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dc.contributor.authorOstapiuk, Aleksander
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-05T07:39:17Z
dc.date.available2019-08-05T07:39:17Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1899-2226
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/29884
dc.description.abstractThe goal of the article is to criticise neoclassical economics from the behavioural economics perspective on the example of Poland’s reform of the retirement system (the possibility of earlier retirement). The creators of the reform assume that people are rational and will choose the best option and save enough for retirement. Thanks to conclusions from psychology we know that people cannot discount utility in time, but they behave in accordance with hyperbolic discounting. This situation leads to the conflict between preferences in time. To resolve this conflict, the concept of multiple selves is presented. Different preferences in time are not the problem for neoclassical economics, which assumes that people choose what is best for them (revealed preferences). The criticism of this assumption is presented along with the limitations of perceiving rationality in the instrumental sense. Thanks to axiomatic assumptions, neoclassical economists could dismiss conclusions from behavioural economics which concerns human irrationality. It proves that people do not always make the best choices, which is observable on the example of people who take early retirement. The concept of libertarian paternalism is presented as a way of helping people to make the “right” choices. The possibility of early retirement is presented as the default option. The author comes to the conclusion that this state is a flawed choice architecture because, despite its negative consequences, many people will choose early retirement.en_GB
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAnnales. Ethics in Economic Life; 1
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.pl_PL
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0pl_PL
dc.subjectretirement systemen_GB
dc.subjectbehavioural economicsen_GB
dc.subjectlibertarian paternalismen_GB
dc.subjectmultiple selvesen_GB
dc.subjectchoice over timeen_GB
dc.titleEkonomia neoklasyczna versus ekonomia behawioralna. Libertariański paternalizm a reforma emerytalnapl_PL
dc.title.alternativeNeoclassical economics versus behavioural economics. Libertarian paternalism and the retirement systemen_GB
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number7-30
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationWroclaw University of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Department of Ecological Economics
dc.identifier.eissn2353-4869
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dc.contributor.authorEmailaleksander.ostapiuk@gmail.com
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/1899-2226.22.1.01
dc.relation.volume22pl_PL
dc.subject.jelD63pl_PL
dc.subject.jelD64pl_PL
dc.subject.jelD91pl_PL


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