *we or them*, *friends or foes*, *our or enemy's*, is ready to fight, not to live and need to be denaturalised.

Project design, research question, data

As we explained earlier, naturalisation is one of the main discursive strategies of massive mobilisation. Some groups or categories of people are represented as enemies, who

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5 Namely, a quilted jackets or padded jackets, naturalised nomination of anti-Ukrainian people or anti-Maidan supporters.
6 Followers of Stepan Bandera, kind of generalised name for pro-Ukrainian supporters.

have tendency to violence "from their nature". Naturalised nominations, which are spreading through mass-media messages, destroy secure space of everyday interaction. Another negative impact of this phenomenon is following: naturalised nominations become a ground for simplified worldview, based on binary oppositions ("white–black", "native–stranger"), which support social polarisation and encourage violence as a method of conflict resolution.

Denaturalisation is an opposite trend, which breaks down simplified worldview of *confronting with brutal enemies* and reinvents socio-historic and sociocultural meanings of naturalised nomination. Denaturalisation accent (among others) on relation between meanings and groups, represented by such nomination, their history and intention, their changeability and contextuality. Previous analysis gives opportunity to presume that denaturalisation will be carried out in dis-identification of *national (ethnic)*, *state (governmental)*, *territorial* and *cultural* as attribution of groups, actions and objects. Denaturalisation also appears in the spontaneous activity of bloggers.

The research question is: *does denaturalisation exist in Euromaidan blogosphere? In what kind of empirical manifestation (strategies and modes) does it appear?*

The object of this research is blogosphere (messages of OSN) of Euromaidan. The subject is a demonstration of denaturalisation as discursive practice in posts about Euromaidan and connected events by pro-Ukrainian bloggers.

This research was conducted during Euromaidan events from November, 2013 to November, 2014. The field of research was narrowed to authors newsfeed in Facebook. The total number of friends is 548; there are no official politicians, professional journalists among them. All authors of analysed posts are pro-Ukrainian oriented, live in Kharkiv and are personally acquainted with the author. This

filters were chosen in order to exclude falsified and non-spontaneous posts.

The unit of analysis is a post, which includes the message of denaturalisation. The research method is the traditional analysis of text. The posts, which include denaturalisation, were detected from the Facebook news feed. The research data consists of 50 posts containing denaturalisation, 29 posts were chosen for final analysis. Total number of posts' authors is 15.

Denaturalisation in blogs

The empirical manifestation of denaturalisation in Pro-Euromaidan blogs (in example of author's news feed) were found during the research. In order to organise data the denaturalising messages were divided in two groups – "strategies" and "modes". First group was formed by posts where denaturalisation appears in empirical manifestation of different kind of call to audience. The posts from second group direct to some concepts of communication and interpretation, thinking process as such. In other words, one group of messages has intention to recreate the space of interaction, another – the space of thinking. The names of groups are conditional because the level of awareness as differentiation criterion between "strategies" and "modes" in researched posts have to be proven by special study.

At the beginning we would like to demonstrate the first group of results first group of results with the interactive strategy:

For a lot of people from Russia it is just very difficult to understand what is happening here. For example, it is difficult to realise and accept Russia's participation in our events (new and increasingly credible evidence are persistently needed). And while many people sincerely want to understand what is happening, they have almost no chance, because neither we nor they have ever seen anything like this, and because

they consider their position to be "objective", "above the events" (Denis Kobzin, 16.10.2014)[7].

In Russia, the supporters of the military operation in the eastern regions of Ukraine are convinced that the troops will play a liberating role, that they are needed for the liberation of the friendly people from the "fascist boot", that all of the protesters are "Bandera", who will roll back to Galychyna at the first sound of approaching Russian tank column. But supporters of the Maidan in central and eastern Ukraine perceive what is going on as a threat of foreign intervention and do not understand who are those "dispatched kazachky"[8] that Moscow is talking about. After all, in fact, they turn out to be these "dispatched kazachky" (Rostyslav Siryk, 18.03.2014).

