dc.contributor.author | Misiuna, Krystyna | |
dc.contributor.editor | Kaczmarek, Janusz | |
dc.contributor.editor | Kleszcz, Ryszard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-01T09:01:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-01T09:01:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Misiuna K., How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem, [w:] Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, s. [59]-79, doi: 10.18778/8088-538-7.07 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-83-8088-538-7 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/22478 | |
dc.description.abstract | Our contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional empirical knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.relation.ispartof | Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016; | |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.subject | evidence | pl_PL |
dc.subject | truth | pl_PL |
dc.subject | knowledge | pl_PL |
dc.subject | fallibilism | pl_PL |
dc.subject | infallibilism | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Gettier Problem | pl_PL |
dc.title | How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem | pl_PL |
dc.type | Book chapter | pl_PL |
dc.rights.holder | © Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016 | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | [59]-79 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | University of Warsaw, Department of Logic | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.eisbn | 978-83-8088-539-4 | |
dc.references | ARMSTRONG, D. M. [2004], Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | BACON, J. [1995], Universals and Property Instances. The Alphabet of Being. Aristotelian Society Series 15. Oxford: Blackwell. | pl_PL |
dc.references | BERGMAN, M. [2004], “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, 709–727. | pl_PL |
dc.references | CAMERON, R. P. [2008], “Truthmakers and Necessary Connections”, Synthese 161, 27–45. | pl_PL |
dc.references | CAMPBELL, K. [1990], Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell. | pl_PL |
dc.references | DAVIDSON, D. [1967], “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, [in:] Rescher, N. (ed.) The Logic of Decision and Action. Reprinted in Davidson 2001. | pl_PL |
dc.references | DAVIDSON, D. [1983], “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in his The Essential Davidson. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2006. | pl_PL |
dc.references | DAVIDSON, D. [2001], Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2nd edn. | pl_PL |
dc.references | DRETSKE, F. [1971], “Conclusive Reasons”, Australiasian Journal of Philosophy 49, 1–22. | pl_PL |
dc.references | FENNELL, D., CARTWRIGHT, N. [2010], “Does Roush Show that Evidence Should Be Probable?”, Synthese 175, 289–310. | pl_PL |
dc.references | FLORIDI, L. [2004], “On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem”, Synthese, 142, 61–79. | pl_PL |
dc.references | FORREST, P., KHLENTZOS D. (eds) [2000], “Truth Maker and Its Variants”, Special Issue of Logique et Analyse 43, No. 169–170. | pl_PL |
dc.references | GETTIER, E. L. [1963], “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis 23: 121–123. | pl_PL |
dc.references | GOLDMAN, A. [1967], “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy 64, 357–372. | pl_PL |
dc.references | HEIL, J. [2003]. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Clarendon Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | HETHERINGTON, S. [2012], “The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier Partialism and Infallibilism”, Synthese 188, 217–230. | pl_PL |
dc.references | KIRKHAM, R. [1984], “Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 93, 501–513. | pl_PL |
dc.references | KLEIN, P. [2002], „Skepticism”, [in:] Moser, P. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Chapter 11. | pl_PL |
dc.references | LEHRER, K., PAXSON, T. [1969], “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief”, The Journal of Philosophy 66, 1–22. | pl_PL |
dc.references | MAURIN, A.-S. [2002], If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer. | pl_PL |
dc.references | MAURIN, A.-S. [2010], “Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress”, Synthese 175, 311–326. | pl_PL |
dc.references | MCDANIEL, K. [2001], “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Philosophical Studies 104, 269–290. | pl_PL |
dc.references | MOSER, P. (ed.) [2002], The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | MULLIGAN, K., SIMONS, P., SMITH, B. [1984], “Truth –Makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 287–321. | pl_PL |
dc.references | NOZICK, R. [1981], Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | ROUSH, S. [2005], Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SCHELLENBERG, S. [2011], “Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, 1–40. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SCHREIBER, D. S. G. [1987], “The Illegitimacy of Gettier Examples”, Metaphilosophy 18, 49–54. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SELLARS, W. [1956], “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, [in:] Feigl, H. and Scriven, M. (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 253–329. Reprinted [in:] Sellars, W. [1963],Science, Perception and Reality,London: Routledge & Kegan Ltd. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SIMONS, P. [1994], “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 553–575. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SIMONS, P. [2000], “Identity through Time and Trope Bundles”, Topoi 19, 147–155. | pl_PL |
dc.references | SIMONS, P. [2003], “Absolute Truth in a Changing World”, [in:] Hintikka, J. et al. (eds), Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. | pl_PL |
dc.references | STANLEY, J., WILLIAMSON, T. [2001], “Knowing – How”. The Journal of Philosophy 98, 411–444. | pl_PL |
dc.references | STEUP, M. [2001a], „The Analysis of Knowledge”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/. | pl_PL |
dc.references | STEUP, M. [2001b], „Foundationalism, Sense-Experiential Content, and Sellar’s Dilemma”, Manuscript: http://web.stcloudstate.edu/msteup/SellDilem.html. | pl_PL |
dc.references | TRETTIN, K. [2001], „Ontologische Abhängigkeit in der Tropentheorie“, Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 2, 23–54. | pl_PL |
dc.references | WILLIAMSON, T. [2000], Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. | pl_PL |
dc.references | ZAGZEBSKI, L. T. [1994], “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”, Philosophical Quarterly 44, 65–73. | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorEmail | krystyna.simons@uw.edu.pl | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/8088-538-7.07 | |