How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem

Misiuna, Krystyna

dc.contributor.author	Misiuna, Krystyna
dc.contributor.editor	Kaczmarek, Janusz
dc.contributor.editor	Kleszcz, Ryszard
dc.date.accessioned	2017-09-01T09:01:42Z
dc.date.available	2017-09-01T09:01:42Z
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.identifier.citation	Misiuna K., How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem, [w:] Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, s. [59]-79, doi: 10.18778/8088-538-7.07	pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn	978-83-8088-538-7
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11089/22478
dc.description.abstract	Our contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional empirical knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth.	pl_PL
dc.language.iso	en	pl_PL
dc.publisher	Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego	pl_PL
dc.relation.ispartof	Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016;
dc.rights	Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/	*
dc.subject	evidence	pl_PL
dc.subject	truth	pl_PL
dc.subject	knowledge	pl_PL
dc.subject	fallibilism	pl_PL
dc.subject	infallibilism	pl_PL
dc.subject	Gettier Problem	pl_PL
dc.title	How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem	pl_PL
dc.type	Book chapter	pl_PL
dc.rights.holder	© Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016	pl_PL
dc.page.number	[59]-79	pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation	University of Warsaw, Department of Logic	pl_PL
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-83-8088-539-4
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dc.contributor.authorEmail	krystyna.simons@uw.edu.pl	pl_PL
dc.identifier.doi	10.18778/8088-538-7.07