Denaturalisation appears here in actualising the disposition of the *opposite side* of conflict which is named as *people from Russia* in the first post and more precisely and narrower *supporters of the military operation* in the second one. As seen, the dispositions of the *opposite side* is analysed according to its contextual and situational background, the relation between position and disposition is establishing, and only then the judgments is giving.

Another empirical expression of interactive strategy found is self-criticism:

There is a question that bothers me. … I never liked such a singer as Ani Lorak. … But the question remains. What makes us different from the neighboring country, where they announced a persecution of Makarevich, for example? Why do we have to behave like vatniki ? … Prohibition is a big temptation. And then it will be difficult to refuse. It makes me sad to see that we are turning into savages (Zoya Kazanzhy, 4.08.2014).

Friends. People of Kharkiv. Yesterday morning I was standing in front of the RSA[9] – we're not much better than colorady in our ability to hear the opponent. One woman from their side tried to explain in good faith, … that they also want to be heard, they do not want anything bad for Kharkov, that for many of them (according to her) Kharkiv is Ukraine. In response to that we have started to sing loudly. It is not good. Actually, guys, I think, there are sane people on the other side, who want to be heard (Kateryna Nesmyeliva, 7.04.2014).

The self-criticism strategy does not deconstruct naturalised nomination. Here the attribute of enemy is used for we–group, named by enemy group is humanised, and the emotional neutralisation is achieved.

The *call for dialogue* interactive strategy was also found. Dialogue is defined here in relation with death: as an opposition to death, as a mean to prevent death, and death as a price of the dialogue:

WE URGENTLY NEED DIALOGUE. The forces, that are trying to tear Ukraine into parts, dream that now everybody should take knives and guns and go to massacre the families of berkut and regionals[10]. They want us to become criminals so that they could deal with us as bandits. We are made to use force in cases when we need a conversation with each other (Rostyslav Siryk, 25.01.2014).

There we have it… Everything changes, when people put their lives on stake. We have led the country to the fact, that other stakes are not accepted. Every human life is a terrible price to pay for the mindless bestiality, which made us hostages. Each death must change something in our mind, that will make the return impossible. Therefore, each death should have a name. And no matter from which ‚side' this death is. We all

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7   The citations from blogs are demonstrating with name of authors and date on publishing according to permissions from authors.
8   Spies.

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9   Building of region state administration.
10 Nomination of "Party of Regions" members and supporters, also of supporters of Victor Yanukovych.

pay for one thing: a country which will be good for living (Iryna Red, 2.05.2014).

Another example of interactive strategy which were found is exposing and censuring hate speech:

The victory of the Maidan is a myth invented by contra. The Maidan cannot win by definition. The fight against obscurantism will stop only after it is gone, i.e. never. If you do not want to waste the Maidan, stop using offensive labels – Katsap , Moskal , Sovok[11], Slave. Don't blacken your soul and don't pollute the space, otherwise all this mud will eventually pour on you. Do not gloat. Just because it's petty and ugly. Besides we have not won yet. The struggle continues. Think who your future mayor will be. Arrange public hearings. Suppress provocations. If you want democracy, learn to do democracy instead of hostility (Rostyslav Siryk, 4.03.2014).

Media falsehood is also becoming an object of exposing. It is the kind of denaturalising strategy where the mediator between audience and reality is problematised:

I found a certain channel "Planet" on my TV-set in the kitchen. While they were waxing eloquent about contact of modern civilisations with aliens … I just laughed. Recently, however, they have started broadcasting about Slavic world unity, the disparity between corrupt, selfish Western attitudes and "communal character of the Slavs". Also, I remember a programme in which they explained that the Romans taught culture to Europe, but it was the Etruscans who had taught the Romans. And Etruscans were an ancient Slavic civilisation (i.e. Russian) (Denys Kobzin, 21.10.2014).

Calls to action, to take part in meeting, to visit Euromaidan were named participatory strategy of denaturalisation. In posts like placed below authors emphasise the importance of personal experience, own practice of participation and observation of the events for

ability to talk about it and to make difference between truth and false:

DEAR RUSSIANS! Those who understand that Ukraine is a normal and adequate country! Those who are against the war between Russia and Ukraine! Today in Moscow more than 200 people who came out to support peace, rather than war between Russia and Ukraine have been arrested! Do you want to avoid being arrested? The answer is simple. Come to Kiev, to the Maidan, join us and tell the whole truth about Putin's regime and that YOU ARE AGAINST THE WAR WITH UKRAINE!!! Here YOU WILL NOT BE ARRESTED! Here the whole world will be able to hear you! Don't be afraid! WE ARE FRATERNAL PEOPLES AND TOGETHER WE CAN WIN! We are ready to welcome you and all will be happy to meet you! Come and you will see that here you will not be hurt!!! Come to Crimea and tell everybody there that you, Russians, are against the war (Rostyslav Siryk, 2.03.2014).

Another group of posts represent de-naturalisation mode which includes two phenomena: dis-identification and reflection. Dis-identification is breaking relationships of identity of some symbols. There are a lot of identifications in everyday and media discourse which used to simplify a message. For example, name of head of state is using to name a national state, state institutions and their activities, etc. Name of country as polysemantic symbol is using to denote territory, national state and institutions, population, culture, people, etc. These semantic links help to transmit some kind relationships, for example hostility, from political leaders to state, to people, to country, to national culture, etc. These kind of meanings transmission becomes a content of political, national or geopolitical mythologies which functions as a mean of mobilisation[12]. Such kind of

"loaded" symbols were explained above as naturalised.

The dis-identifications of "national one" and "state one" were found in blogs:

I talked to my mom yesterday. She was against the Euromaidan for all this time. She repeated foolish things about banderas. But yesterday she asked … me: "We don't have to be in war against Russia! I don't want destructions. I don't want the war". Then the text about national belonging was coming: "Your father is Russian, I am Ukrainian, are we against each other?" But I have learned to differ state pretension from the national ones. And I told her that we were talking about … territorial unity of our magnificent state and I don't have any objections against people of any nationalities (Anna Sharygina, 3.03.14).

There were also posts with dis-identification the head of state and national culture:

Keep calm, citizens, quietly. Why the hell should I stop loving Pushkin and consider the Russian language as "a language of the enemy State" because of … [Putin]? Pushkin is my poet, and Russian language is my language, they don't belong to this scum (Vladimir Osetinsky, 4.06.2014).

Another kind of posts is dis-identification of the state and the population of the country:

Friends from Russia write: "Hello Rost. It seems like our mad president is starting a war with your country. Forgive us, we didn't elect him and don't support him, don't wish evil to your country. Don't think bad about Russian citizens. Thanks" (Rostyslav Siryk,1.03.2014).

Revolution, excuse me for being a bit theatrical, is a time of hope and love, war is a time of hate. … On February 21, on the largest pro-Maidan demonstration over the three previous months in Kharkiv, one of our slogans was "Russia is not Putin!" (Then we went to the Russian consulate to express our solidarity with the prisoners of Bolotnaya). I remember well a similar slogan in winter Maidan in Kiev … . Among other things, we got to know that some

of those who came out to Bolotnaya then, later went to fight against the Donbass "Ukrainian fascists" or get delighted at the capture of the Crimea. And I still hope very much that someday we will be able to repeat this slogan (Vladimir Osetinsky, 19.07.2014).

Denaturalisation at the level of regional symbols actualises dis-identification of city, city population and administration:

Our city seems like a hostage to me … taken by a gang which will not go away. Huge masses of people want to go out and demonstrate their loyalty to Ukraine …. Our main power is that we are numerous. But it is disarm by the inability of any of the forces to take responsibility for organising a massive demonstration. Any organisation that would do it will be automatically held responsible for the security of people who would come there. … However, the bandits in our city are not marginalise hiding somewhere in the dark streets, they have acquired legitimacy through elections. Kharkiv citizens have chosen the criminal power by themselves. And now this criminals dominate over the law enforcement and collude with the criminal regime …, keeping our beloved city as a hostage. They frighten us with titushky, the authorities inform as about acts of terrorism that could plunge the city into chaos (Irina Red, 18.04.2014).

Some posts found can be named as dis-identification a nation as such:

I am sure that hundreds of people in Moscow brought flowers to the Embassy of the Netherlands. I know there are many people in Russia who do not support anti-Ukrainian politics, and I know how hard it is for these dissenters to live under these false and terrible sign "99.99% support". Among them there are those who just do not believe in aggression of Russia against Ukraine. I understand why they cannot believe. It's really scary. And right now, when the war corrupts people's minds, it is important to remember, that there are no "evil nations", that scum and heroes exist in any nation, and there

are dictators and cowardly dictators (Rostyslav Siryk, 19.07.2014).

Another mode of denaturalisation which was found in blogs is a reflection. It creates such space for thinking where using naturalised nomination is become inadequate or impossible. Reflection as "coming back", self-analysis, checking own dispositions and thinking methods, critical rethinking of common generalisations help to form sensitivity to distinguish naturalised symbols, to realise functionality and limitation of semantic simplifications. For example, reflection can be directed to reconstruction of processual dimension of reality:

It seems that firstly, I realised myself as Ukrainian (not by blood, of course, by civic identity) in autumn of 2004. Not because I began to feel some special sentiments about Ukrainian history and culture … . But because I felt great respect and admiration for people who can defend their freedom and human dignity in such a way. And it was incredibly cool to feel that I am a part of this nation. … On March 9 this year, during the demonstration in Kharkov that gathered more than ten thousands of people, I, who consider myself as liberal and cosmopolite, was losing my head with joy walking along Sumskaya[13] and waving the national flag of Ukraine. This is what I call evolution, malyata[14] (Vladimir Osetinsky, 26.04.2014).

Another examples of reflection mode including some abstract concepts to interpretation of an event. Citation below includes meditation around concept of civil liberties:

A few days ago a lot of people discussed the video of the picket in front of the entrance of the Kharkov Malyshev factory[15]. … In the immediate rear of the fighting army, in front of entrance

of the plant, which produces military hardware, a dozen picketers yelled hysterically about the "junta" and "fascists" and urged the workers to spoil tanks. The picket was guarded by the police … . People, who discussed this video, wrote about criminality of city authorities, which allow this kind of action. And … I'm just thinking, isn't it the democracy? I mean … that different political forces have possibility to speak freely (during the war!). Maybe this is a civil liberty as such? We were growing up in sovok[16], where it was impossible to imagine such things, and it is terribly difficult for us even to think about it (Vladimir Osetinsky, 25.06.2014).

Metaphoric thinking also can function as denaturalisation mode. There is compare of war and illness:

When you take care of a close person who is seriously ill, it becomes clear, that wars and diseases are twins in terms of their outcomes. If it is your destiny, you will get over it, if not you'll face the completion of the way. The main point is to start the treatment. The same goes for Ukraine. The truthful diagnosis is that our country is morally sick. We can't have been healthy to be ready to ruin it for decades, and our citizens begin to hate one another (Alla Konyaeva, 5.08.2014).

The interesting version of denaturalisation mode is self-reflection:

The whole day today I was corresponding with one person, who I don't know personally, we are not even FB friends. But he has read my comment about disagreement with the march of the UPA in Kharkov, and now we're engaged in a daylong disputes on historical, sociological and all other possible issues. It seems like I am vatnik :)) It's very funny, but most of all, it's true :))) And in Odnoklassniki[17] I have been having a conversation with a friend for six months about the ‚neo-Nazi threat'. And there I turn out to be

"svidomaya"[18] in the bad meaning of this word …. :))) In general, "How terrible life is" (c) :))) (Masha Bakhtigozina, 16.10.2014).

Conclusion

As seen, there is denaturalisation in pro-Euromaidan bloggers posts. Among denaturalisation strategies were found interactive, critique of media, participatory, among denaturalisation modes – dis-identification and reflection. Collective identities which were emerged in Euromaidan space and categories of national, ethnic, and state, country, nation, and its culture, city authorities and population, etc. were denaturalised in some messages.

Dis-identification also can be considered as a competition of some myths about power and nation. Myth of national as ethnic competes with myth of national as states one. Another couple of competing myths is power position and person who occupy it. Competition actualises the question does he or she personalise the state and people will either this person only represents its?

The results of research demonstrate that OSN functioned not only a mobilisation and informational tools for mass protests. It also becomes a space for resistance of hostility rhetoric. Spontaneous bloggers' activity, as seen, confronts a destruction of safe social interaction space. An image of enemy is destroying through reflection of inhomogeneity within *enemies* group, self-reflection and dialog. In other hand the research data allow to identify internal dynamics of pro-Euromaidan discourse which determined by the processes of naturalisation and denaturalisation. OSN becomes a conducive space for denaturalisation because unlike traditional media the subject of speech perceives themselves here as addressee of mythological (naturalised) massage.

As research data allow to generalise, the naturalisation precedes denaturalisation. But these processes are correlating with different social interests and therefore are differing in their social force. That is why a waves of naturalisation and denaturalisation can cover or overlap each other. The one o specific conditions which inhibit or even deny denaturalisation is war. When the use of force becomes permanent and positions of enemies objectifies by hostilities, the seizure of territory, destruction and victims naturalising war discourse monopolises public space.

Also need to emphasise that naturalisation and denaturalisation characterise symbolic aspect and discursive practises of consolidation processes within society, including violent, and that is determined further researches. ◉

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13 A central street in Kharkov.
14 Malyata (Ukrainian word) – addressing to small children, often used ironically to adults.
15 Tank factory in Kharkiv.

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16 In Eng. – scoop. Offensive name for a Soviet man.
17 Russian online social network (like Nasza Klasa in Poland).

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18 Svidomaya (Ukrainian word) – conscientious person, in some context – Ukrainian patriot.

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Denaturalizacja tożsamości zbiorowych w ramach promajdanowego dyskursu (na przykładzie społecznych reprezentacji obecnych na Facebooku)

Streszczenie:

Przemoc rozprzestrzeniająca się poza kijowski Majdan Niezależności stała się głównym problemem dotykającym ukraińskie społeczeństwo zimą na przełomie 2013 i 2014 roku. Dla zwolenników wydarzeń rozgrywających się wówczas na Majdanie, ich względnie bezpieczna przestrzeń codziennych interakcji znalazła się pod presją dyskursu, który dzielił świat na „przyjaciół i wrogów". Naturalizacja tożsamości zbiorowych, zarówno zwolenników Euromajdanu, jak też i ich przeciwników, była przejawem przemocy symbolicznej i dostarczała nieskomplikowanej wizji świata. Z jednej strony bowiem, ten uproszczony ogląd rzeczywistości stał się użytecznym narzędziem do mobilizacji społecznej. Z drugiej jednak, podtrzymując czarno-białą wizję świata, prowokował do przemocy. Przedmiotem refleksji autorki stała się zatem denaturalizacja, rozumiana jako strategia pozostająca w kontradykcji do tych procesów, umożliwiająca bardziej skomplikowany ogląd rzeczywistości. Punktem wyjścia dla tych rozważań okazały się dwa następujące pytania: „czy denaturalizacja istnieje w ramach dyskursu typowego dla Euromajdanu?", „za pomocą jakich strategii dyskursywnych się przejawia?". Badaniem objęte zostały sieci społecznościowe, zwłaszcza zaś Facebook. Sama analiza przyjęła zaś postać tradycyjnej analizy tekstu. Na skutek zastosowania odpowiedniej procedury badawczej autorce udało się zrekonstruować wewnętrzną dynamikę rządzącą dyskursem Euromajdanu.